Cyrus Mehta

SEC v. Jarkesy and Loper Bright v. Raimondo: How the Supreme Court’s Dismantling of the Administrative State Impacts Immigration Law

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

The conservative majority Supreme Court recently issued two decisions that will have a major impact on the administrative state by transferring power from administrative agencies to the courts. We discuss both these cases and their impact on immigration law.

SEC v. Jarkesy

On June 27, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy. As discussed in our previous blog, Jarkesy involved an investment advisor who was charged with violations of securities law and challenged the SEC’s enforcement action on the grounds that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial, that “Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the SEC by failing to provide it with an intelligible principle by which to exercise the delegated power”, and that restrictions on the removal of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) violate Article II. It was feared that the outcome of Jarkesy could significantly impact the immigration court system, as the authority of Immigration Judges (IJs) could be challenged using the same arguments advanced by Jarkesy.

The Supreme Court ultimately held that defendants are entitled to jury trials when the SEC seeks civil penalties against them for securities fraud. However, this holding appears unlikely to impede the ability of IJs to hear cases. In its opinion, the Supreme Court addressed concerns that its holding could reach beyond SEC administrative enforcement proceedings that replicate common law fraud. Citing Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (1909), a case that involved the imposi­tion of a monetary penalty on a steamship company accused of transporting immigrants afflicted with “loathsome or dangerous contagious diseases” to the United States, the Supreme Court clarified that Congress has the power to regulate immigration and even impose monetary fines for violations without triggering the right to a jury trial under the plenary power doctrine. Justice Robert’s majority opinion cited this case as on of the category of cases concerning public rights, including immigration law, which do not include a jury trial.  This discussion seems to exclude most, if not all, immigration-related matters from the Supreme Court’s holding in Jarkesy. On the other hand, one provision resembling common law fraud is the document fraud provision at INA 274C. An individual who is subject to an INA 274C hearing before an ALJ may wish to try to invoke Jarkesy to invalidate the hearing because it is a violation of their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Similarly, if there is an discrimination hearing under INA 274B based on an employee’s complaint, an employer may seek to invoke its right to a jury trial.

Since the Supreme Court did not review an appointments clause violation involving an ALJ, Jarkesy may not have impacted the Space X and Walmart lawsuits that have thus far successfully invalidate proceedings before the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, which handles cases involving unfair employment practices, document fraud and noncompliance record keeping requirements. These will be dealt with at a later time in another case.

Although Jarkesy only struck down as unconstitutional the lack of a civil jury trial for civil penalties under securities law, Justice Sotomayor in her dissent identified at least two dozen agencies that impose civil penalties in administrative proceedings including CFPB, CFTC, EPA, FCC, FDA, FMC, FMSHRC, FRA, DOJ, DOT, FERC, HHS, HUD, MSPB, OSHA, Treasury, USDA, and USPS.

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimando

Another recent Supreme Court decision may, on the other hand, have wide reaching impacts on immigration. In its June 28, 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court abolished the long-standing Chevron doctrine.  Under this doctrine, courts were required to defer to the government agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, stated that “Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires”, but made clear that prior cases decided under the Chevron framework are not automatically overruled. It is likely that courts will revert to Skidmore deference, the lower-level framework that preceded Chevron, which asserts that the level of deference an agency’s decision merits depends on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 (1944).

In a previous blog, we discussed the possible impacts of the elimination of Chevron deference, including the idea that it may open the door for challenges to a number of unfavorable immigration policies. For example, 20 CFR 656, which requires employers to place outdated print advertisements in Sunday newspapers as part of the labor certification recruitment process could now be vulnerable to challenges. INA §212(a)(5) states only that a noncitizen is deemed “inadmissible unless the Secretary of Labor” certifies, inter alia, that “there are not sufficient [U.S.] workers who are able, willing, qualified…and available at the time of application”, and imposes no requirement on employers to conduct recruitment to establish a lack of U.S. workers. Post Chevron deference, courts may be more reluctant to defer to DOL’s interpretation of INA § 212(a)(5) as set forth in 20 CFR 656, which requires compliance with onerous recruitment steps including the placement of print ads. Moreover, the Supreme Court also issued Corner Post v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System further widening the window to challenge regulations beyond the 6-year statute of limitations until the plaintiff is injured b final agency action.

USCIS’ “final merits determination”, the second component of a two-part test for determining whether an applicant has satisfied the criteria for extraordinary ability, outstanding researcher and professor, and exceptional ability immigrant visa petitions may now be more ripe for legal challenges, as well. This requirement arose from USCIS’ interpretation of dicta referencing a “final merits determination” in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Kazarian does not actually impose a final merits determination, nor does this requirement appear anywhere in the relevant regulatory criteria. It may now be possible to attack unfavorable interpretations such as the  BIA’s restrictive definition of “particular social group” under Matter of M-E-V-G , or the BIA’s narrow interpretation of INA §203(h)(3) under Matter of Wang, which precludes many derivative beneficiaries of visa petitions who did not get protection under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) from retaining their parents’ priority dates. The Supreme Court affirmed Matter of Wang purely under Chevron deference in Scialabba v. Osorio.

On the other hand, the future of other, beneficial immigration policies is rendered uncertain without Chevron deference. F-1 OPT is an exercise of DHS’ discretion and not explicitly authorized by statute. F-1 OPT has already been challenged, and was upheld by the First Circuit in 2022 in WashTech v. U.S. under Chevron deference. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a discretionary benefit that has been the subject of numerous legal challenges, could also be vulnerable without Chevron. Even if Chevron no longer helps, there is a statutory basis for the USCIS to issue work authorization to noncitizens under INA § 274A(h)(3) and to set time and other conditions for nonimmigrants under INA § 214(a)(1).

The demise of Chevron also brings about the fall of Brand X. As discussed in our prior blog, the Supreme Court in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) held that an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute may still be afforded deference even if a circuit court has interpreted the statute in a conflicting way. Brand X has been a double edged sword – although allowed agencies to interpret statutes in a way that was detrimental to immigration, it also allowed for the possibility of creative beneficial interpretations notwithstanding contradictory circuit court precedent. Brand X could have been harnessed to allow derivative family members to be counted together with principal applicants in the employment-based (EB) and family based (FB) visa preference categories under INA § 203(d), as the plain text of §203(d) does not require separate counting of derivatives. Although Wang v. Blinken, No. 20-5076 (D.C. Cir. 2021) held that derivative family members must be counted separately in the EB-5 context, Brand X could have allowed an immigrant-friendly presidential administration to issue a policy memorandum overruling the case everywhere else.

Brand X has  also been employed to the detriment of immigrants. In his concurrence in Loper Bright v. Raimondo, Justice Gorsuch pointed to De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1165 (CA10 2015), in which the BIA had invoked Chevron to “overrule a judicial precedent on which many immigrants had relied” in the 10th Circuit. That precedent was Padilla–Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F. 3d 1294 (CA10 2005), which held that a noncitizen subject to the permanent bar could nonetheless adjust pursuant to INA § 245(i). According to Justice Gorsuch, who clearly dislikes Brand X:

“The agency then sought to apply its new interpretation retroactively to punish those immigrants—including Alfonzo De Niz Robles, who had relied on that judicial precedent as authority to remain in this country with his U. S. wife and four children…Our court ruled that this retrospective application of the BIA’s new interpretation of the law violated Mr. De Niz Robles’s due process rights…But as a lower court, we could treat only the symptom, not the disease. So Chevron permitted the agency going forward to overrule a judicial decision about the best reading of the law with its own different ‘reasonable’ one and in that way deny relief to countless future immigrants.”

Its problematic aspects aside, Brand X was a tool for reversing unfavorable circuit court decisions, but has now fallen along with Chevron. In Matter of F-P-R-, 24 I&N Dec. 681 (BIA 2008), for example, the BIA declined to follow the Second Circuit’s decision in Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172 (2d Cir 2006), and held that the one-year period in which a timely application for asylum may be made runs from the applicant’s literal “last arrival” even when that last arrival followed a relatively brief trip outside the United States pursuant to advance parole granted by immigration authorities (which the Second Circuit had held would not restart the one-year clock). Also  in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012) (regarding travel on advance parole by one who has accrued unlawful presence) that could be read as pointing in this direction, the BIA in Arrabally made much of the fact that it was addressing an aspect of the law that the petitioner in the Third Circuit’s previous decision in Cheruku v. Att’y Gen., 662 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2011), had not challenged, see Matter of Arrabally, 25 I&N Dec. at 775 n.6. With the fall of Chevron, Arrabally might also be vulnerable although it remains to be seen whether a state or organization, which tries to challenge Arrabally  and other immigration policies may get standing to sue. In United States v.  Texas, the Supreme Court held that Texas and Louisiana had no standing to challenge the Biden administration’s enforcement priorities. Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh said: “The States have brought an extraordinarily unusual lawsuit. They want a federal court to order the Executive Branch to alter its arrest policies so as to make more arrests. Federal courts have not traditionally entertained that kind of lawsuit; indeed, the States cite no precedent for a lawsuit like this.” In the face of United States v. Texas, it could be harder for states to argue that they have standing to challenge Arrabally or other policies.

