One Big Ugly Bill on Immigration

On July 4, 2025, Congress passed the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act”. Among its many other provisions, the megabill imposes a number of immigration-related changes. Pursuant to the Act, asylum applications, which historically have been able to be filed at no cost, will now be subject to a $100 filing fee. An additional $100 annual fee will apply for each calendar year that an applicant’s asylum application remains pending. Applications for an employment authorization document (EAD) based on a pending asylum application will now have a filing fee of $550. 

There are other fee increases. For instance, the filing fee for appealing a decision of an Immigration Judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals has increased from $110 to $900. A noncitizen who is removed in absentia will have to pay an apprehension fee of $5000. Likewise, an inadmissible noncitizen who is apprehended between ports of entry will need to pay $5000.  How will DHS collect the fee after they deport him? Or will they hold off deporting her until she pays the $5000?   The National Immigration Project has created a chart as a reference tool for understanding the fee increases and the new fees brought by this law: Comparison Chart of the Immigration-Related Fee Changes Brought by H.R.1 the So-Called One Big Beautiful Bill Act.

The Act also states that certain categories of noncitizens, including refugees and asylees, VAWA recipients, and beneficiaries of most humanitarian relief programs are no longer eligible for public benefits programs such as Medicaid, Medicare, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.

Additionally, the Act imposes a tax equal to 1 percent of the total amount on remittances, or international money transfers, to be paid by the sender, including U.S. citizen senders. Individuals who have U.S. Social Security numbers are eligible to apply for credits to offset the impact of the tax. 

Finally, the Act allocates substantial government funds to immigration enforcement and detention measures. It earmarks around $46.5 billion for completion of the border wall, and provides additional funds for construction of CBP facilities. Approximately $45 billion will be dedicated to immigration detention centers, with around $30 billion being set aside for maintenance of existing ICE facilities, hiring personnel, and funding the cost of transporting detainees. Another $13.5 billion is earmarked for reimbursing states for immigration enforcement-related costs. The Act also provides around $3 billion to the Department of Justice for purposes including the hiring of new Immigration Judges. 

The immigration provisions in the Act do not make any attempt to reform the defective immigration system in the US that lacks adequate pathways for people to come to the US and remain in the US legally. 

Ben Johnson, Executive Director of AILA, poignantly describes how Congress has let all of us down:  

“This bill is a profound disappointment. Instead of advancing practical, humane immigration reforms, Congress chose to funnel unprecedented resources into the Administration’s ruthless deportation machine, at the very moment the President is openly threatening to detain and deport U.S. citizens—a betrayal of American values so extreme it threatens the citizenship rights of us all.

All this, at the expense of programs Americans rely upon in their daily lives, especially healthcare. This betrays our most basic constitutional principles and is a chilling escalation of executive overreach.

This legislation fails our nation on every front. It abandons critical efforts to address backlogs in the legal immigration system while creating needless barriers to a functional immigration system. Worse, it makes our communities less safe and less secure by doubling down on fear-based policies that are already proven to be costly and ineffective. Those caught in the crosshairs will be not only newly-arrived immigrants and long-term residents who are part of the fabric of American communities, but also U.S. citizens both naturalized and U.S. born. It ignores the vital role immigrants play in our economy and community life, while pouring billions into a system that inflicts harm rather than offering hope, stability, and due process.

America deserves an immigration system that reflects our values and our interests, not one that undermines the rule of law and weaponizes enforcement against our own neighbors. This is unacceptable. The American people must hold those in Congress who passed this bill to account.”

*Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Supreme Court Decision Limits Nationwide Injunctions Giving More Power to Trump to Violate the Constitution

On June 27, 2025, in a case implicating President Trump’s Executive Order (EO) on birthright citizenship, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision limiting federal courts’ ability to issue nationwide injunctions blocking EOs and broad national policies. It explained that in such cases, courts should normally only block federal policies for the individuals or organizations that bring a lawsuit, unless a statute or class action process allows broader relief. This ruling makes it less likely that a single lawsuit will be able to stop a federal policy from taking effect across the entire country.

The Supreme Court’s order incorporates a change to the effective date of the EO, which was agreed to by the government. The Court stated that the EO does not apply to children born since January 20, 2025, and for 30 additional days after the order. Under the decision, all children born in the United States before July 28, 2025, regardless of their parents’ immigration status, will be recognized as U.S. citizens by the executive branch of the federal government. 

Justice Barrett, who wrote for the majority acknowledged, arguments that “the universal injunction ‘give[s] the Judiciary a powerful tool to check the Executive Branch.’ But federal courts do not exercise general oversight of the Executive Branch; they resolve cases and controversies consistent with the authority Congress has given them,” she emphasized. “When a court concludes that the Executive Branch has acted unlawfully, the answer is not for the court to exceed its power, too.” The justices held along ideological lines that the Judiciary Act of 1798 does not authorize federal district court judges to issue sweeping injunctions that stop the government from enforcing a policy throughout the country. 

Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, in an opinion that she read from the bench, which signaled her strong disagreement with the majority’s ruling. She stated that the majority had ruled that, “absent cumbersome class-action litigation, courts cannot completely enjoin even such plainly unlawful policies unless doing so is necessary to afford the formal parties complete relief. That holding renders constitutional guarantees meaningful in name only for any individuals who are not parties to a lawsuit.”

