Cyrus Mehta

Granting Deferred Action to Aging Out Children in Lawful Status Is Preferable to Having Them Start All Over Again

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta

Children of beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions that are caught in the employment-based backlogs are in danger of aging out if they turn 21 and are unable to obtain permanent resident status with their parents. Although the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) is able to protect the age of some children from aging out, not all children can benefit from the CSPA especially when neither the Date for Filing or the Final Action Date in the State Department Visa Bulletin is nowhere close to becoming current with respect to the I-140 petition filed on behalf of the parent. Indian born beneficiaries in the employment based first, second and third preferences are particularly impacted as the wait time before their priority dates become current can be an absurd  195 years. Over one million Indian born beneficiaries and their dependents will be waiting for the rest of their lives in the backlogs.

Although Congress can easily fix this problem by infusing more visa numbers in the employment-based categories along with reducing the per country limits, due to the intense polarization between the two parties and the obsessive focus on the border, those in Congress who desire to fix the problem are unable to get support to pass meaningful legislation.  On June 13, 2024, a bipartisan group of 43 members of Congress sent a letter  to Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Director Ur Jaddou requesting an administrative fix for children who will age out.

The letter requests three policy changes as follows:

First, “Clarify the applicability of potential grants of deferred action on a case-by-case basis, where discretion is warranted, for children of long-term visa holders who age out of status.”

Second, “Expand eligibility for Employment Authorization to child dependents of visa holders, and to individuals with approved I-140 petitions.” The letter also urges USCIS to expand eligibility for employment authorization (an EAD) under “compelling circumstances” to include “children who are aging out.”

Third, “We urge USCIS to create a process to allow children of long-term visa holders who have aged out to seek parole on a case-by-case basis, if warranted for urgent humanitarian reasons or to advance a significant public benefit.”

My views on this bipartisan letter have been extensively reflected in an article in Forbes written by Stuart Anderson of the National Foundation for American Policy, which are extracted below:

“The administrative proposals are both interesting and intriguing as they may only give a temporary benefit to the child who has aged out with no pathway to permanent residence,” said immigration attorney Cyrus Mehta. “Still, until Congress provides a legislative solution, these proposals, especially the first and second, would be an interim solution.”

A child granted deferred action can remain in the United States and obtain employment authorization. “The big disadvantage under this proposal is that once the parent had been granted permanent residence, what happens to the child?” said Mehta. “The child will have to remain a recipient of deferred action for a very long time until they can obtain their own basis to immigrate to the U.S.” A new presidential administration could rescind the deferred action, leaving an aged-out child in a situation similar to DACA recipients.

On the letter’s second proposal, Mehta explains while it would be good for dependent children to obtain EADs under compelling circumstances, “Children who age out and cannot protect their age under the Child Status Protection Act will not be able to obtain immigrant visas along with their parents.” A rule on the regulatory agenda that has not been issued would clarify and likely expand compelling circumstances for children at risk of aging out.

The letter also recommends granting employment authorization documents to the principal green card applicants waiting for permanent residence. “While granting EADs to beneficiaries of approved I-140s is a good thing, advocates should realize it will not lead to permanent residence if an individual changes jobs unless the new employer files the labor certification and I-140 again and the beneficiary is able to recapture the old priority date,” said Mehta. The child may not be protected from aging out depending on the circumstances.

The third proposal—being paroled into the United States—also does not offer a clear pathway to permanent residence. A future administration can choose not to extend parole. Depending on when a parent obtains permanent residence, sponsoring a son or daughter may be possible, although likely via consular processing.

While these proposals are less than ideal as they do not put aged out children on the path to permanent residence, an executive action that authorizes children to lawfully remain in the US long after they have aged out, and obtain work authorization and travel permission,  is preferable to the status quo.

Presently, a child who is turning 21 would most likely be in H-4 status while the parent who is caught in the backlog is in H-1B status. The child must seek to change status before turning 21 to another nonimmigrant status. Most children of skilled workers are studying in college, and so they can change to F-1 status. Requesting a change to F-1 status is fraught with peril. Changing to F-1 status is fraught with risk as  F-1  nonimmigrant classification requires one to have a temporary intent to remain in the US and ultimately return to a residence abroad, which has not been abandoned. It is difficult for a child in this situation who has been in the US for most of their life to demonstrate such a nonimmigrant intent. Furthermore, even if the child is successful in changing to F-1 status, travelling abroad is fraught with even greater risk as a US consul can deny the F-1 visa under INA 214(b), because the visa applicant has not overcome  the presumption of immigrant intent by sufficiently demonstrating that they  have strong ties to their home country that will compel them to leave the United States at the end of their temporary stay. H-1B and L visa applicants, along with their spouse and any minor children, are excluded from this requirement, but when the child has switched to F-1 status, they have to meet this requirement.

If this child was not born to an Indian born backlogged beneficiary, they would have obtained permanent residence along with the parent. Unfortunately, this child who has aged out  needs to start all over again in the labyrinthine immigration system like their parent has miserably experienced by first obtaining F-1 nonimmigrant status, then take their chance in the H-1B lottery. It is likely that most of them will not get selected in this lottery. If they are fortuitously selected, they can  seek an employer to sponsor them for permanent residency while not getting any credit for their parent’s priority date. They will need to establish a new priority date upon their employer sponsoring them for labor certification, and  filing an I-140 petition, and then they too will have to wait for more than a lifetime to obtain permanent residence unless they happen to marry a US citizen,  and get rescued from quotas  and file for adjustment of status.

Instead of stating all over again in F-1 status, if a child is granted deferred action, they are authorized to remain in the US and even work by applying for employment authorization. If the child wishes to travel, they can request advance parole. This is probably better than remaining in nonimmigrant F-1 status, and then trying to switch to H-1B status under the H-1B lottery. They will need to be a recipient of deferred action for a very long time until they get sponsored for permanent residence through an employer or as an immediate relative of a US citizen spouse or through a family member under one of the family preferences.

Although a new president can yank the deferred action, they will be more stable so long as they have deferred action rather than being thrown into vagaries of the US immigration system. They can also hope that at some point Congress will bless this executive action and provide a pathway for these children to apply for permanent residence and citizenship just as DACA recipients have been hoping and advocating for a long time.

Finally, I also favor advancing the “Dates of Filing” in the State Department Visa Bulletin as much as possible to allow those waiting in employment-based green card categories to file I-485 applications for adjustment of status. This action would enable individuals to obtain employment authorization documents, advance parole for travel purposes and protect the age of the child for an immigration filing.

 

 

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Ethical Obligation of the Public Official Lawyer Who Falsely Undermines the Criminal Justice System after Trump’s Conviction

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box

On May 30, 2024, Donald Trump was convicted of 34 counts of falsifying business records in New York, all in connection with his payment of hush money to adult film actress Stormy Daniels in advance of the 2016 election. Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe eloquently summarized on X the sense of justice that news of the convictions brought –  “Trump’s trial for 34 felony violations of NY law — violations w/out which he might well have lost the 2016 presidential election  — was a model of fairness that law students and trial judges will study for decades. There’s nothing here for any informed person to complain of.” Trump and his followers, however, promptly decried the trial as having been rigged, accusing Justice Juan M. Merchan, who presided over the trial, and the jury of being biased.

Trump quickly found ways to direct blame for the perceived unfairness of the trial at immigrants. In a disjointed monologue that he delivered outside of Trump Tower on the day after the trial, he stated that migrants are “coming in from mental institutions and insane asylums” and “[t]he Congo has just released a lot of people from jail – Congo, Africa – just released a lot of people, a lot of people, from their prisons and jails, and brought them into the United States of America.” (see here). He bafflingly added that these migrants originated “from places unknown, from languages that we … haven’t even heard of… [i]t’s not like Spanish or French or Russian.” He then concluded that New York City, where the trial was held, is corrupt and crime-ridden, stating “you have violent crime all over this city at levels that nobody’s ever seen before.” Republicans quickly followed suit in drawing parallels between immigrants and the supposed injustice of Trump’s convictions. Tucker Carlson stated on Twitter on May 30, 2024: “Import the Third World, become the Third World. That’s what we just saw. This won’t stop Trump. He’ll win the election if he’s not killed first. But it does mark the end of the fairest justice system in the world. Anyone who defends this verdict is a danger to you and your family.”

