Tag Archive for: EAD

Shaping Immigration Policy Through EADs

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In the face of Congressional inaction to fashion an immigration solution for the United States, the Administration does have broad authority to grant an employment authorization document (EAD) to noncitizens. It also has the ability to extend the validity of an EAD.

On September 27, 2023, USCIS announced that it will increase the maximum employment authorization document (EAD) validity period for “certain noncitizens who are employment authorized incident to status or circumstance” to five years. This five-year EAD validity period also applies to some “initial and renewal EADs for certain noncitizens who must apply for employment authorization”. Refugees, asylees, individuals granted withholding of removal, and those with pending asylum application or applications for adjustment of status under INA 245, are among the categories of noncitizens who will be issued EADs with a five-year validity period, according to a USCIS Policy Alert. USCIS stated that this change is aimed at “significantly reduc[ing] the number of new Forms I-765, Application for Employment Authorization, we receive for renewal EADs over the next several years, contributing to our efforts to reduce associated processing times and backlogs”. This announcement is the one of the most recent in a series of DHS measures that have the effect of shaping immigration policy through EADs.

INA 274A(h)(3) provides DHS a basis for providing employment authorization to noncitizens when not specifically authorized under the INA. The provision states:

(3) Definition of unauthorized alien – As used in this section, the term “unauthorized alien” means, with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this Act or by the Attorney General.

DHS has relied on INA 274A(h)(3) as the authority for issuing EADs to H-4 spouses of H-1B workers under 8 CFR 274.12(c)(26). Save Jobs USA, an organization representing California IT workers, is currently challenging the DHS rule that grants work authorization to H-4 nonimmigrants before the Supreme Court. Although the policy was upheld at the district court level in March and no court of appeals decision has yet been rendered, Save Jobs has already sought review by the Supreme Court. Save Jobs is arguing that the issue of H-4 EADs in one of “extraordinary practical importance” because it represents “just the tip of a regulatory-work-authorization iceberg” that threatens the jobs of U.S. workers. Save Jobs further claimed that providing work authorization to noncitizens paroled into the U.S. for humanitarian purposes will “will allow aliens to hold 18 percent of the jobs created in an average year.” In a September 2023 brief, DHS contended that Save Jobs does not have standing to challenge the regulation, and urged the Court to deny certiorari, stating that: “The case would… not warrant certiorari even had the court of appeals already affirmed the district court’s ruling. That petitioner seeks to skip that critical step and obtain certiorari before judgment makes denial of the petition all the more appropriate.”

Although employment authorization is specifically provided for recipients of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) under INA 244(a)(1), INA 274A(h)(3) also affords DHS a basis for providing interim EADs to applicants who have pending TPS applications under 8 CFR 274.12(c)(19). Pursuant to a recent announcement, DHS is redesignating and extending TPS for Venezuela for 18 months. The redesignation will allow Venezuelan nationals who have been continuously residing in the United States since July 31, 2023 and meet the other eligibility criteria to apply for TPS. EADs for current Venezuelan TPS beneficiaries will be automatically extended through March 10, 2025. The redesignation of Venezuela for TPS will relieve the pressure for cities like New York that have accepted recent migrants from Venezuela, as these individuals will be able to legally work with EADs even while they have pending TPS applications rather than relying only on housing and other services provided by NYC.

Other examples where the Administration has relied on INA 274A(h)(3) include the granting of EADs to those who have been paroled into the United States under humanitarian parole under 8 CFR 274.12(c)(11), F-1 students who are in a period of practical training (8 CFR 274.12(c)(3)), applicants with pending I-485 applications (8 CFR 274.12(c)(9)), applicants with pending cancellation of removal applications (8 CFR 274.12(c)(10)), recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) (8 CFR 274.12(c)(33)), and beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions, as well as their spouses and children, based on compelling circumstances (8 CFR 204.5(p)). Under these regulations, some EADs are linked to the noncitizen’s nonimmigrant visa status such as F-1 or H-4 while other EADs are not linked to such visa status and allow the noncitizen to remain lawfully present in the US.

