Cyrus Mehta

Keeping Tabs On a Non-Citizen’s Eligibility For Health Coverage Under The Affordable Care Act

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President Obama’s healthcare law, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), is here to stay especially after the law withstood a challenge in King v. Burwell that allows the federal government to provide subsidies to poor and middle class people to buy health insurance on a nationwide basis.

Even non-citizens who are lawfully present may access the health exchange to buy insurance under the ACA. Many non-citizens will also be subject to the individual mandate or “individual shared responsibility provision” if they do not maintain essential health coverage. It is thus important to keep track of a non-citizen’s eligibility as well as when such an individual may be penalized on his or her next tax return for not maintaining essential coverage, which has been explained in Who is Lawfully Present Under the Affordable Care Act?

Becoming Lawfully Present After Enrollment Period Has Closed

The next open enrollment period for 2016 starts November 1, 2015 and ends January 31, 2016. The last open enrollment closed on February 15, 2015. What if a non-citizen becomes eligible for ACA coverage between February 15, 2015 and November 1, 2015?

Take the example of a US citizen who has sponsored her parents, John Smith and Jane Smith, under the immediate relative category through the filing of an I-130 petition while they were outside the United States. They came to the United States on June 25, 2015 as permanent residents upon the approval of the I-130 and the issuance of immigrant visas at the consular post overseas. A permanent resident is a qualified alien who is eligible for coverage on a health exchange and is also subject to the mandate. Although the open enrollment closed on February 15, 2015, John and Jane are eligible under the 60 day special enrollment period because they just became permanent residents after the prior enrollment period closed on February 15, 2015. Assuming that they do not have minimum essential coverage as yet, if John and Jane do not take advantage of the special enrollment period and get coverage in the first full month during which they are present for the entirety of the month, they will be subject to a penalty when they file their tax returns for 2015. Even if John and Jane choose to return to their original country for two years on a reentry permit to wrap up their business and sell their home, they must still enroll for health coverage or qualify for an exception, which includes qualifying under the foreign earned income exclusion pursuant to section 911(d)(1)(A) or 911(d)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code. This is more fully explained in the blog entitled The Impact of Obamacare on Green Card Holders Who Reside Outside the United States.

Let’s discuss another example of a person who applies for permanent residence from within the United States. Maria Fernandez entered the United States on a B-2 visitor’s visa on January 1, 2009 and has remained ever since. She overstayed her authorized stay as a visitor after July 1, 2009. As a result of overstaying her B-2 visa status, she is not considered lawfully present under the ACA. On April 1, 2015, Maria married a US citizen, who filed an I-130 petition on her behalf and she concurrently filed an I-485 application for adjustment of status. Under the definition of “lawfully present” in 45 CFR 152.2(4)(vii), she is not yet lawfully present as the underlying I-130 visa petition has not been approved. For immigration purposes, Maria will be considered lawfully present as an adjustment application, but some of the definitions of “lawfully present” under the ACA are not in harmony under immigration law. However, if Maria obtains employment authorization as an adjustment applicant, she will be considered lawfully present pursuant to 45 CFR 152.2(4)(iii). Suppose Maria obtains employment authorization on July 1, 2015, although the next open enrollment starts on November 1, 2015 and assuming she does not have minimum essential coverage, Maria will be eligible for the special 60 day enrollment period under 45 CFR 155.420(d)(3).

If on the other hand, Maria does not apply for employment authorization as an adjustment applicant pursuant to 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(9), she will not be considered lawfully present until after her I-130 petition is approved or when she becomes a lawful permanent resident, whichever is earlier.

Special enrollment is available when “[t]he qualified individual, or his or her dependent, which was not previously a citizen, national, or lawfully present individual gains such status.”  45 CFR 155.420(d)(3). It is unclear whether special enrollment would be available to someone who was previously lawfully present, then fell out of status, and now regains another status.  However, it would be bizarre if this rule precluded someone who had ever been lawfully present in their life previously. If the rule was applied so rigidly, someone like Maria in the above example would not qualify for special enrollment and would have to wait for the next open enrollment on November 1, 2015. Even visitors in B-2 status may be considered lawfully present under the ACA, but they may not be required to seek health coverage if they have not yet become tax residents.  Special enrollment ought to cover anyone who goes from not being lawfully present to being lawfully present.

Lawfully Present Non-Citizens with Low Incomes

Lawful Permanent residents are excluded from Medicaid unless they have had this status for at least 5 years under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). The Children’s Health Insurance Program of 1997 (CHIP), however,  allows pregnant women and children lawfully residing in the United States to access both Medicaid and CHIP even if they have not resided in the United States for five years. Not all states, though, have lifted the 5 year waiting period for CHIP coverage.  Although newly minted LPRs with low incomes may not be able to access Medicaid within the first five years unless they qualify for CHIP, the ACA provides subsidies to eligible non-citizens, which are now protected even if offered through the federal health exchange after King v. Burwell. Lawfully present non-citizens with incomes up to 250% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) are eligible for cost sharing subsidies, and those up to 400% of the FPL are eligible for tax credits to offset the costs of purchasing private plans. Due to the 5 year Medicaid ban, lawfully present immigrants that have incomes under 100% of the FPL can also receive subsidies and tax credits that their US citizen counterparts are precluded from obtaining in states that have refused to expand Medicaid.  Although the Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius upheld the constitutionality of the ACA, it also gave states the choice of whether or not to expand Medicaid. At the time of writing, 30 states including the District of Columbia have opted for expanded Medicaid.

Low income non-citizens who avail of either Medicaid or other subsidies will not be rendered a public charge for immigration purposes.  According to USCIS policy, “Non-cash or special purpose cash benefits that are generally supplemental in nature and do not make the person primarily dependent on the government for subsistence do not impact a public charge determination.” On the other hand institutionalization for long term care through Medicaid or other subsidies would be considered as a factor in making a public charge determination.

Conclusion

In King v. Burwell, Chief Justice Roberts who wrote the majority opinion stated that “Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them.” Since the ACA is here to stay and will most likely be firmly entrenched in the nation’s DNA like Social Security and Medicare, many qualified and lawfully present non-citizens will also be able to access benefits the ACA and may also become subject to the mandate. At this point, undocumented immigrants or recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) cannot access the health exchanges or avail of the subsidies. Some states may have their own rules, so for example in New York, DACA recipients and other ‘permanent residents under color of law” (PRUCOL) can still avail of Medicaid since the New York Court of Appeals in Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello held that PRWORA violated New York’s Equal Protection Clause.  The ACA is becoming more and more linked to immigration issues. While an immigration practitioner need not be an expert in other disciplines, he or she must be aware of eligible statuses for coverage under the ACA, the deadlines for enrollment and when the 60 day special enrollment may become available and the potential for someone to be subject to additional payment to the IRS for failing to obtain coverage, unless the client can qualify for an exemption.

Cyrus Mehta

Extension of STEM Optional Practical Training for Foreign Students Under President Obama’s Executive Actions?

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Senator Grassley’s latest angry missive to the DHS protests the proposed increase of F-1 student Optional Practical Training (OPT), which was part of President Obama’s  executive actions of November 20, 2014.  While the Senator’s rant against any beneficial immigration proposal is nothing unusual, it reveals for the first time DHS plans to unveil an OPT  extension regulation relating to its promise to retain skilled foreign talent. It is also refreshing that the Obama Administration is endeavoring to implement a key executive action, especially after a  noted immigration blogger justifiably began to wonder whether the Obama Administration was fulfilling its promise or not.

According to Senator Grassley’s letter dated June 8, 2015, the DHS is moving forward with new regulations on OPT

– allowing foreign students with degrees in STEM fields to receive up to two 24-month extensions beyond the original 12-month period provided under OPT regulations, for a total of up to six years of post-graduation employment in student status; and

– authorizing foreign graduates of non-STEM U.S. degree programs to receive the 24-month extension of the OPT period, even if the STEM degree upon which the extension is based is an earlier degree and not for the program from which the student is currently graduating (e.g. student has a bachelor’s in chemistry and is graduating from an M.B.A. program).

Presently, students can receive up to 12 months of OPT upon graduation. In 2008, the DHS published regulations authorizing an additional 17-months extension of the OPT period for foreign students who graduated in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematical) fields. The Senator’s letter also seems to suggest that the agency is considering that employers will certify that they have not displaced US workers.  The STEM OPT extension is presently subject to a legal challenge by the  Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (Washtech). See Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS, Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-529.   Plaintiffs have alleged that the OPT STEM extension period is a deliberate circumvention of the H-1B visa cap in violation of Congressional intent, and have also been granted competitor standing, which recognizes that a party suffers injury when a government agency lifts regulatory restrictions on competitors or allows increased competition.

Notwithstanding Senator Grassley’s protest and the lawsuit, this is good news for foreign students, especially those who were not selected in the H-1B visa lottery for FY2016.  While the current lawsuit could potentially thwart the  efforts of the administration to extend STEM OPT especially in the face of mounting law suits,  we can also take comfort in an earlier failed legal challenge against STEM OPT.

