Cyrus Mehta

TWO ACES UP PRESIDENT OBAMA’S SLEEVE TO ACHIEVE IMMIGRATION REFORM WITHOUT CONGRESS – NOT COUNTING FAMILY MEMBERS AND PAROLE IN PLACE

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Nothing more poignantly describes the current humanitarian crisis at the Southwest border than a recent New York Times article describing the journey of Alejandro, 8, who came to the United States on his own with only his birth certificate looking for his parents who are somewhere in San Antonio or an aunt in Maryland. The story of an adorable, courageous and resourceful 8 year old braving a dangerous journey in search of his parents will pull at the heartstrings of any parent. 

There may be many reasons for this crisis and what may draw unaccompanied young children to the United States, but one reason for this is our broken immigration system. This system does not allow people accessible pathways to come to the United States legally or gain legal status.  Even those who are here as permanent residents or naturalized citizens have to wait years before their loved ones can join them due to the backlogs in our family and employment-based immigration preferences.  Until recently there was some hope that the House would pass its own version of immigration reform after the Senate passed S. 744 last year. Those hopes have now been dashed. 

The impetus to preserve family unity is pervasive and exists across all cultures, and so is the deep love that parents have for their children and that children have for their parents. Many of the children fleeing violence in Central American countries are trying to unite with parents living in the United States. However, the broken immigration system does not allow families to unite through legal means Instead of beefing up the border with more enforcement; President Obama can bring some balance to the immigration system through bold administrative measures that will promote family unification in a legal and orderly manner. While there are several proposals on the table, one that resonates is to not count derivative family members in the employment and family preferences. The solution is simple but elegant: Count all members of a family together as one unit rather than as separate and distinct individuals. Do that and systemic visa retrogression, resulting in family members waiting endlessly, will quickly become a thing of the past. 

Not Counting Family Members 

Section 203(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is the provision that deals with family members. Let us examine what section 203(d) says: “A spouse or child defined in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E) of section 1101 (b)(1) of this title shall, if not otherwise entitled to an immigrant status and the immediate issuance of a visa under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, be entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration provided in the respective subsection, if accompanying or following to join, the spouse or parent.” There is nothing in section 203(d) that explicitly provides authority for family members to be counted under the preference quotas. While a derivative is “entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration” as the principal, nothing requires that family members also be given numbers. If Congress allocates a certain number of visas to immigrants with advanced degrees, it makes no sense if half or more are used up by family members.  

There is no regulation in 8 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) instructing what section 203(d) is supposed to be doing. Even the Department of State’s regulation at 22 C.F.R. 42.32 only parrots section 203(d) and states that children and spouses are “entitled to the derivative status corresponding to the classification and priority date of the principal.” 22 C.F.R. 42.32 does not provide further amplification on the scope and purpose of section 203(d). We acknowledge that section 203(d) derivatives are wholly within the preference system and bound by its limitations. They are not independent of numerical limits, only from direct limitations. It is the principal alien through whom they derive their claim who is counted and who has been counted. Hence, if no EB or FB numbers were available to the principal alien, the derivatives would not be able to immigrate either. If they were exempt altogether, this would not matter. There is a difference between not being counted at all, which we do not argue, and being counted as an integral family unit as opposed to individuals, which we do assert. We seek not an exemption from numerical limits but a different way of counting such limits.  

If the Executive Branch wanted to reinterpret section 203(d), there is sufficient ambiguity in the provision for it do so without the need for Congress to sanction it. A government agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)—often abbreviated as “Chevron deference”.  When a statute is ambiguous in this way, the Supreme Court has made clear in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), the agency may reconsider its interpretation even after the courts have approved of it.  Brand X can be used as a force for good. For instance, in  Sciallaba v. Osorio: Does the Dark Cloud Have A Silver Lining, Cyrus  Mehta and David Isaacson propose that notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent decision concerning  section 203(h)(3) of the INA, where the Court agreed with the  Board of Immigration Appeal’s (BIA) more restrictive interpretation of this Child Status Protection Act provision in Matter of Wang, 25 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 2009),  the BIA has the power to reverse Matter of Wang under Brand X. Matter of Wang held that not all children who are unable to protect their age under the Child Status Protection Act can claim the earlier priority date under which their parent immigration to the United States.  

As the plurality opinion in Sciallaba v. Osorio explained in its conclusion:

This is the kind of case Chevron was built for.  Whatever Congress might have meant in enacting §1153(h)(3), it failed to speak clearly.  Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually reasonable construction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies underlying immigration law.  Were we to overturn the Board in that circumstance, we would assume as our own the responsible and expert agency’s role.  We decline that path, and defer to the Board.

Kagan slip op. at 33. 

Thus, when a provision is ambiguous such as section 203(d), the government agency may reasonably interpret the provision in a reasonable manner. In our prior article relating to not counting relatives, Why We Can’t Wait:   How President Obama Can Erase Immigrant Visa Backlogs With A Stroke Of A Pen, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2012,0201-endelman.shtm, we discussed  that  there are admittedly some statutory provisions which might be read as pointing against an interpretation to not count family members. Most notably, it has also been pointed to us that  INA section 202(b) permits a spouse or child to “cross charge” to the foreign state of either of the parents or the spouse to avoid family separation, and this may suggest that derivatives must be individually counted for purposes of the per country cap. Still, this too can be interpreted differently under Chevronand Brand X, namely, that the entire family be counted as single unit to the other spouse or parent’s country. Of course, the statutory provision which militates in favor of such an interpretation is most notably the text of INA §203(d) itself. If this happened, the EB and FB preferences could instantly become “current.” The backlogs would disappear. The USCIS might even have to build a new Service Center!

Expansion of Parole in Place

The very idea of “parole” in section 212(d)(5) of the INA is linked to  allowing deserving aliens to come to the United States for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” In most cases, we think this only applies to people who are not yet here. Not so. Digging a bit deeper into the INA, we find in section 235(a)(1) this golden nugget: an applicant for admission is “an alien present in the United states who has not been admitted…” Putting all of this together, there is nothing in law or logic that prevents the full embrace and unfettered application of parole to those already in the United States outside the color of law. The invocation of ‘parole in place” is another example of using new interpretive techniques to mine the existing law for greater benefits. It is the antidote to the inability of Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform. There should be no concern over a possible infringement of separation of powers for the authority of Congress over the legislative process is being fully respected.  Part of the responsibility of the President to enforce the laws is to adopt an understanding of them that best promotes what Congress had in mind when it passed the law in the first place. Parole in place does precisely that. This is not amnesty. The requirements for obtaining legal status on a permanent basis apply in full. It is merely an attempt to think of the law we have not purely or primarily as an instrument of enforcement but as a platform for remediation of the human condition. Indeed, is this not how law in the American tradition is meant to function?

The creation of new solutions by federal agencies has become the norm rather than the exception in our system of governance if for no other reason that the sheer multiplicity of issues, as well as their dense complexity, defies traditional compromise or achievable consensus which are the hallmarks of Congressional deliberation. They require timely and directed executive action as a formula for keeping present problems from getting worse. This is exactly why Congress authorized the Attorney General to grant employment authorization without terms or limitations pursuant to INA 274A (h) (3)(B), a provision that should be linked with the robust exercise of the Executive’s parole power. The INA leaves the granting of parole completely up to the discretion of the Attorney General, now shifted to the DHS. It is hard to imagine a more open invitation to Executive rule- making to provide when parole can be extended, as there is absolutely nothing in the INA that would contradict a DHS regulation allowing parole in place. Not only is it appropriate for the DHS to formulate immigration policy on highly minute technical issues of surpassing moment such as parole in place, but the Constitution expects that to happen. Indeed, without this, who would do it? Far from crossing the line and infringing the authority of Congress, what we ask the DHS to do augments Congressional prerogative by providing a practical way for them to function.

In addition to not counting derivatives, the Obama Administration can extend parole in place (PIP) that has been granted to military families to all immediate relatives of US citizens, which would allow them to adjust in the US rather than travel abroad and risk the 3 and 10 year bars of inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) of the INA. Such administrative relief would be far less controversial than granting deferred action since immediate relatives of US citizens are anyway eligible for permanent residence. The only difference is that they could apply for their green cards in the US without needing to travel overseas and apply for waivers of the 3 and 10 year bars.

The concept of PIP can be extended to other categories, such as beneficiaries of preference petitions, which the authors have explained in The Tyranny of Priority Dates. However, they need to have demonstrated lawful status as a condition for being able to adjust status under INA section 245(c)(2) and the current memogranting PIP to military families states that “[p]arole does not erase any periods of unlawful status.” There is no reason why this policy cannot be reversed. The grant of PIP, especially to someone who arrived in the past without admission or parole, can retroactively give that person lawful status too, thus rendering him or her eligible to adjust status through the I-130 petition as a preference beneficiary. The only place in INA section 245 where the applicant is required to have maintained lawful nonimmigrant status is under INA section 245(c)(7), which is limited to employment-based immigrants. Family-based immigrants are not so subject. For purposes of section  245(c) of the INA, current regulations already define “lawful immigration status” to include “parole status which has not expired, been revoked, or terminated.” 8 C.F.R. section 245.1(d)(v). Indeed, even if one has already been admitted previously in a nonimmigrant visa status and is now out of status, the authors contend  that this person should be able to apply for a rescission of that admission and instead be granted retroactive PIP. Thus, beneficiaries of I-130 petitions, if granted retroactive PIP, ought to be able adjust their status in the US.

There is also no reason why PIP cannot extend to beneficiaries of employment I-140 petitions. If this is done, would such persons be able to adjust status to lawful permanent resident without leaving the USA? In order to do that, they not only need to demonstrate lawful status, but also  to have maintained continuous lawful nonimmigrant status under INA section 245(c)(7), as noted above.  Is there a way around this problem? At first glance, we consider the possibility of using the exception under INA section 245(k) which allows for those who have not continuously maintained lawful nonimmigrant status to still take advantage of section 245 adjustment if they can demonstrate that they have been in unlawful status for not more than 180 days since their last admission. We would do well to remember, however, that 245(k) only works if the alien is “present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission.”  Is parole an admission? Not according to INA section 101(a)(13)(B). So, while retroactive PIP would help satisfy the 180 day requirement imposed by INA section 245(k)(2), it cannot substitute for the lawful admission demanded by section 245(k)(1). Even if an out of status or unlawfully present I-140 beneficiary who had previously been admitted now received nunc pro tunc parole, the parole would replace the prior lawful admission. Such a person would still not be eligible for INA section 245(k) benefits and, having failed to continuously maintain valid nonimmigrant status,  would remain unable to adjust due to the preclusive effect of section 245(c)(7). Similarly, an I-140 beneficiary who had entered EWI and subsequently received retroactive parole would likewise not be able to utilize 245(k) for precisely the same reason, the lack of a lawful admission. Still, the grant of retroactive PIP should wipe out unlawful presence and the 3 and 10 year bars enabling this I-140 beneficiary to still receive an immigrant visa at an overseas consular post without triggering the bars upon departure from the US. Thus, while the beneficiary of an employment-based petition may not be able to apply for adjustment of status, retroactive PIP would nevertheless be hugely beneficial because, assuming PIP is considered a lawful status, it will wipe out unlawful presence and will thus no longer trigger the bars upon the alien’s departure from the US.

Our proposal to grant PIP retroactively so that it erases unlawful presence can also assist people who face the permanent bar under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the INA. If PIP can retroactively erase unlawful presence, then those who entered the country without inspection after accruing unlawful presence of more than 1 year will not trigger the bar under this provision if the unlawful presence has been erased.

One of the biggest contributors to the buildup of the undocumented population in the US has been the 3 year, 10 year and permanent bars.  Even though people are beneficiaries of immigrant visa petitions, they do not wish to risk travelling abroad and facing the bars.  Extending PIP to people who are in any event in the pipeline for a green card would allow them adjust status in the US or process immigrant visas at consular posts, and become lawful permanent residents. These people are already eligible for permanent residence through approved I-130 and I-140 petitions, and PIP would only facilitate their ability to apply for permanent residence in the US, or in the case of I-140 beneficiaries by travelling overseas for consular processing without incurring the 3 and 10 year bars. PIP would thus reduce the undocumented population in the US without creating new categories of relief, which Congress can and should do through reform immigration legislation. 

