If the US Does Not Eradicate Vaccine Inequality, the Requirement of COVID Vaccinations for Many Green Card Applicants Will Result in a De Facto Ban

By Cyrus D. Mehta

Effective October 1, 2021, with few exceptions, those applying for permanent residence (green card) must be vaccinated against COVID-19, now classified as a “Class A inadmissible condition,” the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced. The CDC explained that the COVID-19 vaccination meets the criteria for required vaccinations and is a requirement for applicants eligible for the vaccine regardless of evidence of immunity, a negative COVID-19 test, or prior COVID-19 infection. The new vaccine requirements apply to a foreign national filing an I-485 application for adjustment of status and completing the I-693 medical examination with a designated USCIS civil surgeon or to a foreign national applying for an immigrant visa or refugee status at a US consulate and undergoing a medical examination with a panel physician.

With respect to I-485 adjustment applicants, the CDC  has stated that the applicant “must complete the COVID-19 vaccine series and provide documentation of vaccination to the civil surgeon in person before completion of the medical examination.” The COVID-19 vaccination requirement differs from previous requirements in that “the entire vaccine series (1 or 2 doses depending on formulation) must be completed in addition to the other routinely required vaccines. COVID-19 vaccinations can now be given at any time, without regard to the timing of other vaccinations.” Acceptable vaccines include Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, and Janssen (Johnson & Johnson).

Panel physicians in countries outside the US may accept vaccines authorized for emergency use or approved by the US Food and Drug Administration  or vaccines listed for emergency use by the World Health Organization. In addition to the three vaccines used in the US, the WHO lists many other vaccines used outside the US such as AstraZeneca, Covishield and Covaxin, Sputnik, Sinopharm and Sinovac, among others. Given that the US vaccines are not widely available in many countries, it is good news that other vaccines will be recognized when intending immigrants overseas must be vaccinated against Covid-19.

Waivers are available for  under both circumstances if the vaccine is not age appropriate, the vaccine is medically contraindicated, or the applicant does not have access to one of the approved vaccines in their home country. Applicants may also apply for an individual waiver on religious or moral grounds.

According to reports, the Biden administration also is developing plans for a COVID-19 vaccine mandate for almost all foreign visitors to the United States, with some exceptions. Note though that proof of the vaccination does not exempt international travelers from the preexisting requirement of presenting proof of a negative Covid-19 test within three days of boarding an international flight to the US.

As there is a great disparity in vaccination programs across the world, the mandating of vaccines for green card applicants and visitors may hinder the ability of people to easily come to the US. According to the NY Times vaccine tracker, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.html, the UAE has the highest percentage of  fully vaccinated people within its population (76%), while the percentage of fully vaccinated people in countries such as India (10%),  Senegal (3.5%) and Haiti (<0.1%) is abysmally low.

Until now, even if a country was subject to a Covid ban, one applying for an immigrant visa is exempted from the ban.  The lack of vaccine access in a country will surely hinder the immigrant visa process and impose a de facto ban. Those who have won the DV lottery must be processed for the immigrant visa by September 30 each year, and a delay in getting fully vaccinated by the deadline will result in the loss of an immigrant visa under this category. This is not to suggest we should object to the mandatory vaccination of intending immigrants before arriving in the US because of the lack of vaccine availability in many countries, especially in low and lower-middle income countries,  that send many immigrants to the US.  Indeed,  the US needs to ensure in concert with the WHO that there is no vaccine inequality and people from all over the world must have quick and easy access to vaccines. It is a sad state of affairs that vaccine hesitant people in the US refuse to get vaccinated when there is so much  vaccine availability while it is difficult to get a vaccine in other countries.

Finally, we have consistently maintained that the Covid proclamations imposing travel restrictions are ineffective in curbing the spread of the coronavirus as they are riddled with exceptions. US citizens, permanent residents and noncitizens with US citizen or permanent resident children are exempted from the ban. So are those who can obtain national interest exception waivers on a variety of grounds. On the other hand, those subject to the ban have to suffer immeasurable hardships by remaining separated from employers and family members who are in the US. It will make more sense if the US insists that everyone entering the country be fully vaccinated rather than subject countries to Covid Proclamations. However, to make this a worthy goal, the US as a global leader must ensure vaccine equality to everyone in the world. Ensuring equality would be in the interest of the US and the whole world as it would create the best chance to eradicate the coronavirus pandemic once and for all.

 

 

“The Process By Which Removability Will Be Determined”: How the Recent District Court Decision Ordering the Reinstatement of MPP Contradicts Itself

On Friday, August 13, U.S. District Judge Matthew J. Kacsmaryk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas issued an Opinion and Order ruling in favor of the states of Texas and Missouri in a lawsuit that they had brought against the Biden Administration, seeking to force the Administration to reinstate the so-called “Migrant Protection Protocols” (MPP) created by the Trump Administration.  Human Rights First, among others, had previously observed that MPP was more aptly described as Migrant Persecution Protocols; I will use only the initials from this point on, since they can apply either way.

The gist of MPP was the return of asylum applicants to Mexico, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C), while their applications were pending. As the American Immigration Council explained, many applicants were placed in grave danger in Mexico, and many were unable to return to the United States for their hearings at the appointed time. Upon taking office, the Biden Administration suspended new enrollments into the program on January 20, 2021, and terminated the program on June 1. Texas and Missouri sued to overturn that decision.

The Opinion and Order, the effect of which was stayed for seven days to allow an emergency appeal, held that the termination of MPP violated the Administrative Procedure Act and 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Judge Kacsmaryk therefore vacated the June 1 memorandum terminating MPP, and ordered the government

to enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such a time as it has been lawfully rescinded in compliance with the APA and until such a time as the federal government has sufficient detention capacity to detain all aliens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1255 without releasing any aliens because of a lack of detention resources.

Opinion and Order at p. 52, ¶ 3.

There are a great many problems with the reasoning supporting the Opinion and Order, which I am sure will be elucidated in the coming days by others. Rather than seeking to give a comprehensive account of everything wrong with the Opinion and Order, however, I want to focus here on one particular issue: assuming that it is meant to have significant practical effect, the Opinion and Order is internally contradictory. While it is not completely clear what exactly the government is being ordered to do, the only way for the answer not to be, “almost nothing”, is for various statements in the Opinion and Order to be incorrect.

To see the problem, it is necessary to look at the text and structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1225, one of the two statutes that Judge Kacsmaryk held the government to be violating by terminating MPP.  In particular, the relevant section is 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), which divides applicants for admission into two groups, those processed under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and those processed under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2):

(b) Inspection of applicants for admission

(1) Inspection of aliens arriving in the United States and certain other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled

(A) Screening

(i) In general

If an immigration officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this title, the officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution.

(ii) Claims for asylum

If an immigration officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this title and the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer under subparagraph (B).

(iii) Application to certain other aliens

(I) In general

The Attorney General may apply clauses (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph to any or all aliens described in subclause (II) as designated by the Attorney General. Such designation shall be in the sole and unreviewable discretion of the Attorney General and may be modified at any time.

(II) Aliens described

An alien described in this clause is an alien who is not described in subparagraph (F), who has not been admitted or paroled into the United States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility under this subparagraph.

(B) Asylum interviews

(i) Conduct by asylum officers

An asylum officer shall conduct interviews of aliens referred under subparagraph (A)(ii), either at a port of entry or at such other place designated by the Attorney General.

(ii) Referral of certain aliens

If the officer determines at the time of the interview that an alien has a credible fear of persecution (within the meaning of clause (v)), the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.

(iii) Removal without further review if no credible fear of persecution

(I) In general

Subject to subclause (III), if the officer determines that an alien does not have a credible fear of persecution, the officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review.

(II) Record of determination

The officer shall prepare a written record of a determination under subclause (I). Such record shall include a summary of the material facts as stated by the applicant, such additional facts (if any) relied upon by the officer, and the officer’s analysis of why, in the light of such facts, the alien has not established a credible fear of persecution. A copy of the officer’s interview notes shall be attached to the written summary.

(III) Review of determination

The Attorney General shall provide by regulation and upon the alien’s request for prompt review by an immigration judge of a determination under subclause (I) that the alien does not have a credible fear of persecution. Such review shall include an opportunity for the alien to be heard and questioned by the immigration judge, either in person or by telephonic or video connection. Review shall be concluded as expeditiously as possible, to the maximum extent practicable within 24 hours, but in no case later than 7 days after the date of the determination under subclause (I).

(IV) Mandatory detention

Any alien subject to the procedures under this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.

(iv) Information about interviews

The Attorney General shall provide information concerning the asylum interview described in this subparagraph to aliens who may be eligible. An alien who is eligible for such interview may consult with a person or persons of the alien’s choosing prior to the interview or any review thereof, according to regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. Such consultation shall be at no expense to the Government and shall not unreasonably delay the process.

(v) “Credible fear of persecution” defined

For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “credible fear of persecution” means that there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum under section 1158 of this title.

(C) Limitation on administrative review

Except as provided in subparagraph (B)(iii)(III), a removal order entered in accordance with subparagraph (A)(i) or (B)(iii)(I) is not subject to administrative appeal, except that the Attorney General shall provide by regulation for prompt review of such an order under subparagraph (A)(i) against an alien who claims under oath, or as permitted under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, after having been warned of the penalties for falsely making such claim under such conditions, to have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, to have been admitted as a refugee under section 1157 of this title, or to have been granted asylum under section 1158 of this title.

(D) Limit on collateral attacks

In any action brought against an alien under section 1325(a) of this title or section 1326 of this title, the court shall not have jurisdiction to hear any claim attacking the validity of an order of removal entered under subparagraph (A)(i) or (B)(iii).

(E) “Asylum officer” defined

As used in this paragraph, the term “asylum officer” means an immigration officer who-

(i) has had professional training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques comparable to that provided to full-time adjudicators of applications under section 1158 of this title, and

(ii) is supervised by an officer who meets the condition described in clause (i) and has had substantial experience adjudicating asylum applications.

(F) Exception

Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an alien who is a native or citizen of a country in the Western Hemisphere with whose government the United States does not have full diplomatic relations and who arrives by aircraft at a port of entry.

(G) Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize or require any person described in section 1158(e) of this title to be permitted to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title at any time before January 1, 2014.

(2) Inspection of other aliens

(A) In general

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

(B) Exception

Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an alien-

(i) who is a crewman,

(ii) to whom paragraph (1) applies, or

(iii) who is a stowaway.

(C) Treatment of aliens arriving from contiguous territory

In the case of an alien described in subparagraph (A) who is arriving on land (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States, the Attorney General may return the alien to that territory pending a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

The process described in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), applicable to applicants for admission who are inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7), is known as expedited removal. Such applicants for admission are given the opportunity to establish that they have a credible fear of persecution, but are otherwise removed without proceedings before an immigration judge.  Applicants for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), on the other hand, are, with limited exceptions for crewmen and stowaways, to be placed into removal proceedings before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, otherwise known as INA § 240.

The BIA held in Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2011),  that DHS has prosecutorial discretion to place people into removal proceedings under INA § 240 even if they could also be placed in expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). For roughly a decade, therefore, and well before MPP was invented, the decision of whether to place an applicant for admission into expedited removal proceedings has been one for DHS to make.

The authority for MPP, as noted above, is 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C). This authority applies only to those who otherwise fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). It does not apply to anyone subjected to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). This is why all those placed in MPP were issued Notices to Appear and put into removal proceedings under INA § 240, otherwise known as 8 U.S.C. § 1229a: such proceedings were necessary in order for them to fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).  There has been dispute over whether DHS can, under the statute, permissibly treat asylum applicants in this way, but there does not appear to be any dispute that if asylum applicants can be returned to Mexico under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C), it must be because they have been placed in INA § 240 removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).  (Under current regulations, those applicants who establish credible fear during expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) are also ultimately placed into INA § 240 removal proceedings, but the Administration that designed MPP did not think this an inevitable feature of the statutory structure, instead attempting to promulgate a rule that would have placed such applicants in asylum-only proceedings.)

The question, then, is what, if anything, Judge Kacsmaryk’s Opinion and Order has to say about the initial decision whether to place a particular applicant for admission into expedited removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or directly into 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).  Logically, there are two possibilities. Either the Opinion and Order is meant to affect that decision, requiring it to be made “in good faith” under the auspices of the MPP program that the Opinion and Order sought to preserve, or it is not meant to affect that decision at all.