The decision did not address the merits or constitutionality of the EO, and we have discussed previously that the EO is probably unconstitutional and we hope that the Supreme Court will agree  when it rules on the merits. There will be continuing and evolving uncertainties, including legal challenges to the birthright citizenship order in the federal courts. For example, filed within hours of the decision, a lawsuit in New Hampshire seeks to designate a nationwide class of children needing protection from the EO. The nonprofit plaintiff organization, Casa Inc., also moved swiftly to modify their challenges into a class action. Indeed, the majority order that deemed nationwide injunctions a “shortcut to relief that benefits parties and nonparties alike” did not preclude federal courts from providing relief through class actions.    Meanwhile, at a press conference on June 27, 2025, President Trump announced that the administration plans to take additional actions to end birthright citizenship. These efforts will likely take the form of new agency rules, policies, and guidance aimed at implementing the EO.

If there is any issue that cries out in favor of the universal injunction it is for a court to protect a newborn from a blatantly unconstitutional executive order which the Supreme Court majority sadly failed to do. First it was outrageous that the Supreme Court used this case to demolish the notion of the universal injunction involving such a blatantly unconstitutional executive order. Steve Vladeck  states that class actions are more difficult to bring and are also subject to interlocutory appeals whether the court appropriately certified the class. Even though Justice Barrett held that prohibiting enforcement of the order against the child of a pregnant plaintiff would give that plaintiff complete relief, and extending the injunction to all similarly situated individuals will not render the relief more complete, this limitation on complete relief should not apply to a state plaintiff.  And if a state asks for complete relief and gets it from a district court then this too will be appealed to the Supreme Court, and there is a risk that a state would only be given relief for those who reside in the state. This could result in disastrous disparities in a birthright citizen case, as a child who is born in New Jersey and recognized as a citizen but who later moves to Texas would not be recognized as a citizen in that state.

The cumbersome class action is no substitute for a court to quickly block a blatantly unconstitutional executive order under universal jurisdiction. What if there was an EO prohibiting members of a religion from openly worshiping? A court should be able to quickly block it under universal jurisdiction.

What if Trump issues an EO demanding that all his opponents be shipped to a prison in El Salvador? If one such well-heeled opponent goes to court and gets an order it will only benefit her, and each opponent will have to obtain a similar order as Trump can otherwise keep on enforcing his unconstitutional actions.

Parents in H-1B/H-4 nonimmigrant visa status of a newborn in states that did not challenge the birthright citizenship EO will have to individually sue or join class actions to ensure that their child is recognized as a US citizen, or they are welcome to come to a state like New York or Massachusetts to give birth to their child. But how cruel to force the mother to travel when she is already in labor!

The Supreme Court’s order allows Trump to deny people rights that are embedded in the Constitution so long as they have not found a lawyer or asked a court to protect their rights, and even when they do, they may not succeed in that court. It aligns Trump’s America to an autocratic state, or worse, to a fascist regime.

We also fear that ICE could start deporting plaintiffs and even newborns if they are here unlawfully before they get a favorable court order. The executive order applies not only to children of two undocumented parents, but also to the U.S. born children of parents who hold a valid nonimmigrant status, such as H-1B and H-4. How will a child as soon as it is born acquire H-4 status? One needs to be admitted into the US in H-4 status or change from another nonimmigrant status into H-4 status. Perhaps, the Trump administration may need to issue a regulation recognizing H-4 status of the child at the time of its birth.    As we noted in a prior blog, the best chance for Indian-born beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions who are trapped in the employment-based second (EB-2) and third (EB-3) preference backlogs to obtain permanent residence without waiting for several decades could be sponsorship by a U.S.-born adult child. Parents of children born after the effective date of the executive order may no longer have this opportunity. The executive order will cruelly create a permanent underclass of noncitizens if they are unable to challenge it individually or in a class action. The child in H-4 status would have to leave the US when it turns 21 unless it finds a way to change to another nonimmigrant status or obtain permanent residence independently such as through marriage with a U.S. citizen. 

People have rightly observed that the nationwide injunction has also benefitted Republican controlled states that are against pro-immigration policies such as the successful thwarting of DACA by Judge Hanen in a federal district court in  Texas who held that DACA was unlawful and issued a nationwide injunction.  On the other hand, even though Judge Hanen ruled DACA to be unlawful, his ruling has been appealed, and DACA still benefits its recipients in allowing them to extend their work permits since June 2012. Even if the Supreme Court ultimately agrees with Judge Hanen, there is a possibility that Congress can step in and provide a path for citizenship to DACA recipients.  If a policy is challenged in a legal action, the government that issued it can still defend it and Congress can also step in.  By contrast, without the benefit of a nationwide injunction, a blatantly unconstitutional executive order can continue to stand and adversely impact people, even newborn children. 

 

The Inherently Moral Executive Actions on Immigration Cannot Die Under Trump

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

The Trump administration is doing its best to kill executive actions that benefit vulnerable noncitizens. In a June 6, 2025 Policy Alert, the administration announced that it would rescind automatic consideration of deferred action for noncitizens classed as Special Immigrant Juveniles (SIJ) who are unable to able for adjustment of status due to visa unavailability. This harsh measure will not only deprive noncitizens classified as SIJ who are trapped in the lengthy EB-4 backlog of work authorization based on deferred action, but may also leave them vulnerable to deportation. By way of justification for its policy, the administration asserts that “Congress… did not expressly permit deferred action and related employment authorization for this [SIJ] population. Neither an alien having an approved Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant (Form I-360) without an immediately available immigrant visa available nor a juvenile court determination relating to the best interest of the SIJ are sufficiently compelling reasons, supported by any existing statute or regulation, to continue to provide a deferred action process for this immigrant category.” 

