Tag Archive for: INA 245(k)

Cyrus Mehta

Solutions for the Family Member Who Did Not Get the Employment Based Green Card with the Principal Family Member on September 30, 2022

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By Cyrus D. Mehta & Jessica Paszko*

This past month, we said our goodbyes to summer beach days and cookouts, welcomed the crisp autumn weather, crossed our fingers for clients with current employment-based priority dates and hoped that they would be one of the lucky few to get their green cards before the end of Fiscal Year 2022. As discussed in an earlier blog, September 30, 2022 marked the end of Fiscal Year 2022 for the Department of State and the last day by which USCIS promised to use as many available employment-based visas as possible. We hope that the dream of obtaining a green card came true for many of our readers or clients of our readers. To those that have finally gotten their long awaited green cards, which for many have been over a decade in the making, we wish a big congratulations and extend an official welcome to the U.S. as lawful permanent residents. To those that are still waiting, we wish patience and good fortune for the new fiscal year.

Typically, principal and derivative adjustment applicants get approved at the same time. Unfortunately, the process for others is not as smooth. While many families begin this new month of October celebrating their new status as lawful permanent residents, other still wait to get adjusted themselves or for family members to get adjusted. Under the State Department Visa Bulletin of October 2022, the India Employment-Based Second Preference (EB-2) retrogressed to April 1, 2012. Until September 2022, the India EB-2 Final Action Date was December 1, 2014. If the beneficiary of an I-140 petition with a priority date after April 1, 2012 and till December 1, 2014 did not adjust to permanent residence by September 30, 2022, this individual will have to wait until the date becomes current again. It would be even worse if the principal beneficiary adjusted by September 30, 2022 but not the spouse or the minor child. And far worse if both parents adjust status and not the minor child.  For instance, if the principal beneficiary of an I-140 petition has a priority date of December 1, 2014, she would be eligible to adjust status on or before September 30, 2022. If she did not adjust status by that date, she will not be able to adjust status under the October 1, 2022 Visa Bulletin as the Final Action Date retrogressed to April 1, 2012. If the principal beneficiary adjusted status, but not the spouse and the minor child, then the spouse and minor child will no longer be eligible to adjust status on October 1, 2022 as their I-485 applications are linked to the priority date of the principal applicant. They will need to wait until the Final Action Date in a future Visa Bulletin reaches December 1, 2014.

Today, we endeavor to explore some of the options that may be available for family members who have been left out and who still have not been approved despite the approval of the rest of their family. Take for instance, a principal applicant who received his green card this past month but his spouse’s application is still pending as of October 1, 2022, even though they both applied for adjustment of status at the same time, or a child whose application still remains pending even though both parents received their green cards. What can one do in such situations?

The first option, as always, is to wait and see and hope that the Final Action Date moves ahead after the October 1, 2022 Visa Bulletin for those family members left behind. They can continue to remain in the U.S. based on their pending I-485 application.  However, given that once current priority dates have retrogressed, the prognosis for the near future seems to be grim, and the EB-2 is unlikely to move or move quickly enough in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2023 even though there will an infusion of 60,000 visas beginning on October 1. Assuming the coming months of Fiscal Year 2023 are slow moving, a potential solution is for the freshly minted green card holders to file an I-130 petition on behalf of their left behind family members. Thankfully, the family preference (F2A) visa category for spouses and children (unmarried and under 21 years of age) of lawful permanent residents is current. Thus, principal applicants who have already received their green cards, may file I-130 petitions for eligible spouses and children and could potentially rely on their currently pending adjustment applications by transferring the underlying basis of the I-485 to the new I-130 petition. This process is also known as interfiling.  The USCIS Policy Manual at Chapter 8 contemplates this precise scenario:

The applicant who originally applied for adjustment based on a pending or approved employment-based petition and later married a U.S. citizen now prefers to adjust based on a family-based petition filed by the new U.S. citizen spouse.

However, to be eligible for F2A, one needs to have maintained lawful nonimmigrant status at all times in the US. Once the principal beneficiary, who may have been in H-1B status, adjusted status, the derivative family member will no longer in in a valid nonimmigrant status. Fortunately, the I-485 application that was previously filed and which is the subject of the transfer of underlying basis is still pending and was filed while the spouse and child may have been in a nonimmigrant status such as H-4. The fact that the nonimmigrant status has extinguished upon the adjustment of the principal spouse should not matter if the underlying basis of the I-485 is being transferred to the I-130 petition and the applicant was in nonimmigrant status at the time of filing the I-485 application.