While many are fearing that the undoing of Chevron will unleash an environmental, consumer, food and drug safety free for all, AILA is viewing the decision in a more positive light. AILA’s president Kelly Stump responded to Loper Bright as follows:

“The Loper Bright and Relentless cases had nothing to do with immigration law and policy, but SCOTUS overturning the longstanding Chevron doctrine will have a significant impact on many immigration adjudications. This now means that an agency’s interpretation of the INA doesn’t automatically prevail, which could level the playing field for immigrants and their families and employers. In removal cases, those seeking review of immigration judges’ or Board of Immigration Appeals decisions should now have more opportunity to do so. Employers seeking to obtain a favorable interpretation of a statute granting H-1B or L visa classification to a noncitizen worker may also benefit. We note possible negative consequences as well, as the decision has severely handicapped the executive branch’s power to modernize our immigration system through policy updates or regulations. Valuable immigration benefits created by regulations may be threatened if not clearly based on statutory language. With this ruling, SCOTUS is punting the rule making process back to Congress. We hope Congress takes the initiative to come together in a bipartisan fashion to legislate sensible solutions that make our immigration system reflective of our modern-day realities.”

Notwithstanding Stump’s upbeat view, not everybody will benefit from the fall of Chevron. The most vulnerable being DACA recipients whose cases is being heard at the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Stump too acknowledges that “valuable immigration benefits created by regulations may be threatened if not clearly based in statutory language. “ If the Fifth Circuit and then the Supreme Court find DACA unlawful, Congress will need to step in to save DACA recipients. This remains wishful thinking as Congress has never been able to pass meaningful immigration reform in recent times. Chevron provided the bulwark for an immigrant friendly administration to pass meaningful immigration reform through executive action  thus providing ameliorative relief to hundreds of thousands of nonimmigrants. Some programs involving parole have a statutory basis under INA 212(d)(5) and will continue but other programs without explicit statutory language may be susceptible to challenge.  Without Chevron and Congress stepping up, the rug has been pulled under the feet of vulnerable noncitizens.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Cyrus Mehta

The Uncertain Path of the D-3 Waiver for DACA Recipients under Biden’s New Immigration Initiative  

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On June 18, 2024, the Biden administration announced two new immigration initiatives aimed at keeping families together. The first is a “parole in place” program which will provide a pathway for undocumented spouses of U.S. citizens to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs). In order to be eligible, the noncitizen spouse must have entered the U.S. without admission or parole and hold no immigrant or nonimmigrant status, and “must – as of June 17, 2024 – have resided in the United States for 10 or more years and be legally married to a U.S. citizen, while satisfying all applicable legal requirements.” DHS will evaluate these applications on a case-by-case basis, and will afford approved applicants a three-year period in which to apply for permanent residence.

The other process will enable Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients to more easily obtain employment-based visas. The measure will allow “DACA recipients and other Dreamers, who have earned a degree at an accredited U.S. institution of higher education in the United States, and who have received an offer of employment from a U.S. employer in a field related to their degree, to more quickly receive work visas.” Although many details about this measure are still forthcoming, it appears to involve the expedited issuance of an INA § 212(d)(3) waiver (D-3), which waives many grounds of inadmissibility, including the 3 and 10 year bars that arise from unlawful presence. In a news release corresponding with the Biden administration’s announcement, the U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs stated: “As part of this initiative, the Department will clarify existing guidance to consular officers related to when they should consider recommending that DHS grant a waiver of ineligibility, where applicable… These clarifications will describe when consular officers should consider recommending that the Department of Homeland Security waive ineligibility for these applicants on an expedited basis, in conjunction with visa applications overseas.  However, the processing steps will remain the same.” The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) will also be updated to “encourage consular officers to consider recommending expedited review of waiver requests in conjunction with certain nonimmigrant visa applications overseas, consistent with existing Department regulations and guidance…This will result in certain individuals to potentially more quickly receive work visas if DHS approves a waiver of ineligibility.”

Although DACA recipients can at present apply for a D-3 waiver in order to obtain an employment-based nonimmigrant visa, this process is rarely used in practice. When a DACA recipient who has been unlawfully present in the United States for a lengthy period of time leaves the United States to apply for an employment-based visa at a U.S. consulate abroad, they are likely to trigger the 3- or 10-year bars pursuant to INA § 212(a)(9)(B).Under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) a person who is unlawfully present for more than 180 days but less than 1 year, and who voluntarily departs the US prior to the commencement of proceeding is inadmissible if they seek admission within 3 years from the date of departure. Under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) a person who has been unlawfully present for more than one year, and who again seeks admission within 10 years from the date of the departure is inadmissible.

Minors do not accrue unlawful presence under INA§ 212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I), so a DACA recipient who applied for and received DACA before the age of 18.5 years would not trigger the 3- or 10- year bars. Since the grant of DACA stops the accrual of unlawful presence, they would have accrued less than 180 days of unlawful presence. An individual who obtained DACA after the age of 18.5 years and before 19 would trigger only the 3- year bar, having accrued more than 180 days but less than one year of unlawful presence. DACA recipients who obtained the benefit after the age of 19 would have been unlawfully present in the U.S. for a year or more, and would face the 10-year bar. Individuals could enroll in the DACA program up until they reach age 31, and participation in the program was  highest among those who were well over 18, so many DACA recipients will unfortunately face the full 10-year bar.

The question of whether or not the waiver will be granted is also a purely discretionary determination made by a consular officer, and the waiver application can take months to be adjudicated. The Foreign Affairs Manual directs consular officers to “consider the following factors, among others, when deciding whether to recommend a waiver: The recency and seriousness of the activity or condition causing the applicant’s ineligibility; The reasons for the proposed travel to the United States; and The positive or negative effect, if any, of the planned travel on U.S. public interests. Whether there is a single, isolated incident or a pattern of misconduct; and Evidence of reformation or rehabilitation.”  Thus, DACA recipients, and their prospective employers, currently have little assurance that a D-3 waiver will be granted when they leave the country for consular processing. If the waiver is not granted, the DACA recipient could be stranded outside the U.S. for up to 10 years.

Importantly, an individual can typically only spend a limited amount of time in an employment-based nonimmigrant status – for an H-1B nonimmigrant the maximum is 6 years – so DACA recipients who obtain an employment-based visa such as an H-1B will also need to find a path to remain in the U.S. on a long-term basis, including being sponsored for permanent residence by their employer. Even if the DACA recipient has received the D-3 waiver, this waiver only waives the ground of inadmissibility for the temporary nonimmigrant admission. If the DACA recipient is sponsored for permanent residence, the bars at INA § 212(a)(9)(B) will continue to trigger if the applicant applies for adjustment of status or applies for an immigrant visa overseas. Hence, they will need to wait for 3 or 10 years before they can get admitted as lawful permanent residents. Under USCIS policy, the 3 and 10 year bars can be spent in the US, which we have extensively discussed in a prior blog. The question is how can one wait for 10 years in lawful nonimmigrant status in the US before they can apply for adjustment of status?