Achieving Something Close to Comprehensive Immigration Reform Without Congress

Not counting family members and expanding parole in place can be a potent combination for nearing comprehensive immigration reform administratively in the face of Congressional inaction. The waits in the EB and FB preferences will disappear, and family members waiting abroad can unite with their loved ones more quickly and need not be forced to take the perilous path across the Southwest border in desperation. The expansion of PIP to beneficiaries of approved I-130 and I-140 petitions would allow them to obtain lawful permanent residence, rather than being stuck in permanent limbo due to the 3 and 10 year bars. After removing the obstacle of the bars, the grant of lawful permanent residence would be more rapid as there would be no backlogs in the FB and EB preferences, and loved ones from abroad can unite with newly minted immigrants in the United States through an orderly and legal process. 

Our proposals fall squarely within the mainstream of the American political tradition, animated by the spirit of audacious incrementalism that has consistently characterized successful reform initiatives. We acknowledge that immigration reform passed by Congress would solve more problems in a fundamental way. We seek less dramatic but no less meaningful advances through the disciplined invocation of executive initiative only because these are the ones that can be achieved sooner and with greater predictability. Our justifiable zeal for immigration reform must not blind us to the benefit of more moderate proposals. We are confident that future progress will follow in a way that minimizes disruption and maximizes acceptance. We hold fast to the distinction between prudence and absolutism, between incremental reform and revolutionary upheaval. In the long run, the American experience has been characterized more by the former than the latter and it has led to a fruitful stability that has been the envy of the world.

(Guest writer Gary Endelman is the Senior Counsel of FosterQuan)

David Isaacson

CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW: A NEW TREND IN SECOND CIRCUIT IMMIGRATION CASES?

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In both February and May of this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did something that it appears not to have done in an immigration case in more than fifteen years, and that is rare for other courts to do in such cases as well.  In Nguyen v. Holder, on February 14, 2014, and Efstathiadis v. Holder, on May 20, 2014, the Second Circuit chose to certify questions of state law about which it was uncertain to the highest court of the relevant state – New York in Nguyen, and Connecticut in Efstathiadis — rather than seeking to answer those questions itself.  This is at least a notable coincidence given the historical rarity of such certification in immigration cases, and merits watching to see if it is the beginning of a broader trend.

The issue in Nguyen involved the validity, under New York law, of a marriage between an uncle and his half-niece.  The petitioner, Huyen V. Nguyen, had been admitted to the United States in 2000 as a conditional permanent resident based on her marriage to Vu Truong, a U.S. citizen.  Her joint I-751 petition to remove those conditions, filed in 2002, was ultimately denied by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in 2007 because she was the half-niece of her husband—that is, her grandmother was also her husband’s mother.  USCIS concluded that this marriage was incestuous and void, and an Immigration Judge (IJ) reached a similar conclusion in removal proceedings, holding that a New York statute which voids a marriage between “an uncle and a niece” also applies to a marriage between a half-uncle and a half-niece.  On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that “a marriage between a niece and a half-uncle is invalid under New York law.”  Nguyen, slip op. at 4.

The Second Circuit, however, was not sure that the BIA and IJ were correct. The relevant New York statute, N.Y. Domestic Relations Law §5, voids as incestuous a marriage between
  1. An ancestor and a descendant;
  2. A brother and sister of either the whole or the half blood;
  3. An uncle and niece or an aunt and a nephew.

N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §5, quoted in Nguyen, slip op. at 6.  Subsection 2 of the statute, regarding siblings, specifically includes relationships “of either the whole or the half blood”, but subsection 3 does not.  As the Second Circuit noted, “two cases from New York’s intermediate appellate courts,” that is,Audley v. Audley, 187 N.Y.S. 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 1921), and In re May’s Estate, 117 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952), aff’d, 305 N.Y. 486 (1953), “hold that marriages between half-nieces and half-uncles are void for incest notwithstanding the omission of the ‘whole or the half blood’ language from subsection (3) of the statute.”  Nguyen, slip op at 6.  However, this holding is drawn into question by dicta in In re Simms’ Estate, 26 N.Y.2d 163 (1970), a decision of the New York Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court.  As the Second Circuit explained:

In Simms, the Court of Appeals did not decide the question of statutory interpretation that is before us here, see id. at 167, but it nevertheless cast doubt upon the analysis given by the Appellate Division in Audley. TheSimms opinion observed that the omission of the phrase “whole or half blood” from the applicable statutory language was troublesome given the inclusion of that language in the statute’s immediately preceding interdiction of marriages between brothers and sisters, and further noted that “it seems reasonable to think that if the Legislature intended to prohibit marriages between uncles, nieces, aunts and nephews whose parents were related to the contracting party only by the half blood, it would have used similar language.” Id. at 166. The Court of Appeals further opined that 

[i]f the Legislature had intended that its interdiction on this type of marriage should extend down to the rather more remote relationship of half blood between uncle and niece, it could have made suitable provision. Its failure to do so in the light of its explicit language relating to brothers and sisters suggests it may not have intended to carry the interdiction this far.

Id. While the Court of Appeals’s analysis in Simms can fairly be called dicta, it nonetheless gives us pause in considering the continued vitality of Audley’s interpretation of subsection (3).

Nguyen, slip op. at 8-9.  If, as Simms suggested, marriages between a half-uncle and a half-niece are actually permitted under New York law, then Huyen Nguyen’s marriage would have been valid and the removal proceedings against her would need to be terminated.

Rather than attempting to predict how the New York Court of Appeals would decide this outcome-determinative issue of New York law, the Second Circuit decided to certify the question to the New York Court of Appeals, allowing that court to provide the answer. As the Second Circuit explained, there are criteria established in case law for such certification:

Before exercising our discretion to certify the question before us to the New York Court of Appeals, we must satisfy ourselves that the question meets the following criteria: 1) it must be determinative of this petition; 2) it must not have been squarely addressed by the New York Court of Appeals and the decisions of other New York courts must leave us unable to predict how the Court of Appeals would rule; and 3) the question must be important to the state and its resolution must require value‐laden judgments or public policy choices.

Nguyen, slip op. at 10.  The Second Circuit determined in Nguyen that these criteria were met. The New York State Court of Appeals appears to agree, as it has already accepted the certification in Nguyen and included it on its list of certified questions pending before that court, by an order reported at 22 N.Y.3d 1150 (2014).  Once the New York Court of Appeals answers the certified question, the Nguyen case will return to the Second Circuit for a final ruling.

In Efstathiadis, decided three months after Nguyen, the issue was not one of state family law, as in Nguyen, but one of state criminal law.  Petitioner Charalambos Efstathiadis was a lawful permanent resident of the United States, having immigrated to the US in 1967.  In 2005, he pled guilty to four counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree under Connecticut General Statute (CGS) §53a-73a(a)(2), which criminalizes subjecting “another person to sexual contact without such other person’s consent.” Under the related definitional provision at CGS §53a-65(3), “sexual contact” is defined as contact “with the intimate parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person.”  Efstathiadis, slip op. at 3.  Mr. Efstathiadis was placed in removal proceedings and ultimately found deportable under INA §237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), on the basis that each of his convictions was for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), and that they did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.  

In attempting to determine whether a conviction for sexual assault in the fourth degree under CGS §53a-73a(a)(2) was indeed a CIMT so as to support Mr. Efstathiadis’s removal, the Second Circuit found itself stymied by uncertainty regarding the mens rea, that is, “the degree of mental culpability with which a defendant committed the acts underlying a conviction,” that was required under the Connecticut statute with regard to the element of lack of consent of the victim. Efstathiadis, slip op. at 11.  Based on the text of the statute, some case law applying the statute as written, and the model jury instructions, it appeared that there might be no mens rea requirement at all—that with respect to lack of consent, the crime might be a strict-liability offense, where it was not necessary for the government to prove any particular mental state of the defendant. However, the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713 (Conn. 1989), addressing a different provision of law relating to sexual assault in the first rather than fourth degree, could potentially be read to imply that a reasonable mistake of fact as to consent was a valid defense, meaning that some culpable mens rea would effectively be required for a conviction.  

The question of what if any mens rea or “evil intent” was required for a conviction was potentially key to the determination whether the crime was a CIMT, since a CIMT has been variously described as requiring “a vicious motive or corrupt mind,” or “[a]n evil or malicious intent,” and Second Circuit case law has indicated that “corrupt scienter is the touchstone of moral turpitude” and that “it is in the intent that moral turpitude inheres.” Michel v. I.N.S., 206 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted),quoted in Efstathiadis, slip op. at 14.  Moreover, as the Second Circuit pointed out, while the statute at issue in Efstathiadis does at least have some mens rea requirement insofar as the sexual contact must be committed “for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating [the victim],” this is not necessarily dispositive, because “the intent to receive sexual gratification, standing alone, is not evil.”  Efstathiadis, slip op. at 14.  Thus, the mens rearequirement, or lack thereof, with respect to the lack of consent element was significant.  But the Second Circuit could not definitively determine whether such a mens rea requirement existed, and if so, what it was.

In Efstathiadis as in Nguyen, the Second Circuit therefore decided to certify the question that was puzzling it to the highest court of the relevant state.  In addition to being potentially dispositive, the Second Circuit said, the question of the mens rea requirement with regard to lack of consent in a sexual assault case had significant policy implications, since “[w]hether or not Connecticut imposes strict liability for intentional sexual touching without consent implicates important policy concerns,” Efstathiadis, slip op. at 21. The Second Circuit therefore certified the following two questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court: 
  1. Is C.G.S. § 53a‐73a(a)(2) a strict liability offense with respect to the lack of consent element?
  2. If C.G.S. § 53a‐73a(a)(2) is not a strict liability offense with respect to the lack of consent element, what level of mens rea vis‐à‐vis that element is required to support a conviction?

Id. at 22.  It does not appear that the Connecticut Supreme Court has yet decided whether to accept or reject the certification in Efstathiadis.

The certification of two questions of state law in immigration cases by the Second Circuit in a single year (a year that is not yet half over) is noteworthy, given the historical rarity of such certifications.  Before 2014, the last time the Second Circuit appears to have sought to certify a question of state law in an immigration case was in 1998.  In Yesil v. Reno  and Mojica v. Reno, two of the consolidated cases addressed in Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit attempted to certify a question relating to the existence of jurisdiction over a non-New-York District Director of the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service under the New York “long arm” statute. The New York Court of Appeals respectfully declined the certified questions, Yesil v. Reno, 705 N.E.2d 655 (N.Y. 1998), and the appeals were subsequently withdrawn after the parties settled, as explained in Yesil v. Reno, 175 F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 1999).  

Yesil and Mojica appear to be the only immigration cases, before this year, in which the Second Circuit attempted certification of questions of state law. Historically, the Second Circuit has more commonly utilized certification of questions of state law in other legal settings, but not in the immigration context.  Nor is the technique especially common among other courts in the immigration context, although it is not entirely unheard of.  

In 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, in the case of Renteria-Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, certified to the Supreme Court of Tennessee an issue relating to the powers of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County under state law.  That lawsuit was filed by a U.S. citizen who had twice allegedly been subjected to an investigation of his immigration status following his arrest, pursuant to an October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement between Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Metropolitan Government which he believed to be illegal.  The Supreme Court of Tennessee accepted the certified question, and ruled in an October 4, 2012, decision that the agreement was not illegal as a matter of state law.  

Earlier, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska had attempted to certify a somewhat similar question regarding the powers of a local government body in the Keller v. City of Fremont litigation, regarding a local anti-immigrant ordinance somewhat similar to that struck down by the Third Circuit in Lozano v. City of Hazleton.  However, in November 2010 the Supreme Court of Nebraska declined the certified question in Keller, just as the Court of Appeals of New York had done years earlier in Yesil andMojica. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ultimately upheld that Fremont ordinance as a matter of federal law, and the U.S. Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in the case, allowing the Eighth Circuit’s decision to stand.

Going back further into U.S. legal history, there is also the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, which certified to the Maryland Court of Appeals the question whether Maryland state law prevented G-4 nonimmigrants from acquiring domicile in that state.  But overall, certification of questions of state law has been fairly rare in the immigration context, not only in the Second Circuit but elsewhere, at least until this year.

It is possible that the reappearance of certification in two unrelated Second Circuit immigration cases this year is merely a coincidence, but the possible trend merits further observation. Certification can be, in many areas of the law, a valuable tool for determining the proper answer to a question of state law rather than leaving that question to speculation by a federal court.  If the increased use of certification in immigration cases is indeed a trend in the Second Circuit, it is a potentially promising one for some immigrants whose cases may turn on questions of state law, and for their attorneys.
Cyrus Mehta

Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio: Does the Dark Cloud Have a Silver Lining?