In Tyranny of Priority Dates, Gary Endelman and Cyrus Mehta laid the ground work for how executive actions can be used to provide ameliorative relief to millions of noncitizens caught in the crushing backlogs in the legal immigration system. It was unimaginable that the ideas proposed in this groundbreaking article in 2010 would have resulted in actual executive actions, but they did, from the State Department’s dual date visa bulletin to deferred action to parole for beneficiaries of approved visa petitions waiting outside the US. Most recently, the USCIS recognized that the filing date in the dual visa bulletin  could protect the age of the child under the Child Status Protection Act, which Cyrus Mehta  recommended in 2021. Even while Trump tries to snuff out executive actions that provide ameliorative relief, the blueprints for different executive actions outlined  in Tyranny of Priority Dates can never die, and should be protected and brought to life. 

June 15, 2025, marked the 13th anniversary of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. DACA was created in 2012 to offer deportation relief and work permits to young immigrants who were brought to the U.S. as children. While DACA has allowed hundreds of thousands of Dreamers to pursue education and careers, it remains under legal threat, with new applications currently blocked. Still, even if DACA is on a respirator, it allows recipients to continue to live, work, prosper and contribute to America. DACA has transformed for the better the lives of young, undocumented people who came to the U.S. as children. Without this policy, hundreds of thousands wouldn’t have accessed higher education, started careers, enjoyed the relative stability to start their families and contributed to the US in myriad ways through their skills and talents.  At the same time, with each passing DACA anniversary, there is tremendous uncertainty as the Trump Administration attempted to strip DACA recipients of their protections; an attack on the policy that continues in the courts today. The legal fight will continue into the Supreme Court. Regardless of how the Supreme Court rules on DACA, Congress must step in and provide protection to legal dreamers with a pathway to citizenship. DACA is too precious to be lost and for dreams to shatter. 

In a January 20, 2025 Executive Order entitled “Protecting the American People Against Invasion”, the Trump administration purported to remove the ability for immigration officials to exercise prosecutorial discretion. Notwithstanding the executive order, however, prosecutorial discretion as a concept is embedded in our immigration system and can never truly die. Even Trump himself seems to have acknowledged recently that immigration enforcement taken to the most aggressive extremes may have a deleterious impact. The administration has reportedly asked Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to “largely pause raids and arrests in the agricultural industry, hotels and restaurants”, recognizing that apprehending and detaining immigrant workers in these key industries was likely to harm the U.S. economy and generate a public backlash. 

Ameliorative executive actions such as deferred action and parole have long been used by prior administrations to provide ameliorative relief to millions of vulnerable immigrants left unprotected due to our imperfect immigration laws which Congress has proved incapable of amending over the past few decades. Even if Trump disfavors executive actions that are inherently moral and do good, these concepts will continue to remain blueprints for future enlightened immigrant and immigrant- friendly administrations to re-activate, as well as serving as models for future legislation. In the meantime, today, across the country, people are marching to stand up to abuse of power, unlawful detentions and the cruel and unjust termination of immigration programs. The movement must continue to swell until the Trump administration realizes that being a dictator to immigrants will backfire and will drive him and his minions out of office and into the dustbin of history. 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

In the Walmart Case, the Government Cannot Have Its Cake and Eat it too

In a previous blog, excerpted here, we analyzed Walmart, Inc. v. Jean King, which involved a challenged by Walmart to the administrative proceedings against it for violations of immigration-related recordkeeping requirements on the ground that the proceedings were “being conducted by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who is unconstitutionally shielded from the President’s supervision. ALJs like Jean King, who was presiding over the proceedings against Walmart and is the Chief Judge within the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO), can be removed from their position only for “good cause” as determined by the Merits System Protection Board (MSPB) and by the president for “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”. Walmart alleged that this system violates the Constitution by insulating ALJs “from presidential control by two levels of removal protection”. Walmart argued that Article II of the Constitution, which commands the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, requires him to have the power to remove executive officers. Only two types of officers have been determined to be exempt from the President’s removal power – principal officers, who report directly to the President, and inferior officers, who are appointed by the President but supervised by others. See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020); United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1980 (2021). Walmart argued that ALJs do not within either of these exceptions, “so the removal scheme that protects them is unconstitutional twice over”. Chief Justice J. Randal Hall of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia agreed with Walmart and granted its motion for summary judgement, finding that “the multilevel protection from removal present for the OCAHO ALJs is contrary to Article II, and contrary to the executive power of the President.”

The federal government appealed this finding, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit heard in the case on Friday, June 6. Attorney Jeff Johnson, representing Walmart, argued that the statutory defect invalidates ALJs’ authority, stating: “I’m saying when you bake in an unseverable removal restriction, that takes away their power to act just as much.” The government, on the other hand, stated that it would not defend the constitutionality of the removal provisions for ALJs, but, at the same time, argued that ALJs should still be left with the authority to penalize Walmart and other employers in enforcement proceedings.  Joshua Salzman, attorney for the government, stated: 


“Here they are saying all I-9 enforcement has to stop unless and until Congress is able to act. And it’s not just I-9 enforcement — that actually wildly understates the stakes of the potential implications of their argument”, noting the wide range of administrative proceedings over which ALJs preside. 

[…]


“I could go on and on and on…but the logic of the district court’s opinion here is, all of it stops unless and until Congress amends the statute.”

