May 11, 2012

ASSAULT ON BATTERED IMMIGRANTS: HR 4970 UNDOES VAWA PROTECTIONS AND RISKS LIVES

By Myriam Jaidi

“This will get people killed,” my colleague and I agreed while we reviewed the “Immigration Provisions” of HR 4970, the bill introduced in the House in April, ostensibly to “reauthorize” the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) originally promulgated in 1994 and reauthorized and strengthened since its original passing.  The Immigration Provisions found in Title VIII of HR 4970, however, will effectively dismantle VAWA as we know it in the immigration context, place people in danger, set up a system that will likely violate the United States’ treaty obligations, and reverse decades of progress in the nation’s understanding of domestic violence and the pernicious ways in which an abuser can exercise power and control in domestic relationships.  Overall, HR 4970 undermines the central goals of VAWA: protecting victims of domestic violence and other crimes and assisting law enforcement with the protection of victims, and the investigation and prosecution of crimes.  If passed, it would also pull VAWA relief out of the paradigm governing all other forms of humanitarian relief in the immigration context. 
The risks run high and tempers hot in the context of domestic violence or other types of abusive relationships – such as trafficker to trafficking victim, criminal to crime victim.  Men and women come to us for help in our capacity as immigration lawyers – it is important to recognize that although the law is called the Violence Against Women Act, it helps all victims regardless of whether they are male or female, and we have seen many cases of men being abused either in marital relationships or other contexts.  Clients who come to us have been traumatized and are deeply fearful of further abuse and retaliation from their abuser for their daring to seek help and to escape the abuser.  They fear that the fact of submitting an application will lead to discovery and place them in grave danger.  And they are fearful of law enforcement and concerned that instead of being protected for coming forward, they will be removed from the United States, perhaps sent back to a place where abusers or their family members will have free reign to harm them.
Congress recognized a long time ago that immigrants are a particularly vulnerable group when it comes to relationship dynamics because they are at a disadvantage – their ability to obtain a green card requires sponsorship. Thus, the person seeking status is, until the end of the process, until the green card has been delivered, subject to the will of the sponsoring United States citizen (USC) or lawful permanent resident (LPR). Congress created the self-petitioning process “so that the battered alien can seek status independent of the abuser.” Paul Virtue, Acting Executive Associate Administrator, Non-Disclosure and Other Prohibitions Relating to Battered Aliens: IIRIRA § 384 (May 5, 1997).
Given the draconian provisions of the bill, discussed below, the drafters of HR 4970 appear to be operating on the unfounded assumption that fraud is rampant in the VAWA self-petition context. This has not been our collective experience at CDMA nor have we heard anecdotally that fraudulent self-petitions have been routinely approved. To the contrary, our experience shows that the VAWA Unit at the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Vermont Service Center (VSC) is extremely well trained and carefully adjudicates VAWA self-petitions, issuing requests for evidence and/or notices of intent to deny in cases where an applicant has not provided sufficient proof of eligibility and denying cases where applicants ultimately are unable to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they are eligible for deferred action under the law.
HR 4970 changes all aspects of a VAWA self petition, taking this form of affirmative relief out of the paradigm governing other forms of affirmative, humanitarian-based forms of relief, and converting the process into a trial of the VAWA self-petitioner. Title VIII of HR 4970 jettisons the long-standing standard of proof in VAWA self-petitions. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not provide for a standard of proof for VAWA self-petitions, therefore pursuant to Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369 (AAO 2010) a VAWA self-petitioner “must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.” In assessing whether an applicant has met this burden, INA § 204(a)(1)(J) provides that in adjudicating a self-petition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “shall consider any credible evidence relevant to the petition” and DHS has discretion to determine what evidence is credible and how much weight to give the evidence. Moreover, the rules governing the process provide that a petition may not be denied solely on the basis of information provided by the abuser or a member of the abuser’s family living in the same household as the victim. See 8 USC § 1367(a). Any derogatory information must be independently corroborated. Also, violations of the confidentiality provisions can result in disciplinary action or civil penalties up to $5,000. See 8 USC § 1367(c).
Congress set the standard of proof as it did, precluded dependence on information provided by the abuser, and created strict confidentiality standards based on the established need to protect applicants from being located by an abuser or subjected to retaliation and further abuse. People do in fact get hurt and even killed in these situations. Because of that fact, the protections for applicants under VAWA, especially the confidentiality protections as promulgated in 1996, have been crucial to the central goals of VAWA and therefore strengthened with each subsequent reauthorization of VAWA to date (2005 and 2011).
HR 4970 would impose a “clear and convincing” evidence standard and dismantle the confidentiality provisions, replacing them with a perverse situation in which power over the application submitted by a battered spouse is effectively handed back to the abuser. The clear and convincing evidence standard is a very high standard, far above the default preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to most immigration petitions, whether business or family based. Even individuals in removal proceedings attempting to show that a mandatory ground of denial of an application for relief do not apply to them, carry only the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the grounds do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). Thus a battered spouse faces a higher standard of proof in an affirmative application process under HR 4970 than an individual in removal proceedings attempting to overcome evidence that he has committed a particularly serious crime or presents a danger to the security of the United States!
Moreover, the protections of applicants for asylum are not granted to VAWA self-petitioners under HR 4970. HR 4970 provides that upon filing, a VAWA case will be transferred to a local service center for adjudication and that an officer “shall conduct an in-person interview of the alien who filed the petition” and “may also gather other evidence and interview other witnesses, including the accused United States citizen or lawful permanent resident, if they consent to be interviewed.”