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and David A. Isaacson

On June 9, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio. (The case had previously been known as Mayorkas v. Cuellar de Osorio before Lori Scialabba was appointed as Acting Director of USCIS, replacing former Director Alejandro Mayorkas.)  The Court ruled in Cuellar de Osorio that the BIA’s previous interpretation of the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), as set out in Matter of Wang, 25 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 2009), was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.  In particular, the Court deferred to the BIA’s narrow interpretation of INA §203(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1153(h)(3), severely limiting which derivative beneficiaries of visa petitions could retain their parents’ priority dates.  This is a disappointing decision, but the details of the opinions in Cuellar de Osorio do leave room for some hope.

As discussed in several severalpreviousposts onthis blog, INA §203(h)(3) provides for “automatic conversion” in the cases of certain beneficiaries of preference visa petitions whose age, even as adjusted under the CSPA to account for the time taken to process the visa petition, is determined to be above 21.  Some principal and derivative beneficiaries, according to the statute, will under these circumstances have their petitions automatically converted to the appropriate category, and retain the original priority date.  The question in Cuellar de Osorio and Matter of Wang was who gets to benefit from this automatic conversation.  The en banc Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Cuellar de Osorio, as well as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Khalid v. Holder, had argued for a broad interpretation which allowed all derivative beneficiaries to benefit, as at least some of the language of the statute seemed to suggest.  The BIA in Matter of Wang, as well as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Li v. Renaud and an earlier Ninth Circuit panel decision in Cuellar de Osorio, had chosen narrower approaches, which in effect allowed automatic conversion and priority date retention only for the principal and derivative beneficiaries of family 2A preference petitions, not the derivative beneficiaries of other categories of preference petitions.  The Supreme Court took the Cuellar de Osorio case to resolve this disagreement.

There was no single Supreme Court majority opinion in Cuellar de Osorio, but a total of five justices accepted the BIA’s narrow interpretation of the statute as set out in Matter of Wang, for two different sets of reasons.  The plurality opinion was written by Justice Kagan, and supported by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg.  Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, but for somewhat different reasons.  Justices Sotomayor and Alito authored dissenting opinions; Justice Sotomayor’s dissent was joined by Justice Breyer in its entirety and by Justice Thomas except with regard to one footnote.

To appreciate the different opinions in Cuellar de Osorio, it is helpful to review the text of §1153(h)(3), quoted in the opinion of the Chief Justice and in a footnote to the plurality opinion.  It states:

If the age of an alien is determined under paragraph [1153(h)](1) [the CSPA provision the adjusts the age of a preference petition beneficiary to compensate for elapsed processing time] to be 21 years of age or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.

The different opinions in Cuellar de Osoriotook different views of what Congress may have meant in prescribing that “the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.”

Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion described §1153(h)(3) as “Janus-faced”.  Kagan slip op. at 14.  The first half of the provision, she said, looks toward a broader interpretation of the sort supported by the Ninth Circuit, but the second half describes a remedy, automatic conversion, which Justice Kagan and the plurality saw as most naturally applying only when the new petition to which automatic conversion would occur would have the same petitioner and same beneficiary.  Given this “internal tension”, Justice Kagan said, the BIA was entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)—often abbreviated as “Chevron deference”.  As Justice Kagan and the plurality saw it, there are “alternative reasonable constructions” of §1153(h)(3), “bringing into correspondence in one way or another the section’s different parts.  And when that is so, Chevron dictates that a court defer to the agency’s choice—here, to the Board’s expert judgment about which interpretation fits best with, and makes most sense of, the statutory scheme.”  Kagan slip op. at 14.  As the plurality opinion explained in its conclusion:

This is the kind of case Chevron was built for.  Whatever Congress might have meant in enacting §1153(h)(3), it failed to speak clearly.  Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually reasonable construction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies underlying immigration law.  Were we to overturn the Board in that circumstance, we would assume as our own the responsible and expert agency’s role.  We decline that path, and defer to the Board.

Kagan slip op. at 33.

Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, reached essentially the same conclusion as the three-Justice plurality led by Justice Kagan, but for different reasons.  Concurring in the judgment, the Chief Justice wrote that he did not see “conflict, or even internal tension . . . in section 1153(h)(3).”  Roberts slip op. at 2.  Rather, he “d[id] not think the first clause points to any relief at all.”  Id.at 3.  Instead, he described the second clause of §1153(h)(3) as “the only operative provision.”  Id.at 3-4. In that only operative provision, he took the view that beyond certain basic requirements, “Congress did not speak clearly to which petitions can “automatically be converted.”  Id. at 4.

The dissenting Justices, in contrast, were of the view that even if there was some ambiguity in the statute, it was not sufficient to justify the interpretation that the Board adopted in Matter of Wang.  While “Section 1153(h)(3) is brief and cryptic” and “may well contain a great deal of ambiguity, which the [BIA] is free to resolve,” Justice Alito wrote, it was at least clear that “the alien’s petition shallautomatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.”  Alito slip op. at 2 (emphasis added in original).  The BIA, he contended, was “not free to disregard this clear statutory command.”  Id.  Justice Sotomayor, as well, argued in her dissent that because a reading of the statute was possible that gave effect to both the automatic conversion language and the statute’s broad description of who was eligible for automatic conversion, that reading should have been followed.  Because there were potential interpretations that “would treat §1153(h)(3) as a coherent whole,” she said, “the BIA’s construction was impermissible.”  Sotomayor slip op. at 9

On the surface, the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuellar de Osorio is obviously disappointing for a great many immigrants who were hoping to recapture priority dates of petitions initially filed for their parents through automatic conversion.  Aged-out children who have waited patiently for many years for their parent’s priority date to become current are told that they must now go back to the beginning of the line on a new petition filed by their parent under the Family 2B preference—which for most of the world has a backlog of more than seven years as of the June 2014 Visa Bulletin, and is backlogged many years more for those chargeable to Mexico or the Philippines.  While it is an unfortunate decision from that perspective, however, Cuellar de Osorio does contain some seeds of hope for better outcomes in the future.

The first seed of hope, with respect to §1153(h)(3) itself, is the latitude which the Court has provided for the executive branch to reconsider its decision.  Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion is careful to state that “we hold only that §1153(h)(3) permits—not that it requires—the Board’s decision to so distinguish among aged out beneficiaries.”  Cuellar de Osorio slip op. of Kagan, J., at 21.  The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia is not as explicit in this respect, but it describes its disagreement with the plurality as involving “a different view of what makes this provision ambiguous under Chevron” rather than going to the question whether the provision is ambiguous at all. Indeed, the Chief Justice criticized Justice Kagan’s “Janus-faced” metaphor of §1153(h)(3). “But when Congress assigns to an agency the responsibility for deciding whether a particular group should get relief, it does not do so by simultaneously saying that the group should and that it should not. Direct conflict is not ambiguity, and the resolution of such a conflict is not statutory construction but legislative choice.” Id. at 2.   Thus, a majority of the Court agrees that the meaning of §1153(h)(3) is an ambiguity subject to Chevron deference, rather than suggesting, as the Second Circuit had done in Li v. Renaud, that a narrow reading of §1153(h)(3) is compelled by the statute.

When a statute is ambiguous in this way, the Supreme Court has made clear in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), the agency may reconsider its interpretation even after the courts have approved of it. Thus, the Court’s description of §1153(h)(3) as an ambiguous statute subject to Chevrondeference to the BIA’s interpretation implies that the BIA could, even after Cuellar de Osorio, reverse its position in Matter of Wang.  So too could the Attorney General, on whose behalf the BIA ultimately acts, go against Matter of Wang and adopt a broader interpretation of §1153(h)(3).  As the INA provides, within the executive branch, “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.”  INA §103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1103(a)(1).  Ultimately, it is within the power of Attorney General Holder to save those beneficiaries who have waited in line for many years, and now find themselves pushed to the back of a new line that may be decades long.  Whether or not these results of the Wang interpretation affirmed in Cuellar de Osorio may be legally permissible, they are not desirable as a policy matter, and the Supreme Court has left the Attorney General the power to recognize this.  In light of the Obama Administration’s many noteworthy administrative reform measures in the face of Congressional inaction, the provisional waiver rule and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals being such examples, a broader interpretation of §1153(h)(3) would be consistent with these efforts.

Of course, Congress too could fix the problem, by redrafting the statute to make it clearer that all derivative beneficiaries whose adjusted age is over 21 can retain the principal beneficiary’s priority date.  This was done in section 2305(d)(5)(C) of  S. 744, the comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the Senate, which unfortunately has not been brought to a vote in the House of Representatives.  But if Congress continues not to act, the executive branch has the power to remediate the unfairness of requiring those who have waited in line with their parents for many years to go to the back of a new line and start over from the beginning.

Another policy argument in favor of such a reversal of Matter of Wang which would be worth the consideration of the BIA or the Attorney General, or for that matter Congress, is that the Matter of Wang interpretation of §1153(h)(3), now affirmed in Cuellar de Osorio, reintroduces some of the arbitrariness which the enactment of the CSPA had sought to avoid.  The age-adjustment process under INA §203(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1153(h)(1), in effect subtracts from the adjusted age of a visa applicant the time during which a visa petition was pending.  If the adjusted age of a derivative applicant is under 21, the CSPA as interpreted in Wang and Cuellar de Osorio will allow the applicant to utilize a principal beneficiary parent’s priority date; otherwise, the benefit of the priority date will be lost entirely.  But that means that children whose parents were petitioned for on the same date, and whose parents’ priority dates become current simultaneously, may be treated in dramatically different fashion depending on how long it happened to take USCIS to process the petition on behalf of their parents during the time that no visa number was available.  The broader interpretation of §1153(h)(3) rejected by the BIA in Matter of Wang would have reduced this arbitrariness, by enabling even a child whose parent’s petition happens to be processed relatively quickly, and whose CSPA-adjusted age is therefore over 21 when the priority date becomes current, to enjoy some benefit from that petition and its priority date.

The potential positive implications of Cuellar de Osorio beyond the CSPA context are also worth considering.  As previously discussed in postsonthis blog and articles by co-author Cyrus D. Mehta and Gary Endelman regarding “The Tyranny of Priority Dates” and “Comprehensive Immigration Reform Through Executive Fiat”, the executive branch’s authority under Brand X can potentially be used as a force for good in the immigration context.  This occurred for example in Matter of Douglas, 26 I&N Dec. 197 (BIA 2013), where, as discussed in one of the aforementioned blog posts, the BIA chose not to follow an unfavorable decision by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit regarding procedures for acquisition of citizenship under former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  If, as the plurality in Cuellar de Osorioindicates, tension between the apparent meaning of different statutory provisions is sufficient to activate the Chevronand Brand X authority of the executive branch even if one could conceive of a potential interpretation which could harmonize the different provisions (at the cost of some awkwardness), this will expand the power that the executive branch may have to use Chevron and Brand X for pro-immigration ends.

Take, for example, the proposal in “The Tyranny of Priority Dates” that the executive branch re-interpret INA §203(d) so that derivative family members do not consume additional visa numbers beyond those taken up by the principal beneficiaries of visa petitions, thus freeing up a greater quantity of visa numbers for use by others.  As discussed in that article, there are admittedly some statutory provisions which might be read as pointing against such an interpretation.  But there are also statutory provisions which pull in favor of such an interpretation, most notably the text of INA §203(d) itself when it states that a derivative family member is “entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration provided in the respective subsection, if accompanying or following to join, the spouse or parent.”  INA §203(d), 8 U.S.C. §1153(d).  If family members must be provided with separate visa numbers, then how can one fulfill this command for the family members of the principal immigrant who receives the last available visa number in a fiscal year for a particular category—will they not inevitably be subject to a delay in their “order of consideration” that is inconsistent with §203(d)?  This tension, interpreted in line with the version of Chevron deference implemented by the Cuellar de Osorioplurality, would provide sufficient authority to reinterpret the priority-date system in a way that could significantly reduce the current backlogs in the visa preference categories.

