The Insightful Immigration Blog
  • Home
  • Cyrusmehta.com
  • About Us
  • Click to open the search input field Click to open the search input field Search
  • Menu Menu
DEPORTATION JUDGES
Prof. Stacy Caplow

Deportation Judges

June 13, 2026/0 Comments/in Blog/by Prof. Stacy Caplow

By Prof. Stacy Caplow, Brooklyn Law School[1]

Do you want to be a judge?  Hurry up to apply—the deadline is July 17, 2026.  Look no further than this ad which says:

“Help write the next chapter of America. Apply today to become a deportation judge. Define America for Generations.”[2]

The Trump administration is remaking the Immigration Court in its own image springing into a hiring frenzy following the rapid-fire depletion of more than 100 experienced Immigration Judges.[3]    Between February 2025 and May 2026, this aggressive recruitment effort netted 134 new full time and 22 temporary IJs.[4] The general qualifications of the individuals who heeded this call surprised no one:  Their numbers overwhelmingly included immigration enforcement lawyers, prior prosecutors and veteran or active military officers.  A mere three new IJs had any obvious experience representing immigrants, and even those career interludes were brief and in the past.

Another troubling revelation was how many individuals appointed to this stressful, high volume, complex job lacked any apparent prior knowledge of or experience in immigration law.  In addition to this minimal level of relevant substantive experience, a significant number had received JD degrees within the past 15 years and a few even had earned that degree in less that the supposedly requisite seven years.  Adding insult to injury, the EOIR reduced their training from six weeks[5] so that some new judges were presiding over merits hearings only a few weeks after being sworn in.[6]

These preferences should surprise no one who has paid attention to the goals of this administration to reduce, if not eliminate, grants of relief such as asylum or cancellation of removal, to reduce decades of due process guarantees by ordering removal without an evidentiary hearing, and to deter judicial independence with the threat of firing. By all reports, the restaffing of the immigration court has achieved these goals. resulted in higher rates of denials in asylum cases. Over the last twelve months, the Immigration Court asylum grant rate has plummeted.[7]

The posted job qualifications are very broad yet do not prioritize or even specify any prior knowledge of or experience in immigration law and practice in addition to the minimum requirements of a law degree and law license.[8]  The remaining preferred prior experience includes litigating criminal cases, including in the military, or conducting administrative hearings.  It is not unexpected, therefore, that a great number of the new IJs have government enforcement, military, and/or prosecution backgrounds.  Many have a combination of some or all of these credentials.

Despite this rapid-fire hiring binge, the credentials of these newly appointed IJs actually hew pretty closely those IJs appointed during the first Trump administration.  Once again, large numbers of IJs are drawn from the ranks of government employees.  They come from enforcement offices, particularly ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, as well as USCIS and EOIR.  Similar numbers of IJs have military and prosecution backgrounds, or both.  The number of new judges with past judicial experience is comparable also.

 

Credential 2017-2020[9] 2025-2026[10]
 

Gov’t Immigration Enforcement Background

 

 

46%

 

42%

 

Military Background

 

 

22%

 

31%

 

Prosecution Background

 

 

51%

 

40.2%

 

Judicial Background

 

 

17%

 

13.4%

 

Government Employment Background

Former Government-Side Immigration Lawyers

Immigration Gov't Enforcement Background

Immigration Gov’t Enforcement Background

Forty-two percent, 54/134, new IJs have at one time practiced with the ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), the Immigration Court prosecutors, worked for USCIS as asylum officers or legal counsel or have been lawyers at EOIR. This number closely tracks the forty-six percent of the IJs appointed during the first Trump administration who also had this background. These credentials are not prima facie objectionable since this background reflects a deeper understanding of immigration law and court practice, but a one-sided career may produce judgment distortion and possibly affect objectivity. In addition, the many edicts issued by EOIR that subvert transparent fact-finding processes of immigration court hearings by granting pretermission with a hearing, [11] restricting online access to observers,[12] creating “mega/mass master calendar hearings[13] are designed to diminish the individual discretion and decisional autonomy of IJs.  Given past loyalties to these enforcement institutions, and the chilling track record of terminations without any stated cause, IJs, especially the new appointees, likely rightly fear for their jobs if they deviate from these dictates. Independence is undermined by both the selection process and the oversight of EOIR.

Military and Prosecution Background

 Again, these credentials have always been well represented on the Immigration Court bench. Often the IJ has both credentials on their resume.  Many of the former government lawyers also combine past military and prosecutorial backgrounds.

Thirty-one percent, 42/134, of the new IJs have been or are currently service members. This number represent a significant increase likely due to the controversial reassignment of JAG lawyers to the immigration bench.[14]

Military Background

Military Background

Former prosecutors also proliferate the new ranks of IJs.  Forty-two percent, 54/134 have been former prosecutors in either state or federal offices. This is likely an undercount since some EOIR biographies refer to general positions with a “State’s Attorney” or US Attorney’s Office and do not specify civil or criminal divisions.  Unless this distinction was clear, that individual was not counted as a former prosecutor.

Prosecution Background

Prosecution Background

Government lawyer backgrounds do not conclusively create anti-immigrant bias, but for someone who has worked almost exclusively in an authoritarian workplace routinely opposing various forms of relief, beholden to orders and policies that might undercut or eschew discretion and open-mindedness, and be subject to discipline for perceived deviations, judicial independence may be difficult to imagine or achieve.

Indeed, the very title Deportation Judge and the language used in the job announcement encourage a perception of the position as enforcement and anti-immigrant.  For example, the ad describes the job as “Ensur[ing] adherence to the law; combat[ing] fraud and ensur[ing] those seeking to exploit vulnerabilities in our immigration system are not successful,” implying that the system is riddled with bad actors who need to be ferreted out and deported. There is no message of the benefits or humanitarian role of the Department of Homeland Security other that a reference to deciding “who gets to stay.”

Judicial Experience

Prior judicial experience is unquestionably a plus for any adjudication setting, even the unique immigration court.[15]  Slightly more than 13% (18/134) of the new IJa worked either full or part-time in local administrative courts although none had any immigration focus and often were tribunals for state agencies dealing with commercial, family or health matters. A few had been judicial law clerks.  But as is so often pointed out, the law, especially in these unstable times, is complex, the decisions in immigration court are life-altering and almost always require an exercise of discretion.[16]  The evaluation and application of discretionary factors is a sensitive and quite subjective process that relies on well-developed tools of evaluation and judgment in often highly fact-sensitive cases.  While some prior adjudicators may have developed solid judgment in their respective realms, immigration, with its potentially drastic consequences, poses different. Balancing. Judicial temperament and administrative skills may not be sufficient to assure fair and just outcomes.

Judicial Experience

Judicial Experience

Prior Immigration Law/Practice Experience

Typically, many  IJs come to the bench with immigration law practice experience, most often as ICE Trial Attorneys. As such, they are, or should be, familiar with the proceedings and the applicable legal principles.  Nevertheless, more than 50% of new IJs (67/134) lack any obvious, perceivable immigration law background.  Again, this complete lack of relevant knowledge of this complex legal regime, combined with hasty, shallow training in substantive law, contradicts the usual qualifications for a judge in a specialized practice area.  Thrown into presiding over full hearings or applying the swiftly evolving new case law from the BIA as well as the policy dictates of EOIR, these judges have a recklessly steep learning curve. As they are learning, they have to decide life-or-death claims.

Since these newly appointed judges are refilling the ranks of more, and in many cases much more, experienced IJs, their appointments are not equivalencies for the judges they are replacing.

 

No Obvious Immigration Law Experience

No Obvious Immigration Law Experience

Age and General Legal Experience

The 2026 appointments present a “goldilocks” problem since many judges are very early in their careers while many are very late in their careers. Considering the pressures of the immigration bench, the extent and depth of knowledge needed, and the maturity and temperament to run a courtroom with patience, dignity and respect, this job requires experience.

The stated amount of post-licensing experience is frighteningly undemanding: seven years of any post-bar admission experience.[17]  Although most of the newly named IJs do have more than the bare minimum years of experience, 35 of them have been admitted for less than 15 years.  It is difficult to imagine that the 35 individuals who graduated from law school with 15 years or less before taking the bench possess the maturity and disposition necessary for this challenging job. Six of the 35 new IJs graduated after 2016 and one the graduated only in 2018.

Years Since JD

Years Since JD

At the other end of the spectrum are the considerable number of new IJs who are older than 60. Assuming they received their undergraduate degrees at age 22 in the 1970s or 1980s, 25 judges are in their 60s or even 70s.  Most jurisdictions require judges to retire or take senior status by age 70 although there does not seem to be a mandatory retirement age in EOIR. While these new IJs have had longer, and in some cases more responsible, careers, none of them specialized in immigration law.  It is difficult to imagine that they will serve for many years on the immigration bench. Given the time necessary to reach full capacity and mastery, investing in senior IJs may not be an efficient use of resources.

Senior Age

Senior Age

Immigrant Advocacy Backgrounds

Hiring

One of the key differences between the Trump 1.0 and 2.0 appointments and those IJs appointed by Biden is the greater diversity of the Biden judges. Early in 2021, the number of IJs appointed by Biden who had a background as immigrant advocates jumped noticeably.  In the first year of his administration, 19.4% of Biden’s new IJs had worked for most, if not all, of their careers at nonprofits or private immigration firms.  This contrasts to the 10-11 appointed during the full four years of Trump 1.0.  Only three of the biographies of the 2026 appointed noted any immigrant advocacy work experience, and even that occurred during the early years of their careers.

Firing

The Biden administration explicitly valued diversity and inclusion by inviting applicants “from all backgrounds to join our corps of dedicated adjudicators.”[18] The inescapable impression created by the 100+ purge was that EOIR targeted Biden appointees since all but 15 of them had appointed after 2021. They also consisted of more liberal IJs with higher grant rates many of whom were women, came from identifiable ethnic backgrounds, had immigrant advocacy careers, and/or were recognized as Democrats.  Most were summarily fired without explanation. Others were fired after issuing decisions that the administration disliked.[19]

Some terminated IJs are fighting back. For example, in Irma Pérez v. Todd Blanche, et al.,[20] the complaint alleges sex and age discrimination as well as a civil rights violation.  Her complaint identifies by name 37 women judges who were fired, seven judges with Spanish surnames, and 4 judges with South Asian or Middle Eastern surnames.  Other discrimination lawsuits have been filed in the District of Columbia,[21] Massachusetts,[22] Illinois,[23] and California[24]  advancing similar allegations and facts. An earlier lawsuit challenging the terminations was unsuccessful before the Merit Systems Protection Board so the IJs have turned to the federal courts.[25]

Conclusion

Immigration Court watchers do not need to be told that the bench has been radically transformed over the past 18 months.  Of course, it is dangerous to over-generalize but it is easy to see that the demographics tilt inescapably in favor of people whose backgrounds and experiences imply a sympathy with this administration’s goals.  The job description attracts people with identifiable political and ideological beliefs.  Diversity and inclusion are not hiring goals. Once appointed, the new judges are going along with the program:  terminating applications thus opening the doors for detention and removal; ordering removals to third countries pursuant to Asylum Cooperative Agreements; denying relief in record numbers. Judges whose decisions defy the administration lose their jobs.

Immigration Court has always been a treacherous place to navigate especially for the unrepresented.  Today, its hallways and courtrooms are locations of both legal and physical risk, not only to the individuals appearing there but to lawyers and court observers.[26]  Under the thumb of overbearing ideologues, IJs can no longer be counted on to exercise independent, unbiased judgment or to protect the rights of immigrants.

 

[1] Guest author Prof  Stacy Caplow is a leader in the field of clinical legal education. For more than ten years, Prof. Caplow was the law school’s first dean overseeing all aspects of clinical and experiential education.  Read her full biography at https://www.brooklaw.edu/contact-us/caplow-stacy/

[2] See https://join.justice.gov/.

[3] The National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) has been collecting information about fired judges.  This anonymous list notes that 103 judges lost their jobs.  The list does not separate IJs who may have retired but all but 15 were appointed after 2021 so it’s doubtful that any of them left voluntarily,  List on file with author.

[4] EOIR Notice May 21, 2026: 77 new judges,  https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1441861/dl; April 8, 2026: 15 new judges, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1435381/dl?inline ; March 11, 2026: 42 new judges, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1430876/dl?inline.  In order to facilitate hiring temporary IJs, EOIR promulgated new regulations at 8 CFR §1003.10 that eliminated the level of experience for this position.  Formerly, it was restricted to individuals who had either been immigration adjudicators or experienced government attorneys. The new rule mirrors the more lenient requirements for full IJs but limits the term of service. 90 F.R. 41883, Aug. 28, 2025,  https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-28/pdf/2025-16573.pdf.

[5] Fact Sheet, Executive Office for Immigration Review Immigration Judge Training, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1513996/dl?inline

[6] Celine Castronuovo, Trump Immigration Judges Pushed to Deny Asylum in Swift Training,  Bloomberg Law, Feb. 4, 2026,  https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/trump-immigration-judges-pushed-to-deny-asylum-in-swift-training.

[7] Austin Kocher, The Asylum Denial Machine, June 19, 2025, https://austinkocher.substack.com/p/the-asylum-denial-machine ; TRAC Immigration, Immigration Court Asylum Grant Rates Cut in Half, https://tracreports.org/reports/766/ (During August 2025, only 19.2 percent of asylum seekers were granted asylum). A year earlier during August 2024, the grant rate was 38.2 percent).

[8] Applicants must possess qualifying post-licensure litigation or adjudication experience.

Qualifying trial experience includes experience litigating cases in which a complaint was filed with a court or administrative agency, or a charging document (e.g., indictment, notice of violation, or information) was issued by a court, administrative entity, grand jury, or appropriate military authority. Qualifying experience conducting administrative hearings or adjudicating administrative cases includes relevant experience handling cases in which a formal procedure was initiated by a governmental administrative body.

https://www.usajobs.gov/job/853385500

[9] The percentages for the first Trump administration are drawn from Stacy Caplow, The Sinking Immigration Court: Change Course, Save the Ship, 4  A.I.L.A. L.J, 39, 46-50 (2022).  In turn, these numbers derive from the various EOIR announcement of new appointments during that time period. 

[10] The percentages are drawn from the EOIR Notices, supra n. 3.