The government and the advocacy community have learned over decades how important confidentiality is to victim safety. As recognized by the White House in a recent blog, “the risks of serious injury and homicide increase when a victim is taking steps to leave an abusive relationship,” a central basis for the confidentiality provisions of VAWA. Confidentiality is a long-standing, crucial component of humanitarian forms of relief. For example, in the asylum context, confidentiality is paramount and it is unthinkable to ask the abuser for input on the persecution of the asylum applicant. Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) section 208.6 provides that
Information contained in or pertaining to any asylum application, records pertaining to any credible fear determination conducted pursuant to § 208.30, and records pertaining to any reasonable fear determination conducted pursuant to § 208.31, shall not be disclosed without the written consent of the applicant, except as permitted by this section or at the discretion of the Attorney General.
In the asylum context, confidentiality is considered breached when information contained in an asylum application is disclosed to a third party such that the third party can “link the identity of the applicant to: (1) the fact that the applicant has applied for asylum; (2) specific facts or allegations pertaining to the individual asylum claim contained in an asylum application; or (3) facts or allegations that are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the applicant has applied for asylum.” Joseph E. Langlois, Director, Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations, USCIS Interoffice Memorandum, Fact Sheet on Confidentiality (June 15, 2005). That is a significant protective regime founded on a compelling logic: “Public disclosure of asylum-related information may subject the claimant to retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors in the event that the claimant is repatriated, or endanger the security of the claimant’s family members who may still be residing in the country of origin.” Id. 
The rationale behind the VAWA confidentiality provisions are similarly rooted and make sense in the context of the significant risks faced by battered individuals and the purpose of VAWA: to allow battered immigrants “to leave their batterers without fearing deportation.” Violence Against Women Act of 1993: Summary and Purpose, H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993). Congress developed the existing confidentiality measures to protect victims of domestic violence from being tracked down by their abusers for retaliation and continued abuse. These provisions are crucial to breaking the cycle of power and control that is the crux of domestic violence, and essential to bringing immigrant victims out of the shadows. Experience bears out the fact that whether or not the petitioning individual lives with his or her abuser the possibility that the abuser will be contacted about the application puts the individual in danger. Clearly, HR 4970 makes a mockery of the important protections and undermines them by providing that “all credible evidence submitted by an accused [USC or LPR] . . . shall be considered.” HR 4970 strongly implies that the abuser has to be given notice of the application, as the only way an investigation may be done is if the abuser is contacted and asked to participate. This should simply not be allowed. People will be killed as a result of a measure like this.  
The bill’s use of the term “the accused” in reference to the abuser is completely inappropriate and highlights the fact that the bill shifts the inquiry from a victim-centered assessment of eligibility to a trial of the victim, shockingly taking a defensive stance in favor of the abuser, with the presumption being that the applicant is lying. Other fora already exist in which “the accused” can have his or her day in court such as divorce court, criminal court, family court, or civil court. Disputes between individuals can be weighed in all of these fora. But the self-petition process should not be a trial and is not intended to be adversarial. Furthermore, as noted above, there is extensive documentation of the fact that victims are afraid to come forward and press charges against their abusers specifically because they fear retaliation meted upon them or their children and other loved ones.
Another deeply troubling aspect of the bill is the proposed dismantling of the VAWA Unit at the USCIS Vermont Service Center. The VAWA Unit has amassed 12 years of specialized experience in adjudicating VAWA self-petitions and officers there receive extensive training on how to assess applications, uncover fraud, and properly determine an applicant’s eligibility under the law. Dismantling this unit in favor of local adjudication would be a huge waste of money and undermine the purpose of VAWA.  
HR 4970 adds other obstacles to the process by requiring a stay of adjudication “if an investigation or prosecution is pending” and directing the adjudicating officer to consider the fact that “no investigation has been undertaken or if a prosecutor’s office has not commenced a prosecution after the matter was referred to it . . . .” No acknowledgement is made of the legion reasons why a case might not be prosecuted even after it commenced, including prosecutorial discretion, limited resources, a victim being threatened by the abuser that his or her cooperation will lead to retaliation by the abuser, or a combination of factors. In the U visa context, a prosecutor will sometimes decide not to issue the required U visa certification to the victim who needs it to apply for a U visa, if there is to be a trial in a criminal case, until the trial is completed. This is done for various reasons, the central one being so that the defense cannot use the fact of the certification to impeach the victim’s testimony or to ensure cooperation of the witness at trial. However, the key distinction is that in one case the prosecutor is exercising her discretion whereas in the other, the prosecutor’s discretion does not come into play in a meaningful way. HR 4970 makes the decision for the prosecutor – and stalls a case if a prosecution ensues or paints a case with a negative brush if a prosecutor decides not to proceed.  
Another highly disturbing component of the bill is the mandated denial of a petition and expedited removal of an applicant “upon receiving any evidence of any material misrepresentation on a petition . . . .” The evidence need not be credible. The misrepresentation need not be knowing or willful. Thus a simple mistake of fact on the part of the applicant leads to draconian results including not only denial of the petition, but being processed for expedited removal and being barred from eligibility for any other form of relief. This provision could potentially come into direct conflict with the United States’s treaty obligations, such as those imposed by Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, which prohibits the United States from returning an alien to a state where there are substantial grounds for believing that the individual would be subjected to torture.  
This bill effectively represents throwing decades of research and aggregated knowledge about domestic violence out the window and constitutes an abuser’s dream codified and approved by the federal government. And no wonder. The Huffington Post discovered one of the driving forces behind HR 4970 is the head of a mail order bride service. A federal jury awarded one of the brides her company matched with an abusive American husband $434,000 after a trial. The verdict was affirmed upon appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Go figure.