Remarkably, Cuellar de Osorio was not decided on the usual conservative-liberal ideological lines as with many Supreme Court decisions. The pairings of justices who decided one way or the other are rather odd much like combining a full-bodied red Malbec with a delicate white fish –  Ginsburg and Scalia were part of the plurality that denied relief to children while Sotomayor and Thomas vigorously dissented. The outcome in this case is neither a liberal nor a conservative victory.  This could potentially give President Obama through his Attorney General some political cover if they decided to use Brand X as a force for good by reversing Matter of Wang. Of course, the government caused this in the first place by litigating all the way to the Supreme Court. Sceptics will rightly question why the government would change course after having gone so far. However, the Attorney General, through the BIA, has reversed course before. For example, in Matter of Silva, 16 I&N Dec. 26 (BIA 1976), the BIA acquiesced to Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976), and allowed 212(c) relief for LPRs in deportation proceedings who had not previously departed and returned, despite its earlier contrary holdings in Matter of Francis and Matter of Arias-Uribe, 13 I&N Dec. 696 (BIA 1971). If Congress fails to  enact Congressional reform, it is likely that the Administration will endeavor to provide relief through further administrative measures. Our blog provides the Administration with a way to do so for children who were left out of the American Dream solely because they were unlucky to have aged out.

Cyrus Mehta

A WORK IN PROGRESS: MENTAL COMPETENCY ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION PRACTICE

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It is already hard enough for an immigration lawyer to represent a foreign national client in an immigration proceeding, given the language and other cultural barriers, along with the fact that immigration law can be extremely complex and unforgiving. On top of this, an immigration lawyer who represents a foreign national client with mental competency issues faces even greater challenges, including ethical conundrums.

To what extent can a lawyer represent a client who may not even have the capacity to consent or to comprehend the fact that there is a lawyer who can assist him or her? This client may be discovered in immigration custody while in the middle of complex removal proceedings. The lawyer may also encounter a client with mental competency issues who may need to file for immigration benefits such as adjustment of status or naturalization.  This issue has gained even more importance in light of the mandatory appointment of counsel for unrepresented respondents in immigration custody who have mental disorders.

While clients with diminished mental capacity also include children, this blog focuses on the challenges that lawyers face in representing clients with mental disorders. The first breakthrough with respect to the development of safeguards came about in Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474 (BIA 2011),  where the Board of Immigration Appeals held that for an alien to be competent to participate in an immigration proceeding, he or she must have a rational and factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceeding and a reasonable opportunity to exercise the core rights and privileges afforded by the law.  The decisive factors are whether the respondent understands the nature and object of the proceedings, can consult with the attorney or representative, and has a reasonable opportunity to examine adverse evidence, present favorable evidence and cross examine government witnesses.  Further guidance relating to Matter of M-A-M- can be found in the excellent practice advisory of the Litigation Action Center.

Subsequently, in Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, No. 10-02211 (C.D. Cal Apr. 23, 2013),  a class action law suit, the court ordered that non-citizen detainees with severe mental disabilities in Arizona, California and Washington be provided qualified legal representatives at government expense in removal and bond proceedings. The court also ordered bond redetermination hearings for those detained more than 180 days. The EOIR on December 13, 2013 issued guidelinesto provide enhanced procedural protection to unrepresented detained respondents with mental disorders. These guidelines are more robust than the principles set forth in Matter of M-AM-, and require an assessment of eight competencies in order to determine whether the respondent is competent to represent him- or herself:

A rational and factual understanding of:

  • The nature and object of the proceeding;
  • The privilege of representation, including but not limited to, the ability to consult with a representative if one is present;
  • The right to present, examine, and object to evidence;
  • The right to cross-examine witnesses; and
  • The right to appeal

A reasonable ability to:

  • Make decisions about asserting and waiving rights;
  • Respond to the allegations and charges in the proceedings; and
  • Present information and respond to questions relevant to eligibility for relief.

If a detained respondent is unable to perform any one of the above functions, then he or she is unable to represent him-or herself. An Immigration Judge is required to detect facts suggesting incompetency, conduct a judicial inquiry, and follow up with a competency review. If the Immigration Judge determines that a respondent is not competent to represent him-or herself, the EOIR may provide a qualified representative who is found to be incompetent to represent him-or herself. While this elaborate process to determine whether a respondent is competent or not is a good first step, one wonders why this process is conducted on behalf of a respondent without the presence of a lawyer. This writer believes that the respondent should have a legal representative earlier in the process, when his or her competency is being evaluated.

Even when a lawyer is appointed by the court to represent a respondent who is not found to be competent, there is a potential for conflict of interest as the appointment will generally only last while the client is detained. If the client is bonded out, the lawyer will no longer be paid by EOIR after the client is released. This creates an ethical dilemma. If the client desperately needs the assistance of a lawyer who is paid by the government, he or she can only be represented by counsel at government expense while in immigration custody.  Would it be in the client’s best interest to be released but not to have appointment counsel, or rather to have appointed counsel while in custody? This might be easier to resolve if the client could make decisions and provide informed consent, but clients with severe mental disabilities might be unable to make informed decisons.

On the other hand, there are no safeguards relating to non-citizens applying for immigration benefits outside a custodial setting. Practitioners representing clients with mental disorders should advocate for the application of the safeguards enunciated in Matter of M-A-M even outside a removal hearing, which include:

–          Legal representation

–          Identification of close friends or family members who can assist

–          Docketing/managing case to give time for legal representation or medical treatment

–          Participation of a guardian in the proceedings

–          Continuance or administrative closure

–          Closing hearing to the public

–          Waiving respondent’s appearance

–          Assistance with development of record

–          Reserving appeal rights

 

Lawyers must also consult ABA Model Rule 1.14, and its analog in a state bar ethics rule, which relates to representing a client with diminished mental capacity. Rule 1.14 instructs a lawyer to maintain a normal lawyer-client relationship as far as possible. Thus, to the extent that an impaired client is capable of making competent decisions, the lawyer must follow them. A lawyer may seek help from a family member or others in communicating with a client with a mental disorder, while at the same time taking into consideration whether the presence of others would affect the attorney-client privilege.

This writer has represented clients for benefits applications, and has found it extremely useful to communicate with the client through trusted family members. A client with a mental disorder may have moments of lucidity, and it is important for the lawyer to ascertain how best to work with such a client through a professional diagnostician. At the benefits interview, counsel must insist that the USCIS generously provide accommodations for a client, including having the presence of a family member during the interview and to only ask the most basic questions, while relying on documentary evidence to determine eligibility for the immigration benefit. Note that 8 CFR 103.2(a)(2) allows a legal guardian to sign a form for a person with mental disabilities.

With respect to applying for naturalization, the law has developed favorably towards persons with disabilities. Applicants who are physically or developmentally disabled, or have mental impairment are exempt from the English as well as civics/history test. Applicants may also seek a waiver of the oath requirement if they are unable to comprehend it. Designated representatives can complete the Form N-400, such as a guardian, surrogate, US citizen spouse, parent, son, daughter or sibling. It is potentially possible for a comatose applicant on a respirator to be able to apply for and obtain US citizenship, and sponsor a qualifying spouse through an I-130 petition, who in turn files his or her own adjustment application for lawful permanent residence.

Rule 1.14 also allows a lawyer to take reasonably protective action when a client is at risk of harm by either consulting with individuals or entities, and in appropriate cases, seek the appointment of a guardian or guardian ad litem. The lawyer may be impliedly authorized to reveal information protected by rule 1.6, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests. While resorting to the appointment of a guardian may appear to be an obvious step on behalf of one who is unable to comprehend the nature of the proceedings or consent to the representation, it may also be a traumatic and expensive process, and may undermine the autonomy that the client is required to have under Rule 1.14. The guiding principles, as much as possible, are that the client determines the ends while the lawyer has control over the means.  According to Comment 7 to Model rule 1.14, “In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client.”

To the extent that a client with mental disorders can provide informed consent, the lawyer’s role is made that much easier. The challenge lies with a client who is unable to consent at all. Under these circumstances, should the lawyer still play an activist role and represent the client? Is counsel then always required to seek the appointment of a guardian? Or are there less restrictive alternatives such as seeking the assistance of family members in determining the client’s best interests.   If counsel has been appointed by an immigration judge, how relevant is the client’s incapacity to consent if the lawyer believes it is still in the client’s best interests to have a legal representative? 8 CFR 1292.1(a)(1) &(a)(4) state, without reference to consent, that attorneys are entitled to appear in removal hearings. An attorney can play a crucial role on behalf of a client who is unable to consent.  Indeed, if the goal is for the respondent to remain in the United States (but that may only be assumed if the client is unable to comprehend the nature of the immigration proceeding), the very fact that a respondent may have a mental disorder may prompt an immigration judge to consider granting asylum if the respondent will be removed to a country that is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens with mental disorders. An immigration judge may also grant cancellation of removal pursuant to INA section 240A(b) if the documentation is able to demonstrate eligibility, such as 10 years of physical presence, good moral character and the qualifying relatives, who may be US citizens or permanent residents, are able to demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.  There may be times, especially with clients who cannot seek relief, to advocate for administrative closure of the case or even termination. Again, when the client is unable to consent, would administrative closure or termination be in the client’s best interest over being removed from the United States and being with close family members abroad?

There is much work that needs to be done to develop standards and provide clearer guidance.  In the meantime, the lawyer must grapple with emerging standards from the courts and EOIR, as well as interpret Rule 1.14 within the immigration context, although not all states have adopted this rule.  While representing non-citizen clients with mental competency issues can pose additional challenges, obtaining a successful outcome for the client under difficult circumstances can be extremely rewarding to the immigration lawyer.

“The test of our progress is not whether we add to the abundance of those who have much. It is whether we provide enough to those who have little.”

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Cyrus Mehta

Work Authorization for Some H-4 Spouses Liberates Them From the Tyranny of Priority Dates

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By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

All the forces in the world are not so powerful as an idea whose time has come.

Victor Hugo

Sometimes it takes a while for a sound idea to gain acceptance. Granting employment authorization to H-4 spouses of H-1B visa holders is a good example. It is in line with the policies of other countries, and if the United States wishes to attract the brightest and the best, such an individual may be dissuaded from coming to the United States if the spouse is not allowed to work.  This is especially true if the H-1B workers have to wait for several years before they and their families can apply for permanent residency.

Almost 4 years ago, then USCIS General Counsel Roxanna Bacon, Service Center Operations Head Donald Neufeld and Field Operations Chief Debra Rogers recommended that H-4 spouses  be granted employment authorization to USCIS Director Alejandro Mayorkas, but only for those “H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B principals where the principals are also applicants for lawful permanent residence under AC 21.” Memorandum, Administrative Alternatives to Comprehensive Immigration Reform. The memo was leaked by those who wanted to defeat any administrative initiatives and they did so. There matters stood until January 31, 2012 when the Department of Homeland Security brought this idea back to life.

On May 6, 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)   announced that it would allow certain H-4 spouses to obtain employment authorization. The proposed rule provides that an H-4 spouse may apply for employment authorization if  the principal H-1B spouse is the beneficiary of an approved I-140 immigrant petition; or, if the H-1B spouse  been granted an extension of beyond the 6-year limitation pursuant to section 106(a) of the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 (AC21). Under section 106(a) of AC 21, the filing of a labor certification or employment-based immigrant visa petitions 365 days prior to the sixth year allows the H-1B worker to apply for an additional year be yond the sixth year.

In Tyranny of Priority Dates and subsequent articles, we pointed out the long delays befalling skilled immigrants due to the backlogs in the priority dates, and proposed remedial measures, including the ability of an H-4 spouse to work. Our prior analysis of H-4 spousal employment and earlier indications that the USCIS recognized the problem and intended to do something about it provide a helpful context against which the importance of this latest development can be measured. .

The proposed rule to grant work authorization to H-4 spouses is much welcomed recognition of this problem. It acknowledges the contributions of foreign born immigrants, especially in the tech industry, and cites the findings of Vivek Wadhwa that in 25% of tech companies founded between 1995-2005, the chief executive or lead technologist was foreign born.  Indeed, the preamble to the proposed rule acknowledges that certain beneficiaries of I-140 petitions under the India EB-3 preference may have to wait over 10 years to obtain permanent residence. In the meantime, the H-4 spouse cannot seek employment, and is also prohibited from other work related activities such as engaging in self-employment through a home based business. While only Congress could create new visa categories, we argued that the Executive under section 103(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was charged with the administration and enforcement of the INA. Also, the Executive had authority to grant work authorization to any aliens under INA section 274A(h)(3). Under these provisions, we had proposed that the Executive could provide relief for beneficiaries, including spouses, of approved I-130 and I-140 petitions through the grant of employment authorization who were caught in the crushing backlogs. After all, these people were in the pipeline for the green card, but for the backlogs in the priority dates.  The H-1B visa also allows for “dual intent,” as it permits one to apply for permanent residency even though it is technically a nonimmigrant visa.

