Tag Archive for: unlawful presence

Cyrus Mehta

A Practical Guide to Spending the 3 and 10 Year Bars in the US

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

 On June 24, 2022, USCIS issued a Policy Alert on inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)  This provision states that a noncitizen was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year will be inadmissible to the United States for 3 years after departure or removal, while an individual who has accrued more than one year of unlawful presence will be barred for 10 years. The Policy alert, which is included in Volume 8 of the USCIS Policy Manual,  clarified that a noncitizen who seeks admission after the 3- or 10- year bar has expired “is not inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(9)(B) even if the noncitizen returned to the United States, with or without authorization, during the statutory 3-year or 10-year period.” Further, “a noncitizen’s location during the statutory 3- or 10-year period and the noncitizen’s manner of return to the United States during the statutory period are “irrelevant” for purposes of determining inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)”, the alert stated. USCIS stated that noncitizens whose applications were denied because they had entered, or remained in, the U.S. during the period of inadmissibility may be able to file Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion to request that their applications be reopened.

Whether noncitizens can spend the 3-and 10-year bars in the United States has long been a source of uncertainty. In a 2008 blog, we discussed this issue in the context of a July 14, 2006 letter from Robert Divine, former Chief Counsel of the USCIS, to attorneys David P. Berry and Ronald Y. Wada. See AILA Doc. No. 08082930. In the letter, Mr. Divine confirmed that the 3-year inadmissibility period continues to run even if the noncitizen subsequently returned to the US on parole under INA §212(d)(5). The letter included the caveat that a noncitizen who is unlawfully present in the U.S., leaves, and later attempts to reenter would be inadmissible and could trigger additional bars.

The guidance laid out in the new policy guidance applies most readily to a noncitizen who has been unlawfully present in the U.S. departs and reenters on a nonimmigrant visa along with a nonimmigrant waiver under INA §212(d)(3). Individuals who are subject to the 3- and 10-year bars could seek to be admitted in a nonimmigrant status such as H-1B or O-1 with a §212(d)(3) nonimmigrant waiver and spend the bars in the US. After spending the 3- or 10- year bar in the US, this individual would no longer be inadmissible and be eligible to adjust status to permanent residence.  Of course, those who have a qualifying relative can obtain an immigrant waiver under 212(a)(9)(5) by demonstrating extreme hardship to that relative and would not need to spend all the 3 or 10 years before they can adjust status to permanent residence. The new policy guidance truly comes to the rescue of those who do not have qualifying relatives as they can spend the 3- or 10-year bars in the US and no longer be inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(9)(B).

Take the example of a person who came to the US in B-2 status on January 1, 2020 and has remained in the US unlawfully long after the authorized stay ended on June 30, 2020. If this individual was offered a job in early 2022, got selected in the H-1B lottery and became the beneficiary of an H-1B visa petition with a start date of October 1, 2022, she would not be eligible to change status to H-1B on October 1, 2022 as she has been out of status. If she left the US to apply for an H-1B visa at a US Consulate, she would become subject to the 10-year bar and be denied the visa due to inadmissibility under INA §212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). However, she can request the US consul to recommend the nonimmigrant visa waiver under §212(d)(3). If the waiver is granted by the Admissibility Review Office within Customs and Border Protection, she can be admitted in H-1B status and be able to spend at least six years in H-1B status.

The standard for obtaining  a §212(d)(3) nonimmigrant waiver is quite broad. It does not require a showing of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative as one has to demonstrate to apply for the corresponding immigrant waiver under §212(a)(9)(v). In Matter of Hranka, 16 I&N Dec. 491, 492 (BIA 1978), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) explained the factors used to adjudicate a § 212(d)(3) waiver:

[T]here are essentially three factors which we weigh together.  The first is the risk of harm to society if the applicant is admitted.  The second is the seriousness of the applicant’s prior immigration law, or criminal law, violations, if any.  The third factor is the nature of the applicant’s reasons for wishing to enter the United States.

Matter of Hranka, 16 I&N Dec. at 492.

The BIA also clarified that “there is no requirement that the applicant’s reasons for wishing to enter the United States be ‘compelling.’”  Id.

Notwithstanding the broad standard set forth in Matter of Hranka, the waiver is still discretionary and can be easily refused by the Admissibility Review Office or not even be recommended by the US Consul. Individuals who have spent long periods unlawfully in the US and who leave, and then immediately request the waiver through the US Consulate can be denied in the exercise of discretion. Moreover, the chances are better when one is applying for an H-1B or L visa that clearly allows “dual intent”  as opposed to applying for an F-1 visa. In the latter instance, the US Consul can simply refuse the visa on the grounds that the applicant is presumed to be an intending immigrant under INA §214(b). H-1B and L visas are exempted from this presumption in §214(b). Even though an O visa is recognized as a “dual intent” visa under 8 CFR §214.2(o)(13), the recipient while being exempted from requiring a residence abroad must still return home at the end of the O-1 validity period. Therefore, even an O-1 visa applicant would be susceptible to a refusal under INA §214(b) when seeking a 212(d)(3) nonimmigrant waiver.

An individual who is subject to the 10-year bar and already in the United States in H-1B status can potentially wait the period out by getting one-year H-1B extensions beyond the sixth year under §106(a) of the American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act (AC 21). If this individual is born in India, she can become eligible for 3 year H-1B extensions under §104(c)  of AC 21.  As cautioned in our previous blog, though, one year extensions under AC 21 can potentially be denied under 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D)(10) if the individual has not filed his adjustment of status application within one year of the priority date becoming current, unless good cause is shown. USCIS has the discretion to excuse a failure to file an I-485 if the noncitizen establishes that the failure to apply was due to circumstances beyond his or her control. It is unclear whether USCIS might accept a good cause argument from an individual who wished to continue applying for H-1B extensions in order to spend the 10-year bar in the United States.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Cyrus Mehta

Extending Visitor Visa Status During Covid-19 and after the Birth Tourism Rule

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Visitors who have been admitted in B-2 visa status may extend their status while in the United States. Even if a visitor has a multiple entry visa in the passport for a duration of ten years, the visitor is admitted into the US for a more limited time at a port of entry, which is generally a period of six months in B-2 status.

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, many visitors have sought to extend their status as flights are not yet plying to their home country or they may wish to avoid flying out of fear of contracting the infection. Some countries have put restrictions on travelers from the US. A request to extend B-2 status may be made by filing Form I-539 pursuant to 8 CFR 214.1(c)(1) either electronically or through a paper-based application. Although this blog’s focus is on filing an extension for B-2 status, it is also possible to change from another nonimmigrant status to B-2 status pursuant to 8 CFR 248.1. Many nonimmigrants in H-1B or L status who have lost their jobs due to the economic downturn caused by Covid-19 have had to resort to changing to B-2 status due to non-availability of flights to their home country. Note that one who was admitted under the Visa Waiver as a visitor for 90 days is not eligible for filing for an extension of status, although a Visa Waiver entrant may apply for a 30 day extension directly wither with USCIS or CBP called Satisfactory Departure.

In order to be eligible to request an extension of B-2 status or a change to B-2 status, it is important for the applicant to have maintained her current nonimmigrant status. If the visitor has engaged in unauthorized employment, he will be ineligible to request an extension of status. Although the extension or change of status request must be filed timely, the USCIS has authority to exercise its discretion in excusing an untimely filing based on extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the applicant. The applicant must also demonstrate that she has not otherwise violated nonimmigrant status, continues to remain a bona fide nonimmigrant and is not the subject of removal proceedings. The USCIS has indicated that it will consider late filings caused as a result of Covid-19. See 8 CFR 214.1(c)(4) for authority for excusing untimely filings for extensions of status and 8 CFR 248(b) for excusing untimely filings for change of status.

There are very harsh consequences if the applicant overstays the terms of his stay in the US. Overstaying one’s visa results in the automatic voidance of the multiple entry visa on the passport under INA 222(g). Overstaying beyond the expiration of the nonimmigrant status, governed by the I-94, for more than 180 days results in a 3-year bar against re-entry under INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). Furthermore, overstaying the visa for more than one-year results in a 10-year bar against re-entry under INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). Therefore, ensuring that the I-539 is timely submitted (of if not timely submitted, it is at least excused by USCIS) will toll the accrual of unlawful presence, and thus avoid the triggering of automatic voidance of the visa stamp or the accrual of unlawful presence that will result in the 3- or 10-year bars to reentry into the United States.

At the time of submission, Form I-539 must be accompanied by evidence that the reason for the extension is consistent with the purpose of the visitor visa, and the visitor continues to maintain a residence in the home country as well as ties with that country. It is also strongly recommended that a sworn statement is included that clearly indicates the need for the extension and the change of intention since the initial admission to stay longer, along with an I-94 printout and other evidence of financial sufficiency and support. A Form I-134, Affidavit of Support, may also be submitted to bolster the evidence of financial support. The new public charge rule took effect on February 24, 2020 and applies to extension and change of status requests. The USCIS will consider whether an applicant seeking an extension of stay or change of status has received, since obtaining the nonimmigrant status she seeks to extend or from which he or she seeks to change, public benefits for more than 12 months, in total, within any 36-month period, such that, for instance, the receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months.  Among the prohibited benefits is federally funded Medicaid, although Medicaid funding for an emergency medical condition will not be considered, which includes emergency labor and delivery. Noncitizens regardless of status are eligible to receive Medicaid for an emergency medical condition. See 42 CFR 440.255A. Form I-539 has new sections that require applicants to check off whether they have accepted prohibited benefits.