Taking the latter possibility first, if the Opinion and Order is not meant to affect the decision whether to place an applicant for admission into expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), then it would seem to have very little practical effect. If the government is just as free to place anyone into expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) as it was before the Opinion and Order was issued, then the Opinion and Order will only apply to those applicants whom the government independently decides to place straight into § 1229a removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).  Only those people would be properly subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C), the underlying authority for the MPP.  But if the government is not constrained by the Opinion and Order in making the decision whether to follow the § 1225(b)(1) track or the § 1225(b)(2) track, then there may be few people processed under § 1225(b)(2) at all. Perhaps the only applicants who will be so processed are those who cannot be subjected to expedited removal proceedings, such as those who are not inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (which covers fraud and false claims to U.S. citizenship), or 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (which covers those without proper documents), but are thought to be inadmissible on some other basis—say, Lawful Permanent Residents with certain criminal convictions thought to render them inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). The effect of the Opinion and Order might then be largely academic, although still problematic in a limited number of cases.

One would think this probably was not what Judge Kacsmaryk had in mind. If so, however, then he must have meant for the Opinion and Order to have some impact on the decision whether or not to place particular applicants for admission into § 1225(b)(1) expedited removal proceedings, as opposed to processing them under § 1225(b)(2).  The problem is that this would contradict several statements made in the Opinion and Order, statements which provided critical underpinnings for Judge Kacsmaryk’s determination that he had the authority to issue the Opinion and Order in the first place.

First, in addressing why the jurisdictional bar of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) purportedly does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over this suit, the Opinion and Order says:

42. Section 1252(b)(9) states: “Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this Section.” (emphasis added). This Section functions as a limit on where aliens can seek judicial review of their immigration proceedings.

43. But the Supreme Court has recently stated: “As we have said before, § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar where those bringing suit are not asking for review of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability will be determined.” [DHS v. ] Regents [of the University of California], 140 S. Ct. [1891,] 1907 [(2019)] (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841, 875–76 (2018) (plurality opinion) (internal marks omitted)). “And it is certainly not a bar where, as here, the parties are not challenging any removal proceedings.” Id.

Opinion and Order at 29.

If the Opinion and Order means to exert control over the determination whether applicants for admission should be placed in expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or processed under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) so that they can be subjected to MPP, however, then it makes no sense to say that “those bringing suit are not asking for review of . . . the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability will be determined.” They very much are. The states bringing suit, on this interpretation, are asking for review of the decision to place certain applicants for admission in expedited removal proceedings, where removability will be determined under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and they cannot be returned to Mexico while their cases are pending, as opposed to placing those applicants in immediate § 1229a removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), so that the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C) can apply and the applicants can be returned to Mexico under MPP. In this respect, the case is not like the challenge to the recission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) in Regents, which did not implicate a decision to seek removal or the process by which removability would be determined, given that the DACA recission did not involve commencement of removal proceedings against anyone. A broad interpretation of the Opinion and Order’s mandate that MPP be implemented would necessarily involve the commencement of a specific type of removal proceedings, under § 1225(b)(2) and § 1229a, as opposed to the commencement of proceedings under § 1225(b)(1).

This is not the only such contradiction in the Opinion and Order.  Later, addressing why the decision to terminate MPP is not “committed to agency discretion” and thus unreviewable, the Opinion and Order states:

Moreover, the MPP program is not about enforcement proceedings at all. Any alien eligible for MPP has already been placed into enforcement proceedings under Section 1229a. The only question MPP answers is where the alien will be while the federal government pursues removal — in the United States or in Mexico.

Opinion and Order at 32.  That is true if, and only if, the Opinion and Order does not mean to have any impact on the initial decision whether to place particular applicants for admission into expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), as opposed to regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a by way of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). But in that case, as discussed above, the Opinion and Order would not accomplish what it seems intended to accomplish.

As a crowning touch, the Opinion and Order says near the end: “Nothing in this injunction requires DHS to take any immigration or removal action nor withhold its statutory discretion towards any individual that it would not otherwise take.” Opinion and Order at 53. Again, it is not entirely clear what this means. But if DHS is truly not required to “take any immigration or removal action . . . that it would not otherwise take”, then it cannot be compelled to operate the MPP, because a necessary predicate of the MPP is the action of placing applicants for admission into immediate § 1229a removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) rather than placing them into expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1).

At bottom, the problem here may be that like the MPP itself, the Opinion and Order makes background assumptions that are not supportable when examined more closely. Like the MPP, the Opinion and Order seems superficially sensible when examined from a certain perspective.  But like the MPP, the seeming logic of the Opinion and Order does not withstand closer scrutiny.

The Sinking Immigration Court: Change Course, Save the Ship

By Stacy Caplow*

Immigration Court, where hundreds of judges daily preside over wrenching decisions, including matters of family separation, detention, and even life and death, is structurally and functionally unsound. Closures during the pandemic, coupled with unprecedented backlogs, low morale, and both procedural and substantive damage inflicted by the Trump Administration, have created a full-fledged crisis. The Court’s critics call for radical reforms. That is unlikely to happen. Instead, the Biden Administration is returning to a go-to, cure-all solution: adding 100 Immigration Court judges and support personnel[1] to help address the backlog that now approaches 1.3 million cases.[2]

No one could oppose effective reform or additional resources. Nor could anyone oppose practical case management changes that do not require legislation and that could expedite and professionalize the practice in Immigration Court. Linked with a more transparent and more inclusive process for selecting Immigration Judges, these changes would make the Immigration Courts more efficient, more accurate and fairer but not at the expense of the compelling humanitarian stakes in the daily work of the Court. Immediate changes that do not require legislation but do require the will to transform the practice and culture of the Court would be a major step forward in improving the experiences and the outcomes in Immigration Court.

 

I. Changes to the Practices and the Culture of the Immigration Court

 Immigration hearings are adversarial. While the stakes are very high and often punitive—removal, ongoing detention, family separation—the proceedings are civil. Yet this court bears little resemblance to typical civil litigation settings in both the pretrial or trial context. Most of the characteristic judicial tools regulating litigation are absent: pretrial discovery, pretrial settlement or status conferences to resolve or narrow issues, rare stipulations, or enforcement tools to require government lawyers to participate in a meaningful way until shortly before the hearing.

Generally, no Trial Attorney [TA] from the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor [OPLA], a division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE], the prosecutors in Immigration Court, is assigned to or takes responsibility for a case until a few weeks prior to an individual hearing.[3]  If a case is pending for several years, as so many are these days, except in the rare instance, it is impossible to have any kind of substantive discussion in advance about the conduct of the hearing, possible forms of settlement or alternative relief, narrow issues. Stipulations are rare or unhelpfully last minute. There are no enforcement tools that require government attorneys to participate in a meaningful way until shortly before the hearing. This can and should be changed. The Immigration Court can adopt practices familiar in civil and criminal tribunals around the country. Common litigation management tools could expedite and rationalize Immigration Court proceedings.

 

1. Assign Trial Attorneys to Cases Promptly

A TA should be assigned to review a case at the earliest possible time following the initial Master Calendar appearance where pleadings are entered. At a minimum, a TA should be assigned at the request any Respondent who wants to discuss a case regardless of when the hearing is scheduled. The government lawyers in Immigration Court, like prosecutors in any busy court, can handle a caseload without waiting until the last minute to review the claim. In order to foster meaningful discussions, these TA assignments should occur as soon as the respondent has completed her evidentiary filings.

The positive impact of a prompt TA assignment system will benefit everyone—Respondents, TAs, and the IJs. For example, although many cases require a credibility finding based on in-person testimony, some claims simply do not. If there is no basis for doubting credibility in light of the evidence, and the law is clear, a one, two or three-year wait for a decision is unconscionable. Under the current system, the TA does not review the submissions until shortly before the hearing. Faced with cases in which credibility is not an issue, more often than not, the TA does not seriously contest the facts or the eligibility for relief once she has reviewed the submissions. This results in half-hearted cross-examination, if there is any at all, and a quick grant of relief without opposition. Unfortunately, this happens only after years of delay and anxiety as well as extensive preparation often requiring logistical headaches and inconveniences to witnesses. Earlier, thorough case assessment could avoid the stress to Respondents of a life on hold, could result in fewer or more focused hearings, and could accomplish timeliness and efficiency goals of EOIR.

2. Require Pre-Hearing Conferences

The EOIR Practice Manual provides for a Pre-Hearing Conference.[4] This tool, commonplace in other kinds of courts, is rarely used. Neither Immigration Judges nor TAs routinely invite or encourage pre-hearing conferences. Following the lead of many civil and criminal courts, there should be a regularly scheduled status conference in every case upon a simple request from either party, conducted as expeditiously as possible after the pleadings at the Master Calendar. This could achieve great efficiencies and fairer outcomes.

A mandatory pre-hearing conference would necessitate assigning an individual ICE Trial Attorney to a case well in advance of the hearing. For an effective conference, a Respondent’s lawyer would generally need to submit evidence and even a memorandum of law. A process similar to a summary judgment motion might result. If the Trial Attorney concedes that there are no factual disputes or lack of credibility, the judge could decide the legal basis for relief. This procedure might require an abbreviated hearing, an oral argument, or could be decided on written submissions.

A few prototypical cases illustrate how this might work. Imagine an asylum seeker who has suffered or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of sexual orientation who comes from a country whose homophobic laws and oppression of people who are LGBTQ are undisputed. If the asylum seeker is credible, well settled law would surely warrant a granted of asylum. Or suppose a woman who was subjected to genital circumcision has medical records confirming this condition. Again, under well-settled law she is likely to be granted asylum. Or a one-year filing deadline bar could be resolved without the need for testimony based on written submissions. These issues could be resolved at a pre-hearing conference. Another set of cases might involve requests for Cancellation of Removal. The pre-hearing conference could conclude that objective evidence satisfies most of the statutory factors. This could narrow the case so that the Immigration Judge would only hear evidence relevant to the hardship determination. If the Trial Attorney reviewed the evidence and conceded that the hardship standard had been satisfied, this could eliminate the need for a hearing altogether.

Immigrants and their advocates shoulder the burden of multi-year delays and suffer from the resulting uncertainty and angst. Meanwhile, they build lives despite their unpredictable future, increasing the harsh impact of eventual deportation. During the interval, immigration advocates’ caseloads multiply. Years later, when a hearing is finally held, the consequences of delay are substantial. Court submissions need updating. Legal claims may be affected by changes in the law. Witnesses may be unavailable. Memories may fade. The is particularly harsh for asylum seekers whose credibility is at the heart of any immigration hearing[5] but whose trauma may have affected their ability to recall events, particularly the persecution they would prefer to forget. Accelerating resolution through pre-hearing processes following a full presentation of the claim by the Respondent and a full review of the evidence by the government would divert cases from the court’s hearing dockets.

A serious and sincere discussion of the claims and the evidence might resolve cases more expeditiously. Relief could be granted without a hearing. In some instances, TAs could choose to terminate the proceedings through an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Good case management, effective communication, and open-mindedness are imperative to making the system work more smoothly and more quickly.

3. Enforce the Practice Manual Equably

After years without any standardized practices, the EOIR published a Practice Manual.[6]  This guidance was a welcome development. On its face, it appears to govern all aspects of practice neutrally. A closer reading of the Manuel, however, reveals how one-sided these rules and the practice they govern really are. The everyday reality is even more blatantly lopsided because only Respondents’ attorneys actually do the work that the Manual regulates. The power imbalance between the parties and the close relations between the immigration bench and the prosecutors is embedded in the contents, language and impact of the Manual

In most cases before IJs the burden of proof to secure relief is on the Respondent, once removability is established.[7]  This means that Respondents, represented in only about 60% of all cases,[8] submit all of the evidence to support their application for relief. In the Manual, there are detailed rules relating to filings, motions and the conduct of hearings down to the types of tabs, cover sheets, identifiers for motions, cover pages, tables of contents, proof of service, witness lists and hole-punching. Submissions must be filed and served at least 30 days in advance of the hearing (up from 15 in a prior version of the Manual)

Since government lawyers rarely submit any evidence other than proof of removability if the Respondent does not concede, none of these rules affect their workload. On the rare occasion that the ICE lawyers do file a proposed exhibit, they often do so on the day of the hearing—with impunity since the IJs permit this. In a typical court, flagrant disobedience of the rules would be sanctioned without prejudice to the other party. More typically a Hobson’s choice is given to the Respondent:  accept the poor service or postpone the case. These days, postponement can mean years. The Respondent, anxious and prepared for that day’s testimony, is likely to opt for the former letting the government ignore the rules with the IJs permission.

