Cyrus Mehta

Pathways for Terminated H-1B Workers Who Want to Become Entrepreneurs

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By Cyrus D. Mehta & Jessica Paszko*

The list of options for an H-1B beneficiary who has been laid off is often narrow. At the top of the list sits the most obvious option: find another employer who will sponsor you for an H-1B. Although, in the current job market, which is growing more competitive due to the influx of laid off employees, there simply may not be enough open positions to fill. But laid off H-1B beneficiaries who can’t find another employer to sponsor them and who have been dreaming of setting up their own startups may not need to pack their bags and book their flights home just yet as there might be another, more creative option to consider: starting your own company and extending H-1B status through that company.  Whichever option laid off beneficiaries pursue; they have 60 days to get their affairs in order under 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(l)(2) which allows H-1B beneficiaries to remain in the U.S. for up to 60 days after their H-1B employment ceases.

The last time we explored the topic of H-1B entrepreneurs, the control test in the Memo “Determining Employer-Employee Relationship for Adjudications of H-1B Petitions, Including Third-Party Site Placements” by Donald Neufeld posed an obstacle. The Neufeld Memo attempted to clarify what constitutes a valid employer-employee relationship under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) and established a policy wherein H-1B petitioners had to establish that they had the right to control over when, where and how the beneficiary performed the job. Neufeld urged USCIS officers to consider eleven factors in determining whether a petitioner had sufficiently established its “right to control”. Despite the Neufeld Memo, we still entertained, in our blog, the idea of whether a startup owner can be able to get  sponsored on an H-1B through a startup, while simultaneously addressing the potential obstacles that one might experience in attempting such a feat.

Now, ten years after that blog was published, changes have occurred in immigration policy that contemplate scenarios in which entrepreneurs can remain in the U.S. on an H-1B through their startup or be paroled into the U.S. to set up their start-ups. For starters, on June 17, 2020, the Neufeld Memo was rescinded, effectively ending the “right to control” era. Instead, in assessing whether an employee and a beneficiary have an employer-employee relationship, USCIS officers were instructed to consider whether the petitioner has established that it meets at least one of the “hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of” factors with respect to the beneficiary. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Most recently, on March 10, 2023, USCIS issued comprehensive guidance on parole for international entrepreneurs.

USCIS has also provided FAQs where it addresses parole pathways for entrepreneurs under the International Entrepreneur Rule, a topic that is not the focus of this blog, but which also touches on the key requirements that one must fulfill to qualify for classification as an H-1B specialty occupation worker. The first requirement is establishing an employer-employee relationship with the petitioning U.S. employer. Here, the sole or majority owner of the petitioning company may be able to establish a valid employer-employee relationship if the facts show that the petitioning entity meets at least one of the “hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of” factors.  Old decisions recognize the separate existence of the corporate entity as separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and stockholders. See Matter of M, 8 I&N Dec. 24, 50 (BIA 1958, AG 1958); Matter of Aphrodite Investments Limited, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm.1980); and Matter of Tessel, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980).  As such, a corporation, even if it is owned and operated by a single person, may hire that person, and the parties will be in an employer-employee relationship. This point needs to be brought out when advancing an H-1B for an entrepreneur when Neufeld has been rescinded. Still, we acknowledge that the H-1B petition may have more success when there is another investor or shareholder, and the beneficiary is not the sole owner of the entity. That person may be able to exercise control over the H-1B beneficiary, even if they have a minority interest. It may not be necessary to show that the other individual or entity has the power to discipline the beneficiary, but only that this person can exercise negative control over the beneficiary’s decisions. There is nothing preventing the other individual from being a family member, and the shareholder or director also need not be residing in the U.S.

The second requirement is establishing that the job qualifies as a specialty occupation under one of the four criteria under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). The third requirement is establishing that the job is in a specialty occupation related to the beneficiary’s field of study which may done by submitting a detailed description of the specific duties of the position, written opinions from experts in the field, resources describing the degree fields normally associated with the occupation, or evidence that similar companies in the industry require similar degrees for similar positions. USCIS could likely challenge whether a position in a startup, where the beneficiary may be wearing many hats, can support a specialized position. The H-1B visa law requires the petitioner to demonstrate that a bachelor’s degree in a specialized field is the minimum qualification for entry into that occupation. Lastly, the fourth requirement is that an H-1B visa number be available at the time of filing the petition, unless the petition is exempt from numerical limits, though the topic of this blog assumes that one has already been counted against the cap. Notably, this new guidance does not seem to elevate control over all the other components in the employer-employee relationship under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).

There are other challenges for an H-1B entrepreneur that may be beyond the USCIS’s control. Every H-1B petition must be accompanied by a certified Labor Condition Application (LCA) from the DOL. Under an LCA, the employer attests that it must pay the beneficiary the higher of the prevailing or actual wage, and must also do so on a regular prorated basis. In a startup, there may be no revenue stream to pay the entrepreneur initially. Thus, unless the startup is sufficiently capitalized through venture capital or other forms of financing that can ensure a steady stream of income to the H-1B beneficiary at the required wage, the petitioning entity may be in violation of the DOL rules if it cannot guarantee a regular prevailing wage.

Still, these challenges are not insurmountable. H-1B beneficiaries who wish to obtain H-1B status through their startups face a less hostile environment as they do not have to deal with the control test under the Neufeld memo. Before, our answer to the question of “can the startup owner be able to sponsor themselves on an H-1B through the startup?” was a shaky “maybe”. Now, however, while still not implying a definitive “yes”, there is at least more reason to believe that an entrepreneur should be able to successfully sponsor him or herself through their own startup, especially in light of the June 17, 2020 guidance and the latest FAQs. If the beneficiary has an approved I-140, then he or she can also get three year H-1B extensions if eligible. Recall though that those who qualify for three year extensions only do so because they are nationals of countries with per-country limitations. Thus, when their priority dates become current, they will no longer be eligible for three year H-1B extensions. At that point, they could file an EB-2 National Interest Waiver (NIW), for instance, in order to be to apply for a green card through a viable I-140 petition and in doing so, will be able to recapture their old priority date. As a result of starting their own companies, these entrepreneurs can now capitalize on their startups and use them as a basis for establishing their eligibility for the NIW. The NIW may also be a viable option for those in the STEM field as the USCIS Policy Manual was updated last year to clarify how the NIW can be used by STEM entrepreneurs.

On the other hand, H-1B beneficiaries who are terminated and have pending I-485 applications can attempt to port to self-employment. INA § 204(j) allows foreign workers who are being petitioned for permanent residence by their employer to change jobs once their I-485 applications have been pending for 180 days or more. 8 C.F.R.§ 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B) even allows a beneficiary to port to a new employer based on an unadjudicated I-140, filed concurrently with an I-485 application, so long as it is approvable at the time of filing. Therefore, H-1B beneficiaries who have a pending or approved I-140 and who have adjustment applications that have been pending for 180 days can, after being terminated by their H-1B/I-140 sponsor, start their company and port to that company, or even a sole proprietorship,  so long as their job duties are same or similar to the occupation that was the basis of the I-140 petition. They may ne able to rely on their pending I-485 application, and employment authorization document, rather than remain in H-1B status.

While there is no specific startup visa in the INA, USCIS should think of immigration in a strategic sense as a mechanism to create wealth and expand the economy. By encouraging H-1B entrepreneurs the USCIS should also think like an entrepreneur, use all its authority under the INA to allow entrepreneurs to remain and thrive in the U.S., and adjudicate H-1B petitions consistent with this objective. Notwithstanding a downturn in certain sectors of the economy, the talents and creative energies of H-1B workers who have been laid off can be unleashed so that they be part of the effort in turning around the economy in addition to landing on their feet.

*Jessica Paszko is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta &  Partners PLLC. She graduated with a J.D. degree from Brooklyn Law School in 2021.

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Providing Competent Representation to Undocumented Noncitizens Despite the Criminal Encouragement Provision 

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

Our previous blog discussed United States v. Helaman Hansen, a case in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 9, 2022. Oral argument in the case is set for March 27, 2023. Hansen questions whether INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv), or the “encouragement provision”, which prohibits individuals from “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law” is unconstitutionally overbroad. Helaman Hansen ran an organization called Americans Helping America Chamber of Commerce (“AHA”) that purported to help undocumented immigrants become U.S. citizens through adult adoption. In reality, this is not possible, and Hansen was convicted for having violated INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) because he encouraged or induced individuals who participated in his program to overstay their visas on two occasions.

Hansen first moved to dismiss his convictions based on a violation of INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv), arguing that this provision is facially overbroad, void for vagueness, and unconstitutional as applied to him, but the district court denied his motion. He then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing in relevant part that INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) is facially overbroad under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the encouragement provision prohibits a broad range of protected speech. One could violate 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) merely by “knowingly telling an undocumented immigrant ‘I encourage you to reside in the United States’”, the court reasoned. The government is seeking review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision at the Supreme Court. The government’s brief focuses on the argument that INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) is not facially overbroad because the terms “encourage” and “induce” in the encouragement provision are terms of art borrowed from criminal law that refer to specific and egregious conduct, namely facilitation and solicitation. The government further argues that the statutory history and context of the encouragement provision indicate that it is aimed at punishing facilitation and solicitation, rather than a broader range of conduct. The government also asserts that fear of prosecution under the encouragement provision are unlikely to chill legitimate advice to undocumented immigrations because the fraud counts Hansen was charged with require that the offense be “done for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain”, a criterion that would not be met in many scenarios.

AILA and numerous other immigration organizations filed an amicus brief that points out the troubling implications that the encouragement provision could have for immigration lawyers:

Elliptical counseling is particularly ill-suited to the immigration context, which is high-stakes and complex. Clients in this area need straightforward advice about what to do. And it would be especially strange to fault attorneys for advising noncitizen clients about remaining in the United States in violation of civil immigration laws, when those laws themselves condition numerous benefits on physical presence in the United States.

The brief cites our previous blog on Hansen as evidence that “The immigration bar has taken note of the government’s arguments about the Encouragement Provision, and is actively discussing when and how immigration practitioners should self-censor to avoid criminal liability”. Amici also point out that while the “financial gain” requirement contained in the provisions that Hansen was charged under might exempt well-intended advice given to a noncitizen by a priest or social worker, it “leaves large quantities of immigration advice within the statute’s reach” as private lawyers, and sometimes even those who work for a nonprofit organization, often charge at least a nominal fee for their services. Given the complexity of immigration law, the idea that lawyers could be deterred from providing advice to clients for fear of being punished under the encouragement provision is particularly troubling. Many immigration benefits are only available to noncitizens who are physically present in the United States, so an immigration lawyer could competently and ethically advise an undocumented client to remain in the U.S. for a variety of reasons. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court recognized the importance of encouraging “full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice”. The most severe consequence for a violation of immigration law is deportation, which is a severe and potentially life-altering punishment. For this reason, it is of the utmost importance that immigration lawyers be able to freely advice their clients.