Soon after the DHS extended OPT from twelve months to twenty-nine months for STEM students, the Programmers Guild sued DHS. in Programmers Guild v. Chertoff, 08-cv-2666 (D.N.J. 2008), challenging the regulation, and initially seeking an injunction, on the ground that DHS. had invented its own guest worker program without Congressional authorization. The court dismissed the suit for injunction on the ground that DHS was entitled to deference under Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under the oft quoted Chevrondoctrine, courts will pay deference to the regulatory interpretation of the agency charged with executing the laws of the United States when there is ambiguity in the statute. The courts will step in only when the agency’s interpretation is irrational or in error. The Chevron doctrine has two parts: Step 1 requires an examination of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If Congress had clearly spoken, then that is the end of the matter and the agency and the court must give effect to the unambiguous intent of the statute. Step 2 applies when Congress has not clearly spoken, then the agency’s interpretation is given deference if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute, and the court will defer to this interpretation even if it does not agree with it. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), while affirming Chevron, held that if there is an ambiguous statute requiring agency deference under Chevron Step 2, the agency’s interpretation will also trump a judicial decision interpreting the same statute. Brand Xinvolved a judicial review of an FCC ruling exempting broadband Internet carrier from mandatory regulation under a statute. The Supreme Court observed that the Commission’s interpretation involved a “subject matter that is technical, complex, and dynamic;” therefore, the Court concluded that the Commission is in a far better position to address these questions than the Court because nothing in the Communications Act or the Administrative Procedure Act, according to the Court, made unlawful the Commission’s use of its expert policy judgment to resolve these difficult questions.

The District Court in dismissing the Programmers Guild lawsuit discussed the rulings in Chevron and Brand X to uphold the DHS’s ability to extend the student F-1 OPT regulation. Programmers Guild appealed and the Third Circuit also dismissed the lawsuit based on the fact that the Plaintiffs did not have standing. Programmers Guild, Inc. v. Chertoff, 338 Fed. Appx. 239 (3rd Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 13, 2009) (No. 09-590). While the Third Circuit did not address Chevronor Brand X – there was no need to – it interestingly cited Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978), which held that Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts its statutes without change. Here, the F-1 practical training regulation was devoid of any reference to the displacement of domestic labor, and Congress chose not to enact any such reference, which is why the Programmers Guild lacked standing.

So, why is Washtech again challenging the STEM OPT extension after another challenger had previously failed? This is because the DC Circuit is a favorable court to get standing, which it has already been granted. Even if plaintiffs ultimately prevail on their competitor standing theory, which requires them to show that they are direct and current competitors to F-1 students, plaintiffs still have an uphill task. The plaintiffs rely on International Bricklayers Union v. Meese (another reason why they have commenced legal action in the DC Circuit),  which struck down an INS Operating Instruction that allowed foreign laborers to come to the US on B-1 visas to install equipment or machinery after it had been purchased from an overseas seller. The court in International Bricklayers agreed with the plaintiffs that the laborers were not properly in the United States on a B-1 business visa, which under INA 101(a)(15)(B) precluded one from “performing skilled or unskilled labor.” In fact, Congress had enacted the H-2B visa for this sort of labor pursuant to INA 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).

On the other hand, the provision pertaining to F-1 students at INA 101(a)(15)(F)(i) is more ambiguous. It prescribes the eligibility criterion for a student to enter the United States, but does not indicate what a student may do after he or she has completed the educational program. For over 50 years, the government has allowed students to engage in practical training after the completion of their studies, which Congress has never altered.  Thus, a court should be more inclined to give deference to the Administration’s interpretation of INA 101(a)(15)(F)(i) under Chevron and Brand X even if it expanded STEM OPT beyond the maximum available  period of 29 months. From a policy perspective, the Administration should be given room to expand STEM OPT in order to retain skilled talent in the United States. Global competition for STEM students has increased dramatically, and many countries have reformed their immigration systems to attract such students. American innovation will fall behind global competitors  if we cannot find ways to attract foreign talent especially after they have been educated at American universities.

Senator Grassley’s misgivings about extending STEM OPT  are misplaced, and it is fervently hoped that the Administration will not pay heed to his letter and cynically scrap the program after putting up a show that it had tried it’s best. If extended STEM OPT is implemented, it will provide the impetus for the implementation of other key executive actions such as allowing entrepreneurs to be paroled into the United States and permitting beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions to work and enjoy job mobilityeven if their priority dates have not become current. Each and every action will surely get challenged, but the Administration should fight on and prevail, like it did when the motion to preliminarily enjoin the granting of work authorization to H-4 dependent spouses failed.

Cyrus Mehta

PUTTING DISNEY AND H-1B VISAS IN PERSPECTIVE

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By Cyrus D. Mehta

Most who read Julia Preston’s New York Times article on Disney laying off its qualified programmers to be replaced with Indian  programmers on H-1B visas at HCL America are understandably outraged. The fact that Disney axed its employees – an iconic American  company that has promoted happiness, gentleness  and well being– has let down people even more. There have been more than 3,000 mostly angry comments to the article.

If we put aside the Indian H-1B worker for a minute, no one will doubt that it is business reality for companies to contract out many of their functions, such as IT, accounting or human resources. This practice is not limited to employers using foreign labor, and it is a widespread practice for companies to cut costs by reducing overhead such as payroll and benefits. Would there be similar outrage if an American law firm contracted away its human resources functions and stopped hiring additional HR personnel? Or if an entrepreneur wanted to sell a newly designed stroller with interesting gizmos in the US market, but arranged to have the manufacturing done in China? While we all feel badly for the American workers who may have been laid off, this is an unavoidable part of the quantum advances that have been made in globalization and the information technology revolution, which does not just involve access to foreign skilled labor (even if outside the United States) but even automation and robotics. Tom Friedman once famously said this in his NYT column “Average is Over”:

In the past, workers with average skills, doing an average job, could earn an average lifestyle. But, today, average is officially over. Being average just won’t earn you what it used to. It can’t when so many more employers have so much more access to so much more above average cheap foreign labor, cheap robotics, cheap software, cheap automation and cheap genius. Therefore, everyone needs to find their extra — their unique value contribution that makes them stand out in whatever is their field of employment. Average is over.

This is not to suggest that the laid off American workers in the Disney episode were average, but it is fervently hoped that the benefits that accrue in contracting away functions in this new era of globalization will allow companies to engage in innovations that will  ultimately benefit consumers, which in turn will create more, albeit different, jobs in the United States. Even Disney said that after its reorganization that allowed it to focus on more innovations, it had a net gain of 70 jobs and has created 30,000 new jobs in the past decade.

While the media highlights the cases of Disney and SoCalwhere US workers are laid off and replaced by H-1B workers of an IT consulting company, most employers hire H-1B workers to supplement their workforce and not to replace their workforce. The H-1B visa cap is too small with only a total of 85,000 annual slots, and I personally have represented employers and  talented H-1B workers who can no longer be employed because they were not selected under the H-1B visa lottery. It is unfortunate that US employers lost talented foreign workers, many of whom have been educated at US universities. Lower costs, as is commonly believed,  is not the driving factor in hiring H-1B workers . The employer has to pay the higher of the prevailing wage or the actual wage it pays similarly situated workers, and so it is generally difficult for an H-1B worker to replace a US worker because they are cheaper. The employer has to also pay filing fees ranging from upwards of $2,325 to $5550, plus lawyers’ fees, besides the mandated prevailing wage.

Contrary to how the H-1B visa program is portrayed in the media, an employer does not have to first find a US worker before hiring an H-1B worker, or be concerned about displacing American workers at client locations such as Disney,  unless the employer is dependent on H-1B workers or has been found to have been a willful violator. See INA 212(n)(1)(E), (F) and (G) & INA 212(n)(3)(A). But even a dependent H-1B employer or willful violator need not recruit for a US worker first, or be concerned about displacement,  if it pays the H-1B worker over $60,000 or the worker has a Master’s degree. See INA 212(n)(3)(B).  The employer has to pay the higher of the prevailing or the actual wage among the workers that it employs and not which Disney employs. The replacement H-1B worker relating to the skill needed for Disney’s new technology platform need not have 10 years of experience, but probably less experience, and can be paid accordingly but still at the prevailing wage.

Critics of the H-1B program seize upon INA 212(n)(1)(A)(ii), which  states that an employer “will provide working conditions for such [an H-1B] nonimmigrant that will not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed.”  They argue that it is this provision that renders what happened at Disney to be in violation of the spirit of the law, if not the letter of the law.  But this is hardly the case. INA 212(n)(1)(A)(ii) represents the second of four attestations that a non-dependent employer makes on a Labor Condition Application. 20 CFR 655.732(b) defines “working conditions” to “include matters such as hours, shifts, vacation periods, and benefits such as seniority-based preferences for training programs and work schedules.” The first attestation is that the employer agrees to pay the higher of the prevailing or actual wage. The third attestation that the employer makes is that there is no strike or lock-out in the occupational classification at the place of employment. The fourth and final attestation requires the employer to provide notice to the bargaining representative, and if none exists, then it must be posted at the place of employment for 10 days.

INA 212(n)(1)(A)(ii) does not mandate that the employer has to first recruit US workers. Elsewhere in INA 212(n) it is clear that only a dependent employer or one found to be a willful violator, who has no exempt H-1B workers, is required to recruit US workers and be concerned about displacing American workers at client sites. See INA 212(n)(1)(E), (F) and (G). While it intuitively makes sense for the employer to be required to test the US labor market before hiring all H-1B workers and be concerned about displacing a US worker, the H-1B visa is a temporary visa, and there is also the countervailing policy interest for employers  to be able to expeditiously hire foreign national workers to urgently execute projects. If they wish to sponsor them for permanent residence, there is an elaborate procedure for the employer to first certify that there was no willing or qualified worker for the position. H-1B workers have to also be paid the higher of the prevailing or actual wage, and at times the prevailing wage mandated by the Department of Labor seems to be higher than what it is in reality in many occupations.