The plot thickens in cases where the applicant may have not been in lawful status at the time of filing the I-485 application but took advantage of INA § 245(k). INA § 245(k) allows one who is filing an I-485 under one of the five employment based preferences to still file an I-485 application so long as the violation was for a duration of 180 days or less since the last lawful admission. Hence, if the spouse or child were not in status for less than 180 days or at the time of filing the I-485 application, their I-485 might have been valid so long as it was filed in conjunction with the employment based I-140 petition. Unfortunately, one who is filing an I-485 as a family preference beneficiary must have maintained a lawful immigration status at all times. 8 CFR § 245.1(d)(1)(ii) defines “lawful immigration status” for purposes of I-485 eligibility as an alien “whose initial period of admission has not expired or whose nonimmigrant status has been extended in accordance with part 214 of 8 CFR chapter 1.” USCIS also interprets this requirement of being in valid nonimmigrant status at all times under INA § 245(c)(2) and § 245(c)(8) to prior stays in the US for family preference beneficiaries. The INA § 245(k) exception would be unavailing to this person if the underlying basis of the I-485 application is transferred from the I-140 petition to the I-130 petition.

But all hope is not lost even under this scenario. The derivative family member can always go overseas for consular processing once the I-130 petition has been approved. While the EB-2 remains retrogressed, this person can remain in the U.S. on the I-485 application and continue to obtain work and travel authorization. If the Employment-Based (EB) date moves forward, she can adjust status under this I-485 application and not pursue the I-130 petition. If the EB date continues to remain retrogressed, then once the I-130 petition is approved (a process that can take anywhere from 6 months to 30 months), and an interview is scheduled at the U.S. consulate overseas, she can leave the U.S. and process for the immigrant visa and return as a permanent resident. If the I-130 takes long to process, then there is a good chance that the EB dates will advance and become current again before the I-130 gets approved. Under this unfortunate scenario, where delays are the norm,  the left behind family member may still have options.

Obviously, this entire rigmarole can be avoided if the USCIS efficiently adjudicated I-485s applications of the whole family together and have not wasted green cards as they did in FY2021. This hardship could be further avoided if Congress allocated more visa numbers in the EB backlogs so that skilled beneficiaries of I-140 petitions do not have to wait endlessly for permanent residence.

*Jessica Paszko is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC. She graduated with a J.D. degree from Brooklyn Law School in 2021.

 

 

 

 

 

 

David Isaacson

Some Highlights of the EB-5 Reauthorization: CSPA Protection and How 245(k) and Concurrent Filing Combine to Create a New Option for Some Applicants Who Have Recently Dropped Out of Status

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The recently enacted Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022, which was signed into law on March 15 after the House and Senate resolved their differences earlier in the month, reauthorized the EB-5 Regional Center program and made some other changes to the EB-5 program in the “EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022”, included as Division BB of the appropriations bill (at pages 1022 to 1061 of the PDF version of the bill).  Others have already produced summaries of the bill, such as one drafted shortly before the President signed the bill by Robert Divine of Baker Donelson and posted by Invest in the USA, and I will not here attempt an exhaustive list of all of the changes contained in almost 40 pages of statutory text, but there are a few highlights that seemed particularly worth mentioning.

Section 203(h)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 102(b) of Division BB (at pages 1026-1027 of the PDF version of the bill), provides additional protection under the Child Status Protection Act for some children of investors who would otherwise age out of their derivative status. If a child becomes a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) on a conditional basis through a parent’s investment, and the parent’s conditional resident status is later terminated because of, for example, failure to create the requisite number of U.S. jobs, there will be a one-year window after the termination during which the parent can file a new EB-5 petition and the child (if still unmarried) will continue to qualify as a child under the new petition even if then over age 21.

Likely of relevance to more people are two provisions of Division BB which can have a particularly powerful effect in combination: the addition of EB-5 petitions to those covered by INA § 245(k), and the addition of a new section § 245(n) allowing concurrent filing of an application for adjustment of status where approval of an EB-5 petition would make a visa number immediately available. Both of these are contained in section 102(d) of Division BB (at page 1027 of the PDF version of the bill).

Under previous law, EB-5 petitions and applications for adjustment of status could not be filed concurrently, and INA § 245(k) did not apply to EB-5 petitions. The former meant that it was necessary to file an EB-5 petition and wait for it to be approved before filing an I-485 application for adjustment of status, and the wait could be very long: current posted USCIS processing times indicate that an I-526 Petition by Alien Investor under the EB-5 program can take anywhere from 35 months to 71.5 months to adjudicate. During those three to six years, the investor/petitioner would have to either maintain status in the United States, or (if already here) leave the country. And when the time finally came to apply for adjustment of status, the inapplicability of section 245(k) meant that absent some rare exceptions, the investor/petitioner would have to prove that they had maintained status continuously, without even small gaps, and had never worked without authorization.  This is in contrast to most employment-based green card categories, where section 245(k) provides for limited forgiveness of up to 180 days of time out of status or employed without authorization since one’s last admission into the United States.

Under the former law, therefore, the EB-5 program was not a useful option for people who wanted to remain in the United States, but lacked access to a long-term nonimmigrant status or had briefly fallen out of status for whatever reason. With these amendments, on the other hand, it can be.