In our previous blog, we suggested that a best practice for immigration lawyers in light of Hansen is to refrain from expressly advising or encouraging clients to remain in the U.S. in violation of the law, and instead outline both the adverse consequences and potential benefits of this course of action. Moreover,  ABA Model Rule 1.2(d), which has analogs in many state rules of professional responsibility, states that “[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.” ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) may thus provide some refuge for lawyers who competently counsel undocumented clients. Given the strikingly broad sweep of INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv), it is unclear how much protection it would provide to a lawyer who was prosecuted under the encouragement provision.

First, encouraging an undocumented client to stay in the US may be a violation of a civil statute, rather than constitute criminal or fraudulent conduct. The analog of Rule 1.2(d) in the New York Rules of Professional Conduct states: “[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is illegal or fraudulent, except that the lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client.” Although the New York version of Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from counseling or assisting a client in conduct that is “illegal,” we question whether advising an undocumented person to remain in the US in order to seek a benefit under INA constitutes conduct that is illegal. We also recognize that a noncitizen who has been ordered removed and who fails to depart within 90 days can incur criminal liability under INA § 243(a). However, INA § 243(a)(2) provides an exception from criminal liability if willfully remaining in the US is for the “purpose of securing cancellation of or exemption from such order of removal or for the purpose of securing the alien’s release from incarceration or custody.” A noncitizen who received a final removal order may move to reopen, even many years later, if the government consents to reopening and there is available relief against deportation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iv).

Further, a lawyer who hedges his advice in conditional probabilities may be at risk of failing to provide competent representation. Even the government’s brief assures that lawyers  will not be prosecuted if  they advise their clients that they are unlikely to be removed. This is in contrast to a lawyer strongly recommending that the undocumented client remain in the US in the hope of seeking a benefit in the future, and the government’s brief does not provide any assurance that such advice would insulate the lawyer from prosecution under INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv). The government offers the example of a lawyer advising a client in removal proceedings who has been released on bond to stay in the US but that is different from advising an undocumented client whose US citizen child will turn 21 in two years to remain in the US, which is when the parent would qualify for adjustment of status.

Some clients may be unable to interpret opaque advice from their lawyers, and a lawyer may not provide adequate representation in this scenario unless she gives the client a clearer recommendation.  ABA Model Rule 1.1 and some state analogs caution that “a lawyer shall provide competent representation”, the “shall” language leaving little room for error. Additionally, as noted above,  it may be necessary for an immigration lawyer to frankly advise an undocumented client to stay in the US in order to apply for a benefit like adjustment of status, a T visa, or DACA, which would be unavailable to the client if she left the country. It is difficult to imagine how a lawyer could provide competent representation to her client without outlining the immigration benefits that the client may be eligible for and advising him how to obtain them by remaining in the US.  INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) would chill the ability of the lawyer to provide such advice and thus inhibit competent representation. Operating within the contours of Rule 1.2(d) might impede rather than facilitate competent representation in the immigration context, although until the Supreme Court provides more clarity, immigration lawyers will need to operate within the framework of Rule 1.2(d).

Regardless of the outcome in US v. Hansen, a lawyer ought not to be sanctioned under either INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) or Rule 1.2(d) who advises an undocumented client to remain in the US if the lawyer is doing so as part of competent representation.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Cyrus Mehta

Khedkar v. USCIS Affirms that Employee Also Has Interest in an I-140 Petition Filed By Employer

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box

Because an employment-based immigrant visa petition, or Form I-140, is filed by an employer on behalf of a foreign national employee who is being sponsored for permanent residency, there is sometimes a perception that both the I-140 petition and the underlying labor certification belong to the employer. They are initiated by the employer on behalf of the noncitizen employee or prospective employee who is referred to as the beneficiary. The I-140 petition is signed by the employer. Although one part of the labor certification is signed by the beneficiary, the employer still drives the labor certification process and files the application. It is the employer who also has the unilateral power to withdraw the labor certification or I-140 petition.

However, a recent U.S. District Court case, Khedkar v. USCIS, 552 F. Supp. 3d 1 (DDC 2021), reiterated the idea that a beneficiary also has an interest in the I-140 petition. Mr. Khedkar’s employer, Deloitte, had filed an I-140 petition on his behalf classifying him as a multinational manager under INA § 203(b)(C), while Khedkar concurrently filed an adjustment of status application. Khedkar then joined another employer, Alpha Net Consulting LLC, in a similar position and filed an I-485 Supplement J to notify USICS that he was porting to a similar job. The USCIS issued a Request for Evidence but Khedkar’s former employer, Deloitte, was not interested in responding after he had left the company. Khedkar then joined IBM and filed another I-485J. Khedkar did not realize that the USCIS had sent an RFE to Deloitte, which was not responded to. The USCIS denied the I-140 petition for failure to respond to the I-140 petition. Khedkar filed a motion to reopen with USCIS and then an appeal to the Administrative Appeals Office, but both agencies did not recognize Khedkar as an affected party. Khedkar sought review under the Administrative Procedures Act in federal district court. The court agreed with Khedkar that USCIS should have issued the RFE to Khedkar rather than Deloitte after he provided notification to the USCIS about his porting through I-485 Supplement J. “The result is not only at odds with the portability provision’s aim of encouraging job flexibility — it is unfair too,” Judge Contreras said.

The court’s decision in Khedkar v. USCIS is in keeping with a growing understanding that beneficiaries also have a legal interest in I-140 petitions as we also observed in a prior blog. Current regulations generally preclude beneficiaries from participating in employment-based immigrant visa proceedings, including post-adjudication motions and appeals. But this changes when a beneficiary exercises her right to job portability pursuant to INA §204(j) and 8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B). If a Request for Evidence (RFE) is subsequently issued on the underlying I-140, the beneficiary may be entitled to this RFE as they may be able to respond to it even if the employer chooses not to.

INA §204(j) allows foreign workers who are being petitioned for permanent residence by their employer to change jobs once their I-485 adjustment of status application has been pending for 180 days or more. Furthermore, 8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B) allows a beneficiary to port to a new employer based on an unadjudicated I-140, filed concurrently with an I-485 application, so long as it is approvable at the time of filing.

Even if a petitioner decides not to employ a beneficiary after the filing of an I-140 and I-485, this  does not preclude a petitioner from responding to an RFE issued on the underlying I-140 for a beneficiary who has already ported or who may port in the near future. This is because this intention – which is to no longer employ the beneficiary – was formed after the filing of the I-140 and I-485. Therefore, a petitioning employer may still seek to establish that the I-140 was approvable when filed pursuant to 8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B), and indicate that it has no intention to permanently employ the beneficiary, so that a beneficiary may exercise job portability based on her pending I-485. Our firm had success in such a situation wherein a beneficiary of a previously filed I-140 and I-485 was able to work with a petitioner to respond to an RFE even though the beneficiary would not be employed permanently and had expressed an intention to port to a new job in the same occupational classification.  After the I-140 had been erroneously denied on grounds not related to the lack of permanent employment, our firm assisted the beneficiary in successfully reopening the I-140 with the cooperation of the petitioner, and ultimately winning approval of the I-140 and approval of the I-485 for the beneficiary.

The question remains, however, what recourse does a beneficiary have if the petitioner refuses to respond to an RFE, or otherwise cooperate with the beneficiary? May a beneficiary, for example, file an I-290B notice of appeal or motion to reopen a subsequent denial of the I-140?

The answer may be found under existing USCIS policy. Under the Policy Memo promulgated on November 11, 2017, a Beneficiary becomes an “affected party” upon USCIS’ favorable determination that the beneficiary is eligible to port. See USCIS, Guidance on Notice to, and Standing for, AC21 Beneficiaries about I-140 Approvals Being Revoked After Matter of V-S-G- Inc., PM-602-0152, Nov. 11, 2017 at page 5.  Thus, under the policy adopted by USCIS in Matter of V-S-G- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-06 (AAO Nov. 11, 2017),  beneficiaries, who are affected parties as defined in the Matter of V-S-G- Inc. decision, are entitled to a copy of any decision made by USCIS and may file an appeal or motion on Form I-290B with respect to a revoked Form I-140, even though existing form instructions generally preclude beneficiary filings.

In Matter of V-S-G- Inc., which we have discussed at length in a prior blog, the beneficiary had changed employers and taken a new position after the adjustment of status application had been pending for more than 180 days.  Meanwhile, the president of their original petitioning organization was convicted of mail fraud in connection with another USCIS petition.  USCIS sent a notice of intent to revoke (“NOIR”).  When the petitioner failed to respond to the NOIR, USCIS revoked the petitioner’s approval due to the petitioner’s failure to respond. Although Matter of V-S-G-, Inc. dealt with the issue of an NOIR of an approved I-140 petition, one could argue that the AAO should extend the holding in Matter of V-S-G- to a Beneficiary who successfully ports to a new employer while the underlying I-140 remains unadjudicated.  This is because upon the filing of an I-485, Supplement J – required when the beneficiary ports or intends to port to a job in a same or similar occupational classification – the beneficiary becomes an “affected party,” and should be given a copy of any RFE, as well as a copy of any subsequent denial of her I-140. The argument for extending Matter of V-S-G is further supported by the promulgation of 8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B), which enables the I-140 to be approved even if a job offer no longer exists so long as the I-140 was eligible for approval at the time of filing. See 8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B)(2). 

A review of the preamble to 8 CFR § 245.25 published in the Federal Register, while not dispositive, also supports this position. The preamble notes that several commentators had expressed concern that individual beneficiaries of Form I-140s are not provided notice when USCIS seeks to revoke the approval of those petitions. In response, DHS noted that it was considering administrative action to address these concerns. See Federal Register /Vol. 81, No. 223 /Friday, November 18, 2016 /Rules and Regulations at page 82418 (hereinafter the “preamble”). Similar concerns were also raised in the preamble in the section entitled “Portability Under INA 204(j)” wherein the DHS states:

As a practical matter, petitioners have diminished incentives to address inquiries regarding qualifying Form I-140 petitions once beneficiaries have a new job offer that may qualify for INA 104(j) portability […] Accordingly, denying a qualifying Form I-140 petition for either ability to pay issues that occur after the time of filing, or for other petition eligibility issues that transpire after the associated application for adjustment of status has been pending for 180 days or more, would be contrary to the primary goal of AC21. Such a policy would in significant part defeat the aim to allow individuals the ability to change jobs and benefit from INA 204(j) so long as their associated application for adjustment of status has been pending for 180 days or more.

