The Sinking Immigration Court: Change Course, Save the Ship

By Stacy Caplow*

Immigration Court, where hundreds of judges daily preside over wrenching decisions, including matters of family separation, detention, and even life and death, is structurally and functionally unsound. Closures during the pandemic, coupled with unprecedented backlogs, low morale, and both procedural and substantive damage inflicted by the Trump Administration, have created a full-fledged crisis. The Court’s critics call for radical reforms. That is unlikely to happen. Instead, the Biden Administration is returning to a go-to, cure-all solution: adding 100 Immigration Court judges and support personnel[1] to help address the backlog that now approaches 1.3 million cases.[2]

No one could oppose effective reform or additional resources. Nor could anyone oppose practical case management changes that do not require legislation and that could expedite and professionalize the practice in Immigration Court. Linked with a more transparent and more inclusive process for selecting Immigration Judges, these changes would make the Immigration Courts more efficient, more accurate and fairer but not at the expense of the compelling humanitarian stakes in the daily work of the Court. Immediate changes that do not require legislation but do require the will to transform the practice and culture of the Court would be a major step forward in improving the experiences and the outcomes in Immigration Court.

 

I. Changes to the Practices and the Culture of the Immigration Court

 Immigration hearings are adversarial. While the stakes are very high and often punitive—removal, ongoing detention, family separation—the proceedings are civil. Yet this court bears little resemblance to typical civil litigation settings in both the pretrial or trial context. Most of the characteristic judicial tools regulating litigation are absent: pretrial discovery, pretrial settlement or status conferences to resolve or narrow issues, rare stipulations, or enforcement tools to require government lawyers to participate in a meaningful way until shortly before the hearing.

Generally, no Trial Attorney [TA] from the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor [OPLA], a division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE], the prosecutors in Immigration Court, is assigned to or takes responsibility for a case until a few weeks prior to an individual hearing.[3]  If a case is pending for several years, as so many are these days, except in the rare instance, it is impossible to have any kind of substantive discussion in advance about the conduct of the hearing, possible forms of settlement or alternative relief, narrow issues. Stipulations are rare or unhelpfully last minute. There are no enforcement tools that require government attorneys to participate in a meaningful way until shortly before the hearing. This can and should be changed. The Immigration Court can adopt practices familiar in civil and criminal tribunals around the country. Common litigation management tools could expedite and rationalize Immigration Court proceedings.

 

1. Assign Trial Attorneys to Cases Promptly

A TA should be assigned to review a case at the earliest possible time following the initial Master Calendar appearance where pleadings are entered. At a minimum, a TA should be assigned at the request any Respondent who wants to discuss a case regardless of when the hearing is scheduled. The government lawyers in Immigration Court, like prosecutors in any busy court, can handle a caseload without waiting until the last minute to review the claim. In order to foster meaningful discussions, these TA assignments should occur as soon as the respondent has completed her evidentiary filings.

The positive impact of a prompt TA assignment system will benefit everyone—Respondents, TAs, and the IJs. For example, although many cases require a credibility finding based on in-person testimony, some claims simply do not. If there is no basis for doubting credibility in light of the evidence, and the law is clear, a one, two or three-year wait for a decision is unconscionable. Under the current system, the TA does not review the submissions until shortly before the hearing. Faced with cases in which credibility is not an issue, more often than not, the TA does not seriously contest the facts or the eligibility for relief once she has reviewed the submissions. This results in half-hearted cross-examination, if there is any at all, and a quick grant of relief without opposition. Unfortunately, this happens only after years of delay and anxiety as well as extensive preparation often requiring logistical headaches and inconveniences to witnesses. Earlier, thorough case assessment could avoid the stress to Respondents of a life on hold, could result in fewer or more focused hearings, and could accomplish timeliness and efficiency goals of EOIR.

2. Require Pre-Hearing Conferences

The EOIR Practice Manual provides for a Pre-Hearing Conference.[4] This tool, commonplace in other kinds of courts, is rarely used. Neither Immigration Judges nor TAs routinely invite or encourage pre-hearing conferences. Following the lead of many civil and criminal courts, there should be a regularly scheduled status conference in every case upon a simple request from either party, conducted as expeditiously as possible after the pleadings at the Master Calendar. This could achieve great efficiencies and fairer outcomes.

A mandatory pre-hearing conference would necessitate assigning an individual ICE Trial Attorney to a case well in advance of the hearing. For an effective conference, a Respondent’s lawyer would generally need to submit evidence and even a memorandum of law. A process similar to a summary judgment motion might result. If the Trial Attorney concedes that there are no factual disputes or lack of credibility, the judge could decide the legal basis for relief. This procedure might require an abbreviated hearing, an oral argument, or could be decided on written submissions.

A few prototypical cases illustrate how this might work. Imagine an asylum seeker who has suffered or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of sexual orientation who comes from a country whose homophobic laws and oppression of people who are LGBTQ are undisputed. If the asylum seeker is credible, well settled law would surely warrant a granted of asylum. Or suppose a woman who was subjected to genital circumcision has medical records confirming this condition. Again, under well-settled law she is likely to be granted asylum. Or a one-year filing deadline bar could be resolved without the need for testimony based on written submissions. These issues could be resolved at a pre-hearing conference. Another set of cases might involve requests for Cancellation of Removal. The pre-hearing conference could conclude that objective evidence satisfies most of the statutory factors. This could narrow the case so that the Immigration Judge would only hear evidence relevant to the hardship determination. If the Trial Attorney reviewed the evidence and conceded that the hardship standard had been satisfied, this could eliminate the need for a hearing altogether.

Immigrants and their advocates shoulder the burden of multi-year delays and suffer from the resulting uncertainty and angst. Meanwhile, they build lives despite their unpredictable future, increasing the harsh impact of eventual deportation. During the interval, immigration advocates’ caseloads multiply. Years later, when a hearing is finally held, the consequences of delay are substantial. Court submissions need updating. Legal claims may be affected by changes in the law. Witnesses may be unavailable. Memories may fade. The is particularly harsh for asylum seekers whose credibility is at the heart of any immigration hearing[5] but whose trauma may have affected their ability to recall events, particularly the persecution they would prefer to forget. Accelerating resolution through pre-hearing processes following a full presentation of the claim by the Respondent and a full review of the evidence by the government would divert cases from the court’s hearing dockets.

A serious and sincere discussion of the claims and the evidence might resolve cases more expeditiously. Relief could be granted without a hearing. In some instances, TAs could choose to terminate the proceedings through an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Good case management, effective communication, and open-mindedness are imperative to making the system work more smoothly and more quickly.

3. Enforce the Practice Manual Equably

After years without any standardized practices, the EOIR published a Practice Manual.[6]  This guidance was a welcome development. On its face, it appears to govern all aspects of practice neutrally. A closer reading of the Manuel, however, reveals how one-sided these rules and the practice they govern really are. The everyday reality is even more blatantly lopsided because only Respondents’ attorneys actually do the work that the Manual regulates. The power imbalance between the parties and the close relations between the immigration bench and the prosecutors is embedded in the contents, language and impact of the Manual

In most cases before IJs the burden of proof to secure relief is on the Respondent, once removability is established.[7]  This means that Respondents, represented in only about 60% of all cases,[8] submit all of the evidence to support their application for relief. In the Manual, there are detailed rules relating to filings, motions and the conduct of hearings down to the types of tabs, cover sheets, identifiers for motions, cover pages, tables of contents, proof of service, witness lists and hole-punching. Submissions must be filed and served at least 30 days in advance of the hearing (up from 15 in a prior version of the Manual)

Since government lawyers rarely submit any evidence other than proof of removability if the Respondent does not concede, none of these rules affect their workload. On the rare occasion that the ICE lawyers do file a proposed exhibit, they often do so on the day of the hearing—with impunity since the IJs permit this. In a typical court, flagrant disobedience of the rules would be sanctioned without prejudice to the other party. More typically a Hobson’s choice is given to the Respondent:  accept the poor service or postpone the case. These days, postponement can mean years. The Respondent, anxious and prepared for that day’s testimony, is likely to opt for the former letting the government ignore the rules with the IJs permission.

This is an example of how IJs could behave more forcefully—preclude the evidence. Or cite the government for contempt in egregious cases. Instead, a tolerance of  lazy lawyering only inspires even less compliance with the rules

4. Encourage Prosecutorial Discretion as a Case Management Tool

Resolving a case through an exercise of prosecutorial discretion [PD] is another tool available to, but rarely employed by, the government. IJs cannot force Trial Attorneys to take certain actions relating to the merits of a case, but they can review the evidence in a pre-trial conference and make a strong suggestion about the best resolution.

The May 2021 Interim Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities is a vehicle for re-evaluating prosecutorial discretion [PD] as part of the holistic case management reforms that will benefit the TAs. the Immigration Court and the Respondents.[9]  The Interim Guidance reestablishes priorities and encourages a resuscitation of vigorous prosecutorial discretion. The guidance gives express permission to the Trial Attorneys to consider prosecutorial discretion even in the absence of a request.[10] Its reference to “mutual interest” strives to break down the adversarial barriers that obstruct judiciously exercised discretion and encourages shared problem-solving.

Some OPLA offices have established protocols for submitting requests for prosecutorial discretion. It is too early to tell whether this change in policy will result in a change in culture in the field. In the past, requests were not very successful despite encouraging guidelines and priorities.[11] But even if the Trial Attorneys do not take initiative, at the very least, there is a structure in which to engage in serious discussions about the direction of a case on the court’s docket. While the ultimate exercise of discretion belongs exclusively to the TAs, IJs could and should identify and encourage active consideration of appropriate cases for PD at a Pre-Hearing Conference.

 5. Apply Disciplinary Rules to Government Lawyers as well as Immigration Advocates

Lawyer disciplinary rules must be applied equally to ICE attorneys as well as attorneys for Respondents. This recommendation may seem obvious. Yet, the 2018 Policy Guidance promulgated by the EOIR raised serious concerns.[12] It established policies and procedures for reporting ineffective assistance of counsel or other violations of rules of professional conduct identified by the EOIR itself. Of course, protecting immigrants against unscrupulous or incompetent lawyers is a worthy goal. But these disciplinary rules apply only to immigrant advocates and not government lawyers.[13] EOIR should promptly issue equivalent guidance that applies to ICE attorneys who might commit ethical violations. In the absence of attempts by EOIR to be evenhanded, the 2018 policy guidance is a troubling example of bias within the court system.

6. Be Attentive to Professional Standards in the Courtroom

All of these practical manifestations of the imbalance of power—the reluctance to regulate, sanction or discipline—and the very environment of the courtroom expose the cozy connection between the immigration bench and the prosecution and destroy any fiction of independence. IJs preside in courts in which former colleagues (perhaps friends) appear. They chitchat with the government lawyers while Respondents sit in the room, often in a cone of incomprehension. The appearance if not the reality of this relationship is visible to any observer. The integrity and objectivity of the court is seriously undermined by these everyday departures from appropriate courtroom conduct. The obvious and easy remedy for this appearance of partiality inferred from the comradery between the prosecutor and the judge would be a change in atmosphere to elevate the inside of these courtrooms to the same degree of dignity and seriousness that all courtrooms should possess.

 

II. Changes to the Selection Process of Immigration Court Judges

 

To transform the present obstacles to effective judicial performance, remove the damaging management directives of the former administration. As so many commentators already have suggested, roll back the heavy-handed Attorney General imposed operating guidelines relating to case management to restore a system of logical adjudication priorities[14] and remove the Damoclesean sword of quantitative performance metrics or quotas which only encourage hasty outcomes that devalue the stakes involved in most hearings. These steps require only will, not legislation or rule making. While a return to the old normal will not fully address the structural capture of this court by the Department of Justice [DOJ] and the widely divergent outcomes between courts,[15] restoring decision making to IJs will improve morale and incentivize judges to be independent thinkers without fear of interference or reprisals.[16]

The Attorney General recently took significant steps to reverse many of the more controversial and harmful administrative policies inflicted by the prior administration that limit the ability of Immigration Judges to decide their cases carefully and fairly.[17]  But more can be done.

Changes to the eligibility criteria and the selection process for Immigration Judges also would make a difference both to how the Court operates and how its integrity is perceived by the people appearing before it and by the public.

 

1. The Past Decade of Immigration Court Growth

Injecting new resources into the Immigration Courts is a common prescription for a system that is overloaded, backlogged, and inefficient. This approach seems sensible, and it has indeed been tried but without much success. Between 2017 and the end of 2020 more than 330 judges were added to the ranks in an effort to reduce the enormous backlog. The table below shows the exponential growth in judges.

Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics

Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics[18]

 

Over that same four-year period, almost 100 courtrooms were added, totaling 474 at the end of 2020.[19] Now, approximately 535 immigration judges preside over 68 immigration courts and three adjudications centers.[20]

Despite the infusion of resources, waiting times have grown to an average of 54 months.[21]  Although the Executive Office of Immigration Review asserts that, “The timely and efficient conclusion of cases serves the national interest,”[22] today many hearings are adjourned for as long as two or three years. Swift and certain justice after a full and fair removal proceeding eludes most people.

While some of this eye-popping number of pending matters is attributable to the influx of asylum-seekers at the southern border,[23] Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] also has been filing new removal cases.[24] In addition, the pandemic shut most of the courts for more than a year. These external forces have been intensified pressures, but they are not the root causes of the Court’s dysfunction. Adding more judges will not solve the well-recognized structural defects of the court itself.

An immigration  bench that has been populated to serve political goals lacks genuine independence and is subject to political branch dictates.[25]  The Trump Department of Justice only further diminished judicial independence by imposing performance metrics,[26] limiting the exercise of discretion,[27] litigating to decertify the judges’ union,[28] muzzling individual judges,[29] and radically changing longstanding legal principles.[30] On its own website, the stature of this tribunal is degraded to “quasi-judicial,” dropping the pretense of independence and reducing its stature.[31]

The breakdown of the court is also attributable to recent mismanagement decisions and its almost total departure from normal litigation practices that prevents judges from supervising their caseloads and promptly presiding over life-altering deportation proceedings. Administrative inefficiencies that have longed plagued this court only worsened under the policies adopted by the four-year, multi-faceted Trump assault on immigration. Old cases languished while new cases poured in.