[11] Pretermission of Legally Insufficient Applications for Asylum, PM 25-28, Effective: April 11, 2025

[12] Fact Sheet, Observing Immigration Court Hearings, Nov. 2025.

[13] Trump Administration Short Circuits Due Process with New Mass Hearings for Unrepresented Immigrants, Nat’l Immig. Justice Ctr., May 29, 2026.

[14] Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsel Department Of War, Detailing Attorneys to the Department of Justice to Serve as Immigration Judges and Special Assistant United States Attorneys, Oct. 23, 2025 (“The Department of War may detail attorneys to serve as immigration judges on a reimbursable basis.”); Ximena Bustillo , Military lawyers called up to relieve a shortfall in immigration judges, NPR, Sept. 2, 2025; N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, Report By The Immigration & Nationality Law Committee and the Rule Of Law Task Force Condemning the Use of Military Lawyers as Temporary Immigration Judges, Jan 15, 2026.

[15] See supra note 6.

[16] The famous describes immigration court a deciding “death penalty cases in a traffic court setting.”  IJ Dana Marks provided this unforgettable description on an episode of Last Week with John Oliver.

[17] EOIR, How to Become an Immigration Judge,  https://www.justice.gov/eoir/how-become-immigration-judge.

[18] Notice, EOIR Announces 24 New Immigration Judges, Oct. 27, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2023/05/30/eoir_announces_24_new_immigration_judges_10272021.pdf.  In this small but representative batch, 50% of the new IJs had worked at some point as immigrant advocates either for NGOs or in private practice.

[19] Hamed Aleaziz, Nicholas Nehamas and Steven Rich , Judges Fired After Blocking Deportations of Pro-Palestinian Students, NY Times, Apr. 11, 2026; Joshua Goodman,  Military Lawyerr Swiftly Fired From Immigration Bench After Defying Trump Deportation Push, AP, Dec. 19, 2025.

[20] 2:26-cv-06173 (C.D. Cal , 2026), https://www.law360.com/articles/2487026?sidebar=true. See also, Celine Castronuovo and Megan Crepeau, Fired Immigration Judges Test Trump’s Executive Power in Suits, Bloomberg News, June 10, 2026, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/fired-immigration-judges-test-trumps-executive-power-in-suits ;

[21] Nemer v. Bondi, 1:25-cv-04170, (D.D.C.); Former Immigration Judge files lawsuit accusing Trump administration of bias in her firing, NBC News, Dec. 2, 2025

[22] Simon Rios, Fired Mass. immigration judge sues Trump administration to get his job back, WBUR, May 18, 2026, https://www.wbur.org/news/2026/05/18/massachusetts-george-pappas-chelmsford-boston-judge-sues-trump.

[23] Espinoza v. Blanche, 1:26-cv-05157 (N.D. Ill., May 5, 2026).

[24] Lilien v. Blanche, No. 3:26-cv-03965 (N.D. Cal.); Chamberlin v. Blanche, 3:26-cv-04390  (May 12, 2026); Luz Pena, Fired Bay Area Immigration Judge sues DOJ alleging discrimination over gender, age and political views, May 7, 2026, https://abc7news.com/post/fired-bay-area-immigration-judge-sues-doj-alleging-discrimination-gender-age-political-views/19054420/.

[25]Jackler and Jarosh v. Dep’t of Justice, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-25-0330-I-1, Mar. 20, 2026

[26] Victoria Bekiemkis, Brad Lander found not guilty of blocking elevator at New York ICE facility, The Guardian, June 11, 2026,  https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jun/11/brad-lander-not-guilty-blocking-elevator-new-york-ice.

 

http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/DEPORTATION-JUDGES.webp 343 736 Prof. Stacy Caplow http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png Prof. Stacy Caplow2026-06-13 13:47:492026-06-13 13:47:49Deportation Judges
Cyrus Mehta

Federal Court Strikes Down Trump’s $100,000 H‑1B Fee: INA § 212(f) Is Not a Taxing Power

June 9, 2026/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus Mehta

By Cyrus Mehta, Damira Zhanatova and Kaitlyn Box

On Monday, June 8, 2026, a Massachusetts federal judge delivered a major decision for employers who rely on the H‑1B program. In State of California et al. v. Markwayne Mullin et al., U.S. District Judge Leo T. Sorokin ruled that President Donald Trump’s $100,000 payment requirement on new H‑1B visas is a tax that Congress never authorized the President to impose. He declared the fee unlawful and vacated it in its entirety.

The lawsuit, brought by 20 Democratic state attorneys general, challenged a September 2025 Proclamation that announced an additional $100,000 “supplemental payment” for each new H‑1B petition, dramatically increasing the cost of sponsoring highly skilled foreign workers. Judge Sorokin rejected the government’s central argument that the President’s broad authority under INA § 212(f) to “impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate” provided legal support for the payment. The court concluded that Congress did not confer taxing power on the President through the Immigration and Nationality Act. As Judge Sorokin wrote, “The court finds that the policy imposes a tax on H‑1B petitions without the requisite delegation by Congress.”

This district court decision is a major victory for H‑1B employers and a sharp reminder that presidential power under INA § 212(f) has real limits although it has been endorsed by the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii to restrict the entry of nationals of certain countries. The court rejected the Trump Administration’s attempt to use § 212(f) to impose a flat $100,000 “supplemental payment” on every new H‑1B petition. In the court’s view, the payment is a tax, the INA does not clearly delegate taxing authority to the President, the implementing Policy violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Policy is therefore vacated nationwide.

The court’s core holding is that § 212(f) is not a blank check to tax H‑1B petitions. The government leaned heavily on the phrase “any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate,” arguing that this language is as broad as the tariff authority the Supreme Court upheld in Algonquin under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. The court, however, relies on the Supreme Court’s more recent Learning Resources decision, which sharply narrows how far Algonquin can be pushed.

In Learning Resources, the Supreme Court contrasted Section 232 with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Section 232(b) authorizes the President to “adjust imports” and to “take such action . . . as he deems necessary” to do so, in a statutory setting that explicitly references “duties” and “import restrictions.” That context made it natural to read Section 232 as including tariff authority. IEEPA, by contrast, only allows the President to “regulate” imports, omits the “such action as he deems necessary” language, and contains no mention of duties or tariffs. The Supreme Court therefore refused to treat IEEPA’s general regulatory grant as a delegation of tariff or taxing power.

Applying that same framework to the INA, Judge Sorokin notes that §§ 212(f) and 215(a) let the President suspend or restrict entry and prescribe “reasonable rules, regulations, and orders” and “limitations and exceptions” governing entry, but they never mention duties, taxes, or any other revenue‑raising fees. Even though § 212(f) appears broad in isolation, it lacks the specific, duty‑focused context that justified Algonquin’s limited reading of Section 232. Learning Resources underscores that the Supreme Court has long been reluctant to read extraordinary delegations of Congress’s core powers into ambiguous text, especially where the “power of the purse” is involved. Taxing authority, the Court has said, is “core to Congress,” and Judge Sorokin finds nothing in the INA that clearly hands that power to the President.

In his opinion, he emphasizes that the Supreme Court has “long expressed reluctance to read into ambiguous statutory text extraordinary delegations of Congress’s powers,” and that “separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent suggest Congress would not have delegated highly consequential power through ambiguous language.” Those principles, he explains, “apply with particular force where, as here, the purported delegation involves the core congressional power of the purse.” The opinion also notes that the government itself conceded that the taxing power is “core to Congress.” Against that backdrop, Judge Sorokin concludes that these considerations “preclude reading INA §§ 212(f) and 215(a) as delegating Congress’s exclusive power to tax.”

That reasoning closely tracks what we identified in our prior blog as a form of the major questions doctrine at work in the immigration context. Without using the label “major questions,” Judge Sorokin applies the same basic logic. The court treats the imposition of a massive, program‑wide $100,000 charge as a “highly consequential power” that Congress would not have handed to the Executive through vague references to “restrictions” on entry. In his view, a de facto tax of that magnitude – one that would fundamentally reshape the cost structure of a central employment‑based visa category – is a decision of great economic and political significance. In that situation, generalized language about “restrictions” on entry is not enough. When the Executive claims authority to take such a consequential step, courts will look for, and insist on, a clear statement from Congress. The major questions doctrine, discussed at length in Learning Resources, and addressed in our prior blog, has implicitly been acknowledged in this recent decision.  The Supreme Court’s tariffs decision in Learning Resources influenced the court in California v Mullane in finding Trump’s $100,000 fee unlawful, and although this court did not state so explicitly, under the major questions doctrine where executive actions have major economic or political significance there has to be explicit Congressional authorization, and here there was none notwithstanding the broad authority given to the President under INA 212(f) in determining the entry of noncitizens into the US.

The government tried to recast the $100,000 payment as an incident of the President’s immigration or commerce powers, invoking nineteenth‑century state head‑tax cases (Smith v. Turner and Henderson v. Mayor of New York) and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe. The court is not persuaded. Smith and Henderson were about state taxes on arriving foreign passengers and the boundary between state and federal power over foreign commerce. They did not suggest that a tax on entry is purely a commerce regulation or that delegating commerce powers to the Executive silently includes taxing authority. Merrion, in turn, addressed the inherent sovereign power of a tribe to tax on its own reservation. Tribal taxing power does not derive from the U.S. Constitution, whereas the President has no inherent authority to raise revenue at all. That power lies exclusively with Congress under Article I, Section 8. In Skinner, the Supreme Court held that Congress must clearly indicate any intent to delegate taxing power to the Executive. The court sees no such clear indication in the INA, so these lines of cases do not rescue the Proclamation.

The government also argued that the $100,000 payment is simply a “restriction on entry” authorized by § 212(f). The court confronts that argument directly. Textually, § 212(f) speaks of “restrictions.” In ordinary usage, a tax is not a “restriction” on entry. It is a fiscal measure. Congress did not say “any tax, penalty, or condition” but instead chose narrower language. Structurally, the government’s reading would leave “no perceivable limits” on presidential power. On that view, the President could demand a percentage of a company’s equity as a condition for obtaining an H‑1B, require a U.S. citizen sponsoring a spouse to surrender half her assets, or even try to impose incarceration as a “condition” on sponsoring a relative. Government counsel conceded at argument that incarceration would collide with other constitutional protections, but that only underscores how far the asserted reading strays from statutory text and congressional intent. The court’s hypotheticals make this part of the opinion particularly valuable for future litigation, because they show in concrete terms why § 212(f) cannot be converted into an all‑purpose tool for extracting economic value from U.S. sponsors or re‑engineering large parts of the immigration system.

Once the court concludes that the $100,000 payment is an unauthorized tax, its APA analysis follows logically. The government tried to insulate the Policy from APA review by describing it as a mere “extension of the President’s action.” The court adopts what is becoming the prevailing rule: agency actions taken to implement a presidential directive are subject to APA review unless the underlying authority has been committed by Congress to the sole discretion of the President. The authority to tax H‑1B petitions was never delegated to the President at all, much less committed to his exclusive discretion, so DHS and State cannot shelter behind the Proclamation.

The court finds that the memoranda, FAQs, updated webpages, revised H-1B fee schedule, and online payment system collectively amount to “final agency action” under Bennett v. Spear. They marked the consummation of the agencies’ decision making and immediately changed the legal obligations of H-1B petitioners by making payment of $100,000 a prerequisite for approval. 

On the APA’s procedural requirements, the court holds that the Policy is a legislative rule adopted without notice‑and‑comment. Because the President lacked statutory authority to tax H‑1Bs, his Proclamation did not itself have the force of law. It was the agency materials that created rights, assigned duties, and imposed obligations. That makes them legislative rules subject to § 553. The court rejects the argument that agencies were compelled to follow the Proclamation: agencies are not obligated to comply with unconstitutional or ultra vires directives, and they cannot use such directives as a shortcut around APA rulemaking. Nor can the foreign‑affairs or good‑cause exceptions save the Policy. The government identified no “definitely undesirable international consequences” that would have flowed from using notice‑and‑comment, and it pointed to no emergency threatening life, property, or public safety that would meet the high bar for good cause. The agencies did not contemporaneously invoke good cause in their documents. The court also refuses to treat the violation as harmless, because notice‑and‑comment might have affected the substance of the policy or forced serious consideration of its impact on state employers and cap‑exempt institutions.

On the substantive side of the APA, the court translates its separation‑of‑powers discussion into an “excess of statutory authority” holding. Agencies literally have no power to act unless Congress has conferred it. No INA provision authorizes DHS or State to impose a $100,000 tax on H‑1B petitions. Section 1356(m) is limited to cost‑recovery adjudication fees, and by the government’s own admission, the Proclamation does not impose a fee to cover costs, does not displace existing fees, and is not collected or used like other adjudication fees. Because §§ 212(f) and 215(a) also do not confer taxing power, there is simply no statutory hook for the Policy. As a result, it is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations” under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).

The court further finds that the Policy is arbitrary and capricious. The agencies offered only thin, high‑level rhetoric about addressing “systemic abuse” of H‑1B visas and protecting American workers, with no reasoned explanation of why a flat $100,000 tax is a rational or tailored response. They failed to identify or assess reliance interests, despite the obvious reality that state schools, hospitals, and universities had built long‑term staffing models around the existing H‑1B cost structure, particularly for cap‑exempt roles. The record shows no consideration of alternatives, such as lower amounts, exemptions or discounts for public or cap‑exempt employers, or less disruptive tools targeted at specific abuses. There is also a stark sector mismatch: the Proclamation’s rationale is aimed at STEM and IT sectors and private tech firms, but the Policy applies equally to human‑services sectors like education and healthcare without any sector‑specific analysis or justification. Finally, the court rejects the argument that agencies cannot be arbitrary when they are merely following a presidential directive. The directive itself was not lawful, and even under a lawful directive, agencies must implement it “to the extent permitted by law,” which includes satisfying APA reasoned‑decisionmaking requirements.

On remedy, the court emphasizes that the APA’s instruction to “set aside” unlawful agency action has long been understood to authorize vacatur. It distinguishes vacatur from injunctions: an injunction is directed at particular parties, while vacatur operates on the rule or policy itself, nullifying the government’s authority to act under it. The court sees no need to limit relief to the plaintiffs and rejects res judicata arguments based on overlapping membership with parties in other cases, noting that mere association membership does not create the kind of privity needed for claim preclusion. It issues a declaratory judgment that the Policy is unlawful and vacates it in its entirety, concluding that a separate permanent injunction is unnecessary so long as vacatur is available.