Many DACA recipients are natives and citizens of Mexico or South American countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, or El Salvador, so they are likely to be eligible to file an employment-based adjustment of status application much more quickly than a beneficiary from a backlogged country such as India or China. In the June 2024 Visa Bulletin, for example, the Final Action Date for the employment-based third preference category (EB-3) is November 22, 2022 for India and the “rest of world”, but for India it is August 22, 2012. However, §104(c)  the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21)  allows a beneficiary’s H-1B status to be extended for three years at a time if they are the beneficiary of an employment-based I-140 immigrant visa petition, and are eligible to adjust status but for backlogs, caused by per-country limitations, in the employment-based first (EB-1), second (EB-2), or third preference (EB-3) categories. The H-1B status can be extended every three years until the backlogs caused by the per country limitation clears.  Because the priority date is likely to become current far more quickly for former DACA recipient not born in India who are the beneficiaries of I-140 petitions, they will be at a disadvantage when it comes to obtaining H-1B extensions beyond the sixth year, as they need to spend 10 years in the US before they can overcome the 212(a)(9)(B) ground of inadmissibility, which could complicate the process of remaining in a valid nonimmigrant status while they wait to apply for adjustment of status. An H-1B worker can also obtain a one year H-1B extension under AC21 §106(a) if at least 365 days have elapsed since the filing of a labor certification with the DOL or an immigrant visa petition with USCIS. See 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D). However, noncitizens are precluded from availing of this extension if they do not file for adjustment of status within one year of visa availability. 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D)(10). DACA recipients waiting to overcome 212(a)(9)(B) inadmissibility are thus unlikely to benefit from this provision.

Some DACA recipients may opt for the L-1 nonimmigrant path if they spend one year abroad for a subsidiary, parent, or branch of their US employer in a qualifying executive, managerial or specialized knowledge capacity. However, beware, that unlike one in H-1B status who may be able to keep on applying for extensions under AC 21, the shelf life of the L-1A status is 7 years, and 5 years for the L-1B status, as AC21 does not apply to L-1s. One way to get around spending 10 years in the US to overcome 212(a)(9)(B) inadmissibility is if the applicant is eligible for a waiver under INA §212(a)(b)(b)(v), which is based on a showing of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative such as a spouse or parent is a US citizen or lawful permanent resident. If an applicant has such a qualifying relative, they need not wait out the entire 10 years and can waive the ground of inadmissibility.

In conclusion, obtaining the D-3 waiver only allows the DACA recipient who faces the 3 or10 year bar to be admitted into the US as a nonimmigrant. If the DACA recipient needs to obtain permanent residence, they must either wait it out for 3 or 10 years in a nonimmigrant status before they can get admitted as permanent residents, or they need to qualify for a second waiver under INA 212(a)(b)(b)(v). Most DACA recipients may be better off remaining in DACA status rather than exchanging it for H-1B nonimmigrant status. Once they are in H-1B nonimmigrant status, they will have to remain with the employer who sponsored them and will not be able to seek employment in the open market so readily. Of course, the calculus of giving up DACA in exchange for the H-1B nonimmigrant status may change if the Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court deem DACA unlawful, or if President Trump is reelected and yanks DACA. It remains to be seen whether DACA could survive rescission efforts by a future Trump administration. When upholding DACA in 2020 in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, the Supreme Court found that the “reliance interests” of DACA recipients, who have enrolled in college, embarked on careers, started businesses, purchased homes, and married and had children in reliance on the DACA program, must be taken into consideration when deciding the future of the program. This case was discussed at length in a prior blog.

 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Granting Deferred Action to Aging Out Children in Lawful Status Is Preferable to Having Them Start All Over Again

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By Cyrus D. Mehta

Children of beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions that are caught in the employment-based backlogs are in danger of aging out if they turn 21 and are unable to obtain permanent resident status with their parents. Although the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) is able to protect the age of some children from aging out, not all children can benefit from the CSPA especially when neither the Date for Filing or the Final Action Date in the State Department Visa Bulletin is nowhere close to becoming current with respect to the I-140 petition filed on behalf of the parent. Indian born beneficiaries in the employment based first, second and third preferences are particularly impacted as the wait time before their priority dates become current can be an absurd  195 years. Over one million Indian born beneficiaries and their dependents will be waiting for the rest of their lives in the backlogs.

Although Congress can easily fix this problem by infusing more visa numbers in the employment-based categories along with reducing the per country limits, due to the intense polarization between the two parties and the obsessive focus on the border, those in Congress who desire to fix the problem are unable to get support to pass meaningful legislation.  On June 13, 2024, a bipartisan group of 43 members of Congress sent a letter  to Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Director Ur Jaddou requesting an administrative fix for children who will age out.

The letter requests three policy changes as follows:

First, “Clarify the applicability of potential grants of deferred action on a case-by-case basis, where discretion is warranted, for children of long-term visa holders who age out of status.”

Second, “Expand eligibility for Employment Authorization to child dependents of visa holders, and to individuals with approved I-140 petitions.” The letter also urges USCIS to expand eligibility for employment authorization (an EAD) under “compelling circumstances” to include “children who are aging out.”

Third, “We urge USCIS to create a process to allow children of long-term visa holders who have aged out to seek parole on a case-by-case basis, if warranted for urgent humanitarian reasons or to advance a significant public benefit.”

My views on this bipartisan letter have been extensively reflected in an article in Forbes written by Stuart Anderson of the National Foundation for American Policy, which are extracted below:

“The administrative proposals are both interesting and intriguing as they may only give a temporary benefit to the child who has aged out with no pathway to permanent residence,” said immigration attorney Cyrus Mehta. “Still, until Congress provides a legislative solution, these proposals, especially the first and second, would be an interim solution.”

A child granted deferred action can remain in the United States and obtain employment authorization. “The big disadvantage under this proposal is that once the parent had been granted permanent residence, what happens to the child?” said Mehta. “The child will have to remain a recipient of deferred action for a very long time until they can obtain their own basis to immigrate to the U.S.” A new presidential administration could rescind the deferred action, leaving an aged-out child in a situation similar to DACA recipients.

On the letter’s second proposal, Mehta explains while it would be good for dependent children to obtain EADs under compelling circumstances, “Children who age out and cannot protect their age under the Child Status Protection Act will not be able to obtain immigrant visas along with their parents.” A rule on the regulatory agenda that has not been issued would clarify and likely expand compelling circumstances for children at risk of aging out.

The letter also recommends granting employment authorization documents to the principal green card applicants waiting for permanent residence. “While granting EADs to beneficiaries of approved I-140s is a good thing, advocates should realize it will not lead to permanent residence if an individual changes jobs unless the new employer files the labor certification and I-140 again and the beneficiary is able to recapture the old priority date,” said Mehta. The child may not be protected from aging out depending on the circumstances.

The third proposal—being paroled into the United States—also does not offer a clear pathway to permanent residence. A future administration can choose not to extend parole. Depending on when a parent obtains permanent residence, sponsoring a son or daughter may be possible, although likely via consular processing.

While these proposals are less than ideal as they do not put aged out children on the path to permanent residence, an executive action that authorizes children to lawfully remain in the US long after they have aged out, and obtain work authorization and travel permission,  is preferable to the status quo.

Presently, a child who is turning 21 would most likely be in H-4 status while the parent who is caught in the backlog is in H-1B status. The child must seek to change status before turning 21 to another nonimmigrant status. Most children of skilled workers are studying in college, and so they can change to F-1 status. Requesting a change to F-1 status is fraught with peril. Changing to F-1 status is fraught with risk as  F-1  nonimmigrant classification requires one to have a temporary intent to remain in the US and ultimately return to a residence abroad, which has not been abandoned. It is difficult for a child in this situation who has been in the US for most of their life to demonstrate such a nonimmigrant intent. Furthermore, even if the child is successful in changing to F-1 status, travelling abroad is fraught with even greater risk as a US consul can deny the F-1 visa under INA 214(b), because the visa applicant has not overcome  the presumption of immigrant intent by sufficiently demonstrating that they  have strong ties to their home country that will compel them to leave the United States at the end of their temporary stay. H-1B and L visa applicants, along with their spouse and any minor children, are excluded from this requirement, but when the child has switched to F-1 status, they have to meet this requirement.

If this child was not born to an Indian born backlogged beneficiary, they would have obtained permanent residence along with the parent. Unfortunately, this child who has aged out  needs to start all over again in the labyrinthine immigration system like their parent has miserably experienced by first obtaining F-1 nonimmigrant status, then take their chance in the H-1B lottery. It is likely that most of them will not get selected in this lottery. If they are fortuitously selected, they can  seek an employer to sponsor them for permanent residency while not getting any credit for their parent’s priority date. They will need to establish a new priority date upon their employer sponsoring them for labor certification, and  filing an I-140 petition, and then they too will have to wait for more than a lifetime to obtain permanent residence unless they happen to marry a US citizen,  and get rescued from quotas  and file for adjustment of status.