Imagine, for example, a well-off L-1A nonimmigrant manager or executive sent to open a new office in the United States who runs into trouble after a year because the sponsoring company’s business operation has not yet developed to the point that USCIS acknowledges it to be able to support his or her continued efforts as a manager or executive. If an L-1A extension is denied, and an EB-1C I-140 petition for a manager or executive is not a viable option because USCIS would deny it for the same reason, the previous law would not have allowed the nonimmigrant to remain in the United States while pursuing the EB-5 process after falling out of L-1 status.  An I-526 petition would have had no direct impact on the nonimmigrant’s status until years later.

Under the newly amended version of the law, however, assuming no previous time out of status or unauthorized employment since the last time that our hypothetical L-1 nonimmigrant was admitted to the United States, there would be a window of 180 days after the L-1 extension denial when the nonimmigrant could utilize the EB-5 process to remain in the United States. If the requisite investment were made and an I-526 petition were concurrently filed with an I-485 application for adjustment of status within that time, then the I-485 application would be protected by amended INA § 245(k).  (According to USCIS guidance, it would also be necessary for the applicant to refrain from unauthorized employment after filing and before receiving employment authorization; the legal correctness, or not, of that guidance is outside the scope of this blog post.) The applicant would then be protected from the accrual of unlawful presence by the pendency of the I-485 application for adjustment of status, and could be issued an employment authorization document (EAD) while the application was pending, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(9).  Thus, while the I-526 and I-485 were pending, the applicant would effectively remain able to live and work in the United States, ultimately transitioning to LPR status if the petition and application were approved.

The above scenario is only possible when, at the time of filing, a visa number is immediately available in the EB-5 category without the need for an earlier priority date. However, as things now stand, the State Department’s Visa Bulletin indicates that this will be true in almost all scenarios, with only one exception. In the April 2022 Visa Bulletin, the non-regional-center EB-5 Final Action cutoff dates are Current for all countries, meaning that visa numbers are available for any priority date and so concurrent filing is possible. Although the regional-center EB-5 Final Action Dates were Unavailable at the time of Visa Bulletin publication because the Bulletin was first authored on March 10 before the Consolidated Appropriations Act reauthorized the regional center program (though there has since been an update referencing the reauthorization), the regional-center Dates for Filing were Current for all countries but China, and the same will likely be true of the Final Action cutoff dates next month.  For those born in mainland China and unable to exercise cross-chargeability based on birth of a spouse or (under certain rare circumstances) parents elsewhere, however, regional-center EB-5 numbers will not be available without a priority date much earlier than concurrent filing would produce: the Dates for Filing cutoff as of April 2022 is December 15, 2015. Thus, concurrent filing will not be possible for such investors born in China and pursuing a regional center investment.  It will, however, still be possible for them in connection with a direct investment.

The Act raises the minimum required investment thresholds, so taking advantage of this new opportunity will require a larger investment than was necessary in the past. For investments in Targeted Employment Areas (that is, either rural areas or areas of high unemployment) or particular infrastructure projects defined by a new provision in the bill, a minimum amount of $800,000 is now required, a significant increase over the previous $500,000 threshold for Targeted Employment Areas. For investments elsewhere, the requirement is $1,050,000, a more modest increase over the previous $1 million threshold. The amounts will be further adjusted for inflation in 2027 and every five years thereafter.  (See page 1024 of the PDF version of the bill.)

It is also important to note that only the Secretary of Homeland Security or “a designee of the Secretary who is an employee of the Department of Homeland Security” will be able to designate high unemployment areas for Targeted Employment Area purposes, while state or local officials will no longer be able to do so. (See page 1023 of the PDF version of the bill.)  This is presumably an effort to counter what current Senate Appropriations Committee chair Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) previously described as “gerrymandering” of purported high-unemployment areas by states. Thus, to take advantage of the lower $800,000 threshold, the investment projects of Regional Centers and others may need to be located in different kinds of places than they previously were.

The new law also indicates, at section 203(b)(5)(E)(ii)(I) of the INA as added by section 103(b)(1) of Division BB (at page 1027 of the PDF version of the bill) that in the regional-center context, DHS “shall prioritize the processing and adjudication of petitions for rural areas”.  Even true areas of high unemployment in an urban or suburban context, therefore, may be disfavored under the amended program relative to rural areas.

One other, more esoteric portion of the new law, which may be of interest primarily to attorneys (like this author) who practice federal litigation, is what one might call an anti-Darby provision. New section 203(b)(5)(P) of the INA, as added by section 103(b)(1) of Division BB (at pages 1049-1050 of the PDF version of the bill), provides for administrative appellate review of various USCIS decisions in the EB-5 context by the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), and then states:

Subject to subparagraph (N)(v) and section 242(a)(2), and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to review a determination under this paragraph until the regional center, its associated entities, or the alien investor has exhausted all administrative appeals.