May 6, 2012

HIDDEN TREASURE: HOW STATES THAT WANT IMMIGRANTS CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ARIZONA v. US

By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

Anyone in favor of federal preemption of state immigration laws, especially Arizona’s SB 1070, was disappointed with the way the oral arguments before the Supreme Court justices on April 25, 2012 turned out in Arizona v. US.  It appears that the core provision of SB 1070, Section 2(B), which mandates police officers to determine the immigration status of anyone they stop if they have a “reasonable suspicion” that the person in “unlawfully present in the United States” may be upheld even if other provisions are  preempted. And while it is obvious that this provision would lead to racial profiling, the case that the United States brought against Arizona is more about whether federal immigration law preempts 2(B) and other provisions. Both conservative and liberal justices did not think so since 2(B) was not creating a new state immigration law. All it does is to allow police officers to determine if someone was unlawfully present by inquiring about that person’s status with the federal Department of Homeland Security. Whether this would lead to the incarceration of both citizens and lawfully present non-citizens did not seem to concern the justices as the inquiry regarding immigration status would be made in conjunction with another state offense, such as speeding or driving without a license. Moreover, even without SB 1070, the justices noted that the federal government has allowed state enforcement personnel to do much the same thing, especially through its Secure Communities program or through cooperation in the “investigation, apprehension or detention of aliens in the United States” under INA § 287(g).
The colloquy, below,  between Chief Justice Roberts and Solicitor General Verrilli  during oral argument gives us some insight into why 2(B) is likely to be upheld:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right. So, apart from Section 3 and Section 5, take those off the table, you have no objection to Section 2?
GENERAL VERRILLI: We do, Your Honor. But, before I take 3 and 5 off the table, if I could make one more point about 3 and 5, please? The -- I think -­because I think it's important to understand the dilemma that this puts the Federal government in.
Arizona has got this population, and they've -- and they're, by law, committed to maximum enforcement. And so the Federal government's got to decide, are we going to take our resources, which we deploy for removal, and are we going to use them to deal with this population, even if it is to the detriment of our priorities –­
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Exactly. You -- the Federal government has to decide where it's going to use its resources. And what the state is saying, here are people who are here in violation of Federal law, you make the decision. And if your decision is you don't want to prosecute those people, fine, that's entirely up to you. That's why I don't see the problem with Section 2(B).
We hope we are proved wrong and the Supreme Court will find SB 1070 unconstitutional in its entirety, but even if we are not wrong, do not lose heart. Good things can also come out of it.  Take a look at Peter Spiro’s intriguing essay in the New York Times, where he argues that even if SB 1070 stands, it will ultimately wither as Arizona, and other copycat states, will continue to hurt economically. Thus, such laws that Arizona and some states will enforce with vigor will ultimately die their own natural death. Of course, this still does not excuse the fact that 2(B), while in existence, is likely to result in mass incarcerations, while the state police inquire about each detainee’s status. One saving grace it that someone who is actually affected, such as an individual who is lawfully present,  can mount another challenge based on due process and equal protection violations, rather than preemption, and this may have more of a chance to succeed. In the mean time, Spiro states, “One of federalism’s core virtues is the possibility of competition among states. Competition in this context is likely to vindicate pro-immigrant policies.” Thus, most other states that welcome immigrants, legal and undocumented, and recognize their contributions, will deliberately not pass similar laws like Arizona’s. By not enacting similar laws, they will be competing with those states by enticing their corporations, as well as jobs, to move over.
While there are very good arguments in support of preemption, if  part of SB 1070 is upheld, states that want immigrants can go even further than do nothing. For instance, a state can pass a law that encourages immigrants who reside within to apply for a personal endorsement from the state’s governor in support of a national interest waiver request, which waives the job offer and labor certification requirement, when applying for permanent residency. The state can set criteria for whom it wants to encourage, such as entrepreneurs or robotics specialists, and its governor can write a  personal letter in support of their petitions for permanent residency through the federal national interest waiver pursuant to INA § 203(b)(2)(B)(i). As in Arizona’s Section 2(B), the state is not creating a new immigration category, but simply assisting the federal government to make a determination under federal law. Unlike Arizona’s SB 1070, which is premised on driving away immigrants from the state through attrition, the purpose of a state law in our hypothetical example is to encourage the immigrant to remain in that state and contribute to its economy, which in turn will benefit the national interest of the US. Indeed, we commend noted attorney Rami Fakhoury of Troy, Michigan, who is proposing such standards for Governor Snyder of Michigan to implement in order to support a national interest waiver request from a Michigan resident.
In the same vein, a state can designate certain occupations as shortage occupations, which may assist the Department of Labor in more easily certifying a labor certification  pursuant to INA § 212(a)(5) of an employer filed on behalf of a non-citizen resident in the state. A state can be a more effective judge of shortage occupations than the federal government, and if a labor certification is filed on behalf of a non-citizen in that particular state designated shortage occupation, the DOL may be more influenced in making a favorable determination on the labor certification. Similarly, even with regards to an undocumented immigrant, a state may be able to enact criteria for recommending that such a person, who has otherwise not been convicted of serious crimes and is say an essential farm worker,  is deserving of prosecutorial discretion by the federal government under its new prosecutorial discretion policy and thus be permitted to remain in the state and  prevent its farm produce from otherwise rotting away. There may already be such authority under INA § 287(g), which authorizes the federal government to enter into a written agreement with a state to perform the function of a qualified immigration officer in relation to the “investigation, apprehension and detention” of non-citizens. In the era where the government has implemented a broad prosecutorial discretion policy, a state can assist the federal government in the “investigation, ”  rather than the apprehension or detention, of an individual who may merit such discretion from the federal government.
While Utah has also passed an enforcement oriented immigration law similar to Arizona’s, it contains one unique provision quite unlike any other state’s law. The Utah provision offers work permits to undocumented immigrants who pass background checks, have paid fines and can demonstrate a work history. The measure does not offer legal status or citizenship, but would allow unauthorized workers who meet its criteria to continue working in Utah. This provision also requires a federal waiver. If the Utah provision, which is currently enjoined, is allowed to go forward, in the event that the Supreme Court gives a green signal to states in Arizona v. US, we estimate that there will be more states that will enact laws similar to the Utah guest worker provision than Arizona’s SB 1070.
There is no reason to think that it will always be punitive. Many of the progressive achievements in modern American history, such as women suffrage, popular election of senators, wage and hour laws, occupational safety, and most recently same sex marriages, to name but a select few, first appeared on the state level. The many instances where federal intervention has been necessary to protect civil rights against state abuse should not blind us to the possibility that state action can also be a force for good. Long ago, Justice Brandeis recognized that federalism offered a constitutional framework for experimentation and creativity:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country…
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 S.Ct. 371, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1932)(Brandeis, J. dissent)
Since the New Deal, the operating assumption in American politics has been that reform must come from Washington DC to be imposed upon the states. The growth of the imperial presidency has flowed directly and inevitably from this core conviction. This is certainly the case with immigration reform given the plenary federal power over this issue as an extension of foreign policy. The inability or unwillingness of Congress to deal effectively with undocumented migration to this country on an unprecedented level has created the impetus for state action to fill up the vacuum. We advocate that Congress must deal with this situation by creating more pathways to legal status over an enforcement only approach, which is what states like Arizona have done.  Until now, such state action has been deprived of constitutional legitimacy; the Supreme Court may be ready to change that. Indeed, the first signs of this came with Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011) when a 5-3 ruling upheld the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act thus transforming the power of state regulators to grant or withhold business and professional licenses into tools of immigration enforcement. Should the High Court sustain SB 1070, for the first time since the 1870’s, the states will be able to take advantage of a constitutional regime that not only tolerates but welcomes their presence and invites their participation. Of course, Congress can also deal with states legislating on immigration by expressly preempting such action, but one will need to wait for that day to happen.
Those who think immigration is good for America will then have to find a way to review and revise their most basic assumptions on the nature of American reform. There is a way to make lemonade out of lemons.  Even now, not all state and local action has been negative. Utah is but one such example. Look and you will find others. Congress may not have passed a federal Dream Act but California and Illinois have done precisely that on the state level. Maryland too adopted its own Dream Act in 2011 and the Maryland Supreme Court will soon decide if this measure must go to a voter referendum this fall. In his most recent state-of-the-city address, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg vigorously supported a Dream Act for New York State, though Governor Cuomo has yet to declare his position. 12 states now grant in-state tuition rates to undocumented students. Texas, California and New Mexico provide financial aid to undocumented students. If we look north to our neighbor, Canada, its provinces have considerable influence in Canada’s immigration policy. An intending immigrant to Canada will get a preference if he or she meets certain requirements of Quebec province, for example. 
Our position on SB 1070 has not changed. We do not believe it is constitutional. We do not write to endorse a patchwork immigration system of 50 different approaches without unity or definition. The dangers of this are apparent to all and we devoutly wish that our ideas will be made irrelevant when the Supreme Court finds SB 1070 to be constitutionally impermissible. Yet, candor requires us to admit that the result may not be as we would like. Now is the time to prepare for what may come and think the unthinkable. We owe it to our clients and our country to turn a problem into an opportunity.  Until now, both supporters and critics of SB 1070 have assumed that if the Supreme Court were to uphold the law,  it will unleash a tsunami of copycat legislation. This may happen and it may hurt. Yet, the future often has a way of surprising us. More may emerge; the outcome could well be different than what most hope or fear. This blog points a way forward. What happens next is up to you. 