For immigration practitioners and H‑1B employers, the immediate effect is straightforward. Agencies may not condition H‑1B approval on payment of the vacated $100,000 charge. H‑1B costs are again limited to the statutory charges Congress has enacted and to cost‑recovery adjudication fees lawfully set by DHS under § 1356(m). The decision also sends a broader signal about executive power in immigration. It marks a strong limit on § 212(f), making clear that “restrictions on entry” cannot be used to impose taxes, confiscate equity, or extract other unrelated economic concessions from U.S. sponsors. It reinforces a clear‑statement rule for taxation: if the Executive wants to tie immigration benefits to revenue‑raising exactions, it must point to explicit statutory authority and comply with APA procedures and reasoned‑decision making standards.

The ruling also provides a template for litigation strategy. It shows how to challenge executive actions that blur the line between regulating entry and raising revenue, particularly when they are implemented via FAQs, web postings, and internal memoranda rather than formal rulemaking. The court’s hypotheticals and its reliance on Learning Resources offer useful language to resist over‑broad readings of § 212(f) that would erode the INA’s structure.

Practitioners should adjust current H‑1B counseling and filings to reflect that no $100,000 “supplemental payment” may be imposed under this vacated Policy. It is prudent to monitor closely for any new attempts, whether by rulemaking or new proclamation or through the government appealing the decision, to alter the H‑1B fee structure, and to scrutinize those efforts for a clear statutory basis and APA compliance. For clients who hesitated to file H‑1Bs because of the proposed charge, counsel can now revisit those decisions and, where appropriate, move forward under the restored statutory framework, while keeping an eye on potential appeals or replacement policies that might test these same legal boundaries in new ways.

 

http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png 0 0 Cyrus Mehta http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png Cyrus Mehta2026-06-09 05:50:482026-06-09 05:50:48Federal Court Strikes Down Trump’s $100,000 H‑1B Fee: INA § 212(f) Is Not a Taxing Power
Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova

Dorcas v. USCIS: Federal Court Reaffirms That USCIS Must Adjudicate, Not Stonewall, Immigration Benefits

June 5, 2026/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Damira Zhanatova∗

In Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v. USCIS, No. 26‑cv‑132‑JJM‑PAS, Chief Judge John J. McConnell Jr. held that USCIS’s Trump‑era “Travel Ban Countries” policies violated both the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). He found that the agency had thrown “the lives of countless immigrants living in the United States into indeterminate legal limbo” by placing an indefinite pause on the adjudication of immigration benefit requests for individuals from 39 African, Asian, Latin American, and Middle Eastern countries (“Travel Ban Countries”) and by re‑opening already approved benefits, based solely on applicants’ countries of birth. Each of the four policies at issue was declared unlawful, vacated, and set aside. 

The plaintiffs were a coalition of nonprofits and unions: Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island and Refugee Dream Center in Providence, SEIU, UAW, African Communities Together, the Venezuelan Association of Massachusetts, the Partnership for the Advancement of New Americans, and American Gateways. They represent thousands of noncitizens from Afghanistan, Iran, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and other Travel Ban Countries whose asylum, adjustment, work authorization, visa, and naturalization applications were frozen or sent into re‑review solely based on nationality and date of entry. Judge McConnell noted that these immigrants followed all required legal processes – filing applications, paying fees, giving biometrics, and appearing for interviews – yet USCIS “refuses to adjudicate” their cases, and he concluded that “the rule of law has to apply to everyone equally” and that USCIS has neither “followed the law” nor “done things the right way.”

The court’s opinion carefully reconstructs how the policies arose. On the first day of his second term, the President issued Executive Order 14161, directing enhanced vetting and screening of “all aliens who intend to be admitted, enter, or are already inside the United States, particularly those aliens coming from regions or nations with identified security risks.” The order instructed senior officials to submit a report identifying countries whose vetting and information‑sharing were so deficient that entry of their nationals should be partially or fully suspended under INA § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). 

Based on that report, the President issued Proclamation 10949, restricting entry of nationals from 19 countries deemed “deficient with regards to screening and vetting,” and later Proclamation 10998, expanding the Travel Ban list to 39 countries and certain Palestinian Authority travel documents. These presidential actions were explicitly grounded in § 212(f) and related statutes and focused on entry at the border. They did not address, much less mandate, any change to domestic processing of asylum, adjustment, work authorization, or naturalization applications for people already inside the United States. 

Two high‑profile security incidents involving Afghan nationals then became the catalysts for a radical shift in USCIS policy. In June 2025, Nasir Ahmad Tawhedi pled guilty to conspiring and attempting to provide material support to ISIS in connection with a 2024 Election Day attack plot. In November 2025, Rahmanullah Lakanwal allegedly shot two National Guard members in Washington, D.C., killing one and critically injuring another, which DHS publicly characterized as a terrorist attack. 

Immediately after the D.C. shooting, the President and then–DHS Secretary Kristi Noem issued inflammatory public statements about immigrants. The President described the “foreign population” as “most of which are on welfare, from failed nations, or from prisons, mental institutions, gangs, or drug cartels,” and blamed immigrants for “failed schools, high crime, urban decay, overcrowded hospitals, housing shortages, and large deficits.” Secretary Noem declared that she had recommended “a full travel ban on every damn country that’s been flooding our nation with killers, leeches, and entitlement junkies,” calling immigrants “foreign invaders” who “slaughter our heroes, suck dry our hard-earned tax dollars, or snatch the benefits owed to AMERICANS,” and concluding: “WE DON’T WANT THEM. NOT ONE.” Days later, the President referred at a rally to a “permanent pause on Third World migration, including from hellholes like Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, and many other countries,” and repeated his earlier remark wondering why the U.S. admitted people from “shithole countries” instead of places like Norway and Sweden. Judge McConnell recounted these statements in detail and later found them probative of anti‑immigrant animus behind the policies. 

Against this political and rhetorical backdrop, USCIS enacted the four Challenged Policies through formal memoranda and Policy Manual revisions.

First, the Global Asylum Hold Policy. In PM‑602‑0192 (the “December Memorandum”), USCIS ordered a hold on “all applications for asylum and withholding of removal, regardless of the applicant’s country of nationality,” pending a “comprehensive review.” The memo explicitly stated that this “hold will remain in effect until lifted by the USCIS Director through a subsequent memorandum.” While USCIS later announced on its website that asylum processing had resumed for “non high‑risk countries,” it never issued a Director‑level memorandum lifting the global hold. The court therefore assumed that the Global Asylum Hold remained in effect and treated it as one of the policies to be reviewed and set aside. 

Second, the Benefits Hold Policy. PM‑602‑0192 and PM‑602‑0194 placed a hold on “pending benefit requests for aliens from, pending a comprehensive review, regardless of entry date.” The January memo clarified that a “hold” allowed cases to proceed through some processing steps but barred “any final adjudication,” defined as “the issuance of a final decision on a case, such as an approval, denial, or dismissal.” This Benefits Hold applied to adjustment of status, employment authorization, naturalization, and other immigration benefits for nationals of all 39 Travel Ban Countries. The hold, like the asylum hold, would “remain in effect” until lifted by a subsequent Director memorandum. 

Third, the Comprehensive Re‑Review Policy. The December memorandum also directed USCIS personnel to “conduct a comprehensive re-review of approved benefit requests for aliens from countries listed in the Travel Ban who entered the United States on or after January 20, 2021.” Those individuals were required to undergo a “thorough re-review process, including a potential interview and, if necessary, a re-interview, to fully assess all national security and public safety threats along with any other related grounds of inadmissibility or ineligibility.” This affected prior grants of asylum, withholding, adjustment of status, EADs, and possibly naturalization, based solely on nationality and date of entry, not on any individualized indicator of risk. 

Fourth, the Country‑Specific Factors Policy. On November 27, 2025, USCIS issued Policy Alert PA‑2025‑26 (the “November Memorandum”), amending the Policy Manual. It instructed that, “effective immediately,” adjudicators must consider “any relevant country-specific factors such as those specified in the Travel Ban as significant negative factors in the adjudication of discretionary benefit requests.” The alert specified that “insufficient vetting and screening information” from identified countries should be treated as a significant negative factor, and it declared that the new guidance “is controlling and supersedes any related prior guidance.” In effect, for discretionary benefits linked to immigrant visas, being from a Travel Ban Country became itself a negative factor adjudicators were required to weigh. 

USCIS tried to anchor these policies in INA § 212(f) and the President’s Proclamations 10949 and 10998, and it repeatedly invoked national security. Judge McConnell, however, emphasized that § 212(f) “addresses only the President’s authority and concerns only a single aspect of federal immigration law: restrictions on entry.” It empowers the President to “suspend the entry” of classes of noncitizens, but it does not govern USCIS processing of benefit applications by people already inside the United States. The travel‑ban proclamations themselves regulate “entry into the United States” and do not mention any holds on asylum, adjustment of status, work authorization, or naturalization. The court therefore held that “nothing in Section 1182(f) or the Presidential Proclamations authorize the Challenged Policies at issue here” and that USCIS could not bootstrap presidential entry powers into a broad domestic benefits freeze. 

The government also argued that INA § 1252’s jurisdiction‑stripping clauses barred judicial review of the policies and that, in any event, adjudicating immigration benefits is “committed to agency discretion by law.” Judge McConnell rejected those arguments. He noted the “presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action” and explained that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) is best read to bar review of individual discretionary denials (e.g., one person’s adjustment denial), not “collateral actions challenging general policies and procedures.” He distinguished the plaintiffs’ broad pattern‑or‑practice challenge from direct appeals of individual outcomes and applied Kucana v. Holder to hold that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies only when Congress itself, “by legislation,” makes a decision discretionary. USCIS cannot insulate new powers from review by declaring them discretionary in internal memoranda. The government’s reliance on 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(a) and 1324a as sources of discretion to adopt nationality‑based holds did not persuade the court, because those statutes focus on individual eligibility and define unauthorized work, not on any power to impose categorical, indefinite moratoria based on country of origin. 

The court then examined the INA and USCIS regulations to test the government’s claim that the policies were unreviewable because they were “committed to agency discretion.” It found “more than enough law” across the asylum, adjustment, EAD, and naturalization frameworks to provide judicially manageable standards and to confirm that USCIS has nondiscretionary duties to adjudicate applications. For asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii) requires that, absent “exceptional circumstances,” final adjudications “shall be completed within 180 days,” and 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(a) directs that “USCIS shall adjudicate the claim of each asylum applicant whose application is complete” and that “in all cases” proceedings must be conducted in accordance with the asylum statute. For naturalization, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1446 and 1447 and 8 C.F.R. § 335.3(a) require personal investigations, examinations, and a decision (“shall grant” or deny) at or within 120 days of the exam. Adjustment and EAD regulations state that applicants “must file” and that USCIS “shall” notify them of decisions and reasons for denials. Taken together, these sources show that Congress and USCIS expected benefits to be processed and decided, not left in limbo. The policies therefore could not be shielded from APA review as matters “committed to agency discretion by law.” 

On finality, the court rejected USCIS’s claim that its holds were interim. The memoranda were “effective immediately,” bound USCIS staff, and explicitly said that holds would remain until lifted by a Director‑level memo. Later carve‑outs for narrow categories, like Operation PARRIS cases, certain family petitions, and physicians, did not undo the core policies for Travel Ban nationals. Under Bennett v. Spear, these memoranda marked the “consummation” of the agency’s decision‑making and had clear legal consequences: they stopped cases from reaching decisions, caused individuals to lose work authorization and miss naturalization ceremonies, and increased the risk of arrest and removal. That was enough to constitute final agency action under the APA. 

The court held that the claims were ripe because the policies were already in force, USCIS had already offered its national‑security rationales, and the core legal questions – whether the policies exceeded statutory authority and violated the APA – turned on events that had already occurred. Plaintiffs were not required to wait for individual denials. Their injury stemmed from USCIS’s refusal to decide at all. In terms of hardship, Judge McConnell highlighted unrebutted evidence that many individuals had lost jobs and status, that organizations like Dorcas and RDC were prevented from taking on new clients or had to reopen hundreds of closed files, and that substantial staff time was being devoted to counseling and support. 

On the merits, Judge McConnell held that each policy was both “contrary to law” and “arbitrary and capricious.” For the Global Asylum Hold, he stressed that Congress’s repeated use of “shall” in § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii) and the asylum regulations created a nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate asylum and withholding claims, and that withholding and CAT protections are mandatory once eligibility is established, under both statute and regulation. A blanket suspension of these adjudications, including for non–Travel Ban nationals, could not be squared with the statutory and regulatory scheme, especially because the government did not rely on the “exceptional circumstances” exception. 

For the Benefits Hold Policy, he observed that naturalization law requires USCIS to investigate applicants, conduct examinations, and decide applications with reasons; regulations add that decisions must be made at or within 120 days of the interview and that applications that meet requirements “shall” be granted. Adjustment and EAD regulations impose filing obligations on applicants and notification and explanation duties on USCIS. Congress’s “sense” in 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) that benefits “should” be processed within 180 days reflects an expectation that adjudication would proceed, not that USCIS could freeze adjudications for entire nationality‑based categories indefinitely. The government’s reliance on security inadmissibility provisions and information‑sharing statutes was misplaced because those provisions address entry and law‑enforcement cooperation, not domestic adjudication holds. In the court’s view, the Benefits Hold Policy was “fundamentally inconsistent” with the INA and USCIS’s own regulations and had to be set aside. 

For the Comprehensive Re‑Review Policy, Judge McConnell pointed out that Congress has already prescribed how asylum, permanent residence, naturalization, and employment authorization may be revoked or terminated, through individualized procedures based on ineligibility, fraud, or other enumerated grounds. USCIS could not cite any statute conferring power to order a mass re‑review of all approved benefits for entire nationalities based solely on country of origin and entry date. While some courts recognize narrow inherent reconsideration power for agencies, that power does not apply “where Congress has spoken as to the proper procedure for reversing a decision.” Here, Congress had spoken, so USCIS’s attempt to subject all approvals for certain nationalities to a new re‑review regime exceeded its authority. 