The use of IT consulting companies is widespread in America (and even the US government contracts for their services), and was acknowledged by Congress when it passed the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (AVWIA) by creating onerous additional attestations for H-1B dependent employers. The current enforcement regime has sufficient teeth to severely punish bad actors.  IT consulting employers who hire professional workers from India unfortunately seem to be getting more of a rap for indiscriminately using up the H-1B visa. However, it is this very business model has provided reliability to companies in the United States and throughout the industrialized world to obtain top-drawer talent quickly with flexibility and at affordable prices that benefit end consumers and promote diversity of product development. This is what the oft-criticized “job shop” or “body shop” readily provides. By making possible a source of expertise that can be modified and redirected in response to changing demand, uncertain budgets, shifting corporate priorities and unpredictable fluctuations in the business cycle itself, the pejorative reference to them as “job shop” is, in reality, the engine of technological ingenuity on which progress in the global information age largely depends.  Such a business model is also consistent with free trade, which the US promotes vehemently to other countries (including the protection of intellectual property rights of its pharmaceutical companies that keep life saving drugs high), but seems to restrict when it applies to service industries located in countries such as India that desire to do business in the United States through their skilled personnel. US companies and IT consulting companies should engage in more public relations efforts to highlight the overall benefits of their collaborations, which in the case of the Disney episode was admittedly not enough.

By continuing to limit and stifle the H-1B program, US employers will remain less competitive and will not be able to pass on the benefits to consumers. We need more H-1B visa numbers rather than less. We also need to respect H-1B workers rather than deride them, even if they work at IT consulting company, as they too wish to abide by the law and to pursue their dreams in America.  The best way to reform the H-1B program is to provide more mobility to H-1B visa workers. By providing more mobility, which includes being able to obtain a green card quickly,  H-1B workers will not be stuck with the employer who brought them on the H-1B visa, and this can also result in rising wages within the occupation as a whole. Mobile foreign workers will also be incentivized to start their own innovative companies in America, which in turn will result in more jobs. This is the best way to reform the H-1B visa program, rather than to further shackle it with stifling laws and regulations, labor attestations and quotas.

Cyrus Mehta

Fifth Circuit Precedent On Preemption Can Provide Obama With Path to Victory In Texas v. United States

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After a split Fifth Circuit panel declined to lift Judge Hanen’s preliminary injunction in Texas v. United States blocking President Obama’s two executive actions that could defer the deportations of an estimated 4.4 million people, the score was 2 in favor of Texas and 0 for President Obama.  One of the memorable quotes in the Rocky movie about boxing is apt here, “[I]t ain’t how hard you hit; it’s about how hard you can get hit, and keep moving forward.”

Although President Obama has been hit hard, his legal team has to keep moving forward and there is plenty to look forward to that can ultimately win the day for the 4.4 million who will benefit from deferred action.  Although there has been substantial analysis regarding the flaws in the latest decision, scant attention has been paid to a 2013 decision of the Fifth Circuit that held that a local ordinance penalizing  landlords and occupants for not being lawfully present in the United States was preempted under federal immigration law.  This decision may provide a narrow path to victory for President Obama.

In Villas at Parkside Partners v. Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5thCir. 2013), the Fifth Circuit struck down a Farmers Branch, TX, ordinance on preemption grounds because it conflicted with federal law regarding the ability of aliens not lawfully present in the United States to remain in the US. The Fifth Circuit also noted that the federal government’s ability to exercise discretion relating to removal of non-citizens is a key reason for a state or local regulation of immigration being preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution:

Whereas the Supreme Court has made clear that there are “significant complexities involved in [making] . . . the determination whether a   person is removable,” and the decision is “entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government,” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 236 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[T]he structure of the immigration statutes makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which eventually will be deported.”), the Ordinance allows state courts to assess the legality of a non-citizen’s presence absent a “preclusive” federal determination, opening the door to conflicting state and federal rulings on the question.

Texas v. United States, on first brush, is not a preemption case as it does not involve a state law regulating immigration that conflicts with federal law. Plaintiff states challenged President Obama’s executive actions, mainly on grounds that the President did not issue a rule prior to implementing deferred action for parents who have citizen or permanent resident children in the US (DAPA) or expanded deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA). Still, the Fifth Circuit’s panel refusing to stay the preliminary injunction of  Judge Hanen  does not bode too well for federal preemption of immigration law and policy, which has been upheld not only by the Fifth Circuit in Farmers Branch, but also by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012),   which articulated:

A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials…… Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all. If removal proceedings commence, aliens may seek asylum and other discretionary relief allowing them to remain in the country or at least to leave without formal removal….

Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their   families,  for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service. Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s international relations. Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state maybe mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon return. The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.

When the actual merits of Judge Hanen’s injunction are considered by another panel of judges in the Fifth Circuit, they will hopefully take notice of Farmer’s Branch that was decided en banc, which upheld the federal government’s ability to exercise discretion in the removal of aliens under the preemption doctrine. Interestingly, Judges Smith and Elrod, who  decided against President Obama in the Fifth Circuit, were also among the dissenting judges in the Farmers Branch case.

The key issue in Texas v. United States is whether states should be even permitted to sue the federal government on immigration enforcement policy. If President Obama loses in the Fifth Circuit on the actual appeal, and the Supreme Court upholds it, then this would be an open invitation for any cantankerous state politician to bring a law suit against the federal government over an immigration policy that he or she dislikes. The ability of a state to harass the federal government could be endless. For instance, the federal government can invoke its authority to parole aliens into the United States under INA 212(d)(5), and could bring in a large group of people into the US for humanitarian reasons, such as victims of atrocities by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. A state opposed to the paroling of these aliens can potentially sue the federal government if it can manufacture some harm that would befall it, like Texas did, that it would be costly for the state to issue drivers licenses to them. Similarly, a state could sue the federal government for granting deferred action to victims of domestic violence or crime victims or widows and widowers of US citizens, like the federal government has done in the past. These sorts of challenges from states would undermine the long established doctrine that immigration policy is within the purview of the federal government and Congress. Another concern for upholding preemption of federal immigration law from interference by states is the concern about the relationship between immigration and foreign affairs. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).  If a state were allowed to sue each time the federal government issued a policy and blocked it, this would upset the long acknowledged preemption doctrine relating to immigration. If there is a disagreement in how the Executive Branch implements immigration policy, it is for Congress to intervene by changing the law rather than for states like Texas to file a law suit.

Judge Higginson’s dissenting opinion (who also wrote the majority opinion in Farmers Branch) in the Fifth Circuit’s decision refusing to lift the stay correctly opined that President Obama’s executive actions are non-justiciable as they are internal executive enforcement guidelines. The dissenting opinion appropriately relied on the Supreme Court decision in Heckler v. Chaney,  470 U.S. 821 (1985), which held  “that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agencies absolute discretion.”  Whether executive enforcement guidelines provide deferred action to millions rather than thousands or hundreds should not make them any more or less amenable to a legal challenge by a state. So long as the President does not grant legal status, which he cannot do under the INA (and both Judge Hanen and the majority in the Fifth Circuit confused legal status with lawful presence), it should not make a difference under Heckler v. Chaney whether deferred action is granted to thousands of spouses of military personnel or to millions of parents of citizen and permanent resident children.  Charles Kuck and othershave forcefully proposed that President Obama should publish a rule in the Federal Register, and this would weaken plaintiffs’ chief claim that the President violated the Administrative Procedure Act by not proposing a rule for public notice and comment when implementing DAPA and DACA. While this is an intriguing idea, it would also be a cop out. Every new enforcement decision would have to go through the notice and comment procedure under the APA out of fear of inviting more law suits from states, and this would again undermine the preemption doctrine relating to immigration.

Indeed, one of the concurring opinions in Farmers Branch acknowledged that the largely federal discretionary immigration enforcement system, including the grant of deferred action,  would be upset if a state regulation conflicted with it, and relied on Arizona v. USAby opining:  “The Court held that the statute stood as an impermissible obstacle to the design and purposes of the largely discretionary immigration enforcement system Congress created because it could result in “unnecessary harassment of some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or someone assisting with a criminal investigation) whom federal officials determine should not be removed” and ultimately “would allow the State to achieve its own immigration policy.” [citation omitted]. Because such state-to-state variance “is not the system Congress created,” the Court held that the Arizona statute “violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.””

There are many arguments that may ultimately carry the day for the Obama administration and its ability to bring relief to millions who are a low enforcement priority. In Crane v. Johnson, the federal government was victorious in a law suit against the previous 2012 DACA program as the Fifth Circuit held that Mississippi lacked standing since its claim to injury was speculative.  Texas, however, has been able to manufacture a more cogent harm regarding the burdens that would be caused in the issuance of new driver licenses. Regardless of the merits of a state’s standing claim, standing would be moot if the claim is non- justiciable as Judge Higginson found, and  Farmers Branch should provide the basis for this on the ground that a state cannot upset the preemption doctrine on immigration. It is no secret that Texas v. United States is a political fight as the plaintiff states are Republican, and the judges that have ruled against Obama have been appointed by Republican Presidents.  It is also true that the majority of judges in the Fifth Circuit are Republican appointees, but Farmers Branch was also decided en banc in the Fifth Circuit, and the panel that considers the appeal will be bound by its own precedent.

Cyrus Mehta

Phantom Visa Statuses

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While life is fortunately not always so dull and single dimensional, a rigid immigration system may force you into a straightjacket. Is there any leeway in the US visa system that might enable foreign nationals to pursue interests outside the narrow purpose of their entry without jeopardizing their visa status?

One who comes on an H-1B visa to work for a specific employer as a software engineer may not be prevented from also pursuing activities that are permissible under a tourist visa – such as participating in a community orchestra as an amateur violinist or taking rock climbing lessons in Yosemite national park. Similarly, someone visiting the United States on a tourist visa should not be prevented from also participating on a business conference call relating to one’s occupation in his home country.  I for one have furiously sent business e mails back and forth in relation to my law practice in the United States while waiting in an immigration line of another country’s airport to enter as a tourist. Even before the age of smart phones and Skype, nothing prevented a tourist in the United States from jotting notes on a yellow pad in preparation for a business meeting that would take place in his or her home country after he returned.