In light of this grim reality, the time has come to rethink of some embedded assumptions and practices, particularly those that do not have to wait for structural court reform.

2. Surveying the Newly Appointed Immigration Judges

The job of Immigration Judge, as one IJ famously said, consists of hearing “death penalty cases in a traffic court setting.[32] Immigration Court needs to be staffed by experienced judges committed to applying the law with both rigor and compassion. Immigration Judges need to be able to use the tools that judges normally employ in other settings to administer their courts effectively. Knowledgeable, fair-minded, even-tempered, confident and courageous judges should be the norm.

The following collective profile of the newest IJs has been noted widely but some aspects deserve a bit more detailed attention because they call into question whether this goal can be achieved if past practices are simply replicated as more IJs are appointed.

a. Government Enforcement Background

From 2017 to 2020, the Department of Justice hired 166 judges who were drawn predominantly from current or former employees of one or more government-side immigration prosecution, enforcement or related agencies.[33] Filling the bench with lawyers from this career path is not new, or particularly surprising, since these are candidates who actually do have a deep knowledge of the law and a familiarity with the court. But a career in enforcement risks distorting objectivity and impartiality.

Prior Government Immigration Enforcement Experience

There is, however, a striking imbalance among the IJs with considerable immigration practice backgrounds. A review of their biographies reveals that only a handful—about 10 or 11—worked in either private practice or public interest organizations representing immigrants. Thus, one of the two obvious source of experienced immigration attorneys—immigrant advocates—is barely represented.

Another conclusion that these numbers forcefully imply is that not only are government-side lawyers overly represented but, even when the few former immigrant advocates are added to this group, close to half of new IJs appear to have no discernable knowledge of immigration law or experience in immigration practice.[34]

Lawyers with government immigration careers are not the only former law enforcement employees sitting on the Immigration Court bench.

 

  • Fifty-four percent of new IJs’ credentials include past positions as either federal and/or state prosecutors, or both.

Prior Prosecutorial Experience

  • Many have military records (often in combination with prosecutorial pasts), an advantage in the selection process. But they report no immigration law experience.

Military Legal Experience (Including JAG)

Many individual biographies include a combination of these experiences—e.g., government enforcement jobs, prior prosecutorial positions and military service. At the risk of overgeneralizing, there are many common characteristics in these backgrounds that could discourage independence, critical or creative thinking, as well as produce intolerance for inefficiency, aggressive advocacy or other challenges to authority.

 

b. Judicial Experience

Prior judicial experience would seem to be a plus but only a handful of the new IJs, 46, have sat on any bench, all of which are state-level tribunals or courts with no obvious immigration jurisdiction.

Prior Judicial Experience

The haste to seat these judges and put them to work with minimal training[35] and little opportunity for ongoing mentorship by experienced judges, only incentivizes them to rush through hearings, and predisposes them to deny applications accompanied by incomplete or sloppy reasoning.[36] Just as more judges are being added, veteran judges are leaving the bench, some in reaction to the new pressures to perform.[37]  As witnesses to the degrading of the court, the increasingly active and expanding Round Table of Former Immigration Judges has been a vocal critics both before Congress and as amicus curiae.[38]

 

c. Legal Experience

Generally, ascent to the judiciary occurs after a lawyer acquires expertise in a legal field, and demonstrates maturity, judgment and capacity. Knowledge of the law, an even temperament, impartiality and the ability to make reasoned decisions are the basic qualities associated with judging. Lawyers usually requires years of legal experience to gain and deepen these qualities. The requirement of seven years post-bar admission seems quite minimal.

Years of General Legal Experience

The survey showed that most new IJs do have more than the minimum amount of

experience. But, when their years in practice is seen are measured by the kind of experience the majority of these seasoned lawyers have—government enforcement—it is fair to conclude that their often extensive and formative careers opposing or obstructing relief and challenging credibility have shaped their judicial outlook.

d. Bias in Results

The opaque selection process seems to yield judges with questionable qualifications and possible biases.  The data tends to confirm the prediction that the newly appointed IJs with these credentials are granting fewer requests for asylum relief.[39] According to EOIR’s own statistics, the denial rate since 2018 increased from a range of 20-32%) to continuously increasing ranges of 31.75% to 54.53% by 2020.[40]

Looking at the list of individual IJs the change is even more obvious. Between 2013 and 2018, 58 judges denied asylum more than 90% of the time, and 69 judges denied asylum between 80-90% of the time.[41] Over the five-year period 2015-2020, the number of IJs who denied asylum more than 90% of the time rose to 109 and the number denying asylum between 80-90% of the time rose to 111.[42] While some toughening of legal standards imposed by the prior administration might account for a portion of this upsurge in denials,[43] the coincidence between these dramatic numbers and the infusion of new IJs appointed by the Trump Department of Justice is hard to ignore.

 

e. A Better Judicial Selection Process

 

An infusion of new personnel in the near future provides an opportunity to look closely at and reform the appointment process of Immigration Judges to make it less vulnerable to political influences. By many accounts, it was intensely politicized over the past four years. Appointment to the court is governed by the Department of Justice, allowing the country’s chief prosecutor to unilaterally advance a frequently biased agenda.[44] This undeniable conflict is nothing new but it demeans the integrity of the bench. Even worse, the opaqueness of the selection process shields an agenda that is suspect, based on the profile of the IJs appointed over the past four years.[45]

A cleaner, more transparent merit selection process, typical of most judicial systems, would enhance the reputation of the Court and might attract a more diverse applicant pool through a recruitment process that is attractive to a wider range of applicants. The work is very demanding, but it pays well.[46]

In addition, the criteria for the job, are now absurdly undemanding.  Aside from a law degree and licensure in any U.S. jurisdiction, an applicant must have

[A] full seven (7) years of post-bar experience as a licensed attorney preparing for, participating in, and/or appealing formal hearings or trials involving litigation and/or administrative law at the Federal, State or local level. Qualifying litigation experience involves cases in which a complaint was filed with a court, or a charging document (e.g., indictment or information) was issued by a court, a grand jury, or appropriate military authority. Qualifying administrative law experience involves cases in which a formal procedure was initiated by a governmental administrative body.[47]

Knowledge of or experience in immigration law is not an expressed job qualification although it may be an advantage.

Without the need for legislative reform, the Department of Justice and the EOIR could improve the perception and reality of the Immigration Court selection process. Simple improvements include the following steps:  1) elevating the selection standards to require more than 7 years’ experience and more direct knowledge of immigration law; 2) assuring a neutral merit selection process that incentivizes. applications from immigrant advocates; 3) opening the selection process for more public input; 5) improving training and oversight that emphasizes competence more than productivity; 6) restoring morale by recognizing and respecting the responsibility placed on IJs and treating them not as employees but as judicial officers; and 7) overseeing and questioning the basis for abnormally high denial rates.

 

III. Conclusion

 

Is there a life preserver on this sinking ship?  Courts reopening following the pandemic are facing an unprecedented backlog with cases already postponed years into the future. The new Administration, in the position to institute real reform to the way business is conducted, has started to steer in a positive direction due to a now shared interest of the Court and ICE to address the burdensome and shameful backlog. This is a potentially defining moment when change may actually happen. Meanwhile, the new administration is articulating goals to ameliorate not only the backlog but to seriously change enforcement priorities. If these two agents of potential change take advantage of the crisis that is affecting everyone involved with the system to work collaboratively with each other and consult sincerely with the immigrant advocates bar and other stakeholders, there may be some hope. To make this happen, a true cultural change must occur at every level. A few small steps have been taken: The EOIR is reacting to the prosecutorial discretion directive but the jury is still out on the buy-in to any kind of genuine reform.[48]

Like a lifeboat, survival depends on a commitment to problem-solving, trust and collaboration until rescue arrives. Someday structural reform may truly reshape the court to enough to eliminate the qualifier quasi. IJs will become full-fledged judges capable of making legally sound decisions in courtrooms where dignity, respect, patience and compassion are the norm without fear of retribution. Give the judges the tools they need to manage their courtrooms and the parties to achieve goals of integrity, efficiency and fairness. Recalibrate the balance between the parties. Recognize the demands of presiding over life-altering matters on their own wellbeing by giving them the resources, the power and the trust to be full-fledged judges.

Until then, directives from the top down are an important start; transformation still depends on change in the field in order to bring this court in conformity with general adjudication norms and practices, as well as to successfully implement the policy instructions that have the potential address the court crisis from the government’s standpoint without sacrificing fairness and humanitarian considerations.


Guest author Professor Stacy Caplow teaches Immigration Law at Brooklyn Law School where she also has co-directed the Safe Harbor Project since 1997.

 

Footnotes

[1] President Biden’s proposal is part of his overall budget planning, See Letter from Executive Office of the President, Apr. 9, 2021, at 22:

Supports Efforts to Reduce the Immigration Court Backlog. In order to address the nearly     1.3 million outstanding cases before the immigration courts, the discretionary request makes   an investment of $891 million, an increase of $157 million or 21 percent over the 2021             enacted level, in the Executive Office for Immigration Review. This funding supports 100       new immigration judges, including support personnel, as well as other efficiency measures to        reduce the backlog.

available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/FY2022-Discretionary-Request.pdf.  See also Fact Sheet: President Biden Sends Immigration Bill to Congress as Part of His Commitment to Modernize our Immigration System, Jan. 20, 2021, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-president-biden-sends-immigration-bill-to-congress-as-part-of-his-commitment-to-modernize-our-immigration-system/.

 

[2] TRAC Immigration, The State of the Immigration Courts: Trump Leaves Biden 1.3 Million Case Backlog in Immigration Courts, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/637// (last visited July 28, 2021). This statistic is complicated and does not fully account for all matters since some have been “inactive” thereby excluded from the final figure. Id. at n. 1. The Executive Office of Immigration Review reports 1,277,152 pending cases as of the first quarter of FY2021 i.e. Dec. 31, 2020. See https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/637/ (last visited July 28, 2021).

 

[3] “The Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) is the largest legal program in DHS, with over 1,250 attorneys and 290 support personnel. By statute, OPLA serves as the exclusive representative of DHS in immigration removal proceedings before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, litigating all removal cases including those against criminal aliens, terrorists, and human rights abusers.” See https://www.ice.gov/about-ice/opla.

 

[4] “Pre-hearing conferences are held between the parties and the Immigration Judge to narrow issues, obtain stipulations between the parties, exchange information voluntarily, and otherwise simplify and organize the proceeding.” OCIJ Practice Manual, Sec. 4.18, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-policy-manual/4/18.

[6] Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, Practice Manuel, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-policy-manual/part-ii-ocij-practice-manual (updated March 24, 2021).

 

[7] INA § 240 (c)(4).

 

[8] Interestingly, while there is general consensus that representation makes a huge difference to positive outcomes, the denial rate for asylum increased12% between 2108 and 2020 notwithstanding representation. Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics Current Representation Rates, available at

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1062991/download(Date generated April 2021).

 

[9]  John D. Trasivina, U.S. Immigration & Customs and Enforcement, Interim Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities INA § 240 (c)(4)(C), May 27, 2021, available at , https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/opla/OPLA-immigration-enforcement_interim-guidance.pdf.

 

[10] Id. at 7-8.

 

[11]  An example of the policies for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during the Obama administration is the Policy Memorandum Number: 10075.1 issued by John Morton, then Director of ICE entitled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, June 17, 2011, available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.

 

[12] Internal Reporting of Suspected Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Professional Misconduct, PM 19-06, Dec. 18, 2018.

 

[13] AILA Letter to Director James McHenry, February 15, 2019 (AILA Doc. No. 192159 (on file with author).

 

[14] See, e.g., Recommendations for DOJ and EOIR Leadership To Systematically Remove Non-Priority Cases from the Immigration Court Backlog, AILA Doc. No. 21050301

(posted 5/3/2021), available at file:///Users/stacycaplow/Downloads/21050301.pdf.

 

[15] Philip G. Schrag, Andrew I. Schoenholtz and Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Refugee Roulette. (2011). NEED FULL CITE For example, in the Atlanta Immigration Court, every judge’s denial rate exceeds 90% in contrast to the New York Immigration Court where 29 judges deny in less than 30% of cases. TRAC Immigration, Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts
FY 2015-2020, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2020/denialrates.html.

 

[16] This essay does not address the longstanding arguments advanced for an independent Article I Court.  For a selection of perspectives on that see, e.g., Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13-1 Bender’s Immig. Bull. 3, 5 (2008) (the author is an Immigration Judge); Maurice Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 San Diego L. Rev. 1, 18 (1980) (the author was the retired Chair of the Board of Immigration Appeals); American Bar Association Commission on Immigration, Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Create independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, Feb. 2010 and Update 2019, available at. https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2019/03/aba-commission-to-recommend-immigration-reform/(containing more than 100 specific recommendations); AILA, Featured Issue: Immigration Courts, available at, https://www.aila.org/advo-media/issues/all/immigration-courts; Hearing before House Committee on the Judiciary, Courts in Crisis: The State of Judicial Independence and Due Process in U.S. Immigration Courts, Jan. 29.2020, available at, https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2757; New York City Bar Association, Report on the Independence of the Immigration Courts, Oct. 21, 2020, available at https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/reports-listing/reports/detail/independence-of-us-immigration-courts. Statement of Immigration Judge A. Ashley Tabbador on behalf of National Association of Immigration Judges before House Committee on the Judiciary, Jan. 29, 2020, available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU01/20200129/110402/HHRG-116-JU01-Wstate-TabaddorA-20200129.pdf. https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/19070802-pdf-1.pdf. Other voices include the Roundtable of Former Immigration Judges, law professors (see, e.g., Letter to Attorney General Merrick Garlard, available at, https://www.aila.org/File/Related/21050334a.pdf) and the Marshall Project, Is It Time to Remove Immigration Courts From Presidential Control?, Aug. 28, 2019, available at https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/08/28/is-it-time-to-remove-immigration-courts-from-presidential-control; Federal Bar Ass’n, Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, https://www.fedbar.org/government-relations/policy-priorities/article-i-immigration-court/ (last visited May 17, 2021; Mimi Tsankov, Human Rights Are at Risk, ABA Human Rts. Mag., Apr. 20, 2020, available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/immigration/human-rights-at-risk/.