Notwithstanding the Medicaid exception for emergency medical conditions, including pregnancy and birth, applicants have to be very careful regarding applying for extensions based on health reasons, especially relating to pregnancy and birth. The Trump administration has amended the definition of visitor for pleasure at 22 CFR 41.31(b)(2) to prohibit so called birth tourism. The original version of this rule, before it was amended on January 24, 2020, defined “pleasure” as stated in INA 101(a)(15(B) “to legitimate activities of a recreational character, including tourism, amusement, visits with friends or relatives, rest, medical treatment, and activities of a fraternal, social, or service nature.” Now 22 CFR 41.31(b)(2)(i) includes the old definition for pleasure but adds that the term “pleasure” does not include obtaining a visa for the primary purpose of obtaining US citizenship for a child by giving birth in the United States. The new rule at 22 CFR 41.31(b)(2) is reproduced in verbatim below:

(i) The term pleasure, as used in INA 101(a)(15)(B) for the purpose of visa issuance, refers to legitimate activities of a recreational character, including tourism, amusement, visits with friends or relatives, rest, medical treatment, and activities of a fraternal, social, or service nature, and does not include obtaining a visa for the primary purpose of obtaining U.S. citizenship for a child by giving birth in the United States.

(ii) Any visa applicant who seeks medical treatment in the United States under this provision shall be denied a visa under INA section 214(b) if unable to establish, to the satisfaction of a consular officer, a legitimate reason why he or she wishes to travel to the United States for medical treatment, that a medical practitioner or facility in the United States has agreed to provide treatment, and that the applicant has reasonably estimated the duration of the visit and all associated costs. The applicant also shall be denied a visa under INA section 214(b) if unable to establish to the satisfaction of the consular officer that he or she has the means derived from lawful sources and intent to pay for the medical treatment and all incidental expenses, including transportation and living expenses, either independently or with the pre-arranged assistance of others.

iii) Any B nonimmigrant visa applicant who a consular officer has reason to believe will give birth during her stay in the United States is presumed to be traveling for the primary purpose of obtaining U.S. citizenship for the child.

President Trump has always intended to abolish birthright citizenship even though it is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution. Knowing fully well that the abolition of birthright citizenship would require a constitutional amendment, the Trump administration quietly amended the State Department regulation as a step towards discouraging pregnant women from entering the US to give birth to children who then automatically become US citizens. While birthright citizenship has advantages, and abolishing it will be a bureaucratic nightmare as it may be applied retroactively (see Why Birthright Citizenship is so Wonderful for America), visa applicants now have to confront needless scrutiny while applying for a tourist visa. A pregnant person may be denied a visa even if the primary goal is not to give birth to a child in the US for the purpose of conferring US citizenship. The applicant may wish to seek the best medical care for a potentially complicated pregnancy, or may be more comfortable with a doctor and hospital facility in the US than in her own country. An applicant may be travelling purely for business or a holiday and intending to return to her home country to give birth, and could still be denied the visa. Even if the applicant wishes to seek a visa for pursuing medical treatment, even if it is not associated with pregnancy and birth, the rule now requires a demonstration that the applicant will be able to pay for the costs of the medical treatment, and has the ability to pay for them through lawful sources.

Although 22 CFR 41.31(b)(2) applies to a visa issuance at a US Consulate, the USCIS would also likely refer to it when applying for an extension of status even though an applicant previously was issued the B-2 visa at the US consulate. The USCIS routinely issues a Request for Evidence (RFE) asking for further evidence of ties with the home country and financial sufficiency after a request for an extension if filed. An extension request based on medical reasons will result in more scrutiny as a result of 22 CFR 41.31(b)(2). This author has seen RFEs asking for a detailed letter from the applicant’s physician regarding the medical condition, the prescribed treatment and its duration, the physician’s opinion on the applicant’s ability to travel, and the availability of similar treatment in the applicant’s home country. The RFE may also ask for the stated reason for the trip when applying for the B-2 visa at the US Consulate. If the applicant was already suffering from symptoms of the medical condition, the RFE may question whether this was disclosed to the Consular Officer, and if not, an explanation for why the applicant did not disclose the possibility of her seeking treatment in the US. The RFE may also demand extensive proof of financial ability of the applicant to pay the medical bills. Finally, the RFE will also ask for proof of foreign residence when the applicant departs the US.

The timely filing of the I-539 application tolls the accrual of unlawful presence for purposes of the 3- and 10-year bars to reentry into the US if the applicant stays beyond the expiration of the validity date on the I-94. If the I-539 remains pending beyond the requested date, as the request can be made for up to 6 months, another I-539 application must be filed before the date the first extension if granted would have expired even if there has been no decision on the first I-539. The applicant may, however, depart the US during the pendency of the I-539 application. If the application is denied, there is no right of appeal, although the applicant may request a motion to reopen or reconsider. Requesting a reopening or reconsideration will not toll unlawful presence for purposes of the 3- and 10-year bars. If the extension is granted, it is imperative that the applicant depart the US timely prior to the expiration of the extended date. While there is no limit in seeking additional extensions, the USCIS will take issue with immigrant intent.

Finally, even if all goes well and the applicant timely departs the US, the Consular Officer could still question why the applicant sought an extension at the time of next applying for a renewal of the B-2 visa at the US Consulate. Given all the risks and pitfalls, one should avoid seeking an extension or change of status to B-2 unless it is truly necessary and made in good faith.

(This is blog is for informational purposes only, and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Guilford College v. Wolf: Reflecting on the Nationwide Injunction in Immigration Cases

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In a stunning victory for F, J, and M nonimmigrant students battling unlawful presence policy, a federal district court in North Carolina has granted a permanent injunction preventing USCIS from enforcing its problematic August 9, 2018 policy memo. The Trump Administration’s August 2018 policy would have rendered students in F, J and M status unlawfully present for minor technical violations thus subjecting them to 3 and 10 year bars from reentering the United States.

The February 6, 2020  Guilford College et al v. Chad Wolf et al opinion, issued by the Honorable Loretta C. Biggs, is an extraordinary nationwide injunction holding the  August 2018 policy unlawful not just for the Plaintiffs “but for all those subject to its terms.” In addition to summarizing the Court’s well-reasoned justifications for granting Plaintiff’s summary motion in Guilford College, I also reflect on the Court’s justification for granting a nationwide injunction shortly following Justice Gorsuch’s disapproval of such nationwide injunctions in Department of Homeland Security v. New York on January 27, 2020.

As background, the August 2018 policy changed over 20 years of established practice by recalculating how ‘unlawful presence’ time is accrued for foreign students and exchange visitors. In doing so, USCIS blurred the line between established concepts of ‘unlawful presence’ and ‘unlawful status’, and instead made the two terms synonymous as it related to F, J, and M nonimmigrants.

Prior to the August 2018 policy, unlawful presence time would not begin to accrue until the day, or day after, a formal finding was found that the nonimmigrant was out of status. In contrast, under the new policy nonimmigrants would begin accruing unlawful presence time the moment any violation of status occurred. Further, nonimmigrants would not receive any formal notice of a status violation, and any past violation that had been discovered would have begun accrual of unlawful presence. This drastic recalculation of unlawful presence time put many who would be unaware of any status violations at risk of being subject to 3-year or 10-year bars of admission should they accrue more than 180 days of unlawful presence. See INA §212(a)(9)(B)(i)&(II). Mistakes due to technicalities, human error, miscommunication, or ambiguity of rules would cause a nonimmigrant to fall out of status and accrue unlawful presence without their knowledge and without opportunity to cure the violation.

This decision makes permanent a preliminary injunction that was granted on May 3, 2019 on grounds that 1) USCIS had issued the August 2018 policy in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for failure to observe the APA’s notice and comment procedures, and 2) the August 2018 policy conflicted with statutory language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

The Court agreed with the Plaintiffs showing that the language, purpose, context, and effect of the August 2018 USCIS policy rendered it a legislative rule. For a legislative rule to be valid it must have been promulgated in compliance with the APA’s notice and comment procedures under U.S.C. § 553. Thus, in failing to publish notice of its proposed policy change in the Federal Register, USCIS violated the APA, thus invalidating the policy. While acknowledging that the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules is “enshrouded in considerable smog”, the Court found the August 2018 policy to be a legislative rule rather than an interpretive rule as it changed the policy for calculating unlawful presence. It established a binding norm for adjudicators to start calculating unlawful presence from the date of the status violation.