Other Republican leaders, too, denounced the outcome of the trial and questioned the impartiality of judge and jury. Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator for Florida, stated: “The verdict in New York is a complete travesty that makes a mockery of our system of justice. A political show trial conducted by an openly pro-Biden judge whose daughter makes money off the case, a jury from the most liberal county in America, absurd and ridiculous charges and outrageous jury instructions that guaranteed guilty verdicts. Biden and the Trump deranged left will stop at nothing to remain in power.” Senator J.D. Vance of Ohio issued a statement calling the verdict a “an absolute miscarriage of justice” and criticizing the “partisan slant of this jury pool”. Mike Johnson, Speaker of the House, said of the verdict “I do believe the Supreme Court should step in”.

These comments have the troubling potential to undermine confidence in the judicial systems of the United States. Trump and Carlson’s misguided criticism of the verdict and demonization of immigrants is, unfortunate though unsurprising. It is disappointing, though, that well-trained lawyers such as Rubio, Vance, and Johnson who are also elected officials would baselessly claim parroting Trump that the trial was biased. Pursuant to the state analogues to ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4 (c) and (d), lawyers must not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” or “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”. Although these are broad provisions it is unlikely that Rubio, Vance or Johnson would be subject to discipline as their baseless accusations against the criminal justice system may be protected under the First Amendment. Still, Rule 8.4 has been used broadly by disciplinary authorities against lawyers especially when their conduct has been prejudicial to the administration of justice. Comment 7 to Rule 8.4 imposes greater obligations on lawyers who are public official, which states that “[l]awyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer’s abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers.”

Critics have every right to disagree with the verdict reached against Trump, or to support his right to an appeal, but it is concerning to see Republican leaders who are also lawyers make blatantly untrue statements that could create the perception that the trial, or American judicial system as a whole, are unjust and undeserving of respect.

It is ironic that Trump, who as president imposed travel bans against people coming from Muslim-majority nations, will now  face bans from 37 countries including major allies such as Canada, Australia, and  the UK because of his felony convictions, although if he becomes president again, it is likely that these countries will make exceptions while he will continue to act ruthlessly towards immigrants in his own country. And finally, one cannot help but snigger at Trump who falsely accuses undocumented immigrants of being criminals and “poisoning the blood of our country” when he is now a confirmed felon!

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Who Are the Undocumented Immigrants That Would Become Targets of Trump’s Deportation Army If He Got Reelected

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta

If Trump gets reelected, he has hinted that his administration will create a deportation force that would deport 15 million undocumented immigrants. Radley Balko’s  newsletter on substack,  Trump’s Deportation Army,  provides chilling details on how this deportation would be executed, which would be an unmitigated disaster for families, the US economy and the standing of the United States.

“The Trump immigration plan would be the second largest forced displacement of human beings in human history, on par with Britain’s disastrous partition of India, and second only to total forced displacement during World War II, ” Balko states.

According to New York Times’s columnist Jamelle Bouie in  Trump’s Taste for Tyranny Finds a Target immigrants would be the most easy target for Trump to play out his autocratic fantasies. Trump has already said that undocumented immigrants are “poisoning the blood of this country.” The Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii allowed Trump to enforce his Muslim ban.

Stephen Miller, the architect of Trump’s anti-immigrant policies,  has stated on Charlie Kirk’s show how this deportation force would fulfill Trump’s fantasy. The  deportation force would comprise agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Border Patrol and other federal agencies, as well as the National Guard and local law enforcement officials. They would look all over the  country for unauthorized and undocumented immigrants moving from state to state, city to city, neighborhood to neighborhood and, finally, house to house. These are people who in the view of Trump and Miller do not belong, not that because are not authorized but because they are also nonwhite and who are from what Trump once called “shithole” countries. By raiding workplaces and staging public roundups, this deportation force would create a climate of fear and intimidation.

Mistakes are bound to happen as legal immigrants and even US citizens may get caught up in the roundups. There could not be any notion of selective enforcement in these roundups, and those caught up in them would be because they appeared to be immigrants. There would be mass racial and ethnic profiling. And by the time this gets sorted out it may be too late if the person already got deported.

Moreover, one thinks of an undocumented immigrants as a person who entered the United States without inspection or who came to the US legally on a visa and overstayed. However, the term is broader to encompass persons who were previously unauthorized and who have been authorized to stay such as recipients of the Deferred Action of Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, applicants for Temporary Protected Status (TPS),  those who have pending asylum applications and applications for other relief such as under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) or crime victim U visas. There are also those who are on supervised release or who have obtained stays of removal and eligible for employment authorization year after year. All these noncitizens would be lumped together as undocumented immigrants that would be red meat for Trump’s deportation force.

Since it would be beyond the capacity to quickly deport the people caught up in these roundups, especially since countries may not even be willing to accept them easily, there would be holding facilities that would serve as staging centers on land near the Texas border. This would not be too dissimilar from internment camps, which were set up in the United States to detain Japanese Americans after the attack by the Japanese military on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

In addition to the round ups, the second Trump administration would sign an executive order to withhold passports, social security numbers and other government benefits from  children born of undocumented immigrants in the United States never mind that the Fourteenth Amendment says the exact opposite. Under Trump’s deportation plan, there would be no distinction between undocumented immigrants and children born to an undocumented immigrant in the United States. If there are going to be protests and resistance from people against agents storming homes, schools and religious places, Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act to mobilize the miliary and crush the resisters as well as his political opponents.

According to Bouie, “what we are seeing here from Trump isn’t simply a distaste for liberal values; it is a taste for genuine tyranny and bona fide despotism, one that complements his endless praise for dictators and strongmen.” Trump has already likened immigrants to invaders, and he can invoke an emergency, and thus a constitutional crisis,  to go ahead with deportations without waiting for the courts to rule, and  when they do rule, Trump’s hope is that the courts will rule in his favor, especially the Supreme Court, which have historically given deference to the executive branch on matters involving national security. This has happened time and time again with respect to court challenges to the internment of Japanese Americans, against the unlawful detention and abuses of noncitizens after the September 11 attacks and most recently in allowing Trump’s travel ban to pass, which was a major part of his election campaign in 2016 to ban Muslims from coming to the US, and in this reelection campaign for 2024, Trump promises to create a tyrannical force to deport millions of immigrants.

On this Memorial Day, as we reflect upon the sacrifices our military personnel have made to free America and the world from fascism and tyranny, think about how Trump can so easily unravel all of this through a deportation force that rips families apart, tears lives and fractures America.

 

David Isaacson

Harrow v. Department of Defense and What it Means for Immigration Cases: the 30-Day Time Limit for Filing a Petition for Review Is Still Very Important, But Probably Not Jurisdictional Anymore

/0 Comments/in /by

On May 16, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Harrow v. Department of Defense. While this case did not relate in any obvious way to immigration, its holding and reasoning has a significant implication for people seeking review of removal orders in federal court. Specifically, Harrow implies that the 30-day deadline for filing a petition for review of a removal order is not “jurisdictional”, in the sense of being something that cannot be waived and has no equitable exceptions. It is still crucial to file a petition for review in federal court within 30 days of a removal order if at all possible, but Harrow could give new hope to people for whom it was not possible to comply with this critical deadline.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, the only way to seek judicial review of an order of removal, with very rare exceptions, is a petition for review in the appropriate Court of Appeals. According to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), “The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” More than 29 years ago, the Supreme Court held in Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995), with respect to a previous version of the statute, that the time limit for filing a petition for review was “mandatory and jurisdictional” and “not subject to equitable tolling”. The conventional wisdom, expressed by such illustrious sources as the American Immigration Council’s practice advisory on petitions for review and others as well, has been that this is true of the current version of the statute as well. No matter how compelling the circumstances, that is, a petition for review filed outside of the 30-day time limit could not be considered. The remedy in extreme cases was to move the Board of Immigration Appeals (or other agency component that had issued a reviewable removal order) to reopen the proceedings and reissue its decision so that a timely petition for review could be filed. Motions to reissue are not readily granted, although a denial of a motion to reissue can itself be subject to judicial review, and the Courts of Appeals have sometimes granted petitions for review of a refusal to reissue and remanded to the BIA where there are potentially convincing allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, as in Zhao v. INS, 452 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2006), or possible failure by the BIA to send a decision properly, as in Jahjaga v. Att’y Gen., 512 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2008).