 

[17] Attorney General Garland has been actively withdrawing decisions issues by his predecessors. See, e.g., Matter of A-C-A-A, 28 I&N Dec. 351 (A.G. 2021), vacating in its entirety Matter of A-C-A-A, I&N Dec. 84 (A.G. 2020) and restoring discretion to IJs in case management; Matter of Cruz Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326(A.G. 2021), overruling Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018) and restoring ability of IJs to administratively close cases. These decisions also free up Trial Attorneys to exercise PD.

 

[18] Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242156/download (last visited June 1, 2021).

 

[19] Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics Number of Courtrooms, available at  https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248526/download Data collected as of April 2021).

 

[20] Executive Office of Immigration Review, Workload and Adjudication Statistics, Tables 25 and 25A, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/workload-and-adjudication-statistics (data collected as of April 21, 2021).

 

[20]  Dept. of Justice, EOIR, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge-bios  (last visited May 29, 2021).

[21] TRAC, The State of the Immigration Courts: Trump Leaves Biden 1.3 Million Case Backlog in Immigration Courts, available at, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/637/.

[22] Memorandum from the Attorney General for the Executive Office of Immigration Review, Renewing Our Commitment to the Timely and Efficient Adjudication of Immigration Cases to Serve the National Interest, Dec. 5, 2017, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1041196/download.

[23] The total number of pending cases from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras is 715,557. An additional 212, 859 cases from Mexico raise the total to 928,416. Id. at Appendix Table 3. Backlogged Immigration Court Cases and Wait Times by Nationality.

[24] Austin Kocher, ICE Filed Over 100,000 New Cases and Clogged the Courts at the Peak of the Pandemic, Documented, Sept 16, 2020, available at, https://documentedny.com/2020/09/16/ice-filed-over-100000-new-cases-and-clogged-the-courts-in-the-peak-of-the-pandemic/ (last visited May 18, 2021).

[25] Patt Morrison, How the Trump administration is turning judges into ‘prosecutors in a judge’s robe.’ L.A. Times, Aug. 29, 2018., available at, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-ol-patt-morrison-judge-ashley-tabaddor-20180829-htmlstory.html/

[26] Memorandum of James McHenry, Director, Executive Office of Immigration Review, Case Priorities and Performance Metrics, Jan. 17, 2018, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1026721/download.

 

[27] Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 272 (A.G. 2018).

 

[28] U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (Agency) and National Association of Immigration Judges International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Judicial Council 2, 71 FLRA No. 207 (2020).

 

[29] Amiena Khan & Dorothy Harbeck (IJs), DOJ Tries to Silence the Voice of the Immigration Judges—Again! The Federal Lawyer, Mar.Apr. 2020; available at https://immigrationcourtside.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Immigration-TFL_Mar-Apr2020.pdf; Laila Hlass et al., Let Immigration Judges Speak, Slate, oct. 24, 2019, available at, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/10/immigration-judges-gag-rule.html.

[30] Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G.2018) (virtually disqualifying victims of domestic violence and gang violence for asylum). See also, Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, effective date, Jan. 11, available at 2021https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/11/2020-26875/procedures-for-asylum-and-withholding-of-removal-credible-fear-and-reasonable-fear-review.

[31] Executive Office of Immigration Review, Immigration Judge, available at

https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/immigration-judge-16 (last visited May 15, 2021).

[32] IJ Dana Marks provided this unforgettable description on Immigration Courts: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), Apr. 2, 2018, available at  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fB0GBwJ2QA&t=11s (last visited May 20, 2021).

[33] These charts were prepared from the biographical information contained in EOIR announcements of new IJs appointed by an Attorney General serving in the Trump administration between May 2017 and April 2021. The government agencies include The Office of Principal Legal Advisor [OPLA] is the prosecution branch of Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] which in turn is a branch of Department of Homeland Security [DHS]. The Office of Immigration Litigation [OIL], a division of the Department of Justice [DOJ] that represents the government in federal court.

 

[34] In a picture of the newly installed judges sitting in the New York Immigration Court, 8 of the judges previously worked for immigration enforcement agencies, 3 had represented immigrants and 3 had no prior immigration practice experience. Beth Fertig, Presiding Under Pressure, NY Public Radio, May 29, 2019, available at, https://www.wnyc.org/story/presiding-under-pressure.

 

[35] Training now is only a few weeks rather than months. Reade Levinson, Kristina Cooke & Mica Rosenberg, Special Report: How Trump administration left indelible mark on U.S. immigration courts, Mar. 8, 2021 (describing inter alia) the selection and abbreviated training processes), available at, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-trump-court-special-r/special-report-how-trump-administration-left-indelible-mark-on-u-s-immigration-courts-idUSKBN2B0179.

 

[36] This is not necessarily a new criticism. For example, more than 15 years ago, Judge Richard A. Posner decried “the systematic failure by the judicial officers of the immigration service to provide reasoned analysis for the denial of applications for asylum.”  Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F. 3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2004).

[37] Eighty-two experienced Immigration Judges have resigned since 2017. TRAC Immigration, More Immigration Judges Leaving the Bench, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/617/. See also Outgoing SF Immigration Judge Blasts. Immigration Court as ‘Soul Crushing,’ Too Close to ICE, S.F. Chronicle, May 19 2021, available at https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Exclusive-Outgoing-SF-immigration-judge-blasts-16183235.php;  Immigration Judges are quitting or retiring early because of Trump, L.A. Times, Jan. 27, 2020, available at, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-01-27/immigration-judges-are-quitting-or-retiring-early-because-of-trump; Why This Burned-Out Immigration Judge Quit Her Job, The Immigration Post, Feb. 27, 2020, available at, https://www.theimmigrationpost.com/why-this-burned-out-immigration-judge-quit-her-job/; Katie Benner, Top Immigration Judge Departs Amid Broader Discontent Over Trump Policies, NY Times, Sept. 13, 2019, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/us/politics/immigration-courts-judge.html; Hamed Aleaziz, Being An Immigration Judge Was Their Dream. Under Trump, It Became Untenable, BuzzFeed News, Feb. 13,2019, available at, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/immigration-policy-judge-resign-trump; Ilyce Shugall, Op-Ed, Why I Resigned as an Immigration Judge, L.A.Times, Aug. 4, 2019, available at, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-08-03/immigration-court-judge-asylum-trump-policies.

[38] See, e.g., Statement to the House Judiciary Committee on Immigration Court Reform, Jan. 29, 2020 (36 signers) available at, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU01/20200129/110402/HHRG-116-JU01-20200129-SD022.pdf; Brief for Amici Curiae Former Immigration Judges in Support of Petitioner, Barton v. Barr, 140 U.S. 1142 (2020).

 

[39] In FY 2020, the denial rate for asylum, withholding or removal or CAT relief increased to 71.6 percent, up from 54.6 percent in FY 2016. 73.7 percent of immigration judge decisions denied asylum. TRAC Immigration, Asylum Denial Rates Continue to Climb, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/630/ (last visited May 116, 2021); see also, Paul Moses & Tim Healy, Here’s Why the Rejection Rate for Asylum Seekers Has Exploded in America’s Largest Immigration Court in NYC, Dec. 2, 2019, available at, https://www.thedailybeast.com/heres-why-the-rejection-rate-for-asylum-seekers-has-exploded-in-americas-largest-immigration-court-in-nyc.

 

[40] Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics, Asylum Statistics, Data Generated: April 19, 202, available at  https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248491/download

 

[41] TRAC Immigration, Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts
FY 2013-2018, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2018/denialrates.html.

 

[42] TRAC Immigration, Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts
FY 2015-2020, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2020/denialrates.html

 

[43] Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G.2018).

 

[44] The Attorney General has the power to certify matters for their review. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (h).

 

[45] Tanvi Misra, DOJ hiring changes may help Trump’s plan to curb immigration, Roll Call, May 4, 2020, available at, https://www.rollcall.com/2020/05/04/doj-hiring-changes-may-help-trumps-plan-to-curb-immigration; Tanvi Misra, DOJ changed hiring to promote restrictive immigration judges, Roll Call, Oct. 29, 2019, available at, https://www.rollcall.com/2019/10/29/doj-changed-hiring-to-promote-restrictive-immigration-judges/; see James R. McHenry III, Director EOIR, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Immigration Judge and Appellate Immigration Judge Hiring Process , Feb. 19, 2019, available at, https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/general_topics/eoir_hiring_procedures_for_aij/download. The DOJ has been called out in the past for making political appointments during the last Republican administration, see Monica Goodling, et al., Office of the Inspector General, Attorney General, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the, Chapt. 6, Evidence and Analysis: Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals Member Hiring Decisions, July 2008.

 

[46] As of January 2020, the lowest starting salary is $138, 630 and ultimately caps at $181,500. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 2020 Immigration Judge Pay Rates, available at,

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1236526/download.

 

[47] EOIR, Immigration Judge, https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/immigration-judge-7. This website refers to a section called “How You Will Be Evaluated” which appears nowhere. Military service assures a strong preference.

 

[48] Jean King, Acting Director, Policy Memo 21-25 Provides EOIR policies regarding the effect of Department of Homeland Security enforcement priorities and initiatives, June 11, 2021.

 

 

 

The Fight for Immigration Justice Is Not Over: SCOTUS Rules Mandatory Detention of Certain Immigrants Seeking Safety in the United States

By: Sophia Genovese*

In Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. __ (2021), the Supreme Court held that noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are not entitled to a custody redetermination, or bond, hearing before the Immigration Court. This holding effectively leaves thousands of asylum seekers at risk of prolonged and indefinite detention.

By way of background, individuals who return to the United States after having previously been removed are subject to reinstatement of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); 8 C.F.R. 241.8(a). However, if someone with a prior removal order expresses a fear of persecution, they are referred for a Reasonable Fear Interview (RFI) where they must demonstrate “a reasonable possibility that he or she would be persecuted on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, or a reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8(e), 208.31(c). If an Asylum Officer determines that there is a reasonable possibility that the noncitizen will face persecution or torture, the noncitizen will be placed into withholding-only proceedings where they are only permitted to apply for withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e). Neither withholding of removal nor protection under CAT grant lawful permanent residence, but both allow for the noncitizen to obtain work authorization and reside in the United States. An individual granted withholding of removal or protection under CAT can be removed to a third county (see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(f)); however, this rarely occurs.

Prior to Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, most individuals in withholding-only proceedings were held in immigration detention unless they resided in a jurisdiction where they were eligible for release on bond. Prior to June 29, 2021, according to the Second and Fourth Circuits, the detention of noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and are thus entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d). Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2016); Guzman Chavez v. Hott, 940 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2019). According to the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, the detention of noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and are thus not entitled to a bond hearing under the §1226(a) provisions. Martinez v. LaRose, 968 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2020); Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison, 905 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2018); Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2017).

The Second Circuit was the first court of appeals to directly address the issue of whether individuals in withholding-only proceedings were entitled to a bond hearing. In Guerra, the Second Circuit explained that there are two statutory sections which authorize the detention of noncitizens:  8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which governs detention “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States,” and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which governs detention of noncitizens subject to a final order of removal. 831 F.3d at 62. Under § 1226(a), noncitizens are eligible for a custody redetermination, or a bond, hearing before the immigration court, so long as they are not classified as arriving noncitizens on their Notices to Appear, nor subject to mandatory detention under §1226(c). Under §1231(a), detention is mandatory for the 90-day “removal period” after a removal order becomes “administratively final,” and thereafter, noncitizens are entitled to periodic review of their detention by ICE; however, ICE is permitted to continue detaining the individual and extend the removal period. The Second Circuit reasoned that §1226(a) does not contemplate whether the noncitizen is “theoretically removable but rather whether the [noncitizen] will actually be removed.” Guerra, 831 F.3d at 62. It follows that a noncitizen subject to reinstatement of removal is removable, “but the purpose of withholding only proceedings is to determine precisely whether ‘the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.’” Id. The Second Circuit reasoned that §1226(a) contemplates detention of removal proceedings which are ongoing, whereas §1231(a) is primarily concerned with defining the 90-day removal period during which a noncitizen “shall” be removed, and thus, §1226(a) governed the detention of noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings. Id. In addressing finality of the reinstated removal order, the Second Circuit explained that the decision to remove the noncitizen from the country is not made until the proceedings are complete, and accordingly, the reinstated removal order cannot be administratively final. Id. at 64.

In Guzman Chavez v. Hott, 940 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2019), the Fourth Circuit reasoned along similar lines. The Court concluded that §1226 and §1231 “fit together to form a workable statutory framework,” where the §1226 applies “before the government has the actual authority to remove a noncitizen from the country,” and that §1231 applies “once the government has that authority.” 940 F.3d at 876. And thus, “because the government lacks the authority to actually execute orders of removal while withholding-only proceedings are ongoing the petitioners are detained under § 1226.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit and held that noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are detained pursuant to §1231(a). Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F. 3d 826 (9th Cir. 2017). The noncitizen in this case, Mr. Raul Padilla-Ramirez, had previously been deported after his application for asylum was denied. Id. at 829. He re-entered the United States a few years later undetected and was transferred to ICE custody after dismissal of unrelated criminal charges in 2015. While in ICE custody, Mr. Padilla-Ramirez expressed a fear of return to his native El Salvador, passed his RFI, and was placed into withholding-only proceedings. Id. After being denied the opportunity to seek bond before the immigration court, Mr. Padilla-Ramirez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the district court, and he appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision of the lower court, concluding that §1231(a) governed Mr. Padilla-Ramirez’s detention, and ruled that he was not entitled a bond hearing under §1226(a). But see Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that prolonged detention under §1231(a)(6) is prohibited without an individualized hearing to determine whether the person is a flight risk or a danger to the community). In reaching their decision, the Ninth Circuit first analyzed the removal period and assessed whether Mr. Padilla-Ramirez’s reinstated removal order was “administratively final.” The Court concluded that under a plain reading of §1231(a)(5), a reinstated removal order is administratively final. Id. at 831. The Court reasoned that the removal order was final when it was first executed, and if reinstated, it is reinstated from its original date and thus retains the same administrative finality. Id. The Court also reasoned that since the reinstatement provision is in the same section in the Act entitled “Detention and removal of [noncitizen] ordered removed,” Congress intended for the detention of noncitizens subject to reinstatement to be governed by that section, which require that the order be administratively final. Id. The Court concluded that withholding-only proceedings do not affect the administrative finality of the removal order; but rather, only determine whether a noncitizen ought to be removed to a particular country, and thus §1231(a) governs their detention. Id. at 832.