In a perfect world, a beneficiary ought to be able to work with a petitioner for the purpose of responding to any RFE or NOIR issued on a previously filed I-140 and I-485 despite the petitioner’s lack of intention to continue to employ the beneficiary. However, as a practical matter, a petitioning employer is likely to refuse to cooperate with a beneficiary who has already been terminated. Nonetheless, there exists a compelling argument that the beneficiary be allowed to respond due to the growing legal recognition of a beneficiary’s interest in an I-140 approval where there is also a pending I-485.  Although Matter of V-S-G-, Inc. dealt with the issue of a NOIR of an approved I-140 petition, it would be consistent with the holding to argue that if a beneficiary is able to successfully port to a new employer prior to the issuance of an RFE, that beneficiary is also an “affected party” due to her interest in demonstrating that the I-140 was approvable as filed.  USCIS ought to extend the holding in Matter of V-S-G- to any beneficiary who successfully ports while the underlying I-140 remains unadjudicated and was filed concurrently with an I-485 application. This has been affirmed in Khedkar which remains an unpublished decision.  Such an extension would go a long way towards fulfilling one of the primary goals of AC21 by allowing individuals the ability to change jobs and benefit from INA § 204(j). Even if the employer does not participate, a beneficiary should be allowed to respond to the RFE in order to establish that the I-140 was approvable when it was filed concurrently with an I-485 application.  Such an extension of the holding of Matter of V-S-G- would also be in line with the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, which held that a plaintiff has the ability to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act when his or her claim is within the zone of interests a statute or regulation protects. Other courts have agreed that the original employer should not be the exclusive party receiving notice relating to an I-140 petition when the foreign national employee has ported to a new employer. Beneficiaries who have ported to new employers fall within INA § 204(j)’s zone of interests and have standing to participate in visa revocation proceedings. See Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.2d 721 (2015)  and Kurupati v. USCIS, 775 F.3d 1255 (2014). As stated in Khedkar v. USCIS, this logic should now extend to the ability of a foreign national beneficiary of an I-140 petition to be able to respond to an RFE even before it gets denied, especially since 8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B)(2) permits the beneficiary to port based on a concurrently filed unadjudicated I-140 petition and I-485 application. This regulation, which was promulgated consistent with Lexmark, will carry little force if the beneficiary is not considered an affected party in order to challenge both an RFE and a denial.

Finally, employers and their attorneys who are reluctant to share a decision involving an I-140 petition with the beneficiary especially after they have ported should recognize that the beneficiary has an interest in the I-140 petition and would be deprived in responding to a request for evidence or a denial when courts have explicitly held that they can do so. The beneficiary may also  need to know the job description in the labor certification to port to a same or similar job under INA § 204(j). They may also need the approval notice of the I-140 petition for purposes of obtaining a three-year H-1B extension under § 104(c) of the American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act. Moreover, they may also need to know the priority date of this I-140 petition in case a new employer will file a new I-140 petition on their behalf.  Khedkar v. USCIS and other cases have affirmed the strong interest that the beneficiary who has ported under INA 204(j) has in an I-140 petition even if it was initiated and filed by the employer.

This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

The Dates for Filing Chart in the Visa Bulletin Not Only Protects Children from Aging Out But Can Be Dramatically Advanced To Allow Many More Backlogged Immigrants To File Adjustment of Status Applications

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By Cyrus D. Mehta

On February 14, 2023, the USCIS issued updated guidance to indicate when an immigrant visa number “becomes available” for the purpose of calculating a noncitizen’s age in certain situations under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA). The guidance became on effective 2/14/23 and comments are due by 3/14/23.

Since October 2015, the State Department Visa Bulletin two different charts to determine visa availability – the Final Action Dates (FAD) chart and the Dates for Filing (DFF) chart. The DFF in the Visa Bulletin potentially allows for the early filing of I-485 adjustment of status applications if eligible applicants are in the United States and the filing of visa applications if they are outside the country. The FAD is the date when permanent residency (the green card) can be granted.  The Filing Date, if the USCIS so determines, allows for the early submission of an I-485 application prior to the date when the green card actually become available.

Prior to February 14, 2023, the USCIS maintained that the FAD protected the age of the child and not the DFF.  Using the DFF to protect the age of the child who is nearing the age of 21 is clearly more advantageous – the date becomes available sooner than the FAD – but USCIS policy erroneously maintained since September 2018 that only the FAD could protect the age of the child. Thus, if an I-485 application was filed pursuant to a DFF and the child aged out before the FAD became available, the child was no longer protected despite being permitted to file an I-485 application. The I-485 application got denied, and if the child no longer had an underlying nonimmigrant status, was placed in great jeopardy through the commencement of removal proceedings, and even if removal proceedings were not commenced, the child could start accruing unlawful presence, which  triggered the 3- and 10-year bars to reentry. If the child filed the I-485 as a derivative with the parent, the parent could get approved for permanent residence when the FAD becomes available while the child’s application got denied.

I had first advocated in my blog of September 22, 2018 entitled Recipe for Confusion: USCIS Says Only the Final Action Date Protects a Child’s Age under the Child Status Protection Act that the DFF should protect the age of the child under the CSPA rather than the FAD. On August 24, 2018 the USCIS under the Trump administration  explicitly stated in the USCIS Policy Manual that only the FAD could be used to calculate the age of the child.  Subsequent blogs of mine protesting against this change are here and here. Brent Renison filed a lawsuit in Nakka v. USCIS again arguing that the DFF should be considered the point of time to protect the child’s age and even AILA strongly advocated for this change, which can be found here and here. Several others also advocated on this issue.

The USCIS on February 14, 2023 at long last agreed to use the DFF to protect the age of the child. Those whose I-485 applications were denied under the old policy may file motions to reopen. I had argued that the term “an immigrant visa is immediately available” in  INA 245(a)(3), which allows for the filing of an I-485 application,  has not been defined.  Allowing the filing of an I-485 under the DFF and ahead of the FAD  suggests that the term “immigrant visa is immediately available” has been interpreted more broadly to encompass dates ahead of when a green card becomes available. Indeed, the Visa Bulletin describes the DFF as  “dates for filing visa applications within a timeframe justifying immediate action in the application process.” Under this permissible interpretation, I-485 applications can be filed pursuant to  INA 245(a)(3) under the  DFF. Applicants who file I-485s under both the Filing Date and the Final Action Date must satisfy INA 245(a)(3), which only permits the filing of an I-485 application when “an immigrant visa is immediately available.”

Under INA 203(h)(1)(A), which codified Section 3 of the CSPA,  the age of the child under 21 is locked on the “date on which an immigrant visa number becomes available…but only if the [child] has sought to acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residency within one year of such availability.” If the child’s age is over 21 years, it can be subtracted by the amount of time the applicable petition was pending. See INA 203(h)(1)(B).

Under INA 245(a)(3), an I-485 application can only be filed when an  “immigrant visa is immediately available.”

Therefore, there is no meaningful difference in the verbiage relating to visas availability – “immigrant visa becomes available” and “immigrant visa is immediately available” under INA 203(h)(1)(A) and INA 245(a)(3) respectively. If an adjustment application can be filed based on a DFF pursuant to 245(a)(3), then the interpretation regarding visa availability under 203(h)(1)(A) should be consistent, and so the USCIS in it updated policy guidance has stated that the DFF  ought to freeze the age of the child, and the child may seek to acquire permanent residency within 1 year of visa availability, which can be either the Filing Date or the Final Action Date.

The new USCIS policy that recognized the DFF for freezing the age of the child acknowledged this:

“After the publication of the May 2018 guidance, the same applicant for adjustment of status could have a visa “immediately available” for purposes of filing the application but not have a visa “become available” for purposes of CSPA calculation. Applicants who filed based on the Dates for Filing chart would have to pay the fee and file the application for adjustment of status without knowing whether the CSPA would benefit them. To address this issue, USCIS has updated its policies, and now considers a visa available to calculate CSPA age at the same time USCIS considers a visa immediately available for accepting and processing the adjustment of status application. This update resolves any apparent contradiction between different dates in the visa bulletin and the statutory text regarding when a visa is “available.”

USCIS also instructs that those whose I-485 applications got denied because they were not permitted to use the DFF to determine their age may file motions to reopen. While the deadline to file a motion to reopen is 30 days, under 8 CFR 103.5(a)(1)(i) failing to file within 30 days after the denial may be excused if the noncitizen demonstrates that the delay was reasonable and was beyond their control. Hence, those whose applications were denied prior to the change in the policy can request the USCIS to excuse a late filing as the delay was certainly beyond the control of the applicant. What about those who decided not to file an I-485 for their child because of the risks involved if the child aged out before the FAD became current? One can now look back at when the applicable DFF became current which can be used to freeze the age of the child, although under INA 203(h)(1)(A) the applicant should have also sought to acquire permanent resident status to fulfill the condition of freezing the age. If one year has already passed since the DFF became current, it might be possible to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances under Matter of O. Vazquez for failing to seek to acquire permanent resident status. Although the update to the  USCIS Policy Manual has not specifically indicated whether this circumstance qualifies as an extraordinary circumstance, those who did not file I-485 applications within one year of visa availability because they could not predict that the policy would change and also  feared that a denial of the I-485 if the FAD was unable to freeze the child’s age should attempt to invoke the extraordinary circumstance exception.

State Department Must Also Update the FAM to be Consistent with the Updated USCIS Policy Guidance

 Thus far, the State Department has not amended the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) to align with the new USCIS Policy. The FAM still states that the age of the child is determined when the FAD becomes current. A child  who is processing for a visa at an overseas post should also be able to rely on the DFF rather than the FAD even if not filing an I-485 adjustment of status application in the US. If the visa became available under the DFF chart, then it should not matter whether the child is filing an I-485 application in the US or is processing for a visa overseas as the age of the child under the CSPA ought to be calculated based on when the visa became immediately available under INA 203(h)(1)(A).

Advancing the DFF Will Provide Relief to More Children and Backlogged Parents

As a result of the existence of the per country limits, those born in India and China have been drastically affected by backlogs in the employment-based green card categories. Each country is only entitled to 7 percent of the total allocation of visas under each preference. Thus, a country like Iceland with only about 330,000 people has the same allocation as India or China with populations of more than a billion people. For instance, in the employment-based second preference (EB-2), those born in India have to wait for decades, and one study estimates the wait time to be 150 years!

It would be ideal for Congress to eliminate the per country limits and even add more visas to each preference category. Until Congress is able to act, it would be easy for the Biden administration to provide even greater relief through executive action. One easy fix is to advance the dates in the State Department’s Visa Bulletin so that many more backlogged beneficiaries of approved petitions can apply for adjustment of status and get  ameliorative relief.