The Country‑Specific Factors Policy violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). Judge McConnell described the history of that provision, enacted in 1965 to abolish national‑origin quotas and to “eliminate nationality-based discrimination in the immigration system.” He acknowledged that Trump v. Hawaii held § 1152(a)(1)(A) does not limit the President’s § 212(f) entry powers but emphasized that Hawaii itself recognized that § 1152(a)(1)(A) “prohibits discrimination in the allocation of immigrant visas based on nationality.” Adjustment and many employment‑based benefits depend on immigrant‑visa availability, so the nondiscrimination rule applies. By directing officers to treat Travel Ban country‑based “factors” as “significant negative factors” in these benefits, USCIS was effectively penalizing applicants for nationality or place of birth, in direct conflict with § 1152(a)(1)(A). The court rejected the government’s attempt to frame this as simple exercise of discretion, reminding USCIS that it has no discretion “to violate the binding laws, regulations, or policies that define the extent of his official powers” citing Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States.

The court also found all four policies arbitrary and capricious. Two incidents involving Afghan nationals and generalized references to travel‑ban proclamations did not reasonably justify indefinite holds and re‑reviews for all nationals of 39 countries and a worldwide asylum freeze. Judge McConnell wrote that extrapolating “the criminal conduct of two noncitizens to thousands of other noncitizens, from dozens of countries around the world, does not rank as reasoned decisionmaking.” USCIS’s two‑sentence acknowledgment that these policies would cause “processing delays,” coupled with a bare assertion that such delays were “necessary and appropriate,” fell far short of the APA’s requirement that agencies weigh serious reliance interests, especially after “decades of … reliance on prior policy.” 

On pretext, Judge McConnell applied the APA’s bad‑faith exception, supplementing the record with contemporaneous statements in which the President and Secretary referred to immigrants as “killers, leeches, and entitlement junkies” from “hellholes” and “shithole countries.” He characterized these remarks as “statements of ethnic hostility and prejudice” demonstrating “bad faith and impermissible animus,” and he refused the government’s invitation to ignore them merely because they were not quoted in the memoranda. Courts, he wrote, “are not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free,” and officials rarely admit discriminatory motives on the face of policy documents. The court also highlighted the carve‑outs for athletes and physicians as further evidence of pretext: if nationals of Travel Ban Countries as a class could not be trusted with benefits, it made little sense to exempt particular subgroups facing similar alleged vetting deficiencies. Taken together, the record revealed “a significant mismatch between the decision the agency made and the rationale it provided,” confirming that the national‑security rationale was contrived.

As a remedy, Judge McConnell followed the APA’s directive that courts “set aside” unlawful agency action. He vacated all four policies nationwide: the Global Asylum Hold Policy, the Benefits Hold Policy, the Comprehensive Re‑Review Policy, and the Country‑Specific Factors Policy. Vacatur renders those policies legally void and prevents USCIS from applying them going forward. The court also entered a declaratory judgment that each policy is unlawful under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and (C). He declined to issue a permanent injunction, reasoning that vacatur and declaratory relief already provide complete relief because USCIS cannot rely on the invalidated policies, and that any future, substantively similar measures could be challenged on their own records if promulgated. Injunctions, he noted, are an “extraordinary” remedy, and here less drastic remedies sufficed. He also applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to decline ruling on plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due-process and equal-protection claims, denying the government’s motion to dismiss those claims without prejudice because the case was fully resolved on APA grounds. 

Judge McConnell closed by stating that USCIS’s policies “did not simply place a hold on adjudications. More fundamentally, the Challenged Policies placed the lives of countless individuals on hold – solely by virtue of their countries of birth.” Many remained “without work, without legal status, and without any meaningful ability to plan for their futures.” It is not the court’s role to judge the wisdom of immigration policy, he wrote, but it is its duty to decide whether those policies comply with the law. Here, they did not – and so had to be “vacated and set aside.”

For immigrants and employers, the court’s ruling – grounded in the INA and the APA as the opinion makes clear – means that USCIS may no longer rely on these four vacated policies to categorically freeze adjudications or to treat nationals of the 39 Travel Ban Countries as presumptively disfavored in immigrant‑visa–linked benefits. Going forward, USCIS must operate within the statutory and regulatory framework the court described: complete, properly filed applications must be adjudicated; nationality‑based penalties in immigrant‑visa allocation are prohibited by 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A); and broad, nationality‑based moratoria and mass re‑review programs exceed the authority Congress has given the agency. 

The court itself spelled out the practical consequences. It held that the Global Asylum Hold, Benefits Hold, Comprehensive Re‑Review, and Country‑Specific Factors Policies are “declared unlawful and are hereby vacated and set aside”. That means applications that were frozen solely because the applicant is from a Travel Ban Country must return to ordinary adjudication channels under the INA and USCIS regulations. Asylum and withholding applications for those nationals can no longer be held in indefinite limbo based on the vacated policies. Work authorization, adjustment of status, and naturalization applications filed by people from the 39 countries must be processed without categorical, nationality‑based holds or across‑the‑board negative presumptions. Previously approved benefits may not be subjected to a special, country‑based re‑review regime. If USCIS seeks to rescind or terminate benefits, it must use the individualized grounds and procedures Congress defined for asylum termination, rescission of adjustment, denaturalization, or EAD revocation. And adjudicators may not treat Travel‑Ban‑derived “country-specific factors” as automatic negative weights in immigrant‑visa–linked discretionary decisions in a way that conflicts with § 1152(a)(1)(A).

For practitioners, the opinion points to clear next steps rooted in the court’s reasoning: identify clients from Travel Ban Countries whose asylum, EAD, adjustment, or naturalization cases have stalled, been reopened, or had oath ceremonies cancelled since late 2025; confirm whether those delays were attributable to the now‑vacated policies; and consider targeted agency follow‑up or, where appropriate, litigation that invokes the vacatur and declaratory relief in Dorcas. For affected communities, Judge McConnell’s decision reaffirms a core principle: the federal government may not close lawful immigration pathways or single out entire national‑origin groups for adverse treatment “solely by virtue of their countries of birth,” under the guise of national security, when the INA and the APA provide no such authority and the record reveals policies that placed “the lives of countless individuals on hold” for reasons the law does not permit.

Dorcas v USCIS does not apply to the State Department’s January 21, 2026 pause on visa issuances at US consulates who are nationals of 75 specified countries. The 75 country ban is subject to a separate lawsuit, Clinic v. Rubio.

The following passage from the opening lines of the decision are worth quoting:

“In ruling on these motions, the Court is reminded of a line often repeated in discussions around immigration policy: If people wish to immigrate to the United States, they ought to ‘follow the law’ and ‘do things the right way.’ This case serves as a perfect example of immigrants doing just that. Plaintiffs and their members have observed the legal processes that Congress enacted by statute and USCIS promulgated by regulation so that they may one day obtain immigration benefits. They have, for example, filed the appropriate paperwork, paid the required filing fees, submitted to the requested biometrics collections, and attended the necessary in-person interviews. Even so, Plaintiffs and their members are stuck waiting, for months on end, for benefit requests that USCIS refuses to adjudicate.

But the rule of law has to apply to everyone equally and, as evident here, USCIS has neither ‘followed the law’ nor ‘done things the right way.’ Indeed, the agency has violated the very immigration laws that Congress has charged it with administering, as well as the administrative laws that govern the agency’s actions. In enacting its latest immigration policies, USCIS: claims statutory and regulatory authority that it does not possess; makes decisions without the reasoned explanations that it must provide; acts without regard for the reliance interests of applicants that it must consider; and justifies its actions with pretextual concerns of ‘national security’ that mask anti-immigrant sentiments that it is forbidden from letting influence its decision-making. In legal terms that means USCIS’s actions are contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious.

Accordingly, as set forth below, each of the Challenged Policies that USCIS enacted—the Benefits Hold Policy, the Global Asylum Hold Policy, the Comprehensive Re-Review Policy, and the Country-Specific Factors Policy—are declared unlawful and are vacated and set aside.”

 

∗ Damira Zhanatova is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC

http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png 0 0 Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova2026-06-05 18:32:182026-06-06 14:59:28Dorcas v. USCIS: Federal Court Reaffirms That USCIS Must Adjudicate, Not Stonewall, Immigration Benefits
Cyrus Mehta

The Credibility Problem in Extraordinary Ability Cases: Why Evidence Matters More Than Ever in EB-1 and O-1 Petitions 

May 31, 2026/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus Mehta

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Manjeeta Chowdhary *

In visa categories such as EB-1 and O-1, evidence is the cornerstone of the petition. The USCIS Policy Manual identifies the types of evidence that may support O-1 and EB-1 petitions, underscoring that these classifications are fundamentally evidence-driven. In EB-1 cases, the central issue is whether the beneficiary has achieved sustained national or international acclaim and reached the top of the field. O-1 petitions similarly require evidence of distinction, extraordinary ability, or extraordinary achievement in the beneficiary’s profession. USCIS decides these cases based on documentary proof. Put simply, evidence is the lens through which the agency determines whether a beneficiary is truly extraordinary. Where evidence is central, credibility is essential. That is precisely why caution is warranted when evidence appears formulaic, crowdsourced, or manufactured. 

One increasingly visible pattern in EB-1 and O-1 petitions is the repetition of strikingly similar combinations of supporting documentation: the same professional memberships, the same categories of awards, similar judging invitations, comparable forms of published material, and increasingly familiar expert opinion structures and narratives. In many instances, these strategies are not developed independently based on the beneficiary’s unique career trajectory, but are influenced by online discussion forums, Reddit threads, WhatsApp groups, Discord communities, YouTube videos, paid consultants, and informal immigration networks where beneficiaries exchange information about “what worked” in prior cases.

This concern becomes particularly relevant in the context of paid publications, staged awards, or carefully developed judging opportunities. The issue is not necessarily whether money changed hands or whether an opportunity was strategically pursued. Public relations firms serve legitimate business purposes, some reputable awards involve nomination or participation fees, and professional visibility is often a normal aspect of career advancement. Nor is there anything inherently improper about pursuing speaking, judging, or leadership opportunities. The more difficult inquiry is whether the evidence genuinely reflects independent recognition within the field or whether it appears manufactured primarily to satisfy an immigration criterion.

There is a meaningful difference between media recognition that arises because a beneficiary’s work generated genuine professional attention and media coverage obtained primarily to create “published material” evidence. Likewise, there is a difference between a respected and competitive award recognized within a profession and an accolade that appears prestigious in title but carries limited significance in practice. Judging opportunities may strongly support extraordinary ability where a beneficiary was selected because of recognized expertise; however, where judging opportunities appear carefully arranged primarily to generate immigration evidence, questions regarding probative value inevitably arise.

The concern becomes more serious when supporting evidence contains exaggerated, unsupported, or potentially misleading information. In extraordinary ability petitions, the question is not simply whether a document fits a regulatory category, but whether the underlying claims are accurate, independently supported, and reflective of genuine professional recognition. When publicity-generated articles, curated awards, or arranged judging opportunities include overstated claims, credibility concerns begin to emerge. In these evidence-driven classifications, unsupported factual assertions carry greater consequences because they go to the central question USCIS must decide whether the beneficiary has truly achieved distinction in the field.

A related concern is the increasing reliance on Artificial Intelligence to develop extraordinary ability narratives. When relied upon uncritically, AI may generate generalized expert letters, polished but unsupported narratives, or language that overstates the evidentiary record. In extraordinary ability petitions, persuasive drafting cannot substitute for independently verifiable facts. We also refer our readers to a prior blog, “To What Extent Can Immigration Practitioners  Ethically Rely on Chat GPT to Aid their Practice”, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2023/09/to-what-extent-can-immigration-practitioners-ethically-rely-on-chatgpt-to-aid-their-practice.html, where we demonstrate that a support letter for an O-1B petition generated by ChatGPT may be polished but superficial. It is incumbent on the applicant to provide more details and not simply rely on the AI generated product.  The USCIS may also be able to detect a letter generated by AI and not give it the same weight. 

This phenomenon is understandable. Extraordinary ability classifications remain among the most subjective areas of immigration law. Unlike petitions based on clearly defined educational or occupational requirements, EB-1 and O-1 petitions often require USCIS to evaluate concepts that are inherently more difficult to assess objectively, including distinction, acclaim, originality, influence, recognition, or significance within a field. Given this uncertainty, it is natural for beneficiaries to seek predictability and to look toward examples of successful cases, online discussions, and recurring forms of evidence that appear to have persuaded USCIS in prior filings.

To be clear, there is nothing inherently improper about shared information or recurring forms of evidence. Professional memberships, judging opportunities, media coverage, published articles, and industry awards may all serve as highly probative evidence in the appropriate context. Online communities may also play an important educational role by helping applicants better understand complex regulatory criteria that might otherwise seem inaccessible. Similarly, artificial intelligence can be an effective tool for organization, drafting, issue spotting, and synthesizing large volumes of information.

The concern, however, arises when strategy becomes so standardized that evidence begins to appear curated for immigration purposes rather than reflective of genuine professional distinction. Extraordinary ability petitions are not intended to function as checklist exercises. The inquiry is not whether a beneficiary has assembled the same evidence discussed online or obtained credentials others have successfully relied upon. Rather, the relevant question is whether the evidence persuasively demonstrates that this beneficiary has attained sustained acclaim, distinction, or extraordinary achievement within the field.

Recurring evidence is not inherently weak or improper, and beneficiaries need not avoid it simply because others have used it successfully. The problem is not repetition, but the use of evidence chosen mainly to satisfy a regulatory category rather than to reflect genuine professional distinction. That is when credibility concerns begin to arise, especially if the supporting evidence is exaggerated, unsupported, or detached from authentic recognition in the field.

This issue also raises ethical concerns. Immigration attorneys must critically evaluate evidence, not simply compile it. Third-party materials, particularly publicity-driven articles, questionable awards, or strategically arranged judging opportunities, require close review when their claims seem exaggerated, unsupported, or unrelated to genuine professional recognition. The fact that similar evidence succeeded in earlier cases does not make it reliable, and meeting a regulatory category does not prove the underlying claims are true. When factual assertions cannot be independently verified, the issue is no longer just evidentiary weakness, but credibility. The USCIS can potentially charge the noncitizen applicant with fraud or misrepresentation, which would result in permanent inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Knowingly, submitting fraudulent material about one’s credentials can also incur criminal liability under federal penal statutes such as 18 USC 1001. An attorney who knowingly assists their client in submitting such material can also be charged criminally with aiding or abetting conspiracy. Moreover, the attorney would also be violating their ethical obligations under the state analog of ABA Model Rule 3.3 and pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.102(c) for knowingly making a false statement, which is part of the federal rules that sanction immigration practitioners. 