 

The Supreme Court has previously held that two types of officers have been determined to be exempt from the President’s removal power – principal officers, who report directly to the President, and inferior officers, who are appointed by the President but supervised by others. See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020); United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1980 (2021). As it stands, ALJs may not fall within either of these categories. Even if they are considered inferior officers, because they cannot be easily removed, their appointment may still be unconstitutional.  If the court can sever only the problematic removability clause from the statutory provision giving authority to ALJs, perhaps ALJs can be interpreted to be constitutionally appointed. The 11th Circuit panel indicated that if the government was unwilling to defend the constitutionality of the removal provisions, it would appoint a third party to take up the defense of those protections’ constitutionality. “The court can’t simply accept the government’s concession of unconstitutionality without evaluating the issue for itself,” they said.

It is noteworthy that the administration has refused to defend the constitutionality of the removal procedures of ALJs. Earlier in February 2025,  Acting Director Sirce Owen of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) issued Policy Memorandum (PM) 25-23 stating that, in the context of any future personnel actions and after additional review, EOIR may decline to recognize the multiple layers of for-cause removal restrictions for all of EOIR’s inferior officers if they are determined to be unconstitutional.  If the government is unwilling to defend the statute regarding the removal procedures for ALJs, and  the court cannot remedy it,  then Congress should step in to amend it. Although it is easy to assume that Congress is in a logjam and is not capable of intervening, it should nonetheless do its job and act. Otherwise, the ALJ system should be dismantled and judges who are not constitutionally appointed should have no authority to sanction employers.  The government cannot have its cake and it it too!

 *Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

The Great Betrayal: Supreme Court’s Ratification Of Trump’s Termination of CHNV Parole

On March 25, 2025, DHS terminated parole programs that had allowed an estimated 530,000 Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans to enter the United States legally in 2022 and 2023. The federal register notice stated that “Paroled aliens, including those paroled under the CHNV parole programs, may apply for any immigration benefit or status for which they may be eligible, including discretionary employment authorization under the [8 CFR 274a.12(c)(11)] employment eligibility category…” However, on February 14, 2025 USCIS implemented an administrative hold on processing of all applications for benefits filed by CHNV parolees, as well as individuals who entered the United States pursuant to the United for Ukraine program, or the Family Reunification Parole process.

DHS’ termination of these parole programs was quickly challenged through litigation. See Svitlana Doe, et al., v. Noem, et. al., No. 25-cv-10495 (D. Mass. Apr. 14, 2025). On April 14, 2025, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts temporarily stayed the early termination of the CHNV parole programs, as well as EADs issued in connection with these programs. The district court held that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in their claims that DHS’ termination of the program was arbitrary and capricious, reasoning that the Federal Register Notice

“gave no explanation or support for the conclusion that the CHNV programs were addressing relevant humanitarian concerns through something other than case-by-case determinations. The FRN also gave no rationale for its conclusion that such humanitarian concerns no longer justified the existing parole programs and offered no reasons for categorically revoking parole despite the humanitarian concerns previously articulated by DHS. Finally, despite asserting that “DHS believes that consideration of any urgent humanitarian reasons for granting parole is best addressed on a case-by-case basis consistent with the statute, and taking into consideration each alien’s specific circumstances,” 90 Fed. Reg. at 13612, the FRN provides for no individual case-by-case determination as to the humanitarian concerns facing each parolee whose parole is being truncated.”

DHS appealed to the First Circuit, which declined to overturn the stay, and ultimately to the Supreme Court.

On May 30, 2025, the Supreme Court issued an abbreviated order blocking the district court’s stay. This order in effect allows DHS’ termination of the parole programs to continue even while the First Circuit makes a decision on the merits of the case. In her dissent, joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson argued that the Court’s order “undervalues the devastating consequences of allowing the Government to precipitously upend the lives and livelihoods of nearly half a million noncitizens while their legal claims are pending…While it is apparent that the Government seeks a stay to enable it to inflict maximum predecision damage, court-ordered stays exist to minimize—not maximize—harm to litigating parties.”

The Trump administration’s abrupt termination of the program leaves hundreds of thousands of individuals vulnerable to being placed in removal proceedings and potentially returned to turbulent and unsafe home countries. It also puts into doubt the validity of the EAD under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(11). Although the EAD under (c)(11) may be valid on its face if it has not expired, a public announcement of the termination of the program would put employers on notice that impacted employees are no longer authorized to work under 8 USC 1324(a)(1)(A) and (2). The Supreme Court order has stayed the District Court’s order that prevented the DHS from terminating CHNV parole, including (c)(11) EADs issued pursuant to the program.   Still, employers may not know whether the (c)(11) EAD is associated CHNV parole or some other kind of parole, and it may be discriminatory to ask an employee to provide the basis for the (c)(11) EAD. EADs issued to CHNV parolees bear the same code as EADs issued to other parolees, unlike, for example, DACA EADs, which have a different code from other deferred action cases. Moreover, it is entirely plausible that that many CHNV parolees may have c(8) EADs by now based on pending I-589 asylum applications, and 8 USC 1324(a)(B) does not obligate an employer to ask. Employers have to walk a fine line to avoid discrimination in requesting additional documents from employees to determine if an employee is no longer work authorized.  AILA advises  that “organizations employing CHNV parolees should evaluate the risks and potential consequences associated with identifying this specific population of their workforce, how to update I-9 records and confirm these individuals’ continued (in)eligibility to work in the United States, providing these individuals with an opportunity to present other documents from the List of Acceptable Documents, and the potential impact on the organization’s workforce planning strategies and the continuity of their business operations.” See AILA Doc. No. 25042408.