With respect to Plaintiff’s contention that the August 2018 policy violated the statute at INA §212(a)(9)(B)(ii), the provision is reproduced in its entirety to better explain the Court’s reasoning:

“Construction of unlawful presence – For purposes of this paragraph, an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.”

The Court opined that it was clear that unlawful presence accrued “after the expiration of the period of stay authorized” in §212(a)(9)(B)(ii). Since F, M and J nonimmigrants were admitted under “duration of status” there is no express expiration date. Under the August 2019 policy, the nonimmigrant “starts accruing unlawful presence…the day after he or she engages in an unauthorized activity.”  The August 2019 policy, according to the Court,  “improperly dissolves the distinction between the ‘expiration of the period of stay authorized’ and the violation of lawful status.” The second ground for setting aside the August 2019 is significant. Even if the administration promulgated a rule under the APA, as it appears to be proposing to do so, it may still potentially be set aside as violating §212(a)(9)(B)(ii).

On top of the Court’s reasons for granting a permanent injunction, it also grants a nationwide injunction despite Justice Gorsuch’s scolding against this practice in DHS v. New York a week earlier. Justice Gorsuch complained that a single judge enjoined the government from applying the new definition of public charge to everyone without regarding to participation in this lawsuit, and that they are “patently unworkable” and sow chaos. Earlier, Justice Thomas too complained in his concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii that universal injunctions are a recent phenomenon and that federal courts’ equitable powers were constrained after the country’s founding. Hence, nationwide injunctions are constitutionally suspect. Mila Sohoni, a professor at the University of San Diego law school, argues in the Harvard Law Journal that nationwide injunctions are not a recent phenomenon and this practice goes all the way back to the 19th century. Because nationwide injunctions have a long pedigree, moves today by judges, lawyers in the Trump administration, members of Congress and legal scholars to do away with the universal injunction would be a sharp departure from precedent and practice.

The Court in Guilford College properly reasoned that the scope of an injunction is dictated by “the extent of the violation established, and not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class.” The Court further held that “Plaintiffs seek a remedy that applies not just anywhere, but to anyone who would otherwise be subject to the policy implemented by the August 2018 PM.” Moreover, as Professor Sohoni has argued, if the policy is violative of the APA, then it must be set aside under 5 USC 706(2). The Fourth Circuit has also explained in IRAP v. Trump that nationwide injunctions are especially appropriate in the immigration context, as Congress has made clear that federal immigration laws must be enforced vigorously and uniformly. Moreover, the plaintiffs in Guilford College were dispersed throughout the US further justifying a nationwide injunction. And to counter Justice Gorsuch’s point that nationwide injunctions sow chaos, could it also not be argued that the lifting of a nationwide injunction would sow even greater chaos if a law that is potentially inconsistent with a statute or unconstitutional is implemented until it is found so by a court – thus causing needless hardship to hundreds of thousands, even millions, of would be immigrants? Another legal scholar Amanda Frost agrees that “nationwide injunctions are the only means to provide plaintiffs with complete relief, or to prevent harm to thousands of individuals similarly situated to the plaintiffs who cannot quickly bring their own cases before the courts.” As the executive has been steadily expanding its powers, a nationwide injunction can act as an important check against the executive branch especially when a polarized and ineffective Congress is unable to do so, according to yet another legal scholar Suzette Malveaux.

Finally, why are people in favor of restrictionist immigration policies within the Trump administration making a fuss about nationwide injunctions? It already happened the other way when Judge Hanen issued a nationwide injunction in Texas v. USA  against President Obama’s expansion of deferred action to parents of US citizen children. Judge Hanen justified the grant of a nationwide preliminary injunction on the ground that if millions began to benefit from a policy that was potentially in violation of the APA or the INA, there would be no effective way of “putting the toothpaste back in the tube should the plaintiffs prevail on the merits.”  When Judge Hanen issued a nationwide injunction, the very same people who are now in charge of implementing hurtful immigration policy cheered. Today, they are critical of the nationwide injunction when courts block their immigration policies.   They cannot have it both ways!

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

To Leave Or Not To Leave: The Devastating Impact of USCIS’s Unlawful Presence Policy on Foreign Students

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The new USCIS Policy on Unlawful Presence for F, J and M Nonimmigrants took effect on August 9, 2018. This policy has had the effect of rendering nonimmigrants in F, J and M status, mainly students, unlawfully present upon being found to have violated their status.

Under the new policy, unlawful presence started accruing on August 9, 2018 based upon a prior finding of a violation of status. Individuals who have accrued more than 180 days of unlawful presence during a single stay, and then depart, may be subject to 3-year or 10-year bars to admission, depending on how much unlawful presence they accrued before they departed the United States. See INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) & (II).

February 5, 2019, will be the 180th day from August 9, 2018 according to a web based date calculator. If the USCIS has determined that the foreign student violated status at some point in the past, even prior to August 9, 2018, this individual who does not depart on or before February 5, 2019, will face a 3-year bar from re-entering the US. In order to play safe, the individual should leave the US even before February 5 to avoid risks with flight delays or a difference of opinion with a consular official regarding the exact date and time of departure from the US. Those who violated their status after August 9, 2018 should start counting the 180 days from  the date of the status violation, which will now be after February 5, 2019.

Individuals have been found to have been in violation of their status for a number of reasons, and at times the reason may not be so readily obvious. The determination is often even erroneous, but since August 9, 2018,  the student would have begun to accrue unlawful presence and will face a 3 -year bar upon departure from the US after February 5, 2019.  It is one thing when a student drops out of school and engages in unauthorized unemployment. This is an obvious violation of F-1 status. One instance of a less obvious violation is when an  F-1 student who has received more than 12 months of Curricular Practical Training (CPT) may be found by USCIS to have violated F-1 status and thus ineligible to be granted a change of status in the US.  8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10) provides that a student may be authorized a total of 12 months of practical training, and becomes eligible for another 12 months when the student changes to a higher educational level. Under 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i), however,  “students who have received one year or more of full time curricular practical training are ineligible for post-completion academic training.” Note that the inclusion of “academic training” appears to be an obvious typographical error, and it ought to have been “practical training” when the rule was last promulgated on 12/11/2002.

This supposed finding of a status violation is erroneous as 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i) clearly contemplates a student to be authorized to receive more than 1 year of CPT. The school authorizes it, and this authorization is entered in the student’s SEVIS, which in turn is administered by ICE. If ICE authorizes more than 12 months of CPT, it is clearly erroneous and contradictory on the part of the USCIS to find that the student violated status.

Still, if one’s change of status request from F-1 to H-1B has already been denied, this student should leave the US by February 5, 2019. A departure after February 5, 2019, would likely result in a 3 year bar to reentry to the US. If an applicant for change of status has received a Request for Evidence (RFE) accusing him or her for not maintaining status for exceeding one year of practical training, then the dilemma to leave or not to leave becomes more acute. Not all allegations of violation of status based on being issued more than 1 year of CPT result in denials. Many have been able to overcome this finding in the RFE and successfully obtain a change of status from F-1 to H-1B. Thus, one who decides to remain in the US must carefully evaluate the risk in the likelihood of success or failure in overcoming an RFE of this sort. As there is some risk that the request for change of status may be denied, the student may feel that it is safer to leave the US by February 5 rather than take a chance and overcome the objection. If the student cannot overcome the objection, and leaves after February 5, the 3 year bar would have triggered.  However, this is a decision that each individual must make with his or her immigration attorney.

Others face different challenges. A student in F-1 Optional Practical Training may have been thought to have been unemployed for more than 90 days. Such an individual who is unemployed for more than 90 days ceases to be in F-1 OPT status (and if in STEM OPT more than 150 days). See 8 CFR 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(E).  However, whether one is employed or unemployed may not be so readily obvious. The individual may be treated as an employee by the employer listed on the I-20, but the employer may not have paid her because there was no work during the 90 day period. But the student could have still been viewed as an employee by the employer. Again, one who faces an allegation of not maintaining status due to unemployment for more than 90 days has to make a risk assessment whether to stay in the US beyond February 5, 2019 or whether to leave by February 5.

Those who have found to have violated their status can salvage the situation by leaving the US by February 5, 2019. They still have time to do this. They can return again on another visa, such as the H-1B visa. If one wants to return again in F-1 status, and on the existing F-1 visa, care should be taken as the student may start accruing a new period of unlawful presence if he or she was not properly admitted into the US. If the student received a new I-20 to correct the violation prior to departure, then arguably the student would have been properly admitted and may not start accruing unlawful presence again.  However, after February 5, those who were found to have violated their status prior to August 9, 2018 will be trapped. If they leave after February 5, 2019, they will face a 3-year bar. If they leave after August 9, 2019, and if the violation occurred on or prior to August 8, 2018,  they will face a 10-year bar. The USCIS unlawful policy memo’s devastating impact on foreign students has already begun to unfold, and will become more acute after February 5.