This is an example of how IJs could behave more forcefully—preclude the evidence. Or cite the government for contempt in egregious cases. Instead, a tolerance of  lazy lawyering only inspires even less compliance with the rules

4. Encourage Prosecutorial Discretion as a Case Management Tool

Resolving a case through an exercise of prosecutorial discretion [PD] is another tool available to, but rarely employed by, the government. IJs cannot force Trial Attorneys to take certain actions relating to the merits of a case, but they can review the evidence in a pre-trial conference and make a strong suggestion about the best resolution.

The May 2021 Interim Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities is a vehicle for re-evaluating prosecutorial discretion [PD] as part of the holistic case management reforms that will benefit the TAs. the Immigration Court and the Respondents.[9]  The Interim Guidance reestablishes priorities and encourages a resuscitation of vigorous prosecutorial discretion. The guidance gives express permission to the Trial Attorneys to consider prosecutorial discretion even in the absence of a request.[10] Its reference to “mutual interest” strives to break down the adversarial barriers that obstruct judiciously exercised discretion and encourages shared problem-solving.

Some OPLA offices have established protocols for submitting requests for prosecutorial discretion. It is too early to tell whether this change in policy will result in a change in culture in the field. In the past, requests were not very successful despite encouraging guidelines and priorities.[11] But even if the Trial Attorneys do not take initiative, at the very least, there is a structure in which to engage in serious discussions about the direction of a case on the court’s docket. While the ultimate exercise of discretion belongs exclusively to the TAs, IJs could and should identify and encourage active consideration of appropriate cases for PD at a Pre-Hearing Conference.

 5. Apply Disciplinary Rules to Government Lawyers as well as Immigration Advocates

Lawyer disciplinary rules must be applied equally to ICE attorneys as well as attorneys for Respondents. This recommendation may seem obvious. Yet, the 2018 Policy Guidance promulgated by the EOIR raised serious concerns.[12] It established policies and procedures for reporting ineffective assistance of counsel or other violations of rules of professional conduct identified by the EOIR itself. Of course, protecting immigrants against unscrupulous or incompetent lawyers is a worthy goal. But these disciplinary rules apply only to immigrant advocates and not government lawyers.[13] EOIR should promptly issue equivalent guidance that applies to ICE attorneys who might commit ethical violations. In the absence of attempts by EOIR to be evenhanded, the 2018 policy guidance is a troubling example of bias within the court system.

6. Be Attentive to Professional Standards in the Courtroom

All of these practical manifestations of the imbalance of power—the reluctance to regulate, sanction or discipline—and the very environment of the courtroom expose the cozy connection between the immigration bench and the prosecution and destroy any fiction of independence. IJs preside in courts in which former colleagues (perhaps friends) appear. They chitchat with the government lawyers while Respondents sit in the room, often in a cone of incomprehension. The appearance if not the reality of this relationship is visible to any observer. The integrity and objectivity of the court is seriously undermined by these everyday departures from appropriate courtroom conduct. The obvious and easy remedy for this appearance of partiality inferred from the comradery between the prosecutor and the judge would be a change in atmosphere to elevate the inside of these courtrooms to the same degree of dignity and seriousness that all courtrooms should possess.

 

II. Changes to the Selection Process of Immigration Court Judges

 

To transform the present obstacles to effective judicial performance, remove the damaging management directives of the former administration. As so many commentators already have suggested, roll back the heavy-handed Attorney General imposed operating guidelines relating to case management to restore a system of logical adjudication priorities[14] and remove the Damoclesean sword of quantitative performance metrics or quotas which only encourage hasty outcomes that devalue the stakes involved in most hearings. These steps require only will, not legislation or rule making. While a return to the old normal will not fully address the structural capture of this court by the Department of Justice [DOJ] and the widely divergent outcomes between courts,[15] restoring decision making to IJs will improve morale and incentivize judges to be independent thinkers without fear of interference or reprisals.[16]

The Attorney General recently took significant steps to reverse many of the more controversial and harmful administrative policies inflicted by the prior administration that limit the ability of Immigration Judges to decide their cases carefully and fairly.[17]  But more can be done.

Changes to the eligibility criteria and the selection process for Immigration Judges also would make a difference both to how the Court operates and how its integrity is perceived by the people appearing before it and by the public.

 

1. The Past Decade of Immigration Court Growth

Injecting new resources into the Immigration Courts is a common prescription for a system that is overloaded, backlogged, and inefficient. This approach seems sensible, and it has indeed been tried but without much success. Between 2017 and the end of 2020 more than 330 judges were added to the ranks in an effort to reduce the enormous backlog. The table below shows the exponential growth in judges.

Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics

Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics[18]

 

Over that same four-year period, almost 100 courtrooms were added, totaling 474 at the end of 2020.[19] Now, approximately 535 immigration judges preside over 68 immigration courts and three adjudications centers.[20]

Despite the infusion of resources, waiting times have grown to an average of 54 months.[21]  Although the Executive Office of Immigration Review asserts that, “The timely and efficient conclusion of cases serves the national interest,”[22] today many hearings are adjourned for as long as two or three years. Swift and certain justice after a full and fair removal proceeding eludes most people.

While some of this eye-popping number of pending matters is attributable to the influx of asylum-seekers at the southern border,[23] Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] also has been filing new removal cases.[24] In addition, the pandemic shut most of the courts for more than a year. These external forces have been intensified pressures, but they are not the root causes of the Court’s dysfunction. Adding more judges will not solve the well-recognized structural defects of the court itself.

An immigration  bench that has been populated to serve political goals lacks genuine independence and is subject to political branch dictates.[25]  The Trump Department of Justice only further diminished judicial independence by imposing performance metrics,[26] limiting the exercise of discretion,[27] litigating to decertify the judges’ union,[28] muzzling individual judges,[29] and radically changing longstanding legal principles.[30] On its own website, the stature of this tribunal is degraded to “quasi-judicial,” dropping the pretense of independence and reducing its stature.[31]

The breakdown of the court is also attributable to recent mismanagement decisions and its almost total departure from normal litigation practices that prevents judges from supervising their caseloads and promptly presiding over life-altering deportation proceedings. Administrative inefficiencies that have longed plagued this court only worsened under the policies adopted by the four-year, multi-faceted Trump assault on immigration. Old cases languished while new cases poured in.

In light of this grim reality, the time has come to rethink of some embedded assumptions and practices, particularly those that do not have to wait for structural court reform.

2. Surveying the Newly Appointed Immigration Judges

The job of Immigration Judge, as one IJ famously said, consists of hearing “death penalty cases in a traffic court setting.[32] Immigration Court needs to be staffed by experienced judges committed to applying the law with both rigor and compassion. Immigration Judges need to be able to use the tools that judges normally employ in other settings to administer their courts effectively. Knowledgeable, fair-minded, even-tempered, confident and courageous judges should be the norm.

The following collective profile of the newest IJs has been noted widely but some aspects deserve a bit more detailed attention because they call into question whether this goal can be achieved if past practices are simply replicated as more IJs are appointed.

a. Government Enforcement Background

From 2017 to 2020, the Department of Justice hired 166 judges who were drawn predominantly from current or former employees of one or more government-side immigration prosecution, enforcement or related agencies.[33] Filling the bench with lawyers from this career path is not new, or particularly surprising, since these are candidates who actually do have a deep knowledge of the law and a familiarity with the court. But a career in enforcement risks distorting objectivity and impartiality.

Prior Government Immigration Enforcement Experience

There is, however, a striking imbalance among the IJs with considerable immigration practice backgrounds. A review of their biographies reveals that only a handful—about 10 or 11—worked in either private practice or public interest organizations representing immigrants. Thus, one of the two obvious source of experienced immigration attorneys—immigrant advocates—is barely represented.

Another conclusion that these numbers forcefully imply is that not only are government-side lawyers overly represented but, even when the few former immigrant advocates are added to this group, close to half of new IJs appear to have no discernable knowledge of immigration law or experience in immigration practice.[34]

Lawyers with government immigration careers are not the only former law enforcement employees sitting on the Immigration Court bench.

 

  • Fifty-four percent of new IJs’ credentials include past positions as either federal and/or state prosecutors, or both.

Prior Prosecutorial Experience

  • Many have military records (often in combination with prosecutorial pasts), an advantage in the selection process. But they report no immigration law experience.

Military Legal Experience (Including JAG)

Many individual biographies include a combination of these experiences—e.g., government enforcement jobs, prior prosecutorial positions and military service. At the risk of overgeneralizing, there are many common characteristics in these backgrounds that could discourage independence, critical or creative thinking, as well as produce intolerance for inefficiency, aggressive advocacy or other challenges to authority.

 

b. Judicial Experience

Prior judicial experience would seem to be a plus but only a handful of the new IJs, 46, have sat on any bench, all of which are state-level tribunals or courts with no obvious immigration jurisdiction.

Prior Judicial Experience

The haste to seat these judges and put them to work with minimal training[35] and little opportunity for ongoing mentorship by experienced judges, only incentivizes them to rush through hearings, and predisposes them to deny applications accompanied by incomplete or sloppy reasoning.[36] Just as more judges are being added, veteran judges are leaving the bench, some in reaction to the new pressures to perform.[37]  As witnesses to the degrading of the court, the increasingly active and expanding Round Table of Former Immigration Judges has been a vocal critics both before Congress and as amicus curiae.[38]

 

c. Legal Experience

Generally, ascent to the judiciary occurs after a lawyer acquires expertise in a legal field, and demonstrates maturity, judgment and capacity. Knowledge of the law, an even temperament, impartiality and the ability to make reasoned decisions are the basic qualities associated with judging. Lawyers usually requires years of legal experience to gain and deepen these qualities. The requirement of seven years post-bar admission seems quite minimal.

Years of General Legal Experience

The survey showed that most new IJs do have more than the minimum amount of

experience. But, when their years in practice is seen are measured by the kind of experience the majority of these seasoned lawyers have—government enforcement—it is fair to conclude that their often extensive and formative careers opposing or obstructing relief and challenging credibility have shaped their judicial outlook.

d. Bias in Results

The opaque selection process seems to yield judges with questionable qualifications and possible biases.  The data tends to confirm the prediction that the newly appointed IJs with these credentials are granting fewer requests for asylum relief.[39] According to EOIR’s own statistics, the denial rate since 2018 increased from a range of 20-32%) to continuously increasing ranges of 31.75% to 54.53% by 2020.[40]

Looking at the list of individual IJs the change is even more obvious. Between 2013 and 2018, 58 judges denied asylum more than 90% of the time, and 69 judges denied asylum between 80-90% of the time.[41] Over the five-year period 2015-2020, the number of IJs who denied asylum more than 90% of the time rose to 109 and the number denying asylum between 80-90% of the time rose to 111.[42] While some toughening of legal standards imposed by the prior administration might account for a portion of this upsurge in denials,[43] the coincidence between these dramatic numbers and the infusion of new IJs appointed by the Trump Department of Justice is hard to ignore.

 

e. A Better Judicial Selection Process

 

An infusion of new personnel in the near future provides an opportunity to look closely at and reform the appointment process of Immigration Judges to make it less vulnerable to political influences. By many accounts, it was intensely politicized over the past four years. Appointment to the court is governed by the Department of Justice, allowing the country’s chief prosecutor to unilaterally advance a frequently biased agenda.[44] This undeniable conflict is nothing new but it demeans the integrity of the bench. Even worse, the opaqueness of the selection process shields an agenda that is suspect, based on the profile of the IJs appointed over the past four years.[45]

A cleaner, more transparent merit selection process, typical of most judicial systems, would enhance the reputation of the Court and might attract a more diverse applicant pool through a recruitment process that is attractive to a wider range of applicants. The work is very demanding, but it pays well.[46]

In addition, the criteria for the job, are now absurdly undemanding.  Aside from a law degree and licensure in any U.S. jurisdiction, an applicant must have

[A] full seven (7) years of post-bar experience as a licensed attorney preparing for, participating in, and/or appealing formal hearings or trials involving litigation and/or administrative law at the Federal, State or local level. Qualifying litigation experience involves cases in which a complaint was filed with a court, or a charging document (e.g., indictment or information) was issued by a court, a grand jury, or appropriate military authority. Qualifying administrative law experience involves cases in which a formal procedure was initiated by a governmental administrative body.[47]

Knowledge of or experience in immigration law is not an expressed job qualification although it may be an advantage.