There is nothing in the Immigration and Nationality Act that prevents one from engaging in activities in what I call a “phantom” status, provided they do not constitute unauthorized unemployment.  This is recognized in the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) at 9 FAM 41.11 N3.1, which states that “[a]n alien desiring to come to the United States for one principal, and one or more incidental, purposes should be classified in accordance with the principal purpose.” The FAM note provides the example of a student who prior to entering an approved school wishes to first make a tourist trip of not more than 30 days. The FAM instructs that the person should receive the F-1 or M-1 student visa rather than a B-2 tourist visa.

The H-1B employee in the above example while working for her employer as a software engineer may decide to invest in a startup company. Preparatory activities such as meeting with corporate lawyers to incorporate the company and to market the business idea to venture capitalists would arguably be permissible under the B-1 business visa. Since one cannot hold H-1B and B-1 status at the same time, she can potentially engage in permissible business activities through this phantom B-1 status even while actually being in H-1B status. One must be careful, though, not to cross the line.  Once the startup is established and the H-1B worker manages its day to day affairs, she may engage in activities that would not be permissible under the B-1 visa and this would constitute unauthorized employment.

There is a clear prohibition against unauthorized unemployment. 8 CFR 214.1(e) provides:

Employment. A nonimmigrant in the United States in a class defined in section 101(a)(15)(B) of the Act as a temporary visitor for pleasure, or section 101(a)(15)(C) of the Act as an alien in transit through this country, may not engage in any employment. Any other nonimmigrant in the United States may not engage in any employment unless he has been accorded a nonimmigrant classification which authorizes employment or he has been granted permission to engage in employment in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. A nonimmigrant who is permitted to engage in employment may engage only in such employment as has been authorized. Any unauthorized employment by a nonimmigrant constitutes a failure to maintain status within the meaning of section 241(a)(1)(C)(i) of the Act.

The question is when does one cross that line so that it constitutes unauthorized employment? This is hard to tell, but the best way to gauge this is whether the activity would be permissible under the B-1 visa for businessor the B-2 visa for pleasure. Thus, our H-1B employee may regularly participate as a violinist in an amateur orchestra as such an activity would be permissible under the B-2 tourist visa. If the H-1B worker was also a professional violinist, and was paid to play in a professional philharmonic orchestra in the United States while on an H-1B visa, that would be an impermissible activity as it would constitute unauthorized employment. The most appropriate visa for a performer would be an O-1 visa (an H-1B visa claim for a violinist was turned down a few years ago, see Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS). When there are two competing work activities that can only be done under different visa statuses, the person must choose to either be in the United States on an H-1B visa or an O-1 visa. It is unfortunate that our visa policy cannot accommodate a renaissance woman like our H-1B employee and violinist. On the other hand, if the work activities can be done under the same visa, the H-1B worker who is employed as a software engineer can also potentially be employed concurrently in H-1B status through her startup entity.

The ability to engage in activities under a phantom status is especially crucial in light of the USCIS policy to attract entrepreneurs to the United States under the existing visa system, and in the absence of a specific startup visa. One encounters many students who desire to establish startups while still in F-1 student status, or H-1B workers too who have dreams of leaving their existing jobs for the companies they have founded So long as their activities are preparatory in nature and otherwise permissible under the B-1 visa, they have arguably not violated their F-1 status. The USCIS Entrepreneur Pathway Portal provides a good explanation of activities permissible under the B-1 visa that could arguably be undertaken even while in another nonimmigrant status such as an F-1 or H-1B:

The B-1 visa is intended only for business activities that are a “necessary incident” to your business abroad. This covers a wide range of activities such as attending meetings, consulting with associates, engaging in negotiations, taking orders for goods produced and located outside the United States, attending conferences, and researching options for opening a business in the United States (such as locating or entering into a lease for office space). Generally speaking, you cannot engage in any activity or perform a service that would constitute local employment for hire within the United States. What constitutes local employment for hire will depend on the circumstances of each case, but generally speaking, any activity you perform in the United States must be directly connected with and part of your work abroad. 

If you are coming to secure funding for a new business, you cannot remain in the United States after securing the funding to start actual operations or to manage the business, unless you change status to another classification that authorizes employment in the United States.

In Garavito v. INS, the First Circuit shed further light on activities that might not constitute unauthorized employment in the context of one who had established a gas station in contemplation of later applying for an E-2 visa:

The INS nowhere explains, however, what law would prevent a business visitor from making phone calls, giving employees instructions, or taking clients to their cars. Indeed, were the INS regulations to make such activity unlawful, it is difficult to see how foreign businessmen could conduct business within the United States, and it is equally difficult to see how any such regulation could fall within the lawful scope of the relevant statute.

Once the line is crossed from starting to managing the business, the individual in F-1 status must change to H-1B visa status through the startup, or if already in an H-1B status must file a concurrent H-1B visa through the startup. There are other reasons why it is good policy to permit activities under a phantom status. A person admitted on a B-1 visa to participate in business meetings should also be permitted to engage in tourism. Likewise, someone who primarily enters the United States to visit family members should be permitted to participate in an incidental one hour business meeting without having to switch status from B-2 to B-1. In the same vein, it would be preposterous to penalize a tourist who engages in communications through her iPhone relating to professional activities outside the United States while rock climbing in Yosemite!

David Isaacson

ZOMBIE PRECEDENTS, THE SEQUEL: HOW RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND THE BIA POINT TO A BETTER WAY OF DEALING WITH PRECEDENT DECISIONS THAT HAVE BEEN VACATED BY A COURT

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In my October 2014 post The Walking Dead: Why Courts of Appeals Should Not Defer to BIA or Attorney General Precedent Decisions that Have Already Been Vacated by Another Court of Appeals, I discussed why such vacated “zombie precedents” should not be given deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), by Courts of Appeals that address subsequent unpublished BIA decisions purporting to rely on them.  Recent decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) provide additional support for that suggestion.

On April 9, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its opinion in Lugo v. Holder.  In that case, Ms. Lugo disputed whether her 2005 conviction for misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. §4 constituted a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”).  She had been found barred from cancellation of removal based on the Immigration Judge’s ruling that misprision was indeed a CIMT, as the BIA had held in Matter of Robles-Urrea, 24 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 2006).  The BIA had affirmed the Immigration Judge’s ruling in an unpublished decision.

As the Second Circuit discussed in Lugo, the BIA had originally held in Matter of Sloan, 12 I&N Dec. 840 (A.G. 1968; BIA 1966) that misprision of felony was not a CIMT.  In Matter of Robles-Urrea, however, the BIA agreed with the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2002), to the effect that misprision of felony under 18 U.S.C. §4 was in fact a CIMT, and overruled Matter of Sloan in relevant part.  Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated Matter of Robles-Urrea in Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012), and held that misprision of felony was not categorically a CIMT.  (The complicated history of the case law regarding whether misprision of felony is a CIMT was also discussed in Cyrus D. Mehta’s March 2014 post on this blog, Was the Attorney Really Ineffective in Kovacs v. United States?.)

The Second Circuit therefore held in Lugo that it was “left to wonder whether, going forward, the Board wishes to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s rule or the Eleventh Circuit’s.” Lugo, slip op. at 3-4.  It concluded that “it is desirable for the Board to clarify this matter in a published opinion.”  Lugo, slip op. at 4.  The Second Circuit remanded to the BIA to enable to answer both this question and a related question regarding retroactivity: that is, whether Matter of Robles-Urrea could appropriately be applied to Ms. Lugo even if the BIA otherwise wished to follow it, given that Ms. Lugo had pled guilty prior to the issuance of that published opinion.

One way to look at what the Second Circuit did in the first portion of its remand in Lugo is as an admirable refusal to defer to a zombie precedent.  Having been vacated by the Ninth Circuit in Robles-Urrea v. Holder, the BIA decision in Matter of Robles-Urrea fits the description of a zombie precedent as discussed in my post The Walking Dead.  It had been cancelled, rescinded, by a competent court, and thus, since “vacatur dissipates precedential force,” In re: Bernard Madoff Inv. Securities LLC, 721 F.3d 54, 68 (2d Cir. 2013), it was properly seen as “not precedent.”  Asgeirsson v. Abbott, 696 F.3d 454, 459 (5th Cir. 2012).  The non-precedent decision in Lugo’s own case, meanwhile, was not entitled to deference because, as the Second Circuit had previously held, in Rotimi v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 56 (2d Cir. 2007), “a nonprecedential decision by a single member of the BIA should not be accorded Chevron deference.”  The Second Circuit therefore properly vacated the nonprecedential decision in Lugo’s case and remanded to the BIA for the issuance of a precedential decision.  That is, the Second Circuit did in Lugo essentially what I had suggested in The Walking Dead, and earlier in Burning Down the House: The Second and Third Circuits Split on Whether Arson Not Relating to Interstate Commerce is an Aggravated Felony, that it should have done in Luna Torres v. Holder, No. 13-2498 (August 20, 2014).  Hopefully, this may be the start of a trend of Courts of Appeals not deferring to zombie precedents, but instead remanding to the BIA for further precedential analysis of whether the BIA wishes to follow in the footsteps of a prior precedent decision vacated by another Court of Appeals, or instead wishes to accede to the Court of Appeals decision which vacated that prior precedent.