(The views expressed by guest author, Gary Endelman, are his own and not of his firm, FosterQuan, LLP)

April 24, 2012

FROM MADISON TO MORTON: CAN PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION TRUMP STATE ACTION IN ARIZONA v. USA?

By Gary Endelman and Cyrus Mehta

Warning against the danger of faction in his famous Federalist Paper No. 10, James Madison sought to moderate the impact through the diffusion of power amongst the three branches of the federal government as well as between state and federal authority. This coming Wednesday, the United States Supreme Court will hear oral argument over the most contentious provisions of Arizona SB 1070. It is perhaps no small exaggeration to say that the outcome of this case will determine if prosecutorial discretion as a tool of immigration enforcement can survive.

In an age of finite resources, to govern is to choose. That is why ICE Director John Morton decided this past June 2011 to exercise prosecutorial discretion in removal cases involving non-citizens who demonstrate favorable factors, such as their length of presence in the US, the person’s ties to the community, including the presence of immediate relative who may be US citizens or permanent residents, the circumstances of the person’s entry into the US, particularly if he or she was brought in as a young child and whether the person is likely to be granted permanent residency in the future, to name a few. Mr. Morton in a separate policy memo also included the victims and witnesses of crime, including domestic violence, and those persons who were plaintiffs in non-frivolous lawsuits or otherwise engaged in action to protect their civil rights. Director Morton elected to concentrate on deporting national security concerns or those non-citizens with a serious criminal history. This was not the first time that those who were charged with enforcement of our immigration laws embraced the virtues of prosecutorial discretion. On November 17, 2000, then INS Commissioner Doris Meissner explained it this way:
Prosecutorial Discretion is the authority of an agency charged with enforcing a law to decide whether to enforce, or not to enforce, the law against someone. The INS, like other law enforcement agencies, has prosecutorial discretion and exercises it every day…The favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion means a discretionary decision not to assert the full scope of the INS’s enforcement authority as permitted under the law…It is important to recognize not only what prosecutorial discretion is but also what it is not. The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion applies to law enforcement decisions whether, and to what extent, to exercise the coercive power of the Government over liberty and property, as authorized by law in cases when individuals have violated the law..The distinction is not always an easy bright-line rule to apply… Like all law enforcement agencies, the INS has finite resources, and it is not possible to investigate and prosecute all immigration violations
It is an oversimplification, but still an insightful one, to conclude that, thanks largely to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ( IIRAIRA), the importance of prosecutorial discretion has increased in inverse measure to the shrinking remedial actions left open to immigration judges whose ability to grant relief from removal, especially in the context of criminal convictions, has been dramatically curtailed. If the consequences of deportation can no longer be avoided or ameliorated, then the decision on whom to target and how to punish become a moments of surpassing criticality. While prosecutorial discretion is not the answer to a legislature run amuck, it may serve to limit the damage. As Assistant Attorney General Robert Raban wrote to Congressman Barney Frank on January 19, 2000, it is in bad times, more than good, when justice needs prosecutorial discretion the most:
Consequently, the IIRAIRA rendered the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the INS the only means for averting the extreme hardship associated with certain deportation and/or removal cases…
The State of Arizona, it would seem, has other priorities. While ICE may feel the need to choose, Arizona manifestly does not. Indeed, the four provisions of SB 1070 are precisely the ones that most flagrantly impose burdens on ICE in the absence of federal selection. In the absence of a matching federal mechanism, SB 1070 requires Arizona law enforcement officers to check the immigration status of anyone they stop, arrest or detain if they have a “reasonable suspicion “ the person is unlawfully present. SB 1070 complete disregards the Morton prosecutorial discretion policy, which now allows an ICE official to grant a stay of removal to a person who even has a removal order. While SB 1070 may still consider this person to be unlawfully present, under the federal prosecutorial discretion policy, this individual who has been granted a stay of removal, along with an order of supervision, may even apply for a work permit. Furthermore, ignorant or indifferent to federal policies that implicitly tolerate or openly protect the undocumented, SB 1070 criminalizes a failure to carry immigration registration documentation. It has already been pointed out that a battered woman who has obtained discretionary deferred action after filing an I-360 self-petition under the Violence Against Women Act will not be conferred with a registration document. Yet, such a person is allowed to remain and even work in the US until he or she obtains permanent residence. While neither the Immigration Reform Control Act of 1986 or the INA as a whole consider unauthorized employment as criminal conduct, SB 1070 does; even to apply for or solicit work is no less felonious. In the absence of federal warrant or any expression of federal interest in prosecution, SB 1070 sanctions warrantless arrest based on probable cause that the alien in question has committed a deportable offense. The New York Times recently but accurately termed this “an invitation to chaos:”
While Arizona says its law merely empowers law enforcement to work cooperatively with federal officers, that is demonstratively false. The four provisions at issue go beyond federal law, turning federal guidelines into state enforcement rules and violations of federal rules into state crimes. They transform a federal policy that allows discretion in seeking serious criminals among illegal immigrants into a state mandate to target everyone in Arizona illegally…
This concern is at the core of the pre-emption argument against SB 1070, though it has not received much ink in the popular press. In effect, Arizona seeks to impose an unfunded mandate on Washington, precisely the reverse of what is the norm. As Judge Paez wrote for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Arizona, 641 F. 3d 339, 352-53 (9th Cir.2011):
By imposing mandatory obligations on state and local officers, Arizona interferes with the federal government’s authority to implement its priorities and strategies in law enforcement, turning Arizona officers into state-directed DHS agents…the threat of 50 states layering their own immigration enforcement rules on top of the INA weighs in favor of preemption…
It is for this reason that the United States devoted a full 7 pages of it’s appellate brief to the Supreme Court ( pp.17-23) on this very issue. The curtailment of prosecutorial discretion is the negation of federal priorities. On pp. 22-23, we get to the heart of the matter:
The framework that the Constitution and Congress have created does not permit the States to adopt their own immigration programs and policies or to set themselves up as rival decision makers based on disagreement with the focus and scope of federal enforcement. Yet that is precisely what SB 1070 would do, by consciously erecting a regime that would detain, prosecute and incarcerate aliens based on violations of federal law but without regard to federal enforcement provisions, priorities and discretion. SB 1070 cannot be sustained as an exercise in cooperative federalism when its very design discards cooperation and embraces confrontation.
It is not hard to understand or appreciate why or how Arizona is frustrated, for good people of diverse views share this same conviction that ours is a broken immigration regime. It is the particular manner in which Arizona has elected to manifest this dissatisfaction that places the prosecutorial discretion of federal authorities at risk. We must not sacrifice constitutional verities to contemporary passions. Let us return to Madison Federalist No. 51:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary…
In an increasingly complex, hyper-technical system, the need for discretion as a way to make intelligent choices seems more open and obvious than ever. It is widely acknowledged that we have a dysfunctional immigration system whose systemic dislocation has contributed to the buildup of the undocumented population. In the absence of Congressional intervention to restore a permanent balance, the Administration can and must exercise discretion, devoid of ideology or sentiment, to cobble together interim solutions as the need for them arises. Despite SB 1070, rhetoric is not reality and the targeted exercise of discretion to reconcile divergent and often competing interests is something that the Supreme Court should endorse. James Madison would.

(The views expressed by guest author, Gary Endelman, are his own and not of his firm, FosterQuan, LLP) 