The Supreme Court held last year in Santos-Zacaria v. Garland that the requirement of exhaustion of remedies in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, but it did not address whether this was true of the 30-day deadline. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Harrow, however, suggests that the 30-day deadline is very likely not jurisdictional either.

The petitioner in Harrow, Stuart Harrow, had sought review by the Merits Systems Protection Board in 2013 regarding a six-day furlough. His case dragged on for years, because the Merits Systems Protection Board did not have a quorum of members for much of the time that the case was pending before it. By 2022, when the Merits Systems Protection Board finally decided Mr. Harrow’s case, his email address had changed, and he missed the initial notice of the decision. As a result, he also missed the deadline to file a petition for review of the decision: 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) provides that “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board.”

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Mr. Harrow’s untimely petition for review could not be considered, despite his explanation. As the Supreme Court explained:

The Court of Appeals declined Harrow’s request for equitable consideration, believing it had an absolute obligation to dismiss his appeal. The court reasoned that the 60-day statutory deadline is a “jurisdictional requirement,” and therefore “not subject to equitable tolling.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. “Harrow’s situation” might be “sympathetic,” the court stated, but it was also irrelevant. Ibid. Given the deadline’s jurisdictional nature, the court lacked the capacity to “excuse a failure to timely file based on individual circumstances.” Ibid.

Harrow, slip op. at 2.

The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with the Federal Circuit, holding that the deadline at issue in Harrow was not jurisdictional. Under recent precedent, the Supreme Court explained, it “will treat a procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress ‘clearly states’ that it is.” Harrow, slip op. at 3. The statute at issue in Harrow, the Supreme Court pointed out, contains “no mention of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction, whether generally or over untimely claims.” Id. at 5. Absent a clear mention of jurisdiction, current Supreme Court precedent generally holds time limits to be non-jurisdictional. There is an exception regarding a notice of appeal from one court to another, but as the Supreme Court explained, it is a limited one:

The Government identifies one kind of time limit that counts as jurisdictional, but we have already made plain its exceptional nature. As the Government notes, the Court held in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205 (2007), that the deadline for filing an appeal from a district court’s decision in a civil case is jurisdictional, even though the statute setting that limit does not say as much. See Brief for United States 24. In that decision, we reaffirmed a line of precedents pre-dating our current approach to such matters. See 551 U. S., at 209–210, and n. 2. But we have since taken care to delineate both where Bowles applies and where it does not. Bowles governs statutory deadlines to appeal “from one Article III court to another.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U. S. 17, 25 (2017). As to all other time bars, we now demand a “clear statement.” Id., at 25, n. 9. This case falls outside the Bowles exception because Harrow appealed to the Federal Circuit not from another court by from an agency.

Harrow, slip op. at 8. Thus, as a non-jurisdictional time limit, the 60-day limit for a petition for review in Harrow was presumptively subject to equitable tolling, although the government was given the opportunity to rebut that presumption on remand if it could (unless it had waived the issue, a question the Supreme Court also declined to resolve). Id. at 9.

The language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) relating to petitions for review of removal orders is very similar to the language of 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) that was at issue in Harrow. If anything, it is less emphatic, saying only that “The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” Unlike the deadline at issue in Harrow, the deadline for an immigration petition for review is not stated to operate “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” And like the petition for review at issue in Harrow, a petition for review in an immigration case does not involve an appeal from one Article III Court to another, as in Bowles, but rather involves court review of an agency decision. Thus, the conclusion seems inescapable that under Harrow, the petition for review deadline of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), like that of 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1), is not jurisdictional.

Courts of Appeals might still defer to Stone and find the petition for review deadline to be jurisdictional, because the Supreme Court has said in cases such as Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) that “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Arguably, following Harrow in the vast majority of current immigration cases would not require overruling Stone – which, as previously mentioned, concerned an earlier version of the statute – but would merely require declining to extend Stone’s holding regarding the former INA § 106 to the current INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252. But even if Courts of Appeals do follow Stone, as the Seventh Circuit did earlier this year despite Santos-Zacaria in F.J.A.P. v. Garland, at some point in the future, the Supreme Court, if it follows its unanimous decision in Harrow, should overrule this aspect of Stone.

Thus, in any case where exceptional circumstances have rendered it impossible to comply with the 30-day deadline to file a petition for review of a removal order, filing a late petition for review and citing Harrow is likely advisable, even if a motion to reissue the decision is also filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals to provide an alternate pathway to success. There is a good chance that those who preserve the issue will find, ultimately, that they have access to equitable tolling, if they meet the criteria for it.

It is important to keep in mind that it is not easy to qualify for equitable tolling, even in areas of law where equitable tolling is available. The Supreme Court held in Menominee Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250 (2016), quoting its earlier decision in Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), that “a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”

In cases of “extraordinary” attorney misconduct such as Holland, the Supreme Court has indicated that equitable tolling may apply. In that case,

Collins failed to file Holland’s federal petition on time despite Holland’s many letters that repeatedly emphasized the importance of his doing so. Collins apparently did not do the research necessary to find out the proper filing date, despite Holland’s letters that went so far as to identify the applicable legal rules. Collins failed to inform Holland in a timely manner about the crucial fact that the Florida Supreme Court had decided his case, again despite Holland’s many pleas for that information. And Collins failed to communicate with his client over a period of years, despite various pleas from Holland that Collins respond to his letters.

Holland, 560 U.S. at 652. If a similarly egregious attorney failure causes late filing of a petition for review of a removal order, Harrow suggests that equitable tolling may be available under Holland. Other extraordinary circumstances could also qualify, depending on the details.

Therefore, while the 30-day deadline for filing a petition for review of a removal order remains crucial, and should be complied with if at all possible, Harrow may give new hope to those who have been prevented by extraordinary circumstances from complying with that deadline.

Cyrus Mehta

Saving the Labor Certification for the Backlogged Beneficiary Even After the Job Has Changed

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In  “What if the Job Has Changed Since the Labor Certification Was Approved Many Years Ago” we discussed strategies for noncitizen workers who are eligible to file an I-485 adjustment of status application, but find that their job has changed since the approval of the I-140 petition, which may have been many years ago. When the essence of the job remains the same, but the role may have evolved over time or require the use of updated technologies, the blog suggested that one may arguably still rely on the original labor certification and I-140. At the adjustment of status stage, it can be explained that the new position is similar to the one described in the I-140 position, but there has been some progression in the job duties over time. Even if the salary has increased or the job title has been updated, these changes may not be material so long as the core duties of the position remain very similar.

This is unfortunately a common issue with Indian born beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions in the backlogged employment second (EB-2) and third (EB-3)  preferences.  They have not yet been able to file I-485 adjustment of status applications and are thus unable to exercise job portability. The labor certification may have been filed over 10 years ago for a job that has progressed as a result of changes in technologies with the advent of cloud computing and  machine learning. While filing a new labor certification followed by the filing of a new I-140, and capturing the old priority date, is the safest way to proceed, there is no guarantee that a new labor certification may be approved or could even be filed if the company has had layoffs in the same or related occupation in the past six months.