The Second Circuit’s decision in Lugo is not the only recent development that I would submit gives support to my previously expressed views regarding zombie precedents.  As discussed in my prior post, the BIA has been known to reverse course and abandon a precedent following its rejection by one or more Courts of Appeals.  Earlier examples included Matter of Silva, 16 I&N Dec. 26 (BIA 1976), where the BIA acquiesced in the Second Circuit’s decision in Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976) (regarding the availability of relief under former INA §212(c)) rather than insisting on its own contrary decision in Matter of Arias-Uribe, 13 I&N Dec. 696 (BIA 1971), and Matter of Marcal Neto, 25 I&N Dec. 169 (BIA 2010), where the BIA overruled Matter of Perez Vargas, 23 I&N Dec. 829 (BIA 2005) (regarding the exercise of portability under INA §204(j) in immigration court proceedings), after its rejection by several Courts of Appeals, including the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Perez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2007).  I acknowledged in The Walking Dead that the BIA has in some instances made a precedential choice to reaffirm the reasoning of a prior precedent even after its rejection by multiple circuits, and gave as an example Matter of E.W. Rodriguez, 25 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2012): in that case, the BIA reaffirmed Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2010), after its holding regarding the ineligibility of certain Lawful Permanent Residents for waivers of inadmissibility under INA §212(h) had been rejected by multiple Courts of Appeals, and indicated that Koljenovic would continue to be followed in circuits that had not rejected it.  The BIA has now changed its mind on that point.

In Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. 563 (BIA 2015), decided on May 12, the BIA withdrew E.W. Rodriguez and  Koljenovic in light of the rejection of the theory underlying them by nine Courts of Appeals.  The immigration court proceedings in Matter of J-H-J- had taken place within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which had, in Roberts v. Holder, 745 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2014), accepted the BIA’s reasoning in E.W. Rodriguez and  Koljenovic as a reasonable interpretation of the statute.  Thus, the BIA was free to reaffirm E.W. Rodriguez and  Koljenovic in the case if it so wished.  However, given “the overwhelming circuit court authority,” Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. at 564, and the importance of “uniformity in the application of the immigration laws”, id. at 565 (citing Matter of Small, 23 I&N Dec. 448, 450 (BIA 2002)), the BIA instead held that “section 212(h) . . . only precludes aliens who entered the United States as lawful permanent residents from establishing eligibility for a waiver on the basis of an aggravated felony conviction.” Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. at 565.

Strictly speaking, E.W. Rodriguez and  Koljenovic were not zombie precedents as I have defined that term, never having been themselves vacated by a court.  However, the BIA’s overruling of those precedents in Matter of J-H-J- is, like Matter of Silva and Matter of Marcal Neto before it, an example of the BIA’s willingness to reconsider its own precedent in light of contrary appellate case law from outside the circuit having appellate jurisdiction over the case at hand.

Against this background, it makes increasingly little sense for courts to implicitly assume that the BIA would necessarily insist on following in the footsteps of a precedent decision which has already been vacated by a Court of Appeals.  Rather than giving deference to a zombie precedent, the Courts of Appeals should remand to the BIA for reconsideration of whether it wishes to follow in the footsteps of that precedent, as the Second Circuit did in in Lugo.

Cyrus Mehta

Equating Immigrants to Greenhouse Gases: Is This a Valid Basis for Standing to Sue The Federal Government?

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It has lately become fashionable for states that oppose President Obama’s immigration executive actions to sue in federal court on grounds that they are unconstitutional.  But in order to get heard in court, a state must demonstrate standing.        

In the Texas v. United States litigation challenging President Obama’s November 2014 Deferred Action for Parent Accountability Program (DAPA) and expanded Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) programs, plaintiff states led by Texas successfully invoked standing by equating immigrants to noxious air pollutants that cause greenhouse gases. While greenhouse gases can only cause harm, immigrants, legal or not, are more likely to confer benefits than harm. Is it appropriate for a judge to give standing to a state opposing federal immigration policy based on the sort of harm that pollutants would cause it?

Parties seeking to resolve disputes in federal court must present actual “Cases” or “Controversies” under Article III of the US Constitution. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have standing in order to satisfy Article III. They must establish three elements set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) that there is 1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

In Texas v. United States, the states attempted to show harm through the influx of immigrants who will remain in the United States through deferrals of their removals and thus burden them. The basis for linking the harm caused by immigrants to noxious pollutants stems from the seminal Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA in which plaintiffs requested the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under section 202 of the Clean Air Act. After EPA refused to do so, plaintiffs, which included Massachusetts, sought review of the EPA’s refusal in the Supreme Court to regulate greenhouse gases. Massachusetts successfully sought standing under Lujan by showing that global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions was so widespread that the failure of the EPA to regulate them would cause the state environmental damage such as coastal flooding of its shores. Justice Steven delivered the opinion of the Court by beginning with this broad pronouncement on global warming:

A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related. For when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected heat. It is therefore a species—the most important species—of a “greenhouse gas.”

Later, in showing how Massachusetts as a landowner would suffer injury even though global warming was widespread, Justice Stevens stated:

That these climate-change risks are “widely shared” does not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this litigation. [citation omitted]. According to petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of global warming. MacCracken Decl.  5(c), Stdg.App. 208. These rising seas have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land. Id., at 196 (declaration of Paul H. Kirshen 5), 216 (MacCracken Decl.  23). Because the Commonwealth “owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property,” id., at 171 (declaration of Karst R. Hoogeboom  4),[citation omitted] it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner. The severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next century: If sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one Massachusetts official believes that a significant fraction of coastal property will be “either permanently lost through inundation or temporarily lost through periodic storm surge and flooding events.” Id.,  6, at 172.[citation omitted]. Remediation costs alone, petitioners allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Id., 7, at 172; see also Kirshen Decl.  12, at 198.[citation omitted]

While it is undeniable that greenhouse gases can cause only harm, should this case be applicable when a state uses it to invoke standing to challenge federal immigration policy? Texas, the lead plaintiff in Texas v. United States, argued that the President’s executive actions would cause a significant economic burden as deferring removal of certain classes of non-citizens would allow them to  apply for drivers licenses, which  in turn would cost the state several million dollars. Texas relied on this trifling economic burden as the injury that would give it standing,  which Judge Hanen accepted among other standing legal theories. After providing standing, Judge Hanen temporarily blocked the executive actions, and a trenchant criticism of his reasoning in doing so can be found here.  Judge Hanen elaborated at great length in equating the harm that Massachusetts would suffer through global warming with the harm that Texas would suffer as a result of “500,000 illegal aliens that enter the United States each year.” Judge Hanen went on to further expound his views on the harms caused by illegal immigration, as follows:

The federal government is unable or unwilling to police the border more thoroughly or apprehend those illegal aliens residing within the United States; thus it is unsurprising  that, according to prevailing estimates, there are somewhere between 11,000,000 and 12,000,000 illegal aliens currently living in the country, many of whom burden the limited resources in each state to one extent or another. Indeed, in many instances, the Government intentionally allows known illegal aliens to enter and remain in the country. 

While emphasizing the alleged harms that undocumented immigration would cause to the states, Judge Hanen gave short shrift to the well-reasoned amicus brief of 12 states   demonstrating the overwhelming benefits that DAPA and DACA would confer to the states.  Amici argued that the recipients of a prior DACA program in 2012, which was not challenged in the litigation, caused 60% of the recipients to find new jobs and that wages increased by over 240%. Allowing immigrants to work legally and increase their wages substantially increases the state tax base. The granting of deferred action also provides many social benefits, amici argued, as it allows parents to support US citizen children, thus reducing the cost of state social service benefits and it also allows families to remain united.  According to the amicus brief, “When fit parents are deported, it can be difficult for the State to find the parents and reunite them with their children. The existence of fit parents – even if they have been deported – can also prevent the State from seeking alternative placement options for a child, such as a guardianship or adoption by another family member or third party.[citation omitted]. Deferred deportation allows families to remain together, even if only temporarily.”The government appealed Judge Hanen’s preliminary injunction to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In a hearing before a panel in the Fifth Circuit to lift the block while the government’s appeal was pending, Massachusetts v. EPA was again discussed, as presented in David Isaacson’s summary:

Continuing with the standing discussion, Judge Smith directed AAG Mizer to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), which he considered to be a key case on the standing issue.  Mizer responded, first, that there isn’t a territorial effect in this case as in Massachusetts, where the state’s territory was being affected (by rising sea levels resulting from global warming).  Also, the specific statute in Massachusetts v. EPA gave a specific right to sue, while the INA, Mizer argued, “is not enacted to protect the states”.

The success of the legal challenges to President Obama’s executive actions hinges on whether courts will give plaintiffs standing or not. In Crane v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court’s finding that Mississippi, a plaintiff, did not have standing as its claim to fiscal injury arising out of deferral under the DACA 2012 program was speculative.  More recently, a three judge panel in the D.C. Circuit was skeptical of Arizona sheriff Joe Arpaio’s challenge against DAPA and expanded DACA based on standing. While they were skeptical that the deferred action programs will result in more immigrants being detained in Maricopa County jails, one George W.  Bush appointee judge again cited Massachusetts’ standing to sue to prevent environmental harm from greenhouse gases by asking why “at least at the state level, isn’t concern about public safety and crime and that sort of things costs and crime should not be at least equal to the sovereignty concern to the sea level rise taking a few inches of shoreline.”

Although the government has argued in its appeal brief that the Clean Air Act gave a state such as Massachusetts the right to sue while the INA does not in the context of deferred action and prosecutorial discretion, a broader and more compelling argument can be made against invoking Massachusetts v. EPAin immigration litigation. Analogizing the ability of certain classes of immigrants to temporarily remain in the United States to greenhouse gases is both specious and offensive. It is well recognized that greenhouse gases only cause harm, and thus a state impacted by them can readily demonstrate injury in order to seek standing to sue the federal government. Immigrants, unlike greenhouse gases, bring great benefits to the United States. Any manufactured claim of harm by a state, like what Texas has claimed with the so called economic burden caused by issuing driver’s license, is far outweighed by the benefits that immigrants bring to this country. Apart from all the benefits that were discussed by the states opposing the legal challenge, even a second grader can figure out that handing out licenses to people who otherwise could not get it before deferral ensures that many more will drive safely in the state of Texas.