The Supreme Court’s ratification of this betrayal is even more disappointing, however. Individuals who entered the United States pursuant to these parole programs did so legally, only to have the rug cruelly ripped out from under them.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Fighting Back Trump’s Attacks on Foreign Students

In recent weeks, the Trump administration has launched a concerted assault on international students and their ability to remain in the U.S.  In the latest volleys against Harvard University, the Trump administration ordered the revocation of Harvard’s Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) certification, which will ban the university from enrolling international students and force international students currently studying at Harvard to transfer or risk falling out of status. After Harvard filed a complaint, a U.S. district court judge ordered the ban to be halted temporarily in the face of ongoing litigation. International students reportedly make up more than a quarter of Harvard’s student body.

According to reports, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has also recently began sending warning notices to certain F-1 students who have been enrolled in the Optional Practical Training (OPT) program for more than 90 days but have not reported any employment status.

The notices afford impacted students 15 days to update their Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) record with employment information. If no action is taken, the student’s SEVIS record could then be terminated for a violation of status on the grounds that they failed to timely report OPT employment or exceeded the maximum permissible 90-day period of unemployment during OPT. The notice further warns that failure to take corrective action may result of the student being placed in removal proceedings.

Moreover, the administration has evidenced a desire to thwart international students’ ability to remain in the U.S. and work post-graduation. Joseph Edlow, nominated by the president to be the Director of USCIS, stated the following of the OPT program during his Senate confirmation hearing:

“I think the way in which OPT has been handled over the past four years, with the help of certain decisions coming out of the D.C. Circuit Court, have been a real problem in terms of misapplication of the law.

[…]

What I want to see would be essentially a regulatory and sub-regulatory program that would allow us to remove the ability for employment authorizations for F-1 students beyond the time that they are in school.”

Endlow was undoubtedly referring to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“Washtech v. DHS”), which upheld the STEM OPT extension as authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Washtech was analyzed at length in a prior blog, which is excerpted here. The case involved a challenge to the rule permitting eligible students in STEM fields to seek an additional 24 month OPT extension beyond the usual 12 month OPT period by the Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (Washtech), a union representing tech workers. Washtech read INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i) as authorizing DHS to allow F-1 students to remain in the U.S. only until they have completed their course of study, as the provision does not specifically mention post-graduation practical training. The court upheld the STEM OPT extension, reasoning that it is a valid exercise of DHS’ authority under in INA § 214(a)(1) to promulgate regulations that authorize an F-1 student’s stay in the U.S. beyond graduation. The court further noted that “practical training not only enhances the educational worth of a degree program, but often is essential to students’ ability to correctly use what they have learned when they return to their home countries. That is especially so in STEM fields, where hands-on work is critical for understanding fast-moving technological and scientific developments.” Judge Pillard, who authored the opinion, noted that the concept of post-coursework practical training for foreign students predates the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, pointing to a 1947 rule which “allowed foreign students ‘admitted temporarily to the United States . . . for the purpose of pursuing a definite course of study’ to remain here for up to eighteen months following completion of coursework for ‘employment for practical training’ as required or recommended by their school”. Practical training has been authorized even prior to the enactment of the INA in 1952.

While there is no explicit authorization in the INA for OPT, it has been around for over 70 years and predates the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as the court emphasized in Washtech.  Under Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978), Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts its statutes without change. One can argue the reverse of Lollilard v. Ponce in a challenge to a proposed DHS rule that would limit or eviscerate OPT. OPT is so baked into the longstanding interpretation of  INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i) ought to be, which allows a student to enter the U.S. in F-1 status to complete a course of study, and affords additional time beyond the course of study through Optional Practical Training. This is how Congress intended § 101(a)(15)(F)(i) to operate over the several decades even as it amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 several times. Thus, any curtailment of OPT would arguably not be authorized under INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i).

Any efforts by the Trump administration to abolish OPT could also be vulnerable to challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Abolishing OPT would clearly have a devastating impact on U.S. schools, as international student are likely to enroll in fewer numbers if they cannot pursue practical experience in their fields of study. Perhaps the Trump administration would argue that international students in the workforce limit the ability of U.S. workers to get jobs. However, any attempt to argue that international students attending U.S. schools do not add value to the United States appears to clash with INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i), which makes clear that international student are a Congressionally authorized category of nonimmigrant visa classification, which is implicitly beneficial to the US.

In 2020, in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, the Supreme Court held that the Trump administration had run afoul of the APA when it rescinded the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Cyrus Mehta discussed this case in a prior blog. The Court found the rescission of DACA to be “arbitrary and capricious,” noting that “[w]e do not decide whether DACA or its rescission are sound policies,” but only “whether the agency complied with the procedural requirement that it provide a reasoned explanation for its action. Here the agency failed to consider the conspicuous issues of whether to retain forbearance and what if anything to do about the hardship to DACA recipients.” Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion faulted the administration for not factoring reliance interests, as DACA recipients had enrolled in degree programs, embarked on careers, started businesses, purchased homes, and even married and had children, all in reliance on the DACA program. The consequences of the rescission would “radiate outward” to DACA recipients’ families, including their 200,000 US citizen children, to the schools where DACA recipients study and teach, and to the employers who have invested time and money in training them. Justice Roberts also cited a Brief for 143 Businesses as Amici Curiae, which estimated that hiring and training replacements would cost employers $6.3 billion.  In addition, excluding DACA recipients from the lawful labor force may result in the loss of $215 billion in economic activity and an associated $60 billion in federal tax revenue over the next ten years. The reliance interests at issue in any effort to rescind OPT would be similarly weighty. International students enroll in degree programs and pay tuition to U.S. universities in reliance on the assumption that they will be able to gain practical experience in their field of study through OPT employment after graduation. If international students are deterred from studying in the U.S., American universities will suffer, as will U.S. employers who can no longer employ talented foreign graduates. Economists too find OPT to be an economic boon to America  and prohibiting OPT will find it musth more difficult for US companies to  retain talent.