USCIS has provided little guidance on job changes after I-140 approval, but we refer you to a   2023 AILA practice  titled “Job Changes after the PERM Is Approved: Legal and Ethical Considerations for Experienced Practitioners Practice Advisory” by Loan Huynh, Cyrus Mehta and Christine Traversi. When a noncitizen employee’s job has changed or he has been promoted, USCIS provides the following guidance for purposes of job portability under INA 204(j) when an I-485 application has been filed and been pending for 180 days:

“If you change jobs or receive a promotion, USCIS will determine whether you remain eligible for a Green Card on a case-by-case basis and based upon the totality of the circumstances. You must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the relevant positions are in similar occupational classifications. For example, if you move into a more senior but related position which is non-managerial, USCIS will use the criteria explained above to determine whether you are primarily responsible for managing the same or similar functions of your original job or the work of persons whose jobs are in the same or similar occupational classification(s) as your original position.”

 Although this guidance is not clearly applicable outside the I-485 portability context, it suggests that demonstrating that a job remains in the same or a similar SOC code could be one way to establish that the position offered in the I-140 petition remains valid despite a promotion or progression in the duties.

The USCIS Policy Manual also provides guidance on job changes in the “successor in interest” context. When a company is sold, merged, or undergoes similar changes, “the new or reorganized company may demonstrate to USCIS that it can be considered a successor in interest (successor) of the original company to assume the predecessor’s prior immigrant benefits requests.” The Policy Manual states:

“The job offered in the successor-in-interest petition by the successor must remain unchanged with respect to the rate of pay, metropolitan statistical area, job description, and job requirements specified on the permanent labor certification. USCIS denies successor-in-interest claims where the position with the successor is changed such that the rate of pay, job description, or requirements specified on the permanent labor certification no longer relate to the labor market test.

 In other words, officers should deny any successor claim where the changes to the rate of pay, job description, or job requirements, as stated on permanent labor certification, if made at the time that the permanent labor certification was filed with DOL, could have affected the number or type of available U.S. workers who applied for the job opportunity. However, an increase in the rate of pay due to the passage of time does not affect the successor-in-interest claim.”

 

Extrapolating from the guidance provided in the successor in interest context, noncitizens workers whose jobs have changed since the labor certification or I-140 approval can possibly demonstrate that these changes would not have impacted the number or type of U.S. workers who applied to the original job opportunity.

However, when there are job changes outside INA 204(j) portability largely due to technological changes, practitioners must vigorously advocate that the essence of the position remains the same and that a new labor certification is not requited. Our firm’s recent anecdotal experience illustrates that challenges stemming from job changes after the approval of an I-140 petition can be overcome if it is demonstrated that the essential duties of the position remain the same. We assisted an individual who had applied for adjustment of status based on an I-140 petition that was approved some years ago. Since the approval of the I-140 petition and prior to filing the I-1485 application after many years, the employee had been promoted to a more senior job title and had taken on some more managerial job duties. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke (NOIR) the I-140 petition, arguing that the position outlined in the I-140 petition was no longer a bona fide job offer given the progression of the role. After responding to the NOIR and asserting that the substance of the position remained unchanged despite an evolution of some of the specific duties, the I-140 petition was preserved and the employee’s adjustment of status application was ultimately approved.

It is unfair and impractical for an employer to file a new labor certification whenever there is job progression due to the passage of time and technological change. Beneficiaries of  labor certifications also should not be bound by the same job for a decade or longer solely because they were born in a backlogged country like India. It  is hoped that the USICS applies common sense and flexibility in agreeing that a labor certification and corresponding I-140 petition do not get invalidated if there is a progression of the job so long as  the essential aspects of the job remain the same.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

[This blog is only for informational purposes and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice]. 

Cyrus Mehta

Can a Renaissance Person Ever Qualify for a US Visa Classification?

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Jessica Paszko*

Surely, USCIS would be hard-pressed to find that any one of the men who contributed to the founding of our great nation did not possess “extraordinary ability,” but would it draw the same conclusion about each of our Founding Fathers in the early days of their careers when their extraordinary abilities were spread across various fields? In that regard, does the U.S. employment visa system as it currently stands, propel the old saying that a “jack of all trades is a master of none” and rewards only those foreign nationals who are “masters” of a single field of endeavor? The “extraordinary ability” immigrant (EB-1A) and nonimmigrant (O-1) visas both require showing extraordinary ability in a specific field whether it’s the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics. USCIS likely would not be quick to approve the petition of a “Renaissance person” type of applicant whose acclaim is scattered among disparate fields, on the ground that the applicant can only be extraordinary in one field. Such a rigid view as to one’s abilities, however, is at complete odds with the very founding of the U.S. and the multifaceted individuals who had a finger in every pie and were artistic virtuosos in their own right when they weren’t doing things like drafting our founding document.

Apart from being the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, a president, political leader, diplomat, lawyer, architect, and philosopher, Thomas Jefferson was also a skilled violinist. Born on American soil, Thomas Jefferson did not have to try to persuade USCIS that he qualified for an extraordinary ability visa. However, suppose Thomas Jefferson had been a foreign national that came to the U.S. from the United Kingdom a few years ago as a nonimmigrant in H-1B status to work as a banking and finance lawyer for a Virginia law firm. In addition to his U.S. law degree which allows him to practice law in the U.S., Thomas had also previously earned a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy and English Literature with Shakespeare Studies. After meeting his billable hours and logging off for the day, he continued his hobby of playing the violin, sometimes even performing as a volunteer and posting performances on social media, eventually garnering some media coverage and a sizable online following. A volunteer gig as a violin performer at Virginia’s Renaissance Faire also opened the door to the world of acting for Thomas who found the portrayal of Shakesperean characters to be just as interesting as learning about Shakespeare’s literary works in the classroom. Thomas even decided to start his own LLC to serve as an expression of who he is and that would further his violin playing and acting but has yet to make it active. Never taking a dime from any of his musical or acting endeavors, Thomas continued his work at the Virginia law firm but was eventually let go after receiving a scathing performance review that tore apart his “17th century style of writing” and “seeming deep rooted animus towards large bank clients and the banking industry in general.”

Thomas does not mourn the loss of his job, nor does he look for a similar position at another banking and finance law firm. He never liked big banks anyway, and wants to embark on his own pursuit of happiness by way of his other talents. Thomas already has an LLC in place and wishes to go full steam ahead into launching his musical and acting career. Though Thomas lives by the proposition that “nothing can stop the man with the right mental attitude from achieving his goal,” he’ll first need to figure out if the rigid U.S. immigration system will be the thing that stops him from putting all his skills to use and forces him into a straitjacket.

The situation that our 21st century Thomas Jefferson has found himself in raises the question of whether the U.S. visa system allows foreign nationals to pursue interests outside the narrow purpose of their entry without jeopardizing their visa status?

Temporary nonimmigrant workers who come to the U.S. to work for a specific employer in a specific occupation may not be prevented from pursuing activities that are permissible under a tourist visa, such as playing amateur violin gigs or acting on a volunteer basis. There is nothing in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that prevents one from engaging in activities in a “phantom” status, provided such activities do not constitute unauthorized unemployment. This is recognized in the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) at 9 FAM § 402.1-3, which states that an “applicant desiring to come to the United States for one principal purpose, and one or more incidental purposes, must be classified in accordance with the principal purpose.” The FAM note provides the example of a student who prior to entering an approved school wishes to first make a tourist trip of not more than 30 days. The FAM instructs that the person should receive an F-1 or M-1 student visa rather than a B-2 tourist visa.

8 C.F.R. § 214.1(e) clearly prohibits unauthorized unemployment, providing that:

A nonimmigrant in the United States in a class defined in section 101(a)(15)(B) of the Act as a temporary visitor for pleasure, or section 101(a)(15)(C) of the Act as an alien in transit through this country, may not engage in any employment. Any other nonimmigrant in the United States may not engage in any employment unless he has been accorded a nonimmigrant classification which authorizes employment or he has been granted permission to engage in employment in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. A nonimmigrant who is permitted to engage in employment may engage only in such employment as has been authorized. Any unauthorized employment by a nonimmigrant constitutes a failure to maintain status within the meaning of section 241(a)(1)(C)(i) of the Act.