Without the need for legislative reform, the Department of Justice and the EOIR could improve the perception and reality of the Immigration Court selection process. Simple improvements include the following steps:  1) elevating the selection standards to require more than 7 years’ experience and more direct knowledge of immigration law; 2) assuring a neutral merit selection process that incentivizes. applications from immigrant advocates; 3) opening the selection process for more public input; 5) improving training and oversight that emphasizes competence more than productivity; 6) restoring morale by recognizing and respecting the responsibility placed on IJs and treating them not as employees but as judicial officers; and 7) overseeing and questioning the basis for abnormally high denial rates.

 

III. Conclusion

 

Is there a life preserver on this sinking ship?  Courts reopening following the pandemic are facing an unprecedented backlog with cases already postponed years into the future. The new Administration, in the position to institute real reform to the way business is conducted, has started to steer in a positive direction due to a now shared interest of the Court and ICE to address the burdensome and shameful backlog. This is a potentially defining moment when change may actually happen. Meanwhile, the new administration is articulating goals to ameliorate not only the backlog but to seriously change enforcement priorities. If these two agents of potential change take advantage of the crisis that is affecting everyone involved with the system to work collaboratively with each other and consult sincerely with the immigrant advocates bar and other stakeholders, there may be some hope. To make this happen, a true cultural change must occur at every level. A few small steps have been taken: The EOIR is reacting to the prosecutorial discretion directive but the jury is still out on the buy-in to any kind of genuine reform.[48]

Like a lifeboat, survival depends on a commitment to problem-solving, trust and collaboration until rescue arrives. Someday structural reform may truly reshape the court to enough to eliminate the qualifier quasi. IJs will become full-fledged judges capable of making legally sound decisions in courtrooms where dignity, respect, patience and compassion are the norm without fear of retribution. Give the judges the tools they need to manage their courtrooms and the parties to achieve goals of integrity, efficiency and fairness. Recalibrate the balance between the parties. Recognize the demands of presiding over life-altering matters on their own wellbeing by giving them the resources, the power and the trust to be full-fledged judges.

Until then, directives from the top down are an important start; transformation still depends on change in the field in order to bring this court in conformity with general adjudication norms and practices, as well as to successfully implement the policy instructions that have the potential address the court crisis from the government’s standpoint without sacrificing fairness and humanitarian considerations.


Guest author Professor Stacy Caplow teaches Immigration Law at Brooklyn Law School where she also has co-directed the Safe Harbor Project since 1997.

 

Footnotes

[1] President Biden’s proposal is part of his overall budget planning, See Letter from Executive Office of the President, Apr. 9, 2021, at 22:

Supports Efforts to Reduce the Immigration Court Backlog. In order to address the nearly     1.3 million outstanding cases before the immigration courts, the discretionary request makes   an investment of $891 million, an increase of $157 million or 21 percent over the 2021             enacted level, in the Executive Office for Immigration Review. This funding supports 100       new immigration judges, including support personnel, as well as other efficiency measures to        reduce the backlog.

available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/FY2022-Discretionary-Request.pdf.  See also Fact Sheet: President Biden Sends Immigration Bill to Congress as Part of His Commitment to Modernize our Immigration System, Jan. 20, 2021, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-president-biden-sends-immigration-bill-to-congress-as-part-of-his-commitment-to-modernize-our-immigration-system/.

 

[2] TRAC Immigration, The State of the Immigration Courts: Trump Leaves Biden 1.3 Million Case Backlog in Immigration Courts, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/637// (last visited July 28, 2021). This statistic is complicated and does not fully account for all matters since some have been “inactive” thereby excluded from the final figure. Id. at n. 1. The Executive Office of Immigration Review reports 1,277,152 pending cases as of the first quarter of FY2021 i.e. Dec. 31, 2020. See https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/637/ (last visited July 28, 2021).

 

[3] “The Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) is the largest legal program in DHS, with over 1,250 attorneys and 290 support personnel. By statute, OPLA serves as the exclusive representative of DHS in immigration removal proceedings before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, litigating all removal cases including those against criminal aliens, terrorists, and human rights abusers.” See https://www.ice.gov/about-ice/opla.

 

[4] “Pre-hearing conferences are held between the parties and the Immigration Judge to narrow issues, obtain stipulations between the parties, exchange information voluntarily, and otherwise simplify and organize the proceeding.” OCIJ Practice Manual, Sec. 4.18, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-policy-manual/4/18.

[6] Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, Practice Manuel, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-policy-manual/part-ii-ocij-practice-manual (updated March 24, 2021).

 

[7] INA § 240 (c)(4).

 

[8] Interestingly, while there is general consensus that representation makes a huge difference to positive outcomes, the denial rate for asylum increased12% between 2108 and 2020 notwithstanding representation. Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics Current Representation Rates, available at

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1062991/download(Date generated April 2021).

 

[9]  John D. Trasivina, U.S. Immigration & Customs and Enforcement, Interim Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities INA § 240 (c)(4)(C), May 27, 2021, available at , https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/opla/OPLA-immigration-enforcement_interim-guidance.pdf.

 

[10] Id. at 7-8.

 

[11]  An example of the policies for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during the Obama administration is the Policy Memorandum Number: 10075.1 issued by John Morton, then Director of ICE entitled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, June 17, 2011, available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.

 

[12] Internal Reporting of Suspected Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Professional Misconduct, PM 19-06, Dec. 18, 2018.

 

[13] AILA Letter to Director James McHenry, February 15, 2019 (AILA Doc. No. 192159 (on file with author).

 

[14] See, e.g., Recommendations for DOJ and EOIR Leadership To Systematically Remove Non-Priority Cases from the Immigration Court Backlog, AILA Doc. No. 21050301

(posted 5/3/2021), available at file:///Users/stacycaplow/Downloads/21050301.pdf.

 

[15] Philip G. Schrag, Andrew I. Schoenholtz and Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Refugee Roulette. (2011). NEED FULL CITE For example, in the Atlanta Immigration Court, every judge’s denial rate exceeds 90% in contrast to the New York Immigration Court where 29 judges deny in less than 30% of cases. TRAC Immigration, Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts
FY 2015-2020, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2020/denialrates.html.

 

[16] This essay does not address the longstanding arguments advanced for an independent Article I Court.  For a selection of perspectives on that see, e.g., Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13-1 Bender’s Immig. Bull. 3, 5 (2008) (the author is an Immigration Judge); Maurice Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 San Diego L. Rev. 1, 18 (1980) (the author was the retired Chair of the Board of Immigration Appeals); American Bar Association Commission on Immigration, Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Create independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, Feb. 2010 and Update 2019, available at. https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2019/03/aba-commission-to-recommend-immigration-reform/(containing more than 100 specific recommendations); AILA, Featured Issue: Immigration Courts, available at, https://www.aila.org/advo-media/issues/all/immigration-courts; Hearing before House Committee on the Judiciary, Courts in Crisis: The State of Judicial Independence and Due Process in U.S. Immigration Courts, Jan. 29.2020, available at, https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2757; New York City Bar Association, Report on the Independence of the Immigration Courts, Oct. 21, 2020, available at https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/reports-listing/reports/detail/independence-of-us-immigration-courts. Statement of Immigration Judge A. Ashley Tabbador on behalf of National Association of Immigration Judges before House Committee on the Judiciary, Jan. 29, 2020, available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU01/20200129/110402/HHRG-116-JU01-Wstate-TabaddorA-20200129.pdf. https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/19070802-pdf-1.pdf. Other voices include the Roundtable of Former Immigration Judges, law professors (see, e.g., Letter to Attorney General Merrick Garlard, available at, https://www.aila.org/File/Related/21050334a.pdf) and the Marshall Project, Is It Time to Remove Immigration Courts From Presidential Control?, Aug. 28, 2019, available at https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/08/28/is-it-time-to-remove-immigration-courts-from-presidential-control; Federal Bar Ass’n, Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, https://www.fedbar.org/government-relations/policy-priorities/article-i-immigration-court/ (last visited May 17, 2021; Mimi Tsankov, Human Rights Are at Risk, ABA Human Rts. Mag., Apr. 20, 2020, available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/immigration/human-rights-at-risk/.

 

[17] Attorney General Garland has been actively withdrawing decisions issues by his predecessors. See, e.g., Matter of A-C-A-A, 28 I&N Dec. 351 (A.G. 2021), vacating in its entirety Matter of A-C-A-A, I&N Dec. 84 (A.G. 2020) and restoring discretion to IJs in case management; Matter of Cruz Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326(A.G. 2021), overruling Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018) and restoring ability of IJs to administratively close cases. These decisions also free up Trial Attorneys to exercise PD.

 

[18] Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242156/download (last visited June 1, 2021).

 

[19] Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics Number of Courtrooms, available at  https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248526/download Data collected as of April 2021).

 

[20] Executive Office of Immigration Review, Workload and Adjudication Statistics, Tables 25 and 25A, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/workload-and-adjudication-statistics (data collected as of April 21, 2021).

 

[20]  Dept. of Justice, EOIR, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge-bios  (last visited May 29, 2021).

[21] TRAC, The State of the Immigration Courts: Trump Leaves Biden 1.3 Million Case Backlog in Immigration Courts, available at, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/637/.

[22] Memorandum from the Attorney General for the Executive Office of Immigration Review, Renewing Our Commitment to the Timely and Efficient Adjudication of Immigration Cases to Serve the National Interest, Dec. 5, 2017, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1041196/download.

[23] The total number of pending cases from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras is 715,557. An additional 212, 859 cases from Mexico raise the total to 928,416. Id. at Appendix Table 3. Backlogged Immigration Court Cases and Wait Times by Nationality.

[24] Austin Kocher, ICE Filed Over 100,000 New Cases and Clogged the Courts at the Peak of the Pandemic, Documented, Sept 16, 2020, available at, https://documentedny.com/2020/09/16/ice-filed-over-100000-new-cases-and-clogged-the-courts-in-the-peak-of-the-pandemic/ (last visited May 18, 2021).

[25] Patt Morrison, How the Trump administration is turning judges into ‘prosecutors in a judge’s robe.’ L.A. Times, Aug. 29, 2018., available at, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-ol-patt-morrison-judge-ashley-tabaddor-20180829-htmlstory.html/

[26] Memorandum of James McHenry, Director, Executive Office of Immigration Review, Case Priorities and Performance Metrics, Jan. 17, 2018, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1026721/download.

 

[27] Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 272 (A.G. 2018).

 

[28] U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (Agency) and National Association of Immigration Judges International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Judicial Council 2, 71 FLRA No. 207 (2020).

 

[29] Amiena Khan & Dorothy Harbeck (IJs), DOJ Tries to Silence the Voice of the Immigration Judges—Again! The Federal Lawyer, Mar.Apr. 2020; available at https://immigrationcourtside.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Immigration-TFL_Mar-Apr2020.pdf; Laila Hlass et al., Let Immigration Judges Speak, Slate, oct. 24, 2019, available at, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/10/immigration-judges-gag-rule.html.

[30] Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G.2018) (virtually disqualifying victims of domestic violence and gang violence for asylum). See also, Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, effective date, Jan. 11, available at 2021https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/11/2020-26875/procedures-for-asylum-and-withholding-of-removal-credible-fear-and-reasonable-fear-review.

[31] Executive Office of Immigration Review, Immigration Judge, available at

https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/immigration-judge-16 (last visited May 15, 2021).

[32] IJ Dana Marks provided this unforgettable description on Immigration Courts: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), Apr. 2, 2018, available at  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fB0GBwJ2QA&t=11s (last visited May 20, 2021).

[33] These charts were prepared from the biographical information contained in EOIR announcements of new IJs appointed by an Attorney General serving in the Trump administration between May 2017 and April 2021. The government agencies include The Office of Principal Legal Advisor [OPLA] is the prosecution branch of Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] which in turn is a branch of Department of Homeland Security [DHS]. The Office of Immigration Litigation [OIL], a division of the Department of Justice [DOJ] that represents the government in federal court.