There is a legal basis to advance the DFF even further, perhaps to as close as current. This would allow many backlogged immigrants to file I-485 adjustment of status applications and get the benefits of adjustment of status such as the ability to port to a new job under INA 204(j), obtain travel permission and interim work authorization. Many more of the children of these backlogged immigrants would also be able to protect their age under the USCIS’s updated guidance.

As noted, INA 245(a)(3) allows for the filing of an adjustment of status application when “an immigrant visa  is immediately available” to the applicant. 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) links visa availability to the State Department’s monthly Visa Bulletin. Pursuant to this regulation, an I-485 application can only be submitted “if the preference category applicant has a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in the Bulletin (or the Bulletin shows that numbers for visa applicants in his or her category are current).” The term “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3) has never been defined, except as in 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) by “a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in Bulletin” or if the date in the Bulletin is current for that category.

The State Department has historically never advanced priority dates based on certitude that a visa would actually become available. There have been many instances when applicants have filed an I-485 application in a particular month, only to later find that the dates have retrogressed. A good example is the April 2012 Visa Bulletin, when the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China were May 1, 2010. In the very next May 2012 Visa Bulletin a month later, the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China retrogressed to August 15, 2007. If the State Department was absolutely certain that applicants born in India and China who filed in April 2012 would receive their green cards, it would not have needed to retrogress dates back to August 15, 2007.  Indeed, those EB-2 applicants who filed their I-485 applications in April 2012 may still potentially be waiting and have yet to receive their green cards even as of today! Another example is when the State Department announced that the July 2007 Visa Bulletin for EB-2 and EB-3 would become current. Hundreds of thousands filed during that period (which actually was the extended period from July 17, 2007 to August 17, 2007). It was obvious that these applicants would not receive their green cards during that time frame. The State Department then retrogressed the EB dates substantially the following month, and those who filed under the India EB-3 in July-August 2007 waited for over a decade before they became eligible for green cards. More recently, the September 2022  Visa Bulletin has a cutoff date of December 1, 2014 for EB-2 India. In the next October 2022 Visa Bulletin the EB-2 India was abruptly retrogressed to April 1, 2012 and then further retrogressed to October 8, 2011. If a visa number was immediately available in September 2022, an applicant under EB-2 India with a priority date of December 1, 2014 or earlier should have been issued permanent residence.

These three examples, among many, go to show that “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3), according to the State Department, have never meant that visas were actually available to be issued to applicants as soon as they filed. Rather, it has always been based on a notion of visa availability at some point of time in the future.

Under the dual filing dates system first introduced by the State Department in October 2015, USCIS acknowledges that availability of visas is based on an estimate of available visas for the fiscal year rather than immediate availability:

When we determine there are more immigrant visas available for the fiscal year than there are known applicants, you may use the Dates for Filing Applications chart to determine when to file an adjustment of status application with USCIS. Otherwise, you must use the Application Final Action Dates chart to determine when to file an adjustment of status application with USCIS.

Taking this to its logical extreme, visa availability for establishing the DFF may be based on just one visa being saved in the backlogged preference category in the year, such as the India EB-3, like the proverbial Thanksgiving turkey. Just like one turkey every Thanksgiving Day is pardoned by the President and not consumed, similarly one visa can also be left intact rather than used by the noncitizen beneficiary.   So long as there is one visa kept available, it would provide the legal basis for an I-485 filing under a DFF, and this would be consistent with INA 245(a)(3) as well as 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1). DFF could potentially advance and become current, thus allowing hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries of I-140 petitions to file I-485 applications.

This same logic can be extended to beneficiaries of family-based I-130 petitions.

8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) could be amended (shown in bold) to expand the definition of visa availability:

An alien is ineligible for the benefits of section 245 of the Act unless an immigrant visa is immediately available to him or her at the time the application is filed. If the applicant is a preference alien, the current Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Bulletin will be consulted to determine whether an immigrant visa is immediately available. An immigrant visa is considered available for accepting and processing the application Form I-485 [if] the preference category applicant has a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in the Bulletin (or the Bulletin shows that numbers for visa applicants in his or her category are current) (“Final Action Date”). An immigrant visa is also considered available for submission of the I-485 application based on a provisional priority date (“‘Dates for Filing”) without reference to the Final Action Date. No provisional submission can be undertaken absent prior approval of the visa petition and only if all visas in the preference category have not been exhausted in the fiscal year. Final adjudication only occurs when there is a current Final Action Date. An immigrant visa is also considered immediately available if the applicant establishes eligibility for the benefits of Public Law 101-238. Information concerning the immediate availability of an immigrant visa may be obtained at any Service office.

We appreciate that the Biden Administration has provided relief to hundreds of thousands of children by allowing them to use the more advantageous DFF so that they can get protection from aging out  under the CSPA while their parent remains in the backlogs. The Administration can go one step further by advancing the DFF so that hundreds of thousands more who are backlogged can file I-485 applications and their children can get further protection from aging out. Until Congress acts and adds much needed visa numbers to the employment and family based preferences, implementing this additional step will provide relief to many more in the backlogs.

[This blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as a substitute for legal advice]

 

Cyrus Mehta

National Interest Waiver Changes for STEM Graduates and Entrepreneurs, Along with Premium Processing, Will Benefit H-4 Spouses Seeking Work Authorization

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Jessica Paszko*

Earlier this year, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced that as of January 30, 2023, it would accept premium processing requests for all previously filed and newly filed petitions for National Interest Waivers (NIW) under the Employment-Based Second Preference (EB-2) category. For an additional filing fee of $2,500, USCIS will adjudicate these petitions within 45 days. This premium processing development coupled with last year’s update to the USCIS Policy Manual, which clarified how the National Interest Waiver can be used by science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) graduates and entrepreneurs, makes the National Interest Waiver more appealing than ever. We last covered the National Interest Waiver five years ago after the Administrative Appeals Office of the USCIS issued its precedent decision, Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884 (AAO 2016) which articulated a new National Interest Waiver standard.

As background, the National Interest Waiver is an immigrant petition for lawful permanent residence under the EB-2 category. In the ordinary course, a valid, permanent offer of employment in the U.S. and a labor certification application certified by the Department of Labor (DOL) are mandatory prerequisites to the filing of such an employment-based immigrant petition. However, the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT90) provided that the labor certification requirement in the employment-based second category may be waived and foreign nationals may qualify for the NIW in the sciences, arts, professions or business if they are: (1) members of the professions holding advanced degrees; or (2) foreign nationals of “exceptional ability” who will “substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural or educational interest, or welfare” of the United States, i.e. where the foreign national’s employment is deemed to be in the “national interest.”

In the updated Policy Manual, under the Specific Evidentiary Considerations for Persons with Advanced Degrees in STEM Fields heading, USCIS states, at the outset, that it was particularly interested in persons with advanced STEM degrees fostering progress in three areas, namely (1) “focused critical and emerging technologies”, (2) “other STEM areas important to U.S. competitiveness”, and (3) “national security.”

Critical and emerging technologies “are those are critical to U.S. national security, including military defense and the economy”. To identify a critical and emerging technology field, USCIS prompts officers to consider governmental, academic, and other authoritative and instructive sources, and all other evidence submitted by the petitioner. Officers may find that a STEM area is important to competitiveness or security in endeavors that will help the U.S. remain ahead of strategic competitors or adversaries or relates to a field that may contribute to the U.S. achieving or maintain technology leadership or peer statues among allies and partners. Moreover, the lists of critical and emerging technology subfields published by the Executive Office of the President, by either the National Science and Technology Council or the National Security Council, are listed as examples of authoritative lists which officers may consider. The Critical and Emerging Technologies List Update, issued in February 2022, defines critical and emerging technologies as “a subset of advanced technologies that are significant to U.S. national security.” It then goes on to list the critical and emerging technology areas that “are of particular importance to the national security of the United States” as well as a set of key subfields for each identified critical and emerging technology. We encourage readers to view the full list, but note the following subfields: supercomputing, edge computing, cloud computing, data storage, computing architectures, data processing and analysis techniques, distributed ledger technologies, digital assets, digital payment technologies, and digital identity infrastructure.

An indicator of STEM areas important to U.S. competitiveness is inclusion as a priority in the annual research and development priorities memo about the President’s budget issued jointly by the White House Director of the Office of Science Technology Policy and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. For example, the Memorandum on Research and Development Priorities (PDF) (August 2021) for President Biden’s FY2022 budget, where reference is again made to “critical and emerging technologies” including artificial intelligence, quantum information science, advanced communications technologies, microelectronics, high-performance computing, biotechnology, robotics, and space technologies.

U.S. national security objectives, which includes “protect the security of the American people; expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and realize and defend democratic values”, are outlined in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (PDF). The Policy Manual instructs that for purposes of National Interest Waiver policy and adjudications, “national security” refers to these three objectives.

Matter of Dhanasar provides that after eligibility for EB-2 classification has been established, USCIS may grant a NIW if the petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:

  • The foreign national’s proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance.
  • The foreign national is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor.
  • On balance, it would be beneficial to the United States to waive the requirements of a job offer and thus of a labor certification.

The Policy Manual reiterates that with respect to the first prong as set forth in Matter of Dhanasar, supra, as in all cases, the evidence must demonstrate that a STEM endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance. It notes that many proposed endeavors that aim to advance STEM technologies and research, whether in academic or industry settings, not only have substantial merit in relation to U.S. science and technology interests, but also have sufficiently broad potential implications to demonstrate national importance. At the same time though, the Policy Manual makes clear that “classroom teaching activities in STEM” are not, on their own, indicative of an impact in the field of STEM education more broadly, and therefore generally would not establish their national importance.