An employee is “an individual who provides services or labor for an employer for wages or other remuneration,” an employer is “a person or entity . . . who engages the services or labor of an employee to be performed in the United States for wages or other remuneration,” and employment is “any service or labor performed by an employee for an employer within the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f)–(h).

Furthermore, under 9 FAM § 402.2-4, an amateur who performs in the U.S. without compensation will not be in violation of their status. On the other hand, one who is a professional performer, or even one who is normally compensated for performing, will be in violation of their status if they perform in the U.S. without compensation and do not have the appropriate visa to do so.

Taken together, the FAM and regulations suggest that an employment-authorized-temporary worker can cross the line into unauthorized employment territory if they engage in a type of activity that is both (1) a form of employment (i.e., they provide services or labor to a person or entity in the U.S. for wages or other remuneration) and (2) a type of employment that was not contemplated when their nonimmigrant status was authorized. A visitor for business or pleasure is never employment authorized and would cross the line into unauthorized employment territory if they engaged in any kind of employment, i.e., by providing services or labor to a person or entity in the U.S. for wages or other remuneration. Therefore, both the amateur nonimmigrant worker who plays charitable gigs after work hours, and the B-2 visitor on a grand tour of the country’s amateur strings clubs who joins the nonimmigrant worker on stage, would not be in violation of their respective statuses unless they received remuneration for their entertainment services.

What if Thomas now wants to change status to O-1B classification based on the acclaim he has received as a violinist? He has been approached by a talent agency that wants to represent him, find him paid gigs, and take a cut from the money that he is paid through these gigs. Can he meet the O-1B criteria based on his performance as an amateur? Would USCIS accuse him of violating his status while he was on an H-1B visa? What if he wanted to qualify for an O-1B as both a violinist and an actor? Can he still work as a contract lawyer for an entertainment law firm while being represented by the talent agency? Another option is for Thomas to create his own startup entertainment company that can utilize all of his talents as a violinist, actor, and a lawyer. His friend James Madison is very keen to invest in this startup and become a shareholder, and manage the company on Thomas’s behalf as its CEO. James has great foresight in Thomas’s potential who he thinks will go down in history as one of America’s greatest iconic figures.

Thomas likely never violated his H-1B status when he played gigs without remuneration while he was employed by the Virginia law firm based on 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(e) and 9 FAM § 402.2-4. If Thomas wants to transfer his H-1B employment, his LLC can file an H-1B petition on Thomas’ behalf, an avenue that we already touched on in an earlier blog, or it can file an O-1 petition.

As artistic director of his LLC, Thomas would utilize his law degree to negotiate favorable contracts to secure acting and violinist jobs, and would also rely on the knowledge gained as part of his bachelor’s degree program in English Literature with Shakespeare Studies when auditioning for acting roles. With respect to the H-1B visa, however, it is unlikely the specialty occupation criteria under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) contemplate the combination of two degrees in such a manner. Fortunately, the O-1B criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iii) do not require a beneficiary to possess any degree, but they do pigeonhole the beneficiary into one “field of endeavor” of science, education, business, or athletics. For individuals in the arts, the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iv) require only “distinction” or “a high level of achievement in the field of arts evidenced by a degree of skill and recognition substantially above that ordinarily encountered to the extent that a person described as prominent is renowned, leading, or well-known in the field of arts.” If Thomas wants to act in movies or in commercials, there is a separate O-1B category for extraordinary achievement in the motion pictures or TV industry under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(0)(3)(v).

Having only previously performed as an amateur violinist, Thomas may find it difficult to demonstrate that he meets at least three out of the six O-1B regulatory criteria. For instance, performing gigs for free likely does not count as having “performed . . . services as a lead or starring participant in productions or events which have a distinguished reputation” under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iv)(B)(1) by the very fact that Thomas did not perform “services” since he was not paid. Fortunately, the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iv)(B)(3) does not require evidence of having performed services and only requires evidence of having performed “in a lead, starring, or critical role for organizations and establishments that have a distinguished reputation.” Assuming that USCIS would agree that an amateur performance by a violinist or actor who did not perform services for remuneration could satisfy this criterion, Thomas would still need to evidence his “lead, starring, or critical role” through articles in newspapers, trade journals, publications, or testimonials. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(iv)(B)(4)–(5) require evidence of the foreign national’s “record of major commercial or critically acclaimed successes ” and receipt of “significant recognition for achievements from . . . recognized experts” which Thomas could argue is demonstrated through the media coverage he garnered and his sizable social media following.

The regulations make clear that an applicant possessing a number of talents in various fields of endeavors may not qualify as an individual of “extraordinary ability.” Even if Thomas chooses to self-petition for permanent residency through the EB-1A category, we will need to demonstrate that he has extraordinary ability in one of the fields he is pursuing, either as a violinist or actor. Of course, when he obtains permanent residency, he could broaden his horizons and pursue all his other interests.

Finally, Thomas, being a national of the United Kingdom, may also consider making a substantial investment in a U.S. enterprise, his startup, which he owns at least 50% of. So long as the investment is deemed to be substantial and the startup will not be a marginal enterprise, Thomas can obtain an E-2 visa to develop and direct this enterprise, thereby potentially performing all the activities that he is so passionate about that will grow the startup and also create employment opportunities for others in the U.S. Thus, while most other visa categories require the foreign national to pursue specialized and narrow activities that are consistent within the scope of the visa, Thomas might be able to fulfill his potential as a Renaissance man through the E-2 visa category.

The inability of the INA and regulations to classify multitalented foreign nationals as individuals of extraordinary ability presents another shortfall of the current U.S. employment visa system. Certainly, individuals who are the top percent of their field are to be applauded but to regard only them as possessing extraordinary ability may cause us to miss out on the kind of creative minds that have historically propelled the U.S. forward. Ironically, these top percenters of a single field would have once been seen as quite ordinary in relation to their multitalented peers. After all, as the old saying concludes: “A jack of all trades is a master of none, but oftentimes better than a master of one.”

 

*Jessica Paszko is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

The Much Neglected Schedule A, Group II Green Card Option Gets a Boost After USCIS Broadens the “Sciences or Arts” Definition

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On April 10, 2024, USCIS issued a policy alert clarifying the term “sciences or arts” for Schedule A, Group II occupations. Schedule A occupations are those for which the Department of Labor (DOL) has recognized that a shortage of U.S. workers exists. Group I occupations consist of physical therapists and professional nurses, while Group II occupations include “immigrants of exceptional ability in the sciences or arts, including college and university teachers, and immigrants of exceptional ability in the performing arts”. Schedule A occupations are “pre-certified” by the DOL, so employers are not required to conduct a lengthy and onerous test of the labor market or file an ETA-9089 with the DOL.

In its recent policy update, USCIS stated that “DOL, when designating Schedule A, Group II, defines science or art as any field of knowledge or skill with respect to which colleges and universities commonly offer specialized courses leading to a degree in the knowledge or skill.” Previously, these terms were not defined in the USCIS Policy Manual. This update could open up the Schedule A, Group II to encompass any field for which U.S. colleges and universities commonly offer a degree program. Noncitizens whose professions were not clearly a “science” or “art”, such as lawyers, businesspeople, and teachers, may now be able to avail of the Schedule A, Group II program. This broadening of the definitions of “science” and “art” follows the Biden Administration’s Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence to expand the availability of highly-skilled foreign nationals in the Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) and AI fields, as well as additional occupations across the economy, for which there is an insufficient number of ready, willing, able, and qualified United States workers.