 

[34] In a picture of the newly installed judges sitting in the New York Immigration Court, 8 of the judges previously worked for immigration enforcement agencies, 3 had represented immigrants and 3 had no prior immigration practice experience. Beth Fertig, Presiding Under Pressure, NY Public Radio, May 29, 2019, available at, https://www.wnyc.org/story/presiding-under-pressure.

 

[35] Training now is only a few weeks rather than months. Reade Levinson, Kristina Cooke & Mica Rosenberg, Special Report: How Trump administration left indelible mark on U.S. immigration courts, Mar. 8, 2021 (describing inter alia) the selection and abbreviated training processes), available at, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-trump-court-special-r/special-report-how-trump-administration-left-indelible-mark-on-u-s-immigration-courts-idUSKBN2B0179.

 

[36] This is not necessarily a new criticism. For example, more than 15 years ago, Judge Richard A. Posner decried “the systematic failure by the judicial officers of the immigration service to provide reasoned analysis for the denial of applications for asylum.”  Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F. 3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2004).

[37] Eighty-two experienced Immigration Judges have resigned since 2017. TRAC Immigration, More Immigration Judges Leaving the Bench, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/617/. See also Outgoing SF Immigration Judge Blasts. Immigration Court as ‘Soul Crushing,’ Too Close to ICE, S.F. Chronicle, May 19 2021, available at https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Exclusive-Outgoing-SF-immigration-judge-blasts-16183235.php;  Immigration Judges are quitting or retiring early because of Trump, L.A. Times, Jan. 27, 2020, available at, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-01-27/immigration-judges-are-quitting-or-retiring-early-because-of-trump; Why This Burned-Out Immigration Judge Quit Her Job, The Immigration Post, Feb. 27, 2020, available at, https://www.theimmigrationpost.com/why-this-burned-out-immigration-judge-quit-her-job/; Katie Benner, Top Immigration Judge Departs Amid Broader Discontent Over Trump Policies, NY Times, Sept. 13, 2019, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/us/politics/immigration-courts-judge.html; Hamed Aleaziz, Being An Immigration Judge Was Their Dream. Under Trump, It Became Untenable, BuzzFeed News, Feb. 13,2019, available at, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/immigration-policy-judge-resign-trump; Ilyce Shugall, Op-Ed, Why I Resigned as an Immigration Judge, L.A.Times, Aug. 4, 2019, available at, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-08-03/immigration-court-judge-asylum-trump-policies.

[38] See, e.g., Statement to the House Judiciary Committee on Immigration Court Reform, Jan. 29, 2020 (36 signers) available at, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU01/20200129/110402/HHRG-116-JU01-20200129-SD022.pdf; Brief for Amici Curiae Former Immigration Judges in Support of Petitioner, Barton v. Barr, 140 U.S. 1142 (2020).

 

[39] In FY 2020, the denial rate for asylum, withholding or removal or CAT relief increased to 71.6 percent, up from 54.6 percent in FY 2016. 73.7 percent of immigration judge decisions denied asylum. TRAC Immigration, Asylum Denial Rates Continue to Climb, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/630/ (last visited May 116, 2021); see also, Paul Moses & Tim Healy, Here’s Why the Rejection Rate for Asylum Seekers Has Exploded in America’s Largest Immigration Court in NYC, Dec. 2, 2019, available at, https://www.thedailybeast.com/heres-why-the-rejection-rate-for-asylum-seekers-has-exploded-in-americas-largest-immigration-court-in-nyc.

 

[40] Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics, Asylum Statistics, Data Generated: April 19, 202, available at  https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248491/download

 

[41] TRAC Immigration, Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts
FY 2013-2018, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2018/denialrates.html.

 

[42] TRAC Immigration, Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts
FY 2015-2020, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2020/denialrates.html

 

[43] Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G.2018).

 

[44] The Attorney General has the power to certify matters for their review. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (h).

 

[45] Tanvi Misra, DOJ hiring changes may help Trump’s plan to curb immigration, Roll Call, May 4, 2020, available at, https://www.rollcall.com/2020/05/04/doj-hiring-changes-may-help-trumps-plan-to-curb-immigration; Tanvi Misra, DOJ changed hiring to promote restrictive immigration judges, Roll Call, Oct. 29, 2019, available at, https://www.rollcall.com/2019/10/29/doj-changed-hiring-to-promote-restrictive-immigration-judges/; see James R. McHenry III, Director EOIR, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Immigration Judge and Appellate Immigration Judge Hiring Process , Feb. 19, 2019, available at, https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/general_topics/eoir_hiring_procedures_for_aij/download. The DOJ has been called out in the past for making political appointments during the last Republican administration, see Monica Goodling, et al., Office of the Inspector General, Attorney General, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the, Chapt. 6, Evidence and Analysis: Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals Member Hiring Decisions, July 2008.

 

[46] As of January 2020, the lowest starting salary is $138, 630 and ultimately caps at $181,500. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 2020 Immigration Judge Pay Rates, available at,

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1236526/download.

 

[47] EOIR, Immigration Judge, https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/immigration-judge-7. This website refers to a section called “How You Will Be Evaluated” which appears nowhere. Military service assures a strong preference.

 

[48] Jean King, Acting Director, Policy Memo 21-25 Provides EOIR policies regarding the effect of Department of Homeland Security enforcement priorities and initiatives, June 11, 2021.

 

 

 

The Fight for Immigration Justice Is Not Over: SCOTUS Rules Mandatory Detention of Certain Immigrants Seeking Safety in the United States

By: Sophia Genovese*

In Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. __ (2021), the Supreme Court held that noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are not entitled to a custody redetermination, or bond, hearing before the Immigration Court. This holding effectively leaves thousands of asylum seekers at risk of prolonged and indefinite detention.

By way of background, individuals who return to the United States after having previously been removed are subject to reinstatement of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); 8 C.F.R. 241.8(a). However, if someone with a prior removal order expresses a fear of persecution, they are referred for a Reasonable Fear Interview (RFI) where they must demonstrate “a reasonable possibility that he or she would be persecuted on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, or a reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8(e), 208.31(c). If an Asylum Officer determines that there is a reasonable possibility that the noncitizen will face persecution or torture, the noncitizen will be placed into withholding-only proceedings where they are only permitted to apply for withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e). Neither withholding of removal nor protection under CAT grant lawful permanent residence, but both allow for the noncitizen to obtain work authorization and reside in the United States. An individual granted withholding of removal or protection under CAT can be removed to a third county (see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(f)); however, this rarely occurs.

Prior to Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, most individuals in withholding-only proceedings were held in immigration detention unless they resided in a jurisdiction where they were eligible for release on bond. Prior to June 29, 2021, according to the Second and Fourth Circuits, the detention of noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and are thus entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d). Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2016); Guzman Chavez v. Hott, 940 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2019). According to the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, the detention of noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and are thus not entitled to a bond hearing under the §1226(a) provisions. Martinez v. LaRose, 968 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2020); Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison, 905 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2018); Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2017).

The Second Circuit was the first court of appeals to directly address the issue of whether individuals in withholding-only proceedings were entitled to a bond hearing. In Guerra, the Second Circuit explained that there are two statutory sections which authorize the detention of noncitizens:  8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which governs detention “pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States,” and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which governs detention of noncitizens subject to a final order of removal. 831 F.3d at 62. Under § 1226(a), noncitizens are eligible for a custody redetermination, or a bond, hearing before the immigration court, so long as they are not classified as arriving noncitizens on their Notices to Appear, nor subject to mandatory detention under §1226(c). Under §1231(a), detention is mandatory for the 90-day “removal period” after a removal order becomes “administratively final,” and thereafter, noncitizens are entitled to periodic review of their detention by ICE; however, ICE is permitted to continue detaining the individual and extend the removal period. The Second Circuit reasoned that §1226(a) does not contemplate whether the noncitizen is “theoretically removable but rather whether the [noncitizen] will actually be removed.” Guerra, 831 F.3d at 62. It follows that a noncitizen subject to reinstatement of removal is removable, “but the purpose of withholding only proceedings is to determine precisely whether ‘the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.’” Id. The Second Circuit reasoned that §1226(a) contemplates detention of removal proceedings which are ongoing, whereas §1231(a) is primarily concerned with defining the 90-day removal period during which a noncitizen “shall” be removed, and thus, §1226(a) governed the detention of noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings. Id. In addressing finality of the reinstated removal order, the Second Circuit explained that the decision to remove the noncitizen from the country is not made until the proceedings are complete, and accordingly, the reinstated removal order cannot be administratively final. Id. at 64.

In Guzman Chavez v. Hott, 940 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2019), the Fourth Circuit reasoned along similar lines. The Court concluded that §1226 and §1231 “fit together to form a workable statutory framework,” where the §1226 applies “before the government has the actual authority to remove a noncitizen from the country,” and that §1231 applies “once the government has that authority.” 940 F.3d at 876. And thus, “because the government lacks the authority to actually execute orders of removal while withholding-only proceedings are ongoing the petitioners are detained under § 1226.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit and held that noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are detained pursuant to §1231(a). Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F. 3d 826 (9th Cir. 2017). The noncitizen in this case, Mr. Raul Padilla-Ramirez, had previously been deported after his application for asylum was denied. Id. at 829. He re-entered the United States a few years later undetected and was transferred to ICE custody after dismissal of unrelated criminal charges in 2015. While in ICE custody, Mr. Padilla-Ramirez expressed a fear of return to his native El Salvador, passed his RFI, and was placed into withholding-only proceedings. Id. After being denied the opportunity to seek bond before the immigration court, Mr. Padilla-Ramirez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the district court, and he appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision of the lower court, concluding that §1231(a) governed Mr. Padilla-Ramirez’s detention, and ruled that he was not entitled a bond hearing under §1226(a). But see Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that prolonged detention under §1231(a)(6) is prohibited without an individualized hearing to determine whether the person is a flight risk or a danger to the community). In reaching their decision, the Ninth Circuit first analyzed the removal period and assessed whether Mr. Padilla-Ramirez’s reinstated removal order was “administratively final.” The Court concluded that under a plain reading of §1231(a)(5), a reinstated removal order is administratively final. Id. at 831. The Court reasoned that the removal order was final when it was first executed, and if reinstated, it is reinstated from its original date and thus retains the same administrative finality. Id. The Court also reasoned that since the reinstatement provision is in the same section in the Act entitled “Detention and removal of [noncitizen] ordered removed,” Congress intended for the detention of noncitizens subject to reinstatement to be governed by that section, which require that the order be administratively final. Id. The Court concluded that withholding-only proceedings do not affect the administrative finality of the removal order; but rather, only determine whether a noncitizen ought to be removed to a particular country, and thus §1231(a) governs their detention. Id. at 832.

The Third Circuit in Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison, 905 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2018) agreed with the Ninth Circuit. Mr. Rafael Guerrero-Sanchez had reentered the United States after having previously been ordered removed, passed his RFI, and was placed into withholding-only proceedings. Having been denied a bond hearing, Mr. Guerrero-Sanchez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court held that his detention was governed by §1226(a) and ordered his release after nearly two years in ICE custody. 905 F.3d at 210. On appeal, the government argued that Mr. Guerrero-Sanchez was detained pursuant to §1231(a), and not entitled to a bond hearing. In response, Mr. Guerrero-Sanchez argued that he was detained pursuant to §1226(a) and was entitled to a bond hearing; and also, even if detained pursuant to §1231(a), he was still entitled to a bond hearing given his prolonged detention. Id. at 211. The Court ultimately held that §1231(a) governed Mr. Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention, that his reinstated removal order was administratively final, and “that §1231(a)(6) affords a bond hearing after prolonged detention [after six months] to any [noncitizen] who falls within the ambit of that provision.” Id.

The Sixth Circuit in Martinez v. LaRose, similarly held that noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are detained pursuant to §1231(a). 968 F. 3d at 557. The petitioner in this case, Mr. Walter Martinez, had been previously deported in 2008. Upon return to El Salvador, he was brutally beaten by the MS-13 gang and the police who worked with the gang. He fled to the United States again, passed his RFI, and was held in immigration detention for two years. Mr. Martinez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his prolonged detention had violated his due process rights and requesting that he be given an individualized bond hearing. Id. His habeas petition was dismissed, where the district court held that §1226(a) does not apply to his detention, and under § 1231(a), “his due process claims fail because his removal is reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at 558. The Sixth Circuit upheld the decision and declined to adopt a similar six-month test as had been done in Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison.