The proposed rule now recognizes, as we did in The Tyranny of Priority Dates, the ability of the Executive to pass ameliorative measures in the face of crushing delays for those in the green card queue.  While Congress has still not been able to pass a reform of the broken immigration system, the proposed rule  further acknowledges that the Executive has the legal authority to authorize spousal employment pursuant to INA sections 103(1) and 274A (h)(3) Resting on this foundation, the proposed rule further relies on INA sections 214(a)(1), which authorizes the Executive to prescribe regulations setting forth terms and conditions with respect to the admission of nonimmigrants into the United States.  Recognizing that H-1B workers and their spouses would be green card holders but for the backlogs in the priority dates, Commerce Secretary appropriately stated, “These individuals are American families in waiting.”

The granting of work authorization to H-4 spouses if the principal spouse has applied for an AC 21 extension also resolves the conundrum when both spouses are on H-1B visas and are reaching the sixth year on their H-1B visas. Under this situation, the spouse who was not the subject of a labor certification was generally forced to switch to H-4 status, and was then prohibited from continuing employment.  In Two H-1B Spouses: One Labor or Certification we advocated how both spouses could take advantage of the labor certification filed on behalf of one of the spouses in order to get a seventh year extension. While there is a sound basis to argue that AC 21 would benefit the spouse who was relying on the labor certification filed on behalf of the labor certification, since this is the basis for their adjustment of status,  the USCIS did not always interpret AC 21 section 106(a) broadly to benefit both spouses. Now, thankfully, this uncertainty will no longer exist. The spouse who is not the subject of the labor certification can switch to H-4 status and can still apply for work authorization. At the same time, we still advocate that a spouse on an H-1B visa be able to rely on the other spouse’s labor certification or I-140 to seek an H-1B extension beyond the sixth year limitation. There will be occasions when it is more expeditious for the spouse to file an H-1B extension and continue working, rather than file for a change of status to H-4 and then apply for an employment authorization document before re-starting work again. This is an excellent illustration of how doctrinal clarity by the USCIS can promote robust operational flexibility by aliens and their advocates.

The proposed rule also resolves another uncertainty. H-4 spouses who were able to file an I-485 adjustment of status application for permanent residency could always apply for work authorization by virtue of filing the I-485 pursuant to 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(9). What was not clear is whether such H-4 spouses forfeited their right to remain in H-4 status if they engaged in work pursuant to an employment authorization under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(9) while their I-485 applications remained pending. The proposed rule in footnote 13 appears to suggest that they did not violate their status. The rule will create  8 CFR 274a.12(c)(26) as a basis for H-4 spouses to apply for work authorization, and suggests that H-4 spouses who previously availed of work authorization under 274a.12(c)(9) can also avail of work authorization under 274a.12(c)(26). If the spouse lost H-4 status by engaging in employment pursuant to 274a.12(c)(9), it would not be possible for the H-4 spouse to now take advantage of new 274a.12(c)(26).  As with the H-1B  itself, the proposed H-4 rule recognizes and diffuses the tension between the constraints of nonimmigrant visa categories, such as the H-1B which is employer-specific or the H-4 that  hitherto was not allowed to sustain employment, and the adjustment of status provision in INA Section 245 that grants open market employment.

Many advocates feel that the rule did not go far enough and could have granted work authorization for all H-4 spouses without condition.  After all, the L-1 and E visas, allow dependent spouses to apply for  work authorization immediately upon being admitted under those statuses. On the other hand, the authorization to grant spouses of L and E nonimmigrants work authorization stems from Congress, although J-2 spouses who do not support the principal J-1 exchange visitor work solely through regulation Congress has not specifically authorized work authorization for H-4 spouses, although there is authority in the INS, as discussed, which still provides such authority to the DHS. While this is fair criticism, the Administration also faces withering opposition from anti-immigration advocates, including the likes of Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), who question whether there is any authority at all to grant work authorization. Hence, the middle ground to grant work authorization benefits to H-4 spouses who are already on the pathway to permanent residence but are caught up in the backlogs. The proposed rule also acknowledges that this ameliorative measure is consistent with AC 21, which was enacted so that the principal H-1B spouses could continue to remain in the United States beyond the sixth year, and thus avoid disruption to US employers. Limiting work authorization to H-4 spouses who are on the pathway to green cards can also more easily insulate such a rule from challenges in federal court.

Still, even under this logic, it would be preferable if H-4 spouses are able to apply for work authorization as soon as a labor certification is filed on behalf of the principal spouse. There is no need to pre-condition the grant of employment authorization upon the approval of the I-140 petition, given the delays in the PERM labor certification process, which can take two years if the application is subject to an audit or to supervised recruitment. The rule also recognizes that an H-4 can apply for employment when a labor certification is filed, but only when it is used to obtain an H-1B extension beyond the six years under AC 21. It is illogical to only allow the H-4 to apply for a work permit when the principal spouse relies on the labor certification to seek an extension beyond six years, and not otherwise. Furthermore, while the majority of H-1B visa holders may be sponsored by employers through I-140 petitions, some H-4 spouses may also be sponsored by prospective employers in their own right. H-4 spouses who are directly sponsored by employers under an I-140 petition should also be allowed to apply for employment authorization. And why limit this to only I-140s? Some H-1Bs or H-4s are also sponsored by qualifying family members through an I-130 petition. They too are Americans in waiting.

Finally, children in H-4 status have been left out and do not have the ability to apply for work authorization. Children of L-1 and E-1 visa holders are also not allowed to work, although children of J-1 visa holders can work. On the other hand, H-4 children can obtain work authorization benefits if they switch to F-1 student visa status.

We continue to call upon Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform, including the expansion of H-1B visa numbers.  Any administrative initiative, however meaningful or positive, and this one is both, is, by its very nature, both tentative and subject to reversal. Only an INA worthy of the many difficult but exciting challenges that America must confront and master in the 21st century can provide the nation with the vision that it needs and deserves. Yet, until that happy day comes, the USCIS can and must do justice with the law that we all have. That is what has finally happened with H-4 spousal employment. Not a full and complete step certainly, but a stride forward towards a better day.

Something else needs to be said before we go. What we in the United States are dealing with is a global battle for talent. More than any other single immigration issue, the H-1B visa debate highlights the growing and inexorable importance of a skilled entrepreneurial class with superb expertise and a commitment not to company or country, but to their own careers and the technologies on which they are based. They have true international mobility and, like superstar professional athletes, will go to those places where they are paid most handsomely and given a full and rich opportunity to create. We are no longer the only game in town. The debate over the H-1B is, at its core, an argument over whether the United States will continue to embrace this culture, thus reinforcing its competitive dominance in it, or turn away and shrink from the competition and the benefits that await. No decision on H quotas can or should be made separate and apart from an answer to a far more fundamental question: How can we, as a nation, attract and retain that on which our prosperity most directly depends, namely a productive, diverse, stable and highly educated work force irrespective of nationality and do so without sacrificing the dreams and aspirations of our own people whose protection is the first duty and only sure justification for the continuance of that democracy on which all else rests? This is the very heart of the H-1B maze.

An immigration system that restricts the importation of human capital hurts American competitiveness every bit as much as high tariffs or artificial subsidies. In each case, the controlled but predictable flow of capital across national boundaries is the lubricant of economic activity. Preserving the H-1B as an instrument of job creation for Americans while enhancing the ability of foreign professionals to make our cause their own is an essential and irresistible component of comprehensive immigration reform. Allowing some, though not all, H-4 spouses to work is a key step in this direction. The DHS estimates that 100,600 H-4 spouses will apply for work authorization in the first year and 35,900 will initially apply in subsequent years. For those concerned about the impact on the US labor market, these H-4 spouses would in any event be able to work once the principal H-1B spouse applied for adjustment of status. They will also be able to contribute to the US economy, and the incentive provided to them will also encourage the H-1B spouse to stay on in the United States. We have every good hope that is will lead to ever more confident strides in the days to come. It is in the very nature of reform in the liberal tradition for progress to be incremental.  If the Chinese maxim that “the journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step,” retains its power to teach,  as we believe it surely does, we who legitimately want much more than the H-4 spousal regulation offers should not, even for a single moment, divert our eyes from the very real progress that has now been taken.

(Guest writer Gary Endelman is the Senior Counsel of FosterQuan)
 
Cyrus Mehta

WILL KAZARIAN CHANGE THE 0-1 VISA?

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By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta
The value of the O-1 visa is its flexibility, an adaptive quality that enables it to respond to the different needs of different petitioners. Any formulaic approach that restricts the full and open expression of such subtlety not only reduces the value of the O-1 but undermines its bedrock utility. That is why the stated willingness of the USCIS to apply a subjective Kazarian-style final merits analysis in the O-1 context, even after the applicant has satisfied the evidentiary criteria, should arouse our most serious concern. This is true for several reasons. Not only does such a constricted view of the O-1 prevent it from being all that it can be, but it blurs the distinction between the O-1 and the EB1-1 extraordinary ability immigrant petition, two different visa categories with different purposes. Just as the approval of an O-1 nonimmigrant petition does not ensure similar approval of an EB1-1 immigrant petition, the analytical tools used by USCIS examiners to evaluate the merits of these distinct categories must themselves remain separate.

With this as our starting point, what do the regulations tell us about the O-1? The O-1 visa is a useful visa for people, under INA §101(a)(15)(o), who can demonstrate extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business or athletics. Unlike the H-1B visa, it is not subject to an annual cap. It can also be availed of by artists and entertainers, people who are traditionally self-employed, as long as an agent serves as a sponsor. Although the “extraordinary ability” standard is a high one, artists can prove their eligibility under a lower “distinction” standard pursuant to INA §101(a)(46). Those qualifying for an O-1 visa in the motion pictures or television industry have to demonstrate extraordinary achievement, rather than extraordinary ability. There are thus three different standards under the O-1 visa.

Extraordinary ability in science, education, business or athletics means “a level of expertise indicating that the person is one of the small percentages who have arisen to the very top of the field of endeavor.” 8 CFR 214.2(o)(3)(ii).

The extraordinary criteria, as set forth in 8 CFR 214.2(o)(iii), are as follows:

(A) Receipt of a major, internationally recognized award, such as the Nobel Prize; or

(B) At least three of the following forms of documentation:

(1) Documentation of the alien’s receipt of nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards for excellence in the field of endeavor;

(2) Documentation of the alien’s membership in associations in the field for which classification is sought, which require outstanding achievements of their members, as judged by recognized national or international experts in their disciplines or fields;

(3) Published material in professional or major trade publications or major media about the alien, relating to the alien’s work in the field for which classification is sought, which shall include the title, date, and author of such published material, and any necessary translation;

(4) Evidence of the alien’s participation on a panel, or individually, as a judge of the work of others in the same or in an allied field of specialization to that for which classification is sought;

(5) Evidence of the alien’s original scientific, scholarly, or business-related contributions of major significance in the field;

(6) Evidence of the alien’s authorship of scholarly articles in the field, in professional journals, or other major media.

(7) Evidence that the alien has been employed in a critical or essential capacity for organizations and establishments that have a distinguished reputation;

(8) Evidence that the alien has either commanded a high salary or will command a high salary or other remuneration for services, evidenced by contracts or other reliable evidence.

(C) If the criteria in paragraph (o)(3)(iii) of this section do not readily apply to the beneficiary’s occupation, the petitioner may submit comparable evidence in order to establish the beneficiary’s eligibility.

Extraordinary Achievement in the motion pictures and television means a “very high level of accomplishment in the motion picture or TV industry evidenced by a degree of skill and recognition significantly above that ordinarily encountered.” 8 CFR 214.2(o)(3)(ii).