That is, one will be required to first appeal to the AAO before going to federal court. This is in contrast to the general rule set out by the Supreme Court’s decision in Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993), which held that under 5 U.S.C. § 704, judicial review of an agency action ordinarily need not await an administrative appeal of that action unless the agency has both required an appeal and made the administrative action inoperative pending that appeal. However, Darby specifically recognized that an exception exists when an appeal is “expressly required by statute,” and Congress has chosen to create such an express requirement here in the new statute. In this context, therefore, unlike many other contexts, it will not be possible to bypass the AAO and seek review of a USCIS decision directly in federal court.  (The referenced exceptions in subparagraph (N)(v) and INA section 242(a)(2) relate to removal proceedings, where there would generally still be an administrative appeal required at least to the Board of Immigration Appeals, if not the AAO, before judicial review could be sought.)

As flagged by IIUSA, USCIS has indicated that it intends to provide “additional guidance” regarding the changes to the EB-5 program made by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, so we can expect that further details regarding the USCIS interpretation of the provisions mentioned above, and others, may become available in the future.  Even before such guidance comes out, however, it is already clear that things have changed in some interesting ways.

Cyrus Mehta

Sanchez v. Mayorkas: Although TPS Is Not An Admission, Justice Kagan’s Opinion Leaves Open Avenues for TPS Recipients to Adjust Status as Nonimmigrants

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On June 7, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Sanchez v. Mayorkas, holding that a grant of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) does not constitute an admission under INA § 245(a) for purposes of adjustment of status. Though overall a disappointing decision, the Court’s opinion may nonetheless leave open some options for some TPS recipients who want to obtain their green cards.

Sanchez v. Mayorkas involved the plight of Jose Santos Sanchez, an El Salvadoran national who entered the United States without inspection in 1997 and was subsequently granted TPS based on a series of earthquakes in his home country. In 2014, Sanchez, together with his wife, Sonia Gonzalez, sought to adjust status after more than 20 years of residence in the United States, but the USCIS denied his application on the grounds that “[a] grant of TPS does not cure a foreign national’s entry without inspection or constitute an inspection and admission of the foreign national”.

Sanchez challenged the denial, and the District Court ruled in his favor, holding that an LPR “’shall be considered as’ having ‘lawful status as a nonimmigrant’ for purposes of applying to become an LPR”. See Santos Sanchez v. Johnson, 2018 WL 6427894, *4 (D NJ, Dec. 7, 2018). The District Court further held that INA §244(f)(4) requires TPS holders to be treated “as though [they] had been ‘inspected and admitted.’” The Third Circuit, though, reversed, holding that “a grant of TPS does not constitute an ‘admission’ into the United States.” Sanchez v. Secretary U. S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 967 F. 3d 242, 252 (2020).

The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Kagan, held that an individual who entered the United States without inspection is not eligible to adjust status under INA §245 by virtue of being a TPS recipient. The Court drew a distinction between the concept of “admission” and one’s immigration status, noting that there are several categories of individuals who have nonimmigrant status without having been admitted to the United States (alien crewmen, crime  victims in U visa status, etc.).

Though unfortunate that the Court did not consider a grant to TPS to be an admission under INA § 245(a), Justice Kagan’s opinion includes some interesting language that may leave open some avenues for TPS recipients to adjust status. On pages 8-9 of the opinion, the Court held that TPS recipients will be considered to have nonimmigrant status, which is needed to adjust status under §245. Thus, an individual who was admitted to the United States in lawful B-2 status for example, but fell out of status before being granted TPS might be able to adjust status, having satisfied both the “admission” and “nonimmigrant status” requirements.

Thus, it is unclear whether a grant of TPS “wipes out” a lapse in one’s nonimmigrant status, no matter the duration. Justice Kagan gives the more narrow example of an individual who was out of status for a few months before receiving TPS, potentially implying that TPS ends an individual’s time out of status who otherwise would have exceeded 180 days and been unable to adjust under INA § 245(k). However, a noncitizen relying on §245(k) to adjust status would not need to have received TPS, or any other nonimmigrant status, to file an employment based I-485 within 180 days of admission.  On the other hand, INA §245(k) could still potentially come to the rescue if the individual is granted TPS status within 180 days of the admission but then seeks to file for adjustment of status 180 days after the admission. The grant of TPS would have put the person back in nonimmigrant status within the 180 days from the admission, even if they file an adjustment application after 180 days.

Justice Kagan’s opinion can be interpreted even more broadly to support the idea that a grant of TPS “wipes out” a lapse in the nonimmigrant status and thus overrides INA §§§ 245(c)(2), (7) and (8), when the lack of a lawful status impedes an individual’s ability to adjust status. Under INA §245(c)(2) an applicant for adjustment of status even if admitted (other than an immediate relative) is precluded from applying for adjustment of status if they are in unlawful status at the date of filing the application or who have failed to maintain continuously a lawful status since entry into the US. INA § 245(k) allows one who was admitted to apply for adjustment of status under the first three employment-based preferences and the employment-based fourth preference as a religious worker if they have failed to maintain lawful status for not more than 180 days. But INA § 245(k) is inapplicable to one who is applying for adjustment of status under a family-based preference.  A grant of TPS at any point in time, if Justice Kagan’s opinion is interpreted broadly, should once again render an applicant eligible for adjustment of status whether they are filing an adjustment application under a family based preference or  an employment-based preference even 180 days beyond the admission and the grant of TPS.