However, the significance of this change should not be overstated as all the existing requirements for Schedule A, Group II designation still apply. For noncitizens in the sciences or arts, even under the expanded definition, this means that they must demonstrate exceptional ability in their field. Employers must provide a full-time offer of employment, and offer the beneficiary at least the prevailing wage. The employer must also provide notice of the position to a bargaining representative, or its employees. The specific requirements that USCIS outlines for each Schedule A occupation must also be met. In order to demonstrate “exceptional ability in the sciences or arts”, a beneficiary’s prospective employer must “submit documentary evidence showing the widespread acclaim and international recognition accorded to the beneficiary by recognized experts in the beneficiary’s field”. The beneficiary’s employment during the past year, as well as the position offered in the U.S., must also require exceptional ability.

Additionally, the beneficiary must meet at least two of the following seven criteria laid out in 20 CFR 656.15(d)(1):

  • Documentation of the beneficiary’s receipt of internationally recognized prizes or awards for excellence in the field;
  • Documentation of the beneficiary’s membership in international associations, in the field, which require outstanding achievement of their members, as judged by recognized international experts in their disciplines or fields;
  • Published material in professional publications about the beneficiary, about the beneficiary’s work in the field, which must include the title, date, and author of such published material;
  • Evidence of the beneficiary’s participation on a panel, or individually, as a judge of the work of others in the same or in an allied field of specialization;
  • Evidence of the beneficiary’s original scientific or scholarly research contributions of major significance in the field;
  • Evidence of the beneficiary’s authorship of published scientific or scholarly articles in the field, in international professional journals or professional journals with an international circulation; and
  • Evidence of the display of the beneficiary’s work, in the field, at artistic exhibitions in more than one country.

It is also important ensure that the “exceptional ability” criteria for Schedule A, Group II are not conflated with the criteria for an employment-based, second preference visa based on exceptional ability. In order to qualify for Employment-Based Second Preference (EB-2) classification, a noncitizen must hold an advanced degree or equivalent, or “be able to show exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business”. Exceptional ability for EB-2 purposes is defined as “degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered in the sciences, arts, or business”. Beneficiaries must also demonstrate that they meet at least three of the six criteria outlined in 8 CFR 204.5(k)(3)(ii):

  • Official academic record showing that you have a degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, university, school, or other institution of learning relating to your area of exceptional ability
  • Letters from current or former employers documenting at least 10 years of full-time experience in your occupation
  • A license to practice your profession or certification for your profession or occupation
  • Evidence that you have commanded a salary or other remuneration for services that demonstrates your exceptional ability
  • Membership in a professional association(s)
  • Recognition for your achievements and significant contributions to your industry or field by your peers, government entities, professional or business organizations

Other comparable evidence of eligibility is also acceptable.

Schedule A, Group II, provides an alternative basis for an employer to sponsor a noncitizen employee for permanent residence without going through the lengthy labor certification process in addition to the person extraordinary ability under the Employment-Based First Preference (EB-1) or the National Interest Waiver under EB-2.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

[This blog is only for informational purposes and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice].

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

To What Extent Can Walmart’s Successful  Blocking of an Administrative Law Judge in the Executive Office for Immigration Review  Extend to  Immigration Judges?

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box

On March 25, 2024 Chief Justice J. Randal Hall of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Statesboro Division granted Walmart’s motion for summary judgment in Walmart Inc. v. Jean King, which alleged that the administrative proceedings against the company for violations of immigration-related recordkeeping requirements should be halted because they were “being conducted by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who is unconstitutionally shielded from the President’s supervision. ALJs like Jean King, who was presiding over the proceedings against Walmart and is the Chief Judge within the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO), can be removed from their position only for “good cause” as determined by the Merits System Protection Board (MSPB) and by the president for “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”. Walmart alleged that this system violates the Constitution by insulating ALJs “from presidential control by two levels of removal protection”. Walmart argued that Article II of the Constitution, which commands the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, requires him to have the power to remove executive officers. Only two types of officers have been determined to be exempt from the President’s removal power – principal officers, who report directly to the President, and inferior officers, who are appointed by the President but supervised by others. See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020); United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1980 (2021). Walmart argued that ALJs do not within either of these exceptions, “so the removal scheme that protects them is unconstitutional twice over”. Judge Hall agreed with Walmart and granted the motion for summary judgement, finding that “the multilevel protection from removal present for the OCAHO ALJs is contrary to Article II, and contrary to the executive power of the President.”

 This case is just one in a string of recent examples of constitutional challenges to the authority of ALJs. In a previous blog, we discussed Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, which, in part, concerns whether the Congress’ decision to allow ALJs to be removed only for “good cause” violates Article II. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jarkesy in November 2023, and its decision in the case could have sweeping consequences for the future of ALJs. We also reported on SpaceX’s successful challenge against the DOJ’s prosecution of discrimination allegations against it under INA 274B. SpaceX’s Appointments Clause challenge was unique as it argued that the Attorney General, despite appointing OCAHO ALJs, does not review their decisions under INA 274B as an aggrieved party under  INA § 274B(g)(1) must seek review in the court of appeals.

Jarkesy and Walmart also raise the possibility about whether Immigration Judges (IJs), too, could face constitutional challenges. Like the OCAHO, they too are housed within the Executive Office for Immigration Review under the purview of the Department of Justice.

However, in Fortunato de Jesus Amador Duenas v. Garland, the Ninth Circuit rejected an argument that the removal process for IJs violates Article II. The Court reasoned that the Attorney General (AG), who supervises IJs, enjoys the unrestricted authority to remove them at his discretion. Historically, AGs have exercised this power fairly liberally. John Ashcroft, the AG under President George W. Bush, fired a number of IJs who had reputations for being lenient toward immigration. See Jill Family, Regulated Immigrants: An Administrative Law Failure, 29 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 401, 415 (March 14, 2024). Jill Family’s article in providing a fascinating history of the APA points out that Congress exempted deportation and exclusion cases from the Administration Procedure Act. See Supplemental App. Act of 1951, Pub. L.64 Stat. 1044 (1951).  During the Trump administration, AG Jeff Sessions similarly removed IJ Steven Morley from handling the Castro-Tum case and replaced him with a different judge after Morley had previously administratively closed it.  On the other hand, IJs are also subject to the Merits System Protection Board (MSPB) like the ALJ in the Walmart case. In Roy v. MSPB,  the only reason why Susan Roy, a former  Immigration Judge,  could not make a claim in the MSPB is because she had not served two years. Otherwise, Roy v. MSPB shows that IJs who have completed two years can challenge their removal to the MSPB.  IJs are also subject to union control, which was not brought up in Fortunato de Jesus Amador Duenas v. Garland.

Even if the Supreme Court in Jarkesy ultimately rules that ALJs are unconstitutional, it is unlikely that the holding would extent to IJs notwithstanding the fact that IJs may also receive some modicum of protection from removal. IJs have historically been susceptible to removal by the AG who is appointed by the President. They can be reassigned from a case and the  AG also has the authority to certify decisions made by an IJ to himself and overrule them. There is another part of Jarkesy that brought a Seventh Amendment challenge because Mr. Jarkesy was subject to an administrative proceeding against him and was deprived of a jury trial in federal court.  If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Mr. Jarkesy on his right to a jury trial, this may invite challenges with respect to the authority of IJs. Even here, S. Michael McColloch, counsel for Jarkesy, argued that the court should hold that when the government brings a case with the “same essential function” as a traditional lawsuit for claims such as fraud, it should have to bring the case in federal court, where a jury trial right would apply. However, when pressed further he emphasized that Jarkesy should not apply to adjudicating government benefits and debts and that  the authority of IJs should not be impacted by the outcome of the case.

It remains to be seen whether a broad ruling in Jarkesy will strike at the heart of the immigration court system. If the Supreme Court’s holding brings about the evisceration of the immigration courts, Congress could be forced to create an independent immigration court system under Article I of the Constitution as a replacement. An Article 1 court would ensure that IJs are independent from political interference as they are currently under the purview of the Attorney General within the Department of Justice.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

The Application for  Prevailing Wage Determination and the Application for Permanent Labor Certification – Siblings or Twins?