The Third Circuit in Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison, 905 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2018) agreed with the Ninth Circuit. Mr. Rafael Guerrero-Sanchez had reentered the United States after having previously been ordered removed, passed his RFI, and was placed into withholding-only proceedings. Having been denied a bond hearing, Mr. Guerrero-Sanchez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court held that his detention was governed by §1226(a) and ordered his release after nearly two years in ICE custody. 905 F.3d at 210. On appeal, the government argued that Mr. Guerrero-Sanchez was detained pursuant to §1231(a), and not entitled to a bond hearing. In response, Mr. Guerrero-Sanchez argued that he was detained pursuant to §1226(a) and was entitled to a bond hearing; and also, even if detained pursuant to §1231(a), he was still entitled to a bond hearing given his prolonged detention. Id. at 211. The Court ultimately held that §1231(a) governed Mr. Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention, that his reinstated removal order was administratively final, and “that §1231(a)(6) affords a bond hearing after prolonged detention [after six months] to any [noncitizen] who falls within the ambit of that provision.” Id.

The Sixth Circuit in Martinez v. LaRose, similarly held that noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are detained pursuant to §1231(a). 968 F. 3d at 557. The petitioner in this case, Mr. Walter Martinez, had been previously deported in 2008. Upon return to El Salvador, he was brutally beaten by the MS-13 gang and the police who worked with the gang. He fled to the United States again, passed his RFI, and was held in immigration detention for two years. Mr. Martinez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his prolonged detention had violated his due process rights and requesting that he be given an individualized bond hearing. Id. His habeas petition was dismissed, where the district court held that §1226(a) does not apply to his detention, and under § 1231(a), “his due process claims fail because his removal is reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at 558. The Sixth Circuit upheld the decision and declined to adopt a similar six-month test as had been done in Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison.

Johnson v. Guzman Chavez

The Supreme Court in Johnson v. Guzman Chavez addressed the circuit split and examined whether noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are entitled to a bond hearing before the immigration court.

Justice Alito writing on behalf of the conservative majority ultimately agreed with the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, holding that the detention of noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are not entitled to a bond hearing, and that the reinstated removal orders are administratively final. Notably, the Court refers to noncitizens as “aliens” an astonishing 214 times in its decision, despite recent efforts to abolish the use of the dehumanizing term. The Court, in rejecting the arguments of counsel for the noncitizens, found that withholding-only proceedings only address whether the noncitizen is to be removed to a particular country, and not from the United States, concluding that the reinstated removal order remains final throughout these proceedings. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 11. The Court acknowledges that although very few individuals are ever removed to a third country, this reality does not negate the fact that withholding-only proceedings are country specific. Id.

The majority cites to §1231(a) in rendering its decision. The Court explained that the 90-day removal period in §1231(a)(1)(A) begins on the latest of three dates (1) the date the order of removal becomes “administratively final,” (2) the date of the final order of any court that entered a stay of removal, or (3) the date on which the alien is released from non-immigration detention or confinement. §1231(a)(1)(B). During the removal period, detention is mandatory. §1231(a)(2). The removal period may be extended in certain conditions, including: if the noncitizen takes actions which prevent their removal; if DHS stays the removal if it is not practicable or proper; or if the noncitizen is inadmissible, removable as a result of certain violations, or is a risk to the community. §§ 1231(a)(1)(C), 1231(c)(2)(A), 1231(a)(6). By taking a plain reading of the statute, the Court states, the reinstated removal orders have long been final, and “there is nothing left for the BIA to do with respect to the removal order other than to execute it.” 594 U.S. at 10. The majority sidesteps any analysis under Chevron or Auer, and resorts to a pseudo-textual interpretation of the INA, continuing a trend also observed in Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 593 U.S. ___ (2021), where the Supreme Court similarly refused to engage in a Chevron analysis. The majority seeks to justify its holding and prohibition of bond hearings for noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings by commenting “[noncitizens] who reentered the country illegally after removal have demonstrated a willingness to violate the terms of a removal order, and they therefore may be less likely to comply with the reinstated order.” Id. at 20.

Agreeing with the Fourth and Second Circuits, the dissent argues that §1226(a) governs the detention of noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings where there is a pending decision on whether the noncitizen is to be removed from the United States. The dissent also finds that the reinstated removal order is not final while withholding-only proceedings are pending. The dissent remarks that withholding-only proceedings involve a full hearing before the immigration court, may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and seek judicial review thereafter, which can take well over two years before the case is resolved. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 5 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent questions whether Congress intended to deny bond hearings “to individuals who reasonably fear persecution or torture, and who, as a result, face proceedings that may last for many months or years.” Id. at 6.

The dissent also finds that §1231(a)(1)(A)’s language, “except as otherwise provided in this section,” and the later restriction-on-removal provision indicate that §1231(a) is not the appropriate governing statute for the detention of withholding-only applicants. Id. The dissent reasons that the removal period for withholding-only applicants cannot begin until their proceedings have concluded – that is, “the order is not ‘final’ until the immigration judge and the BIA finally determine whether the restriction on removal applies and prohibits removal.” Id. at 7. By adopting the majority’s rationale that the reinstated removal order is final as of the date it was originally executed, it creates uncertainty around how, if it all, the removal period can apply to withholding-only applicants.

Who Is Affected By This Decision?

As examined in our previous articles (here, here, and here), the Trump administration eviscerated asylum protections in the United States. Under this and other flawed case law and policies, thousands of asylum seekers were deported despite having very real fears of violence in their countries of origin. Upon returning to their home countries, and facing the exact violence they anticipated, noncitizens return to the United States again seeking safety.

Although the Biden administration has taken important steps to undo some of the most egregious Trump-era policies (such as restoring asylum eligibility for survivors of domestic violence and family units, and empowering judges to manage their own dockets), the administration continues to follow the unlawful practice of expelling migrants and asylum seekers under the supposed authority of Title 42, resulting in thousands of asylum seekers being forcibly denied entry into the United States. Because asylum seekers still face the same dangers they fled, they are forced to seek irregular entry into the United States; and, depending on their individual situation and whether they have a prior removal order, may be subjected to withholding-only proceedings.

Now in the United States a second or third time after previously being unfairly removed, these individuals are only eligible for withholding of removal or protection under CAT, which do not lead to permanent lawful status. Withholding of removal and protection under CAT are also both extremely difficult protections to achieve – far more difficult than winning asylum. And in light of Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings will have to fight for these narrow protections from the confines of immigration detention, where they are at high risk of contracting COVID-19, likely to experience difficulties in accessing evidence they need for their cases, as well as less likely to find competent counsel.

Strategies for Noncitizens in Withholding-Only Proceedings Seeking Release From Immigration Detention

Although Guzman Chavez prevents noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings from seeking bond under §1226(a) authority, there remain several avenues to advocate for release:

Advocates and attorneys may request that ICE exercise prosecutorial discretion in vacating reinstatement orders and issuing notices to appear, which will allow noncitizens to pursue all relief in ordinary removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a); Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2013) (“ICE agents, to whom § 1231(a)(5) delegates the decision to reinstate a prior removal order, may exercise their discretion not to pursue streamlined reinstatement procedures.”)  It follows that the noncitizen would then be detained pursuant to §1226(a) and thus entitled to a bond hearing.

Individuals may also seek release from ICE custody as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. Noncitizens may be released on parole or on their own recognizance. In seeking release, noncitizens must establish that they are not a danger to the community nor a flight risk, and should submit evidence of strong equities which would convince ICE to exercise its discretion in releasing the noncitizen from ICE custody. (See CLINIC’s Guide to Obtaining Release From Immigration Detention for helpful tips on preparing these requests for release).

Noncitizens may also continue seeking bond hearings in the Third and Ninth Circuits, where these jurisdictions have ruled that noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are permitted to seek custody review after their detention has become prolonged (usually at six months). Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2018); Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011). In other jurisdictions, noncitizens can seek release via a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that their indefinite detention violates their due process rights. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (See the American Bar Association’s Guide for Seeking Release from Indefinite Detention After Receiving A Final Order of Deportation for tips and sample petitions).

Johnson v. Guzman Chavez significantly restricts the ability to obtain release from ICE custody for noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings. Although practitioners have many other tools at their disposal to advocate for the release of their clients, what is ultimately needed are concrete legislative changes that make clear noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are bond eligible, or more broadly, legislation which challenges the existence of immigration detention for all noncitizens.

*Guest author Sophia Genovese is a Pro Bono Supervising Attorney at Catholic Charities Community Services, Archdiocese of New York. Sophia trains and mentors pro bono volunteer attorneys in their representation of immigrants in removal proceedings. Sophia also represents detained and non-detained immigrants in seeking release and relief before the immigration courts. Sophia previously worked as an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC, where she gained critical insights into immigration law.

No Longer in Use: How Changes in SOC Systems Affect Employment-based Immigration

Cyrus D. Mehta and Isabel Rajabzadeh*

The Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) is a federal statistical standard used by federal agencies to classify workers into occupational categories. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) coordinates the Federal statistical system, including the SOC. The SOC Policy Committee assists the OMB in the SOC revision process, and is comprised of Federal agencies including the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor. Most notably, SOC codes are used to categorize nonimmigrant and immigrant workers on the Permanent Employment Certification (“PERM” or Form ETA 9089, used to file most I-140s),  the Labor Condition Application (“LCA”, necessary to file H-1Bs and other visas) and the ETA 9142B for H-2B workers. The SOC system was created in order to facilitate job classification. It therefore collects occupational data and enables comparison of occupations across data sets.

In assigning the correct SOC code for employment-based petitions, one must compare the proffered position’s job duties and its requirements against the system. In addition, the requirement to pay prevailing wages as a minimum salary is mandatory for some employment-based visas. In order to determine the prevailing wage of a geographic area, one must look up the SOC code in the Foreign Labor Certification Data Center Online Wage Library (“OWL”) which is run by the U.S. Department of Labor.

According to the Department of Labor, the SOC serves as the framework for information being gathered through the Department of Labor’s Occupational Information Network (O*NET). The O*NET database includes detailed information on tasks, skills, tools used, credentials, and other information associated with the occupations. Much like the OWL, the information found on O*NET is listed by the occupation’s SOC codes.

Many may not realize the SOC codes exist, however, its use is integral to some employment-based visas and therefore, can result in a denial if not used properly. These codes are based on statistics, however, what happens when the system is updated? The SOC has been revised four times: 1980, 2000, and then again ten years later in 2010. The most recent update is the 2018 SOC system, which was deemed to be a “multi-year process” by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. In November 2020, the O*NET 25.1 Database incorporated the O*NET-SOC 2019 Taxonomy, which aligned with the 2018 SOC system. It stated, “updates and added new and emerging occupations ensure that the O*NET-SOC taxonomy not only represents the SOC structure, but reflects changes occurring in the world of work due to advancing technologies, innovative business practices, and the new organization of work.” However, the OWL still has not caught up with all of the SOC codes listed in the 2018 SOC system. Although the OWL states it integrated O*NET 25.3 on July 1, 2021, (which is later than version 25.1) it still does not reflect all of the changed SOC codes in the 2018 SOC system.

The Problem

In an effort to transition between the different SOC systems and SOC codes, “crosswalks” were developed to portray the changes of that year’s update. The crosswalks show which SOC code was replaced by a different title and/or SOC code number. The crosswalk from the 2000 SOC to the 2010 SOC can be found here. The crosswalk from the 2010 SOC to the 2018 SOC can be found here. As stated above, the OWL fails to keep up with the changes in the SOC codes. This causes huge discrepancies. Although not always detrimental to a case, it may cause unnecessary delays such a Request For Evidence (“RFE”).

For instance, “15-1031, Computer Software Engineers, Applications” is no longer in use and it was replaced by “15-1132 Software Developers, Applications” in the 2010 SOC system. Then, the 2018 SOC system changed the SOC code again to, “15-1252, Software Developers.” But what happens when a PERM was filed in 2011 which used the SOC code based on the 2010 SOC system? Then, 10 years later, the foreign national wants to downgrade their I-140 to take advantage of EB-3 priority dates? Which SOC code should be used on the I-140 form? Use of the 15-1031 SOC code would patch the previously filed PERM, however, it is no longer in use so that may raise flags. Use of the new SOC code may be effective, however, it may trigger a Request for Evidence. Even if there is an RFE, it could be overcome by explaining that 15-1132 (Software Developers, Applications) has replaced 15-1031 (Computer Software Engineers), which in turn has most recently been replaced by 15-1252 (Software Developers).

Not only are immigrant visas affected by this but the H-1B system also relies heavily on SOC codes. What happens when an SOC code like 15-1132 is used on an LCA because the new SOC code 15-1252 is not reflected in the OWL and thus, one cannot reference the most relevant information to determine the position? Although usage of the “older” SOC codes on LCAs seem to be permitted by the USCIS, there is significantly less detailed information on the OWL for each SOC code than O*NET. While the O*NET provides detailed explanations for each SOC code based on the 2018 SOC System, we are left using the 2010 SOC system to determine prevailing wage information. In responding to specialty occupation RFE’s, this system forces individuals to not only argue the specialized nature of the position, but that the O*NET also sees it as a specialty occupation in order to strengthen the argument. In some cases, this requires one to dig into the O*NET archives to find the older 2010 SOCs.

In an occupation like technology it is understandable that SOC codes require changes. However, the impact of these changes on petitions filed by employers for immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications are not formally addressed, and therefore, require us to connect the SOC code dots.

Finally, it should be noted that the Office of Foreign Labor Certification Data Center (“OFLC) has delayed the implementation of the 2018 SOCs to July 1, 2022. While O*NET has updated its system to the 2018 SOCs, the 2010 SOCs are archived in O*NET. Stakeholders can only use the 2010 SOCs until July 1, 2022, when the OFLC makes them go live in the Foreign Labor Application Gateway (FLAG), OWL, and in the PERM portal.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

* Isabel Rajabzadeh is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC and is admitted to practice law in New York.