The only silver lining in the horizon is a lawsuit, Guildford College et al v. Nielson,  that has been filed to challenge the unlawful presence policy. The plaintiffs have also subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction on December 14, 2018 to take effect on February 4, 2019. If the preliminary injunction is granted by February 4, 2019, students who have been accused of violating their status, especially those contesting erroneous allegations, can breathe easy for now as they do not have to make plans to depart by February 5.

Update – January 28, 2019: The court in Guildford College v. Nielson granted a temporary restraining order in favor of the two individual plaintiffs who would otherwise be impacted by the unlawful presence policy. This is a positive development.  Thus far, the the TRO only positively impacts the two plaintiffs and does not apply globally to all students who may be adversely impacted by the policy.  The court has granted a date on March 26, 2019 on the motion for preliminary hearing. If plaintiffs win on the merits at this hearing, that relief should provided global protection.

(The blog is for informational purposes only and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice)

Cora-Ann Pestaina

USCIS Denying Change Of Status For F-1 Students With Over 12 Months Of Curricular Practical Training

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An F-1 student who has received more than 12 months of Curricular Practical Training (CPT) may be found by United States Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS), to have violated F-1 status and thus ineligible to be granted a change of status in the US. This is yet another disturbing trend that we first mentioned in an earlier blog where we indicated that USCIS had started challenging F-1 maintenance of status through CPT by issuing Requests for Evidence on pending H-1B petitions requesting a change of status in the US.

Essentially, 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10) provides that a student may be authorized a total of 12 months of practical training, and becomes eligible for another 12 months when the student changes to a higher educational level. Under 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i), however,  “students who have received one year or more of full time curricular practical training are ineligible for post-completion academic training.” Note that the inclusion of “academic training” appears to be an obvious typographical error, and it ought to have been “practical training” when the rule was last promulgated on 12/11/2002. [revised 10/25/2018] This could clearly be interpreted to mean that a student can receive more than one year of CPT and, if so granted, this student would simply become ineligible to receive any practical training after graduation. This appears to have been the prevailing interpretation by all government agencies and CPT has continued to be routinely granted by Designated Student Officers (DSO) through the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) that is administered by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Enter the new USCIS in the era of Trump. Suddenly, USCIS has begun to interpret the regulations to mean that a student may only be granted a total of 12 months of any type of practical training. This, despite the fact that ICE, its sister agency, authorized more than 12 months of CPT. USCIS is choosing to completely disregard the unmistakable indication in 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i) that students may legitimately receive “one year or more” of CPT.

It is painfully obvious that the intent behind the regulation was only to prohibit students who had received more than 12 months of CPT from then also receiving Optional Practical Training (OPT) after graduation. The intent was not to penalize a student for receiving more than 12 months of CPT. First, the student could not receive more than 12 months of CPT if the CPT weren’t actually granted by a school DSO and entered into SEVIS. Accordingly, if there were any violation, it should be on the part of the school and not the student. The student should not be punished for failure to maintain status when that student followed all the appropriate steps to maintain status. Second, why is USCIS making a determination that such a student failed to maintain status when ICE is the agency that administers the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP)? If ICE has not determined that a student failed to maintain status and if SEVIS indicates that the student is currently in status, then USCIS ought to acknowledge that. If there had truly been a violation of status then SEVIS would have so indicated.  And third, the regulations at 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10) are simply outdated. In March 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) amended its F-1 student visa regulations on OPT for certain students with degrees in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) from SEVP-certified and accredited U.S. colleges and universities. Specifically, the final rule allows such F-1 STEM students who have elected to pursue 12 months of OPT in the U.S. to extend the OPT period by 24 months (STEM OPT extension). See 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C). Perhaps DHS could have also amended the regulations and removed all outdated sentences. Unfortunately, USCIS is now seizing upon such a sentence and using it to launch another attack on F-1 students.

In the case of the H-1B petition, USCIS can approve the underlying H-1B but deny the request for a change of status. In order to obtain H-1B status, the student would need to leave the US and apply for an H-1B visa at a US Consulate or Embassy abroad. At this point in time, upon receipt of a USCIS denial of a request for a change of status on an H-1B petition, the F-1 student would only have accrued unlawful presence from August 9, 2018 under USCIS’ unlawful presence policy for F, J and M nonimmigrants. Individuals who have accrued more than 180 days of unlawful presence during a single stay, and then depart, may be subject to 3-year or 10-year bars to admission, depending on how much unlawful presence they accrued before they departed the United States. See INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) & (II).  Individuals who have accrued a total period of more than one year of unlawful presence, whether in a single stay or during multiple stays in the United States, and who then reenter or attempt to reenter the United States without being admitted or paroled, are permanently inadmissible. See INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(1). Very few students will trigger the permanent bar as they generally do not try to reenter the US without being admitted or paroled.   Students in receipt of a denial of a change of status can take advantage of the current grace period until February 5, 2019. However, if the student departs the US later than February 5, 2019, he or she will be barred from re-entering for 3 or 10 years.

So what can be done? More so than ever before, F-1 students really need to be proactive about their maintenance of status and need to seek legal advice in the event that any rules are unclear or even just to ensure that they are on the right track. It will not be enough to rely on the DSO’s advice as the student will be the one punished in the end. But the bottom line is that this USCIS policy must be challenged in federal court! It is simply unconscionable to inflict the 3 and 10 year bars on a student who has diligently sought to maintain status in the US.

Cora-Ann Pestaina

F-1 Cap Gap Students In Limbo From October 1, 2018 Onward If Their H-1B Cases Have Not Been Approved

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It is October 1, 2018 and this morning, in what is an extremely unfortunate yet totally preventable situation, businesses across the U.S. were forced to temporarily terminate the employment of F-1 students who were previously employed pursuant to their cap-gap extension period.

Briefly, the cap-gap extension regulation temporarily extends the OPT (Optional Practical Training) period for F-1 students with pending H-1B petitions and requests for change of status. The cap-gap period starts when an F-1 student’s status and work authorization expire, and they are extended through September 30th, the end of fiscal year. The ongoing suspension of USCIS’ premium processing service, previously discussed in one of our earlier blogs, has critically impacted H-1B cap subject petitions for F-1 students in the cap-gap extension period. USCIS has found a way to basically suffocate the H-1B visa program.

USCIS extended the suspension of premium processing for fiscal year 2019 cap-subject H-1B petitions which was originally slated to last until September 10, 2018, through to an estimated date of February, 19, 2019. USCIS’ premium processing service has always been a heavily utilized option for U.S. businesses providing them with a significantly faster adjudication timeline of a few weeks instead of the regular processing time of 6-9 months! The premium processing option also allowed businesses to ensure that their professional staff would be available to meet critical project timelines and thus allowed them to plan accordingly. Employers had to offer the jobs prior to April 1, and then file H-1B petitions on behalf of the foreign national within the first five days of April 2018 to be considered in the H-1B visa lottery.  Under the H-1B regulations, an H-1B petition may not be filed or approved earlier than six months before the date of actual need for the beneficiary’s services or training. Therefore, U.S. employers are unable to file an H-1B petition on behalf of a prospective employee more than six months from the intended start date but the processing of that H-1B petition may take well beyond six months.  Without premium processing, many employers are left unable to hire the H-1B worker on October 1, 2018 even though the job offer was made more than six months ago and the petition is potentially approvable. In addition, premium processing was also a great tool for the F-1 student. Imagine having a petition filed on your behalf in the first week of April and for the next 6-9 months, or likely longer, being unable to make any concrete plans for your future, including not knowing whether you would be allowed to remain in the US or have to immediately pack your bags and leave.

USCIS stated that the suspension of premium processing is necessary in order to allow the agency to “[b]e responsive to petitions with time-sensitive start dates” but it is not clear why F-1 students who are in a cap-gap extension period failed to qualify as having time-sensitive start dates. U.S. employers forced to suspend the employment of these F-1 students have no recourse. USCIS has indicated that these petitioners may submit a request for expedited processing but the expedite process is grossly unreliable and it is not clear how these requests are being processed. It is by no means a viable alternative to premium processing.

As of October 1, F-1 students previously employed pursuant to a cap-gap extension are no longer authorized to work and will start accruing unlawful presence in the U.S. if they continue to work under the new unlawful presence policy applicable to students. However, the F-1 student generally may remain in the United States while the change of status petition is pending without accruing unlawful presence, provided they do not work without authorization. This student also cannot travel during the limbo period, unless he or she is prepared to return to the US after the H-1B petition is approved on a new H-1B visa. But one should not assume that the H-1B petition will get approved in a climate where the Trump administration is routinely challenging H-1B petitions for occupations that were previously easily approved.  Although the USCIS has at this time delayed its removal policy with respect to employment-based petitions that ultimately get denied, the delay will not be indefinite and these F-1 cap students will find themselves not just  accruing unlawful presence, but will also find themselves facing removal proceedings if the H-1B petition and the request for change of status is denied.

Of course, if an F-1 student with a pending change of status H-1B petition has work authorization (such as a valid Employment Authorization Document (EAD)) that extends past September 30th they may continue to work as authorized.