As already noted, an O-1 in the arts has to prove only distinction. While “extraordinary achievement” and “distinction” may appear to be two separate standards, the criteria for demonstrating extraordinary achievement in the motion picture or TV industry or distinction in the arts are almost identical, and  set forth at 8 CFR 214.2(o)(3)(iv) and (v), which are as follows:

(A) Evidence that the alien has been nominated for, or has been the recipient of, significant national or international awards or prizes in the particular field such as an Academy Award, an Emmy, a Grammy, or a Director’s Guild Award; or

(B) At least three of the following forms of documentation:

(1) Evidence that the alien has performed, and will perform, services as a lead or starring participant in productions or events which have a distinguished reputation as evidenced by critical reviews, advertisements, publicity releases, publications contracts, or endorsements;

(2) Evidence that the alien has achieved national or international recognition for achievements evidenced by critical reviews or other published materials by or about the individual in major newspapers, trade journals, magazines, or other publications;

(3) Evidence that the alien has performed, and will perform, in a lead, starring, or critical role for organizations and establishments that have a distinguished reputation evidenced by articles in newspapers, trade journals, publications, or testimonials;

(4) Evidence that the alien has a record of major commercial or critically acclaimed successes as evidenced by such indicators as title, rating, standing in the field, box office receipts, motion pictures or television ratings, and other occupational achievements reported in trade journals, major newspapers, or other publications;

(5) Evidence that the alien has received significant recognition for achievements from organizations, critics, government agencies, or other recognized experts in the field in which the alien is engaged. Such testimonials must be in a form which clearly indicates the author’s authority, expertise, and knowledge of the alien’s achievements; or

(6) Evidence that the alien has either commanded a high salary or will command a high salary or other substantial remuneration for services in relation to others in the field, as evidenced by contracts or other reliable evidence; or

If the above criteria do not readily apply, only those establishing distinction in the arts can submit comparable evidence. People trying to qualify for an O-1 visa under the extraordinary achievement standard for motion pictures and the TV industry cannot submit comparable evidence.

All O-1 petitions must be accompanied by consultations from the appropriate unions, and if they do not exist, may contain opinions from expert sources.

Recent unpublished decisions from the Appeals Administrative Office are applying the two-part approach in Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). When Kazarian was first decided, it was received with much jubilation as it was thought that the standards for establishing extraordinary ability under a green card category pursuant to INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(i) would be more straightforward and streamlined. Kazarian essentially holds that a petitioner claiming extraordinary ability need not submit extraordinary evidence to prove that he or she is a person of extraordinary ability. If one of the evidentiary criteria requires a showing of scholarly publications, the petitioner need not establish that the scholarly publications in themselves are also extraordinary in order to qualify as a person of extraordinary ability. This is a circular argument, which Kazarian appropriately shot down.  If Kazarian just stopped there, it would have been a wonderful outcome. Unfortunately, Kazarian has been interpreted to also require a vague and second step analysis known as the “final merits determination,” which can stump even the most extraordinary. We point readers to Cyrus Mehta’s blog, How Extraordinary Does One Have to Be to Qualify as a Person of Extraordinary Ability, for a detailed analysis of the Kazarian decision and how the USICS has interpreted it.

In its December 22, 2010 Policy Memorandum, (“Policy Memorandum“), United States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) implemented a “two-part adjudicative approach” for extraordinary ability, outstanding researcher and professor, and exceptional ability immigrant visa petitions. Here is the first, but unfortunately not the last, indication of a desire by the USCIS to utilize the final merits methodology of Kazarian in case types not mentioned in or justified by Kazarian itself. While the USCIS doubtless may view the extension of Kazarian to the O-1 as a logical expansion of its prior application to EB1-(2) outstanding researcher and EB-2 exceptional ability cases, skeptics may properly question whether this ever-widening deployment signifies not a greater precision but a lack of programmatic restraint.  The Service cites Kazarian as the basis for modifying the Adjudicator’s Field Manual to   include a second step in the adjudication process, the “final merits determination.” Although Kazarian did not actually create a “final merits determination,” and objected essentially to the AAO’s imposition of extra requirements under the evidentiary criteria in 8 CFR §§ 204.5(h)(3)(iv) and (v), the Service seized on the following excerpts in Kazarian as a basis for justifying a “final merits determination” analysis:

(1) While other authors’ citations (or lack thereof) might be relevant to the final merits determination of whether a petitioner is at the very top of his or her field of endeavor, they are not relevant to the antecedent procedural question of whether the petitioner has provided at least three types of evidence (emphasis added); and

(2) … [W]hile the AAO’s analysis might be relevant to a final merits determination, the AAO may not unilaterally impose a novel evidentiary requirement (emphasis added).

Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d at 1121.

Under this two part test as it applies to an EB-1(1) extraordinary ability petition, the USCIS must essentially accept the evidence of extraordinary ability under the 10 criteria set forth in 8 CFR §204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x). The USCIS cannot object to the submission of the alien’s “scholarly articles in the field, in professional or major trade publications or other major media” under §204.5(h)(vi) unless there is consideration of the research community’s reaction to those articles, as it did erroneously in Kazarian. Still, the USICS may take this extra evidentiary factor into consideration, namely, the lack of reaction in the research community, during the “final merits determination” analysis. It is readily apparent that the analysis under the second step defeats the very essence of the holding in Kazarian that the USCIS cannot impose extra requirements under the evidentiary criteria. What it cannot do under the first step, the USCIS can still do under the “final merits determination.”

The authors question whether it is appropriate for the AAO to adopt the Kazarian two step analysis to O-1 petitions. Kazarian involved an extraordinary ability petition under INA § 203(b) (1)(A)(i), which is the employment-based first preference category (EB-1), through which an alien obtains lawful permanent residence. While the extraordinary ability criteria under the EB-1 may be identical to the O-1 extraordinary criteria for science, education, business and athletics, the criteria for extraordinary achievement in the motion picture and TV industry and for distinction in the arts are markedly different. Moreover, the O-1 visa petition requires a consultation from a union or expert opinion. A favorable opinion from the relevant union for an artist ought to be given deference by the USICS.   Injecting Kazarian into the O-1 visa adds needless subjectivity into the decision making process.

Kazarian’ s two-part test and final merits determination analysis runs counter to  prior decisions such as, Buletini v. INS, 860 F.Supp. 1222 (E.D. Mich 1994), which held, “[o]nce it is established that the alien’s evidence is sufficient to meet three of the criteria listed in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3), the alien must be deemed to have extraordinary ability unless the INS sets forth specific and substantiated reasons for its finding that the alien does not meet extraordinary ability.” Id. at 1234. Similarly, in Muni v. INS, 891 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1995), a federal court reversed a denial for a professional hockey player where INS did not apply the proper criteria for extraordinary ability, and based its decision  on the ground that he was not an all-star or one of the highest paid players. Under the burden shifting approach in Buletini, the petitioner should be deemed qualified, and the burden then shifts  onto  the  Service to reject the evidence that meet the criteria, if suppose, it finds that the evidence was  fraudulent or too dated and stale. In fact, such a burden shifting approach is not unknown in other aspects of immigration law. If the Kazarian final merits determination analysis was deployed at that time, both Muni and Buletini, a leading physician in Albania, may have suffered a different fate.  As our colleague David Isaacson has pointed out, in the asylum context, an applicant who demonstrates that he or she has suffered past persecution on account of a protected ground is rebuttably presumed to have a reasonable fear of future persecution on that same ground.  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(1).  In such cases, by regulation, “the Service shall bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence” that a change in circumstances, or the reasonable possibility of relocating within the country of persecution, should lead to a denial of asylum.  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(ii), 1208.13(b)(1).

Moreover the USCIS Policy Memorandum, which invented this two-part test from its interpretation of Kazarian, does not indicate that it would apply this test to O-1 visa adjudications, even though it has extended the two-art test to outstanding professors and researchers and aliens of exceptional ability.  On the other hand, the USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) section on O-1s ( 33. 4(d))  states, as follows:

For an O-1 or O-2 case, the adjudicator must determine whether the alien meets the standards as outlined in the regulations cited above; however, he/she cannot make a favorable determination simply because the petitioner has submitted three of the forms of documentation mentioned. It must be a decision based on whether the total evidence submitted establishes that the alien of extraordinary ability has sustained national or international acclaim and recognition in his field of endeavor; or in the case of an alien of extraordinary ability in the arts and extraordinary achievement in the motion picture or television industry, whether he or she has a demonstrated record of high level accomplishment or a high level of achievement (or “distinction”).

However, it is not clear from this passage whether the USCIS intended to specifically apply the Kazarian “final merits determination” approach. The USCIS, and the predecessor Immigration and Naturalization Service, has always insisted that the alien overall meet the standard of extraordinary ability, but this was never meant to be as expansive as the Kazarian final merits determination. Rather, under the Buletini standard, the burden was on the government to the INS sets forth specific and substantiated reasons for its finding that the alien does not meet extraordinary ability.

The positive aspect of Kazarian, which established that the USCIS cannot create extra-regulatory criteria during the adjudication of a visa petition,  without formally amending the regulation through notice and comment to stakeholders, ought to be applicable to all visa petitions. On the other hand, introducing the vague and subjective “final merits determination” to O-1 visas will needlessly add subjectivity to the process, when Congress specifically required that O-1 visa petitions be accompanied by union consultations and expert opinions. Kazarian was also a decision that deals with the extraordinary criteria under the EB-1, while the O-1 visa has three different standards – extraordinary ability, extraordinary achievement and distinction. The guidance fails to alert USCIS adjudicators on how they could specifically apply the “final merits determination” standard to extraordinary achievement and distinction.  It is also important to restrict the application of the Kazarian final merits determination to other visa adjudications, or else there will be no limitation to the reach of the final merits determination. Will is also impact H-1B and L visa adjudications?  The long-range impact of what charitably be called “doctrine creep” is not hard to fathom. If the USCIS were to use the Kazarian final merits exercise much as it now deploys the Neufeld Memo, the meaning of “extraordinary ability” would be transformed beyond all ready recognition, much as the right of control has evolved beyond the imagination of the regulation that created it. When Congress enacted the standards for visa petitions, it intended adjudicators to faithfully apply those standards to either approve or deny the petitions. The infusion of the Kazarian “final merits determination” to visa adjudications would allow USCIS adjudicators to impermissibly stray from those standards.

Beyond that, to wrap the O-1 in an analytical straitjacket is yet another disturbing example of legislation through interpretation by the USCIS. While the INA itself does not change, what it means most certainly does change. All this comes about without the assent of Congress, whether expressed or implied, and in the absence of any notice and comment rulemaking mandated by the Administrative Procedures Act, thus eliminating the possibility of participation by concerned stakeholders. We all remember how the Administrative Appeals Unit decision in the New York State Department of Transportation case completely changed the meaning and practice of the National Interest Waiver. More recently, the USCIS jihad against the L-1B visa category and what amounts to a de facto rejection of the very concept of specialized knowledge has, in practice, repealed this visa provision to a very large extent. Is the O-1 now to suffer the same fate? What may be the most hard to detect damage resulting from invoking Kazarian in the O-1 arena is the fact that the evidence submitted by an O-1 petitioner is now to be judged by criteria that cannot be defined or even anticipated in advance Any attempt by the USCIS to use Kazarian to complicate the O-1 must be resisted. Complexity that exists for its own sake, not as an aid to an intellectually honest assessment but as a substitute for it does not advance the national interest. In a democratic society, the logic of any successful national policy must be transparently obvious to those who have to obey and support it. That is why the blurring of distinction between the O-1 and the Kazarian final merits determination is not only of little benefit to its intended beneficiaries, but actually frustrates any coherent attempt to make the system more amenable to consistent interpretation and effective enforcement.

(Guest writer Gary Endelman is the Senior Counsel of FosterQuan)
Cyrus Mehta

Immigrant Power: Naturalized American Wins Boston Marathon

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Today is a day to celebrate. One year after the devastating bombings at the Boston Marathon, Meb Keflezighi won the Boston marathon. Keflezighi is a naturalized American. “I’m blessed to be an American and God bless America and God bless Boston for this special day,” Keflezighi said.

Read more here: http://www.star-telegram.com/2014/04/21/5753571/american-meb-keflezighi-wins-boston.html#storylink=cpy

This victory resonates much stronger as it comes one year after the horrific bombs resulted in 3 deaths and over 260 injured. The surviving bombing suspect, Dzhokar Tsarnaev, is also a naturalized American. His brother, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who got killed in the shootout last year, unsuccessfully tried to naturalize.

In the immediate aftermath of last year’s bombings, Senator Grassley cynically attempted to tie the Boston marathon attacks to immigration reform. “We appreciate this opportunity to talk about immigration reform in light of all that has been happening in Massachusetts, ” said Senator Grassley. Fortunately, the Senate immigration reform bill, S. 744, still got passed, but it included provisions that would make it more difficult for people to get registered provisional status depending on their country of origin as a result of additional security screening,  and another provision would lead to the revocation of asylum or refugee status if the person visited his or her country of persecution without good cause.