For the second prong, the person’s education and skillset are relevant to whether the person is well positioned to advance the endeavor. Here, the USCIS officer’s analysis involves assessing whether the person has an advanced degree, such as a Ph.D. which USCIS considers an especially positive factor. But the advanced degree must also be in a STEM field tied to the proposed endeavor and related to work furthering a critical and emerging technology or other STEM area important to U.S competitiveness or national security. Additionally, taking into account that doctoral dissertations and some master’s theses concentrate on a particularized subject matter, the person’s “scientific knowledge in a narrow STEM area” must also be considered in order to determine whether that specific STEM area relates to the proposed endeavor. Finally, the Policy Manual cautions that a degree in and of itself, is not a basis to determine that a person is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor, and urges petitioners to submit supplemental evidence, including letters from interested government agencies. Evidence that may demonstrate that the person is well-positioned to advance a proposed endeavor includes, but is not limited to:

  • Degrees, certificates, or licenses in the field;
  • Patents, trademarks, or copyrights developed by the person;
  • Letters from experts in the person’s field, describing the person’s past achievements and providing specific examples of how the person is well positioned to advance the person’s endeavor;
  • Published articles or media reports about the person’s achievements or current work;
  • Documentation demonstrating a strong citation history of the person’s work or excerpts of published articles showing positive discourse around, or adoption of, the person’s work;
  • Evidence that the person’s work has influenced the field of endeavor;
  • A plan describing how the person intends to continue the proposed work in the United States;
  • A detailed business plan or other description, along with any relevant supporting evidence, when appropriate;
  • Correspondence from prospective or potential employers, clients, or customers;
  • Documentation reflecting feasible plans for financial support (see below for a more detailed discussion of evidence related to financing for entrepreneurs);
  • Evidence that the person has received investment from U.S. investors, such as venture capital firms, angel investors, or start-up accelerators, and that the amounts are appropriate to the relevant endeavor;
  • Copies of contracts, agreements, or licenses showing the potential impact of the proposed endeavor;
  • Letters from government agencies or quasi-governmental entities in the United States demonstrating that the person is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor (see below for a more detailed discussion of supporting evidence from interested government agencies and quasi-governmental entities);
  • Evidence that the person has received awards or grants or other indications of relevant non-monetary support (for example, using facilities free of charge) from federal, state, or local government entities with expertise in economic development, research and development, or job creation; and
  • Evidence demonstrating how the person’s work is being used by others, such as, but not limited to:
    • Contracts with companies using products that the person developed or assisted in developing;
    • Documents showing technology that the person invented, or contributed to inventing, and how others use that technology; and
    • Patents or licenses for innovations the person developed with documentation showing why the patent or license is significant to the field.

 

Lastly, with respect to the third prong, the Policy Manual reminds us that it is the petitioner’s burden to establish that factors in favor of granting the waiver outweigh those that support the requirement of a job offer and thus a labor certification. In its evaluation of the third prong and whether the U.S. may benefit from the person’s entry, USCIS considers the following combinations of facts contained in the record to be a strong positive factor:

  • The person possesses an advanced STEM degree, particularly a Ph.D.;
  • The person will be engaged in work furthering a critical and emerging technology or other STEM area important to U.S. competitiveness; and
  • The person is well positioned to advance the proposed STEM endeavor of national importance.

USCIS considers the benefit to be “especially weighty” where the endeavor has the potential to support U.S. national security or enhance U.S. economic competitiveness, or when the petition is supported by letters from interested U.S. government agencies.

The expanded guidance will also benefit noncitizen entrepreneurs under the Matter of Dhanasar standard. They may submit evidence of ownership and a role in the U.S. entity; degrees, certifications, licenses and letters of experience; investments from outside investors; participation in an incubator or accelerator; awards or grants; intellectual property such as patents; published material on the petitioner and U.S. based entity; prospects of revenue generation and job creation; and letters and statements from credible third parties.

In comparison, eligibility under the Employment-Based First-Preference category (EB-1A) can be established through evidence of a one-time, major international award or fulfillment of at least three out of ten criteria. But even after the applicant has demonstrated evidence of at least three criteria, USCIS conducts a final merits determination where it considers the submitted evidence holistically and determines whether the applicant has sustained national or international acclaim and is among the small percentage of individuals who have risen to the top of their field of endeavor. Clearly, to qualify for a National Interest Waiver, one need not satisfy any set regulatory criteria or rise to the EB-1A level of acclaim or level of expertise, which can be quite difficult to establish.  Like the EB-1A, individuals may self-petition for the National Interest Waiver under EB-2 and need not be beholden to an employer.

The NIW on its face will have little utility for India or China born beneficiaries of I-140 petitions in the EB-2. The EB-2 for both these countries is retrogressed, and more so with India which according to the February 2023 State Department Visa Bulletin, the Final Action Date is October 8, 2011. Still, even if an Indian born EB-2 beneficiary obtains the NIW they will not be bound to any employer to file a new labor certification,  and can remain in H-1B status from employer to employer until their Final Action Date becomes current.  Another advantage of the NIW under EB-2 is that dependent spouses in H-4 status can receive work authorization once the I-140 on behalf of a principal beneficiary is approved and the dates for the country remain retrogressed. Currently the EB-2 is retrogressed worldwide at November 1, 2022. Therefore, in addition to H-4 spouses of India born beneficiaries of I-140 petitions, all H-4 spouses would be entitled to work authorization once the I-140 under the NIW is approved. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(9)(iv).   Given that there is now premium processing, the speed with which an H-4 spouse can obtain an EAD through the NIW than through the traditional employer sponsored labor certification process is significant.

Although the USCIS has broadened the evidentiary criteria for NIW petitions, it is still important to demonstrate that the national interest of the US will be advanced under the standards set forth in Matter of Dhanasar.  As the EB-1 has become muddied with the need to satisfy the final merits determination, the NIW may be easier to win under the expanded guidance for individuals in STEM and entrepreneurs and may be worth considering if one is born in a country other than India. However, even for those born in India, the NIW may have a significant benefit as it would allow the H-4 spouse to get employment authorization more rapidly.

(This blog is for informational purposes, and should not be relied up as a substitute for legal advice)

*Jessica Paszko is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta &  Partners PLLC. She graduated with a J.D. degree from Brooklyn Law School in 2021.

 

 

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

How the Humanitarian Parole Program at the Border Can Serve as a Template for Further Relief Under the Broken Immigration System

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By Cyrus D. Mehta & Manjeeta Chowdhary*

Restive people at the U.S.- Mexico border for entry into the United States is not the new norm for the United States government. The usual procedure is to seek humanitarian relief through asylum under Title 8 of the United States Code citing a credible fear of persecution or other threats in their home country regardless of the wait period. However, in fiscal year 2020 with the outbreak of the coronavirus, the number of encounters at the border declined. As Covid became less acute, encounters at the border rebounded sharply in fiscal year 2021 and increased in fiscal year 2022 according to recently published data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the federal agency that encompasses the Border Patrol.

In March 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) implemented Title 42 through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) under the Trump administration after the coronavirus outbreak. Title 42 of the United States Code is the code that addresses public health, social welfare, and civil rights. It grants the government the ability to take emergency action to stop the “introduction of communicable diseases.” But the purpose to invoke Title 42 under the Trump administration was not to control the virus but to use the health ground as a pretext for depriving people of their right to apply for asylum when they came to the United States.

Title 42 has been implemented poorly and widely criticized by immigration and humanitarian groups. It is being continued pursuant to a court order even though President Biden tried to end it.  People expelled are usually driven by bus to the nearest port of entry without their luggage or their belongings. Lateral flights are limited for families with young children. Opportunity to seek asylum has been denied not only to individuals crossing the border between ports of entry, but also applies equally to individuals seeking asylum at ports of entry. Cases of kidnapping, torture, rape or other violent attacks on people have increased. Nevertheless, the Biden administration has continued to expel migrants under Title 42, though to a lesser extent than the Trump administration. Although the Supreme Court has currently stayed the district court’s decision setting aside Title 42, the following extract from Justice Gorsuch’s dissent is worth noting:

But the current border crisis is not a COVID crisis. And courts should not be in the business of perpetuating administrative edicts designed for one emergency only because elected officials have failed to address a different emergency. We are a court of law, not policymakers of last resort.

Depriving asylum seekers of their right to apply for asylum by blocking them under Title 42 has been roundly criticized by asylum rights advocates, although one positive initiative of  President Joe Biden has been to expand the parole program initially launched for  Ukraine and Venezuela   last year. The expansion of the parole program will allow 30,000 qualifying nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela per month to be admitted to the United States for up to two years and will be eligible for work authorization. They must have a U.S. based supporter who agrees to provide them with financial support for the duration of their parole in the United States. Individuals and representatives of organizations seeking to apply as supporters must declare their financial support, and they must pass security background checks to protect against exploitation and abuse. For additional information on the process and eligibility requirements, please see the Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans page. Also, the applicants must apply through an online CBP One app. Applicants will be considered on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of immigration officers and must pass rigorous biometric and biographic national security and public safety screening and vetting; and complete vaccination and other public requirements. Individuals who enter the United States, Mexico, or Panama without authorization will generally be ineligible for these processes. It further confirms that nationals from Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua who do not avail themselves of this process, attempt to enter the United States without authorization, and cannot establish a legal basis to remain will be removed or returned to Mexico, which will accept returns of 30,000 individuals per month who fail to use these new pathways.

This expansion has not ruled out the existence of Title 42 public health order. It will be used alongside the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) under Title 8 of the United States Code for those migrants who cannot be expelled pursuant to Title 42.  INA § 235 allows for the prompt removal of those who do not claim a fear of persecution or torture or are determined not to have a credible fear after an interview with an Asylum Officer, in accordance with established procedures. Also, the CBP One app can be accessed on or after January 12,  2023 to all asylum seekers claiming Title 42 exemption. Each day at a set time, new appointment slots will be released, and one can schedule appointments fourteen (14) days in advance. Access to making an appointment will be “geofenced” to individuals who are physically located at the U.S.-Mexico border and in some major population centers in Central and Northern Mexico. Although the process is free, that’s too short a period for booking the slots, maybe it will end up in jamming the network. Further, some Title 8 relief such as asylum may not be available for those who have significant criminal history, prior removals under Title 8, or could pose a risk to national security. The objective is to have an improved removal process in existence when the Title 42 public health order is lifted.

Further, this expansion proposes a transit ban to those asylum seekers who had not previously applied for asylum in a third country before reaching the United States, as well as those who sought asylum without going through a new process at a port of entry. Individuals who cannot establish a valid claim to protection under the standards set out in the new rule will be subject to prompt removal under Title 8 authorities, which carries a five-year ban on reentry pursuant to INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i). This rule will take some time to come in action as DHS and DOJ will invite public comment on the proposed rule.

Though the expansion through humanitarian parole has indubitably created some legal pathways for migrants from four countries, it has failed to address many questions such as:

  • Will the migrants from these four countries be subject to Title 8 or Title 42, if there is no financial supporter for them in the United States or a financial supporter is reluctant in supporting them or if they fail to pass the test of other requirements?
  • The parole program confirms that one should apply for parole through the CBP One app, but it fails to contemplate what should be done in cases where someone does not have technological access to download CBP one app, or where access to the app will be tough for those who does not know English or speak indigenous dialects beyond Spanish as well as for those who cannot obtain legal representation to help them navigate the process.
  • On being asked if the requirement to buy an airline ticket could prejudice or lean it toward wealthier migrants and make it harder for poorer migrants, President Biden replied yes and also said that “but there’s also ways to get to ports of entry along the border as well”. This is unclear. Did Biden mean that travelling by air is not essential and can be waived?
  • Will this really protect asylum seekers? How does this program help those individuals who left their countries in rush, rescuing their lives, and without any resources? How will they apply for parole through the app?
  • The proposed rule has been subject to criticism as this is the new version of the Trump version of the transit-ban on asylum seekers if they failed to seek protection in a third country before reaching the United States and if they “circumvent available, established pathways to lawful migration.” A similar transit ban was introduced by the Trump administration which was blocked by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and was ruled as unlawful, holding that failure to apply for asylum in a transit country “has no bearing on the validity of a person’s claim for asylum in the United States;”
  • No legal pathways for migrants from other countries have been explained, they will either face removal proceedings under Title 8 or be expelled under Title 42.
  • Will this not suggest discrimination as humanitarian parole only applies to a narrow group of countries?