One would also not use this analogy in other contexts as it is highly offensive to link human beings to greenhouse gases.  Imagine if a state were to challenge a federal policy of providing federal benefits to same-sex married couples whose marriages are valid where celebrated but not in the state of their residence, on the basis that this policy led more same-sex married couples and their families to reside in that state and thus overburden its schools and public hospitals. If the state invoked Massachusetts v. EPA, it would be viewed as highly offensive and also not a very strong argument.  Plaintiffs seem to be getting away for the time being in linking immigrants to noxious pollutants, and it is hoped that some judge will strike down this odious analogy so that it is  no longer invoked in immigration litigation.

Cyrus Mehta

WHEN AN AMENDED H-1B PETITION IS NOT REQUIRED EVEN AFTER MATTER OF SIMEIO SOLUTIONS

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By  Cyrus D. Mehta

The AAO decision in Matter of Simeio Solutions, LLC,  26 I&N Dec. 542 (AAO 2015) has already caused headaches as it will make it more costly and burdensome for employers who hire H-1B workers. An overview of the AAO decision can be found at AAO Firmly Tethers H-1B Workers To The LCA Like A Dog Is To A Leash. In Matter of Simeio, the AAO concluded that changes in the beneficiary’s places of employment, resulting in the obtaining of a new Labor Condition Application (LCA) constituted a material change to the terms and conditions of employment as specified in the original petition,  thus necessitating the filing of an amended petition. 
Every time an H-1B worker moves to a location not covered in the LCA, the employer will have to file an amended petition. The filing of an amended H-1B petition will incur additional costs for an employer. At an April 30, 2015 DHS Ombudsman call on the AAO decision,  it was estimated that if an employer moves 50 workers three times a year, that would be 150 amended petitions resulting in half a million dollars in legal fees and costs.   It will also give a right to the USCIS to adjudicate the H-1B petition as no deference is given to a prior approval when there is a material change in the employment. It is also a fact that the USCIS Vermont Service Center and California Service Center do not always apply consistent standards when adjudicating H-1B petitions. If the Vermont Service Center approved an H-1B petition, and the worker will be assigned to a work location within the jurisdiction of the California Service Center,  there is a likelihood that the amended H-1B petition will be adjudicated under a stricter standard, resulting in a Request for Evidence and even a denial. 
Prior to Simeio Solutions, employers relied on informal USCIS guidance indicating that so long as a new LCA was obtained prior to placing an H-1B worker at a new worksite, an amended H-1B petition was not required. See Letter from Efren Hernandez III, Dir., Bus. And Trade Branch, USCIS, to Lynn Shotwell, Am. Council on int’l Pers., Inc. (October 23, 2003). The AAO has now explicitly stated in Simeio Solutions, footnote 7, that the Hernandez guidance has been superseded. Employers who relied on the prior guidance who file amended H-1B petitions to comply with Simeio Solutions should not be penalized for not previously filing an amended H-1B petition by deeming that the H-1B worker fell out of status. 
When is an amended petition not legally required even after Simeio Solutions? 
Arguably, if an H-1B worker is being moved to a new job location within the same area of intended employment, a new LCA is not required and nor will an H-1B amendment be required. The original LCA should still be posted in the new work location within the same area of intended employment. So a move to a new job location within New York City would not trigger a new LCA, although the previously obtained LCA would need to be posted at the new work location. This could happen if an entire office moved from one location to another within NYC, or even if the H-1B worker moved from one client site to another within NYC.
There is also nothing in the law and regulations that require an employer to first obtain an approval of the amended petition prior to placing a worker there. Footnote 11 in the Simeio decision suggests that the new LCA, along with the amended H-1B petition, must be submitted, before the beneficiary would be permitted to begin working in the new place of employment. It does not suggest that the amended H-1B petition has to be approved before the worker would be permitted to work. Still, there is an exception in the DOL regulations to immediately filing a new LCA, and by corollary an amended H-1B petition, even when an H-1B worker is moved to a new location. Employers may take advantage of the short term placement exception at 20 CFR 655.735. Under the short term placement exception, an employer may under certain circumstances place an H-1B worker at a new job location for up to 30 days, and in some cases 60 days (where the worker is still based at the original location), without obtaining a new LCA. Thus, when an employer needs to urgently transfer an H-1B worker to a new location, it can do so under the short term placement exception without needing to also immediately file an amended H-1B petition. This exception is limited, though, since if the H-1B worker is placed at the new location for more than the 30 or 60 days, the employer needs to obtain a new LCA and also file an amended H-1B petition. An employer also cannot use the short term placement exception if there is already an existing LCA at that location. 

While readers should review the short term placement rule in its entirety, an employer who wishes to take advantage of this rule must:

(i) Continue to pay such worker(s) the required wage (based on the prevailing wage at such worker’s(s’) permanent worksite, or the employer’s actual wage, whichever is higher); 

(ii) Pay such worker(s) the actual cost of lodging (for both workdays and non-workdays); and 

(iii) Pay such worker(s) the actual cost of travel, meals and incidental or miscellaneous expenses (for both workdays and non-workdays). 

Finally, if an H-1B worker is placed at a location that is considered a non-worksite under 20 CFR 655.715, which does not trigger an LCA,  the AAO decision is also inapplicable. Non-worksites include locations where employee developmental activity is conducted such as management conferences, staff seminars, etc. Non-worksites may also include locations where little time is spent by the employee at anyone location, and where the worker’s job is “peripatetic in nature.” They may also include situations where the H-1B worker’s job is spent at one location but where the worker occasionally travels for short periods to other locations  “on a casual, short-term basis, which can be recurring but not excessive (i.e., not exceeding five consecutive workdays for any one visit by a peripatetic worker, or 10 consecutive workdays for any one visit by a worker who spends most work time at one location and travels occasionally to other locations).” 20 CFR 655.715 provides the following examples of non-worksites, although readers are well advised to read the rule in its entirety:

A computer engineer sent out to customer locations to “troubleshoot” complaints regarding software malfunctions; a sales representative making calls on prospective customers or established customers within a “home office” sales territory; a manager monitoring the performance of out-stationed employees; an auditor providing advice or conducting reviews at customer facilities; a physical therapist providing services to patients in their homes within an area of employment; an individual making a court appearance; an individual lunching with a customer representative at a restaurant; or an individual conducting research at a library.

The regulation also provides the following examples of “worksites” that would trigger a new LCA, and now under Simeio, an amended H-1B petition: 

A computer engineer who works on projects or accounts at different locations for weeks or months at a time; a sales representative assigned on a continuing basis in an area away from his/her “home office;” an auditor who works for extended periods at the customer’s offices; a physical therapist who “fills in” for full-time employees of health care facilities for extended periods; or a physical therapist who works for a contractor whose business is to provide staffing on an “as needed” basis at hospitals, nursing homes, or clinics. 

Employers will soon feel the brunt of the AAO decision as they start moving H-1B workers, which in some industries like IT, accounting and management consulting is the norm. The exceptions to filing an amended H-1B petition while useful are still limited. As employers feel overly burdened by the AAO decision, they may consider resorting to litigation as the AAO has created a new rule without going through the appropriate notice and comment procedure under the Administrative Procedure Act.  According to the AAO, “[i]f an employer does not submit the LCA to USCIS in support of a new or amended H-1B petition, the process is incomplete and the LCA is not certified to the Secretary of Homeland Security.” The AAO cites INA 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 CFR 214.2(h)(4)(i)B)(1) and 20 CFR 655.700(b) to support its position, but none of these provisions seem to suggest that an LCA obtained after an H-1B petition has already been submitted is not valid if it is “not certified to the Secretary of Homeland Security.”   The DOL certifies the LCA. There is no separate process where the DOL also has to certify the LCA to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The AAO’s invention of a new rule relating to the validity of the LCA is also ripe for litigation. Finally,  an H-1B worker should not found to be in violation of status for failure to file an amended H-1B petition prior to Simeio. If the USCIS begins to retroactively apply Simeio so as to penalize employers and H-1B workers, this too would be ripe for federal court litigation.

 

David Isaacson

A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ORAL ARGUMENT ON THE APPLICATION FOR STAY IN TEXAS V. UNITED STATES

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On Friday, April 17, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard oral arguments on the motion by the United States for a stay pending appeal of the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Andrew Hanen of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Texas v. U.S., which currently prevents implementation of the DAPA and expanded DACA programs set out in a November 20, 2014 Memorandum of Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson.  The decision on the motion for stay will not be the last word with respect to the preliminary injunction, which is the subject of a pending expedited appeal with briefing scheduled to be completed by mid-May and oral argument possible over the summer.  However, the decision on the motion for stay will determine whether implementation of DAPA and expanded DACA can resume immediately.

In a previous blog post, I provided some initial reaction to the Memorandum and Order in which Judge Hanen issued his injunction.  Having listened to the recording of the oral argument that is available online, it seemed appropriate to provide some initial reactions to the oral argument as well.  Nicholas Espiritu of the National Immigration Law Center, who was actually present at the argument, provided his own recap in a blog post that I would urge readers to review, but I think it is possible that reviewing the recording may make it possible to pick up some things that were less obvious in person—although since a recording still has some disadvantages relative to a transcript, it is also possible that the below may contain errors, for which I apologize in advance.

As background, the three Fifth Circuit judges on the panel hearing the motion for stay were Judge Jerry E. Smith, appointed to the Fifth Circuit by Ronald Reagan in 1987; Judge Jennifer W. Elrod, appointed to the Fifth Circuit by George W. Bush in 2007; and Judge Stephen A. Higginson, appointed to the Fifth Circuit by President Obama in 2011.  Texas was represented by state solicitor general Scott A. Keller, and the United States by Acting Assistant Attorney General Scott A. Mizer.