INA § 245(c)(7) similarly precludes adjustment of status to that of an immigrant under INA § 203(b) (the five employment-based preferences) for one who is not in a lawful nonimmigrant status. A grant of TPS ought to wipe out this impediment. INA § 245(c)(8) disqualifies one from adjusting status who accepted employment while unauthorized. Under the broader interpretation of Justice Kagan’s opinion, the grant of TPS ought to also remove this impediment under INA § 245(c)(8) too.

While the Supreme Court nixed the ability of TPS applicants to adjust status if they were not admitted, there are still some bright spots if one carefully parses through Justice Kagan’s opinion. Under the broadest interpretation of Justice Kagan’s opinion, TPS applicants, if they were initially admitted, should continue to claim that they are eligible to adjust status under both the family and employment preferences by virtue of receiving nonimmigrant status.

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a Law Clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Cyrus Mehta

The Fascinating Confluence of Temporary Protected Status, Removal and Employment-Based Adjustment of Status

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Immigration Judge Ila C. Deiss’ summary order shows how one who is granted Temporary Protected Status can adjust to permanent resident status through an I-140 petition filed by an employer.

Here are the facts based upon which IJ Deiss issued the order:

The Respondent is a native and citizen of Nepal who arrived in the United States in 2006 in F-1 student status. In 2007 he stopped going to school and began working without authorization. He affirmatively filed for asylum in 2008, but his asylum claim was not granted and he was placed in removal proceedings in the same year. An Immigration Judge denied his asylum claim in 2010 and he was granted voluntary departure. Respondent appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal in 2011. Respondent then filed a Petition for Review in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, which was denied in 2014. His case was then remanded to the Immigration Judge and was subsequently Administratively Closed based on a grant of Temporary Protected Status. In 2015, as a result of a massive earth quake, the Attorney General designated Nepal for Temporary Protected Status. Respondent, as a citizen of Nepal, applied for and was granted TPS in the same year and continued to be a recipient of TPS registration at the time of the decision.

Respondent’s employer filed an I-140 petition to the USCIS on his behalf in 2019, and in the same year, Respondent concurrently filed an I-485 adjustment of status application with the court.  The legal question before IJ Deiss was whether the Respondent was eligible for adjustment of status.

Earlier, in Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2017), the Ninth Circuit held that TPS constitutes an admission for purpose of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under INA 245(a). A foreign national who enters the United States without inspection, which was the case in Ramirez v. Brown, does not qualify for adjustment of status even if married to a US citizen since s/he does not meet the key requirement of INA § 245(a), which is to “have been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.” However, both Ramirez, and another case in the 6th Circuit with the same facts,   Flores v. USCIS, 718 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2013), held that as a matter of statutory interpretation, Congress intended TPS recipients to be considered “admitted” for purposes of INA 245(a). Thus, even if the foreign national entered without inspection, the grant of TPS constituted an admission thus rendering the TPS recipient eligible for adjustment of status. Of course, the other conditions of INA 245(a) must also be met, which is not be inadmissible as well as have a visa that is immediately available. The disqualifications to adjustment of status in INA 245(c)(2) such as working without authorization, being in unlawful status or failing to maintain lawful status since entry are not applicable to immediate relatives of US citizens, who are spouses, minor children and parents.

The courts in Ramirez and Flores relied on INA § 244 (f)(4), which provides:

(f) Benefits and Status During Period of Protected Status – During a period in which an alien is granted temporary protected status under this section-

(4) for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245 and change of status under section 248, the alien shall be considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant

Both courts read the above phrase, especially “for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245 and change of status under section 248” to be in harmony with being “admitted” for purposes of adjustment of status. As § 244(f)(4) bestows nonimmigrant status on a TPS recipient, an alien who has obtained nonimmigrant status is deemed to be “admitted.” Thus, at least in places that fall under the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, TPS recipients who have been granted nonimmigrant status under INA 244(f)(4) could potentially adjust status to permanent residence as immediate relatives of US citizens. Those who have entered without inspection in these two circuits need not travel outside the US under advance parole in order to become eligible to adjust status under § 245(a). On the other hand, those not in the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuit who were not previously admitted will need to travel under advance parole to become eligible for adjustment of status as immediate relatives by availing of Matter of Arrabelly and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012). Under this decision, a departure under advance parole does not trigger the 3 and 10-year unlawful presence bars pursuant to INA 212(a)(9)(B).

In a prior blog titled Potential Adjustment of Status Options After the Termination of TPS, I raised the question whether the holdings in Ramirez and Flores could apply to TPS recipients who are beneficiaries of an approved I-140 petition under the employment-based first, second, third and fourth preferences. I postulated that the “answer arguably is ‘yes” under § 245(k) provided they fall under the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.