 

Despite all the flaws in the new process and Title 42 still being used, the humanitarian parole program under INA 212(d)(5) provides a template for President Biden to continue to expand his executive authority to provide relief when the immigration system has broken and the current Congress is too polarized to fix it. Within days of the announcement, the first group of migrants have already come into the US. More than 600 additional migrants from these four crisis-stricken countries had been vetted and approved to come to the U.S. One noted commentator Ilya Somin who sponsored refugees from the Ukraine has reported that the results were astonishing. “Nine days after my wife and I submitted the sponsorship forms, the U.S. government authorized admission to three Ukrainian refugees — Ruslan Hasanov, his wife, Maya, and their 2‑year‐​old daughter, Melissa. Less than five weeks after that they were here. This is little short of a miracle to those of us who have long lamented the sclerotic state of the U.S. refugee system.” Although those who have entered the US under humanitarian parole can only remain for two years, they can apply for asylum once they have been paroled in the US. The humanitarian parole program allows private sponsors backed by business organizations to also support nationals from the designated countries to legally work in the US. The program thus creates a pathway for noncitizens from the designated countries to  enter the US and work legally thus alleviating labor shortages in the US economy.

The possibilities of expanding parole to other immigrants also exist. For instance, beneficiaries of approved I-130, I-140 and I-526 petitions who are outside the US can be paroled into the US while waiting for their priority date under State Department Visa Bulletin to become current.  However, due to a quirk in the law, beneficiaries of I-130 petitions should be able to file I-485 applications upon being paroled into the US since parole is considered a lawful status for purpose of filing an I-485 application. See 8 CFR 245.1(d)(1)(v). On the other hand, beneficiaries of I-140 petitions will not be eligible to file an I-485 application, even if paroled, since INA 245(c)(7) requires one who is adjusting based on an employment-based petition to be in a lawful nonimmigrant status. Parole, unfortunately, is not considered a nonimmigrant status.  Such employment-based beneficiaries may still be able to depart the US for consular processing of their immigrant visa once their final action dates become current.

The parole of beneficiaries of approved petitions can be modelled on the Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program that allows certain beneficiaries of I-130 petitions from Haiti to be paroled into the US pursuant to INA 212(d)(5). The Filipino World War II Veterans Program also has a liberal parole policy for direct and derivative beneficiaries of I-130 petitions. Once the beneficiaries of I-130 petitions are paroled into the US, they can also apply for an EAD, and adjust status once their priority date becomes current. The HFRPP concept can be extended to beneficiaries of all I-130, I-140 and I-526 petitions, and parole eligibility can trigger when either the petition is approved or at least when the Date for Filing (DFF) under the State Department Visa Bulletin is current for each petition. As proposed in a previous blog, the administration has the ability to move the DOF to close to current so long as it preserves one visa in each category.  Beneficiaries of I-130 petitions may file adjustment of status applications, as under the HFRPP, once they are paroled into the US. On the other hand, Beneficiaries of I-140 and I-526 petitions, due to the limitation in INA 245(c)(7) would have to proceed overseas for consular processing once the FAD become current.

Similarly, a program similar to humanitarian parole can be devised for those who have not been selected under the H-1B lottery under INA 212(d)(5). An employer could be able to sponsor a beneficiary who was not selected under the H-1B lottery and whose OPT may have expired by submitting I-134. There is no reason why the  programs similar to humanitarian parole cannot be deployed for those who were not able to successfully come to the US under the H-1B visa but who still have the same job offer for a temporary period of time. INA 212(d)(5) provides authority to parole a noncitizen on a “case-by-case basis  for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Allowing a potential noncitizen who would have otherwise qualified for an H-1B visa parole into the US would potentially qualify as a significant public benefit.

The Biden administration’s authority to provide relief to backlogged beneficiaries of I-140 petitions in the US through parole or other administrative actions can also be explored. The concept of parole in place has been applied to those who have entered without inspection and have been able to adjust status as immediate relatives. Most beneficiaries of I-140 petitions have been admitted in the US and are in valid status. However, deferred action may be considered for certain vulnerable beneficiaries. In May 2022, USCIS considered deferred action and related employment authorization for noncitizens classified as SIJs who are ineligible to apply for adjustment of status to LPR status solely because a visa is not immediately available. Deferred action and employment authorization will provide invaluable assistance to these vulnerable noncitizens who have limited financial and other support systems in the United States while they await an available visa number. The DHS has also recently made available deferred action and  work authorization  to  noncitizen workers who are victims of, or witnesses to, the violation of labor rights, Similarly, there is no reason why backlogged beneficiaries of I-140 petitions cannot avail of deferred action and work authorization on a case by case basis. How about allowing aging our and aged out children of beneficiaries of I-140 petitions who cannot seek the protection of the Child Status Protection Act to seek deferred action? This group of vulnerable noncitizens are deserving of relief through executive action.

Under 8 CFR § 204.5(p), an EAD may be issued to individuals in E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, O-1 or L-1 nonimmigrant status if they can demonstrate compelling circumstances and are the beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions, but their priority dates are not current. “Compelling circumstances” have never been precisely defined, but DHS suggested some examples of compelling circumstances in the preamble to the high skilled worker rule, which include serious illness and disabilities, employer dispute or retaliation, other substantial harm to the worker, and significant disruptions to the employer. DHS has suggested loss of funding for grants that may invalidate a cap-exempt H-1B status or a corporate restructure that render an L-1 visa status invalid are examples of scenarios that might constitute significant disruption to the employer. Historically, USCIS has rarely issued EADs under compelling circumstances. Given the precarious situation that nonimmigrant workers who are impacted by layoffs will find themselves in, the Biden administration could instruct USCIS to employ this authority to generously grant EADs to individuals who have lost their jobs. Nonimmigrant workers who are laid off will be forced to uproot their lives on very short notice if they cannot find new employment within 60 days. Many nonimmigrant workers have lived and been employed in the United States for many years. Some have U.S. citizen children and spouses who have also built careers in the United States. Such individuals will face serious hardship if they are forced to abandon their lives in the United States and return to the countries of which they are citizens, a devastating situation that should be interpreted to readily constitute compelling circumstances. Noncitizens who can demonstrate compelling circumstances under 8 CFR § 204.5(p) should also be able obtain deferred action so that they can apply for advance parole to travel overseas.

There is much that the Biden administration can do in the next two years through humanitarian parole, deferred action and other administrative actions to provide relief to noncitizens while Congress remains paralyzed.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice)

*Manjeeta Chowdhary is a Junior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Cyrus Mehta

United States v. Hansen: Supreme Court Once Again Agrees to Hear Constitutionality of a Smuggling Statute That Could Impact Immigration Lawyers

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On December 9, 2022, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Helaman Hansen, a case that poses the question whether the federal criminal prohibition on encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain in violation of  INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) is unconstitutionally overbroad. Helaman Hansen ran an organization called Americans Helping America Chamber of Commerce (“AHA”) that purported to  help undocumented immigrants become U.S. citizens through adult adoption. Hansen falsely advised these individuals that many undocumented immigrants had successfully become U.S. citizens through his program. In reality, it is not possible to obtain U.S. citizenship through adult adoption. Hansen was convicted of several counts of fraud in California, and was found to have violated INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) because he encouraged or induced individuals who participated in his program to overstay their visas on two occasions. He first moved to dismiss the two fraud counts that were based on a violation of INA INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) on the ground that this provision is facially overbroad, void for vagueness, and unconstitutional as applied to him, but the district court denied his motion.

Hansen then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing in relevant part that INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) is facially overbroad under the First Amendment. The government argued that  that subsection (iv) was limited to speech integral to criminal conduct, specifically solicitation and aiding and abetting. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the provision prohibits a broad range of protected speech. One could violate 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) merely by “knowingly telling an undocumented immigrant ‘I encourage you to reside in the United States’”, the court reasoned. The court held INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) is unconstitutionally overbroad, and reversed Hansen’s convictions under this provision.  The government is seeking review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision at the Supreme Court, arguing in part that it has historically construed the “encourage” or “induce” language of INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) very narrowly to prosecute those who engaged in serious criminal conduct.

The same First Amendment overbreadth argument at issue in Hansen was addressed two years ago in United States v. Evelyn Sineneng-Smith. We discussed this case at length in a previous blog, excerpts of which are reproduced here. United States v. Evelyn Sineneng-Smith involved an unauthorized practitioner who operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. Sineneng-Smith represented mostly natives of the Philippines who were unlawfully employed in the home health care industry and who sought to adjust their status to permanent residence through the filing of a labor certification by an employer.  These clients were not eligible to apply for adjustment of status in the United States under INA § 245(i) which expired on April 30, 2001 and they also did not appear to be grandfathered under this provision. Although Sineneng-Smith knew that her clients were not eligible under 245(i), she continued to sign retainer agreements with them and tell them that they could apply for green cards in the United States. At least two of the clients testified that they would have left the country if they were advised that they were not eligible to apply for permanent residence.

Sineneng-Smith was convicted by a jury on two counts of encouraging and inducing an alien to remain in the United States for the purposes of financial gain, in violation of INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) and INA §274(a)(1)(B)(i). She was also convicted on two counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341. The Ninth Circuit reversed her convictions under INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) and INA §274(a)(1)(B)(i) on the ground that “encourage” and “induce” under their plain meaning restrict vast swaths of protected expression in violation of the First Amendment despite the government countering that the statute only prohibits criminal conduct and a narrow band of unprotected free speech. The court provided several examples of seemingly innocuous conduct that could constitute a criminal violation of the provision, including one that is especially troubling for immigration lawyers – an attorney telling her client that she should remain in the country while contesting removal, because, for example, non-citizens within the United States have greater due process rights than those outside the United States, and because as a practical matter, the government may not physically remove her until removal proceedings have been completed. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the case on other grounds, particularly for having departed from the party presentation principle.