Johnson v. Guzman Chavez

The Supreme Court in Johnson v. Guzman Chavez addressed the circuit split and examined whether noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are entitled to a bond hearing before the immigration court.

Justice Alito writing on behalf of the conservative majority ultimately agreed with the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, holding that the detention of noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are not entitled to a bond hearing, and that the reinstated removal orders are administratively final. Notably, the Court refers to noncitizens as “aliens” an astonishing 214 times in its decision, despite recent efforts to abolish the use of the dehumanizing term. The Court, in rejecting the arguments of counsel for the noncitizens, found that withholding-only proceedings only address whether the noncitizen is to be removed to a particular country, and not from the United States, concluding that the reinstated removal order remains final throughout these proceedings. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 11. The Court acknowledges that although very few individuals are ever removed to a third country, this reality does not negate the fact that withholding-only proceedings are country specific. Id.

The majority cites to §1231(a) in rendering its decision. The Court explained that the 90-day removal period in §1231(a)(1)(A) begins on the latest of three dates (1) the date the order of removal becomes “administratively final,” (2) the date of the final order of any court that entered a stay of removal, or (3) the date on which the alien is released from non-immigration detention or confinement. §1231(a)(1)(B). During the removal period, detention is mandatory. §1231(a)(2). The removal period may be extended in certain conditions, including: if the noncitizen takes actions which prevent their removal; if DHS stays the removal if it is not practicable or proper; or if the noncitizen is inadmissible, removable as a result of certain violations, or is a risk to the community. §§ 1231(a)(1)(C), 1231(c)(2)(A), 1231(a)(6). By taking a plain reading of the statute, the Court states, the reinstated removal orders have long been final, and “there is nothing left for the BIA to do with respect to the removal order other than to execute it.” 594 U.S. at 10. The majority sidesteps any analysis under Chevron or Auer, and resorts to a pseudo-textual interpretation of the INA, continuing a trend also observed in Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 593 U.S. ___ (2021), where the Supreme Court similarly refused to engage in a Chevron analysis. The majority seeks to justify its holding and prohibition of bond hearings for noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings by commenting “[noncitizens] who reentered the country illegally after removal have demonstrated a willingness to violate the terms of a removal order, and they therefore may be less likely to comply with the reinstated order.” Id. at 20.

Agreeing with the Fourth and Second Circuits, the dissent argues that §1226(a) governs the detention of noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings where there is a pending decision on whether the noncitizen is to be removed from the United States. The dissent also finds that the reinstated removal order is not final while withholding-only proceedings are pending. The dissent remarks that withholding-only proceedings involve a full hearing before the immigration court, may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and seek judicial review thereafter, which can take well over two years before the case is resolved. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 5 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent questions whether Congress intended to deny bond hearings “to individuals who reasonably fear persecution or torture, and who, as a result, face proceedings that may last for many months or years.” Id. at 6.

The dissent also finds that §1231(a)(1)(A)’s language, “except as otherwise provided in this section,” and the later restriction-on-removal provision indicate that §1231(a) is not the appropriate governing statute for the detention of withholding-only applicants. Id. The dissent reasons that the removal period for withholding-only applicants cannot begin until their proceedings have concluded – that is, “the order is not ‘final’ until the immigration judge and the BIA finally determine whether the restriction on removal applies and prohibits removal.” Id. at 7. By adopting the majority’s rationale that the reinstated removal order is final as of the date it was originally executed, it creates uncertainty around how, if it all, the removal period can apply to withholding-only applicants.

Who Is Affected By This Decision?

As examined in our previous articles (here, here, and here), the Trump administration eviscerated asylum protections in the United States. Under this and other flawed case law and policies, thousands of asylum seekers were deported despite having very real fears of violence in their countries of origin. Upon returning to their home countries, and facing the exact violence they anticipated, noncitizens return to the United States again seeking safety.

Although the Biden administration has taken important steps to undo some of the most egregious Trump-era policies (such as restoring asylum eligibility for survivors of domestic violence and family units, and empowering judges to manage their own dockets), the administration continues to follow the unlawful practice of expelling migrants and asylum seekers under the supposed authority of Title 42, resulting in thousands of asylum seekers being forcibly denied entry into the United States. Because asylum seekers still face the same dangers they fled, they are forced to seek irregular entry into the United States; and, depending on their individual situation and whether they have a prior removal order, may be subjected to withholding-only proceedings.

Now in the United States a second or third time after previously being unfairly removed, these individuals are only eligible for withholding of removal or protection under CAT, which do not lead to permanent lawful status. Withholding of removal and protection under CAT are also both extremely difficult protections to achieve – far more difficult than winning asylum. And in light of Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings will have to fight for these narrow protections from the confines of immigration detention, where they are at high risk of contracting COVID-19, likely to experience difficulties in accessing evidence they need for their cases, as well as less likely to find competent counsel.

Strategies for Noncitizens in Withholding-Only Proceedings Seeking Release From Immigration Detention

Although Guzman Chavez prevents noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings from seeking bond under §1226(a) authority, there remain several avenues to advocate for release:

Advocates and attorneys may request that ICE exercise prosecutorial discretion in vacating reinstatement orders and issuing notices to appear, which will allow noncitizens to pursue all relief in ordinary removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a); Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2013) (“ICE agents, to whom § 1231(a)(5) delegates the decision to reinstate a prior removal order, may exercise their discretion not to pursue streamlined reinstatement procedures.”)  It follows that the noncitizen would then be detained pursuant to §1226(a) and thus entitled to a bond hearing.

Individuals may also seek release from ICE custody as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. Noncitizens may be released on parole or on their own recognizance. In seeking release, noncitizens must establish that they are not a danger to the community nor a flight risk, and should submit evidence of strong equities which would convince ICE to exercise its discretion in releasing the noncitizen from ICE custody. (See CLINIC’s Guide to Obtaining Release From Immigration Detention for helpful tips on preparing these requests for release).

Noncitizens may also continue seeking bond hearings in the Third and Ninth Circuits, where these jurisdictions have ruled that noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are permitted to seek custody review after their detention has become prolonged (usually at six months). Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2018); Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011). In other jurisdictions, noncitizens can seek release via a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that their indefinite detention violates their due process rights. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (See the American Bar Association’s Guide for Seeking Release from Indefinite Detention After Receiving A Final Order of Deportation for tips and sample petitions).

Johnson v. Guzman Chavez significantly restricts the ability to obtain release from ICE custody for noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings. Although practitioners have many other tools at their disposal to advocate for the release of their clients, what is ultimately needed are concrete legislative changes that make clear noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings are bond eligible, or more broadly, legislation which challenges the existence of immigration detention for all noncitizens.

*Guest author Sophia Genovese is a Pro Bono Supervising Attorney at Catholic Charities Community Services, Archdiocese of New York. Sophia trains and mentors pro bono volunteer attorneys in their representation of immigrants in removal proceedings. Sophia also represents detained and non-detained immigrants in seeking release and relief before the immigration courts. Sophia previously worked as an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC, where she gained critical insights into immigration law.

No Longer in Use: How Changes in SOC Systems Affect Employment-based Immigration

Cyrus D. Mehta and Isabel Rajabzadeh*

The Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) is a federal statistical standard used by federal agencies to classify workers into occupational categories. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) coordinates the Federal statistical system, including the SOC. The SOC Policy Committee assists the OMB in the SOC revision process, and is comprised of Federal agencies including the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor. Most notably, SOC codes are used to categorize nonimmigrant and immigrant workers on the Permanent Employment Certification (“PERM” or Form ETA 9089, used to file most I-140s),  the Labor Condition Application (“LCA”, necessary to file H-1Bs and other visas) and the ETA 9142B for H-2B workers. The SOC system was created in order to facilitate job classification. It therefore collects occupational data and enables comparison of occupations across data sets.

In assigning the correct SOC code for employment-based petitions, one must compare the proffered position’s job duties and its requirements against the system. In addition, the requirement to pay prevailing wages as a minimum salary is mandatory for some employment-based visas. In order to determine the prevailing wage of a geographic area, one must look up the SOC code in the Foreign Labor Certification Data Center Online Wage Library (“OWL”) which is run by the U.S. Department of Labor.

According to the Department of Labor, the SOC serves as the framework for information being gathered through the Department of Labor’s Occupational Information Network (O*NET). The O*NET database includes detailed information on tasks, skills, tools used, credentials, and other information associated with the occupations. Much like the OWL, the information found on O*NET is listed by the occupation’s SOC codes.

Many may not realize the SOC codes exist, however, its use is integral to some employment-based visas and therefore, can result in a denial if not used properly. These codes are based on statistics, however, what happens when the system is updated? The SOC has been revised four times: 1980, 2000, and then again ten years later in 2010. The most recent update is the 2018 SOC system, which was deemed to be a “multi-year process” by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. In November 2020, the O*NET 25.1 Database incorporated the O*NET-SOC 2019 Taxonomy, which aligned with the 2018 SOC system. It stated, “updates and added new and emerging occupations ensure that the O*NET-SOC taxonomy not only represents the SOC structure, but reflects changes occurring in the world of work due to advancing technologies, innovative business practices, and the new organization of work.” However, the OWL still has not caught up with all of the SOC codes listed in the 2018 SOC system. Although the OWL states it integrated O*NET 25.3 on July 1, 2021, (which is later than version 25.1) it still does not reflect all of the changed SOC codes in the 2018 SOC system.

The Problem

In an effort to transition between the different SOC systems and SOC codes, “crosswalks” were developed to portray the changes of that year’s update. The crosswalks show which SOC code was replaced by a different title and/or SOC code number. The crosswalk from the 2000 SOC to the 2010 SOC can be found here. The crosswalk from the 2010 SOC to the 2018 SOC can be found here. As stated above, the OWL fails to keep up with the changes in the SOC codes. This causes huge discrepancies. Although not always detrimental to a case, it may cause unnecessary delays such a Request For Evidence (“RFE”).

For instance, “15-1031, Computer Software Engineers, Applications” is no longer in use and it was replaced by “15-1132 Software Developers, Applications” in the 2010 SOC system. Then, the 2018 SOC system changed the SOC code again to, “15-1252, Software Developers.” But what happens when a PERM was filed in 2011 which used the SOC code based on the 2010 SOC system? Then, 10 years later, the foreign national wants to downgrade their I-140 to take advantage of EB-3 priority dates? Which SOC code should be used on the I-140 form? Use of the 15-1031 SOC code would patch the previously filed PERM, however, it is no longer in use so that may raise flags. Use of the new SOC code may be effective, however, it may trigger a Request for Evidence. Even if there is an RFE, it could be overcome by explaining that 15-1132 (Software Developers, Applications) has replaced 15-1031 (Computer Software Engineers), which in turn has most recently been replaced by 15-1252 (Software Developers).

Not only are immigrant visas affected by this but the H-1B system also relies heavily on SOC codes. What happens when an SOC code like 15-1132 is used on an LCA because the new SOC code 15-1252 is not reflected in the OWL and thus, one cannot reference the most relevant information to determine the position? Although usage of the “older” SOC codes on LCAs seem to be permitted by the USCIS, there is significantly less detailed information on the OWL for each SOC code than O*NET. While the O*NET provides detailed explanations for each SOC code based on the 2018 SOC System, we are left using the 2010 SOC system to determine prevailing wage information. In responding to specialty occupation RFE’s, this system forces individuals to not only argue the specialized nature of the position, but that the O*NET also sees it as a specialty occupation in order to strengthen the argument. In some cases, this requires one to dig into the O*NET archives to find the older 2010 SOCs.

In an occupation like technology it is understandable that SOC codes require changes. However, the impact of these changes on petitions filed by employers for immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications are not formally addressed, and therefore, require us to connect the SOC code dots.