Trump does not only want to attack and curb practical training but also  wants to prevent international students from having the opportunity to come to the U.S. and study at Harvard, America’s most prestigious university. Without international students, who should be able their mind or express their views without fear, Harvard will not be Harvard and the American University that has long commanded respect and prestige throughout the world will sink in Trump’s swamp. Finally, Trump has also detained and attempted to remove foreign students for expressing lawful speech that his administration disfavors, and so far the courts are pushing back on grounds that their detention was retaliatory and unconstitutional as we have discussed in our blog on our client  Mohsen Mahdawi’s successful challenge to his unlawful detention.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Federal Judge Releases Mohsen Mahdawi After Being Detained for  Lawful Speech

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On April 30, 2025, Judge Geoffrey Crawford of the United Stated District Court for the District of Vermont ordered in Mahdawi v. Trump that our client, Mohsen Mahdawi, a long-time lawful permanent resident and Columbia university student activist advocating for the human rights of Palestinians, be released from ICE detention.

Mahdawi’s arrest, like that of fellow activist Mahmoud Khalil, was based on his lawful speech that is disfavored by the Trump administration.  A determination issued by Secretary of State Marco Rubio on March 15, 2025 alleges that Mahdawi’s involvement in pro-Palestinian activism “undermines U.S. policy to combat anti-Semitism around the world and in the United States, in addition to efforts to protect Jewish students from harassment and violence in the United States” and “potentially undermine[s] the peace process underway in the Middle East by reinforcing anti-Semitic sentiment in the regional [sic] and thereby threating the U.S. foreign policy goal of peacefully resolving the Gaza conflict.”

Mahdawi was arrested on April 14, 2025 at the conclusion of his naturalization interview at a USCIS office in Vermont. Following his arrest, ICE attempted to move Mahdawi to Louisiana, but before ICE was able to make him board a flight to Louisiana,  Judge William K. Sessions III of the United Stated District Court for the District of Vermont granted a temporary restraining order preventing him from being removed from the state. This was based on a  habeas petition that was quickly filed which asserts that Mahdawi’s detention violated his constitutional rights. More background information about the case is available on the ACLU’s website.

Mahdawi’s release comes as the first major victory in the case. In his decision ordering Mahdawi’s release, Judge Crawford called the setting of the case “extraordinary” and noted that “Legal residents – not charged with crimes or misconduct – are being arrested and threatened with deportation for stating their views on the political issues of the day. Our nation has seen times like this before, especially during the Red Scare and Palmer Raids of 1919-1920 that led to the deportation of hundreds of people suspected of anarchist or communist views”. Mahdawi thanked his supporter and gave a comment outside the courthouse following his release, stating “We are pro-peace and anti-war”. In a May 2, 2025 op ed in the New York Times, Mahdawi echoed these sentiments, stating:

Despite spending 16 nights in a jail cell, I never lost hope in the inevitability of justice and the principles of democracy. I wanted to become a citizen of this country because I believe in the principles that it enshrines. When Judge Geoffrey W. Crawford ruled in my favor, he reassured me, along with the American people, that there is still reason to hope in those principles. But the road to justice is long. My freedom is intertwined with the freedom of the other students, who exercised the same free speech rights as I did yet languish in jail, and is intertwined with that of the Palestinians, who are fighting for their right to life and justice, too.

The American government accuses me of undermining U.S. foreign policy, a patently absurd pretext for deportation for political speech that the Trump administration dislikes. The government is scraping the bottom of the barrel in its attempts to smear me. My only “crime” is refusing to accept the slaughter of Palestinians, opposing war and promoting peace. I have simply insisted that international law must be respected. I believe the way to a just and long-lasting peace for Palestinians and Israelis is through diplomacy and restorative justice.

 

Although Mahdawi’s release is only the first step, his case sends an important message that a noncitizen cannot be detained solely due to his lawful speech that the administration disfavors. His release under the pending habeas petition in the federal court in Vermont is quite separate from the removal case under which the Trump administration wants to deport him under INA 237(a)(4)(C). A noncitizen can be removed under this provision if the Secretary of State has determined that the noncitizen’s presence or activities, even if lawful,  would potentially have serious adverse foreign policy consequences.    In his decision to release  the pending habeas petition, Judge Crawford ruled that Mahdawi met the heightened standard by demonstrating a “substantial claim” and “extraordinary circumstances” under Mapp v. Reno. The substantial claims asserted by Mahdawi were the infringement of his First Amendment and due process rights, as well as the impact of detention on the efficacy of the habeas remedy. The extraordinary circumstances present in the instant case included the lack of a flight risk or danger to the community posed by Mahdawi, as well as the broader-reaching implications of permitting a lawful permanent resident to be detained based on protected speech. Judge Crawford also took into consideration the fact that Mahdawi’s arrest after the naturalization interview was a honey trap, stating that he “presented himself at the USCIS office in Colchester even though he had suspicions that he would be detained”.

There are over 12.7 million lawful permanent residents in the United States, many of whom may now fear that they will suffer the same fate, if they post on social media, write op-eds, or publish research that may come in the cross hairs of this administration. There are also millions of foreign students and noncitizens on temporary visas who risk detention based on lawful speech that the administration does not like.  As Judge Crawford stated in his decision, “Noncitizen residents like Mr. Mahdawi enjoy First Amendment rights in this country to the same extent as United States citizens”. They must be free to exercise those rights without fear of arrest, imprisonment, or deportation. Mahdawi himself urged his supporters to “Stay positive and believe in the inevitability of justice.”