The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) has called on USCIS to immediately lift the premium processing suspension on FY 2019 H-1B cap-subject petitions for beneficiaries who are in a cap-gap extension period, or alternatively, to publish a notice in the Federal Register extending the cap-gap work authorization period to at least 90 days beyond September 30, 2018, or until all FY 2019 H-1B cap cases can be adjudicated. To date USCIS has issued no response to this request.

In choosing to so suffocate the H-1B visa program, USCIS is restricting legal immigration and fulfilling the Trump administration’s objective under its “Buy American and Hire American” Executive Order No. 13788. But a negative chain reaction easily ensues with an immigration policy influenced by BAHA:  U.S. businesses cannot remain competitive if they are unable to hire the best students graduating from US universities, including foreign students in F-1 status.  U.S. universities will get hurt if they cannot attract the best students in the world who also pay full tuition fees. The U.S. loses out as a nation if it cannot compete with other countries for the best and brightest. The only way out of this downward spiral is for this administration to come to its senses and provide much needed oxygen to the H-1B program it has cruelly strangulated by restoring premium processing and adjudicating bona fide H-1B petitions more sensibly so that they get approved rather than denied.

 

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

USCIS Finalizes Unlawful Presence Policy Putting F, J And M Nonimmigrants In Great Jeopardy

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The USCIS finalized its unlawful presence policy for F, J and M nonimmigrants on August 9, 2018. The final policy makes no significant changes from the draft policy of May 10, 2018. My earlier blog noted the flaws in the draft policy, which persist in the final policy. The final policy incorrectly breaks down the distinction between violating status and being unlawfully present in the US. As of August 9, 2018, F, J and M nonimmigrants who have failed to maintain nonimmigrant status will start accruing unlawful presence.

Individuals who have accrued more than 180 days of unlawful presence during a single stay, and then depart, may be subject to 3-year or 10-year bars to admission, depending on how much unlawful presence they accrued before they departed the United States. See INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) & (II).  Individuals who have accrued a total period of more than one year of unlawful presence, whether in a single stay or during multiple stays in the United States, and who then reenter or attempt to reenter the United States without being admitted or paroled, are permanently inadmissible. See INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(1).

Prior to August 9, 2018,  foreign students (F nonimmigrants) and exchange visitors (J nonimmigrants) who were admitted for, or present in the United States in, Duration of Status started accruing unlawful presence on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigrant benefit or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first. F and J nonimmigrants, and foreign vocational students (M nonimmigrants), who were admitted until a specific date certain accrued unlawful presence on the day after their Form I-94 expired, on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigration benefit, or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first.

This will no longer be the case. Under the new policy effective August 9, 2018, any status violation will start the accrual of unlawful presence. The nonimmigrant will not be provided with any formal notice of a status violation, and any violation from the past that has been discovered would have already started the accrual of unlawful presence. According to the policy memo, the USCIS officer should consider information relating to the alien’s immigration history, including but not limited to:

  • Information contained in the systems available to USCIS;
  • Information contained in the alien’s record; and
  • Information obtained through a Request for Evidence (RFE) or Notice of Intent to Deny, if any.

The final policy purports to make one concession from the draft policy, which is that if a nonimmigrant in F, J or M nonimmigrant classification makes a timely filing for reinstatement of status, then unlawful presence will not accrue during the pendency of this request. In the case of students in F-1 status, a reinstatement application will be considered timely filed if the applicant has not been out of status for more than 5 months at the time of filing for a request for reinstatement under 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(16).  If the reinstatement request is approved, then the period of time an F-1 nonimmigrant was out of status prior to filing the application, along with the period of time during the pendency of the request, will not be counted as unlawful presence. If the reinstatement application is denied, the accrual of unlawful presence resumes on the day after the denial. Whether or not the application for reinstatement is timely filed, USCIS said, an F, J, or M nonimmigrant “whose application for reinstatement is ultimately approved will generally not accrue unlawful presence while out of status.”

USCIS also noted that the Department of State (DOS) administers the J-1 exchange visitor program, to include reinstatement requests. If DOS approves the reinstatement application of a J nonimmigrant, “the individual will generally not accrue unlawful presence from the time the J nonimmigrant fell out of status from the time he or she was reinstated,” USCIS said.

Unfortunately, most students may never know that they fell out of status until it is too late and they may never have an opportunity to file for reinstatement. Students will also likely be found to have violated status if they pursued practical training that is perceived as not being consistent with the regulations.

Esteemed colleague and immigration law expert Stephen Yale-Loehr has compiled a list of 50 examples how an international student might inadvertently or unknowingly fall out of status and start to accrue unlawful presence under the new guidance. Many of these examples arise from mistakes by the school.  For instance, a designated school officer (DSO) may mistakenly complete a record, which will indicate to a USCIS officer that the student has remained in the United States beyond the end date of the program, and may have also worked on campus in violation of F-1 status. Status violations can also result from inadvertent miscommunications between school officials. An undergraduate student receives permission from an academic advisor (but not the DSO) to drop a course. The student is now registered for 11 rather than 12 semester credit hours. Later, the USCIS deems her to be in violation of status and accruing unlawful presence.

The USCIS has already begun to lay traps in order to nab students who may have unwittingly violated status. Recent RFEs issued after the filing of a change of status request from F-1 to H-1B require a student to meticulously demonstrate that he or she maintained status during post-completion practical training, including proving that the student was not unemployed for more than the requisite amount of time. The student must also prove that the employment, including an unpaid internship, was related to the major field of study.  Here is one example inquiring whether a student maintained status during a routine period of optional practical training:

F-1 OPT: Students engaging in initial F-1 post-completion Optional Practical Training (OPT) may not accrue an aggregate of more than 90 days off unemployment during the initial post-completion OPT period. Students granted the 17-month OPT extension may not accrue an aggregate of more than 120 days of unemployment during the total OPT period including any initial OPT and the 17-month OPT extension. Students granted the 24-month OPT extension may not accrue an aggregate of more than 150 days of unemployment during the total OPT period including any initial OPT and the 24-month OPT extension. Further, students engaging in F-1 post-completion must engage in at least 20 hours or more per week of employment that is directly related to the student’s U.S. major of study. Lastly, unpaid internships may meet the OPT employment requirements if the internship is directly related to the student’s U.S. major of study and the internship complies with all labor laws. Please provide evidence that the beneficiary maintained the beneficiary’s F-1 status during post-completion OPT. Evidence may include but is not limited to the following:

-A list of all employers the beneficiary has worked for under post-completion OPT and the periods the beneficiary worked for those employers;

-Copies of all pay records/stubs for the beneficiary from the starting date of post-completion OPT to the present time; and

-Evidence that the beneficiary worked at least 20 hours or more per week in a position is directly related to the beneficiary’s U.S. major of study.

Similarly, maintaining status through Curricular Practical Training (CPT) is frequently challenged in RFEs by asking for evidence that the CPT was an integral part of the beneficiary’s degree program. The regulation at 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(1)(i) leaves undefined “curricular practical training program that is an integral part of an established curriculum” thus leaving it open for a subjective interpretation.  Also, where the CPT commenced immediately upon the student’s enrolment in the program, the USCIS questions whether immediate participation in CPT was required for the beneficiary’s studies.

A student can also be found to have violated status due to an ambiguity in the rules providing for the maximum amount of time in practical training. 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10) provides that a student may be authorized a total of 12 months of practical training, and becomes eligible for another 12 months when the student changes to a higher educational level. 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i) further provides that “students who have received one year or more of full time curricular practical training are ineligible for post-completion academic training.” This could be interpreted to mean that a student can receive more than one year of CPT, and such CPT is routinely granted by DSOs through the SEVIS system that is administered by ICE. But USCIS is now interpreting this to mean that the total time that a student is entitled in any sort of practical training is 12 months even though ICE, its sister agency, authorized more than 12 months of CPT. USCIS is disregarding the suggestion in 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i) that a student may be entitled to more than 12 months of CPT.

Upon receiving such an RFE, it is important to submit evidence to overcome USCIS’s doubts. Still, it may be difficult to challenge USCIS’s interpretation that the regulation at 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10) only authorizes a total of 12 months of practical training, even though 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i) appears to suggest that CPT can be granted in excess of 1 year. It may also be difficult to demonstrate to the USCIS’s satisfaction that the CPT was an integral part of an established curriculum. If the request for a change of status is not granted, the F-1 nonimmigrant would have started accruing unlawful presence as of August 9, 2018. In the event of the student departing later than February 5, 2020, he or she will be barred from entering the US for 3 years. After February 5, 2020, there will be no such grace period, and prior status violations that were in excess of 180 days will result in 3 year or 10 year bars to reentry upon the student departing the United States. The student may not be able to change or adjust status in the United States, and thus will be caught in a federally imposed Catch-22 situation.