Instead of stating all over again in F-1 status, if a child is granted deferred action, they are authorized to remain in the US and even work by applying for employment authorization. If the child wishes to travel, they can request advance parole. This is probably better than remaining in nonimmigrant F-1 status, and then trying to switch to H-1B status under the H-1B lottery. They will need to be a recipient of deferred action for a very long time until they get sponsored for permanent residence through an employer or as an immediate relative of a US citizen spouse or through a family member under one of the family preferences.

Although a new president can yank the deferred action, they will be more stable so long as they have deferred action rather than being thrown into vagaries of the US immigration system. They can also hope that at some point Congress will bless this executive action and provide a pathway for these children to apply for permanent residence and citizenship just as DACA recipients have been hoping and advocating for a long time.

Finally, I also favor advancing the “Dates of Filing” in the State Department Visa Bulletin as much as possible to allow those waiting in employment-based green card categories to file I-485 applications for adjustment of status. This action would enable individuals to obtain employment authorization documents, advance parole for travel purposes and protect the age of the child for an immigration filing.

 

 

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Ethical Obligation of the Public Official Lawyer Who Falsely Undermines the Criminal Justice System after Trump’s Conviction

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box

On May 30, 2024, Donald Trump was convicted of 34 counts of falsifying business records in New York, all in connection with his payment of hush money to adult film actress Stormy Daniels in advance of the 2016 election. Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe eloquently summarized on X the sense of justice that news of the convictions brought –  “Trump’s trial for 34 felony violations of NY law — violations w/out which he might well have lost the 2016 presidential election  — was a model of fairness that law students and trial judges will study for decades. There’s nothing here for any informed person to complain of.” Trump and his followers, however, promptly decried the trial as having been rigged, accusing Justice Juan M. Merchan, who presided over the trial, and the jury of being biased.

Trump quickly found ways to direct blame for the perceived unfairness of the trial at immigrants. In a disjointed monologue that he delivered outside of Trump Tower on the day after the trial, he stated that migrants are “coming in from mental institutions and insane asylums” and “[t]he Congo has just released a lot of people from jail – Congo, Africa – just released a lot of people, a lot of people, from their prisons and jails, and brought them into the United States of America.” (see here). He bafflingly added that these migrants originated “from places unknown, from languages that we … haven’t even heard of… [i]t’s not like Spanish or French or Russian.” He then concluded that New York City, where the trial was held, is corrupt and crime-ridden, stating “you have violent crime all over this city at levels that nobody’s ever seen before.” Republicans quickly followed suit in drawing parallels between immigrants and the supposed injustice of Trump’s convictions. Tucker Carlson stated on Twitter on May 30, 2024: “Import the Third World, become the Third World. That’s what we just saw. This won’t stop Trump. He’ll win the election if he’s not killed first. But it does mark the end of the fairest justice system in the world. Anyone who defends this verdict is a danger to you and your family.”

Other Republican leaders, too, denounced the outcome of the trial and questioned the impartiality of judge and jury. Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator for Florida, stated: “The verdict in New York is a complete travesty that makes a mockery of our system of justice. A political show trial conducted by an openly pro-Biden judge whose daughter makes money off the case, a jury from the most liberal county in America, absurd and ridiculous charges and outrageous jury instructions that guaranteed guilty verdicts. Biden and the Trump deranged left will stop at nothing to remain in power.” Senator J.D. Vance of Ohio issued a statement calling the verdict a “an absolute miscarriage of justice” and criticizing the “partisan slant of this jury pool”. Mike Johnson, Speaker of the House, said of the verdict “I do believe the Supreme Court should step in”.

These comments have the troubling potential to undermine confidence in the judicial systems of the United States. Trump and Carlson’s misguided criticism of the verdict and demonization of immigrants is, unfortunate though unsurprising. It is disappointing, though, that well-trained lawyers such as Rubio, Vance, and Johnson who are also elected officials would baselessly claim parroting Trump that the trial was biased. Pursuant to the state analogues to ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4 (c) and (d), lawyers must not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” or “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”. Although these are broad provisions it is unlikely that Rubio, Vance or Johnson would be subject to discipline as their baseless accusations against the criminal justice system may be protected under the First Amendment. Still, Rule 8.4 has been used broadly by disciplinary authorities against lawyers especially when their conduct has been prejudicial to the administration of justice. Comment 7 to Rule 8.4 imposes greater obligations on lawyers who are public official, which states that “[l]awyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer’s abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers.”

Critics have every right to disagree with the verdict reached against Trump, or to support his right to an appeal, but it is concerning to see Republican leaders who are also lawyers make blatantly untrue statements that could create the perception that the trial, or American judicial system as a whole, are unjust and undeserving of respect.

It is ironic that Trump, who as president imposed travel bans against people coming from Muslim-majority nations, will now  face bans from 37 countries including major allies such as Canada, Australia, and  the UK because of his felony convictions, although if he becomes president again, it is likely that these countries will make exceptions while he will continue to act ruthlessly towards immigrants in his own country. And finally, one cannot help but snigger at Trump who falsely accuses undocumented immigrants of being criminals and “poisoning the blood of our country” when he is now a confirmed felon!

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Who Are the Undocumented Immigrants That Would Become Targets of Trump’s Deportation Army If He Got Reelected

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By Cyrus D. Mehta

If Trump gets reelected, he has hinted that his administration will create a deportation force that would deport 15 million undocumented immigrants. Radley Balko’s  newsletter on substack,  Trump’s Deportation Army,  provides chilling details on how this deportation would be executed, which would be an unmitigated disaster for families, the US economy and the standing of the United States.

“The Trump immigration plan would be the second largest forced displacement of human beings in human history, on par with Britain’s disastrous partition of India, and second only to total forced displacement during World War II, ” Balko states.

According to New York Times’s columnist Jamelle Bouie in  Trump’s Taste for Tyranny Finds a Target immigrants would be the most easy target for Trump to play out his autocratic fantasies. Trump has already said that undocumented immigrants are “poisoning the blood of this country.” The Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii allowed Trump to enforce his Muslim ban.

Stephen Miller, the architect of Trump’s anti-immigrant policies,  has stated on Charlie Kirk’s show how this deportation force would fulfill Trump’s fantasy. The  deportation force would comprise agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Border Patrol and other federal agencies, as well as the National Guard and local law enforcement officials. They would look all over the  country for unauthorized and undocumented immigrants moving from state to state, city to city, neighborhood to neighborhood and, finally, house to house. These are people who in the view of Trump and Miller do not belong, not that because are not authorized but because they are also nonwhite and who are from what Trump once called “shithole” countries. By raiding workplaces and staging public roundups, this deportation force would create a climate of fear and intimidation.

Mistakes are bound to happen as legal immigrants and even US citizens may get caught up in the roundups. There could not be any notion of selective enforcement in these roundups, and those caught up in them would be because they appeared to be immigrants. There would be mass racial and ethnic profiling. And by the time this gets sorted out it may be too late if the person already got deported.

Moreover, one thinks of an undocumented immigrants as a person who entered the United States without inspection or who came to the US legally on a visa and overstayed. However, the term is broader to encompass persons who were previously unauthorized and who have been authorized to stay such as recipients of the Deferred Action of Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, applicants for Temporary Protected Status (TPS),  those who have pending asylum applications and applications for other relief such as under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) or crime victim U visas. There are also those who are on supervised release or who have obtained stays of removal and eligible for employment authorization year after year. All these noncitizens would be lumped together as undocumented immigrants that would be red meat for Trump’s deportation force.

Since it would be beyond the capacity to quickly deport the people caught up in these roundups, especially since countries may not even be willing to accept them easily, there would be holding facilities that would serve as staging centers on land near the Texas border. This would not be too dissimilar from internment camps, which were set up in the United States to detain Japanese Americans after the attack by the Japanese military on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

In addition to the round ups, the second Trump administration would sign an executive order to withhold passports, social security numbers and other government benefits from  children born of undocumented immigrants in the United States never mind that the Fourteenth Amendment says the exact opposite. Under Trump’s deportation plan, there would be no distinction between undocumented immigrants and children born to an undocumented immigrant in the United States. If there are going to be protests and resistance from people against agents storming homes, schools and religious places, Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act to mobilize the miliary and crush the resisters as well as his political opponents.