The Trump administration has already appealed this decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and the legal team representing Mahdawi, which includes our law firm; the ACLU; ACLU of Vermont, Luna Droubi of Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP; Andrew Delaney of Martin Delaney & Ricci Law Group; and CLEAR. will continue to vigorously defend Judge Crawford’s decision upholding the freedom to speak without fearing retaliation or punishment. We are inspired by Mahdawi’s optimism and belief in the inevitability of justice.

 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

DHS Reverses Course, Restores Student SEVIS Records—But Future Remains Uncertain

In the wake of a wave of dozens of lawsuits and emergency court orders following sudden revocations of the visas of foreign students and scholars and deletion of thousands of Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) records by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) without notice or explanation, which have thrown foreign students’ lives into chaos, the agency suddenly reversed course on April 25, 2025, and restored many foreign students’ SEVIS records, along with their legal status. 

The administration sent out mixed signals, however, as DHS officials were quoted as saying that this action was temporary while the agency worked on a new, unspecified policy. Tricia McLaughlin, a DHS spokesperson, said, “We have not reversed course on a single visa revocation. What we did is restore SEVIS access for people who had not had their visa revoked.” A statement from a government attorney in one of the lawsuits said, “ICE is developing a policy that will provide a framework for SEVIS record terminations. Until such a policy is issued, the SEVIS records for plaintiff(s) in this case (and other similarly situated plaintiffs) will remain Active or shall be re-activated if not currently active and [U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement] will not modify the record solely based on the NCIC finding that resulted in the recent SEVIS record termination.”

“It is good to see ICE recognize the illegality of its actions canceling SEVIS registrations for these students. Sad that it took losing 50 times. What we don’t yet know is what ICE will do to repair the damage it has done, especially for those students who lost jobs and offers and had visas revoked,” said Charles Kuck, an attorney for some of the foreign student plaintiffs. Some affected students have already left the United States, while others are in hiding or not attending class, according to reports

Colleges and universities have had to deal with the uncertainty and other effects of these actions on their students, scholars, and programs; their ability to conduct research; and concerns about whether U.S. universities will be able to attract top talent in the future.

Although many students can heave a sigh of relief and return to their classrooms, not all the terminations have been restored, and we know students in F-1 status waiting with baited breath for similar positive action. 

My colleague Jeff Joseph, ponders in a LinkedIn post:

“What remains unresolved, unfortunately, is the shrapnel that remains from this illegal action: 

(1) SEVIS has been restored, but the visas were also revoked as a result of the illegal SEVIS termination, and , guess what? Visa revocations are NOT subject to judicial review, so there may be no way to challenge that (although I am looking for brilliant minds to brainstorm with me on this); 

(2) The only way to challenge the visa revocation is in removal proceedings, but it is not entirely clear how a student would challenge a DOS determination in immigration court. The jurisdiction of the judge over a DOS determination is not entirely clear; 

(3) When your visa is revoked, you become deportable. So, all 4,700 of these students are still subject to arrest, transfer to Louisiana or Texas, detention, and deportation; unless we can figure out how to resolve number 3 above, this problem will haunt these students; 

(4) It is great that ICE is creating a policy about how and when they can terminate SEVIS and all, but that, itself, is illegal. ICE can’t create rules that moderate conduct and create penalties without doing so through formal rulemaking and notice and comment. So, creating this policy may solve part of the TROs, but attorneys will just amend the complaints to challenge the rulemaking power of the agency as well as the fact that it is ultra vires to when ICE is allowed to terminate status in the statute. They can’t create new reasons to terminate status that are not statutory; 

(5) Is SEVIS status or not? ICE has taken inconsistent positions on this in litigation and in their own public facing guidance and in prior litigation. The Courts want to know. DSOs want to know. Employers want to know. Students want to know; and

(6). Will the period between when the students registrations terminated and now considered lawful status? If not, that would impact future applications for change of status. Will USCIS recognize what ICE does in SEVIS and honor the reinstatement of status nunc pro tunc?

As you can see, we stopped the bleeding, but still need to deal with the surgery.”

How the Major Questions Doctrine Can Undo some of Trump’s  Policies, Including On Birthright Citizenship

By Cyrus D Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

Introduced by the Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022), the major questions doctrine holds that, “in certain extraordinary cases” where it is unclear whether an agency action was authorized by Congress, “given both separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent, the agency must point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ for the authority it claims”. Until now, the doctrine has largely been used by the conservative-majority Supreme Court to thwart Biden-era policies, but a recent New York Times op ed by Aaron Tang highlights the doctrine’s potential to be a tool in challenging Trump’s actions, including those relating to immigration. 

Lawsuits have been filed challenging Trump’s  tariffs questioning whether there is clear authorization as they present a matter of vast economic and political significance. Like his tariffs, Trump’s efforts to freeze federal funding, interfere with the states’ administration of their elections and slash the government using the Department of Government Efficiency “DOGE”) are all areas of major national significant that Congress has not authorized the president to decide, the lawsuits claim.

Even if the immigration arena, lawsuit’s invoking the major  questions doctrine challenging Trump’s modification of birthright citizenship question whether federal law has granted the president authority to revoke birthright citizenship. 