It remains to be seen how the Supreme Court rules in Hansen, but its decision could carry important implications for immigration lawyers. Given the striking breadth of INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv), a lawyer telling an undocumented client simply “I encourage you to remain in the United States” – perhaps because the client would later become eligible to seek adjustment of status – could render her vulnerable to prosecution. The Ninth Circuit in Hansen provided numerous other examples of protected speech that could potentially be prosecutable according to the plain text of the statute, including encouraging an undocumented immigrant to take shelter during a natural disaster, advising an undocumented immigrant about available social services, telling a tourist that she is unlikely to face serious consequences if she overstays her tourist visa, or providing certain legal advice to undocumented immigrants.

The Ninth Circuit considered a case that illustrates how easily an immigration lawyer could violate INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) by discussing even general immigration policies and consequences with undocumented clients. In United States v. Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D. Mass. 2012), the government prosecuted a U.S. Customs and Border Patrol supervisor under this provision for “advis[ing her undocumented] cleaning lady generally about immigration law practices and consequences.” 857 F. Supp. 2d at 193. As Judge Bumatay points out in his dissent of the Ninth Circuit’s decision denying an en banc hearing,  the conduct at issue in Henderson may be more egregious than it first appears – the CBP supervisor knowingly engaged an undocumented employee and “coach[ed] the employee on how to evade immigration authorities while residing in the country”. Still, the majority  in Hansen cited the example of  Henderson being prosecuted for advising her cleaning lady about  immigration law practices and consequences, and thus “makes plain the ability of subsection (iv) to chill speech.” While the government has maintained that it will use INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) to prosecute persons who engage in the sort of criminal conduct that Hansen engaged in, this broad provision could also allow an overzealous prosecutor to go after a well meaning worker in a nonprofit who encourages an undocumented immigrant to take shelter during a natural disaster.

In the absence of clarity on how INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) could be applied to immigration lawyers advising their clients, practitioners can refrain from expressly advising or encouraging clients to remain in the U.S. in violation of the law, and instead outline both the adverse consequences and potential benefits of this course of action to clients. Immigration lawyers should also keep in mind that ABA Model Rule 1.2(d), which has analogs in many state rules of professional responsibility, states that “[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.” While it may be unlikely that an immigration lawyer advising an undocumented client to remain in the United States in order to become eligible for an immigration benefit down the road would be prosecuted under INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv), but presenting the general consequences and benefits of remaining in the U.S. in violation of the law, as well as staying within the confines of ABA Model Rule 1.2(d), can offer practitioners some guidelines for avoiding potential liability.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Immigration Enforcement and Prosecutorial Discretion Go Hand in Hand: Will the Supreme Court Upset this Balance?  

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On Tuesday, November 29th, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in US v. Texas, which involves a challenge to the Biden administration’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) enforcement priorities. Originally laid out in the 2021 Mayorkas Memo, this list of enforcement priorities would have allowed ICE to focus its efforts on the apprehension and removal of noncitizens who pose a threat to “national security, public safety, and border security”. The attorneys general of Texas and Louisiana swiftly challenged these enforcement priorities, arguing that ICE would be allowed to overlook noncitizens for whom detention was required, which would subject the citizens of these states to crime committed by noncitizens who should be in detention, and force the state to spend resources providing education and medical care to noncitizens who should be detained. In previous blogs, we have discussed the procedural history of the case.

The Court first addressed the issue of whether the states have standing to challenge the enforcement priorities. General Elizabeth Prelogar, Solicitor General of the United States asserted that states should not have standing to challenge any federal policy that “imposes even one dollar of indirect harms on their own taxing or spending”.  The conservate majority was unmoved by this argument, with Justice Alito even suggesting that the government’s reasoning demonstrates a “special hostility” to the states’ standing.

The arguments then turned to the crux of the case – whether the Biden administration’s enforcement priorities contradict two statutory provisions – 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) pertains to the detention and removal of those who have been ordered removed. § 1226(c) lays out a list of noncitizens who “shall” be taken into custody by the Attorney General, including those who have committed certain criminal offenses.

The “shall” language of § 1226(c) was a point of particular contention for the Court. Justice Kavanaugh, in particular, argued that this language is mandatory, requiring the Court to take into custody noncitizens who fall within one of the categories enumerated in the statutory provision. Chief Justice Roberts, too, seemed to agree that “shall means shall”, leaving little room for the executive to exercise discretion in immigration enforcement. This interpretation, however, is entirely out of step with the usual interpretation of the statute and could have disastrous consequences if implemented.

A first problem with Justice Kavanaugh’s interpretation of the language of § 1226(c) is that it fails to read the statutory language in the context of the earlier provision at § 1226(a). § 1226(a) states that the noncitizens “may” be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether to put them in removal proceedings. This language is plainly permissive and affords the agency the discretion to decline to detain a noncitizen who is in removal proceedings. Indeed, the agency can elect not to place a noncitizen in removal proceedings at all, or to terminate removal proceedings that have already commenced. If the government must arrest and detain all noncitizens, and especially those who fall within § 1226(c)’s scope, the earlier provision affording it discretion to detain those same noncitizens pending the commencement of removal proceedings makes little sense. Statutes should be construed so that, on the whole, no clause, sentence, or word is rendered “superfluous, void, or insignificant” (TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)), and no provision “entirely redundant.” (Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988)). The same should be true for regulatory provisions. See Baude v. United States, 955 F.3d 1290, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (applying this canon of interpretation to a regulation); U.S. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2015) (same).

Moreover, Justice Kavanaugh’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) contradicts established case law, namely Reno v. ADC, which held that discretion applies at every stage of removal proceedings. Justice Sotomayor pointed out this conflict, noting that the Court’s holding in Reno affords the executive the discretion to choose when and if to initiate removal proceedings, and when to terminate them. If discretion applies throughout the process, it follows that the executive can choose which noncitizens to target for enforcement in the first place.

If the government cannot choose which noncitizens to target for removal, perverse practical consequences will result, as well. General Prelogar argued that the government simply lacks the resources to target every removable noncitizen. Justice Kavanaugh appeared to give credence to this argument, stating: “So the government says we don’t have the money to comply. Then — then what do you do?”  If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Texas, the government will never be able to detain all noncitizens subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). The Supreme Court will lose credibility if it issues a ruling that it and the government knows will never be followed. Prosecutorial discretion and enforcement go hand in hand. In order for  enforcement to be rendered effective, the government focuses its efforts and resources on those who it believes should be prosecuted. Even on a highway with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour, state troopers enforce the speed limit on those who blatantly and dangerously violate the limit as opposed to every car on the highway that may be going slightly over the 55 miles per hour speed limit. Moreover, in criminal law enforcement, the police cannot apprehend every violator of the law and no court has forced them to. Why should immigration enforcement be viewed any differently? Indeed, since a violation of immigration law is a civil rather than a criminal violation, more prosecutorial discretion ought to be accorded and other factors considered, such as the noncitizen’s family members who may become destitute if the noncitizen who provides for them is detained.

As immigration law is civil, its violators have not committed crimes. Those who have already been convicted of crimes have served their sentence under the penal system and can be further  detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) only because they are noncitizens.  The purpose of this detention is to deport them rather than to further punish them.  They are deserving of prosecutorial discretion, which permeates immigration policy in every aspect. The administration can parole noncitizens into the US for humanitarian grounds or defer the deportation of noncitizens on similar humanitarian grounds. It has recently allowed Ukrainians fleeing the Russian invasion of their country to come to the US on humanitarian parole. It has terminated removal cases on behalf of those who may be eligible for immigration benefits in the future.  The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program that has allowed young people who came to the US before the age of 16 with no status or fell out of status to remain in the US is also grounded in prosecutorial discretion. The newly promulgated provision at 8 CFR §236.21(c)(1)  aptly describes the basis for DACA:

Deferred action is an exercise of the Secretary’s broad authority to establish national immigration and enforcement priorities under 6 U.S.C. 205(5) and section 103 of the Act. It is a form of enforcement discretion not to pursue the removal of certain aliens for a limited period in the interest of ordering enforcement priorities in light of limitations on available resources, taking into account humanitarian considerations and administrative convenience. It furthers the administrability of the complex immigration system by permitting the Secretary to focus enforcement on high priority targets. This temporary forbearance from removal does not confer any right or entitlement to remain in or reenter the United States. A grant of deferred action under this section does not preclude DHS from commencing removal proceedings at any time or prohibit DHS or any other Federal agency from initiating any criminal or other enforcement action at any time.

If the Supreme Court allows Texas and Louisiana to prevail,  DACA, which is already in legal jeopardy, will be the next major immigration policy involving prosecutorial discretion to fall. If a state hostile to immigrants does not like noncitizens who have been paroled into the US because they have been victims of war, then this state too can sue in federal court to dismantle a worthwhile humanitarian policy that may have foreign policy implications that are broader than a state’s narrow agenda. The Supreme Court should  not allow one state to derail a national immigration policy. The trend that we are seeing goes well beyond preemption of state law that may conflict with federal law. This is a case of a state blatantly challenging a federal immigration policy rather than the federal government seeking to preempt a conflicting state law. Even so, it is hoped that the Supreme Court will be guided by its own affirmation of prosecutorial discretion in the leading preemption case of  Arizona v. USA:

Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the  community, or a record of distinguished military service. Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s international relations. Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state may be mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon return. The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.

 

As esteemed colleague Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia noted in her article for the American Constitution Society, “prosecutorial discretion is inevitable, so it does not stop functioning with litigation”. Earlier in the case’s history, Judge Drew Tipton of the Southern District of Texas had issued a decision precluding the enforcement priorities in the Mayorkas Memo from going into effect. The Supreme Court refused to stay Tipton’s injunction, but the ICE OPLA nonetheless provided guidance on prosecutorial discretion indicating that the doctrine will remain in place even though Mayorkas’ priorities will not explicitly be applied. This guidance states that “OPLA attorneys… may – consistent with longstanding practice – exercise their inherent prosecutorial discretion on a case-by-case basis during the course of their review and handling of cases.” Nonetheless, the majority’s reading of § 1226(c) carries worrying implications for how discretion in removal proceedings will be interpreted, and applied, going forward.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Layoffs Will Hurt Nonimmigrant Workers the Most, Especially Indian Born,  but the Biden Administration Can Provide Relief

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In recent weeks, news of layoffs at the likes of Twitter, Meta, and Amazon have contributed to broader fears that the United States is entering a recession. In last week’s blog, we provided suggestions for how terminated workers can maintain their nonimmigrant status and potentially even pursue permanent residency. The layoffs at Twitter have also shown that it was mainly workers whose H-1B visas were tied to Twitter that have stayed on and abided by the unreasonable ultimatums of Elon Musk. This has given credence to the notion that H-1B workers are akin to indentured laborers especially those who are caught in the never ending green card backlogs. We follow up on the previous blog by providing some suggestions that the Biden administration can follow to allow nonimmigrant workers who have been laid off to remain in the U.S, and even if they are not terminated,  they should not be required to cling on to their job at all costs.