Today, after Keflezighi’s spectacular win, against all odds, no one can and should link immigrants to terrorism. Most immigrants are like Keflezighi, who aspire success for themselves and their families. This is the story of immigration, which is also an Americans story, told over and over again.

Even after the 9/11 attacks, and despite the unfortunate profiling of immigrants from certain countries in the immediate aftermath, immigrants still won. Although  immigration benefits, including obtaining a green card through a marriage with a US citizen, are now viewed through the prism of national security, the immigration system was never radically altered. There was no diminishing of the already meager quotas, and immigrants still came and continue to come to America to make it richer and more diverse.

In this context, Keflezighi’s win is most powerful. An American, who was born in Eritrea,  has won the Boston marathon after Lisa Larsen Weidenbach won in 1985 and Greg Meyer in 1983. While an immigrant has won for America today, millions of  immigrants, through their achievements big and small, win for America all the time.

The urgency to reform our broken immigration system is felt more so today when we can be attracting many more Mebs who will not only excel in sports, but also in scientific achievements and creating innovative companies.  The marathon began last year when the Senate deliberated on and passed a comprehensive immigration reform bill. When will the House joins the race to reach the finishing line and help us all win big time for America?

Cyrus Mehta

WHY WE SHOULD ALL BE MAD ABOUT THE H-1B VISA CAP

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The USCIS announced today, April 9, 2014, that it had received 172,500 H-1B visa petitions for the 65,000 H-1B regular cap and the  20,000 additional cap for graduates with advanced degrees from US universities. This is much more than the 124,000 H-1B visa petitions the USCIS received in 2014. The H-1B cap makes no sense, and here are 10 good reasons why we should all really be more upset about it this year for the simple reason is that we face the cap each year, and nothing ever changes. Enough is enough!

The first reason to be mad about the H-1B cap is that it forces employers to scramble way before the start of the 2015 fiscal year, which is October 1, to file for H-1B visas, only to get rejected by a randomized lottery. This is no way to treat US employers who pay thousands of dollars in legal and filing fees, along with all the steps they need to take in being in compliance. The whole concept of a nonsensical quota reminds us of Soviet era central planning, and then to inject a casino style of lottery into the process, just rubs salt into an oozing old wound.

Second, one can only feel for all the foreign national prospective employees, who all need to qualify to work in a specialty occupation, as defined under the H-1B visa law. Out of the 172,500 H-1B cases received, 87,500 people will get rejected. That is 87,500 hopes and dreams dashed. Many who are in the United States after graduating from American universities may have to leave. Others won’t be able to set foot into the United States to take up their prized job offers.

Third, imagine if all of these 87,500  who will be rejected could  actually come and work in the United States. Their employers would benefit and become more globally competitive – and could have less reason to outsource work to other countries. They would have also been productive workers, and spent money in the US economy, including buying houses and paying taxes. The H-1B cap has robbed the economy of this wonderful cascading effect.

Fourth, the USCIS has taken pains to encourage entrepreneurs to establish startups in the United States because of the potential of creating new technologies resulting in more jobs,  and keeping the country competitive. The entrepreneur portal encourages entrepreneurs to use the H-1B visa to sponsor themselves through their own startups. What a pity to lose out on that entrepreneur who could create the next Google or Tesla electric car.

Fifth, immigration attorneys and their staff who toiled away hard for the past few weeks will feel really bad for their clients, and also for themselves that their labor will not come into fruition.

Sixth, people who have lost the lottery will try to come to the United States under other options, which are much harder. They may also resort more to the B-1 business visa, and although the business visa is ambiguous enough to cover activities that go beyond a business meeting, many will fall afoul of the visa wittingly or unwittingly. Using the B-1 visa when the H-1B visa is not available is like engaging in risky unprotected sex. People will get into trouble at some point in time and the party will be over.

Seventh, the While House very recently announced that it would allow a limited number of spouses on H-4 visas the ability to work. The whole purpose is to encourage highly skilled people to work in the United States on H-1B visas. What is the purpose of such an announcement when the cap eliminates the ability of people to enter the United States on H-1B visas in the first place. It all feels like a joke, rather like flatulence, on this day when it was announced that 172,500 people applied for a meager 85,000 visas.

Eight, even the lucky ones who have gotten selected are by no means guaranteed that their H-1B cases will get approved. The USCIS applies rigidly impossible standards, and also reviews the cases unevenly, the California Service Center being far more cruel than the Vermont Service Center. And even those whose H-1B visa petitions get approved may not be issued visas at the US Consulates overseas, especially consuls in India who use the visa process as a trade barrier to curb the flow of Indian IT professionals from making it to the United States.  Then, those who finally make it will also likely get subjected to oppressive green card quotas down the road.

Ninth, one should also really be incensed at Congress for not doing anything about the 65,000 cap since 2003.

Tenth and lastly, even when Congress does get into the act of doing something, it may make things worse rather than better. The H-1B proposals in the Senate bill, S. 744, make the H-1B visa far more difficult to use and have an outer limit of 180,000. In other words, Congress may not be capable of fixing the problem.

Postscript:  I am actually an optimist, but the only way we can bring about positive change to the H-1B visa cap problem, is to collectively get mad about it!

Cyrus Mehta

Obama’s Paradoxical Deportation Policies

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President Obama has been called the Deporter in Chief as he has presided over nearly 2 million deportations during his presidency – higher than that of any other President. On the other hand, President Obama has also rolled out some of the most innovative prosecutorial discretion policies, which include granting deferred action to hundreds of thousand immigrants who came to the United States when they were young.

A revealing article in the Los Angeles Times shows that the high number of deportations is largely misleading. The likelihood of an undocumented individual already in the United States who has developed ties being deported has lessened considerably under President Obama. Even people with removal orders can seek a stay of removal if they establish that they are deserving of prosecutorial discretion under the Morton June 17, 2011 Memo.  Young immigrants who arrived in the United States prior to the age of 16 and who meet other conditions can apply for deferred action, along with work authorization, under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.

The people who are being deported, and are part of the increased statistics, are those who recently crossed the border without inspection and are apprehended within 100 miles from the border. Under previous administrations, such people were informally bused back outside the United States in what was known as “voluntary returns.” Under the Obama administration, these people are fingerprinted and issued formal deportation orders. INA section 235(b)(1), which was enacted by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, granted authority to expeditiously remove persons at the border who are deemed inadmissible under INA sections 212(a)(6)(C) for making a material misrepresentation or 212(a)(7) for not possessing valid visa documents. On August 11, 2004, DHS promulgated a rule to expand expedited removal to persons who are present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled and who are apprehended within 100 miles from the southern border and who also cannot prove that they were physically present in the country continuously for the preceding 14 days. This rule was expanded to all borders on January 30, 2006.

This is not to suggest that the increased use of expedited removal to recent border crossers does not have devastating effects and should not be remedied through immigration reform measures, since many of these crossers are entering the United States to join family members. Still, it is the expanded use of expedited removal that has resulted in an increase of deportations, when under prior administrations, such persons were informally returned from the United States without terming them as deportations. Once a recent border crosser is expeditiously removed, a reentry into the United States also carries severe criminal penalties unlike a ‘voluntary return.” On the other hand, a person who has been in the United States for a longer period is less likely be placed in the removal proceedings, and even if this person is issued a Notice to Appear before an Immigration Judge, he or she can have a shot at requesting prosecutorial discretion under President Obama’s administration than before, which will result in either administrative closure or termination of the case. Unfortunately, the majority of people who came to the attention of the immigration enforcement authorities within the interior, resulting in deportation proceedings,  are those who got arrested for minor offenses.

As an aside and consistent with the topic of this article, there are instances when it can be more beneficial for a person to be placed in removal proceedings than not. Pursuant to INA section 240A(b), an individual who meets 10 years of physical presence, good moral character for this entire period and can demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to qualifying relatives who are either citizens or permanent residents can obtain cancellation of removal, leading to lawful permanent resident status. The hardship standard is extremely high and needs to be substantially beyond the hardship that would ordinarily be expected to result from the alien’s deportation, as demonstrated in cases such as Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 53 (BIA 2001); Matter of Andazola, 23 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2002) where cancellation was denied; and Matter of Recinas, 23 I&N  Dec. 467 (BIA 2002) where it was granted. Another advantage of being in removal proceedings is to escape the 3 year bar based on unlawful presence of more than 180 days but less than 1 year pursuant to INA section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). Departing the United States under a grant of voluntary departure, which is issued prior to the alien accruing 1 year of unlawful presence, and after the commencement of proceedings, may allow this alien to reenter the United States without being subject to the 3-year bar. Finally, another tactical advantage to being placed in removal proceedings is when an application for adjustment of status is denied, and the best way to get a second chance is to have an Immigration Judge review the adjustment application de novo in proceedings. The irony is that ICE is often  reluctant to put a person under these circumstances in removal proceedings because it is does not have the resources, and is also of the view that as an enforcement agency,  it is contrary to the agency’s mission to place someone in removal so that he or she can ultimately secure an immigration benefit.  One note of caution is that those who came into the United States on a visa waiver should not consider requesting a removal proceeding as they have waived their right to a removal hearing under INA section 217(b).

President Obama used the increased deportation statistics to show that he was enforcing the law, but this has backfired among his critics. Those who favor stricter enforcement are not satisfied with the record increase in deportations by pointing to the Administration’s expanded prosecutorial discretion policies that has resulted in the deferring of thousands of deportations. Enforcement advocates in Congress use the President’s expanded prosecutorial discretion policies, while conveniently ignoring the spike in deportations, as an excuse to delay immigration reform and cooperating with the President.  At the same time, immigration advocates and allies have criticized President Obama for increasing deportations without truly bringing about genuine immigration reform. After the passage of the S. 744, the Senate’s immigration reform bill last year, there is now a stalemate where the prospects of immigration reform in the House have almost evaporated despite unanimous agreement that the immigration system is broken.

If President Obama desires to cement his legacy with respect to immigration reform, he may not be able to achieve it through this Congress. In the past, President Obama has indicated that he does not have the authority to further expand prosecutorial discretion, but this may have to change. The only way for the President to fulfill the promise he has made to so many who voted for him is to go about it on his own through administrative policy changes. The Executive branch can expand deferred action to a broader group of people, which could include family members of DACA recipients and those who have US citizen children. The prosecutorial discretion guidelines under the Morton Memo ought to be further strengthened to ensure that they are not ignored by ICE officials, as many are wont to do. The parole in place policy for relatives of military personnel can be expanded to benefit those who are on the pathway to permanent residency if they are beneficiaries of employment and family immigrant visa petitions. In an eloquent New York Times editorial entitled Yes He Can, On Immigration, the following is worth extracting:

Mr. Obama may argue that he can’t be too aggressive in halting deportations because that will make the Republicans go crazy, and there’s always hope for a legislative solution. He has often seemed like a bystander to the immigration stalemate, watching the wheels spin, giving speeches and hoping for the best.

It’s hard to know when he will finally stir himself to do something big and consequential.

The President must no longer fear doing something big and consequential on the immigration front. Some may justifiably fear that if the President ameliorates the plight of undocumented people through administrative reform measures, another President can quickly undo them; and therefore it is best for Congress to enact immigration reform. Administrative remedies are clearly no substitute for comprehensive immigration reform passed through Congress, but it would be hard for a future President to undo wise administrative reform measures that provide a fix to a broken immigration system. For example, DACA benefits have already been granted to hundreds of thousands of young immigrants who have been able to graduate from college and find jobs. It would be politically imprudent for a future President to undo DACA. Indeed, S. 744, the bipartisan reform bill that was passed by the Senate, incorporates DACA and places DACA recipients on a faster track to permanent residency. If President Obama implements bold administrative measures, it would be difficult for a future administration to undo them, and it is likely that a future Congress will have no choice but to readily adopt them into law.