In a previous blog we examined the role of the major questions doctrine in the immigration context in Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“Washtech v. DHS”) and Texas v. DHS. The dissent in Washtech indicated that the issue of whether DHS’ 2016 Optional Practical Rule for students in F-1 visa status exceeds its statutory authority was a “major question”, and finding that the doctrine applied, directed the district court upon remand to examine whether DHS had the authority to issue OPT regulations under this principle. The major questions doctrine arose again in Save Jobs USA v. DHS, which involved a challenge to the regulation providing work authorization to some H-4 spouses.  There, the D.C. Circuit was not compelled by an argument that Washtech  should be disregarded because it did not address the major questions doctrine, holding that because Washtech had already interpreted the relevant regulations after West Virginia v. EPA, it remained good law. The court in Texas v. USA cited West Virginia v. EPA in holding that DHS had no Congressional authority to implement the DACA program. 

Trump may  be hoisted by his own petard through the major questions doctrine in a birthright citizenship case. Santa Clara County California, in a lawsuit aimed at blocking the implementation of the Trump administration’s executive order restricting birthright citizenship, invoked the major questions doctrine. On page 17 of its brief, Santa Clara County states: 

Even if Section 301(a) could be construed to leave any ambiguity about the meaning of the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” there is no basis for any argument that in 1952 Congress intended that such an ambiguity serve as a delegation of broad authority to the President to define the parameters of a statute, let alone a constitutional right. It is difficult to imagine any question of greater “economic and political significance” than the scope of a provision that describes what group of people constitutes the American polity and may participate in its sovereignty. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022) (statutory ambiguities should not lightly be construed to delegate decision making authority on major questions of economic or political importance). Given these stakes, it is untenable to read the INA as granting the President the authority to resolve or disturb the statutory meaning.

As Tang points out, the major questions doctrine was developed by the Supreme Court at a time when Chevron required the court to give broad discretion to agency decisions. As our previous blog discusses, courts may have now have more latitude to strike down agency actions since the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overturned Chevron and instructed courts to “exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the Administrative Procedure Act  requires”. 

The major questions doctrine can now serve as yet a further tool for courts to employ in resisting the Trump administration’s efforts to make sweeping and destructive changes to immigration law and policy through executive power. Another example is the Trump administration’s broad interpretation of the Alien Enemy Act beyond an armed conflict, to include migration and drug smuggling as an “invasion”, thus triggering sweeping executive removal power. Would the courts consider whether a matter of such “vast … political significance” ought to be decided by the executive branch absent clearer instruction from Congress under the major questions doctrine

 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Is Secretary Rubio’s Bare Bone’s Letter Deserving of Deference in Khalil’s Deportation Case?

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On April 11, 2025, Immigration Judge Jamee Comans in Louisiana ruled that Mahmoud Khalil, a Columbia University graduate and pro-Palestine activist, can be deported. Judge Comans stated that “the department has met its burden to establish removability by clear and convincing evidence”, referring to Rubio’s letter. She also declined to address Khalil’s constitutional claims, stating that the immigration court “is without jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the validity of this law under the Constitution”. Khalil can now appeal his case to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and ultimately to a court of appeals.

Our previous blog addressed Khalil’s case and considered how much deference should be afforded to the Secretary of State’s determination in the post-Chevron era. The immigration enforcement against Khalil is based INA 237(a)(4)(C)(i), which provides for the deportation of a noncitizen if the Secretary of State has determined that their presence or activities would have adverse policy consequences. Pursuant to 212(a)(3)(C)(iii), the government bears the burden of proving “by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the Secretary of State has made a facially reasonable and bona fide determination that an alien’s presence or activities in the United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States” in order to establish that a noncitizen is deportable under this provision. 

A two-page memorandum from Secretary of State Marco Rubio outlining that Khalil’s presence in the U.S. would have seriously adverse consequences on U.S. foreign policy has now been made publicly available. The analysis provided in Rubio’s memorandum is thin, and stately merely that the determination is based on Khalil’s participation in “antisemitic protests and disruptive activities” and “citations for unlawful activity during these protests” which “undermine U.S. policy to combat anti-Semitism around the world and in the United States, in addition to efforts to protect Jewish students from harassment and violence in the United States”. The determination references five attached exhibits, which do not appear to have been made available to the public. It does not appear that Secretary Rubio’s determination has been provided to the chairmen of the Judiciary and Foreign Affairs Committees of the House and to the Judiciary and Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate as required by INA 212(a)(3)(C)(iv) as yet.

As discussed at length in our previous blog, the 2024 Supreme Court decision Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which abolished Chevron deference, could provide a means of challenging the level of deference given to the Secretary’s determination.  Although a 1999 Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) case, Matter of Ruiz-Massieu, held that a determination letter from the Secretary of State “conveying the Secretary’s determination that an alien’s presence in this country would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States, and stating facially reasonable and bona fide reasons for that determination” is sufficient to satisfy INA 212(a)(3)(C)(iii),  this case was decided pre-Loper Bright. Secretary Rubio’s letter provided no thorough discussion of Khalil’s allegedly threatening or antisemitic activities. The letter of Secretary Christopher Warren in the Ruiz-Massieu case  was far more detailed that Rubio’s bare boned letter.  As such, it is hoped that a court of appeals will not give deference to the determination as proof that Khalil’s presence in the US is contrary to US foreign policy interests.

In a future case, an IJ ought not rubber stamp such a bare bones letter as it does not meet the facially reasonable and bona fide determination that the person’s presence or activities in the United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy. If an IJ is not courageous enough to do this, and the Board of Immigration Appeals rubber stamps the IJ,  the courts of appeals would certainly have the authority under Loper Bright to cast aside deference after being presented with such a meagre letter from the Secretary of State. This is in addition to also arguing that INA 237(a)(4)(C)(i) violates a person’s First Amendment rights, is void for vagueness and represents an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the executive

 *Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.