April 15, 2012

JUSTICE GINSBURG'S OBSERVATION ON PIEPOWDER COURTS IN VARTELAS v. HOLDER

By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta 

In the recent landmark Supreme Court decision of Vartelas v. Holder, No. 10-1211, 565 U.S. ___, U.S. LEXIS 2540 (March 28, 2012), which partially restores the rights of lawful permanent residents (LPR) with pre-1996 convictions, Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the opinion for the majority,   made an interesting reference to piepowder courts. For an explanation of the potential significance of Vartelas v. Holder, we refer readers to our previous blog entitled Fleuti Lives! Restoration of A Constitutional Decision.
Piepowder, or dusty feet courts, as Justice Ginsburg’s decision explains in footnote 12, were temporary mercantile courts quickly set up to hear commercial disputes at trade fairs in Medieval Europe. These courts were set up to resolve disputes while the merchants’ feet were still dusty.
Justice Ginsburg made this reference to piepowder courts in the immigration context in our modern era, stating that an immigration official at the border would not set up a piepowder court to determine whether an LPR committed an offense identified in INA § 212(a)(2) to determine whether he or she was inadmissible. This is what Justice Ginsburg said: “Ordinarily to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that an alien has committed a qualifying crime, the immigration officer at the border would check the alien’s record of conviction. He would not call into session a piepowder court to entertain a plea or conduct a trial.”
The Supreme Court’s observation on quaint “dusty feet” courts, although charming, is also extremely significant. Most lawyers who do not practice immigration law, and of course everyone else, will be surprised to know that a non-citizen, including an LPR, can be found inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(2) for being convicted or who admits having committed certain crimes, such as crimes involving moral turpitude or controlled substance offenses.  Thus, a non-citizen, including an LPR, need not have a criminal conviction to be found inadmissible, he or she can be equally snared for having admitted to the commission of a crime. Clearly, with respect to an LPR travelling from abroad, Justice Ginsburg’s observation appears to restrict a CBP officer's ability at an airport from trying to obtain a confession regarding the commission of a CIMT. A CBP official cannot set up a piepowder court at the airport, like the merchants of a bygone era, to try an LPR who has travelled through many time zones, and who instead of having dusty feet may have bleary eyes, for the purposes of bludgeoning him or her into an admission for having committed a crime.
Admittedly, the observation on piepowder courts was obiter dictum. It  was made in the context of whether INA § 101(a)(13)(C), enacted by the Illegal Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which allows the government to charge a long term LPR as an arriving alien for having committed an offense under 212(a)(2), could be applied retroactively.  The Supreme Court in Vartelas v. Holder held that the  doctrine enunciated in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), that an LPR who made a brief, casual and innocent trip abroad should  not be charged as an arriving alien,  still applies to LPRs with pre- IIRIRA criminal conduct. Noting that there was a presumption against retroactive legislation under Landgraf v. USI film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the Supreme Court  in Vartelas concluded that  INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v) resulted in an impermissible retroactive effect as it  created a “new disability” to conduct completed  prior to IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996. This new disability was Vartelas’ inability to travel after 1996, which he could freely do so prior to 1996. The Court criticized the Second Circuit in the same case below, which did not find INA §101(a)(13)(C)(v) retroactive since it did not reference a conviction but only the commission of a crime, which if pleaded to prior to 1996 in reliance of more favorable treatment under pre-1996 law, would have been impermissibly retroactive as in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). It was at this point that Justice Ginsburg said that “[t]he practical difference (between a conviction and commission of a crime), so far as retroactivity is concerned, escapes our grasp” and then made her observation that an immigration official would in any event need to determine under the clear and convincing standard at the border by checking the record of conviction, rather than convene a piepowder court, to determine whether the alien committed the crime.
It is also significant that Justice Ginsburg in her observation on piepowder courts affirmed that the burden has always been on the government to establish that an LPR is not entitled to that status, and this burden established in Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966), is that the government must prove by “clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence that the LPR should be deported. This burden applies to all LPRs regardless of whether they have pre-1996 or post-1996 criminal convictions. Thus, under a Woodby analysis too, since the government bears a heavy burden of proof, it would be turning the tables on the LPR if the government tried to extract a confession regarding the commission of a crime and thus be able to escape from the heavy burden it bears under the “clear, unequivocal and convincing” standard. This can potentially happen with an LPR who may have had the charges dismissed or reduced, but a nasty CBP official still wants to know the real story via a hypothetical piepowder court at the airport. Indeed, the Board of Immigration Appeals held many years ago in Matter of Guevara, 20 I&N Dec.238 (1990) that an alien’s silence alone does not provide sufficient evidence under the Woodby standard, in the absence of other evidence, to establish deportability. The following extract from Matter of Guevara is worth noting:
The legal concept of a “burden of proof” requires that the party upon whom the burden rests carry such burden by presenting evidence. If the only evidence necessary to satisfy this burden were the silence of the other party, then for all practical purposes, the burden would actually fall upon the silent party from the outset. Under this standard, every deportation proceeding would begin with an adverse inference which the respondent be required to rebut. We cannot rewrite the Act to reflect such a shift in the burden of proof. [citing Woodby v. INS, supra; other citations omitted]
Of course, an LPR can still voluntarily admit to the commission of a crime if he or she chooses to, but such an admission needs to meet rigid criteria. The BIA has set forth the following requirements for a validly obtained admission: (1) the admitted conduct must constitute the essential elements of a crime in the jurisdiction in which it occurred; (2) the applicant must have been provided with the definition and essential elements of the crime in understandable terms prior to making the admission; and (3) the admission must have been made voluntarily. See Matter of K-, 7 I&N Dec. 594 (BIA 1957).
Justice Ginsburg's piepowder observation in Vartelas v. Holder, together with Matter of K and Matter of Guevara, provide more arsenal to an LPR who is charged as an arriving alien based on the commission rather than the conviction of a crime under INA § 212(a)(2). Beyond this, the disinclination to sanction ad hoc investigation through a “dusty feet” court conducted without legal sanction or moral restraint reflects a commendable preference for the stability of the written record as the framework for informed decision.
The conceptual framework that governs any discussion of retroactivity is the traditional two-step formula announced in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra. Since Congress did not expressly instruct on how far back IIRIRA could go, we move to the second prong announced by the High Court at page 277 of Landgraf, namely whether giving retrospective effect to INA 101(a)(13)(C)(v) will contradict basic notions of proper notice and upset “settled expectations” on which the actor “reasonably relied.” When in doubt, retroactivity is disfavored. The Supreme Court got it right. “Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly.” Landgraf, 511 US at 265.
Justice Ginsburg’s admonition reflects a profound appreciation of the due process rights that returning LPR’s have traditionally enjoyed.   While Woodby may not have been a constitutional decision, the warning against piepowder courts can only be understood in a constitutional context.  Remember the returning LPR seaman in Kwong Hai Chew v Colding, 349 US 590(1953) that authorities sought to exclude without a hearing; the Supreme Court reminded us that he deserved full constitutional rights to a fair hearing with all the due process protection that would have been his had he never left. Remember what Rosenberg v Fleuti, 374 US 449, 460(1963) taught us: “A resident alien who leaves this country is to be regarded as retaining certain basic rights.” Remember the ringing injunction of Shaughnessy v. US ex rel Mezei, 345 US 206, 213(1953): “A lawful resident alien may not captiously be deprived of his constitutional rights to procedural due process.”  In essence, behind Justice Ginsburg’s distaste for piepowder courts when applied to returning resident aliens, regardless of when their conviction or admission took place, is nothing less than the right “ to stay in this land of freedom.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 US 21, 36 (1982) quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 306 US 135, 154 (1945).
The refusal to sanction IIRIRA retroactivity in Vartelas v. Holder provides the kind of predictability that LPRs need and deserve before they leave the USA and seek to return.  This, after all, is why retroactivity is disfavored .This is precisely why a piepowder court is not allowed; an LPR should know what this status means, what his or her rights are and should be able to leave the US with the confidence that an uneventful return is not only possible but entirely to be expected. In this sense, the refusal to embrace IIRIRA retroactivity and the caution against a piepowder court spring from the same place and say the same thing- predictability is at the very essence of a lawful society.  After all, to borrow Einstein’s happy phrase, God does not play dice with the universe.