Finally, it should be noted that the Office of Foreign Labor Certification Data Center (“OFLC) has delayed the implementation of the 2018 SOCs to July 1, 2022. While O*NET has updated its system to the 2018 SOCs, the 2010 SOCs are archived in O*NET. Stakeholders can only use the 2010 SOCs until July 1, 2022, when the OFLC makes them go live in the Foreign Labor Application Gateway (FLAG), OWL, and in the PERM portal.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

* Isabel Rajabzadeh is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC and is admitted to practice law in New York.

 

Wang v. Blinken Nixes Any Hope for Excluding the Counting of Family Members in the Green Card Caps

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On July 9, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion in Wang v. Blinken, No. 20-5076 (D.C. Cir. 2021), interpreting INA § 203(d) to include the counting of derivatives toward the EB-5 investor cap. The Plaintiffs in the case are a group of EB-5 investors who would have been able to adjust status long ago if not for the lengthy backlogs in the EB-5 China, and subsequently Vietnam, categories caused by counting derivative family members against the EB-5 cap.

In a previous blog, we discussed the case at the District Court Level, where Plaintiffs’ primary argument was that nothing in the language of INA § 203(d), which states that “[v]isas shall be made available, in a number not to exceed 7.1 percent of [the 140,000 employment-based] worldwide level, to qualified immigrants seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in a new enterprise…..in which such alien has invested” a qualifying amount of capital, and which will create at least 10 jobs for U.S. workers, requires derivative family members to be counted against the cap. Instead, spouses and children, under INA 203(d) are “entitled to the same status and the same order of consideration provided in the respective subsection, if accompanying or following to join, the spouse or parent.”

Plaintiffs also argued that Congress intended to exempt derivative family members from the numerical caps when it changed the relevant regulatory language in the Immigration Act of 1990. Prior to 1990, the “same status, and the same order of consideration” language as it pertains to derivative family members appeared in a section describing which immigrants “are subject to the numerical limitations”, but in 1990 this provision was shifted to a new section entitled “Treatment of Family Members”. Plaintiffs argued that this change indicated an intent on the part of Congress to subject only EB-5 investors, and not their spouses and children, to the numerical cap.

The Court, however, disagreed with this reasoning. Judge Walker, who authored the opinion, interpreted the key phrase “same status” to mean that because an EB-5 investor’s family members get the same type of visa as the principal, they must also be counted against the cap, and reasoned that “same order of consideration provided in the respective subsection,” which refers to the worldwide cap on employment-based visas, further indicates that spouses and children of EB-5 investors are subject to the cap.

The Court’s decision in Wang v. Blinken comes as a deep disappointment to the many immigration attorneys who had hoped that the Biden administration could reinterpret INA § 203(d) to support either not count derivatives at all or counting family units as one. We have long taken the position that not counting derivatives under the preference quotas would be consistent with INA § 203(d). See, for example, our blogs on The Tyranny of Priority Dates in 2010, How President Obama Can Erase Immigrant Visa Backlogs With A Stroke Of A Pen in 2012, and The Way We Count in 2013. The Biden administration solicited recommendations on how to remove barriers and obstacles to legal immigration, and unitary counting of derivatives, an idea which our firm proposed,  would have done much to serve this goal by relieving the decade-long backlogs. If the Biden administration wanted to reform the immigration system through executive actions, reinterpreting the law to not count derivatives in the green card categories would have been a good first step, along with not opposing the plaintiffs in Wang v. Blinken. Sadly, though, the administration did not choose to go in this direction, and the Court’s decision in Wang v. Blinken is likely a death knell for other, future lawsuits that would make similar arguments under other employment or family-based visa categories.

While the Court’s decision in Wang v. Blinken can still be appealed to the Supreme Court, a positive outcome is not likely given the conservative majority on the Supreme Court, which has adopted a pseudo textualist approach to interpreting immigration statutes. For instance, the Supreme Court in Sanchez v. Mayorkas also recently strictly interpreted INA § 244(f)(4) to hold that the grant of Temporary Protected Status did not constitute an admission thus allowing recipients to adjust status in the US.   Even if different plaintiffs could get a favorable decision in another circuit, the Supreme Court would likely rule on the circuit split anyway. Particularly as it has Chevron deference on its side, the government is likely to prevail in any litigation scenario. And even if the Biden administration later changes its mind and decides to adopt a nationwide policy to not count derivatives, it would be precluded from implementing this policy for people living within the jurisdiction of the D.C Circuit.  Perhaps a better way forward would be convincing Congress to explicitly state that derivative family members will not be counted against the cap under INA § 203(d). Passing such an amendment would be extremely difficult in a divided Senate, but one idea is to pass a measure through the reconciliation procedure that requires only a simple majority, rather than a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate.

(This blog is for information purposes, and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice).

* Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a Law Clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

 

Requesting Premium Processing on a Downgraded I-140 Petition  

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In October 2020, USCIS’ decision to apply the Filing Dates, rather than the Final Action Dates, to employment-based I-485 adjustment of status applications, together with advancement in the Filing Dates in the State Department Visa Bulletin allowed many noncitizen workers who had been trapped in the green card backlogs for years to file I-485 adjustment of status applications. Since the EB-3 Filing Date for India significantly overtook the EB-2 Filing Date, some beneficiaries approved EB-2 petition opted to “downgrade” by filing a new I-140 under EB-3. Generally, beneficiaries may still rely on the original Labor Certification when filing a downgraded I-140 and retain the priority date of the EB-2 petition, unless the job has drastically changed.

In previous blogs, we have discussed the nuances of filing a downgrade petition, and addressed some common questions that arise in this situation. One frequent source of questions is whether Premium Processing is available for downgrade petitions given that these I-140 petitions filed since October 2020 are still pending and have yet to be approved. Generally, USCIS will  not accept a case for Premium Processing unless it is filed with an original Labor Certification. Thus, beneficiaries whose Labor Certifications were filed with the original EB-2 petition likely cannot file a downgrade I-140 together with a Premium Processing request. Although USCIS might, in rare instances, accept a Premium Processing request made with an I-140 downgrade petition, it is more likely that the Premium request, or even the entire petition, will be rejected.

A strategy more likely to meet with success is filing the downgrade I-140 via regular processing, waiting USCIS to issue a receipt notice, and then request Premium Processing of the pending I-140. USCIS may still reject the Premium Processing request if it cannot match the pending I-140 to the previous file or retrieve the original Labor Certification. Even in the case of a rejection, however, the pending I-140 will be safe and subsequent Premium Processing requests can be filed, if desired. There are an increased number of Premium Processing requests from beneficiaries of downgraded I-140 petitions given that the EB-3 India Final Action Date has rapidly advanced. Under the July 2021 State Department Visa Bulletin, the EB-3 India Final Action Date is January 1, 2013. If the I-140 petition is approved when the Final Action Date is current for the I-140 petition, the beneficiary and family members can hope to have their I-485 applications approved although the USCIS has been approving them at a snail’s pace and may alarmingly not be able to use up all EB visas for this fiscal year. It should also be noted that the swifter approval of the I-140 petition does not speed up the processing of the applications for employment authorization or advance parole when the I-485 application remains pending.

Recently, however, we have seen some requests to upgrade I-140s to Premium Processing being repeatedly rejected on the ground that an original Labor Certification was no provided, despite other, similar Premium Processing requests being accepted. In an email inquiry placed to the USCIS Premium Processing address in response to one such case, our firm received a helpful response. An Immigration Services Officer  advised that Petitioners resubmit rejected Premium Processing requests and indicate on a brightly colored sheet of paper that USCIS has the original labor certification.  A more guaranteed method, according to the USCIS response, is to submit a copy of the original Labor Certification. Submissions lacking at least one of these documents are vulnerable to immediate rejection since the reviewing officer will not see a Labor Certification included. Although this was not part of the guidance we received, it would also be advisable to indicate the receipt number of the prior approved EB-2 petition which contains the original Labor Certification, and direct the USCIS to look for it in that petition.

Even if the Premium Processing request is accepted, there is always a risk that the USCIS might issue a Request for Evidence (RFE) even if the prior I-140 under EB-2 was approved. Note, though, that such an RFE could also be issued even if there is no request for Premium Processing, although there might be an incentive to issue the RFE if the officer cannot complete the processing within the mandated 15 days. Although RFEs have been seldom, the most common reason for an RFE is to request submission of evidence that the employer still has the ability to pay the proffered wage from the establishment of the priority date until the present, and up to the point of time that the beneficiary receives permanent residency.  If the employer’s current tax returns show losses and the beneficiary is not being paid the proffered wage,  Premium Processing should not be considered, and the I-140 can continue to remain pending,  until the employer is able to potentially overcome such an RFE.  Another reason for an RFE is that the prior SOC code that was designated at the time of the granting of the Labor Certification does not match with the SOC code that was indicated in the downgrade I-140 petition. This is not a valid basis for the USCIS to issue an RFE as the SOC code available for the occupation at that time has become obsolete. For instance, SOC Code 15-1031 for Computer Software Engineers, Applications is no longer in existence. It has now changed to SOC Code 15-1132 for Software Developers, which has again most recently changed to SOC Code 15-1252. This sort of RFE can be more easily overcome.

All of these issues should be carefully considered when requesting Premium Processing of a downgrade I-140 petition. Despite the issues that can arise when making a Premium Processing request of this kind, petitioners can help prevent rejections by following USCIS’ guidance and including a highly visible reference to the original Labor Certification, or a copy of the Labor Certification itself with the request. Submitting timely and thorough responses to any RFEs too helps to ensure that the petition will ultimately be successful.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be considered as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a law clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

Reflections on Giuliani’s Suspension of his New York Bar License

The  temporary suspension of Rudolph Giuliani’s bar license by a New York appellate court for making false statements on behalf of Donald Trump’s election is thought provoking for lawyers, especially those who have opposed Trump and continue to oppose him.

The court wrote that “these false statements were made to improperly bolster respondent’s narrative that due to widespread voter fraud, victory in the 2020 United States presidential election was stolen from his client.” The court further stated that “respondent’s conduct immediately threatens the public interest and warrants interim suspension from the practice of law, pending further proceedings before the Attorney Grievance Committee.”

Giuliani’s temporary suspension is based  specifically  on New York Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3, 4.1 and 8.4 while he was serving as Trump’s lawyer.

Rule 3.3 provides that: “(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”

Rule 4.1  provides that: “In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person,”

Rule 8.4 provides that  “A lawyer or law firm shall not: . . . (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, . . . or (h) engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.”

Charging a lawyer for a 3.3 violation is narrow as the lawyer must make false statements to the courts, but Giuliani was also charged under 4.1 and 8.4 for making false statements to legislators and the public. Charging a lawyer for making statements to the public under 4.1 and 8.4 is concerning as another disciplinary authority sympathetic to former president Trump may charge a lawyer for allegedly making false claims against Trump. One may argue that  Giuliani was  primarily charged in his capacity as a lawyer for Trump but the disciplinary rules are broad and allow a disciplinary authority to charge a lawyer  even if the lawyer may not be acting in a representational capacity on behalf of a client.

Many lawyers tweeted  that Trump was helped by the Russians to steal the 2016 elections and thus engaged in criminal conspiracy. The Mueller report found insufficient evidence that Trump’s  campaign “coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election-interference activities. “  However, the same  report  also found that  Trump engaged in  obstruction of justice, and so a lawyer  accused of making false claims against Trump can find support in the Mueller report itself  that the Russian government “interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion” and “violated U.S. criminal law”.    Even if a lawyer’s tweet is perceived by a pro-Trump disciplinary authority as not being entirely entirely  true that Trump criminally conspired with Russia, there probably would not be a basis to charge lawyers  under Rule 4.1 or 8.4 as they were not acting as lawyers for Clinton or her campaign. This lawyer may have a far stronger defense than Giuliani as the allegation that Trump was involved in a criminal conspiracy with Russian agents has not been entirely disproven.

Another interesting aspect of the NY court’s opinion is that Giuliani also lied that “illegal aliens” voted in Arizona. Here too he did this in his capacity as a lawyer for a Trump, but another NY lawyer Aaron Schlosberg was publicly censured  under 8.4(h) when he went on a racist rant against workers in a NY restaurant who spoke Spanish and not English, and he did not do this while representing a client. https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2021/01/04/manhattan-attorney-whose-racist-rant-went-viral-is-publicly-censured/?slreturn=20210524210958. This part of the opinion brings vindication to immigration lawyers who have strenuously opposed Trump and his allies for scapegoating immigrants.