Recent developments further reinforce the importance of evidentiary credibility in extraordinary ability petitions. In Matter of Texperts, Inc., 29 I&N Dec. 491 (AAO 2026), the Administrative Appeals Office issued a significant precedent decision confirming that USCIS may continue to preserve findings relating to fraud or willful misrepresentation even after a petition has been withdrawn. Although the case arose in the H-1B context, the AAO’s reasoning rests upon broader USCIS authority and immigration principles that are not confined to a single visa category. For evidence-driven petitions such as EB-1 and O-1 filings—where eligibility often turns on documentary submissions—the practical implication is difficult to ignore: withdrawal may not necessarily resolve concerns arising from unsupported or misleading evidence once it enters the administrative record. The decision serves as an important reminder that, in evidence-driven petitions, credibility concerns may outlast the petition itself.

*Manjeeta Chowdhary is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC. 

http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png 0 0 Cyrus Mehta http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png Cyrus Mehta2026-05-31 13:39:482026-05-31 13:46:47The Credibility Problem in Extraordinary Ability Cases: Why Evidence Matters More Than Ever in EB-1 and O-1 Petitions 
Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova

USCIS New Policy Limiting Adjustment of Status Eligibility Is Bad Policy and Contrary to Law

May 23, 2026/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova

By Cyrus D Mehta and Damira Zhanatova*

As previously addressed here, on May 21, 2026, USCIS issued Policy Memorandum PM-602-0199 (“memo”), announcing that filing an I-485 adjustment of status (AOS) application in the United States will be treated as an “extraordinary” form of relief and emphasizing that most individuals seeking permanent residence should instead complete immigrant visa processing abroad through a U.S. consulate. USCIS presents this as a reaffirmation of a “consistent and longstanding approach” and a return to the “original intent” of INA 245, but the practical effect is a sharp break from decades of adjudicatory practice in which eligible applicants routinely adjusted status from within the United States in both employment-based and family-based categories. The policy is expected to have substantial consequences for employers, families, and individuals who have relied on adjustment of status as the central mechanism for obtaining permanent residence.

The standard set forth in this memo is not only an abrupt upheaval of established USCIS policy, but also in contravention of the law. INA 245(a), codified at 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), states only that “Any alien who has been lawfully admitted for temporary status… such status not having been terminated, may apply for adjustment of status…” Although adjustment of status is a discretionary benefit pursuant to INA 245(a), it has never been interpreted as an “extraordinary” form of relief. The characterization of adjustment of status as “extraordinary relief” is not present anywhere in the INA and would surely have been spelled out by Congress if this was, in fact, its intent. USCIS’s interpretation of the word “may” in INA 245(a) to mean “extraordinary” is not only illogical, but contrary to the meaning of the statute and to longstanding USCIS policy.

The memo’s core message is that adjustment of status is not the norm but an exception. USCIS repeatedly characterizes AOS as “a matter of discretion and administrative grace,” citing decisions such as Matter of Blas, where the BIA characterized adjustment as discretionary relief and described it as “extraordinary” because it allows a noncitizen to avoid the ordinary consular visa-issuing process. The memo quotes that adjustment “was not designed to supersede the regular consular visa-issuing process or to be granted in non-meritorious cases,” and it points to federal cases like Chen v. Foley for the proposition that adjustment is not meant to replace consular processing. It then extends this characterization to current practice by stating that, as a general matter, nonimmigrants and parolees are expected to depart once the purpose of their admission or parole is fulfilled and that seeking AOS instead “contravenes” Congressional expectations.

Under the memo, remaining in the United States and applying to adjust status rather than departing and consular processing will often be treated as an adverse discretionary factor. USCIS says that, with limited exceptions, the statutory scheme suggests that Congress expects paroled and nonimmigrant entrants to depart and pursue immigrant visas abroad, and it notes that applicants who do not depart typically have violated status, overstayed, or engaged in unauthorized employment. The memo invokes Matter of Blas for the proposition that such adverse factors may need to be offset by “unusual or even outstanding equities,” while explicitly stating that the mere absence of adverse factors is not enough to show such equities. What the memo does not mention, however, is that the BIA’s precedent decision in Matter of Arai is still the law. In Matter of Arai, the Board held that where there are adverse factors weighing against the approval of an adjustment of status application, the applicant may need to offset those factors by showing “unusual or even outstanding equities,” but in cases where there are no adverse factors present, adjustment of status will ordinarily be granted, albeit still as a matter of discretion. In other words, Arai makes clear that the presence of statutory eligibility and the absence of negatives should normally result in a grant. The memo adopts the “unusual or even outstanding equities” language while omitting Arai’s equally important holding that, when there are no adverse factors, adjustment should generally be approved.

This is a significant shift assuming USCIS intends to implement the new policy. Historically, although adjustment under INA 245(a) has always been technically discretionary, USCIS adjudications in employment-based and family-based cases focused on statutory eligibility, inadmissibility, and policy-manual guidance on discretion. Eligible applicants in lawful status, particularly employment-based applicants in H-1B or L-1 status and family-based immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, were not treated as asking for “extraordinary” relief merely because they sought to adjust status rather than depart for consular processing. The new memo aims to reverse that presumption by recasting AOS as an act of “administrative grace” that should generally yield to consular processing.

This interpretation depends heavily on a novel reading of the word “may” in INA 245(a). The statute provides that the status of an eligible alien “may be adjusted by the Secretary, in his discretion.” That language plainly grants discretion, but it does not say that adjustment must be “extraordinary,” rare, or disfavored. Elsewhere in the immigration statute, Congress has explicitly used heightened standards like “clear and convincing evidence” when it wished to impose special burdens or reserve relief for exceptional cases. Indeed, INA 245 itself contains provisions that require “clear and convincing” evidence in specific contexts. If Congress intended adjustment of status in 245(a) to be limited to “extraordinary” circumstances, it knew how to say so directly and did not. Interpreting “may” to mean “extraordinary” has no support in the statutory language of 8 U.S.C. 1255. It is a policy choice layered on top of the statute rather than an interpretation compelled by the statute itself.

The broader structure of section 245 and related provisions confirms that Congress saw adjustment as a central, normal mechanism for those already in the United States. Through 245(i), Congress allowed certain individuals who would otherwise be barred (for example, for unauthorized employment or unlawful presence) to adjust upon payment of a penalty, thereby expanding access to adjustment. Through 245(k), Congress created a targeted cure for certain employment-based applicants with limited status violations of 180  days or less from their last admission. Congress also affirmatively created and preserved dual-intent categories like H-1B and L, which only make sense if pursuing permanent residence, including through adjustment, while in nonimmigrant status is an anticipated and legitimate use of the system. At no point did Congress amend 245(a), 245(i), or 245(k) to say that adjustment in those contexts is “extraordinary” or a disfavored exception. When Congress enacted INA section 204(j) portability through the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act (AC21), it also included sections 104(c) and 106(a), specifically to allow H-1B workers pursuing permanent residence to extend status beyond normal limits while their adjustment cases remained pending. Those provisions reflect that adjustment of status for dual intent H-1Bs and Ls is routine and normal, not an extraordinary exception.

The structure of 245 and related AC21 provisions thus shows a legislative intent to use adjustment as a central pathway for those present in the United States who meet detailed eligibility criteria, not as a marginal, almost unattainable form of grace. By insisting that the ordinary, statutorily authorized use of these pathways is now disfavored “extraordinary” relief, the USCIS memo runs directly against what Congress actually did in INA 245 and AC21.

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s Loper Bright decision overturning Chevron deference, this kind of aggressive agency reinterpretation of “may” in INA 245(a) should be especially vulnerable. Under Chevron, agencies received considerable leeway to interpret ambiguous statutes. Post-Chevron, courts will be far more willing to ask whether an agency’s reading is consistent with the statutory text and structure. A court looking at 8 U.S.C. 1255 could reasonably conclude that USCIS’s attempt to convert ordinary discretionary language “may” into a requirement that adjustment be rare, “extraordinary” relief is not a permissible interpretation but a rewriting of the statute. The lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking for a shift this sweeping strengthens an Administrative Procedure Act challenge, because the memo functions more like a substantive rule than a minor interpretive clarification.

The memo is also incomplete in its treatment of prior BIA case law. While it leans on decisions like Matter of Blas to characterize adjustment as an “extraordinary” remedy, it omits reference to BIA decisions that recognize the central role of adjustment for immediate relatives and other core categories. For example, BIA cases dealing with spouses and children of U.S. citizens, such as Matter of Cavazos and Matter of Ibrahim, required a favorable exercise of discretion but also acknowledged that strong equities in those relationships often warranted granting adjustment where statutory eligibility and admissibility were satisfied. These decisions do not treat immediate-relative adjustment as rare “extraordinary” relief but as the expected mechanism Congress intended for uniting U.S. citizens with close family. The memo’s silence about that line of cases underscores how selective its reliance on precedent is.

Beyond the prevailing policy of this administration, adjustment of status under INA 245 is the linchpin of the modern legal immigration system for people already in the United States. For employment-based applicants, AOS permits continued work authorization and stable employment relationships while multi-year immigrant visa backlogs clear, sparing both employers and employees the disruption and risk of consular trips and administrative processing abroad. For family-based applicants, especially those with U.S. citizen spouses and children, adjustment is often the only realistic way to avoid lengthy family separation during the green card process. For noncitizens from countries that have faced travel bans or other entry restrictions, consular processing may be effectively impossible or extremely risky. Those who leave may be subject to a visa refusal under INA 221(f).  In these circumstances, a USCIS policy that treats AOS as disfavored “extraordinary” relief threatens to leave many with no viable path at all. The US approves over 1 million people to become lawful permanents, and about half of them apply through adjustment of status. The policy memo, if implemented will bar over 600,000 people from getting green cards through adjustment of status. 

The memo’s approach is especially severe for applicants in long-backlogged categories who are already living and working lawfully in the United States and raising U.S. citizen children. For these families, a pending adjustment application functions as a lifeline: it anchors work authorization, travel permission, and a basic measure of stability in an otherwise precarious system. By recasting adjustment as a rare exception and steering applicants toward consular processing, the policy threatens to tear that safety net away. The harm is magnified by existing conditions at U.S. consulates, where many posts already struggle with long appointment queues, expanded security screening, and unpredictable administrative processing. Forcing large numbers of cases that historically would have adjusted domestically into these consular pipelines will almost inevitably worsen backlogs and delays, compounding the disruption.

The practical consequences for employers will be substantial. If officers, following the memo, routinely decline to exercise discretion favorably in adjustment cases and instead encourage or effectively require consular processing, employers can expect more frequent international travel disruptions, extended periods during which key employees are stuck abroad awaiting immigrant visas, higher legal and logistical costs, and greater uncertainty in workforce planning and retention. These burdens will sit on top of the already-documented consular constraints, including resource limitations and enhanced social media and security vetting, which have made visa processing timelines increasingly unreliable.

For individuals and families, particularly those in backlogged preference categories who are lawfully employed and caring for U.S. citizen children here, the memo threatens to strip away a critical stabilizing mechanism. A pending adjustment application does more than just move a case forward. It provides employment authorization, travel permission, and a degree of protection that is especially vital for people who cannot safely or realistically return abroad for consular processing because of travel bans, persecution risks, or severe consular delays. Under a regime that treats adjustment as an extraordinary indulgence rather than an integral, congressionally designed component of the system, many families will be forced into impossible choices between prolonged separation and abandoning their pursuit of lawful permanent residence altogether.

Since the memo’s release, there has already been an indication that USCIS is attempting to water down its message in response to immediate backlash, an implicit acknowledgment of how vulnerable the policy is under the statute and how disruptive it is likely to be for employers, workers, and families. A recent report on X describes USCIS officials as suggesting that those with applications that “provide an economic benefit or otherwise are in the national interest” will be permitted to continue on their current adjustment path, while others may be asked to apply for immigrant visas abroad depending on their individualized circumstances. Even this “watering down” is contrary to INA 245(a) and will result in more subjectivity and denials. Creating a vague, extra-statutory category of cases that supposedly serve “economic” or “national interest” goals does not cure the underlying legal defect. It simply adds another layer of unconstrained discretion. In addition to the new policy being driven by animus towards noncitizens, whether they are legal or not, it reflects sheer incompetence given the disruption it will cause to businesses and families.

In sum, INA 245 does not preclude adjustment of status, and the memo does not change the law. USCIS has always had discretion to approve or deny and adjustment of status application. Matter of Arai holds that if there are no adverse factors present, adjustment of status should be granted as a matter of discretion. Applicants may still file adjustment of status applications, and respond to requests for evidence, if issued, regarding whether they merit the favorable exercise of discretion. We need to continue to evaluate how the USCIS will adjudicate currently pending adjustment of status  applications and new applications. If there are arbitrary denials because USCIS has begun to view adjustment of status as  “extraordinary” relief,  applicants and their lawyers can challenge them in federal court. Until then, adjustment of status still remains a viable option as before and should not be foreclosed based on a USCIS memo that unlawfully reinterprets the law. 

* Damira Zhanatova is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png 0 0 Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova2026-05-23 19:33:452026-05-23 19:43:57USCIS New Policy Limiting Adjustment of Status Eligibility Is Bad Policy and Contrary to Law
Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova

The Diplomatic Exception to Birthright Citizenship: Paths to Permanent Residence and Naturalization

May 17, 2026/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova

By Cyrus D Mehta and Damira Zhanatova*

One of the most misunderstood areas of U.S. immigration law is the treatment of children born in the United States to foreign diplomats. Most people assume that anyone born on U.S. soil is automatically a U.S. citizen. In reality, the Fourteenth Amendment and federal regulations carve out a narrow exception for children born to certain accredited diplomats. These children are generally not U.S. citizens at birth, but they have a unique, voluntary path to lawful permanent residence (a green card) that is effective from birth and, from there, to U.S. citizenship. When that framework is ignored or mishandled, the consequences can be deeply disruptive.