According to Bouie, “what we are seeing here from Trump isn’t simply a distaste for liberal values; it is a taste for genuine tyranny and bona fide despotism, one that complements his endless praise for dictators and strongmen.” Trump has already likened immigrants to invaders, and he can invoke an emergency, and thus a constitutional crisis,  to go ahead with deportations without waiting for the courts to rule, and  when they do rule, Trump’s hope is that the courts will rule in his favor, especially the Supreme Court, which have historically given deference to the executive branch on matters involving national security. This has happened time and time again with respect to court challenges to the internment of Japanese Americans, against the unlawful detention and abuses of noncitizens after the September 11 attacks and most recently in allowing Trump’s travel ban to pass, which was a major part of his election campaign in 2016 to ban Muslims from coming to the US, and in this reelection campaign for 2024, Trump promises to create a tyrannical force to deport millions of immigrants.

On this Memorial Day, as we reflect upon the sacrifices our military personnel have made to free America and the world from fascism and tyranny, think about how Trump can so easily unravel all of this through a deportation force that rips families apart, tears lives and fractures America.

 

David Isaacson

Harrow v. Department of Defense and What it Means for Immigration Cases: the 30-Day Time Limit for Filing a Petition for Review Is Still Very Important, But Probably Not Jurisdictional Anymore

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On May 16, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Harrow v. Department of Defense. While this case did not relate in any obvious way to immigration, its holding and reasoning has a significant implication for people seeking review of removal orders in federal court. Specifically, Harrow implies that the 30-day deadline for filing a petition for review of a removal order is not “jurisdictional”, in the sense of being something that cannot be waived and has no equitable exceptions. It is still crucial to file a petition for review in federal court within 30 days of a removal order if at all possible, but Harrow could give new hope to people for whom it was not possible to comply with this critical deadline.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, the only way to seek judicial review of an order of removal, with very rare exceptions, is a petition for review in the appropriate Court of Appeals. According to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), “The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” More than 29 years ago, the Supreme Court held in Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995), with respect to a previous version of the statute, that the time limit for filing a petition for review was “mandatory and jurisdictional” and “not subject to equitable tolling”. The conventional wisdom, expressed by such illustrious sources as the American Immigration Council’s practice advisory on petitions for review and others as well, has been that this is true of the current version of the statute as well. No matter how compelling the circumstances, that is, a petition for review filed outside of the 30-day time limit could not be considered. The remedy in extreme cases was to move the Board of Immigration Appeals (or other agency component that had issued a reviewable removal order) to reopen the proceedings and reissue its decision so that a timely petition for review could be filed. Motions to reissue are not readily granted, although a denial of a motion to reissue can itself be subject to judicial review, and the Courts of Appeals have sometimes granted petitions for review of a refusal to reissue and remanded to the BIA where there are potentially convincing allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, as in Zhao v. INS, 452 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2006), or possible failure by the BIA to send a decision properly, as in Jahjaga v. Att’y Gen., 512 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2008).

The Supreme Court held last year in Santos-Zacaria v. Garland that the requirement of exhaustion of remedies in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, but it did not address whether this was true of the 30-day deadline. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Harrow, however, suggests that the 30-day deadline is very likely not jurisdictional either.

The petitioner in Harrow, Stuart Harrow, had sought review by the Merits Systems Protection Board in 2013 regarding a six-day furlough. His case dragged on for years, because the Merits Systems Protection Board did not have a quorum of members for much of the time that the case was pending before it. By 2022, when the Merits Systems Protection Board finally decided Mr. Harrow’s case, his email address had changed, and he missed the initial notice of the decision. As a result, he also missed the deadline to file a petition for review of the decision: 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) provides that “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board.”

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Mr. Harrow’s untimely petition for review could not be considered, despite his explanation. As the Supreme Court explained:

The Court of Appeals declined Harrow’s request for equitable consideration, believing it had an absolute obligation to dismiss his appeal. The court reasoned that the 60-day statutory deadline is a “jurisdictional requirement,” and therefore “not subject to equitable tolling.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. “Harrow’s situation” might be “sympathetic,” the court stated, but it was also irrelevant. Ibid. Given the deadline’s jurisdictional nature, the court lacked the capacity to “excuse a failure to timely file based on individual circumstances.” Ibid.

Harrow, slip op. at 2.

The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with the Federal Circuit, holding that the deadline at issue in Harrow was not jurisdictional. Under recent precedent, the Supreme Court explained, it “will treat a procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress ‘clearly states’ that it is.” Harrow, slip op. at 3. The statute at issue in Harrow, the Supreme Court pointed out, contains “no mention of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction, whether generally or over untimely claims.” Id. at 5. Absent a clear mention of jurisdiction, current Supreme Court precedent generally holds time limits to be non-jurisdictional. There is an exception regarding a notice of appeal from one court to another, but as the Supreme Court explained, it is a limited one:

The Government identifies one kind of time limit that counts as jurisdictional, but we have already made plain its exceptional nature. As the Government notes, the Court held in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205 (2007), that the deadline for filing an appeal from a district court’s decision in a civil case is jurisdictional, even though the statute setting that limit does not say as much. See Brief for United States 24. In that decision, we reaffirmed a line of precedents pre-dating our current approach to such matters. See 551 U. S., at 209–210, and n. 2. But we have since taken care to delineate both where Bowles applies and where it does not. Bowles governs statutory deadlines to appeal “from one Article III court to another.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U. S. 17, 25 (2017). As to all other time bars, we now demand a “clear statement.” Id., at 25, n. 9. This case falls outside the Bowles exception because Harrow appealed to the Federal Circuit not from another court by from an agency.

Harrow, slip op. at 8. Thus, as a non-jurisdictional time limit, the 60-day limit for a petition for review in Harrow was presumptively subject to equitable tolling, although the government was given the opportunity to rebut that presumption on remand if it could (unless it had waived the issue, a question the Supreme Court also declined to resolve). Id. at 9.

The language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) relating to petitions for review of removal orders is very similar to the language of 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) that was at issue in Harrow. If anything, it is less emphatic, saying only that “The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” Unlike the deadline at issue in Harrow, the deadline for an immigration petition for review is not stated to operate “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” And like the petition for review at issue in Harrow, a petition for review in an immigration case does not involve an appeal from one Article III Court to another, as in Bowles, but rather involves court review of an agency decision. Thus, the conclusion seems inescapable that under Harrow, the petition for review deadline of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), like that of 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1), is not jurisdictional.

Courts of Appeals might still defer to Stone and find the petition for review deadline to be jurisdictional, because the Supreme Court has said in cases such as Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) that “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Arguably, following Harrow in the vast majority of current immigration cases would not require overruling Stone – which, as previously mentioned, concerned an earlier version of the statute – but would merely require declining to extend Stone’s holding regarding the former INA § 106 to the current INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252. But even if Courts of Appeals do follow Stone, as the Seventh Circuit did earlier this year despite Santos-Zacaria in F.J.A.P. v. Garland, at some point in the future, the Supreme Court, if it follows its unanimous decision in Harrow, should overrule this aspect of Stone.

Thus, in any case where exceptional circumstances have rendered it impossible to comply with the 30-day deadline to file a petition for review of a removal order, filing a late petition for review and citing Harrow is likely advisable, even if a motion to reissue the decision is also filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals to provide an alternate pathway to success. There is a good chance that those who preserve the issue will find, ultimately, that they have access to equitable tolling, if they meet the criteria for it.

It is important to keep in mind that it is not easy to qualify for equitable tolling, even in areas of law where equitable tolling is available. The Supreme Court held in Menominee Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250 (2016), quoting its earlier decision in Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), that “a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”

In cases of “extraordinary” attorney misconduct such as Holland, the Supreme Court has indicated that equitable tolling may apply. In that case,

Collins failed to file Holland’s federal petition on time despite Holland’s many letters that repeatedly emphasized the importance of his doing so. Collins apparently did not do the research necessary to find out the proper filing date, despite Holland’s letters that went so far as to identify the applicable legal rules. Collins failed to inform Holland in a timely manner about the crucial fact that the Florida Supreme Court had decided his case, again despite Holland’s many pleas for that information. And Collins failed to communicate with his client over a period of years, despite various pleas from Holland that Collins respond to his letters.

Holland, 560 U.S. at 652. If a similarly egregious attorney failure causes late filing of a petition for review of a removal order, Harrow suggests that equitable tolling may be available under Holland. Other extraordinary circumstances could also qualify, depending on the details.