 

Wang v. Blinken Nixes Any Hope for Excluding the Counting of Family Members in the Green Card Caps

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On July 9, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion in Wang v. Blinken, No. 20-5076 (D.C. Cir. 2021), interpreting INA § 203(d) to include the counting of derivatives toward the EB-5 investor cap. The Plaintiffs in the case are a group of EB-5 investors who would have been able to adjust status long ago if not for the lengthy backlogs in the EB-5 China, and subsequently Vietnam, categories caused by counting derivative family members against the EB-5 cap.

In a previous blog, we discussed the case at the District Court Level, where Plaintiffs’ primary argument was that nothing in the language of INA § 203(d), which states that “[v]isas shall be made available, in a number not to exceed 7.1 percent of [the 140,000 employment-based] worldwide level, to qualified immigrants seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in a new enterprise…..in which such alien has invested” a qualifying amount of capital, and which will create at least 10 jobs for U.S. workers, requires derivative family members to be counted against the cap. Instead, spouses and children, under INA 203(d) are “entitled to the same status and the same order of consideration provided in the respective subsection, if accompanying or following to join, the spouse or parent.”

Plaintiffs also argued that Congress intended to exempt derivative family members from the numerical caps when it changed the relevant regulatory language in the Immigration Act of 1990. Prior to 1990, the “same status, and the same order of consideration” language as it pertains to derivative family members appeared in a section describing which immigrants “are subject to the numerical limitations”, but in 1990 this provision was shifted to a new section entitled “Treatment of Family Members”. Plaintiffs argued that this change indicated an intent on the part of Congress to subject only EB-5 investors, and not their spouses and children, to the numerical cap.

The Court, however, disagreed with this reasoning. Judge Walker, who authored the opinion, interpreted the key phrase “same status” to mean that because an EB-5 investor’s family members get the same type of visa as the principal, they must also be counted against the cap, and reasoned that “same order of consideration provided in the respective subsection,” which refers to the worldwide cap on employment-based visas, further indicates that spouses and children of EB-5 investors are subject to the cap.

The Court’s decision in Wang v. Blinken comes as a deep disappointment to the many immigration attorneys who had hoped that the Biden administration could reinterpret INA § 203(d) to support either not count derivatives at all or counting family units as one. We have long taken the position that not counting derivatives under the preference quotas would be consistent with INA § 203(d). See, for example, our blogs on The Tyranny of Priority Dates in 2010, How President Obama Can Erase Immigrant Visa Backlogs With A Stroke Of A Pen in 2012, and The Way We Count in 2013. The Biden administration solicited recommendations on how to remove barriers and obstacles to legal immigration, and unitary counting of derivatives, an idea which our firm proposed,  would have done much to serve this goal by relieving the decade-long backlogs. If the Biden administration wanted to reform the immigration system through executive actions, reinterpreting the law to not count derivatives in the green card categories would have been a good first step, along with not opposing the plaintiffs in Wang v. Blinken. Sadly, though, the administration did not choose to go in this direction, and the Court’s decision in Wang v. Blinken is likely a death knell for other, future lawsuits that would make similar arguments under other employment or family-based visa categories.

While the Court’s decision in Wang v. Blinken can still be appealed to the Supreme Court, a positive outcome is not likely given the conservative majority on the Supreme Court, which has adopted a pseudo textualist approach to interpreting immigration statutes. For instance, the Supreme Court in Sanchez v. Mayorkas also recently strictly interpreted INA § 244(f)(4) to hold that the grant of Temporary Protected Status did not constitute an admission thus allowing recipients to adjust status in the US.   Even if different plaintiffs could get a favorable decision in another circuit, the Supreme Court would likely rule on the circuit split anyway. Particularly as it has Chevron deference on its side, the government is likely to prevail in any litigation scenario. And even if the Biden administration later changes its mind and decides to adopt a nationwide policy to not count derivatives, it would be precluded from implementing this policy for people living within the jurisdiction of the D.C Circuit.  Perhaps a better way forward would be convincing Congress to explicitly state that derivative family members will not be counted against the cap under INA § 203(d). Passing such an amendment would be extremely difficult in a divided Senate, but one idea is to pass a measure through the reconciliation procedure that requires only a simple majority, rather than a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate.

(This blog is for information purposes, and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice).

* Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a Law Clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

 

Requesting Premium Processing on a Downgraded I-140 Petition  

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In October 2020, USCIS’ decision to apply the Filing Dates, rather than the Final Action Dates, to employment-based I-485 adjustment of status applications, together with advancement in the Filing Dates in the State Department Visa Bulletin allowed many noncitizen workers who had been trapped in the green card backlogs for years to file I-485 adjustment of status applications. Since the EB-3 Filing Date for India significantly overtook the EB-2 Filing Date, some beneficiaries approved EB-2 petition opted to “downgrade” by filing a new I-140 under EB-3. Generally, beneficiaries may still rely on the original Labor Certification when filing a downgraded I-140 and retain the priority date of the EB-2 petition, unless the job has drastically changed.

In previous blogs, we have discussed the nuances of filing a downgrade petition, and addressed some common questions that arise in this situation. One frequent source of questions is whether Premium Processing is available for downgrade petitions given that these I-140 petitions filed since October 2020 are still pending and have yet to be approved. Generally, USCIS will  not accept a case for Premium Processing unless it is filed with an original Labor Certification. Thus, beneficiaries whose Labor Certifications were filed with the original EB-2 petition likely cannot file a downgrade I-140 together with a Premium Processing request. Although USCIS might, in rare instances, accept a Premium Processing request made with an I-140 downgrade petition, it is more likely that the Premium request, or even the entire petition, will be rejected.

A strategy more likely to meet with success is filing the downgrade I-140 via regular processing, waiting USCIS to issue a receipt notice, and then request Premium Processing of the pending I-140. USCIS may still reject the Premium Processing request if it cannot match the pending I-140 to the previous file or retrieve the original Labor Certification. Even in the case of a rejection, however, the pending I-140 will be safe and subsequent Premium Processing requests can be filed, if desired. There are an increased number of Premium Processing requests from beneficiaries of downgraded I-140 petitions given that the EB-3 India Final Action Date has rapidly advanced. Under the July 2021 State Department Visa Bulletin, the EB-3 India Final Action Date is January 1, 2013. If the I-140 petition is approved when the Final Action Date is current for the I-140 petition, the beneficiary and family members can hope to have their I-485 applications approved although the USCIS has been approving them at a snail’s pace and may alarmingly not be able to use up all EB visas for this fiscal year. It should also be noted that the swifter approval of the I-140 petition does not speed up the processing of the applications for employment authorization or advance parole when the I-485 application remains pending.

Recently, however, we have seen some requests to upgrade I-140s to Premium Processing being repeatedly rejected on the ground that an original Labor Certification was no provided, despite other, similar Premium Processing requests being accepted. In an email inquiry placed to the USCIS Premium Processing address in response to one such case, our firm received a helpful response. An Immigration Services Officer  advised that Petitioners resubmit rejected Premium Processing requests and indicate on a brightly colored sheet of paper that USCIS has the original labor certification.  A more guaranteed method, according to the USCIS response, is to submit a copy of the original Labor Certification. Submissions lacking at least one of these documents are vulnerable to immediate rejection since the reviewing officer will not see a Labor Certification included. Although this was not part of the guidance we received, it would also be advisable to indicate the receipt number of the prior approved EB-2 petition which contains the original Labor Certification, and direct the USCIS to look for it in that petition.

Even if the Premium Processing request is accepted, there is always a risk that the USCIS might issue a Request for Evidence (RFE) even if the prior I-140 under EB-2 was approved. Note, though, that such an RFE could also be issued even if there is no request for Premium Processing, although there might be an incentive to issue the RFE if the officer cannot complete the processing within the mandated 15 days. Although RFEs have been seldom, the most common reason for an RFE is to request submission of evidence that the employer still has the ability to pay the proffered wage from the establishment of the priority date until the present, and up to the point of time that the beneficiary receives permanent residency.  If the employer’s current tax returns show losses and the beneficiary is not being paid the proffered wage,  Premium Processing should not be considered, and the I-140 can continue to remain pending,  until the employer is able to potentially overcome such an RFE.  Another reason for an RFE is that the prior SOC code that was designated at the time of the granting of the Labor Certification does not match with the SOC code that was indicated in the downgrade I-140 petition. This is not a valid basis for the USCIS to issue an RFE as the SOC code available for the occupation at that time has become obsolete. For instance, SOC Code 15-1031 for Computer Software Engineers, Applications is no longer in existence. It has now changed to SOC Code 15-1132 for Software Developers, which has again most recently changed to SOC Code 15-1252. This sort of RFE can be more easily overcome.

All of these issues should be carefully considered when requesting Premium Processing of a downgrade I-140 petition. Despite the issues that can arise when making a Premium Processing request of this kind, petitioners can help prevent rejections by following USCIS’ guidance and including a highly visible reference to the original Labor Certification, or a copy of the Labor Certification itself with the request. Submitting timely and thorough responses to any RFEs too helps to ensure that the petition will ultimately be successful.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be considered as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a law clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

Reflections on Giuliani’s Suspension of his New York Bar License

The  temporary suspension of Rudolph Giuliani’s bar license by a New York appellate court for making false statements on behalf of Donald Trump’s election is thought provoking for lawyers, especially those who have opposed Trump and continue to oppose him.

The court wrote that “these false statements were made to improperly bolster respondent’s narrative that due to widespread voter fraud, victory in the 2020 United States presidential election was stolen from his client.” The court further stated that “respondent’s conduct immediately threatens the public interest and warrants interim suspension from the practice of law, pending further proceedings before the Attorney Grievance Committee.”

Giuliani’s temporary suspension is based  specifically  on New York Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3, 4.1 and 8.4 while he was serving as Trump’s lawyer.

Rule 3.3 provides that: “(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”

Rule 4.1  provides that: “In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person,”

Rule 8.4 provides that  “A lawyer or law firm shall not: . . . (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, . . . or (h) engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.”

Charging a lawyer for a 3.3 violation is narrow as the lawyer must make false statements to the courts, but Giuliani was also charged under 4.1 and 8.4 for making false statements to legislators and the public. Charging a lawyer for making statements to the public under 4.1 and 8.4 is concerning as another disciplinary authority sympathetic to former president Trump may charge a lawyer for allegedly making false claims against Trump. One may argue that  Giuliani was  primarily charged in his capacity as a lawyer for Trump but the disciplinary rules are broad and allow a disciplinary authority to charge a lawyer  even if the lawyer may not be acting in a representational capacity on behalf of a client.

Many lawyers tweeted  that Trump was helped by the Russians to steal the 2016 elections and thus engaged in criminal conspiracy. The Mueller report found insufficient evidence that Trump’s  campaign “coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election-interference activities. “  However, the same  report  also found that  Trump engaged in  obstruction of justice, and so a lawyer  accused of making false claims against Trump can find support in the Mueller report itself  that the Russian government “interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion” and “violated U.S. criminal law”.    Even if a lawyer’s tweet is perceived by a pro-Trump disciplinary authority as not being entirely entirely  true that Trump criminally conspired with Russia, there probably would not be a basis to charge lawyers  under Rule 4.1 or 8.4 as they were not acting as lawyers for Clinton or her campaign. This lawyer may have a far stronger defense than Giuliani as the allegation that Trump was involved in a criminal conspiracy with Russian agents has not been entirely disproven.

Another interesting aspect of the NY court’s opinion is that Giuliani also lied that “illegal aliens” voted in Arizona. Here too he did this in his capacity as a lawyer for a Trump, but another NY lawyer Aaron Schlosberg was publicly censured  under 8.4(h) when he went on a racist rant against workers in a NY restaurant who spoke Spanish and not English, and he did not do this while representing a client. https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2021/01/04/manhattan-attorney-whose-racist-rant-went-viral-is-publicly-censured/?slreturn=20210524210958. This part of the opinion brings vindication to immigration lawyers who have strenuously opposed Trump and his allies for scapegoating immigrants.

The bottom line is that the same broad First Amendment protections may not apply to lawyers who violate the disciplinary rules, especially when they  knowingly make false statements in the course of representing a client or engage in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness as a lawyer. While Rule 3.3 is more specific as a lawyer can only be accused of violating it if they lie in court, and Rule 4.1 is triggered when the lawyer lies to third parties in the course of representing a client, a lawyer can be disciplined for just about any perceived violation under Rule 8.4 whether it is inside or outside the courtroom and even when it relates to conduct in a lawyer’s private life.

So while we rejoice that Giuliani got his comeuppance for blatantly lying on behalf of Trump that the election was stolen from him, remember the old saying that what is good for the goose is also good for the gander.

Sanchez v. Mayorkas: Although TPS Is Not An Admission, Justice Kagan’s Opinion Leaves Open Avenues for TPS Recipients to Adjust Status as Nonimmigrants

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On June 7, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Sanchez v. Mayorkas, holding that a grant of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) does not constitute an admission under INA § 245(a) for purposes of adjustment of status. Though overall a disappointing decision, the Court’s opinion may nonetheless leave open some options for some TPS recipients who want to obtain their green cards.

Sanchez v. Mayorkas involved the plight of Jose Santos Sanchez, an El Salvadoran national who entered the United States without inspection in 1997 and was subsequently granted TPS based on a series of earthquakes in his home country. In 2014, Sanchez, together with his wife, Sonia Gonzalez, sought to adjust status after more than 20 years of residence in the United States, but the USCIS denied his application on the grounds that “[a] grant of TPS does not cure a foreign national’s entry without inspection or constitute an inspection and admission of the foreign national”.

Sanchez challenged the denial, and the District Court ruled in his favor, holding that an LPR “’shall be considered as’ having ‘lawful status as a nonimmigrant’ for purposes of applying to become an LPR”. See Santos Sanchez v. Johnson, 2018 WL 6427894, *4 (D NJ, Dec. 7, 2018). The District Court further held that INA §244(f)(4) requires TPS holders to be treated “as though [they] had been ‘inspected and admitted.’” The Third Circuit, though, reversed, holding that “a grant of TPS does not constitute an ‘admission’ into the United States.” Sanchez v. Secretary U. S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 967 F. 3d 242, 252 (2020).