The unlawful presence policy compounds the plight of the nonimmigrant who may also receive a Notice to Appear and be placed in removal proceedings under yet another USCIS policy designed to make life more difficult for law abiding nonimmigrants. Some are deciding to withdraw the request for change of status, upon receiving difficult to overcome RFEs, and leave the United States, prior to February 5, 2020, so that they can process their H-1B visas at a US consulate abroad. While such a strategy may allow the applicant to escape being issued a Notice to Appear, it could cause issues at the US consulate where a consul may still want the applicant to justify whether the CPT program was bona fide. On the other hand, if the applicant is placed in removal proceedings, and if voluntary departure is issued by an Immigration Judge prior to the accrual of unlawful presence of one year or more, then there is an escape hatch pursuant to INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). The 3 year bar does not apply to those who departed after the commencement of proceedings and before the accrual of 1 year of unlawful presence (as there is explicit language to this effect in the provision). If the voluntary departure order is issued after 1 year of unlawful presence,  then the ten-year bar would trigger under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) would apply. There is no escape hatch to the 10 year bar as there is to the 3 year bar whilst in removal proceedings. Further ethical and strategic considerations regarding representing beneficiaries of denied requests in removal proceedings can be found in my blog here.

The final policy will not just cause havoc to nonimmigrants snared with technical or perceived violations of status, but schools will also face liability for errors by DSOs. Challenging the policy in federal court is indeed the need of the hour, and there is an urgent need for universities, hospitals and research institutions to come forward as plaintiffs! The 3 and 10 year bars, or the permanent bar under INA § 212(a)(9)C), are extremely draconian and should only be triggered when the nonimmigrant goes beyond a date certain expiration date. This is consistent with the statutory definition of unlawful presence under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(ii), which provides:

“…an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.”

The new policy blurs the difference between being out of status and unlawfully present, and thus violates INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(ii). If the USCIS wanted to so radically change its prior interpretation of unlawful presence for F, J and M nonimmigrants, it ought to have promulgated a rule through a more formal notice and comment under the Administrative Procedure Act. Finally, the policy violates the due process rights of these nonimmigrants as it imposes draconian penalties, 3 and 10 year bars, for status violations for which they never received formal warning and notice. All these are ripe grounds, among many others, for a successful challenge to this flawed policy in federal court!

 

Cyrus Mehta

USCIS Improperly Blurs Distinction Between Violation of Status and Unlawful Presence for F, J and M Nonimmigrants

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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued a policy memorandum on May 10, 2018, “Accrual of Unlawful Presence and F, J, and M Nonimmigrants.” The memo abruptly revises previous policy guidance in the USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual relating to this issue. The new guidance is effective August 9, 2018, and after reading this blog, it is hoped that readers are sufficiently shocked and motivated to submit comments as the radical departure from previous policy will jeopardize the ability of many nonimmigrants, mainly foreign students, from returning to the United States for unwitting or inadvertent status violations.

There has always been a strict distinction between violating status and being unlawfully present in the United States. One can be in violation of status without being unlawfully present. Even if an F, J and M student dropped out of school or engaged in unauthorized work, he or she would be considered to have been in violation of status but not accruing unlawful presence. This is because an F, M and J nonimmigrant is usually admitted for a Duration of Status (D/S) rather than up to a certain date. An F, M or J can maintain status so long as they remain enrolled in the educational institution or participate in activities pursuant to that status, which is why they are admitted under D/S.  On the other hand, one who is the beneficiary of an approved H-1B or L nonimmigrant petition is admitted only up to the validity date of the petition. F, M and J nonimmigrants are not beneficiaries of prior approved petitions filed by sponsors.

The new policy states various ways in which F, J, and M nonimmigrants and their dependents begin accruing unlawful presence. For example, F, J, and M nonimmigrants who failed to maintain nonimmigrant status before August 9, 2018, will start accruing unlawful presence based on that failure on August 9, 2018, unless the nonimmigrant had already started accruing unlawful presence based on several scenarios under the prior policy discussed below.

Individuals who have accrued more than 180 days of unlawful presence during a single stay, and then depart, may be subject to 3-year or 10-year bars to admission, depending on how much unlawful presence they accrued before they departed the United States. See INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) & (II).  Individuals who have accrued a total period of more than one year of unlawful presence, whether in a single stay or during multiple stays in the United States, and who then reenter or attempt to reenter the United States without being admitted or paroled, are permanently inadmissible. See INA 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(1).

The new policy supersedes existing policy, which is that foreign students (F nonimmigrants) and exchange visitors (J nonimmigrants) who were admitted for, or present in the United States in, Duration of Status started accruing unlawful presence on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigrant benefit or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first. F and J nonimmigrants, and foreign vocational students (M nonimmigrants), who were admitted until a specific date certain accrued unlawful presence on the day after their Form I-94 expired, on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigration benefit, or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first.

By contrast, one admitted under an approved H-1B or L visa petition up to a certain date starts accruing unlawful presence after remaining beyond that date while a student who was admitted under D/S did not unless there was a violation of status finding by the USCIS or by an immigration judge. This holds true even with respect to a nonimmigrant admitted under a date certain visa. If the H-1B or L nonimmigrant violates status during the validity period of the admission, he or she will be in violation of status but will not accrue unlawful presence unless there is a formal finding by the USICS or an immigration judge.

The prior policy made more sense, and maintained the important distinction between maintenance of status and lawful or unlawful presence. The 3 and 10 year bars, or the permanent bar, are extremely draconian and should only be triggered when the nonimmigrant goes beyond a date certain expiration date. This is consistent with the statutory definition of unlawful presence under 212(a)(9)(B)(ii), which provides:

“….an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled”

The new policy blurs the difference between being out of status and unlawfully present. Unlawful presence ought to only trigger when one goes beyond an expiration date and not when there is a contestable violation of status. If a student in F status is in violation of that status, he or she can be placed in removal proceeding and may contest the allegation in the proceeding. If the Immigration Judge orders the person removed based on the violation, then the unlawful presence period may commence upon the order. Similarly, when one who is in F status applies for a change of status, and the USCIS finds that the applicant violated status, which the applicant may have been able to contest,  unlawful presence may commence after such a finding.

Under the new policy, a nonimmigrant in F, J or M status may have unwittingly violated that status by not pursuing a full course of study or engaging in an unauthorized activity, and may never get notice of it until much later. Even F-1 students in post-completion practical training could potentially be deemed later to have engaged in unauthorized activity, such as not working in an area consistent with their field of study or a STEM trainee being placed at a third party client site, which USCIS has without notice abruptly disfavored,   or if a school’s curricular practical training does not meet the USCIS’s subjective interpretation of whether the school was in compliance when it authorized such training.   In the meantime, this person would have started accruing unlawful presence and triggered the 10 year bar to reentry upon departing the United States. The dependent spouse would also unfairly accrue unlawful presence as a result of a status violation by the principal spouse. This individual may never get a chance to contest the violation of status after the fact. Unlawful presence should only trigger when there is clear notice of remaining beyond an expiration date of authorized stay in the United States and not when there is a contestable allegation of violation of status. An F, J or M nonimmigrant is now in a worse off position than say an H-1B nonimmigrant admitted under a date certain validity period. A violation of status by the H-1B nonimmigrant during the period of authorized stay would not trigger unlawful presence.  Even after 9/11, when immigration policies concerning students were tightened, we did not see such a cynical change in policy for students as now under the Trump administration where they may not know in time of a status violation only to later realize they have unwittingly accrued unlawful presence triggering the 10 year bar.

This is my preliminary reaction to the new unlawful presence policy relating to F, M and J nonimmigrants. There will be many other good arguments that will be developed and interested persons, along with those who will be potentially affected by 3 and 10 year bars,  are strongly urged to send in comments before June 11, 2018. The memo will take effect on August 9, 2018, but the abrupt change in policy without any proper rationale or justification also potentially makes it ripe for litigation.

David Isaacson

Waiving Goodbye to Unappealable Decisions: Indirect AAO Jurisdiction, or Why Having Your Appeal Dismissed Can Sometimes be a Good Thing

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The USCIS Administrative Appeals Office, or AAO, has administrative appellate jurisdiction over a wide variety of USCIS decisions that are not appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals.  This jurisdiction is primarily set forth in a regulatory list that has been absent from the Code of Federal Regulations since 2003, but was incorporated by reference that year into DHS Delegation 0150.1.  Pursuant to that delegation, as manyAAOdecisionsstate, the AAO exercises appellate jurisdiction over the matters described at 8 C.F.R. 103.1(f)(3)(iii) as in effect on February 28, 2003.  (It has been previously pointed out by attorney Matt Cameron that a currently nonexistent jurisdictional regulation is an undesirable state of affairs for an appellate body; USCIS recently indicated in a July 2013 Policy Memorandum regarding certification of decisions that DHS intends to replace the list in the regulations in a future rulemaking.)

The regulatory list of applications over which the AAO has jurisdiction does not include Form I-485 applications for adjustment of status, with a minor exception relating to applications based on a marriage entered into during removal proceedings denied for failure to meet the bona fide marriage exemption under INA §245(e).  Thus, it would appear that the AAO would not have appellate jurisdiction over denials of adjustment applications, and that one’s sole administrative recourse if an adjustment application is denied would be to seek review before an immigration judge in removal proceedings, as is generally permitted (except for certain arriving aliens) by 8 C.F.R. §1245.2(a)(5)(ii).  But appearances can be deceiving.