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

The process for an employer to sponsor a noncitizen employee for permanent labor certification is long and complicated. The first step in the process for filing Form ETA 9089, Application for Permanent Labor Certification, also known as PERM, is to file Form  ETA 9141, Request for Prevailing Wage Determination. It takes about 6 months for the National Prevailing Wage Center to issue the prevailing wage determination. It is only after the prevailing wage is determined, and recruitment is conducted, that the employer can file Form 9089, which takes 9 months to a year before a labor certification is issued.

The filing of  Form 9089 sets the priority date, which determines where the noncitizen is in the queue under the Employment-Based Second (EB-2) or Employment-Based Third (EB-3) Preference. The filing of the Form 9089 can also provide the legal basis for filing an H-1B extension beyond the six year limit if it is filed one year before the sixth year under section 106(c) of the American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act.

As the Form 9141 is imperative in ensuring that the Form 9089 can be filed as soon as possible, the National Prevailing Wage Center has begun to issue Requests for Information (RFI) after the Form 9141 is filed to request a prevailing wage determination, which have the potential to further delay the overall labor certification process.

In the Form 9141, the position and the requirements have to be provided in detail so that the National Prevailing Wage Center (NPWC) can issue an appropriate prevailing wage determination. For instance, if the position requires travel, this too needs to be specified on Form 9141. Since June 1, 2023, Form  9141 links to the new Form 9089, automatically populating certain fields on the PERM application form. Some of the information on Form 9141, such as the description of the offered position and its requirements, remain only on Form 9141.

Practitioners have been receiving a Request for Information (RFI) after filing Form 9141 requesting the employer to answer the travel requirement question with more specificity. This could add further delays to the issuance of a prevailing wage determination, which is taking about six months, which in turn would lead to delays towards filing Form 9089.  Question F.d.3 on Form 9141 asks, “Will travel bs required in order to perform the job duties?” If the response is “Yes” to this question, then the employer is required  under Question F.d.3. to “provide geographic location and frequency of travel”

If the position requires travel, Question F.d.3. should be answered as specifically as possible. If the position requires travel about once a month domestically to meet clients, the employer must specify under F.d.3 that the position requires travel once a month with  the US to meet with clients. If such details are not provided in Form 9141, and instead, the answer is “occasional travel required” then the NPWC will issue an RFI asking for specific details as set forth in the following example we have received on behalf of a client:

Item F.d.3a states, “Frequent travel required. ” Please clarify if the occupation will require any national or international travel, and the frequency of that travel. Your response should also confirm that the NPWC has permission to correct your Form ETA-9141 with the information you provide in your response.

The employer is given the choice to respond directly to the RFI in the FLAG system or via e mail. The employer must respond within 7 days. The employer is also given the choice to withdraw and apply again too.

In the case of “roving employees”, the 1994 Barbara Farmer Memo states that the employer’s main or headquarters (HQ) office should be indicated as the worksite when a job opportunity will require a beneficiary to work in various locations throughout the U.S. that cannot be anticipated.  Even with roving employees, the employer will tend to answer “Yes” to F.d.3, which asks “Will travel be required in order to perform the job duties?” Then, under F.d.3.a. where the employer is asked to “provide [the] geographic location and frequency of travel” the employer tends to answer consistent with the  Barbara Farmer Memo as follows: “Must be willing to relocate and work anywhere in the US.”

Recently, the NPWC has been issuing an RFI on this response too stating:

Item F.d.3 states “Yes”, and Item F.d.3a states the applicant “Must be willing to relocate and work anywhere in the U.S. ”

Please clarify the frequency of that travel.

However, this response does not relate to travel because the frequency of travel is now known. The position, rather than requiring travel, requires the employee to be willing to relocate and work anywhere.

At the AILA 2024 Spring Conference in Washington DC on March 22, 2024, Lindsey Baldwin, Director, National Prevailing Wage Center, clarified that the DOL is more interested in knowing about travel in the Form 9141 than unanticipated job locations under the Barbara Farmer memo. She also said that the information in the Form 9141 does not have to match everything that is in the Form 9089, and suggested that the Form 9141 and Form 9089 may be siblings but they are not twins!

Given that the information in the Form 9141 links to the Form 9089, what if the employer answers “No” to Question F.d.3 regrading travel for a position that only requires the ability to work at unanticipated locations under the Barbara Farmer Memo? How will the ability to work at unanticipated worksites get captured in the Form 9089? Answering “No” may avoid an RFI regarding travel. However, the information in the Form 9089 must also match with the information provided in the advertisements, which requires that the job applicant  be willing to relocate and work anywhere in the US.

One way of ensuring that the need to relocate to unanticipated worksites gets into Form 9089 is to answer “Yes” to  Fb.1. in Form 9089 – Will work be performed in geographic areas other than the one identified in Section F as above? Then answer F.c. – Other Definable Geographic Area(s) – by stating “Various worksites such as the Company Headquarter [insert address] and other unanticipated locations in the US.” This further demonstrates that Form 9141 and Form 9089 are siblings and not twins.

In order to answer the RFI and also answer F.d.3.a on Form 9141 to avoid a future RFI another suggested response from the employer may include answering positively to the travel question after consulting with the employer regarding the anticipated frequency of relocation. One example is as follows:

Must be willing to relocate and work anywhere in the US. Travel in the context of relocation may be required at least once or twice a year based on clients’ needs.

Ms. Baldwin did however emphasize that when responding to the RFI regarding travel, the employer must specify:

  • Whether travel is local or international

  • How frequent is the travel? – once or twice a year or more (do not indicate “occasional travel” as that is subjective)

  • What is the nature of the travel? Is it for meetings or is it for the performance of the duties of the position?

If the employer does not answer the RFI with such specificity, the Form 9141 issuance will get further delayed.

The labor certification process has been both exacting and maddeningly complex. The recent trend of RFIs being issued in the context of travel to determine the prevailing wage have added even more complexity as well as confusion to the process. The authors only provide suggested responses to RFIs and how to complete the travel section in Form 9141 and related sections in Form 9089. They do not provide any assurances that DOL will agree with these suggested responses.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

[This blog is only for informational purposes and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice].

 

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

As Texas Has Been Smacked Down Twice for Lack of Standing in Challenges to Federal Immigration Policies, Biden Should Get Even Bolder in Reforming Our Immigration System Through Executive Actions

/0 Comments/in /by

On March 8, 2024, Judge Tipton in Texas v. DHS dismissed a lawsuit brought by Texas and 20 other states challenging President Biden’s humanitarian parole program. Judge Tipton, who was appointed by Trump,  has otherwise been receptive to challenges to Biden’s immigration policies but not this time. Texas filed the lawsuit in his court thinking that Judge Tipton would again issue a favorable decision but Judge Tipton held that Texas did not have standing to bring the lawsuit.

President Biden’s humanitarian parole program is a wonderful example of how executive action can reshape immigration policy in the face of Congressional inaction.  It allows people fleeing troubled spots to come to the US in an orderly manner. The program initially implemented for Ukrainian and Venezuelan nationals all0wed 30,000 qualifying nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela (CHNV) to be admitted to the United States every month for up to two years. These individuals will be eligible for work authorization, and must have a U.S. sponsor who agrees to provide them with financial support for the duration of the parole period.

In Texas v. DHS  the challengers asserted that the program exceeded the parole authority given to the administration under INA 212(d)(5) as it can be used ‘only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit’”. They also asserted that the program failed to include a notice and comment period and the program was arbitrary and capricious. Judge Tipton’s order did not address the merits because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate they had standing to bring the lawsuit.

Judge Tipton gave short shrift to Texas’s claim that the parole of CHNV nationals  would impose additional health care costs on the state or additional incarceration costs or an increase in education costs since the CHNV program has resulted in the decrease of migrants entering the US irregularly through the southern border. Judge Tipton also found that an increase in CHNV nationals seeking driver’s licenses would not impose additional costs on Texas, in fact the increased applications would result in a profit for Texas.  Prior to the CHNV program DHS released an average of 2,356 CHNV nationals per day but after the implementation of the program there were a total of 1,326 arrivals per day, which was a 44% reduction.