IJ Deiss’ order in the San Francisco Immigration Court, which falls under the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, now confirms that §245(k) can rescue such persons even if they are in removal proceedings. § 245(k) exempts applicants for adjustment of status who are otherwise subject to the § 245(c)(2) bar based on unauthorized employment or for not maintaining lawful status provided they are present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission and subsequent to such admission have not failed to maintain lawful status or engaged in unauthorized unemployment for more than 180 days. § 245(k) also waives the bars under §§ 245(c)(7) and (c)(8) that otherwise apply to employment-based adjustment applicants.  Thus, even if the TPS recipient may have not been in lawful status prior to the grant of TPS, the grant of TPS resulted in the individual being admitted into the US. If this person files within the TPS validity period, 245(k) should allow this person to adjust to permanent residence, as IJ Deiss also held.

The attorney for the respondent, Emily Wilson,  in arguing for 245(k) eligibility relied on a USCIS memo by Acting Associate Director, Donald Neufeld, titled Applicability of Section 245(k) to Certain Employment Based Adjustment of Status Applications filed under Section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This memo correctly interprets 245(k) by stating that “adjudicators must only examine the 180 day period from the date of the alien’s last lawful admission to the United States and must not count violations that occurred before the alien’s last lawful admission.” In the instant case, the Respondent’s last lawful admission to the United States was his grant of TPS in 2015. Ms. Wilson went on to argue, “Under a plain reading of the regulation and USCIS’ guidance on the applicability of 245(k) it is clear that only violations of 245(c)(2), (c)(7), and (c)(6) that occurred after the TPS grant are relevant in this case. Since the Respondent has no violations of 245(c)(2), (c)(7), and (c)(8) since his TPS grant on [redacted] 2015 he is eligible to adjust status to lawful permanent resident under §§ 245(a) and 245(k) of the INA.”

Another interesting aspect of this case is that the grant of TPS constituted another admission, thus resenting the clock, although the Respondent was previously admitted in F-1 status. In Ramirez and Flores, the adjustment applicants had entered without inspection, and conceptually, it is easier to admit someone who was previously not admitted. However, there is nothing in the reading of  §244(f)(4) that should preclude someone from being admitted again, as in the instant case,  even if previously admitted in a nonimmigrant status prior to the TPS grant.

There are other interesting things to ponder about. Although the Trump administration has sought to terminated TPS for Nepal, under the court ordered stipulation in Bhattarai v. Neilsen the TPS designation for Nepal remains in effect. I would argue that even assuming TPS for Nepal was terminated at the time IJ Deiss rendered her decision, 245(k) ought to allow a respondent in removal proceedings to adjust status. Although INA 244(f)(4) bestows lawful nonimmigrant status to a current TPS recipient, that grant of nonimmigrant status also previously admitted the TPS recipient into the United States. The fact that she was once admitted through the TPS grant cannot vanish just because she is no longer a TPS recipient, and she ought to be eligible to adjust status under 245(k) so long as she has not stayed in the US greater than 180 days from the termination of TPS designation. Once a person has been admitted, the person is still considered to have been admitted for 245(a) purposes even if the period of stay under TPS expires. I would further argue that this should apply to a § 244(f)(4) implied admission as much as it does to any other kind of admission. If you are necessarily admitted because you have gone from having entered without inspection to being in nonimmigrant status, that does not cease to have been the case because your nonimmigrant status later goes away. Finally, Ms. Wilson correctly pointed out in footnote 1 in her decision that a derivative may also benefit under § 245(k), according to the USCIS 245(k) memo, and so the Respondent’s spouse who presumably is also a TPS recipient along with her spouse is also eligible to apply for adjustment of status.

Note that § 245(k) is only applicable to I-485 applications filed under the employment-based first, second, third and fourth preferences. With respect to family-based preference petitions, USCIS has taken the position that anyone who has ever failed to maintain continuously a lawful status will not be eligible for adjustment of status (although there is one outlier federal district court decision, See Figueroa v. Rodriguez, No. CV-16-8218 -PA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128120 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2017)). Hence, the beneficiary of an I-130 filed by a permanent resident on behalf of his spouse will likely not be able to adjust status if he was not in status prior to the grant of TPS. Also, one who needs to travel outside the United States in order to become eligible for adjustment of status under § 245(a) as an immediate relative, especially those outside the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, will not be able to avail of § 245(k) to adjust pursuant to an employment-based I-140 petition as § 245(k) only applies to one who has been admitted rather than paroled into the United States..

Unfortunately, the beneficial impact of a TPS grant for employment-based adjustment applicants is only applicable to those within the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuit. It is also important to note that the Eleventh Circuit in Serrano v. Unites States Attorney General, 655 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2011) held that TPS was not an admission for purposes of adjustment under INA 245(a). A class action, filed by the American Immigration Council, is designed to replicate the Ramirez and Flores decisions in all Circuits that have not yet ruled and has been awaiting a decision from the district court judge for over a year in the Eastern District of New York. In the interim, the issue is now pending in the Third, Fifth, and Eight Circuits and the AIC has filed amicus briefs in all of them. There is a strong statutory argument that the grant of TPS constitutes an admission under § 244(f)(4), and thus allows one to adjust status both as an immediate relative and also through an employment-based I-140 petition under § 245(k). This logical and unambiguous interpretation should ultimately be adhered to by all courts.