The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Kagan, held that an individual who entered the United States without inspection is not eligible to adjust status under INA §245 by virtue of being a TPS recipient. The Court drew a distinction between the concept of “admission” and one’s immigration status, noting that there are several categories of individuals who have nonimmigrant status without having been admitted to the United States (alien crewmen, crime  victims in U visa status, etc.).

Though unfortunate that the Court did not consider a grant to TPS to be an admission under INA § 245(a), Justice Kagan’s opinion includes some interesting language that may leave open some avenues for TPS recipients to adjust status. On pages 8-9 of the opinion, the Court held that TPS recipients will be considered to have nonimmigrant status, which is needed to adjust status under §245. Thus, an individual who was admitted to the United States in lawful B-2 status for example, but fell out of status before being granted TPS might be able to adjust status, having satisfied both the “admission” and “nonimmigrant status” requirements.

Thus, it is unclear whether a grant of TPS “wipes out” a lapse in one’s nonimmigrant status, no matter the duration. Justice Kagan gives the more narrow example of an individual who was out of status for a few months before receiving TPS, potentially implying that TPS ends an individual’s time out of status who otherwise would have exceeded 180 days and been unable to adjust under INA § 245(k). However, a noncitizen relying on §245(k) to adjust status would not need to have received TPS, or any other nonimmigrant status, to file an employment based I-485 within 180 days of admission.  On the other hand, INA §245(k) could still potentially come to the rescue if the individual is granted TPS status within 180 days of the admission but then seeks to file for adjustment of status 180 days after the admission. The grant of TPS would have put the person back in nonimmigrant status within the 180 days from the admission, even if they file an adjustment application after 180 days.

Justice Kagan’s opinion can be interpreted even more broadly to support the idea that a grant of TPS “wipes out” a lapse in the nonimmigrant status and thus overrides INA §§§ 245(c)(2), (7) and (8), when the lack of a lawful status impedes an individual’s ability to adjust status. Under INA §245(c)(2) an applicant for adjustment of status even if admitted (other than an immediate relative) is precluded from applying for adjustment of status if they are in unlawful status at the date of filing the application or who have failed to maintain continuously a lawful status since entry into the US. INA § 245(k) allows one who was admitted to apply for adjustment of status under the first three employment-based preferences and the employment-based fourth preference as a religious worker if they have failed to maintain lawful status for not more than 180 days. But INA § 245(k) is inapplicable to one who is applying for adjustment of status under a family-based preference.  A grant of TPS at any point in time, if Justice Kagan’s opinion is interpreted broadly, should once again render an applicant eligible for adjustment of status whether they are filing an adjustment application under a family based preference or  an employment-based preference even 180 days beyond the admission and the grant of TPS.

INA § 245(c)(7) similarly precludes adjustment of status to that of an immigrant under INA § 203(b) (the five employment-based preferences) for one who is not in a lawful nonimmigrant status. A grant of TPS ought to wipe out this impediment. INA § 245(c)(8) disqualifies one from adjusting status who accepted employment while unauthorized. Under the broader interpretation of Justice Kagan’s opinion, the grant of TPS ought to also remove this impediment under INA § 245(c)(8) too.

While the Supreme Court nixed the ability of TPS applicants to adjust status if they were not admitted, there are still some bright spots if one carefully parses through Justice Kagan’s opinion. Under the broadest interpretation of Justice Kagan’s opinion, TPS applicants, if they were initially admitted, should continue to claim that they are eligible to adjust status under both the family and employment preferences by virtue of receiving nonimmigrant status.

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a Law Clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

State Department’s New Guidance Broadening Transmission of Citizenship to Children Born Abroad Is Welcome and Consistent with Federal Court Decisions

On May 18, 2021, the State Department issued guidance broadening the path for transmission of US citizenship to a child born abroad to married parents. The guidance is reproduced below:

Recognizing the advances in assisted reproductive technology the State Department is updating our interpretation and application of Section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which establishes the requirements for acquisition of U.S. citizenship at birth.

Children born abroad to parents, at least one of whom is a U.S. citizen and who are married to each other at the time of the birth, will be U.S. citizens from birth if they have a genetic or gestational tie to at least one of their parents and meet the INA’s other requirements.  Previously, the Department’s interpretation and application of the INA required that children born abroad have a genetic or gestational relationship to a U.S. citizen parent.

This updated interpretation and application of the INA takes into account the realities of modern families and advances in ART from when the Act was enacted in 1952.

This change will allow increased numbers of married couples to transmit U.S. citizenship to their children born overseas, while continuing to follow the citizenship transmission requirements established in the INA.   Requirements for children born to unmarried parents remain unchanged.

At the same time, we remain vigilant to the risks of citizenship fraud, exploitation, and abuse.  As with all citizenship and immigration benefits we examine, the Department will implement this policy in a manner that addresses these concerns.

This new interpretation allows a U.S. citizen who has a child through surrogacy, an egg donor, in vitro fertilization as well as other advances in assisted reproductive technology (ART)  to transmit U.S. citizenship to their child, even if there is no genetic or gestational relationship to the U.S. citizen parent so long as such a link exists with the other married parent. As stated in the State Department’s announcement, this change in policy “takes into account the realities of modern families.” This is welcome news for a growing number of families who rely on the advancements of reproductive technologies to build their families.

For instance, prior State Department policy deprived the US citizen mother who may neither have been the gestational mother nor have a genetic relationship with the child from passing US citizenship. A US citizen mother is medically unable to bear a child and needs to use a surrogate mother overseas to carry the child to birth, and the egg is not hers and the sperm is from a non-US citizen father, US citizenship could not be passed onto the child. Thus, under the prior policy, such a mother who for medical reasons was unable to establish a biological link to her child, and also could not serve as the gestational mother herself, was unable to transmit US citizenship to her child. This was unfair for such mothers.

The nationality provisions of the INA were written long before the advent of ART. The State Department is to be heartily congratulated for bringing them into the 21st century. The willingness and ability to understand parentage in a broader sense is something for which advocates have long contended. It is precisely what a consistent line of Ninth Circuit case law and more recently a Second Circuit case, which did not deal with ART, has long exemplified. See Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159 (2000); Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales401 F. 3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005);   Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2018).  In these cases,  so long as a child was not born out of wedlock, or if born out of wedlock was subsequently legitimated,  the child did not need to prove that he or she was the biological child of the US citizen parent to acquire citizenship.

Public policy supports recognition and maintenance of a family unit. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) was intended to keep families together. It should be construed in favor of family units and the acceptance of responsibility by family members. See, e.g., Kaliski v. Dist. Dir. of INS, 620 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir.1980) (discussing the “humane purpose” of the INA and noting that a “strict interpretation” of the Act, including an “arbitrary distinction” between legitimate and illegitimate children, would “detract from … the purpose of the Act which is to prevent continued separation of families.”); H.R.Rep. No. 85-1199, pt. 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N.2016, 2020 (observing that the “legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to provide for a liberal treatment of children and was concerned with the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united).

Solis-Espinoza, supra, at 1094.

The Second Circuit in Jaen v. Sessions did not insist on a genetic or gestational tie with the US citizen parent, and the State Department’s new policy is consistent with Jaen v. Sessions. David Isaacson’s blog, Jaen v. Sessions: The Government Reminds Us That Government Manuals Aren’t Always Right, correctly pointed out that the prior US government policy or guidance may not actually be the law, and federal courts need to step in to point this out. Fortunately, the State Department has now stepped in.  In Jaen v. Sessions, as discussed in David’s blog,  Levy Alberto Jaen was born in Panama in 1972 to a non-U.S.-citizen mother, Leticia Rogers Boreland, who was then married to a naturalized U.S. citizen named Jorge Boreland.  But Jaen’s Panamanian birth certificate indicated that his father was another man named Liberato Jaen. Jaen moved to the US at the age of 15 as a nonimmigrant in 1988 and lived with the Boreland family. In 2008, Jaen was placed in removal proceedings based on controlled substance violations and he moved to terminate proceedings on the ground that he was a US citizen. The Immigration Judge denied the motion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Second Circuit reversed and pointed out that  the historic common-law definition of the term “parent” included a common-law presumption of legitimacy that held a married man to be the father of a child to whom his wife gave birth.  As it was put in Blackstone’s Commentaries, “Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant”—the nuptials show who is the father.  Jaen, slip op. at 13 & n. 5.  This common-law definition of parent, the Second Circuit held, would be sufficient to render Jorge Boreland the parent of Levy Jaen for citizenship purposes.

Although the State Department policy is meant to cover children born through ART, it is clearly applicable to out of wedlock scenarios in Jaen, Solis-Espinoza and Scales. Levy Alberto Jaen, for example, had a genetic link to his non-US citizen mother Leticia Rogers Boreland, who was married to his US citizen legal (although not biological) father Jorge Boreland.  Consistent with the new State Department policy, Jaen had a genetic or gestational tie to at least one of [his] parents, Leticia, and she was married to another, U.S. citizen parent of his. Though born in Mexico, Solis-Espinoza claimed citizenship by virtue of the US citizenship of the woman he knew as his mother.   That woman, who was married to Solis-Espinoza’s biological father at the time of petitioner’s birth, acknowledged him from his infancy as a member of her family and raised him as his mother, though he did not in fact have a biological connection with that woman. Scales was born in the Philippines in 1977, to Stanley Scales, Sr.  an American citizen-serviceman at the time, and Aily Topaz, a Philippine citizen.   Stanley and Topaz met during the first week of September 1976, and one week later, Topaz told Stanley that she was pregnant, probably from a prior relationship.  Topaz and Stanley were married on March 13, 1977, and Petitioner was born on April 6, 1977.

Although one arguable difference is that he had a legally relevant third parent to a greater extent than generally exists in ART cases (where the egg or sperm donor is usually acknowledged not to have legal parentage rights),  it isn’t unheard of for a child to have more than two parents for immigration purposes especially in the stepparent context. The State Department’s new policy is not only consistent with the common law meaning of “parent” in the INA, especially INA 301(g), but it is also in keeping with public policy that supports the recognition and maintenance of a family unit.

 

 

 

 

Proposals for Shattering Barriers and Obstacles to Legal Immigration Without Waiting for Congress to Act

In response to the Biden administration’s invitation to comment, I submitted several proposals to reform the immigration system through executive actions so that many can be quickly helped without waiting for Congress to act. You too can submit a proposal  by May 19, 2021 at https://www.regulations.gov/document/USCIS-2021-0004-0001 

 

May 19, 2021

Samantha Deshommes
Regulatory Coordination Division Chief
Office of Policy and Strategy
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS
5900 Capital Gateway Drive
Camp Springs, MD 2074

 

Re: USCIS-2021-0004

Identifffying Barriers Across U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Benefits and Services; Request for Public Input

 

Dear Ms. Deshommes:

I would like to propose ideas that would provide relief to beneficiaries of immigrant visa petitions caught in the backlogs.  While I understand that President Biden has proposed the US Citizenship Act of 2021, my proposals do not need legislative action and can bring about far reaching reform and restore balance to the immigration system whether Congress acts or does not act.

I submit the following ideas for consideration under the following headings: 1. Using the Dual Date Visa Bulletin to Allow the Maximum Number of Adjustment Filings; 2. Parole of Beneficiaries of Approved I-130 and I-140 Petitions; 3. Protecting the Age of the Child Under the Filing Date, and 4. Counting the Family Together So That They May Stay Together.

1. Using the Dual Date Visa Bulletin to Allow the Maximum Number of Adjustment Filings

As a result of the existence of the per country limits, those born in India and China have been drastically affected by backlogs in the employment-based green card categories. Each country is only entitled to 7 percent of the total allocation of visas under each preference. Thus, a country like Iceland with only about 330,000 people has the same allocation as India or China with populations of more than a billion people. For instance, in the employment-based second preference (EB-2), those born in India have to wait for decades, and one study estimates the wait time to be 150 years!

It would be ideal for Congress to eliminate the per country limits and even add more visas to each preference category. Until Congress is able to act, it would be easy for the Biden administration to provide even greater relief through executive action. One easy fix is to advance the dates in the State Department’s Visa Bulletin so that many more backlogged beneficiaries of approved petitions can apply for adjustment of status and get ameliorative relief. Other fixes could include allowing beneficiaries of petitions overseas to enter the US on parole, and protecting more derivative children from aging out under the Child Status Protection Act.

The State Department’s October 2020 Visa Bulletin was thus refreshing. It advanced the Dates for Filing (DFF) for the India employment-based third preference (EB-3) from February 1, 2010 to January 1, 2015. This rapid movement allowed tens of thousands of beneficiaries of I-140 petitions who were languishing in the backlogs and born in India to file I-485 adjustment of status applications. Although an I-485 application filed pursuant to a current DFF does not confer permanent residence, only the Final Action Dates  (FAD) can,  the DFF provides a number of significant benefits, such as allowing the applicant to “port” to a different job or employer in the same or similar occupational classification after 180 days pursuant to INA 204(j), obtain an Employment Authorization Document (EAD) that enables them to work in the United States, and request advance parole or travel permission. Even derivative family members can also get EADs and travel permission upon filing an I-485 application.

The DFF in the November 2020 Visa Bulletin continued to remain at January 1, 2015 for the India EB-3, thus enabling many more in the backlogs to file I-485 applications and take advantage of job portability. In the December 2020 Visa Bulletin the DFF for the India EB-3 was pulled back to January 1, 2014. From January 1, 2021 onwards, the USCIS closed I-485 filings under the DFF for EB cases.  While the advance to January 1, 2015 in October and November 2020 was a positive development, there is a legal basis to advance the DFF even further, perhaps to as close as current, without regard to whether the FAD will move to the DFF within a year or not. The Biden administration should seriously consider this proposal.