Near the beginning of the argument, Judge Elrod offered an extensive hypothetical regarding the question of reviewability: would the states be able to sue, she asked, if the administration gave something like DAPA to all of the aliens present without authorization?  What about if the administration gave that same population voting rights?  The goverment’s attorney, AAG Mizer, responded that the states wouldn’t have standing in the hypothetical case of DAPA being greatly expanded, although there might be competitor standing by other workers.  In the voting hypothetical, however, he indicated that the states would probably have standing because the Voting Rights Act has provisions giving special rights and thus standing to states.

On the topic of reviewability, Judge Higginson asked whether expanding deferred action and thereby vastly expanding the class of people eligible for employment authorization might be reviewable, despite the existence of the longstanding regulations regarding employment authorization for deferred action recipients, if employment authorization through deferred action had previously been available to a smaller class of people.

Judge Elrod raised the issue of the district court’s factual finding that there is not an actual exercise of discretion by USCIS, and whether it is necessary to overcome a clear-error standard of review in order for the government to prevail with regard to that finding—a point that she revisited later in the argument.  The argument was based on the agency’s alleged practices in adjudicating applications for the original DACA program, as instituted in 2012 by then-Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, which was not challenged by the plaintiff States and is not affected by the injunction; Judge Hanen effectively found that DHS had not exercised discretion in the 2012 DACA program and so would not exercise discretion with DAPA and expanded DACA.  Judge Higginson, in response, made an interesting point about how the fact the agency is removing more people than ever before may rebut the suggestion that DHS is being pretextual in claiming that they are exercising discretion.

Judge Elrod then raised the issue of whether the government has been disingenuous in the litigation, and whether that influences a credibility determination.  (On the question of whether the attorneys for the government indeed had breached any ethical obligations, I would refer the reader to an AILA Leadership Blog postby Cyrus D. Mehta in his capacity as Chair of the AILA Ethics Committee, and the related more comprehensive paper from the AILA Ethics Committee, “Judge Hanen’s Troubling Accusations of Unethical Conduct in Texas v. United States of America”.)  The district court, AAG Mizner pointed out in response, considered “public safety” denials of the original 2012 DACA as not being discretionary, which is not really fair, since protecting public safety is a major discretionary factor.

Judge Higginson pointed out, with regard to the question of alleged disingenuousness and credibility, that the district court doesn’t actually seem to have made any credibility finding regarding the competing affidavits of USCIS union official Kenneth Palinkas and USCIS Associate Director for Service Center Operations Donald Neufeld, who had offered vastly different accounts of how applications are processed.  That goes to Judge Elrod’s earlier point regarding the finding of fact, since it would seem to be error to make such a finding while simply ignoring a contrary affidavit and without having held an evidentiary hearing to resolve any credibility issues.

Returning to the question of standing and reviewability, the government noted that “Texas has been here before” in terms of trying to sue the US government about immigration policy, in 1997, and lost.  AAG Mizner further pointed out that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g), and the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999), interpreting that section, argue against anybody being able to sue regarding prosecutorial discretion—if even disappointed aliens can’t sue regarding the exercise of such discretion, then why would states, who have no role in immigration, be able to do so?

Continuing with the standing discussion, Judge Smith directed AAG Mizer to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), which he considered to be a key case on the standing issue.  Mizer responded, first, that there isn’t a territorial effect in this case as in Massachusetts, where the state’s territory was being affected (by rising sea levels resulting from global warming).  Also, the specific statute in Massachusetts v. EPA gave a specific right to sue, while the INA, Mizer argued, “is not enacted to protect the states”.

Mizer moved on to an interesting hypothetical about the problem with Texas’s standing argument.  Take the case of thousands of paroled Cubans, for example, who then became eligible to adjust status (under the Cuban Adjustment Act).  On Texas’s theory, if the paroled aliens moved to Texas, then Texas would have a judicially cognizable harm.  But to find standing for Texas under such circumstances, Mizer said, would be inconsistent with the FAIR v. Reno decision of the D.C. Circuit, which rejected a challenge to an agreement between the US and Cuba that would have such an effect.  Indeed, if Texas is right, Mizer argued, then they would be able to challenge an individual decision to grant a single person asylum, because if that person then gets a Texas driver’s license, it’s a harm to Texas.

Judge Elrod asked about why the US didn’t address the constitutional arguments made by the plaintiffs below (and not passed upon by the District Court).  Given the burden is on the government, she suggested that this might mean the government would lose at the stay stage.  Between this, the earlier noted questions from Judge Elrod, and a question soon thereafter in which Judge Elrod relied on President Obama’s comments at a press conference, rather as Judge Hanen had below, it seemed that Judge Elrod might be leaning in favor of denying a stay, although reading the proverbial “tea leaves” from an oral argument is always tricky.

Judge Higginson next returned to a variant of his point about the potential significance of DHS’s high number of removals, noting that the “abdication” theory propounded by Judge Hanen doesn’t make sense given that high number.

Judge Higginson followed up with an interesting hypothetical question about what would happen if the next administration flipped the priorities and went after DAPA recipients. AAG Mizer responded that DHS hasn’t bound itself not to change its mind.  Secretary Johnson may have bound his subordinates, but he has not bound the agency.

Returning to the question of standing, Judge Smith asked about the “special solicitude” that Massachusetts v. EPA says is afforded to the states.  Mizer says the immigration context is different than that case, because the Supreme Court has said in Arizona v. United States that the states can’t enact laws to conflict with federal immigration policy; why should the states be able to file a lawsuit to the same end?

Judge Elrod then asked AAG Mizer about whether “lawful status” is a benefit and about the difference between this and the Watt case, that is, Watt v. Energy Action Education Foundation, 454 U.S. 151 (1981).  Regarding Watt, Mizer’s response was to point out that California actually had a statutory interest in sharing the revenues from the program at issue in that case.  Regarding “legal status”, Mizer stated that deferred action is not a lawful status, just lawful presence. There followed a somewhat confused discussion of what exactly lawful presence is.  AAG Mizer ultimately pointed out that it doesn’t matter a great deal as a practical matter if one has lawful presence under DAPA, because DAPA beneficiaries already had more than a year of unlawful presence to begin with, and would thus already have sufficient unlawful presence to trigger the 10-year bar (that is, INA §212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)).

The states’ lawyer, Texas Solicitor General Keller (TSG Keller for short), near the beginning of his argument, tried to pick up the thread regarding lawful presence versus lawful status and make the case that granting “lawful presence” is affirmative government action different than prosecutorial discretion. He couldn’t answer a question whether past deferred action grantees had lawful presence, but suggested that they might not have.  He also seemed near the beginning of is argument to concede that the scale of the program is not “pertinent to the legal doctrines”, though he then said that it “colors whether it is a substantive rule”.

Judge Higginson, picking up on the earlier discussion of lawful presence and lawful status, cited to Arizona v. United States and other case law to say that allowed presence from deferred action is different from lawful status.

TSG Keller moved on to talk about the double deference afforded in this stay posture.  He returned again later in the argument to a discussion of the “stay posture” and the record compiled on an expedited basis.  I found this interesting because to the extent the decision on the motion to stay relies on deference factors unique to the stay context, that suggests that any unfavorable decision on the motion to stay should not be given much deference by the panel that subsequently considers the appeal of the preliminary injunction.

One of the more notable aggressive moments of TSG Keller’s argument was when he claimed that 8 U.S.C. §1324a(h)(3)is only a “definitional” provision, and that the existing regulations regarding employment authorization may not be legal.  Judge Hanen, as I had pointed out in my prior post on this blog, had seemed to ignore that statute and the portion of the regulations, 8 C.F.R. §274a.12(c)(14), authorizing the grant of employment authorization to deferred action recipients.  Suggesting that the statutory provision is nearly meaningless and the regulations potentially invalid is, I suppose, an interesting alternative analytical route, but the argument strikes me as unconvincing, and would have far-reaching and problematic consequences if it did succeed.  This argument by TSG Keller would imply that the courts should read the statute to invalidate, for example, all employment authorization given to applicants for adjustment of status pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §274a.12(c)(9), just because the powers given to the Secretary of Homeland Security (formerly the Attorney General) by the statute to confer such employment authorization happen to be bestowed in the form of a definitional provision.

Another somewhat rocky moment in TSG Keller’s argument pertained to the “abdication” theory of Article III standing mentioned by Judge Hanen, regarding which even Judge Elrod appeared to be skeptical.  Judge Elrod was able to get TSG Keller to clarify that the states would still need to show Article III injury in order to proceed on such a theory of standing.  As examples of such injury, TSG Keller pointed to driver’s licenses, health care and education benefits.

On the question of whether discretion was actually exercised in adjudicating applications under the 2012 DACA program, Judge Higginson pointed out that because of “self-selection bias”, you’d expect a high approval rate.  That is, given that it is up to each applicant whether to seek the benefit, people who aren’t going to qualify for the benefit won’t tend to apply for it.  This seemed a compelling point to me, and Judge Higginson returned to it repeatedly.  This discussion of discretion led to a further discussion of the data, or lack thereof, regarding reasons for refusal and so on in DACA 2012, and why the government didn’t, or couldn’t, provide evidence of discretionary refusals—evidently DHS had not kept track of such discretionary denials separately from other denials.

Also with respect to discretion, Judge Higginson had what I thought was a very interesting point about the perverse incentive that would be created by adopting the states’ viewpoint on what evidences a proper exercise of discretion.  If a high approval rate for those applicants meeting the written policy criteria is evidence of a lack of discretion, does that mean that executive agencies need to be careful not to comply with their written policies too well?  He came back to this again later in the argument.  This too struck me as a compelling point, because the implication of the states’ argument is that executive-branch policies not meant to confer enforceable rights on the public may only be defensible if the administration is careful to be arbitrary and unpredictable, allowing lower-level officers to make decisions without any meaningful guidance from their superiors—which would be a very strange way to run the executive branch, and a very strange policy to mandate as a matter of administrative law.