Therefore, while the 30-day deadline for filing a petition for review of a removal order remains crucial, and should be complied with if at all possible, Harrow may give new hope to those who have been prevented by extraordinary circumstances from complying with that deadline.

Cyrus Mehta

Saving the Labor Certification for the Backlogged Beneficiary Even After the Job Has Changed

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In  “What if the Job Has Changed Since the Labor Certification Was Approved Many Years Ago” we discussed strategies for noncitizen workers who are eligible to file an I-485 adjustment of status application, but find that their job has changed since the approval of the I-140 petition, which may have been many years ago. When the essence of the job remains the same, but the role may have evolved over time or require the use of updated technologies, the blog suggested that one may arguably still rely on the original labor certification and I-140. At the adjustment of status stage, it can be explained that the new position is similar to the one described in the I-140 position, but there has been some progression in the job duties over time. Even if the salary has increased or the job title has been updated, these changes may not be material so long as the core duties of the position remain very similar.

This is unfortunately a common issue with Indian born beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions in the backlogged employment second (EB-2) and third (EB-3)  preferences.  They have not yet been able to file I-485 adjustment of status applications and are thus unable to exercise job portability. The labor certification may have been filed over 10 years ago for a job that has progressed as a result of changes in technologies with the advent of cloud computing and  machine learning. While filing a new labor certification followed by the filing of a new I-140, and capturing the old priority date, is the safest way to proceed, there is no guarantee that a new labor certification may be approved or could even be filed if the company has had layoffs in the same or related occupation in the past six months.

USCIS has provided little guidance on job changes after I-140 approval, but we refer you to a   2023 AILA practice  titled “Job Changes after the PERM Is Approved: Legal and Ethical Considerations for Experienced Practitioners Practice Advisory” by Loan Huynh, Cyrus Mehta and Christine Traversi. When a noncitizen employee’s job has changed or he has been promoted, USCIS provides the following guidance for purposes of job portability under INA 204(j) when an I-485 application has been filed and been pending for 180 days:

“If you change jobs or receive a promotion, USCIS will determine whether you remain eligible for a Green Card on a case-by-case basis and based upon the totality of the circumstances. You must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the relevant positions are in similar occupational classifications. For example, if you move into a more senior but related position which is non-managerial, USCIS will use the criteria explained above to determine whether you are primarily responsible for managing the same or similar functions of your original job or the work of persons whose jobs are in the same or similar occupational classification(s) as your original position.”

 Although this guidance is not clearly applicable outside the I-485 portability context, it suggests that demonstrating that a job remains in the same or a similar SOC code could be one way to establish that the position offered in the I-140 petition remains valid despite a promotion or progression in the duties.

The USCIS Policy Manual also provides guidance on job changes in the “successor in interest” context. When a company is sold, merged, or undergoes similar changes, “the new or reorganized company may demonstrate to USCIS that it can be considered a successor in interest (successor) of the original company to assume the predecessor’s prior immigrant benefits requests.” The Policy Manual states:

“The job offered in the successor-in-interest petition by the successor must remain unchanged with respect to the rate of pay, metropolitan statistical area, job description, and job requirements specified on the permanent labor certification. USCIS denies successor-in-interest claims where the position with the successor is changed such that the rate of pay, job description, or requirements specified on the permanent labor certification no longer relate to the labor market test.

 In other words, officers should deny any successor claim where the changes to the rate of pay, job description, or job requirements, as stated on permanent labor certification, if made at the time that the permanent labor certification was filed with DOL, could have affected the number or type of available U.S. workers who applied for the job opportunity. However, an increase in the rate of pay due to the passage of time does not affect the successor-in-interest claim.”

 

Extrapolating from the guidance provided in the successor in interest context, noncitizens workers whose jobs have changed since the labor certification or I-140 approval can possibly demonstrate that these changes would not have impacted the number or type of U.S. workers who applied to the original job opportunity.

However, when there are job changes outside INA 204(j) portability largely due to technological changes, practitioners must vigorously advocate that the essence of the position remains the same and that a new labor certification is not requited. Our firm’s recent anecdotal experience illustrates that challenges stemming from job changes after the approval of an I-140 petition can be overcome if it is demonstrated that the essential duties of the position remain the same. We assisted an individual who had applied for adjustment of status based on an I-140 petition that was approved some years ago. Since the approval of the I-140 petition and prior to filing the I-1485 application after many years, the employee had been promoted to a more senior job title and had taken on some more managerial job duties. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke (NOIR) the I-140 petition, arguing that the position outlined in the I-140 petition was no longer a bona fide job offer given the progression of the role. After responding to the NOIR and asserting that the substance of the position remained unchanged despite an evolution of some of the specific duties, the I-140 petition was preserved and the employee’s adjustment of status application was ultimately approved.

It is unfair and impractical for an employer to file a new labor certification whenever there is job progression due to the passage of time and technological change. Beneficiaries of  labor certifications also should not be bound by the same job for a decade or longer solely because they were born in a backlogged country like India. It  is hoped that the USICS applies common sense and flexibility in agreeing that a labor certification and corresponding I-140 petition do not get invalidated if there is a progression of the job so long as  the essential aspects of the job remain the same.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

[This blog is only for informational purposes and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice]. 

Cyrus Mehta

Can a Renaissance Person Ever Qualify for a US Visa Classification?

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Jessica Paszko*

Surely, USCIS would be hard-pressed to find that any one of the men who contributed to the founding of our great nation did not possess “extraordinary ability,” but would it draw the same conclusion about each of our Founding Fathers in the early days of their careers when their extraordinary abilities were spread across various fields? In that regard, does the U.S. employment visa system as it currently stands, propel the old saying that a “jack of all trades is a master of none” and rewards only those foreign nationals who are “masters” of a single field of endeavor? The “extraordinary ability” immigrant (EB-1A) and nonimmigrant (O-1) visas both require showing extraordinary ability in a specific field whether it’s the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics. USCIS likely would not be quick to approve the petition of a “Renaissance person” type of applicant whose acclaim is scattered among disparate fields, on the ground that the applicant can only be extraordinary in one field. Such a rigid view as to one’s abilities, however, is at complete odds with the very founding of the U.S. and the multifaceted individuals who had a finger in every pie and were artistic virtuosos in their own right when they weren’t doing things like drafting our founding document.

Apart from being the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, a president, political leader, diplomat, lawyer, architect, and philosopher, Thomas Jefferson was also a skilled violinist. Born on American soil, Thomas Jefferson did not have to try to persuade USCIS that he qualified for an extraordinary ability visa. However, suppose Thomas Jefferson had been a foreign national that came to the U.S. from the United Kingdom a few years ago as a nonimmigrant in H-1B status to work as a banking and finance lawyer for a Virginia law firm. In addition to his U.S. law degree which allows him to practice law in the U.S., Thomas had also previously earned a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy and English Literature with Shakespeare Studies. After meeting his billable hours and logging off for the day, he continued his hobby of playing the violin, sometimes even performing as a volunteer and posting performances on social media, eventually garnering some media coverage and a sizable online following. A volunteer gig as a violin performer at Virginia’s Renaissance Faire also opened the door to the world of acting for Thomas who found the portrayal of Shakesperean characters to be just as interesting as learning about Shakespeare’s literary works in the classroom. Thomas even decided to start his own LLC to serve as an expression of who he is and that would further his violin playing and acting but has yet to make it active. Never taking a dime from any of his musical or acting endeavors, Thomas continued his work at the Virginia law firm but was eventually let go after receiving a scathing performance review that tore apart his “17th century style of writing” and “seeming deep rooted animus towards large bank clients and the banking industry in general.”

Thomas does not mourn the loss of his job, nor does he look for a similar position at another banking and finance law firm. He never liked big banks anyway, and wants to embark on his own pursuit of happiness by way of his other talents. Thomas already has an LLC in place and wishes to go full steam ahead into launching his musical and acting career. Though Thomas lives by the proposition that “nothing can stop the man with the right mental attitude from achieving his goal,” he’ll first need to figure out if the rigid U.S. immigration system will be the thing that stops him from putting all his skills to use and forces him into a straitjacket.

The situation that our 21st century Thomas Jefferson has found himself in raises the question of whether the U.S. visa system allows foreign nationals to pursue interests outside the narrow purpose of their entry without jeopardizing their visa status?