The bottom line is that the same broad First Amendment protections may not apply to lawyers who violate the disciplinary rules, especially when they  knowingly make false statements in the course of representing a client or engage in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness as a lawyer. While Rule 3.3 is more specific as a lawyer can only be accused of violating it if they lie in court, and Rule 4.1 is triggered when the lawyer lies to third parties in the course of representing a client, a lawyer can be disciplined for just about any perceived violation under Rule 8.4 whether it is inside or outside the courtroom and even when it relates to conduct in a lawyer’s private life.

So while we rejoice that Giuliani got his comeuppance for blatantly lying on behalf of Trump that the election was stolen from him, remember the old saying that what is good for the goose is also good for the gander.

Sanchez v. Mayorkas: Although TPS Is Not An Admission, Justice Kagan’s Opinion Leaves Open Avenues for TPS Recipients to Adjust Status as Nonimmigrants

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On June 7, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Sanchez v. Mayorkas, holding that a grant of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) does not constitute an admission under INA § 245(a) for purposes of adjustment of status. Though overall a disappointing decision, the Court’s opinion may nonetheless leave open some options for some TPS recipients who want to obtain their green cards.

Sanchez v. Mayorkas involved the plight of Jose Santos Sanchez, an El Salvadoran national who entered the United States without inspection in 1997 and was subsequently granted TPS based on a series of earthquakes in his home country. In 2014, Sanchez, together with his wife, Sonia Gonzalez, sought to adjust status after more than 20 years of residence in the United States, but the USCIS denied his application on the grounds that “[a] grant of TPS does not cure a foreign national’s entry without inspection or constitute an inspection and admission of the foreign national”.

Sanchez challenged the denial, and the District Court ruled in his favor, holding that an LPR “’shall be considered as’ having ‘lawful status as a nonimmigrant’ for purposes of applying to become an LPR”. See Santos Sanchez v. Johnson, 2018 WL 6427894, *4 (D NJ, Dec. 7, 2018). The District Court further held that INA §244(f)(4) requires TPS holders to be treated “as though [they] had been ‘inspected and admitted.’” The Third Circuit, though, reversed, holding that “a grant of TPS does not constitute an ‘admission’ into the United States.” Sanchez v. Secretary U. S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 967 F. 3d 242, 252 (2020).

The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Kagan, held that an individual who entered the United States without inspection is not eligible to adjust status under INA §245 by virtue of being a TPS recipient. The Court drew a distinction between the concept of “admission” and one’s immigration status, noting that there are several categories of individuals who have nonimmigrant status without having been admitted to the United States (alien crewmen, crime  victims in U visa status, etc.).

Though unfortunate that the Court did not consider a grant to TPS to be an admission under INA § 245(a), Justice Kagan’s opinion includes some interesting language that may leave open some avenues for TPS recipients to adjust status. On pages 8-9 of the opinion, the Court held that TPS recipients will be considered to have nonimmigrant status, which is needed to adjust status under §245. Thus, an individual who was admitted to the United States in lawful B-2 status for example, but fell out of status before being granted TPS might be able to adjust status, having satisfied both the “admission” and “nonimmigrant status” requirements.

Thus, it is unclear whether a grant of TPS “wipes out” a lapse in one’s nonimmigrant status, no matter the duration. Justice Kagan gives the more narrow example of an individual who was out of status for a few months before receiving TPS, potentially implying that TPS ends an individual’s time out of status who otherwise would have exceeded 180 days and been unable to adjust under INA § 245(k). However, a noncitizen relying on §245(k) to adjust status would not need to have received TPS, or any other nonimmigrant status, to file an employment based I-485 within 180 days of admission.  On the other hand, INA §245(k) could still potentially come to the rescue if the individual is granted TPS status within 180 days of the admission but then seeks to file for adjustment of status 180 days after the admission. The grant of TPS would have put the person back in nonimmigrant status within the 180 days from the admission, even if they file an adjustment application after 180 days.

Justice Kagan’s opinion can be interpreted even more broadly to support the idea that a grant of TPS “wipes out” a lapse in the nonimmigrant status and thus overrides INA §§§ 245(c)(2), (7) and (8), when the lack of a lawful status impedes an individual’s ability to adjust status. Under INA §245(c)(2) an applicant for adjustment of status even if admitted (other than an immediate relative) is precluded from applying for adjustment of status if they are in unlawful status at the date of filing the application or who have failed to maintain continuously a lawful status since entry into the US. INA § 245(k) allows one who was admitted to apply for adjustment of status under the first three employment-based preferences and the employment-based fourth preference as a religious worker if they have failed to maintain lawful status for not more than 180 days. But INA § 245(k) is inapplicable to one who is applying for adjustment of status under a family-based preference.  A grant of TPS at any point in time, if Justice Kagan’s opinion is interpreted broadly, should once again render an applicant eligible for adjustment of status whether they are filing an adjustment application under a family based preference or  an employment-based preference even 180 days beyond the admission and the grant of TPS.

INA § 245(c)(7) similarly precludes adjustment of status to that of an immigrant under INA § 203(b) (the five employment-based preferences) for one who is not in a lawful nonimmigrant status. A grant of TPS ought to wipe out this impediment. INA § 245(c)(8) disqualifies one from adjusting status who accepted employment while unauthorized. Under the broader interpretation of Justice Kagan’s opinion, the grant of TPS ought to also remove this impediment under INA § 245(c)(8) too.

While the Supreme Court nixed the ability of TPS applicants to adjust status if they were not admitted, there are still some bright spots if one carefully parses through Justice Kagan’s opinion. Under the broadest interpretation of Justice Kagan’s opinion, TPS applicants, if they were initially admitted, should continue to claim that they are eligible to adjust status under both the family and employment preferences by virtue of receiving nonimmigrant status.

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a Law Clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

State Department’s New Guidance Broadening Transmission of Citizenship to Children Born Abroad Is Welcome and Consistent with Federal Court Decisions

On May 18, 2021, the State Department issued guidance broadening the path for transmission of US citizenship to a child born abroad to married parents. The guidance is reproduced below:

Recognizing the advances in assisted reproductive technology the State Department is updating our interpretation and application of Section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which establishes the requirements for acquisition of U.S. citizenship at birth.

Children born abroad to parents, at least one of whom is a U.S. citizen and who are married to each other at the time of the birth, will be U.S. citizens from birth if they have a genetic or gestational tie to at least one of their parents and meet the INA’s other requirements.  Previously, the Department’s interpretation and application of the INA required that children born abroad have a genetic or gestational relationship to a U.S. citizen parent.

This updated interpretation and application of the INA takes into account the realities of modern families and advances in ART from when the Act was enacted in 1952.

This change will allow increased numbers of married couples to transmit U.S. citizenship to their children born overseas, while continuing to follow the citizenship transmission requirements established in the INA.   Requirements for children born to unmarried parents remain unchanged.

At the same time, we remain vigilant to the risks of citizenship fraud, exploitation, and abuse.  As with all citizenship and immigration benefits we examine, the Department will implement this policy in a manner that addresses these concerns.

This new interpretation allows a U.S. citizen who has a child through surrogacy, an egg donor, in vitro fertilization as well as other advances in assisted reproductive technology (ART)  to transmit U.S. citizenship to their child, even if there is no genetic or gestational relationship to the U.S. citizen parent so long as such a link exists with the other married parent. As stated in the State Department’s announcement, this change in policy “takes into account the realities of modern families.” This is welcome news for a growing number of families who rely on the advancements of reproductive technologies to build their families.

For instance, prior State Department policy deprived the US citizen mother who may neither have been the gestational mother nor have a genetic relationship with the child from passing US citizenship. A US citizen mother is medically unable to bear a child and needs to use a surrogate mother overseas to carry the child to birth, and the egg is not hers and the sperm is from a non-US citizen father, US citizenship could not be passed onto the child. Thus, under the prior policy, such a mother who for medical reasons was unable to establish a biological link to her child, and also could not serve as the gestational mother herself, was unable to transmit US citizenship to her child. This was unfair for such mothers.

The nationality provisions of the INA were written long before the advent of ART. The State Department is to be heartily congratulated for bringing them into the 21st century. The willingness and ability to understand parentage in a broader sense is something for which advocates have long contended. It is precisely what a consistent line of Ninth Circuit case law and more recently a Second Circuit case, which did not deal with ART, has long exemplified. See Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159 (2000); Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales401 F. 3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005);   Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2018).  In these cases,  so long as a child was not born out of wedlock, or if born out of wedlock was subsequently legitimated,  the child did not need to prove that he or she was the biological child of the US citizen parent to acquire citizenship.

Public policy supports recognition and maintenance of a family unit. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) was intended to keep families together. It should be construed in favor of family units and the acceptance of responsibility by family members. See, e.g., Kaliski v. Dist. Dir. of INS, 620 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir.1980) (discussing the “humane purpose” of the INA and noting that a “strict interpretation” of the Act, including an “arbitrary distinction” between legitimate and illegitimate children, would “detract from … the purpose of the Act which is to prevent continued separation of families.”); H.R.Rep. No. 85-1199, pt. 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N.2016, 2020 (observing that the “legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to provide for a liberal treatment of children and was concerned with the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united).

Solis-Espinoza, supra, at 1094.

The Second Circuit in Jaen v. Sessions did not insist on a genetic or gestational tie with the US citizen parent, and the State Department’s new policy is consistent with Jaen v. Sessions. David Isaacson’s blog, Jaen v. Sessions: The Government Reminds Us That Government Manuals Aren’t Always Right, correctly pointed out that the prior US government policy or guidance may not actually be the law, and federal courts need to step in to point this out. Fortunately, the State Department has now stepped in.  In Jaen v. Sessions, as discussed in David’s blog,  Levy Alberto Jaen was born in Panama in 1972 to a non-U.S.-citizen mother, Leticia Rogers Boreland, who was then married to a naturalized U.S. citizen named Jorge Boreland.  But Jaen’s Panamanian birth certificate indicated that his father was another man named Liberato Jaen. Jaen moved to the US at the age of 15 as a nonimmigrant in 1988 and lived with the Boreland family. In 2008, Jaen was placed in removal proceedings based on controlled substance violations and he moved to terminate proceedings on the ground that he was a US citizen. The Immigration Judge denied the motion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Second Circuit reversed and pointed out that  the historic common-law definition of the term “parent” included a common-law presumption of legitimacy that held a married man to be the father of a child to whom his wife gave birth.  As it was put in Blackstone’s Commentaries, “Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant”—the nuptials show who is the father.  Jaen, slip op. at 13 & n. 5.  This common-law definition of parent, the Second Circuit held, would be sufficient to render Jorge Boreland the parent of Levy Jaen for citizenship purposes.

Although the State Department policy is meant to cover children born through ART, it is clearly applicable to out of wedlock scenarios in Jaen, Solis-Espinoza and Scales. Levy Alberto Jaen, for example, had a genetic link to his non-US citizen mother Leticia Rogers Boreland, who was married to his US citizen legal (although not biological) father Jorge Boreland.  Consistent with the new State Department policy, Jaen had a genetic or gestational tie to at least one of [his] parents, Leticia, and she was married to another, U.S. citizen parent of his. Though born in Mexico, Solis-Espinoza claimed citizenship by virtue of the US citizenship of the woman he knew as his mother.   That woman, who was married to Solis-Espinoza’s biological father at the time of petitioner’s birth, acknowledged him from his infancy as a member of her family and raised him as his mother, though he did not in fact have a biological connection with that woman. Scales was born in the Philippines in 1977, to Stanley Scales, Sr.  an American citizen-serviceman at the time, and Aily Topaz, a Philippine citizen.   Stanley and Topaz met during the first week of September 1976, and one week later, Topaz told Stanley that she was pregnant, probably from a prior relationship.  Topaz and Stanley were married on March 13, 1977, and Petitioner was born on April 6, 1977.

Although one arguable difference is that he had a legally relevant third parent to a greater extent than generally exists in ART cases (where the egg or sperm donor is usually acknowledged not to have legal parentage rights),  it isn’t unheard of for a child to have more than two parents for immigration purposes especially in the stepparent context. The State Department’s new policy is not only consistent with the common law meaning of “parent” in the INA, especially INA 301(g), but it is also in keeping with public policy that supports the recognition and maintenance of a family unit.