Judge Higginson also pointed out that in one of the cases the states have cited, the remedy for an agency supposedly not exercising the discretion that it claimed to be exercising was remand to the agency.  But he seemed potentially convinced by TSG Keller’s response that this possibility would be more relevant to the merits than to the stay.

In an interesting exchange towards the end of TSG Keller’s argument, both he and Judge Elrod seemed to say that if it were “just deferred action” this would be a very different case.  It seems to me, however, that the difference is not so clear, because once you get “just deferred action” you are eligible for an EAD under the existing regulations, as I have explained previously.

In his rebuttal argument, AAG Mizer argued that deferred action has always conferred lawful presence, and that Congress has acknowledged that.

Judge Elrod pressed AAG Mizner during his rebuttal regarding what scheme Texas could use to decide whom to give driver’s licenses to, that would not necessarily result in the grant of licenses to DAPA recipients, as the U.S.’s argument had seemed to suggest was possible.  AAG Mizer indicated that Texas could come up with a classification scheme not relying on employment authorization, as long as there was a legitimate state reason for that classification scheme.

Judge Higginson followed up with an interesting question about whether Congressional appropriations sufficient to remove all 11 million unauthorized aliens would mandate that this be done.  AAG Mizer responded there would be an impoundment problem with the funds not being utilized for their intended purpose in that hypothetical, but that the government would still have some residual discretion to consider foreign policy and humanitarian concerns and so on.

Regarding the “status quo” standard for a stay, Mizer points them to Justice O’Connor’s stay opinion in INS v. Legalization Assistance Project, 510 U.S. 1301 (1993) (O’Connor, J., in chambers), regarding the injury that the federal government suffers when the judicial branch interferes in its internal processes.

At the end of the argument, Judge Elrod pushed AAG Mizer regarding whether there would be significant benefits granted during a period after any lifting of the stay that would be difficult to unwind if the preliminary injunction were ultimately affirmed.  She did not seem convinced by his response.

Based on this oral argument, the most difficult prediction appears to me to be what view Judge Smith will take on the merits.  Although it seemed from Judge Smith’s questions regarding Massachusetts v. EPA that he was inclined to find in favor of the plaintiff states with regard to standing, his questions did not reveal his view of the merits to the extent that Judge Elrod’s did.  Judge Higginson was also a bit harder to read than Judge Elrod, but on balance it seems from the oral argument that he is more likely to favor the federal government’s position.  Even if Judge Smith and Judge Elrod were both to agree that the plaintiff states had standing, however, a stay could still be granted if Judge Smith were to agree with Judge Higginson’s apparent view of the federal government’s likelihood of prevailing on the merits.  While I am not sure how likely such an outcome is, it is not a possibility that I would entirely rule out based solely on the oral argument.

Cyrus Mehta

AAO FIRMLY TETHERS H-1B WORKERS TO AN LCA LIKE A DOG IS TO A LEASH

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In Matter of Simeio Solutions, LLC, 26 I&N Dec. 542 (AAO 2015), the AAO affirmed the Service Center Director’s decision and revoked the petition’s approval. Among other things, the Director had concluded that changes in the beneficiary’s places of employment constituted a material change to the terms and conditions of employment as specified in the original petition. The changes included different metropolitan statistical areas from the original place of employment, which USCIS agents were unable to find. The AAO found that the petitioner should have filed an amended Form I-129 H-1B petition corresponding to a new labor condition application (LCA) that reflected these changes, but the petitioner failed to do so. The AAO noted that petitioners must immediately notify USCIS of any changes in the terms and conditions of employment of a beneficiary that may affect eligibility for H−1B status

In affirming the Director’s decision, the AAO noted:

(1) A change in the place of employment of a beneficiary to a geographical area requiring a corresponding Labor Condition Application for Nonimmigrant Workers (LCA) be certified to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security with respect to that beneficiary may affect eligibility for H-1B status; it is therefore a material change for purposes of 8 CFR §§ 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E) and (11)(i)(A) (2014).

(2) When there is a material change in the terms and conditions of employment, the petitioner must file an amended or new H−1B petition with the corresponding LCA.

In the not too distant past, employers relied on informal USCIS guidance indicating that so long as a new LCA was obtained prior to placing an H-1B worker at a new worksite, an amended H-1B petition was not required. See Letter from Efren Hernandez III, Dir., Bus. And Trade Branch, USCIS, to Lynn Shotwell, Am. Council on int’l Pers., Inc. (October 23, 2003). The AAO has now explicitly stated in Simeio Solutions, footnote 7, that the Hernandez guidance has been superseded. Even prior to the guidance being formally superseded, employers were filing amended H-1B petitions as consular officers were recommending to the USCIS that the H-1B petition be revoked if a new LCA was obtained without an amendment of the H-1B petition. According to the AAO, “[i]f an employer does not submit the LCA to USCIS in support of a new or amended H-1B petition, the process is incomplete and the LCA is not certified to the Secretary of Homeland Security.” The AAO cites INA 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 CFR 214.2(h)(4)(i)B)(1) and 20 CFR 655.700(b) to support its position, but none of these provisions seem to suggest that an LCA obtained after an H-1B petition has already been submitted is not valid if it is “not certified to the Secretary of Homeland Security.”   The DOL certifies the LCA. There is no separate process where the DOL also has to certify the LCA to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

It is not so much the cost that troubles employers with respect to filing an amended H-1B petition. The USCIS has made it extremely onerous for employers to obtain H-1B petitions especially when an H-1B worker will be assigned to third party client sites. This is a legitimate business model that American companies across the board rely on to meet their IT needs, but the USICS requires an onerous demonstration that the petitioning company will still have a right to control the H-1B worker’s employment. Each time the employer files an amendment, the USCIS will again make the employer demonstrate the employer-employee relationship through the issuance of a humongous Request for Evidence (RFE). The employer will thus risk a denial upon seeking an amendment, even though it received an H-1B approval initially on virtually the same facts.

H-1B workers in other industries such as healthcare also get re-assigned to different locations, such as physicians, nurses and physical therapists. They too will be over burdened by the need to file amended H-1B petitions each time they move to a new work location. One may also have to await the approval of the amendment before the H-1B worker can move to the new job location. The portability provision at INA 214(n) seems to apply only when an H-1B worker is accepting “new employment” by a “prospective employer of a new petition.”

Arguably, if an H-1B worker is being moved to a new job location within the same area of intended employment, a new LCA is not required and nor will an H-1B amendment be required. The original LCA should still be posted in the new work location within the same area of intended employment.

20 CFR 655.17 defines “area of intended employment”:

Area of intended employmentmeans the area within normal commuting distance of the place (address) of employment where the H-1B nonimmigrant is or will be employed. There is no rigid measure of distance which constitutes a normal commuting distance or normal commuting area, because there may be widely varying factual circumstances among different areas (e.g., normal commuting distances might be 20, 30, or 50 miles). If the place of employment is within a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or a Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA), any place within the MSA or PMSA is deemed to be within normal commuting distance of the place of employment; however, all locations within a Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) will not automatically be deemed to be within normal commuting distance. The borders of MSAs and PMSAs are not controlling with regard to the identification of the normal commuting area; a location outside of an MSA or PMSA (or a CMSA) may be within normal commuting distance of a location that is inside (e.g., near the border of) the MSA or PMSA (or CMSA).

So a move to a new job location within New York City would not trigger a new LCA, although the previously obtained LCA would need to be posted at the new work location. This could happen if an entire office moved from one location to another within NYC, or even if the H-1B worker moved from one client site to another within NYC.

The  DOL Wage and Hour Division Fact Sheet # 62J at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/FactSheet62/whdfs62j.htmalso confirms this:

If the employer requires the H-1B worker to move from one worksite to another worksite within a geographic area of intended employment, must the employer obtain an LCA for each worksite within that area of intended employment?

No. The employer need not obtain a new LCA for another worksite within the geographic area of intended employment where the employer already has an existing LCA for that area. However, while the prevailing wage on the existing LCA applies to any worksite within the geographic area of intended employment, the notice to workers must be posted at each individual worksite, and the strike/lockout prohibition also applies to each individual worksite.

The AAO decision in Simeio Solutions further over regulates the H-1B visa, which is already subject to the most hyper-technical scrutiny. This in turn will deprive American companies of an efficient business model that has provided reliability to companies in the United States and throughout the industrialized world to obtain top-drawer talent quickly with flexibility and at affordable prices and scale that benefit end consumers and promote diversity of product development. This is what the oft-criticized “job shop” readily provides. By making possible a source of expertise that can be modified and redirected in response to changing demand, uncertain budgets, shifting corporate priorities and unpredictable fluctuations in the business cycle itself, the pejorative reference to them as “job shop” is, in reality, the engine of technological ingenuity on which progress in the global information age largely depends.  Such a business model is also consistent with free trade, which the US promotes vehemently to other countries, but seems to restrict when it applies to service industries located in countries such as India that desire to do business in the US through their skilled personnel

The Hernandez guidance provided flexibility to employers whose H-1B workers frequently moved between client locations, while ensuring the integrity of the H-1B visa program. Employers were still required to obtain new LCAs based on the prevailing wage in the new area of employment, and also notify US workers. However, they were not required to file onerous H-1B amendments each time there was a move, and risk further arbitrary and capricious scrutiny. The AAO has removed this flexibility, and has further regulated the H-1B to such an extent that the LCA must now always firmly and securely tether an H-1B worker through an amended petition just like a dog is to his leash, although the latter may still be occasionally let loose to enjoy more freedom than an H-1B!