Birthright citizenship comes from the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants citizenship to those “born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” The phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” is crucial. The Supreme Court has long held that this clause excludes only a few narrow groups, including children of foreign diplomats and children born to enemy forces in hostile occupation. Accredited diplomats are treated under international law as remaining under the jurisdiction of their own governments rather than the United States. The State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual explains that diplomatic agents are immune from U.S. criminal jurisdiction and, with limited exceptions, from civil and administrative jurisdiction as well. Because they are not fully subject to U.S. law, their U.S.-born children are not considered “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States and therefore do not acquire citizenship at birth.

This legal framework is implemented through the regulations at 8 CFR 101.3 and 8 CFR 264.2, as well as the corresponding guidance in the USCIS Policy Manual. Under these authorities, a child born in the United States to a foreign diplomatic officer accredited by the Department of State may voluntarily register to be treated as a lawful permanent resident from birth. Because such a child was not born “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” they do not gain citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, but they can choose to be considered a permanent resident as of their date of birth. This registration is voluntary and requires an application. It is not automatic.

The diplomatic exception itself is narrow and depends on the parents’ exact legal status when the child was born. It covers foreign sovereigns on official visits and accredited diplomatic officials such as ambassadors, ministers, chargés d’affaires, counselors, agents and secretaries of embassies, and attachés and other staff attached to an embassy. It also reaches people with comparable diplomatic status and immunities who are assigned to the United Nations or the Organization of American States, or who otherwise hold comparable status under international agreements. In practice, the key question is whether the parent’s accredited title appeared on the State Department’s Diplomatic List, known as the Blue List, at the time of the child’s birth. Only Blue List officers, who enjoy full diplomatic immunity, fall within the regulatory definition of “foreign diplomatic officer” for this purpose. Not all A or G nonimmigrants are on the Blue List or have full immunity. Many consular officers and staff, for example, have more limited protections and are not on the Blue List. Their U.S.-born children are generally citizens at birth because those parents are treated as subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

For someone who does fall under the diplomatic exception, immigration law provides a clear path. A child born in the United States to a qualifying foreign diplomatic officer is not automatically a citizen, but under 8 CFR 101.3 the child may be “considered a lawful permanent resident at birth” if a record of permanent residence is properly created under 8 CFR 264.2. This status is not conferred automatically. The person must submit a Form I‑485 application to create that record. USCIS guidance explains that this process allows a U.S.-born child of an accredited foreign diplomatic officer to voluntarily register permanent resident status, retroactive to birth.

To do that, the child (or a parent, if the child is under 18) files Form I-485 with the fee, supported by a U.S. birth certificate, a list of all U.S. entries and exits, proof of continuous residence, two passport photos, and official confirmation that at least one parent was a Blue List diplomatic officer at the time of birth, including that parent’s classification and title. The applicant also submits Form I-566 (showing A or G status history) and Form I-508 to waive any diplomatic rights and immunities, since lawful permanent residents must be fully subject to U.S. law. USCIS then confirms the parent’s diplomatic status with the Department of State. If all requirements are met, the application is approved, the person is classified as DS1 (Born Under Diplomatic Status in the United States), and permanent residence is treated as having begun on the date of birth, not the approval date. The adjudication does not involve the usual admissibility analysis or discretionary balancing that apply in many other adjustment cases. Instead, the focus is on whether the specific eligibility criteria in the regulations are met.

From there, the path to citizenship is the same as for other permanent residents. Once USCIS approves the I‑485, the person is an LPR effective from their date of birth. When they satisfy the statutory naturalization requirements, they may file Form N‑400 to become a citizen. Because their LPR date is deemed to be their date of birth, most will already meet the residence‑duration requirement at the time they register, as long as they have maintained the residence and presence required by the naturalization laws.

Despite this clear regulatory framework, the diplomatic exception is often missed for years. Local vital records offices issue standard U.S. birth certificates to everyone born in their jurisdiction, including children of diplomats. Those certificates do not reflect the parents’ diplomatic status, and local staff generally do not investigate whether a parent is a foreign diplomatic representative. On the basis of that birth certificate, many children of diplomats obtain Social Security numbers, U.S. passports, and driver’s licenses, and may even register to vote and be called on for jury duty. To agencies and institutions, these individuals appear indistinguishable from U.S. citizens. Yet if their parents held full Blue List diplomatic status at the time of their birth, they may never have acquired citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. This discrepancy often comes to light only when they apply for, or attempt to renew, a U.S. passport, or when a more detailed status review prompts a closer examination of their parents’ diplomatic history and Blue List records.

One widely reported case shows how disruptive this can be. A U.S.-born physician in his early sixties, who had lived in the United States his entire life, practiced internal medicine in Northern Virginia for more than three decades, and paid taxes for years, applied in 2023 to renew his U.S. passport. Instead of a routine renewal, the State Department informed him that his citizenship had been a “mistake.” Officials determined that his father had been an accredited Iranian diplomat at the time of his birth. Because of his father’s diplomatic immunity, they concluded that he was not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States at birth and had never lawfully acquired citizenship. In a single letter, he went from being a long‑time U.S. citizen in the eyes of his community to being treated as a non‑citizen and essentially stateless. He could not travel, faced uncertainty about his medical license and ongoing employment, and had to retain legal counsel and begin the process of applying for lawful permanent residence under the diplomatic‑birth framework rather than simply renewing a passport. His case underscored that what the government characterizes as a correction under 8 CFR 101.3 can, in practical terms, overturn a person’s life.

USCIS and the State Department’s position in such cases is not that citizenship is being revoked in the denaturalization sense, but that citizenship never attached under the Constitution and 8 CFR 101.3 because the parents’ Blue List diplomatic status placed the child outside U.S. jurisdiction at birth. The proper remedy, in their view, is not a citizenship adjudication, but registration as a permanent resident through 8 CFR 264.2 and, if desired, later naturalization.

There is anecdotal evidence of this pattern.  In one scenario,  a person is born in the United States while both parents are serving here as foreign diplomats, often at a UN mission or embassy. They grow up entirely in the United States, hold a state birth certificate and a Social Security number, and have always assumed they are U.S. citizens. They never applied for a U.S. passport as a child or young adult. Only when they apply for a first passport in adulthood does the State Department review their parents’ records, discover that one or both were Blue List diplomats with full immunity at the time of birth, and deny the passport with an explanation that the applicant is not a U.S. citizen. In another scenario, a person in the same position receives a U.S. passport as a child and may have that passport renewed multiple times. Agencies never examine the parents’ diplomatic history. The person lives in the United States, works, pays taxes, votes, and even serves on juries, believing in complete good faith that they are a citizen. Then, at some later renewal, the State Department undertakes a more thorough review, confirms that a parent was on the Blue List as a fully immune diplomatic officer at the time of birth, and concludes that citizenship was never lawfully acquired. The renewal is denied, and the individual receives a written determination that they are not a U.S. citizen.

From the applicant’s perspective, it feels as if their citizenship is being annulled. But the government’s legal position is that, because the parents were qualifying foreign diplomats, the person was never a citizen at birth. Earlier passports and other documents were issued in error because agencies did not have or did not consider the parents’ diplomatic status. When the State Department now refuses renewal, it is, in effect, correcting that underlying mistake.

At that point, these individuals are no longer simply applying to obtain or renew a passport. They must rebuild their immigration status through the diplomatic‑birth lawful permanent resident framework. In practice, this usually requires filing Form I‑485 under 8 CFR 264.2, with a thorough evidentiary record documenting their U.S. birth, continuous residence, complete travel history, and their parents’ status on the State Department’s Blue List, together with Forms I‑566 and I‑508. Form I‑485 itself poses a series of detailed, high‑stakes questions, including whether the applicant has ever worked in the United States without authorization, whether they have ever falsely claimed to be a U.S. citizen in any context, and whether they have ever voted in violation of federal, state, or local law. For someone who has genuinely believed for decades that they were a U.S. citizen, and who has lived, worked, voted, and paid taxes on that understanding, answering these questions can be especially daunting. Their responses must be crafted with great care and supported by a clear legal and factual explanation so that USCIS understands this history as the product of a long‑standing, government‑reinforced misunderstanding of status, not as deliberate fraud or willful misrepresentation. Fortunately, in this diplomatic‑birth registration setting, USCIS does not apply the usual inadmissibility grounds the way it does in ordinary adjustment cases. When someone is being formally recognized as a permanent resident from birth, their prior good‑faith use of U.S. documents or belief that they were a citizen is not treated as a basis to find them inadmissible for misrepresentation or a false claim to U.S. citizenship.

Once a person in this situation becomes a permanent resident under the DS1 framework authorized by 8 CFR 101.3 and 8 CFR 264.2, they are deemed to have been permanent residents as of their date of birth. For many such individuals, that means they can apply for citizenship as soon as their permanent residence is registered and any separate naturalization‑specific requirements are satisfied.

Children born in the United States to accredited foreign diplomats occupy a unique and often precarious place in U.S. law. They are not citizens at birth because their parents were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. In practice, they are frequently treated as citizens for years because they receive standard birth certificates and, in some cases, passports and other documents. Under 8 CFR 101.3 and 8 CFR 264.2, however, they have a special, voluntary path to lawful permanent residence that is backdated to birth, and once registered as LPRs, they can pursue naturalization under the ordinary rules. When these issues are recognized and handled proactively, the legal framework allows children of diplomats to move from a misunderstood status to permanent residence from birth and ultimately to secure U.S. citizenship. When they are discovered late, as in some cases, the disruption can be significant. For anyone born in the United States to parents who served here as diplomats, it is essential to understand the parents’ exact Blue List and immunity status at the time of birth, to document residence and travel history, and to pursue the most appropriate and legally sound path.

Our blog has nothing to do with the Trump administration’s executive order denying birthright citizenship to children born to parents who are either not in the U.S. lawfully or who are in the U.S. temporarily. It has always been acknowledged that children born in the U.S. to diplomats who enjoy immunity are not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and do not acquire citizenship at the time of their birth in the U.S. Such persons can still register as permanent residents and are able to become U.S. citizens through naturalization. They are in a much better position than what might happen to children born in the U.S. if Trump’s executive order was implemented. That kind of policy could have perverse and far-reaching consequences. Children born in the United States to undocumented parents could be left without any lawful status. Because some countries do not automatically confer citizenship to children born abroad based solely on their parents’ status, some children in this situation could even be born stateless. The U.S.-born children of parents who hold a valid nonimmigrant status, such as H-1B or H-4, would also be impacted. A person must either be admitted into the U.S. in H-4 status or change into H-4 from another nonimmigrant status, so it is unclear how a newborn child could acquire a nonimmigrant status from birth. Parents might be forced to scramble and file immigration applications immediately following a child’s birth to ensure that they are not out of status. Because birth in the United States would no longer be sufficient to confer citizenship, even U.S. citizen parents might be forced to provide exhaustive proof of legal status to ensure that citizenship was also extended to their children. These scenarios are analyzed in greater detail in a prior blog. If Trump’s executive order ever takes effect, although we fervently wish it will never happen, children born of parents in any status should be recognized as permanent residents just like children who are born to foreign diplomats.

The hope is that the Supreme Court, in Trump v. Barbara, will reaffirm the settled understanding of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment: that, with the narrow and historically recognized exception for children born to accredited foreign diplomats, children born on U.S. soil are citizens at birth. For those born in the United States to foreign diplomats who later discover that they did not acquire citizenship at birth, existing law already provides a clear and workable remedy: they can register permanent residence as of their date of birth and then pursue naturalization under the ordinary rules. Any effort to narrow birthright citizenship beyond this limited diplomatic exception would raise serious constitutional concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment.

* Damira Zhanatova is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png 0 0 Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova2026-05-17 19:53:162026-05-18 00:49:45The Diplomatic Exception to Birthright Citizenship: Paths to Permanent Residence and Naturalization
Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova

Navigating the Downgrade of the Indian LL.B in Green Card Sponsorships for Lawyers

May 10, 2026/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova

By Cyrus D Mehta and Damira Zhanatova*

Over the last few years, many U.S. employers sponsoring Indian-trained lawyers for permanent residence have begun seeing a new kind of I-140 Request for Evidence (RFE). The problem is not usually the lawyer’s experience, bar admission, or the substantive need for foreign law expertise. Instead, the RFE often focuses almost entirely on how AACRAO EDGE now classifies the Indian Bachelor of Laws (LLB) degree.

Sometime around 2022, EDGE updated its guidance to treat the Indian LLB as comparable in level to a U.S. bachelor’s degree rather than a U.S. first professional law degree (JD). That shift has created serious complications in employment-based second preference (EB-2) cases for foreign lawyers, particularly where earlier credential evaluations had treated the LLB as JD-equivalent.  This blog explains what is happening, why USCIS is issuing RFEs, and how careful framing of the job requirements and the beneficiary’s credentials can still lead to I-140 approval.

The EDGE update matters because USCIS officers often consult EDGE to evaluate foreign educational credentials. In older cases, credential evaluations concluded that a three-year Indian LLB, earned after a prior bachelor’s degree, was equivalent to a U.S. JD. Now, the updated EDGE entry states that the Indian Bachelor of Laws “represents attainment of a level of education comparable to a bachelor’s degree in the United States,” while also noting, in the author comments, that this credential “functions as a first professional degree in law in India”. The LLB degree can be attained after three years or four years of college followed by three years of study in a law college or the LLB is also attained after five years of study in a law college after twelve years of high school. Both the three year and five-year LLB degrees have been downgraded by EDGE as being comparable to a bachelor’s degree in the US.  RFEs have begun quoting only the “bachelor’s-degree-equivalent” language to argue that a beneficiary does not have the equivalent of a U.S. JD or “equivalent professional degree” that the officer believes the position requires, while ignoring the “first professional degree” function in the Indian legal system.

That EDGE language places the Indian LLB in a very different position than certain other Indian professional degrees. For example, EDGE’s entry for the MBBS states: “The Bachelor of Medicine & Bachelor of Surgery represents attainment of a level of education comparable to a first professional degree in medicine in the United States.” In other words, for medicine EDGE is willing to say directly that the foreign degree is comparable to a U.S. first professional degree. For law, it stops short, saying the LLB “represents attainment of a level of education comparable to a bachelor’s degree in the United States” and only that it “functions as a first professional degree in law in India.”

The situation for LLBs from India has remained unsettled as a result. One theoretical approach is to try to extend the “First Professional Degree” language that EDGE applies to Indian credentials in fields like medicine and dentistry and argue that it should likewise cover law. However, given the current LLB wording, that is a weak argument today and unlikely to be persuasive on its own. The qualifiers “functions as” and “in India” signal that EDGE is deliberately not saying that the LLB is comparable to a first professional law degree in the United States.