INA 245(a)(3) allows for the filing of an adjustment of status application when the visa is “immediately available” to the applicant. 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) links visa availability to the State Department’s monthly Visa Bulletin. Pursuant to this regulation, an I-485 application can only be submitted “if the preference category applicant has a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in the Bulletin (or the Bulletin shows that numbers for visa applicants in his or her category are current).” The term “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3) has never been defined, except as in 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) by “a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in Bulletin” or if the date in the Bulletin is current for that category.

The State Department has historically never advanced priority dates based on certitude that a visa would actually become available. There have been many instances when applicants have filed an I-485 application in a particular month, only to later find that the dates have retrogressed. A good example is the April 2012 Visa Bulletin, when the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China were May 1, 2010. In the very next May 2012 Visa Bulletin a month later, the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China retrogressed to August 15, 2007. If the State Department was absolutely certain that applicants born in India and China who filed in April 2012 would receive their green cards, it would not have needed to retrogress dates back to August 15, 2007.  Indeed, those EB-2 applicants who filed their I-485 applications in April 2012 are still waiting and have yet to receive their green cards even as of today! Fortunately, under the advances in the October 2020 Visa Bulletin and a bit beyond, the beneficiary of an I-140 petition under EB-2 was able to “downgrade” by filing an I-140 under EB-3 and a concurrent I-485 application.  Another example is when the State Department announced that the July 2007 Visa Bulletin for EB-2 and EB-3 would become current. Hundreds of thousands filed during that period (which actually was the extended period from July 17, 2007 to August 17, 2007). It was obvious that these applicants would not receive their green cards during that time frame. The State Department then retrogressed the EB dates substantially the following month, and those who filed under the India EB-3 in July-August 2007 waited for over a decade before they became eligible for green cards.

These two examples, among many, go to show that “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3), according to the State Department, have never meant that visas were actually available to be issued to applicants as soon as they filed. Rather, it has always been based on a notion of visa availability at some point of time in the future.

Under the dual filing dates system first introduced by the State Department in October 2015, USCIS acknowledges that availability of visas is based on an estimate of available visas for the fiscal year rather than immediate availability:

When we determine there are more immigrant visas available for the fiscal year than there are known applicants, you may use the Dates for Filing Applications chart to determine when to file an adjustment of status application with USCIS. Otherwise, you must use the Application Final Action Dates chart to determine when to file an adjustment of status application with USCIS.

See https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/visa-availability-and-priority-dates.

Taking this to its logical extreme, visa availability for establishing the DFF may be based on just one visa being saved in the backlogged preference category in the year, such as the India EB-3, like the proverbial Thanksgiving turkey. Just like one turkey every Thanksgiving Day is pardoned by the President and not consumed, similarly one visa can also be left intact rather than used by the foreign national beneficiary. So long as there is one visa kept available, it would provide the legal basis for an I-485 filing under a DFF, and this would be consistent with INA 245(a)(3) as well as 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1). DFF could potentially advance and become current, thus allowing hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries of I-140 petitions to file I-485 applications.

This same logic can be extended to beneficiaries of family-based I-130 petitions.

8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) could be amended (shown in bold) to expand the definition of visa availability:

An alien is ineligible for the benefits of section 245 of the Act unless an immigrant visa is immediately available to him or her at the time the application is filed. If the applicant is a preference alien, the current Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Bulletin will be consulted to determine whether an immigrant visa is immediately available. An immigrant visa is considered available for accepting and processing the application Form I-485 [if] the preference category applicant has a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in the Bulletin (or the Bulletin shows that numbers for visa applicants in his or her category are current) (“Final Action Date”). An immigrant visa is also considered available for submission of the I-485 application based on a provisional priority date (“‘Dates for Filing”) without reference to the Final Action Date. No provisional submission can be undertaken absent prior approval of the visa petition and only if all visas in the preference category have not been exhausted in the fiscal year. Final adjudication only occurs when there is a current Final Action Date. An immigrant visa is also considered immediately available if the applicant establishes eligibility for the benefits of Public Law 101-238. Information concerning the immediate availability of an immigrant visa may be obtained at any Service office.

 

2. Parole of Beneficiaries of Approved I-130 and I-140 petitions

With respect to beneficiaries of approved I-130 and I-140 petitions who are outside the US, they too can be paroled into the US upon their DFF becoming current. This would provide fairness to beneficiaries of approved petitions who are within or outside the US.

However, due to a quirk in the law, beneficiaries of I-130 petitions should be able to file I-485 applications upon being paroled into the US since parole is considered a lawful status for purpose of filing an I-485 application. See 8 CFR 245.1(d)(1)(v). On the other hand, beneficiaries of I-140 petitions will not be eligible to file an I-485 application, even if paroled, since INA 245(c)(7) requires one who is adjusting based on an employment-based petition to be in a lawful nonimmigrant status. Parole, unfortunately, is not considered a nonimmigrant status.  Such employment-based beneficiaries may still be able to depart the US for consular processing of their immigrant visa once their FAD become current.

This proposal can be modelled on the Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program that allows certain beneficiaries of I-130 petitions from Haiti to be paroled into the US pursuant to INA 212(d)(5). See https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/the-haitian-family-reunification-parole-hfrp-program. (The Filipino World War II Veterans Program also has a liberal parole policy for direct and derivative beneficiaries of I-130 petitions, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/filipino-world-war-ii-veterans-parole-program).  Once the beneficiaries of I-130 petitions are paroled into the US, they can also apply for an EAD, and adjust status once their priority date becomes current. The HFRPP concept can be extended to beneficiaries of all I-130 and I-140 petitions, and parole eligibility can trigger when the filing date is current for each petition. Beneficiaries of I-130 petitions may file adjustment of status applications, as under the HFRPP, once they are paroled into the US. On the other hand, Beneficiaries of I-140 petitions, due to the limitation in INA 245(c)(7) would have to proceed overseas for consular processing once the FAD become current.

 

3. Protecting the Age of Child Under the Filing Date

The USCIS Policy Manual, https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-7-part-a-chapter-7,  states that only the FAD protects the age of the child under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA). Using the DFF to protect the age of the child who is nearing the age of 21 is clearly more advantageous – the date becomes available sooner than the FAD. Thus, if an I-485 application is filed pursuant to a DFF and the child ages out before the final date becomes available, the child will no longer be protected despite being permitted to file an I-485 application. The I-485 application will get denied, and if the child no longer has an underlying nonimmigrant status, the child can be put in great jeopardy through the commencement of removal proceedings, and even if removal proceedings are not commenced, can start accruing unlawful presence, which can trigger the 3 and 10 year bars to reentry. If the child filed the I-485 as a derivative with the parent, the parent can get approved for permanent residence when the final date becomes available while the child’s application gets denied.

There is a clear legal basis to use the filing date to protect the age of a child under the CSPA:

INA 245(a)(3) only allows for the filing of an I-485 adjustment of status application when “an immigrant visa is immediately available.” Yet, I-485 applications can be filed under the DFF rather than the FAD. As explained, the term “immigrant visa is immediately available” has been interpreted more broadly to encompass dates ahead of when a green card becomes available. Under INA 203(h)(1)(A), which codified Section 3 of the CSPA,  the age of the child under 21 is locked on the “date on which an immigrant visa number becomes available…but only if the [child] has sought to acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residency within one year of such availability.” If the child’s age is over 21 years, it can be subtracted by the amount of time the applicable petition was pending. See INA 203(h)(1)(B).

Under INA 245(a)(3), an I-485 application can only be filed when an “immigrant visa is immediately available.”

Therefore, there is no meaningful difference in the verbiage relating to visa availability – “immigrant visa becomes available” and “immigrant visa is immediately available” under INA 203(h)(1)(A) and INA 245(a)(3) respectively. If an adjustment application can be filed based on a Filing Date pursuant to 245(a)(3), then the interpretation regarding visa availability under 203(h)(1)(A) should be consistent, and so the Filing Date ought to freeze the age of the child, and the child may seek to acquire permanent residency within 1 year of visa availability, which can be either the Filing Date or the Final Action Date.

Unfortunately, USCIS disagrees. It justifies its position through the following convoluted explanation that makes no sense: “If an applicant files based on the filing date chart prior to the date of visa availability according to the final date chart, USCIS considers the applicant to have met the sought to acquire requirement. However, the applicant’s CSPA age calculation is dependent on visa availability according to the final date chart. Applicants who file based on the filing date chart may not ultimately be eligible for CSPA if their calculated CSPA age based on the final dates chart is 21 or older.” The USCIS recognizes that the sought to acquire requirement is met when an I-485 is filed under the DFF, but only the FAD can freeze the age! This reasoning is inconsistent. If an applicant is allowed to meet the sought to acquire requirement from the DFF, the age should also similarly freeze on the DFF and not the FAD. Based on USCIS’s inconsistent logic, the I-485s of many children will get denied if they aged out before the FAD becomes available.

USCIS must reverse this policy by allowing CSPA protection based on the DFF.

 

4. Count the Family Together So That They May Stay Together

Ever since I co-wrote The Tyranny of Priority Dates in 2010, followed by How President Obama Can Erase Immigrant Visa Backlogs With A Stroke Of A Pen in 2012,  I have steadfastly maintained that the current and prior administrations  have got it wrong when counting visa numbers under the family and employment preferences. I do hope that the Biden administration will seriously consider this proposal, which I reiterate below.

There is no explicit authorization for derivative family members to be counted separately under either the employment-based (EB) or family based (FB) preference visas in the Immigration and Nationality Act.  While they must still be counted, they should be counted as “one” with the principal family member. Each family unit takes up one visa rather than separate visas. The treatment of family members is covered by INA 203(d), enacted by the Immigration Act of 1990, which states:

A spouse or child defined in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E) of section 1101(b) of this title shall, if not otherwise entitled to an immigrant status and the immediate issuance of a visa under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, be entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration provided in the respective subsection, if accompanying or following to join, the spouse or parent.

Nothing in INA 203(d) provides authority for family members to be counted under the preference quotas. While a derivative is “entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration” as the principal, nothing requires that family members also be allocated visa numbers. If Congress allocates a certain number of visas to immigrants with advanced degrees or to investors, it makes no sense if half or more are used up by family members. I have also written blogs over the years, herehere and here, to further advance this argument.

The EB and FB numbers ought not to be held hostage to the number of family members each principal beneficiary brings with them. Nor should family members be held hostage to the quotas. We have often seen the principal beneficiary being granted permanent residency, but the derivative family members being left out, when there were not sufficient visa numbers under the preference category during that given year. If all family members are counted as one unit, such needless separation of family members will never happen again.  Should only the principal become a permanent resident while everyone else waits till next year? What if visa retrogression sets in and the family has to wait even longer, maybe for years? This does not make sense. Is there not sufficient ambiguity in INA §203(d) to argue that family members should not be counted against the cap? It is not contended that they should be completely exempted from being counted. As stated in INA §203(d), family members should be given the “same status and the same order of consideration” as the principal. Hence, if there is no visa number for the principal, the rest of the family does not get in. If, on the other hand, there is a single remaining visa number for the principal, the family members, however many there are, ought to be “entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration as the principal.” Viewed in this way, INA §203(d) operates in harmony with all other limits on permanent migration found in INA both on an overall and a per country basis.

There is no regulation in 8 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) that truly interprets INA § 203(d). Even the State Department’s regulation at 22 CFR §42.32 fails to illuminate the scope or purpose of INA 203(d). It does nothing more than parrot INA § 203(d). In Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243, 257 (2006) the Supreme Court held that a parroting regulation does not deserve deference:

Simply put, the existence of a parroting regulation does not change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the statute. An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.

It is certainly true that family members are not exempted from being counted under INA § 201(b) as are immediate relatives of US citizens, special immigrants, or those fortunate enough to merit cancellation of their removal. Yet, it is noted that the title in INA §201(b) refers to “Aliens Not Subject to Direct Numerical Limitations.” What does this curious phrase mean? Each of the listed exemptions in INA §201(b) are outside the normal preference categories. That is why they are not subject to direct counting. By contrast, the INA § 203(d) derivatives are wholly within the preference system, bound fast by its stubborn limitations. They are not independent of all numerical constraints, only from direct ones. It is the principal alien, who is and has been counted, through whom they derive their claim \.. When viewed from this perspective, there is nothing inconsistent between saying in INA §203(d) that derivatives should not be independently assessed against the EB or FB cap despite their omission from INA §201(b) that lists only non-preference category exemptions.

It is reiterated that derivative beneficiaries are not exempt from numerical limits. As noted above, they are indeed subject in the sense that the principal alien is subject by virtue of being subsumed within the numerical limit that applies to this principal alien. Hence, if no EB or FB numbers were available to the principal alien, the derivatives would not be able to immigrate either. If they were exempt altogether, this would not matter. There is, then, a profound difference between not being counted at all and being counted as an integral family unit rather than as individuals. For this reason, INA §201(b) simply does not apply. The Biden administration through the simple mechanism of an Executive Order can direct a different way of counting derivatives.

INA §§201(a)(1) and 201(a)(2) mandate that “family sponsored” and “employment based immigrants” are subject to worldwide limits. Does this not cover spouses and children? True enough but all is not lost. While the term “immigrant” under INA §101(a)(15) includes spouse and children, they were included because, in concert with their principal alien family member, they intended to stay permanently in this their adopted home. No one ever contended they were or are non-immigrants. However, this does not mean that such family derivatives are either “employment based” or “family sponsored” immigrants. No petitioner has filed either an I-140 or I-130 on their behalf. Their claim to immigrant status is wholly a creature of statute, deriving entirely from INA §203(d) which does not make them independently subject to any quota.

INA §203(d) must be understood to operate in harmony with other provisions of the INA. Surely, if Congress had meant to deduct derivative beneficiaries, it would have plainly said so somewhere in the INA. The Immigration Act of 1990 when modifying INA §§201(a)(1) and 201(a)(2) specifically only referred to family sponsored and employment-based immigrants in §203(a) and §203(b) respectively in the worldwide cap. This was a marked change from prior law when all immigrants save for immediate relatives and special immigrants, but including derivative family members, had been counted. In this sense, the interpretation of INA §203(d) for which we contend should be informed by the same broad, remedial spirit that characterizes IMMACT 90’s basic approach to numerical limitation of immigration to the United States As already noted, these immigrants ought to only be the principal beneficiaries of I-130 and I-140 petitions. Derivative family, of course, are not the beneficiaries of such sponsorship. At no point did Congress do so. Under the theory of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that Congress had not authorized such deduction. Surely, if this was not the case, Congress would have made its intent part of the INA.  If the Executive Branch under President Biden wanted to reinterpret §203(d), there is sufficient ambiguity in the provision for it do so without the need for Congress to sanction it. A government agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)—often abbreviated as “Chevron deference”.  When a statute is ambiguous in this way, the Supreme Court has made clear in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), the agency may reconsider its interpretation even after the courts have approved of it.  Brand X can be used as a force for good.  Thus, when a provision is ambiguous such as INA §203(d), the government agencies charged with its enforcement may reasonably interpret it in the manner that we suggest.