As a result, Texas was unable to show an “injury-in-fact” that the CHNV program increased the   costs on Texas. In fact, to the contrary, the CHNV parole program has reduced the total number of individuals from the four countries and Texas has spent less money after the implementation of the parole program. Texas counter argued that even if there are fewer apprehended CHNV nationals, the court should consider the money Texas would spend on CHNV nationals under the parole program. Judge Tipton emphasized that the court must consider the “actual injury – not the labels put on the injury” as otherwise plaintiffs will engage in “artful pleading” to make an end run around the standing requirement under Article III of the Constitution. To determine whether actual injury exists the raw numbers need to be looked at in context rather than in a vacuum. The CHNV program reduced the overall numbers of CHNV nationals that the United States admitted prior to the implementation of the program.

The CHNV program, which will continue for now,  has been a spectacular success thus far and is built on the US historically using parole to respond to immigration crises.  The CHNV parole program has “redirected many migrants away from risky journeys through Mexico into a lawful framework. By allowing sponsors to financially support beneficiaries, the programs have facilitated safe and orderly migration, reducing the strain on government resources,” according to the Cato report in the link.

Texas and the other states may appeal Judge Tipton’s decision, but this is the second time that Texas’s challenge has been smacked down due to lack of standing. Last June 2023 in United States v.  Texas, the Supreme Court in an 8-1 majority opinion rendered a blow to Texas and Louisiana in holding that they had no standing to challenge the Biden administration on federal immigration policy on enforcement priorities. Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh said, “The States have brought an extraordinarily unusual lawsuit. They want a federal court to order the Executive Branch to alter its arrest policies so as to make more arrests. Federal courts have not traditionally entertained that kind of lawsuit; indeed, the States cite no precedent for a lawsuit like this.”

Originally laid out in the 2021 Mayorkas Memo, this list of enforcement priorities would have allowed ICE to focus its efforts on the apprehension and removal of noncitizens who pose a threat to “national security, public safety, and border security”. The attorneys general of Texas and Louisiana swiftly challenged these enforcement priorities, arguing that ICE would be allowed to overlook noncitizens for whom detention was required, which would subject the citizens of these states to crime committed by noncitizens who should be in detention, and force the state to spend resources providing education and medical care to noncitizens who should be detained.. The question turned on  whether the Biden administration’s enforcement priorities in the Mayorkas Memo contradicted two statutory provisions – 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) pertains to the detention and removal of those who have been ordered removed. § 1226(c) lays out a list of noncitizens who “shall” be taken into custody by the Attorney General, including those who have committed certain criminal offenses. Judge Tipton readily agreed by vacating the Mayorkas Memo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed but the Supreme Court reversed holding  that in order to get standing the plaintiff states must show that the alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable and that the dispute must also be redressable in federal court. As Kavanaugh explains, the plaintiff states “have not cited any precedent, history, or tradition of courts ordering the Executive Branch to change its arrest of or prosecution policies so that the Executive Branch makes more arrests of initiates more prosecutions.”

As a result of Texas losing twice on standing, the enforcement priorities under the Mayorkas Memo continue to be applied and the CHNV parole program will also allow CHNV nationals to enter the US through parole in an orderly manner and relieve the strain on the Southern border. It remains to be seen whether Texas’s challenge to DACA can also be denied based on standing. Currently, the Fifth Circuit is reviewing Judge Hanen’s ruling in September 2023 holding that DACA is illegal.  Judge Hanen also affirmed that Texas had standing to challenge DACA notwithstanding the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Texas, where Justice Kavanaugh also stated  that “a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis.” Judge Hanen seized upon this sentence from Justice Kavanaugh’s decision by holding that DACA involved  “non prosecution with benefits” and so it was distinguishable from the enforcement priorities in the Mayorkas Memo. Judge Hanen also seized upon another part in Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion stating that the “standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions.” Judge Hanen thought that DACA was such an example where the administration has abandoned its statutory responsibility to make arrests and bring prosecutions and thus violated the “Take Care Clause” of the Constitution.

Both Texas v. DHS and United States v. Texas should serve as templates for either the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court to once again deny Texas standing to challenge DACA and Texas’s other serial challenges to Biden’s immigration programs. Texas lacks standing  because DACA like the CHNV parole program has been widely successful and it can be shown that it has not injured Texas. In his order Judge Tipton contrasted Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), as revised, (Nov. 25, 2015), aff’d by equally divided Court, 597 U.S. 547 (2016), where President Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) was found to be unlawful, with the CHNV program. The Fifth Circuit held that Texas demonstrated injury in fact because “DAPA would enable at lest 500,000 illegal aliens in Texas” and the extended DACA program  would also cause “pocketbook injuries on the State in the form of healthcare, education, and social service costs.” However, if DACA is viewed independently from DAPA, it can be demonstrated that the benefits from DACA recipients since 2012 in the form of tax contributions to Texas and increased profits from the issuance of driver’s licenses, among other benefits,  have not resulted in injury-in-fact to Texas. Using the comparative analysis of Judge Tipton in Texas v. DHS, it can also be argued that the number of DACA recipients did not increase after the implementation of DACA in 2012 as they were already in the US prior to its implementation.

Moreover, in  Texas’ challenge to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, Texas has argued that it is entitled to “special solicitude.” The doctrine first enunciated in Massachusetts v. EPA allows states to skirt some of the usual standing requirements, like whether the court can redress an alleged injury. However, Justice Brett Kavanaugh addressed the doctrine in a footnote in United States v. Texas stating that the states’ reliance on Massachusetts v. EPA to support their argument for standing was misplaced. Massachusetts v. EPA held that the state could challenge the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases based on special solicitude, although that case dealt with a “statutorily authorized petition for rulemaking, not a challenge to an exercise of the executive’s enforcement discretion,” the footnote said. Another footnote in Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion said lower courts need to be mindful of constraints on lawsuits filed by states, saying that indirect effects on state spending from federal policies don’t confer standing. Although Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion in United States v. Texas left open the possibility that “a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis”. note that Justice Kavanaugh said that it “could” lead to a different standing analysis and not that it would. It is also worth mentioning that In his concurrence in United States v. Texas, Justice Gorsuch argued that the harm Texas and the states that joined it were concerned with – primarily increased spending to provide healthcare and other services to higher numbers of undocumented immigrants present in the state – was not redressable. As with the Mayorkas Memo, the DACA program also involves prosecutorial discretion and so Texas’s challenge to DACA may suffer the same redressability problem identified by Justice Gorsuch.

As the latest order to Judge Tipton in Texas v. DHS and Texas v. United States has made it harder for a state like Texas, which has reflexively sued on every immigration policy to get standing, the Biden administration should consider moving forward more boldly by reforming the immigration system through parole initiatives  and other executive actions without fear of being sued by these states. As a fitting coda, it is worth mentioning that the Judicial Conference of the United States, the policy arm of the judiciary, has  strengthened the policy governing random case assignment, limiting the ability of litigants to effectively choose judges in certain cases by where they file a lawsuit. This new policy would make it more difficult for states like Texas to file a lawsuit in courts where the judge might rule more favorably in a challenge to a Biden federal immigration policy. However, after receiving intense backlash from conservative lawmakers, judges and judicial experts, the Judicial Conference issued a revised policy making clear that the policy is a recommendation and district courts cannot be forced to follow it.  Although Texas’s choice of filing its lawsuit against the CHNV program in the United States District Court Southern District of Texas, Victoria Division, where Judge Tipton presides, backfired, even if this policy is non-binding guidance, it would still make it more difficult for Texas to try this strategy repeatedly in courts where other friendly judges preside like the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Brownsville Division,  where Judge Hanen presides.