Temporary nonimmigrant workers who come to the U.S. to work for a specific employer in a specific occupation may not be prevented from pursuing activities that are permissible under a tourist visa, such as playing amateur violin gigs or acting on a volunteer basis. There is nothing in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that prevents one from engaging in activities in a “phantom” status, provided such activities do not constitute unauthorized unemployment. This is recognized in the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) at 9 FAM § 402.1-3, which states that an “applicant desiring to come to the United States for one principal purpose, and one or more incidental purposes, must be classified in accordance with the principal purpose.” The FAM note provides the example of a student who prior to entering an approved school wishes to first make a tourist trip of not more than 30 days. The FAM instructs that the person should receive an F-1 or M-1 student visa rather than a B-2 tourist visa.

8 C.F.R. § 214.1(e) clearly prohibits unauthorized unemployment, providing that:

A nonimmigrant in the United States in a class defined in section 101(a)(15)(B) of the Act as a temporary visitor for pleasure, or section 101(a)(15)(C) of the Act as an alien in transit through this country, may not engage in any employment. Any other nonimmigrant in the United States may not engage in any employment unless he has been accorded a nonimmigrant classification which authorizes employment or he has been granted permission to engage in employment in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. A nonimmigrant who is permitted to engage in employment may engage only in such employment as has been authorized. Any unauthorized employment by a nonimmigrant constitutes a failure to maintain status within the meaning of section 241(a)(1)(C)(i) of the Act.

An employee is “an individual who provides services or labor for an employer for wages or other remuneration,” an employer is “a person or entity . . . who engages the services or labor of an employee to be performed in the United States for wages or other remuneration,” and employment is “any service or labor performed by an employee for an employer within the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f)–(h).

Furthermore, under 9 FAM § 402.2-4, an amateur who performs in the U.S. without compensation will not be in violation of their status. On the other hand, one who is a professional performer, or even one who is normally compensated for performing, will be in violation of their status if they perform in the U.S. without compensation and do not have the appropriate visa to do so.

Taken together, the FAM and regulations suggest that an employment-authorized-temporary worker can cross the line into unauthorized employment territory if they engage in a type of activity that is both (1) a form of employment (i.e., they provide services or labor to a person or entity in the U.S. for wages or other remuneration) and (2) a type of employment that was not contemplated when their nonimmigrant status was authorized. A visitor for business or pleasure is never employment authorized and would cross the line into unauthorized employment territory if they engaged in any kind of employment, i.e., by providing services or labor to a person or entity in the U.S. for wages or other remuneration. Therefore, both the amateur nonimmigrant worker who plays charitable gigs after work hours, and the B-2 visitor on a grand tour of the country’s amateur strings clubs who joins the nonimmigrant worker on stage, would not be in violation of their respective statuses unless they received remuneration for their entertainment services.

What if Thomas now wants to change status to O-1B classification based on the acclaim he has received as a violinist? He has been approached by a talent agency that wants to represent him, find him paid gigs, and take a cut from the money that he is paid through these gigs. Can he meet the O-1B criteria based on his performance as an amateur? Would USCIS accuse him of violating his status while he was on an H-1B visa? What if he wanted to qualify for an O-1B as both a violinist and an actor? Can he still work as a contract lawyer for an entertainment law firm while being represented by the talent agency? Another option is for Thomas to create his own startup entertainment company that can utilize all of his talents as a violinist, actor, and a lawyer. His friend James Madison is very keen to invest in this startup and become a shareholder, and manage the company on Thomas’s behalf as its CEO. James has great foresight in Thomas’s potential who he thinks will go down in history as one of America’s greatest iconic figures.

Thomas likely never violated his H-1B status when he played gigs without remuneration while he was employed by the Virginia law firm based on 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(e) and 9 FAM § 402.2-4. If Thomas wants to transfer his H-1B employment, his LLC can file an H-1B petition on Thomas’ behalf, an avenue that we already touched on in an earlier blog, or it can file an O-1 petition.

As artistic director of his LLC, Thomas would utilize his law degree to negotiate favorable contracts to secure acting and violinist jobs, and would also rely on the knowledge gained as part of his bachelor’s degree program in English Literature with Shakespeare Studies when auditioning for acting roles. With respect to the H-1B visa, however, it is unlikely the specialty occupation criteria under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) contemplate the combination of two degrees in such a manner. Fortunately, the O-1B criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iii) do not require a beneficiary to possess any degree, but they do pigeonhole the beneficiary into one “field of endeavor” of science, education, business, or athletics. For individuals in the arts, the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iv) require only “distinction” or “a high level of achievement in the field of arts evidenced by a degree of skill and recognition substantially above that ordinarily encountered to the extent that a person described as prominent is renowned, leading, or well-known in the field of arts.” If Thomas wants to act in movies or in commercials, there is a separate O-1B category for extraordinary achievement in the motion pictures or TV industry under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(0)(3)(v).

Having only previously performed as an amateur violinist, Thomas may find it difficult to demonstrate that he meets at least three out of the six O-1B regulatory criteria. For instance, performing gigs for free likely does not count as having “performed . . . services as a lead or starring participant in productions or events which have a distinguished reputation” under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iv)(B)(1) by the very fact that Thomas did not perform “services” since he was not paid. Fortunately, the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iv)(B)(3) does not require evidence of having performed services and only requires evidence of having performed “in a lead, starring, or critical role for organizations and establishments that have a distinguished reputation.” Assuming that USCIS would agree that an amateur performance by a violinist or actor who did not perform services for remuneration could satisfy this criterion, Thomas would still need to evidence his “lead, starring, or critical role” through articles in newspapers, trade journals, publications, or testimonials. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iv)(B)(4)–(5) require evidence of the foreign national’s “record of major commercial or critically acclaimed successes ” and receipt of “significant recognition for achievements from . . . recognized experts” which Thomas could argue is demonstrated through the media coverage he garnered and his sizable social media following.

The regulations make clear that an applicant possessing a number of talents in various fields of endeavors may not qualify as an individual of “extraordinary ability.” Even if Thomas chooses to self-petition for permanent residency through the EB-1A category, we will need to demonstrate that he has extraordinary ability in one of the fields he is pursuing, either as a violinist or actor. Of course, when he obtains permanent residency, he could broaden his horizons and pursue all his other interests.

Finally, Thomas, being a national of the United Kingdom, may also consider making a substantial investment in a U.S. enterprise, his startup, which he owns at least 50% of. So long as the investment is deemed to be substantial and the startup will not be a marginal enterprise, Thomas can obtain an E-2 visa to develop and direct this enterprise, thereby potentially performing all the activities that he is so passionate about that will grow the startup and also create employment opportunities for others in the U.S. Thus, while most other visa categories require the foreign national to pursue specialized and narrow activities that are consistent within the scope of the visa, Thomas might be able to fulfill his potential as a Renaissance man through the E-2 visa category.

The inability of the INA and regulations to classify multitalented foreign nationals as individuals of extraordinary ability presents another shortfall of the current U.S. employment visa system. Certainly, individuals who are the top percent of their field are to be applauded but to regard only them as possessing extraordinary ability may cause us to miss out on the kind of creative minds that have historically propelled the U.S. forward. Ironically, these top percenters of a single field would have once been seen as quite ordinary in relation to their multitalented peers. After all, as the old saying concludes: “A jack of all trades is a master of none, but oftentimes better than a master of one.”

 

*Jessica Paszko is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

The Much Neglected Schedule A, Group II Green Card Option Gets a Boost After USCIS Broadens the “Sciences or Arts” Definition

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On April 10, 2024, USCIS issued a policy alert clarifying the term “sciences or arts” for Schedule A, Group II occupations. Schedule A occupations are those for which the Department of Labor (DOL) has recognized that a shortage of U.S. workers exists. Group I occupations consist of physical therapists and professional nurses, while Group II occupations include “immigrants of exceptional ability in the sciences or arts, including college and university teachers, and immigrants of exceptional ability in the performing arts”. Schedule A occupations are “pre-certified” by the DOL, so employers are not required to conduct a lengthy and onerous test of the labor market or file an ETA-9089 with the DOL.

In its recent policy update, USCIS stated that “DOL, when designating Schedule A, Group II, defines science or art as any field of knowledge or skill with respect to which colleges and universities commonly offer specialized courses leading to a degree in the knowledge or skill.” Previously, these terms were not defined in the USCIS Policy Manual. This update could open up the Schedule A, Group II to encompass any field for which U.S. colleges and universities commonly offer a degree program. Noncitizens whose professions were not clearly a “science” or “art”, such as lawyers, businesspeople, and teachers, may now be able to avail of the Schedule A, Group II program. This broadening of the definitions of “science” and “art” follows the Biden Administration’s Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence to expand the availability of highly-skilled foreign nationals in the Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) and AI fields, as well as additional occupations across the economy, for which there is an insufficient number of ready, willing, able, and qualified United States workers.