In the EB-2 context, the core legal standard is set out in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k). Under that provision, an I-140 can be approved for a “member of the professions holding an advanced degree” if the beneficiary has either an advanced degree (or a foreign equivalent) or a U.S. bachelor’s degree (or a foreign equivalent) followed by at least five years of progressive post-baccalaureate experience in the specialty. The regulation explicitly recognizes that a foreign degree equivalent to a U.S. bachelor’s degree plus five years of progressive experience can satisfy the “advanced degree” requirement, even if the foreign degree itself is not equivalent to a U.S. master’s or JD. 

Agency guidance interpreting 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k) reiterates that where the foreign education is found to be only equivalent to a U.S. bachelor’s degree, the petitioner may still satisfy the advanced-degree standard by documenting at least five years of progressive post-baccalaureate experience in the specialty occupation. That guidance further explains that “progressive” experience must reflect increasing levels of responsibility, complexity, and judgment over time, rather than simply time served in an unchanging role. 

This is where the EDGE shift collides with long-standing EB-2 standards. When credential evaluators previously described the LLB as JD-equivalent, many EB-2 filings for Indian-trained lawyers were framed as if the beneficiary already held a foreign professional law degree at the U.S. graduate level. With EDGE now labeling the LLB as bachelor’s-level, adjudicators are much more likely to apply the bachelor’s-plus-five-years track laid out in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(i)(B). That approach is consistent with the regulation’s text, but it requires petitioners to pay close attention to how they document both education and experience.

At the same time, resources like AACRAO EDGE are not binding sources of law. Officers are ought to treat such tools as aids, but to base final determinations on the totality of the evidence and the regulatory standards in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k). Where a foreign degree is only at the bachelor’s level, adjudicators must examine whether the record establishes at least five years of progressive post-baccalaureate experience in the specialty, rather than allowing EDGE alone to determine the outcome.

In practice, effective responses to the Indian LLB-related RFEs have emphasized several key points. One key point is the distinction between EDGE’s “level” description and the LLB’s actual professional function. Even if EDGE now describes the LLB as comparable to a U.S. bachelor’s degree, the same entry acknowledges that it functions as a first professional degree in law in India. Petitioners substantiate this by submitting evidence that the LLB is the credential required for enrollment as an advocate with an Indian bar council, and that without it, an individual cannot practice law in that jurisdiction. Enrollment certificates and bar‑council documentation demonstrate that the LLB is, in fact, the professional law qualification in the foreign system, not a generic academic credential.

Another key point is the importance of the certified job requirements. Where the labor certification permits an LLB or an “equivalent professional degree” among the acceptable qualifications, USCIS’s role at the I‑140 stage is to determine whether the beneficiary possesses that foreign professional law degree and any other DOL‑certified minimums, not to retroactively raise the bar to a U.S. JD alone. The friction introduced by the revised EDGE language should be addressed in the EB‑2 analysis under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k), rather than by rewriting the Department of Labor’s minimum qualifications after the fact.

Petitioners have also increasingly grounded their arguments in the bachelor’s-plus-five-years prong of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(i)(B). If USCIS treats the Indian LLB as equivalent to a U.S. bachelor’s degree, the path forward is to demonstrate that the beneficiary has at least five years of progressive post-baccalaureate experience in the relevant legal specialty. Agency guidance interpreting that provision indicates that experience must show advancement in responsibility and complexity, such as moving from junior work to leading complex matters, supervising other professionals, or managing key client relationships, rather than merely accumulating time. Detailed letters of experience from prior employers, with concrete descriptions of duties and progression, are therefore essential.

Many practitioners continue to use credential evaluations that synthesize EDGE and other authorities to explain why an LLB pursued after a prior bachelor’s degree should be understood as a first professional degree in law in terms of structure and purpose. Evaluations point out that, structurally, the combination of a prior bachelor’s degree and a three-year LLB in India is analogous to the U.S. pattern of an undergraduate degree followed by a JD, and that in both systems, the professional law degree is the prerequisite for bar admission. Even if USCIS adheres to EDGE’s bachelor’s-level characterization for level-equivalency purposes, these evaluations help show that the overall educational and professional pathway satisfies the EB-2 advanced-degree standard when combined with the required progressive experience under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k). 

The bottom line is that the EDGE “downgrade” of the Indian LLB has changed how many I-140s for Indian-trained lawyers are argued and reviewed, but it has not closed the door on EB-2 classification. By acknowledging the updated EDGE language, highlighting the LLB’s role as a first professional law degree in India and as the gateway to bar admission, aligning job requirements with that foreign professional credential, and deliberately building a record of at least five years of progressive post-baccalaureate experience within the framework of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k), employers can continue to obtain I-140 approvals for Indian-trained attorneys despite this new wave of RFEs.

Finally, employers petitioning for H-1B classification on behalf of Indian trained lawyers with an LLB degree should also structure the job requirements as a minimum of a bachelor’s degree rather than a JD degree. The Indian trained lawyer should be able to qualify for H-1B classification as it meets the minimum of a bachelor’s degree to qualify as a specialty occupation. However, many Indian lawyers with LLB degrees have also graduated with a Master of Laws (LLM) degree from a US law school. An Indian lawyer with an LL.M should be able to qualify under EB-2 by virtue of this degree as well as for H-1B classification. Our blog deals more with the lawyer who is being sponsored by a US employer with only an Indian LLB degree and the pitfalls associated with its unfortunate downgrade. 

* Damira Zhanatova is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png 0 0 Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova2026-05-10 10:29:292026-05-18 00:51:02Navigating the Downgrade of the Indian LL.B in Green Card Sponsorships for Lawyers
Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova

L-1 Eligibility Without Traditional Employment: Pozzoli, Tessel, and Historic INS Guidance

May 2, 2026/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova

By Cyrus D Mehta and Damira Zhanatova*

For many multinational employees, founders and senior executives, especially outside the United States, “employment” is not always a simple paycheck and payroll relationship. They may be compensated through their own entities, hold significant equity, or even draw no traditional salary. Yet U.S. immigration law still requires that an L-1 beneficiary have been “employed” abroad by a qualifying organization for at least one year. 

Over decades, legacy INS and USCIS have answered what “employment” means in the L-1 context in a consistent way: the focus is on the underlying relationship of control and corporate integration, not on formalities like which entity runs payroll, what the local contract is called, or whether the individual receives a conventional salary. Classic decisions such as Matter of Pozzoli, 14 I&N Dec. 569 (Reg. Comm. 1974), and Matter of Tessel, Inc., 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1981), along with later policy guidance, frame “employment” as the rendering of services under the employer’s power to direct and control, within a genuine corporate structure.

To qualify for L-1 classification under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a foreign national must have been employed abroad continuously for at least one year in the three years preceding the petition and admission, must have been so employed by a qualifying organization (the same employer or its parent, subsidiary, or affiliate), and must be coming to the United States to work for that organization in either an executive or managerial capacity (L-1A) or in a position involving specialized knowledge (L-1B). Neither the statute nor the regulations provide a bespoke L-1 definition of “employment.” Instead, INS and USCIS have articulated that concept through case law and policy, repeatedly emphasizing who has the power of control over the individual’s work, how integrated the individual is into the organization’s management and operations or its specialized functions, and whether the services are rendered within a bona fide multinational corporate structure.

In Matter of Pozzoli, a U.S. corporation petitioned for a long‑term executive of its Italian subsidiary to come to the United States as an L‑1. The company made clear that during his U.S. assignment, the beneficiary would remain on the Italian subsidiary’s payroll. The district director denied the petition, reasoning that because the Italian affiliate would continue to pay him, he would still be “employed” by the foreign company abroad and not “rendering his services” to the U.S. entity. On certification, the Regional Commissioner reversed. After reviewing the statutory history of section 101(a)(15)(L) and general master‑servant law, INS concluded that the district director’s focus on payroll source was misplaced. The Commissioner found that the petitioner and its Italian subsidiary were part of the same multinational enterprise, that the transfer was “to continue his employment as an executive of the corporation,” and that the purpose of the L‑1 amendments was to facilitate exactly this sort of movement of key personnel. The decision explicitly held that “the question of where the beneficiary’s paycheck may originate is not a relevant factor” in determining eligibility for L‑1 classification, and that payment by the foreign affiliate “does not preclude him from establishing eligibility.” In other words, for L‑1A purposes, the source of salary from a qualified affiliate abroad or from the U.S. entity does not, by itself, decide whether the person is “employed” by a qualifying organization; what matters is the corporate relationship and who actually controls the work.

Matter of Tessel, Inc. dealt with a different but closely related issue: can a person be treated as an “employee” when he is essentially an owner executive and does not draw a traditional salary? Tessel arose in the context of Schedule A, Group IV labor certification, but the analysis was explicitly tied to the L-1 definition of “affiliate” and the nature of qualifying employment abroad.

In Tessel, the beneficiary owned the vast majority of a South African company, served as its unsalaried chairman, and also owned a majority of the U.S. petitioner. The district director and the Regional Commissioner both questioned whether he was truly an employee at all, characterizing him instead as an investor or entrepreneur, and expressing doubt that an employer employee relationship could exist where the petitioner and beneficiary were “one and the same.” The Commissioner rejected those views, relying in part on Matter of M, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA; A.G. 1958), which held that a corporation could file a preference petition for its sole shareholder.

Tessel reaffirmed that a corporation is a separate legal entity from its stockholders and is capable of employing them and petitioning on their behalf. It held that an unsalaried appointed chairman is nonetheless an employee in a managerial or executive position for purposes of Schedule A, Group IV, and that the fact that someone may qualify in another immigrant classification (such as investor) does not preclude simultaneous qualification as an employee. The decision also clarified that companies can be “affiliated” for L-1 purposes where there is a high degree of common ownership and management, either directly or through a third entity. Taken together, Tessel makes two core points that carry directly into the L-1 context: equity ownership does not destroy an employment relationship, and the absence of a conventional salary does not, by itself, mean there is no executive or managerial “employment.”

In 1995, INS distilled these themes in a policy letter that explicitly addressed the meaning of “employed” for L‑1 purposes. In a letter dated August 25, 1995, attorney William Z. Reich wrote to INS about a Canadian citizen who had been refused L‑1 admission under NAFTA because he could not produce a T‑4 wage form, the Canadian equivalent of a W‑2. The individual had been compensated under a contract that was more advantageous for tax purposes, rather than as a salaried employee, and therefore did not have the usual wage documentation. Nonetheless, a letter from the employer’s human resources manager confirmed several years of permanent, full‑time employment; he had no other job; he devoted his full attention to managing the business; and he received direction and assignments from the company’s executives, remaining subject to their control at all times. Mr. Reich argued that, given the nature and character of the relationship, the individual was clearly not an “independent contractor” as defined in the regulations, but rather an employee in substance. In her December 18, 1995 response, Yvonne M. LaFleur, then Chief of the Nonimmigrant Branch at INS, acknowledged that a general regulatory definition of “employment” elsewhere in the rules specifies compensation as one element, but explained that for L-1 purposes the Service “generally equates the rendering of service with employment for the qualifying L-1 period.” The letter cites both Tessel and Pozzoli, emphasizing that a non-salaried chairman can qualify as an L-1 nonimmigrant, and that the “power of control over the employee’s activity, rather than salary, is the essential element in the employment relationship.” That is a direct echo of the master servant analysis cited in Pozzoli: the truly “essential element” is the right to control how, when, and for whose benefit the work is performed, with the power to appoint and dismiss as strong evidence of that relationship, and the payment of wages “the least important factor”. This correspondence is reproduced at 73 Interpreter Releases 49 (Jan. 10, 1996).

Taken together, Pozzoli, Tessel, and the LaFleur letter all point in the same direction. For L-1 purposes, “employment” is primarily a question of whether the individual renders services under the direction and control of a qualifying organization. The existence of salary, the exact form of compensation, and the source of payroll are secondary considerations. Ownership, even majority or sole ownership, does not prevent a corporation from being the individual’s employer if the corporate entity is real and exercises governance authority over the executive role. Formal gaps in local payroll documentation, such as the absence of a T-4 or W-2, do not, by themselves, negate a qualifying employment relationship when the factual record shows full time, controlled service to the company.

These long-standing principles are increasingly important as global employers use local structures that do not resemble a U.S. W-2 job. Brazil provides a good illustration. In Brazil, the traditional employment relationship is governed by the Consolidation of Labor Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho, or CLT), Decree‑Law No. 5,452/1943. A CLT relationship is the classic labor‑law employment bond that brings with it a bundle of statutory wage protections, benefits, and social charges. In addition to this traditional CLT employment, however, Brazilian law recognizes several other legitimate forms for structuring professional activities. These include corporate relationships, specialized service arrangements, and the exercise of executive functions formalized through civil or commercial contracts. Under the widely used “Pessoa Jurídica” (PJ) model, for example, a professional provides services through a legal entity that he or she owns. That entity invoices the company, and compensation flows through the PJ rather than directly through a CLT employment contract. PJ contracts typically include boilerplate clauses disavowing a CLT “employment bond” or “subordination” and assigning labor and social security obligations to the PJ entity. These clauses are designed to allocate responsibilities under Brazilian labor and tax law and to make clear that the relationship is not governed by CLT, but they do not automatically mean that the individual is economically independent from, or external to, the company’s internal management.

In some L‑1A scenarios, a Brazilian‑based executive may, for more than a year within the three‑year lookback period, serve as the top‑level executive of a foreign parent company while being compensated, consistent with local practice, through a wholly owned PJ, rather than under a CLT bond. On the surface, standard PJ contract language disavowing a CLT bond or “subordination” can make the relationship look like independent contractor work, even when, in substance, the executive functions as an internal leader of the foreign enterprise. 

Under long-standing INS/USCIS guidance, the proper way to analyze such a structure is not to stop at the contract label, but to examine the underlying master-servant relationship. Corporate documents, shareholder resolutions, and other evidence can show that the foreign parent has in fact selected and engaged the individual as its principal executive; defined that person’s duties and strategic objectives; approved and adjusted compensation; retained the power, through corporate bodies, to appoint, supervise, and remove the executive; and relied on full-time, exclusive service integrated into its governance and reporting structure. A legal opinion from Brazilian counsel can further explain that the PJ form and CLT disclaimers reflect a choice among different lawful modes of engagement under Brazilian law, and do not necessarily mean that the individual operates as an external, multi-client contractor. In many such cases, the PJ itself has no other clients and functions solely as a billing and tax vehicle for executive services rendered inside the parent’s corporate structure.