(The views expressed by guest author, Gary Endelman, are his own and not of his firm, FosterQuan, LLP)

April 8, 2012

FLEUTI LIVES! THE RESTORATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION

By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

There was a time when a lawful permanent resident (LPR) or green card holder had more rights than today. 
Prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),   if an LPR with a criminal conviction travelled abroad,  he or she was not found inadmissible, or excludable as it was then known, if the trip was brief, casual and innocent. 
This was as a result of a landmark decision of the Supreme Court, Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).    Fleuti, an LPR and Swiss national, was found excludable after he returned from a visit to Mexico of only about a couple of hours under the then exclusion ground of being an alien “afflicted with psychopathic personality” based on his homosexuality.  This was only an excludable and not a deportable ground. If Flueti had not departed the US, he would not have been in the predicament he was in after his brief trip to Mexico. The Supreme Court interpreted a then statutory provision involving involuntary departures not resulting in an entry into the US, INA §101(a)(13),  to hold that Congress did not intend to exclude long term residents upon their return from a trip abroad that was “innocent, causal and brief.”Thus, under the Fleuti doctrine, such an LPR was not thought to have left the US so as to trigger excludability.
In 1996, IIRIRA amended § 101(a)(13), which now provides:
(C) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien —
(i) has abandoned or relinquished that status,
(ii) has been absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 days,
(iii) has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States,
(iv) has departed from the United States while under legal process seeking removal of
the alien from the United States, including removal proceedings under this Act and
extradition proceedings,
(v) has committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2), unless since such offense
the alien has been granted relief under section 212(h) or 240A(a), or
(vi) is attempting to enter at a time or place other than as designated by immigration officers or has not been admitted to the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.

The Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Collado-Munoz, 21 I&N Dec. 1061 (BIA 1998),  interpreted this amendment as eliminating the Fleuti doctrine. Thus, post 1996, an LPR who was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and who travelled abroad  would be seeking admission in the US under new § 101(a)(13)(C)(v) and could be put on the same footing as any alien seeking admission who may not have the same long term ties to the US as the LPR. Such an LPR would be found inadmissible of that CIMT even if that crime did not trigger removability  had he or she not left the US. The BIA eliminated the Fleuti  doctrine   despite a long line of Supreme Court cases holding that returning LPRs were entitled to the same due process rights as they would have if they were placed in deportation proceedings. For instance, in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953), involving a seaman LPR whose entry was deemed prejudicial to the public interest and who was detained at Ellis Island as an excludable alien, the Supreme Court held that we must first consider what would have been his constitutional rights had he not undertaken his voyage to foreign ports but remained continuously in the US.  Even in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), where the LPR’s trip abroad involved a smuggling operation and was not  considered so innocent,  the Supreme Court held that she could seek the Fleuti exception even in exclusion proceedings as well as enjoy all the due process rights as an LPR.  Landon recognized the LPR’s long term ties with the country noting that her right to “stay and live and work in this land of freedom” was at stake along with her right to rejoin her family.  It seemed that the BIA in Matter of Collado-Munoz, an administrative agency, was limited by its inability to rule upon the constitutionality of the laws it administered despite the robust dissent of Board Member Rosenberg  who stated that “[w]e are, however, authorized and encouraged to construe these laws so as not to violate constitutional principles.” Circuit courts deferred to the BIA interpretation while “recognizing that there are meritorious arguments on both sides of the issue.”  See Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2003).
As a result after IIRIRA, LPRs  with prior convictions who travelled abroad briefly for holidays, weddings or to visit sick relatives were found inadmissible upon their return, and were also detained under the mandatory detention provision pursuant to § 236(c) if the conviction was a CIMT. This was true even if the conviction occurred prior to 1996 when Fleuti existed. In January 2003,  Vartelas, an LPR,  returned from a week- long trip to Greece, and immigration officials at the airport determined he was an alien seeking admission pursuant to § 101(a)(13)(c)(v) as he was convicted in 1994 for conspiring to make counterfeit security, which was characterized as a CIMT.  Vartelas challenged his designation as an arriving alien seeking admission all the way to the Supreme Court, and in Vartelas v. Holder, No. 10-1211, 565 U.S. ___, U.S. LEXIS 2540 (March 28, 2012), the Supreme Court recently held that the Fleuti doctrine  still applies to LPRs with pre-IIRIRA convictions who travel abroad.  Noting that there was a presumption against retroactive legislation under Langraf v. USI film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the Supreme Court concluded that  INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v) resulted in an impermissible retroactive effect as it  created a “new disability” to conduct completed  prior to IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996. This new disability was Vartelas’ inability to travel after 1996, which he could freely do so prior to 1996. The Vartelas court noted, “Once able to journey abroad to fulfill religious obligations, attend funerals and weddings of family members, tend to vital financial interests, or respond to family emergencies, permanent residents situated as Vartelas now face potential banishment." We refer you the excellent practice advisory of the Legal Action Center of the American Immigration Council on how to represent clients with pre-1996 convictions who have been positively impacted by Vartelas v. Holder.
Not all share our view of Vartelas v. Holder. One expert commentator limits it to LPRs with pre-1996 convictions, and for this reason predicts that it will not have a broad impact.
We think differently.  Although the Supreme Court passed up the opportunity to rule on the viability of Fleuti for post 1996 convictions;  in footnote 2 while acknowledging that the BIA read INA §101(a)(13)(C)  to overrule Fleuti  the Court noted,  “Vartelas does not challenge the ruling in Collado-Munoz. We therefore assume, but do not decide, that IIRIRA’s amendments to §101(a)(13)(A) abrogated Fleuti.” This is significant since the Supreme Court explicitly did not affirmatively decide that Fleuti  had been repealed for LPRs who had convictions after the enactment of IIRIRA. Practitioners with have LPR clients who have been charged as arriving aliens after a brief trip abroad should continue to advocate for the viability of the Fleuti doctrine on behalf of their clients in removal proceedings.
There are compelling arguments for doing so, and we commend readers to the brilliant amicus brief that Ira Kurzban and Debbie Smith wrote for the American Immigration Lawyers (AILA) Association in Vartelas v. Holder providing suggestions on how to convincingly make them.  The key argument is that that  the §101(a)(13)(C) categories never abrogated Fleuti; rather they codified some of the characteristics of Fleuti by suggesting, for example,  that an LPR would not be seeking admission if the trip overseas was brief (§101(a)(13)(C)(ii)) and that it was innocent (§101(a)(13)(C)(iii)). Moreover, § 101(a)(13)(C) employs “shall not …unless” language, which suggests that the provisions within are only necessary conditions to trigger inadmissibility, but not necessary and sufficient conditions to trigger inadmissibility.