First, the Biden administration could extend the 60-day grace period to allow nonimmigrant workers additional time to find alternate employment after being impacted by a layoff. As discussed in prior blogs, 8 CFR § 214.1(l)(2) allows E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, L-1, O-1 or TN nonimmigrant workers a grace period of 60 days after a cessation of their employment. Workers who are able to find new employment within 60 days will be able to remain in the U.S. and maintain their nonimmigrant status, but this period may not allow sufficient time for job hunting, especially if layoffs and hiring freezes become more widespread. By extending the 60-day grace period, the Biden administration would allow terminated workers more time to find new employment in the U.S. The 60-day grace period is a relatively new concept, having been introduced in a final rule that went into effect on January 17, 2017. Before this rule was enacted, nonimmigrant workers did not benefit from any grace period, and had to immediately leave the U.S. if their employment was terminated to avoid being considered in violation of their nonimmigrant status. Because the 60-day grace period was itself created by a rule, the Biden administration could easily promulgate a new rule extending the grace period to 180 days, for example, or even longer. To avoid Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenges, though, the administration would likely have to follow the strictures of the notice and comment rulemaking process rather than bypassing them under the good cause exception. Notice and comment rulemaking takes time, however, and the relief of an extended grace period might not arrive quickly enough for workers who have already lost their jobs or are laid off in the near future.

The next suggestion is to make clear when the 60 day grace period starts. Many workers are placed on severance or garden leave. The 60 day grace period should start at the end of the severance period. However, a June 2020 USCIS Policy Memo has muddied the waters somewhat. In this memo, the USCIS has indicated that “[t]he failure to work according to the terms and conditions of the petition approval may support, among other enforcement actions, revocation of the petition approval, a finding that the beneficiary failed to maintain status, or both.” Based on this policy, it would seem that the grace period starts when the H-1B worker is no longer in productive status even though they may be paid their full salary during the severance or nonproductive period. The USCIS should clarify that an H-1B worker continues to maintain status so long as the employer-employee relationship has not terminated.

The USCIS also gives officers discretion to determine whether nonproductive status constitutes a violation of the beneficiary’s nonimmigrant classification. The following extract from the USCIS Policy Memo is worth noting:

In assessing whether a beneficiary’s non-productive status constitutes a violation of the beneficiary’s H-1B nonimmigrant classification, the officer must assess the circumstances and time spent in non-productive status. While neither statutes nor regulations state the maximum allowable time of non-productive status, the officer may exercise his or her discretion to issue a NOID or a NOIR to give the petitioner an opportunity to respond, if the time period of nonproductive status is more than that required for a reasonable transition between assignments. As always, if the officer encounters a novel issue, the officer should elevate that issue to local service center management or Service Center Operations, as appropriate.

One should also note a 1999 advisory opinion concerning reductions in force.  USCIS indicated that a severance package that offered terminated H-1B and L-1 employees their normal compensation and benefits for a 60-day period did not preserve the beneficiaries’ nonimmigrant status. Specifically, Branch Chief Simmons wrote, “An H-1B nonimmigrant alien is admitted to the United States for the sole purpose of providing services to his or her United States employer. Once H-1B nonimmigrant alien’s services for the petitioning United States employer are terminated, the alien is no longer in a valid nonimmigrant status. However, an H-1B worker who has not been terminated, but is on leave, can distinguish his or her situation from one who has indeed been terminated.”

Instead of all this muddled guidance and mixed messaging, the USCIS should provide straightforward clarification regarding when H-1B status ends, and clearly indicate that H-1B workers who are still maintaining an employer-employee relationship after being given notice ought to be considered in status until the relationship ends.

Another step that the Biden administration can employ to aid laid off nonimmigrant workers is the expeditious issuance of employment authorization documents (EADs) that would allow nonimmigrants to continue working in the United States for a new employer. Under 8 CFR § 204.5(p), an EAD may be issued to individuals in E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, O-1 or L-1 nonimmigrant status if they can demonstrate compelling circumstances and are the beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions, but their priority dates are not current. “Compelling circumstances” have never been precisely defined, but DHS suggested some examples of compelling circumstances in the preamble to the high skilled worker rule, which include serious illness and disabilities, employer dispute or retaliation, other substantial harm to the worker, and significant disruptions to the employer. DHS has suggested loss of funding for grants that may invalidate a cap-exempt H-1B status or a corporate restructure that render an L-1 visa status invalid are examples of scenarios that might constitute significant disruption to the employer. Historically, USCIS has rarely issued EADs under compelling circumstances. Given the precarious situation that nonimmigrant workers who are impacted by layoffs will find themselves in, the Biden administration could instruct USCIS to employ this authority to generously grant EADs to individuals who have lost their jobs. Nonimmigrant workers who are laid off will be forced to uproot their lives on very short notice if they cannot find new employment within 60 days. Many nonimmigrant workers have lived and been employed in the United States for many years. Some have U.S. citizen children and spouses who have also built careers in the United States. Such individuals will face serious hardship if they are forced to abandon their lives in the United States and return to the countries of which they are citizens, a devastating situation that should be interpreted to readily constitute compelling circumstances.

The Biden administration can also utilize a provision at 8 CFR § 214.1(c)(4), which affords USCIS the discretion to accept an untimely filing if “the delay was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner, and the Service finds the delay commensurate with the circumstances; [t]he alien has not otherwise violated his or her nonimmigrant status; [t]he alien remains a bona fide nonimmigrant; and [t]he alien is not the subject of deportation proceedings”. A nonimmigrant worker whose employer was unable to timely file a petition on his behalf due to a layoff could credibly assert that his uncertain employment situation constituted extraordinary circumstances. If the layoff was the result of a recession or general economic difficulties, it should be demonstrable that the resultant delay of filing the H-1B petition beyond the grace period was not the fault of either the petitioner or the beneficiary. By generously applying this discretionary authority, the USCIS can assist nonimmigrants whose ability to seek a timely extension of status is impacted by a termination.

Ideally, a legislative solution would relieve the immense immigrant visa backlog, which would prevent beneficiaries of I-140 petitions from remaining in a nonimmigrant visa status for years until they can file adjustment of status applications. Proposals for legislative solutions include the recapture of wasted visa numbers from previous years and the allocation of additional visas to backlogged categories. Although Wang v. Blinken, No. 20-5076 (D.C. Cir. 2021), a case we have discussed in a previous blog, previously struck the idea down, Congress could assert that INA § 203(d) requires the unitary counting of family members. Even the Administration could contradict Wang v. Blinken if it had chutzpah through a rule or policy memo under the Brand X doctrine (thus overruling the case everywhere except in the DC Circuit), but this is hard to imagine as it recently successfully contested the plaintiff’s contention of unitary counting in that case. Another legislative proposal is to eliminate the per country limits, but even if that passes, there will still be backlogs although not as terrible right now which could be over a 100 years for Indian born beneficiaries.  Of course, finding a legislative solution is easier said than done in a polarized Congress, which will get even more polarized in 2023 when the Republicans take control of the House and the Democrats take control of the Senate. The GOP is too obsessed about border security before making any deal on immigration reform. There is also an urgency to prioritize on a legislative solution for DACA recipients as it is expected that the Supreme Court will uphold the lower courts that have found that DACA is not authorized by the INA. Unless by some stroke of luck the lame duck Congress can cobble together a deal to bring relief to backlogged beneficiaries based on the many proposals on the table, the Biden administration should focus on administrative solutions to bring relief to terminated nonimmigrant workers, who stand to suffer the most in the face of layoffs and economic woes.

Existing Indian born H-1B workers in the employment based green card backlogs who get terminated are  far worse off than others. But for the backlogs they may have already had their green cards or become US citizens. Indian born beneficiaries whose labor certifications were filed after April 1, 2012 are still caught in the backlogs and have remained in H-1B status while their contemporaries born in other countries have become US citizens.  Making tweaks in existing policies such as extending the 60-day grace period, issuing EADs based on a more generous interpretation of compelling circumstances, and giving more  discretionary authority to accept untimely filings under 8 CFR § 214.1(c)(4)  can provide some small amelioration to terminated nonimmigrant workers, especially those who are caught in the never ending green card backlogs.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Why the AILA Law Journal is Important

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The AILA Law Journal has come a long way since its April 2019 launch. At the time of the publication of the November 2022 issue, the AILA Law Journal will be 8 issues old.

I am proud to be the Editor in Chief of the AILA Law Journal at the time of the release of this November 2022 issue. The AILA Law Journal plays an invaluable role by curating high quality articles that guide attorneys to advance novel and innovative arguments on behalf of their clients.  For the AILA Law Journal’s success and contributions, I pay tribute to my predecessor, Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, who so successfully launched the publication and led it until recently. I hope to inspire attorneys, law students, and others, as Shoba did, to contribute articles in the immigration field that will not just benefit attorneys, but will also help to shape immigration laws.

I really look forward to working with a fabulous team of editors to take the AILA Law Journal to the next phase. Being Editor in Chief gets me thinking about some of the important issues of the day. I have been  consistently writing on contemporary immigration topics, and taking on this new role completely aligns with my passion to express a point of view or highlight an important development for AILA colleagues and clients.  For example, to what extent can the Executive Branch allow noncitizens to remain and work in the US when there is no explicit provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) covering these categories of noncitizens? Two courts of appeals have ruled differently in recent decisions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (“Washtech) v. the U.S. Department of Homeland Security addressed the question of F-1 students and whether they could remain in the U.S. after graduation for practical training. Citing DHS’ authority under INA § 214(a)(1) and the long history of post-graduation practical training, the court upheld Optional Practical Training that has been granted to students after they graduate in the US. The Fifth Circuit in Texas v. US confronted a different issue – that of young people who came to the U.S. and whether they could remain in the country through deferred action. Finding that DACA exceeds DHS’ inherent authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, the court struck down the program, though deferred action is a well-established practice like OPT. Although the Washtech case dealt with students, the D.C. Circuit’s decision can serve as a template for the Supreme Court to uphold the authority for other categories of noncitizens to remain in the U.S., including DACA recipients.

I hope the AILA Law Journal can attract articles that explore themes like this in depth. I also look forward to articles in the AILA Law Journal being cited by federal courts. Some day, I hope that the AILA Law Journal can organize a symposium attracting both scholars and practical lawyers to present papers that will then get published in a dedicated issue of the AILA Law Journal.

It is very important for lawyers to write and express their views. The AILA Law Journal is here to encourage this. And for those who do not have the time or inclination, it is hoped that the excellent articles in the AILA Law Journal from one issue to the next will provide food for thought to all – lawyers, policy makers and judges – that will result in fair and sensible immigration policies and outcomes.

A version of this blog first appeared on Think Immigration