(Hats off to Emily Wilson who was the Respondent’s attorney!)

Cyrus Mehta

Potential Adjustment of Status Options After the Termination of TPS

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As President Trump restricts immigration, it is incumbent upon immigration lawyers to assist their clients with creative solutions available under law. The most recent example of Trump’s attack on immigration is the cancellation of Temporary Protected Status for more than 200,000 Salvadorans. David Isaacson’s What Comes Next: Potential Relief Options After the Termination of TPS comprehensively provides tips on how to represent TPS recipients whose authorization will soon expire with respect to asylum, cancellation or removal and adjustment of status.

I focus specifically on how TPS recipients can potentially adjust their status within the United States through either a family-based I-130 petition or an I-140 employment-based petition for permanent residency. A September 2017 practice advisory from the American Immigration Council points to two decisions from the Ninth and Sixth Circuit, Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2017) and Flores v. USCIS, 718 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2013), holding that TPS constitutes an admission for purpose of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under INA 245(a).

In both these cases, the plaintiffs previously entered the United States without inspection, and then became recipients of TPS grants and subsequently married US citizens. At issue in both those cases was whether they were eligible for adjustment of status under INA 245(a) as beneficiaries of immediate relative I-130 petitions filed by their US citizen spouses. Both the decisions answered this question in the affirmative.

A foreign national who enters the United States without inspection does not qualify for adjustment of status even if married to a US citizen since s/he does not meet the key requirement of INA 245(a), which is to “have been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.” However, both Ramirez and Flores held that as a matter of statutory interpretation, Congress intended TPS recipients to be considered “admitted” for purposes of INA 245(a). Thus, even if the foreign national entered without inspection, the grant of TPS constituted an admission thus rendering the TPS recipient eligible for adjustment of status. Of course, the other conditions of INA 245(a) must also be met, which is to be eligible to receive a visa and not be inadmissible as well as have a visa that is immediately available. The disqualifications to adjustment of status in INA 245(c)(2) such as working without authorization, being in unlawful status or failing to maintain lawful status since entry are not applicable to immediate relatives of US citizens, who are spouses, minor children and parents.

The courts in Ramirez and Flores relied on INA 244 (f)(4), which provides:

(f) Benefits and Status During Period of Protected Status – During a period in which an alien is granted temporary protected status under this section-

(4) for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245 and change of status under section 248, the alien shall be considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant

Both courts read the above phrase, especially “for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245 and change of status under section 248” to be in harmony with being “admitted” for purposes of adjustment of status. As INA 244(f)(4) bestows nonimmigrant status on a TPS recipient, an alien who has obtained nonimmigrant status is deemed to be “admitted.” Thus, at least in places that fall under the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, TPS recipients who have been granted nonimmigrant status under INA 244(f)(4) could potentially adjust status to permanent residence as immediate relatives of US citizens.

The next question is whether a TPS recipient can also adjust status to permanent residence if s/he is the beneficiary of an approved I-140 petition under the employment-based first, second, third and fourth preferences. The answer arguably is “yes” provided the applicant resides in a place that falls under the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. INA 245(k) will come to their rescue, which applies to the employment-based first to fourth preferences.

A TPS recipient from El Salvador who is concerned that her TPS designation will terminate on September 9, 2019 may wish to request her employ to file a labor certification on her behalf. If the labor certification is approved, after an unsuccessful test of the US labor market for her experience and skills, the employer may file an I-140 petition and potentially a concurrent I-485 adjustment of status application. The EB-2 and EB-3 priority dates for a person born in El Salvador are current in the February 2018 visa bulletin, and likely to remain current over the foreseeable future.

INA 245(k) exempts applicants for adjustment who are otherwise subject to the INA 245(c)(2) bar based on unauthorized employment or for not maintaining lawful status provided they are present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission and subsequent to such admission have not failed to maintain lawful status or engaged in unauthorized unemployment for more than 180 days. Thus, even if the TPS recipient may have not been in lawful status prior to the grant of TPS, the grant of TPS resulted in the individual being admitted into the US. If this person files within the TPS validity period, 245(k) should allow this person to adjust to permanent residence.

I would posit that this person would be eligible under 245(k) to apply for adjustment of status within 180 days from the expiration of the TPS status. This may well be the case if there is a delay in the processing of the labor certification or if there is a retrogression in the priority date.  Although INA 244(f)(4) bestows lawful nonimmigrant status to a current TPS recipient, that grant of nonimmigrant status also previously admitted her into the United States. The fact that she was once admitted through the TPS grant cannot vanish just because she is no longer a TPS recipient, and she ought to be eligible to adjust status under 245(k) so long as she has not stayed in the US greater than 180 days from the termination of TPS designation. Once a person has been admitted, the person is still considered to have been admitted for 245(a) purposes even if the period of stay under TPS expires. I would argue that this should apply to a INA 244(f)(4) implied admission as much as it does to any other kind of admission. If you are necessarily admitted because you have gone from having entered without inspection to being in nonimmigrant status, that does not cease to have been the case because your nonimmigrant status later goes away.