Moreover,  the burden has always been on the government to establish that an LPR is not entitled to that status, and this burden established in Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966), is that the government must prove by “clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence that the LPR should be deported. Subsequent to Woodby, in Landon v. Plasencia, supra, the Supreme Court held that a returning resident be accorded due process in exclusion proceedings and that the Woodby standard be applied equally to an LPR in exclusion proceedings. With the introduction of  the § 101(a)(13)(C) provisions rendering a returning LPR inadmissible, the CBP’s Admissibility Review Office and more than one government lawyer argued that the heavy burden of proof that the government had  under Woodby had shifted to the LPR.  Indeed, INA §240(c)(2) places the burden on the applicant for admission to prove “clearly and beyond doubt” that he or she is not inadmissible.  Fortunately, a recent decision of the BIA in Matter of Rivens, 25 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 2011) shatters this assumption once and for all. The BIA by affirming the Woodby standard in Rivens held, “Given this historical practice and the absence of any evidence that Congress intended a different allocation of standard of proof to apply in removal cases arising under current section 101(a)(13)(C) of the Act, we hold that the respondent – whose lawful permanent resident status is uncontested – cannot be found removable under the section 212(a) grounds of inadmissibility unless the DHS first proves by clear and convincing evidence [footnote omitted] that he is to be regarded as an applicant for admission in this case by having “committed an offense indentified in section 212(a)(2).”  It is surprising that Justice Ginsburg did not mention Rivens although footnote No. 1 in that decision reveals that the BIA was keenly attuned to what the Supreme Court might do with the Vartelas case.
Thus, the survival of Woodby, notwithstanding the enactment of §101(a)(13)(C),  carries with it the survival of Fleuti. Even though the Vartelas Court did not have to decide if Fleuti still lived, it reminds us that, despite the failure of the BIA to realize it in Collado-Munoz, Fleuti is at heart a constitutional decision. Vartelas belongs in this same line of cases because it too emphasizes the special protection that the Constitution offers to returning LPRs. The  portion of Vartelas that  could serve as a springboard for such an argument  in a future case is part of footnote 7of the slip opinion:
"The act of flying to Greece, in contrast, does not render a lawful permanent resident like Vartelas hazardous. Nor is it plausible that Congress' solution to the problem of dangerous lawful permanent residents would be to pass a law that would deter such persons from ever leaving the United States."
The authors credit David Isaacson for pointing that  the second sentence, in particular, suggests a potential willingness to avoid reading 101(a)(13)(C)(v) in the way that  Collado-Munoz did, essentially on the ground that such a reading makes no sense because of its logical consequence.  One might be able to combine this with the constitutional concerns raised in the AILA amicus brief and get Collado-Munoz overturned (and Fleuti restored) on the basis of a combination of purpose-based ambiguity in the statute and the doctrine of avoidance of constitutional doubts, which trumps Chevron deference, see, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Coast Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-575 (1988).  The effect would be analogous to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) where the statute was found ambiguous largely because of concerns relating to its purpose and then interpreted in the manner that would not raise serious constitutional concerns. To the authors, this places Vartelas in a much larger context where the full potential of the ruling may be examined and developed in the future. 
The significance of Vartelas  is not limited to returning permanent residents with pre-1996 convictions. Rather, when viewed with a wide-angle lens, it may serve as the ruling that restores Fleuti as a constitutional decision. Unlike the assumption of the BIA in Collado-Munoz that Fleuti was decided in what Ira Kurzban and Deborah Smith insightfully term a “constitutional vacuum,” Justice Ginsburg has given back to Fleuti the constitutional provenance that sadly it seemed to have lost.Unlike the Fifth Circuit in De Fuentes v. Gonzalez, 462 F.3d 498,503(5th Cir. 2006) that saw no “constitutional core” in Fleuti or the Third Circuit in Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382,397 (3d Cir 2003) which boldly though mistakenly proclaimed that  Fleuti had no basis in constitutional principle, Vartelas harkens back to an appreciation of lawful permanent residence that IIRIRA made us think for a while had vanished: “Once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.” Landon v. Plascencia, 459 US at 32 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 US 763, 770(1950)). If that happy day comes when Fleuti is restored in full, legal scholars may well look back to Vartelas v Holder as the case that made it all possible. The lasting contribution to the law that the Supreme Court has made through Vartelas v Holder may well be not only, or even primarily, in its forthright rejection of IIRIRA retroactivity, but rather in reclaiming for Fleuti its lasting  place in the penumbra of constitutional safeguards that have nurtured and protected the rights of lawful permanent residents.  In this sense, Fleuti did not create new rights for permanent residents so much as refine and expand existing constitutional alliances. For this reason, a revival of Fleuti would not be a radical leap into terra incognita but the rightful restoration of a constitutional regime that commands our attention and merits our respect. We do not know what the future will be for Fleuti   but, now, thanks to Vartelas,  there might be a story to tell.


(The views expressed by guest author, Gary Endelman, are his own and not of his firm, FosterQuan LLP)