Skeptics who contend that the INA as written mandates individual counting of all family members point to two provisions of the INA, §§202(a)(2) and 202(b). Neither is the problem that supporters of the status quo imagine.  Let’s consider §202(a)(2) first. In relevant part, it teaches that not more than 7% of the total number of family and employment-based immigrant visas arising under INA §203(b) may be allocated to the natives of any single foreign state. Eagle eyed readers will readily notice that this does not apply to derivative family members whose entitlement comes from INA §203(d) with no mention of §203(b). Also, but no less importantly, INA §202(a)(2) is concerned solely with overall per country limits. There is no reason why the number of immigrant visas cannot stay within the 7% cap while all members of a family are counted as one unit. There is no reason why monitoring of the per country family or employment cap should require individual counting of family members. The per country cap is, by its own terms, limited to the named beneficiaries of I-130 and I-140 petitions and there is no express or implied authority for any executive interpretation that imposes a restriction that Congress has not seen fit to impose.

What about cross-chargeability under INA §202(b)? Even if §202(b) has language regarding preventing the separation of the family, it does not mean that the derivatives have to be counted separately. If an Indian-born beneficiary of an EB-2 I-140 is married to a Canadian born spouse, the Indian born beneficiary can cross charge to the EB-2 worldwide rather than EB-2 India. When the Indian cross charges, the entire family is counted as one unit under the EB-2 worldwide by virtue of being cross charged to Canada. Such an interpretation can be supported under Chevron and Brand X, especially the gloss given to Chevron by the Supreme Court in the Supreme Court decision in Scialabba v. de Osorio involving an interpretation of the provision of the Child Status Protection Act.  Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion, though seeking to clarify the Child Status Protection Act, applies with no less force to our subject: “This is the kind of case that Chevron was built for. Whatever Congress might have meant… it failed to speak clearly.” Kagan slip op. at 33. Once again, as with the per country EB cap, the concept of cross-chargeability is a remedial mechanism that seeks to promote and preserve family unity, precisely the same policy goal for which we contend.

In a recent not so positive development, a federal district court in Wang v. Pompeo  turned down a claim from EB-5 investors that derivatives should not be counted under the employment-based fifth preference (EB-5). Even though the claim focused on the EB-5 preference, it can be applied to all preference categories.   Although plaintiffs argued that the annual limits do not apply to derivatives pursuant to  INA §203(d) as enacted by the Immigration Act of 1990, Judge Tanya Chutkan disagreed on the ground  that §203(d) is identical to the prior §203(a)(9) as it existed after the 1965 Act. If derivatives were counted under 203(a)(9), under the doctrine in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 US 575, 580 (1978), “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that same interpretation when it re-enacts the statute without change.” Moreover, in footnote 1 in Wang v. Pompeo, the court agreed with the government that “Congress spoke unambiguously spoke to the question at issue” and so the court need not address whether the government was entitled to Chevron deference.

Since this is a district court decision, the Biden administration can disregard Wang v. Pompeo and still choose to interpret §203(d) to allow for the unitary counting of principal and derivatives. Plaintiffs have appealed this decision to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals. If the DC Court of Appeals affirms Judge Chutkan’s decision, especially footnote 1, which indicates that INA 203(d) is unambiguous, it would be impossible for the Biden administration to change the interpretation of §203(d) under Chevron and Brand X within the jurisdiction of the DC Circuit Court of Appeals.  This in turn will result in an untenable situation where those within the jurisdiction of the DC Court of Appeals would not be able to derive the beneficial impact of a reinterpretation of §203(d). It would thus be prudent for plaintiffs to delay taking up the appeal until the Biden administration decides whether they will change the interpretation under §203(d) or not. On the other hand, one would not complain if the DC Court of Appeals rules in plaintiff’s favor and overrules the district court decision.

Obviously, if Congress can affirmatively modify §203(d) to explicitly state that derivates will not be counted, that would be the best outcome. However, if Congress remains divided and there is no legislative fix forthcoming, and unless we are willing to watch the slow and tortured death of the priority date system in silence, President Biden must act on his own. Doing so will double or triple the number of available green cards without the creation of a single new visa. The waiting lines will vanish or be drastically reduced.

 

References

https://www.scribd.com/document/45650253/The-Tyranny-of-Priority-Dates-by-Gary-Endelman-and-Cyrus-D-Mehta-3-25-10

https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2010/03/286.html

https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2015/10/when-is-visa-immediately-available-for.html

https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2018/09/recipe-for-confusion-uscis-says-only-the-final-action-date-in-visa-bulletin-protects-a-childs-age-under-the-child-status-protection-act.html

https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2020/09/downgrading-from-eb-2-to-eb-3-under-the-october-2020-visa-bulletin.html

https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2014/09/the-family-that-is-counted-together-stays-together-how-to-eliminate-immigrant-visa-backlogs.html

https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2013/03/the-way-we-count.html

 

If you have further questions or need further input, please do not hesitate to contact me.

 

Sincerely,

 

 

Cyrus D. Mehta

 

 

 

The First Step for Reforming the Immigration Courts is to Allow Immigration Judges to Administratively Close Cases

By Cyrus D. Mehta

On May 5, 2021, the majority opinion in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Sanchez v. Attorney General followed two other circuit courts in holding that an Immigration Judge (IJ) has the authority to administratively close cases. If there is a case that is deserving for an IJ to administratively close a case, this is it. Former Attorney General Sessions, under President Trump, issued Matter of Castro Tum holding that an IJ and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) did not have this authority. It is about time that the Biden administration stop defending Matter of Castro Tum. There is a great and urgent need to reform the immigration courts, including making them more independent, but a simple first step is for Attorney General Merrick Garland to withdraw Matter of Castro Tum. This would have a great impact in reducing the immigration court backlog, bring a modicum of fairness and allow an IJ to focus on serious cases.

The Petitioner in Sanchez v. AG, Arcos Sanchez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the US at the age of seven without inspection. In 2012, he  applied for Consideration of Deferred Action for  Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, which was approved. The DHS periodically granted his requests for renewals. In April 2019, Sanchez was arrested and charged in New Jersey with sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. As a result of these charges, the USCIS revoked Sanchez’s DACA status and placed him in removal proceedings. Sanchez applied for asylum and related relief. The IJ denied his claims and issued an order of removal. Two weeks from the IJ’s decision, the state criminal charges were dismissed. As a result of the dismissal of the charges, Sanchez was eligible again for DACA status.

On appeal to the BIA, Sanchez challenged the IJ’s decision and requested that the BIA remand the case to the IJ for consideration of administrative closure so that his DACA application could be approved, which in turn would favorably impact the disposition of the removal proceeding. The BIA denied remand, citing the binding decision of Castro Tum. The Third Circuit overruled the BIA and held that 8 CFR 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1(ii) unambiguously grants IJs and the BIA general authority to administratively close cases by authorizing them to take “any action” that is “appropriate and necessary” for the disposition of cases.

The majority in Sanchez relied on the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, which has come to the aid of petitioners challenging DHS’s interpretation of supposedly ambiguous immigration regulations. Our prior blogs addressing the beneficial impact of Kisor v. Wilkie on federal court decisions involving immigration law are here and here.  In Auer v. Robins, the Supreme Court held that the same Chevron type of deference applies to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.  After Kisor, no longer can the DHS invoke Auer deference with respect to its ability to interpret its own regulations. The majority opinion in Kisor  essentially “cabined the scope” of Auer deference, and set forth a three-step approach. Under this test,  the court must determine (i) that the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous” — the court should reach this conclusion after exhausting all the “traditional tools” of construction; (ii) if the regulation is genuinely ambiguous, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable; and (iii) even if it is a reasonable interpretation, whether it meets the “minimum threshold” to grant Auer deference, requiring the court to conduct an “independent inquiry” into whether (a) it is an authoritative or official position of the agency; (b) it reflects the agency’s substantive expertise; and (c) the agency’s interpretation of the rule reflects “its fair and considered judgment.”

A great example of a federal court applying Kisor in an immigration case is the 2019 Fourth Circuit decision Romero v Barr. The court in Romero overturned Matter of Castro-Tum by holding that the plain language of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) unambiguously confers upon IJs and the BIA the general authority to administratively close cases such that an Auer deference assessment is not warranted. Even if these regulations are ambiguous, the court citing Kisor noted that Auer deference cannot be granted when the new interpretation results in “unfair surprise” to regulated parties especially when the agency’s current interpretation conflicts with a prior one. The Fourth Circuit in Romero v. Barr focused on  the specific language “may take any action…..appropriate and necessary for the disposition” of the case” in 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) & 1003.10(b). According to the Fourth Circuit, this language would necessarily encompass actions of whatever kind appropriate, including administrative closure, and hence there was no ambiguity thus necessitating Auer deference.

The majority in  in Sanchez agreed with this analysis. In a dissent,  Judge Paul Matey said that the rule which states that cases may only be administratively closed when “appropriate and necessary,” shouldn’t be interpreted to grant “unfettered discretion.” According to Judge Matey, “[t]o the contrary, ‘appropriate and necessary’ is itself an important restriction on the scope of the attorney general’s delegation, and one that comes with some bite.”

In a subsequent opinion in June 2020 following Romero v. Barr by now Justice Amy Coney Barrett,  the Seventh Circuit in Meza Morales v. Barr also concluded that “the immigration regulations that grant immigration judges their general powers [are] broad enough to implicitly encompass that [administrative closure] authority.” Although the Sixth Circuit in Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr a few months later in November 2020 upheld Castro-Tum, the Third Circuit majority in Sanchez sided with the reasoning in the Fourth and Seventh Circuit.  The majority in Hernandez-Serrano was concerned that when immigration cases leave an IJ’s active calendar they never come back and “[t]hus  the  reality  is  that,  in hundreds  of  thousands  of  cases,  administrative  closure  has  amounted  to  a  decision  not  to  apply the Nation’s immigration laws at all.” But even if that is a legitimate concern, the Sanchez court reasoned that the Attorney General can amend the regulation and it is not the role for the court to interpret the regulation in a way that would alleviate the government’s concern.

Given that there are three circuits that have overruled Castro-Tum on the ground that there is no ambiguity in the regulation authorizing administrative closure, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie aiding this interpretation, it is about time that AG Garland restore the BIA’s decision in Matter of Avetisyan and withdraw Castro Tum. As argued in our prior blogs, here and here, Matter of Avetisyan makes more sense than Castro Tum.  In Matter of Avetisyan, an IJ repeatedly continued a removal hearing pending the filing and adjudication of a family-based immigrant visa petition. During the final hearing, despite DHS’s opposition, the IJ granted the respondent’s motion to administrative closure, and the DHS filed an interlocutory appeal. The issue here was whether an IJ or the BIA has the authority to administratively close a case when one of the parties to the proceeding opposes. The BIA determined that there was fault in the general rule stated in Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 1996) that “a case may not be administratively closed if opposed by either party.” The BIA, in overruling Matter of Gutierrez, held that affording absolute deference to a party’s objection is improper and that the IJ or the BIA, in the exercise of independent judgement and discretion, has the authority to administratively close a case, regardless of party opposition, if it is otherwise appropriate under the circumstances. The BIA further held that when evaluating a request for administrative closure, the IJ should weigh all relevant factors presented in the case, including, but not limited to: (1) the reason administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to administrative closure; (3) the likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other action he or she is pursuing outside of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5) the responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate outcome of removal proceedings (for example, termination of the proceedings or entry of a removal order) when the case is recalendared before the IJ or the appeal is reinstated before the BIA. In Avetisyan, the visa petition had been pending for a long time through no apparent fault of the respondent or her husband, and there was no obvious impediment to the approval of the visa petition or ability of the respondent to successfully apply for adjustment of status. The BIA determined that the circumstances supported the exercise of the IJ’s authority to administratively close the case.

There are hundreds of thousands of cases in immigration court that do not need to be active as the respondents will be eligible for permanent residence or related relief. Reviving  Avetisyan  and withdrawing Castro Tum will go a long way in clearing the backlog in Immigration Court. In addition to reducing clutter in the immigration court’s docket, certain removal cases require resolution of questions that depend on outcomes from other immigration agencies that neither the IJ nor the BIA have any control over. Thus, the approval of an I-130 petition filed by a US citizen spouse on behalf of the foreign national spouse in removal proceedings, or the resolution of an appeal of an I-130 denial, will greatly determine the outcome of the removal case, although neither the IJ or the BIA have any control over the adjudication of the I-130 petition in a removal proceeding.  It would make sense, and also be fair, for the IJ or BIA to receive the outcome of the I-130 petition before deciding to order removal of the respondent.

The Biden administration should thus refrain from appealing Sanchez to the Supreme Court notwithstanding the circuit split. As a practical matter, the administration may likely lose since all the nine justices were either part of the majority or concurring opinions in Kisor v. Wilkie, which aids in finding that there is no need to give Auer deference to the government’s interpretation of 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) & 1003.10(b). Justice Ginsburg is sadly no more and has been replaced by Justice Barrett, who wrote the opinion in Meza-Morales v. Barr when she was a judge on the Seventh Circuit, which overruled Castro Tum. Hence, despite the change in composition of the Supreme Court,  there is still a very strong likelihood that the Biden administration will lose big in the Supreme Court if it asks the court to uphold Castro Tum.  It would be much easier, and more in line with the Biden administration’s thinking on bringing fairness to immigration proceedings that Trump undermined, for AG Garland to withdraw Castro Tum and reinstate Avetisyan.