A person who was previously admitted in a nonimmigrant status, but who then fell out of status prior to the grant of TPS, may also arguably be considered admitted once again under 245(k) upon receiving a grant of TPS. One could argue that the TPS is the last admission for 245(k).  However, the argument is probably stronger for one who entered without inspection, since traditionally only the granting of status to someone previously not admitted is a new “admission”—going out of status and back in doesn’t have the same tradition of being characterized that way.

Note that 245(k) is only applicable to I-485 applications filed under the employment-based first, second, third and fourth preferences. With respect to family-based preference petitions, USCIS has taken the position that anyone who has ever failed to maintain continuously a lawful status will not be eligible for adjustment of status. Hence, the beneficiary of an I-130 filed by a permanent resident on behalf of his spouse will not be able to adjust status if he was not in status prior to the grant of TPS. The AIC practice advisory cites Figueroa v. Rodriguez, No. CV-16-8218 -PA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128120 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2017), which held to the contrary that TPS cures the prior lack of status for a family preference beneficiary, but since this is a decision from a district court it has no precedential value and should not be relied upon.  Of course, if his spouse becomes a US citizen, then he qualifies as an immediate relative and also eligible to adjust status if admissible despite having not maintained status prior to the TPS grant, or even if the TPS terminates, as immediate relatives are exempt from the 245(c)(2) bar.

Those who do not reside in the Sixth and Ninth Circuit can also adjust by availing of Matter of Arrabelly and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012). Under this decision, a departure under advance parole does not trigger the 3 and 10-year unlawful presence bars pursuant to INA 212(a)(9)(B). Thus, a TPS recipient may apply for advance parole, leave the United States and be paroled back into the United States (although beware that under the Trump administration, CBP could deny entry to one with advance parole). The departure would not trigger the unlawful presence bars and the parole would be recognized for purposes of adjusting under INA 245(a) as having been “inspected and admitted or paroled.” Note, though, that the entry into the United States under parole would only render one eligible for adjustment of status as an immediate relative, and not under an approved I-140 preference petition since INA 245(k) only applies to one who has been admitted rather than paroled into the United States. The parole entry would also not help a preference beneficiary under an approved I-130. Although parole could be considered a lawful status (as the INA 245(c)(7) bar only applies to employment-based I-140s that are not subject to the 245(k) exception) for purposes of adjustment of status based on a family preference I-130, the applicant must demonstrate that s/he never previously violated lawful status. Proceeding overseas for consular processing, where filing an adjustment of status application may not be possible, may trigger the 3 and 10-year bars if the TPS recipient previously accrued unlawful presence prior to the grant of TPS. Even if the TPS recipient departs the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole, it is not clear whether the US Consulate will recognize Matter of Arrabelly and Yerrabelly in situations where the person departs under advance parole but intends to return on an immigrant visa. Thus, those who plan to proceed for consular processing who have accrued the requisite unlawful presence to trigger the 3 and 10-year bars should only proceed if they can obtain a provisional waiver of the bars based on extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

What is quite certain presently is the ability to adjust status as an immediate relative if the TPS recipient resides within the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) or the Ninth Circuit (California, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands). It is also important to note that the Eleventh Circuit in Serrano v. Unites States Attorney General, 655 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2011) held that TPS was not an admission for purposes of adjustment under INA 245(a).  As David pointed out in his blog, those who reside outside those two Circuits, except in the Eleventh Circuit,  might still be able to pursue adjustment of status on the same theory if they are willing to litigate in federal court following any denials. An applicant can litigate by bringing an action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.  701 in federal district court. Alternatively, if the applicant is placed in removal proceedings, s/he can argue these theories before an Immigration Judge, and if unsuccessful to the Board of Immigration Appeals and subsequently in a Court of Appeals. Further details on various litigation strategies may be provided in a subsequent blog.  Even if a TPS recipient resides within the jurisdiction of the Sixth or Ninth Circuit, it is not clear whether the USCIS will accept an argument for adjustment of status through an I-140 employment-based petition under INA 245(k). This uncertainty gets exacerbated where the TPS grant has already expired and the I-485 is being filed within 180 days of its final expiration date.  Hence, the TPS recipient planning to deploy an adjustment of status strategy under 245(k) must also be prepared to litigate even if residing within the jurisdiction of the Sixth or Ninth Circuit. Under the Trump administration, when immigration benefits have suddenly been curtailed for long time TPS recipients, it may be worth adopting creating adjustment of status strategies, and if USCIS does not accept them, to consider litigating until there is success as was the case in the Ramirez and Flores decisions.

(This blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as a substitute for independent legal advice supplied by a lawyer familiar with a client’s case.)