Many, although not all, of the grounds for denial of an adjustment application are potentially subject to waiver under appropriate conditions.  If an application is denied because the applicant was found inadmissible under INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i) due to conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), for example, a waiver can be sought under INA §212(h) if either the criminal conduct took place more than 15 years ago, or the applicant can attempt to demonstrate that the applicant’s U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, son or daughter would face extreme hardship if the applicant were not admitted.  Similarly, one who is found inadmissible under INA §212(a)(6)(C)(i) due to fraud or willful misrepresentation (not involving a false claim to U.S. citizenship taking place after September 30, 1996) can seek a waiver of inadmissibility under INA §212(i) based on extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent.  Various other grounds of inadmissibility are waiveable as well.

While the AAO does not have jurisdiction directly over the denial of an adjustment application, the AAO does have jurisdiction over the denial of most waiver applications.  And in the AAO’s view, appellate jurisdiction to determine whether someone should have been granted a waiver necessarily includes jurisdiction to decide whether that applicant even needed a waiver in the first place.  If the AAO finds that a waiver was unnecessary, it will dismiss the waiver appeal and remand for further processing of the adjustment application.  That is, it will decide on appeal that the applicant was not, in fact, inadmissible, and thus in effect will have reviewed the denial of the underlying adjustment application even without regard to whether a waiver would be justified if one were indeed necessary.  Although this process does not appear to be documented in any precedential AAO decision, comparatively few AAO precedent decisions of any sort having been published, this exercise of indirect appellate jurisdiction by the AAO occurs with some frequency in non-precedential, “unpublished” decisions that have been made available online (generally by USCIS itself, or occasionally by other sources).

Dismissal of a waiver appeal as moot can occur in the context of a §212(h) waiver, for example, where the AAO finds that the applicant’s conviction was not for a CIMT (see also these additional decisionsfrom 2012; 2010; February, March, Apriland June of 2009; 2008; and 2007).  Even if the applicant does have a CIMT conviction, that AAO may conclude that the applicant’s only conviction for a CIMT qualifies for the petty offense exception under INA §212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) and thus does not give rise to inadmissibility (see also these decisions along the same lines from Januaryand Marchof 2009, 2008, and 2006).  Dismissal of a §212(h) waiver application as moot can also occur when the AAO finds that the applicant was not convicted of a crime at all given that the official disposition of a charge was a “Nolle prosequi”, or that an applicant who was not convicted of a crime had not given a valid admission to the elements of a crime, in accordance with the procedural safeguards required by precedent, so as to give rise to inadmissibility in the absence of a conviction.  Outside the CIMT context, as well, the AAO can dismiss a §212(h) waiver appeal as moot upon a finding that no waiver is needed, such as when someone who was thought to have a waiveable conviction involving 30 grams or less of marijuana successfully points out on appeal that disorderly conduct under a statute not mentioning drugs is not an offense relating to a controlled substance.

In the context of a denial based on inadmissibility for fraud or misrepresentation, the AAO can dismiss an appeal from the denial of a §212(i) waiver as moot if it finds that the misrepresentation was not material (see also these decisions from 2010, 2009and 2007), or that an applicant who was victimized by others submitting a fraudulent application on his behalf without his knowledge did not make a willful misrepresentation, or that any misrepresentation was the subject of a timely retraction (see also this decision from 2006).  AAO dismissal of a §212(i) waiver appeal as moot can also be used to vindicate the legal principle that presenting a false Form I-94 or similar false documentation to an employer to obtain employment does not give rise to inadmissibility under §212(a)(6)(C)(i), and neither does procuring false immigration documentation from a private individual more generally, because a misrepresentation under 212(a)(6)(C)(i) must be made to an authorized U.S. government official.  Finally, AAO dismissal of a §212(i) waiver appeal as moot can occur where the only alleged misrepresentation occurred in the context of a legalization program which is subject to statutory confidentiality protection, such as the SAW (Special Agricultural Worker) program under INA §210 or a LULAC late legalization application or other application under INA §245A, and therefore any such misrepresentation cannot be the basis of inadmissibility under §212(a)(6)(C)(i) because of the confidentiality protection.

This sort of indirect AAO jurisdiction can also be used to correct errors regarding inadmissibility for unlawful presence under INA §212(a)(9)(B), if a waiver application is filed under INA §212(a)(9)(B)(v).  For example, in a 2012 decision involving an applicant who was admitted for duration of status (D/S) and had been incorrectly found to have accrued unlawful presence after failing to maintain status even absent any finding of such by USCIS or an immigration judge, contrary to the 2009 Neufeld/Scialabba/Chang USCIS consolidated guidance memorandum on unlawful presence, the AAO dismissed the appeal as moot upon finding that the applicant was not, in fact, inadmissible under §212(a)(9)(B).

The AAO’s indirect appellate jurisdiction over inadmissibility determinations has even been exercised where the initial inadmissibility determination was made not by a USCIS officer in the context of an application for adjustment of status, but by a Department of State consular officer in the context of a consular application for an immigrant visa.  In a 2009 decision, the AAO dismissed as moot an appeal from the denial of a §212(h) waiver by the Officer in Charge (OIC) in Manila, holding that the applicant did not require a waiver because the applicant’s admission to an examining physician that he had used marijuana in the past did not give rise to inadmissibility, and that Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a valid admission to the elements of a crime resulting in inadmissibility under similar circumstances) did not apply because the applicant and the office that made the decision were located in the Philippines rather than within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.  The AAO ordered “the matter returned to the OIC for further processing of the immigrant visa application.” It explained the source of its authority in this context as follows:

The Secretary of Homeland Security (and by delegation, the AAO) has final responsibility over guidance to consular officers concerning inadmissibility for visa applicants. See Memorandum of Understanding Between Secretaries of State and Homeland Security Concerning Implementation of Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, issued September 30, 2003, at 3.

Matter of X- (AAO June 17, 2009), at 4.

Nor was that Manila case an isolated exception, although the detailed explanation of the source of the AAO’s authority in the consular context that was contained in that decision is rarer that the exercise of the authority itself.  The AAO has also dismissed as moot an appeal of the denial of an application for a §212(h) waiver by the Mexico City district director in the case of an applicant who sought an immigrant visa in the Dominican Republic and had been convicted of a firearms offense which would properly give rise to deportability but not inadmissibility; dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Frankfurt, Germany OIC denying a §212(h) waiver for an applicant whom the AAO determined had not been convicted of a CIMT; dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Vienna, Austria OIC denying a §212(h) waiver for an applicant the AAO found had only been subject to juvenile delinquency proceedings not giving rise to a conviction for immigration purposes under Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2001); and dismissed another appeal from a decision of the Vienna OIC where the AAO found that the applicant’s conviction qualified for the petty offense exception.  Indeed, the AAO has exercised its indirect appellate jurisdiction over a consular inadmissibility determination in at least one appeal from a decision of the Mexico City district director where “the applicant did not appear to contest the district director’s determination of inadmissibility” but the AAO found that neither of the crimes of which the applicant had been convicted was a CIMT.  The AAO’s indirect appellate jurisdiction has also been exercised in a case coming from the New Delhi, India OIC where an applicant disputed his date of departure from the United States which started the running of the ten-year bar, and the AAO found that the applicant’s actual departure had been more than ten years prior and thus no §212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver was required.

Perhaps most interestingly, it appears that the AAO will even exercise its indirect appellate jurisdiction over inadmissibility determinations in some cases where the applicant has failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the relevant waiver, although the only examples that this author have been able to find of this involve the AAO’s indirect jurisdiction over USCIS adjustment denials rather than consular-processing of an immigrant visa.  In a 2006 decision, an applicant who had not provided any evidence that his wife was a Lawful Permanent Resident who could serve as a qualifying relative for either a §212(i) waiver or a §212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver was found not to be inadmissible because he had made a timely retraction of any misrepresentation, and had accrued no unlawful presence due to last departing the United States in 1989.  In a 2009 decision, an applicant who had pled guilty to hiring undocumented workers, and who had been found inadmissible under INA §212(a)(6)(E)(i) for alien smuggling and appealed the denial of his application for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA §212(d)(11), was found not inadmissible by the AAO, which withdrew the district director’s contrary finding—even though the district director had found that the applicant did not meet the requirements of §212(d)(11), and seems very likely to have been right about that, since §212(d)(11)applies only to an applicant who “has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only an individual who at the time of the offense was the alien’s spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the United States in violation of law.”  And in 2010, the AAO declared moot a waiver application under INA §212(g) by an individual infected with HIV who apparently had not established any relationship with a qualifying relative, on the ground that in January 2010 the Centers for Disease Control had removed HIV from the official list of communicable diseases of public health significance, and therefore HIV infection was no longer a ground of inadmissibility.  Some potentially difficult ethical and practical questions would need to be resolved before deliberately filing a waiver application on behalf of an applicant ineligible for such waiver in order to obtain AAO review of whether the applicant was inadmissible at all, but it is at least a possibility worthy of further analysis.