However, the significance of this change should not be overstated as all the existing requirements for Schedule A, Group II designation still apply. For noncitizens in the sciences or arts, even under the expanded definition, this means that they must demonstrate exceptional ability in their field. Employers must provide a full-time offer of employment, and offer the beneficiary at least the prevailing wage. The employer must also provide notice of the position to a bargaining representative, or its employees. The specific requirements that USCIS outlines for each Schedule A occupation must also be met. In order to demonstrate “exceptional ability in the sciences or arts”, a beneficiary’s prospective employer must “submit documentary evidence showing the widespread acclaim and international recognition accorded to the beneficiary by recognized experts in the beneficiary’s field”. The beneficiary’s employment during the past year, as well as the position offered in the U.S., must also require exceptional ability.

Additionally, the beneficiary must meet at least two of the following seven criteria laid out in 20 CFR 656.15(d)(1):

  • Documentation of the beneficiary’s receipt of internationally recognized prizes or awards for excellence in the field;
  • Documentation of the beneficiary’s membership in international associations, in the field, which require outstanding achievement of their members, as judged by recognized international experts in their disciplines or fields;
  • Published material in professional publications about the beneficiary, about the beneficiary’s work in the field, which must include the title, date, and author of such published material;
  • Evidence of the beneficiary’s participation on a panel, or individually, as a judge of the work of others in the same or in an allied field of specialization;
  • Evidence of the beneficiary’s original scientific or scholarly research contributions of major significance in the field;
  • Evidence of the beneficiary’s authorship of published scientific or scholarly articles in the field, in international professional journals or professional journals with an international circulation; and
  • Evidence of the display of the beneficiary’s work, in the field, at artistic exhibitions in more than one country.

It is also important ensure that the “exceptional ability” criteria for Schedule A, Group II are not conflated with the criteria for an employment-based, second preference visa based on exceptional ability. In order to qualify for Employment-Based Second Preference (EB-2) classification, a noncitizen must hold an advanced degree or equivalent, or “be able to show exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business”. Exceptional ability for EB-2 purposes is defined as “degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered in the sciences, arts, or business”. Beneficiaries must also demonstrate that they meet at least three of the six criteria outlined in 8 CFR 204.5(k)(3)(ii):

  • Official academic record showing that you have a degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, university, school, or other institution of learning relating to your area of exceptional ability
  • Letters from current or former employers documenting at least 10 years of full-time experience in your occupation
  • A license to practice your profession or certification for your profession or occupation
  • Evidence that you have commanded a salary or other remuneration for services that demonstrates your exceptional ability
  • Membership in a professional association(s)
  • Recognition for your achievements and significant contributions to your industry or field by your peers, government entities, professional or business organizations

Other comparable evidence of eligibility is also acceptable.

Schedule A, Group II, provides an alternative basis for an employer to sponsor a noncitizen employee for permanent residence without going through the lengthy labor certification process in addition to the person extraordinary ability under the Employment-Based First Preference (EB-1) or the National Interest Waiver under EB-2.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

[This blog is only for informational purposes and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice].

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

To What Extent Can Walmart’s Successful  Blocking of an Administrative Law Judge in the Executive Office for Immigration Review  Extend to  Immigration Judges?

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box

On March 25, 2024 Chief Justice J. Randal Hall of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Statesboro Division granted Walmart’s motion for summary judgment in Walmart Inc. v. Jean King, which alleged that the administrative proceedings against the company for violations of immigration-related recordkeeping requirements should be halted because they were “being conducted by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who is unconstitutionally shielded from the President’s supervision. ALJs like Jean King, who was presiding over the proceedings against Walmart and is the Chief Judge within the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO), can be removed from their position only for “good cause” as determined by the Merits System Protection Board (MSPB) and by the president for “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”. Walmart alleged that this system violates the Constitution by insulating ALJs “from presidential control by two levels of removal protection”. Walmart argued that Article II of the Constitution, which commands the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, requires him to have the power to remove executive officers. Only two types of officers have been determined to be exempt from the President’s removal power – principal officers, who report directly to the President, and inferior officers, who are appointed by the President but supervised by others. See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020); United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1980 (2021). Walmart argued that ALJs do not within either of these exceptions, “so the removal scheme that protects them is unconstitutional twice over”. Judge Hall agreed with Walmart and granted the motion for summary judgement, finding that “the multilevel protection from removal present for the OCAHO ALJs is contrary to Article II, and contrary to the executive power of the President.”

 This case is just one in a string of recent examples of constitutional challenges to the authority of ALJs. In a previous blog, we discussed Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, which, in part, concerns whether the Congress’ decision to allow ALJs to be removed only for “good cause” violates Article II. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jarkesy in November 2023, and its decision in the case could have sweeping consequences for the future of ALJs. We also reported on SpaceX’s successful challenge against the DOJ’s prosecution of discrimination allegations against it under INA 274B. SpaceX’s Appointments Clause challenge was unique as it argued that the Attorney General, despite appointing OCAHO ALJs, does not review their decisions under INA 274B as an aggrieved party under  INA § 274B(g)(1) must seek review in the court of appeals.

Jarkesy and Walmart also raise the possibility about whether Immigration Judges (IJs), too, could face constitutional challenges. Like the OCAHO, they too are housed within the Executive Office for Immigration Review under the purview of the Department of Justice.

However, in Fortunato de Jesus Amador Duenas v. Garland, the Ninth Circuit rejected an argument that the removal process for IJs violates Article II. The Court reasoned that the Attorney General (AG), who supervises IJs, enjoys the unrestricted authority to remove them at his discretion. Historically, AGs have exercised this power fairly liberally. John Ashcroft, the AG under President George W. Bush, fired a number of IJs who had reputations for being lenient toward immigration. See Jill Family, Regulated Immigrants: An Administrative Law Failure, 29 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 401, 415 (March 14, 2024). Jill Family’s article in providing a fascinating history of the APA points out that Congress exempted deportation and exclusion cases from the Administration Procedure Act. See Supplemental App. Act of 1951, Pub. L.64 Stat. 1044 (1951).  During the Trump administration, AG Jeff Sessions similarly removed IJ Steven Morley from handling the Castro-Tum case and replaced him with a different judge after Morley had previously administratively closed it.  On the other hand, IJs are also subject to the Merits System Protection Board (MSPB) like the ALJ in the Walmart case. In Roy v. MSPB,  the only reason why Susan Roy, a former  Immigration Judge,  could not make a claim in the MSPB is because she had not served two years. Otherwise, Roy v. MSPB shows that IJs who have completed two years can challenge their removal to the MSPB.  IJs are also subject to union control, which was not brought up in Fortunato de Jesus Amador Duenas v. Garland.

Even if the Supreme Court in Jarkesy ultimately rules that ALJs are unconstitutional, it is unlikely that the holding would extent to IJs notwithstanding the fact that IJs may also receive some modicum of protection from removal. IJs have historically been susceptible to removal by the AG who is appointed by the President. They can be reassigned from a case and the  AG also has the authority to certify decisions made by an IJ to himself and overrule them. There is another part of Jarkesy that brought a Seventh Amendment challenge because Mr. Jarkesy was subject to an administrative proceeding against him and was deprived of a jury trial in federal court.  If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Mr. Jarkesy on his right to a jury trial, this may invite challenges with respect to the authority of IJs. Even here, S. Michael McColloch, counsel for Jarkesy, argued that the court should hold that when the government brings a case with the “same essential function” as a traditional lawsuit for claims such as fraud, it should have to bring the case in federal court, where a jury trial right would apply. However, when pressed further he emphasized that Jarkesy should not apply to adjudicating government benefits and debts and that  the authority of IJs should not be impacted by the outcome of the case.

It remains to be seen whether a broad ruling in Jarkesy will strike at the heart of the immigration court system. If the Supreme Court’s holding brings about the evisceration of the immigration courts, Congress could be forced to create an independent immigration court system under Article I of the Constitution as a replacement. An Article 1 court would ensure that IJs are independent from political interference as they are currently under the purview of the Attorney General within the Department of Justice.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.