Cyrus Mehta

The Impact of Obamacare on Green Card Holders Who Reside Outside the United States

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By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

Unlike many, if not most countries, the long reach of Uncle Sam’s tax laws extend far beyond geographic boundaries to affect citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPR) on an extraterritorial basis. Status not physical presence triggers the tax obligation. The need for LPRs living abroad to comply with US tax regimes is another example of how,  since enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, immigration has become increasingly and inextricably intertwined with all other aspects of American life and law. Beyond that, lawful permanent residence is not only a legal status but an economic one as well with tax implications that intimately affect the maintenance of such status and the fiscal consequences of its continued exercise. The impact of the individual health care mandate under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), also popularly known as Obamacare, upon LPRs who reside overseas is the most recent example of a growing tension between a domestically focused immigration policy and the increasingly global nature of both individual and national economic conduct in the global economy of the 21st century.

A number of LPRs, also known as green card holders, temporarily live outside the United States for a variety of legitimate reasons. In a globalized world, LPRs may more readily find employment assignments in other countries or they may need to be outside the United States to look after a sick relative. Essentially, an LPR must be returning from a temporary visit abroad under INA § 101(a)(27) in order to avoid a charge of abandonment. The term “temporary visit abroad” has been subject to interpretation by the Circuit Courts, and although the LPR may remain outside the United States for an extended period of time, the visit may still be considered temporary so long as there is an intention to return. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1997) is generally followed:

A trip is a ‘temporary visit abroad’ if (a) it is for a relatively short period, fixed by some early event; or (b) the trip will terminate upon the occurrence of an event that has a reasonable possibility of occurring within a relatively short period of time.” If as in (b) “the length of the visit is contingent upon the occurrence of an event and is not fixed in time and if the event does not occur within a relatively short period of time, the visit will be considered a “temporary visit abroad” only if the alien has a continuous, uninterrupted intention to return to the United States during the visit.

For a more extensive review on this subject, we refer you to our article, Home Is Where TheCard Is: How To Preserve Lawful Permanent Resident Status In A Global Economy, 13 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 849, July 1, 2008.

With the deadline period for enrollment on March 31, 2014, a number of non-citizens, including LPRs,  are eligible for health care benefits under the ACA.  The ACA requires all “applicable individuals” including LPRs to maintain “minimum essential health coverage,” and the failure to do so will result in a penalty when they file their federal income tax returns for year 2014 onwards. The “minimum essential coverage” is required on a monthly basis, but only during those months that qualify people as applicable individuals.”  On March 26, HHS released guidance which clarifies that many consumers who were unable to enroll through the marketplace before the March 31 deadline are eligible for a special enrollment period (SEP). The SEP gives qualifying consumers additional time to get health coverage without being assessed a penalty. To be eligible for the SEP, the consumer must have experienced one of the barriers identified in the guidance. These barriers include experiencing errors related to immigration status and being transferred between the marketplace and state Medicaid/CHIP agency. The additional time available to apply depends on the specific barrier and when it is resolved.

An LPR residing outside will need to purchase health insurance under the ACA.  There are circumstances under which LPRs can still be deemed to be maintaining minimum essential coverage even when they are outside the United States if they meet the Internal Revenue Service test for shielding their foreign income from US taxation.

Under 26 CFR 1.5000A-1, “An individual is treated as having minimum essential coverage for a month—

(i) If the month occurs during any period described in section 911(d)(1)(A) or section 911(d)(1)(B) that is applicable to the individual”.

In turn, section 911(d)(1) provides:(d) Definitions and special rules
For purposes of this section—

(1) Qualified individual

The term “qualified individual” means an individual whose tax home is in a foreign country and who is—

(A) a citizen of the United States and establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that he has been a bona fide resident of a foreign country or countries for an uninterrupted period which includes an entire taxable year, or

(B) a citizen or resident of the United States and who, during any period of 12 consecutive months, is present in a foreign country or countries during at least 330 full days in such period.

Section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code allows certain US citizens and LPRs to shield their foreign income from US taxation by virtue of living outside the United States. The foreign earned income exclusion for 2013 is $97, 600.

Since the full consequences of decisions on Obamacare will not become plainly evident until April 2015, any interpretations advanced now must be necessarily both preliminary and tentative, subject to modification if and when the IRS provides future guidance. It is this continuing involvement of the IRS, as well as the byzantine complexity of the ACA itself, that commends a healthy dose of modesty to all commentators. LPRs who are eligible to take the section 911 exemption because they are not physically present in the United States for a full 330 days within a 12 month consecutive month period are treated as having minimum coverage for that 12- month period. It is still not clear whether  LPRs would have to elect to claim the foreign earned income exclusion by filing Form 2555 with  their tax returns so that they be deemed to have minimum essential coverage or whether the IRS will develop a special form for that purpose.

While it is true that only a US citizen can claim the bona fide resident of a foreign country exception, an LPR, if s/he is also tax resident in a county with which the US has an income tax treaty, can use the bona fide residence test pursuant to the treaty’s nondiscrimination provisions to also claim the foreign earned income exclusion. The bona fide residence test can be utilized even if the individual has not been physically present in the United States for 330 or more days.   If that is the case, can a non US citizen of a treaty country also claim minimum coverage under the ACA?

For example, the nondiscrimination provision of the US-India tax treaty, states in relevant part:

Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith which is other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other State in the same circumstances are or may be subjected. This provision shall apply to persons who are not residents of one or both of the Contracting States.

This language in the US-India tax treaty would seem to apply to the ACA health mandate exemption, since it is taxation or a requirement connected therewith. After all, the Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, especially Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion, upheld the constitutionality of the health mandate in the ACA by characterizing it as a tax. “The Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax,” according to Chief Justice Roberts. “Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness,” the Chief Justice further opined.  While the commerce power apparently has its distinct limits for the Roberts Court, the power to tax does not. For this reason, Solicitor General Donald Verelli, who suggested the possible utility of such reasoning to the Court, may turn out to have singular, if unexpected importance.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the ACA statutes refer only to section 911 and not to treaties.  Also, the treaties define the scope of their application, which may have to be revised to include the ACA penalty. The US-India treaty, for example, applies to the following US taxes:

“In the United States, the Federal income taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Code (but excludingthe accumulated earnings tax, the personal holding company tax, and social security taxes), and the excise taxes imposed on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers and with respect to private foundations (hereinafter referred to as “United States tax”)”

Therefore, unless the IRS provides more specific guidance, it is not clear at this time whether an LPR who takes the bona fide residence exception for purposes of shielding foreign income can also be deemed to have the minimum essential coverage.

LPRs who seek to claim a section 911 type foreign earned income exclusion to get out of the mandate under ACA should beware of adverse consequences on their LPR status. Living outside the United States for 330 days or more in itself could lead to a finding of abandonment if the LPR cannot successfully establish that his or her visit abroad was temporary under Singh v. Reno, supra. Even if LPRs assert that their trip abroad was temporary, claiming a section 911 benefit to avoid the health insurance coverage under Obamacare could bolster the government’s charges that they abandoned their status. As we discussed in The Taxman Cometh: When Taking a Foreign Earned Income Exclusion On Your Tax Return Can Hurt Your Ability To Naturalize, taking a section 911 exemption can also impair the applicant’s ability to show that he or she did not disrupt continuity of residence during the relevant 5 or 3 year period. INA § 316(b) states that an absence from the United States of more than six months but less than one year during the 5-year period immediately preceding the filing of the application may break the continuity of such residence. Indeed, utilizing the bona fide residence exception, if it is allowed for LPRs under the ACA, would be more perilous than the physical presence exception as the individual must declare a residence in a foreign country. Another issue worth noting for people who claim bona fide residence under tax treaties is that they must file Form 8833 to do so.  Page 4 of the instructions to that form warns that this sort of bona fide residency claim for an LPR under a tax treaty triggers the exit tax for Long Term Residents (LTR):

If you are a dual-resident taxpayer and a long-term resident (LTR) and you are filing this form to be treated as a resident of a foreign country for purposes of claiming benefits under an applicable U.S. income tax treaty, you will be deemed to have terminated your U.S. residency status for federal income tax  purposes. Because you are terminating your U.S. residency status, you may be subject to tax under section 877A and you must file Form 8854, Initial and Annual Expatriation Statement. You are an LTR if you were a lawful permanent resident of the United States in at least 8 of the last 15 tax years ending with the year your status as an LTR ends.

LPRs who live outside may wish to seek other ways to claim minimum essential coverage under the ACA if they do not wish to risk jeopardizing their green cards or their ability to naturalize in the future. For instance, LPRs who have health insurance provided by foreign insurers may qualify as having minimum essential coverage if the coverage is recognized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Coverage under group health plans provided through insurance regulated by a foreign government may also be recognized as minimum essential coverage, depending on specific circumstances and whether those plans have received U.S. approval. There are also the following statutory exemptions:

Religious conscience. Membership of a religious sect that is recognized as conscientiously opposed to accepting any insurance benefits. The Social Security Administration administers the process for recognizing these sects according to the criteria in the law.

Health care sharing ministry. Membership of a recognized health care sharing ministry.

Indian tribes.  (1) Membership of a federally recognized Indian tribe or (2) an individual eligible for services through an Indian care provider.

Income below the income tax return filing requirement. If the individual’s income is below the minimum threshold for filing a tax return. To find out if you are required to file a federal tax return, use the IRS Interactive Tax Assistant (ITA).

Short coverage gap. Going without coverage for less than three consecutive months during the year.

Hardship. Suffering a hardship that makes one unable to obtain coverage, as defined in final regulations issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.

Affordability. Unable to  afford coverage because the minimum amount the individual must pay for the premiums is more than eight percent of household income.

Incarceration. Being in a jail, prison, or similar penal institution or correctional facility after the disposition of charges against the individual.

Not lawfully present. Not being a U.S. citizen, a U.S. national or an alien lawfully present in the United States.

LPRs can also avail of the short coverage gap exemption. In general, a gap in coverage that lasts less than three months qualifies as a short coverage gap. If an individual has more than one short coverage gap during a year, the short coverage gap exemption only applies to the first gap.

LPRs who fail to maintain the required minimum essential coverage must pay a penalty known as the “individual shared responsibility payment.” In general, according to the IRS, the payment amount is either a percentage of your income or a flat dollar amount, whichever is greater.  The individual will owe 1/12thof the annual payment for each month he or she (or dependents) do not have coverage and are not exempt. The annual payment amount for 2014 is the greater of:

1 percent of household income that is above the tax return threshold for the indvidual’s filing status, such as Married Filing Jointly or single, or

the family’s flat dollar amount, which is $95 per adult and $47.50 per child, limited to a maximum of $285.

The individual shared responsibility payment is capped at the cost of the national average premium for the bronze level health plan available through the Marketplace in 2014. The individual will make the payment when he or she files the 2014 federal income tax return in 2015.

For example, a single adult under age 65 with household income less than $19,650 (but more than $10,150) would pay the $95 flat rate.  However, a single adult under age 65 with household income greater than $19,650 would pay an annual payment based on the 1 percent rate.

If an LPR chooses to pay the penalty instead of purchasing insurance, and fails to pay the penalty or delays in making the payment,   this would need to be disclosed on an N-400 application relating to whether the applicant owes any taxes. This too could jeopardize the naturalization application, and would bring the penalty section of the ACA directly into the context of immigration issues. Furthermore, an LPR opting for the penalty over health insurance may create the impression, whether intentional or unintended, that he or she may not be maintaining ties with the US, further bolstering the government’s charge of abandonment of LPR status.

The ACA is connected to immigration issues, and it behooves a careful practitioner to review the provisions of the ACA as they apply to non-citizens, and LPRs in particular. The interconnectedness of all these issues to the authors is the larger and more widely significant point, such as how seeking an exemption from the health insurance mandate can trigger potential loss of LPR status,  invocation of the exit tax, or the ineligibility to become a US citizen in the future. No longer can any of these decisions be made in a vacuum without consideration of the broader consequences.  The practice of immigration and tax law must invite the collaboration of experts from both disciplines.

Any consideration of the possible adverse consequences resulting from a decision to seek an exemption from the individual mandate imposed by the ACA must be informed by an understanding of the fact that an extended absence from the United States, without more, should never serve as the basis for involuntary abandonment of LPR status. We live in a global economy where international relocation is often the price for career advancement and even job retention.  The law should and must provide that no LPR can be stripped of their “green card” on the basis of abandonment unless he or she clearly manifests or overtly states an intention to give it up. No inference from proven conduct can be possible absent compelling evidence that such was the desired and intended consequence. Application of this caution to the debate over Obamacare would properly reflect the profound importance of LPR status while also serving as a recognition of the enormous and continuing contributions that such permanent residents have made and continue to render to their adopted home.

(Guest writer Gary Endelman is the Senior Counsel of FosterQuan)