So when an application for adjustment of status, or even for a consular-processed immigrant visa, is denied, it is important to keep in mind that an appeal may be available even if it does not appear so at first glance, and that establishing the necessary hardship to a qualifying relative to support a waiver application is not necessarily the only way to win the case.  If a waiver of the ground upon which the denial was based is at least theoretically available, so as to support AAO jurisdiction over the denial of that waiver, then one can leverage the waiver to seek AAO review of whether a waiver was necessary in the first place.

David Isaacson

USCIS Issues Provisional Waiver Final Rule: Beginning in March, Some Waivers of the 3- or 10-Year Bars May Be Sought Before Departing the United States

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One year ago, a previous post on this blog by Cyrus Mehta and this author discussed the issuance by USCIS of a proposed rule allowing certain applicants for a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars to obtain such a waiver on a provisional basis before departing from the United States.  It has been a long wait for the final rule, as USCIS needed to allow time to receive public comments (one of which was submitted by our firm) and then took a substantial amount of time to analyze the comments and determine what changes to make to the proposal, but the wait is finally over.USCIS first announced the final ruleand made an advance copy available on January 2, 2013, and the final rule was officially published in the Federal Registeron January 3.  The rule will take effect on March 4, 2013, and sometime before then USCIS will publish the Form I-601A that is to be used to apply for a provisional waiver.

The provisional waiver rule does not change the substantive standard that one must satisfy in order to obtain a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bar that one incurs upon accruing more than 180 days or a year of unlawful presence respectively.  In order to obtain a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), it is always necessary to show that the waiver applicant’s spouse or parent, who is a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) of the United States, will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is not permitted to remain in the United States.  However, under the new rule, certain applicants will be able to make this showing before they depart the United States to apply for a visa, which should dramatically shorten the amount of time that they need to spend abroad.  If an applicant is seeking a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars based extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen qualifying relative (rather than an LPR), and has an approved petition as an “immediate relative” of a U.S. citizen – that is, as the U.S. citizen’s spouse, parent, or unmarried child (under the age of 21 while taking into account the Child Status Protection Act, although only applicants age 17 or older may seek provisional waivers and younger applicants would not need them because unlawful presence for these purposes does not accrue until age 18)– then the applicant may seek a provisional waiver before departing from the United States, and only go abroad to apply for an immigrant visa after the provisional waiver has already been issued.  This process is subject to various restrictions, some of which are discussed further below, but that is the basic idea.

By allowing some waiver applications to be adjudicated while the applicant remains within the United States, the provisional waiver process should significantly reduce the period of time when the U.S. citizen relative of a successful waiver applicant is subject to the cruel irony that inheres in the current process.  Under the current system, where the waiver application is filed while the applicant is abroad after an immigrant visa interview, and the applicant then remains abroad during the months it takes to adjudicate the waiver application, the qualifying relative must undergo months of the very same extreme hardship that the waiver is intended to avoid!  At least with regard to U.S. citizen qualifying relatives of applicants who are immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, and who face no other ground of inadmissibility besides unlawful presence, this new provisional waiver process should remove much of that cruel irony.  It should also encourage applications by some waiver applicants who were unwilling to travel outside the United States to apply for a waiver because of the risk of long-term separation if the waiver were denied.

One detail to keep in mind is that the U.S. citizen relative to whom extreme hardship is shown in a provisional waiver application need not necessarily be the same U.S. citizen relative who has petitioned for an applicant.  Indeed, the U.S. citizen petitioner need not even be a possible qualifying relative for the 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver.  A child is not a qualifying relative for purposes of obtaining a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars, but an applicant who is sponsored by a U.S. citizen son or daughter over twenty-one years of age, and thus qualifies as an immediate relative, would be able to qualify for a provisional waiver if he or she could show extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen parent in the event that the applicant were not allowed to return to the United States– even though a U.S. citizen parent cannot sponsor an adult son or daughter as an immediate relative.  Or, an applicant with a U.S. citizen spouse, who cannot show that his or her spouse will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is not allowed to return to the United States, could instead obtain a provisional waiver by showing that a U.S. citizen parent will suffer extreme hardship in the applicant’s absence.

Another important detail, which has been changed from the proposed rule, is that applicants in removal proceedings will be able to seek a provisional waiver iftheir proceedings are administratively closed and have not been recalendered.  Administrative closure, most recently addressed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Avetisyan, is a process in which a case is taken off the active calendar of an Immigration Court or the BIA without actually being terminated; one might compare it to an indefinite continuance of the case.  Traditionally, it has occurred with the consent of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), although Avetisyan allows for it to be sought without DHS consent, a possibility which might prove useful in the provisional-waiver context.  Administrative closure has often occurred recently in the contextof the DHS exercise of prosecutorial discretion in favor of those who are lower priorities for removal so that DHS can focus its efforts on removing those who are its higher priorities for removal, such as those with serious criminal convictions—the process discussed in a June 17, 2011 memorandum from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton.It is admirable that USCIS realized, upon reviewing comments on the proposed rule, that no purpose would be served by denying the opportunity to apply for a provisional waiver to those whom ICE is not actively seeking to remove in any event.

One interesting consequence of this new eligibility for those with administratively closed removal cases relates to the process created by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in its October 16, 2012 opinion entitled In the Matter of Immigration Petitions for Review Pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in order to avoid having to spend court time unnecessarily reviewing a removal order in cases where ICE would anyway not seek to execute the order, has created an automatic 90-day waiting period during the processing of petitions for review (although one which can be ended early by either side) to allow for discussion of whether the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is appropriate.  In cases where the Office of Immigration Litigation that is representing the government on the petition for review determines in consultation with ICE that a case is low-priority and suitable for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the case will be remanded to the BIA for administrative closure.  Thus, at least in the Second Circuit, and perhaps in other Circuits which may come to follow the lead of the Second Circuit, some who have already received final orders of removal, but who would be eligible for a provisional waiver absent such final order and have petitioned for review of the order, should be able to return their case to an administratively closed state under the new process and then apply for a provisional waiver.

In another positive development, the final rule has retreated somewhat from the initial USCIS position that the provisional waiver process would only allow for what one might call a single bite at the apple, permitting neither appeal nor re-filing, so that an applicant who was denied a provisional waiver could only proceed with the process by departing from the United States and re-applying for a conventional waiver from abroad.  Although an administrative appeal is still not available, an applicant whose application for a provisional waiver is denied will be permitted under the final rule to file a new application (with the appropriate filing fee).

Not all the news from the final rule is good news, however.  Unfortunately, despite the urging of many commenters, the provisional waiver process will not be available to those who are currently in removal proceedings, unless their proceedings have been administratively closed and not recalendared.  It will also not be available to those who are currently subject to a final removal or deportation or exclusion order—even though those subject to such orders have long been able to file a stand-alone I-212 application for advance permission to reapply for admission prior to departure from the United States, under 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(j).  Unless those subject to a final order can get the case reopened and administratively closed (as for example could be possible on remand from a Court of Appeals), it appears they will need to follow the conventional waiver process from abroad, despite the resulting hardship to qualifying relatives.

The provisional waiver process also will not apply to those who are inadmissible for reasons other than the 3- or 10-year bar resulting from previous unlawful presence.  Although the above-mentioned previous post on this blog, and our official comment submitted to USCISalong the same lines, advocated that provisional waivers should be available in contexts such as alleged fraud for which a waiver is needed under INA section 212(i), USCIS chose not to accept that suggestion.  However, USCIS has held out the possibility of perhaps extending the provisional waiver process to other contexts once it has had a chance to observe how the initial, narrower version of the provisional waiver process works in practice.

Another restriction worth noting is that the provisional waiver will not be available to those who have already been scheduled for an immigrant visa interview as of January 3, 2013.  The key question is not when the interview was scheduled to take place, or whether the applicant attended the interview, but whether the Department of State’s National Visa Center (NVC) had already acted to schedule a consular interview by January 3.  If the NVC had scheduled a visa interview by January 3, the provisional waiver process will not be available.  If the NVC had not acted to schedule an interview by January 3, then the subsequent scheduling of an interview will not remove one’s eligibility for the provisional waiver, although in the interest of efficiency prospective waiver applicants with a case before the NVC are advised to notify the NVC of their intent to seek a provisional waiver before an interview is scheduled.  The NVC has already begun sending emails to some prospective visa applicants advising them that they must inform the NVC of their intent to seek a provisional waiver, by sending an email to NVCI601A@state.gov, and that failure to do so would delay the visa application.

For additional background on the final provisional waiver rule, interested readers may wish to review posts about it on the “AILA Leadership Blog” of the  American Immigration Lawyers’ Associationand the “Lifted Lamp” blog of Benach Ragland LLP.  The New York Times has also reported on the new provisional waiver rules.  Despite all of its imperfections, the final provisional waiver rule is a very positive development, an important step along the road of reducing unnecessary hardship to the qualifying relatives of waiver applicants.