Viewed through the framework of Matter of Pozzoli, Matter of Tessel, and the LaFleur letter, the legal analysis is straightforward. As Pozzoli makes clear, the origin or routing of the paycheck does not determine who “employs” the executive for L-1A purposes; what matters is which qualifying organization actually directs and benefits from the work. Tessel confirms that equity ownership and the absence of a traditional, local-law salary do not prevent a corporation from being the individual’s employer, because the corporation is a separate legal person capable of employing its owners when it exercises genuine governance authority over their roles. And consistent with the LaFleur letter, the fact that compensation is paid under a contract for tax reasons does not disqualify the arrangement, because the Service “generally equates the rendering of service with employment for the qualifying L-1 period” when the master-servant control relationship is clearly documented.

These Brazilian-style PJ situations are simply one illustration of a broader rule. For L-1 purposes, “employment” is not a rigid label tied to local labor codes, salary forms, or who prints the paycheck. Even in the U.S., the use of a Professional Employer Organization (PEO) is prevalent so that companies can access better benefits. A PEO is a firm that provides comprehensive HR outsourcing services to small and medium-sized businesses through a co-employment agreement where the employee is put on the payroll of the PEO.  The PEO can obtain better insurance premiums because it would have more bargaining power than a single company.   It is a functional concept anchored in control and corporate integration, rather than in any single compensation form or local labor‑law label. Whether the petition is for an L‑1A executive or manager or an L‑1B specialized knowledge employee, the core question is the same: has the foreign national, in fact, rendered services abroad for at least one continuous year within the required three‑year window to a qualifying organization that directed and controlled the work within a genuine multinational structure?

In jurisdictions like Brazil, where CLT employment is only one of several legitimate ways to structure professional activities and where executives or specialists often serve under PJ or other civil/commercial arrangements, what matters for L‑1 is not whether the relationship is labeled CLT, PJ, contractor, or something else, but whether the foreign entity truly functions as the employer in the master‑servant sense: selecting the individual, defining duties and objectives, supervising performance, and retaining the power to remove the person from the role. If those elements are present, and all other statutory and regulatory criteria are met, the absence of a CLT bond, a traditional salary, or a familiar payroll form should not, by itself, defeat the one‑year foreign employment requirement for L‑1 category.

[We are grateful to our late friend and colleague, William Reich, who was never afraid to push the envelope on behalf of his clients in seeking fair and favorable interpretations from the government.]

 

* Damira Zhanatova is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png 0 0 Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png Cyrus D. Mehta & Damira Zhanatova2026-05-02 23:01:132026-05-18 00:51:10L-1 Eligibility Without Traditional Employment: Pozzoli, Tessel, and Historic INS Guidance
Cyrus Mehta & Kaitlyn Box*

Blanche v. Lau: Will the Supreme Court Degrade the Rights of Lawful Permanent Residents?

April 28, 2026/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus Mehta & Kaitlyn Box*

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On April 23, 2025, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Blanche v. Lau, a case that confronts the issue of whether the government, in seeking to remove a lawful permanent resident (LPR) who was paroled into the United States on the basis that he committed a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under INA 212(a)(2) must prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the crime at the time of the LPR’s most recent reentry. Mr. Lau, an LPR who had traveled outside the U.S. with a pending charge of third-degree trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey before being paroled into the country in 2012, argued that there is a presumption LPRs are already admitted when they reenter the U.S. after travel abroad. The government, on the other hand, asserted that Lau falls within an exemption to this presumption because he had already committed a crime at the time of his reentry, although he had not yet been convicted.  Under INA 101(a)(13)(C) an LPR shall not be regarded as seeking admission in the US if they have inter alia committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2), which includes crimes involving moral turpitude or drug offenses. 

The conservative justices seemed to largely agree with the government’s position, although Justice Jackson expressed concern about the implications of this position, stating: 

“And my concern is that I could actually see a world in which [bad-faith paroling] would be in the government’s interest. And it’s a situation in which people who are lawful permanent residents who have green cards leave the country and, when they return, based on a suspicion or even an indictment that’s in the government’s control, they flag this person as being returning under parole as opposed to lawful admission. They take this person’s green card, which then makes it much, much harder for this person to actually live and work and continue in their life here in the United States, perhaps so much so that this person self-deports because it’s really, really difficult without a green card to operate in this country. So you could imagine a world in which a government that really is not interested in immigration and having immigrants here, living and working, could use this kind of thing to inappropriately parole people rather than admit them so that it depresses immigration.”

If the Supreme Court sides with the government in Blanche v. Lau and decides that an LPR who is accused of committing a crime and paroled into the U.S. has not already been admitted, this power could be abused by the Trump administration, which has already evidenced an intent to erode the rights of LPRs. This is exactly the sort of abuse that Justice Jackson appeared troubled by in her colloquy during oral argument. By taking the position that an LPR is seeking admission rather than arguing that the individual is deportable, the government can more easily pursue removal. In order to remove an LPR who was admitted, the government would have to show that the individual had been “convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years” of the admission. The government must have clear and convincing evidence in order to determine that an LPR is seeking admission after having committed a crime under INA 212(a)(2), and that burden should only be met if the LPR has actually been convicted of the crime involving moral turpitude, or has admitted to the elements of the crime. 

An LPR can voluntarily admit to the commission of a crime if he or she chooses to, but such an admission needs to meet rigid criteria. The BIA has set forth the following requirements for a validly obtained admission: (1) the admitted conduct must constitute the essential elements of a crime in the jurisdiction in which it occurred; (2) the applicant must have been provided with the definition and essential elements of the crime in understandable terms prior to making the admission; and (3) the admission must have been made voluntarily. See Matter of K–, 7 I&N Dec. 594 (BIA 1957).  The Board of Immigration Appeals also held in Matter of Guevara, 20 I&N Dec.238 (1990) that an alien’s silence alone does not provide sufficient evidence under the  standard in Woodby v. INS, which held that the burden was on the government to prove by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that the LPR should be deported from the United States. This has also been more recently affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Rivens, 25 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 2011). 

As the late Justice Ginsburg observed in Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012), “[o]rdinarily to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that an alien has committed a qualifying crime, the immigration officer at the border would check the alien’s record of conviction. He would not call into session a piepowder court to entertain a plea or conduct a trial.” Piepowder, or “dusty feet courts”, as Justice Ginsburg’s decision notes, were temporary mercantile courts quickly set up to hear commercial disputes at trade fairs in medieval Europe while the merchants’ feet were still dusty. 

Justice Ginsburg’s observation appears to restrict a CBP officer’s ability to try to suspect that an LPR has committed a crime rather than been convicted or one or admitted to the elements of the crime. The CBP officer should also not be able to extract a confession.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit’s holding in Blanche v. Lau was much more in line with Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning. The 2nd Circuit held that the INA does not permit “DHS to treat a returning LPR as an applicant for admission based on the suspicion that a CIMT has been committed, leaving open whether this suspicion will ever be confirmed by a subsequent conviction”. The 2nd Circuit reasoned that the “INA is unmistakably clear that the default presumption is that LPRs will not be treated as seeking admission unless certain threshold determinations have been made…Allowing DHS to defer such a determination and take a wait-and-see approach contingent on whether a conviction eventually materializes effectively nullifies this clear command.” Unlike the merchants of old, a CBP officer cannot set up a piepowder court at the airport to bludgeon a weary LPR traveler into admitting to having committed the elements of a CIMT absent clear and convincing evidence. 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png 0 0 Cyrus Mehta & Kaitlyn Box* http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png Cyrus Mehta & Kaitlyn Box*2026-04-28 13:40:342026-04-28 13:42:24Blanche v. Lau: Will the Supreme Court Degrade the Rights of Lawful Permanent Residents?
Cyrus Mehta & Kaitlyn Box*

H-1B Enforcement While Working Abroad: Why Are CBP Officers in Abu Dhabi Scrutinizing LCAs?

April 21, 2026/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus Mehta & Kaitlyn Box*

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

Recently, reports have surfaced of issues with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Preclearance in Abu Dhabi – namely, that beneficiaries who had been outside the United States were asked questions about whether the conditions described in the Labor Conditions Application (LCA) had been complied with while they were working abroad. The LCA framework and DOL’s protective purpose are defined around H-1B employment in the U.S., which makes CBP’s apparent focus on foreign remote-work patterns somewhat unusual from a traditional LCA-enforcement perspective.

 The American Immigration Lawyers Association solicited examples of these problems in March 2026, and an article from the American Bazaar, despite misstating some information, recounts the plight of an individual who passed through Abu Dhabi preclearance and informed officers that “she had remained in India for close to two months and had worked part time during that period while using her Paid Time Off (PTO)…Officers allegedly determined that she had spent too long outside the United States and questioned the fact that she continued to receive pay from her U.S. employer while working remotely from India. Her visa stamp was reportedly marked ‘Cancelled and Withdrawn,’ and she was told she would need to apply again.” Gnanamookan Senthurjothi, a U.S. immigration lawyer, reported instances of “ increased scrutiny of H‑1B travelers transiting Abu Dhabi’s U.S. preclearance facility, especially on Etihad flights, where individuals who have worked remotely abroad for 2+ months are facing intensive questioning and, in some cases, visa revocation” in a recent LinkedIn post. 

Although it is hoped that these reports are aberrations that CBP will prevent from recurring in future, these reports are troubling. The conditions stated on an LCA, such as a beneficiary’s salary and worksite, are typically construed as applying only to employment within the U.S., as U.S. immigration laws cannot generally regulate employment that takes place abroad.  Because H-1B is a U.S. admission/status classification, a foreign national who is physically outside the U.S. is not ‘in’ H-1B status during that time and, as such, is not required to hold H-1B status to perform services while abroad for a U.S. employer. The immigration consequences arise when that individual seeks re-admission in H-1B classification and CBP or USCIS evaluates whether they have complied with, or will comply with, the terms of the approved petition and LCA.

 The situation in Abu Dhabi raises interesting questions, however, regarding the extent to which activities abroad can impact an employer’s LCA compliance. 

INA 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) specifies that an employer must continue to pay a full-time H-1B worker the wages indicated in the LCA even during a period of “nonproductive period”, if the nonproductive status is “due to a decision by the employer (based on factors such as lack of work)”. This provision prohibits “benching”, or a scenario in which an employer stops paying the required wages to an H-1B worker during periods in which business is slow and there is insufficient work for the individual. Given the types of questions allegedly being raised by officers at Abu Dhabi preclearance, the Department of Labor could hypothetically find that an employer had engaged in “benching” and hold the company liable for back wages if it had not terminated an employee’s H-1B employment in the U.S., and was not paying her the wages listed on the LCA while she worked abroad.

DOL enforcement practice and published decisions tend to focus on underpayment and benching during periods of H-1B employment in the U.S. labor market. There is limited clear authority on how DOL treats extended periods of foreign work where the employer maintains the H-1B petition but modifies pay or duties while the worker is abroad.  Clearly, the US cannot sanction an employer for failing to post notice of the employer’s LCA obligations at a work location abroad. The INA and DOL rules all contemplate compliance of an employer’s LCA obligations when the worker is employed in the US and not at a foreign worksite.

 Ideally, to completely avoid benching liability,  it would be prudent if the employer withdraws the petition while the H-1B worker is employed remotely abroad for long stretches and not paid the required wage. However, this may no longer practical as the employer may have to pay the $100,000 fee under Trump’s H-1B Proclamation when it refiles an H-1B petition on behalf of an overseas H-1B worker to bring them back to the US. Moreover, many remote workers are only working overseas for their US employers because they are waiting for visa appointments or have been subject to “administrative processing” at US posts. Withdrawing the H-1B in these situations would be counterintuitive. 

Due to the war in the Middle East, Abu Dhabi preclearance is not currently operational. CBP has withdrawn officers, who are currently stateside. Travelers routed through Abu Dhabi will be inspected by CBP in the U.S. Hence, the issue is moot at this time, but it may raise its ugly head again when Abu Dhabi preclearance is restored, or if the idea of going after H-1B workers employed overseas catches on with CBP at other ports of entry. Ultimately, CBP should refrain from enforcing the LCA when the worker is employed abroad as there is scant authority for it to do so and it is also impossible to enforce LCA obligations at foreign work locations. CBP can still ask questions about foreign work and pay when those facts bear on whether the underlying H-1B classification remains valid, but it should not be denying admission to H-1B workers because the employer ostensibly did not meet its LCA obligations when the worker was employed abroad. 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png 0 0 Cyrus Mehta & Kaitlyn Box* http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/andromeda/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CDMA_IIB_Logo_2016.png Cyrus Mehta & Kaitlyn Box*2026-04-21 23:47:522026-04-21 23:48:20H-1B Enforcement While Working Abroad: Why Are CBP Officers in Abu Dhabi Scrutinizing LCAs?
Page 1 of 68123›»
Search Search

Subscribe to our Blog

Recent Posts

  • Deportation Judges
  • USCIS Withdraws Appeal in Mukherji: What Changes – And What Does Not?
  • Federal Court Strikes Down Trump’s $100,000 H‑1B Fee: INA § 212(f) Is Not a Taxing Power
  • Dorcas v. USCIS: Federal Court Reaffirms That USCIS Must Adjudicate, Not Stonewall, Immigration Benefits
  • The Credibility Problem in Extraordinary Ability Cases: Why Evidence Matters More Than Ever in EB-1 and O-1 Petitions 

Archives

Links

Immigration Overview
Case Management
Firm in the News
General information on Immigration Law
USCIS Forms
Important Links

Contact Us

ONE BATTERY PARK PLAZA, 9TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10004

(212) 425 0555

 

INSZoom Software Inc.
Alliance of Business Immigration Lawyers
American Immigration Lawyers Association American Immigration Lawyers Association
Copyright © 2019 Cyrus D. Mehta and Partners, PLLC. All rights reserved. | Disclaimer | Attorney Advertising
  • Link to X Link to X Link to X
  • Link to Facebook
  • Link to LinkedIn
  • Link to Rss this site
Scroll to top Scroll to top Scroll to top