Some of the programs that have provided the basis for EADs have been challenged in addition to the H-4 EAD program, such as the DACA program, which the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas recently struck down once again. In a September 13, 2023 order, Judge Hanen stated that the 2022 Final Rule promulgated by the Biden administration to formalize the DACA program was not “materially different” from the 2012 policy that first created the program, and held that “the Final Rule suffers from the same legal impediments” as the 2012 policy. The 2012 policy was ruled unlawful in by the 5th Circuit in October 2022. In a 2015 opinion authored by Judge Hanen, the 5th Circuit struck down the “Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents” program (or “DAPA”) and questioned whether INA 274A(h)(3), which the court characterized as a definitional provision, even affords DHS the authority to grant employment authorization or related benefits.

The administration’s humanitarian parole program, which allows 30,000 qualifying nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela to be admitted to the United States every month for up to two years and apply for work authorization, is currently facing a challenge by Texas and nineteen other states. The plaintiff states allege that the program “amounts to the creation of a new visa program that allows hundreds of thousands of aliens to enter the United States who otherwise have no basis for doing so”. In an October 2022 Court of Appeals case, the Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (Washtech) similary argued that the F-1 STEM Optional Practical Training (OPT) rule should be struck down on the ground that INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i) authorizes DHS to allow F-1 students to remain in the U.S. only until they have completed their course of study and does not specifically authorize post-graduation practical training. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, upheld STEM OPT as a valid exercise of DHS’ authority under in INA § 214(a)(1) to promulgate regulations that authorize an F-1 student’s stay in the U.S. beyond graduation. The Supreme Court recently denied  certiorari allowing STEM OPT and the EAD emanating under 8 CFR 274.12(c)(3) to continue.

Notwithstanding these legal challenges on specific executive actions, the Administration continues to  have the authority to issue and extend EADs to a broad swath of noncitizens. Some of the beneficiaries of EADs are those who are in the queue for permanent residence but are unable to obtain it due to backlogs in the employment categories while others are in the US based on humanitarian reasons. The authority and flexibility that INA 274A(h)(3) provides to the Administration to fashion immigration policy through the grant EADs and transform the lives of hundreds of thousands of noncitizens fills an important gap that complements the immigration benefits provided in the INA.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate

NYC Should Welcome Migrants Rather Than Have a Mayor Who Disparages Them

Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In recent weeks, New York City Mayor Eric Adams has made a series of increasingly uninformed and disparaging comments about migrants arriving in New York. In a town hall meeting on September 6, Adams said of the influx of migrants: “this issue will destroy New York City”. Adams further stated that “every community in this city is going to be impacted” by the arriving migrants, and warned the audience: “It’s going to come to your neighborhoods.” On September 9, 2023, Adams directed agencies to prepare plans for reducing the city’s budget by 15 percent, stating that the cost of caring for increasing numbers of migrants has put a strain on NYC’s financial resources.

Adams’ comments are incredibly troubling to immigration advocates, who view the mayor as demonizing asylum seekers. Murad Awawdeh, executive director of the New York Immigration Coalition, told the New York Times that: “What we’ve seen with the rhetoric he’s using is that it’s activating people in a negative way against their new neighbors. The mayor should know better. The contributions of the immigrant community here have been seismic.” New York City has a rich tradition of welcoming immigrants, and the contributions of immigrants have long shaped the fabric of the city. Even Emma Lazarus’ poem, printed at the base of the iconic Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor, issues the following directive: “Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me”.  Adams’ remarks run entirely contrary to the vision and history of New York City as a refuge for immigrants.

Moreover, Adams seems to ignore the fact that asylum seekers are often eager to find work and begin contributing to their communities. A recent New York Times article also emphasizes that there is no shortage of available jobs for migrants, stating “across the state, many large and small employers have expressed an overwhelming willingness to hire recent asylum seekers”. The article further notes that there is a tremendous need for workers in “service industries like landscaping, manufacturing and hospitality”, particularly in areas of upstate New York that have suffered from declining populations in recent years.

However, the path to obtaining work authorization is less than straightforward for many migrants. Pursuant to INA § 208(d)(2) and 8 CFR 208.7(a)(1), asylum applicants may apply for an employment authorization document (EAD) no earlier than 150 days after the submission of a completed asylum application. The Form I-765 application must then remain pending for an additional 30 days, for a total of 180 days, before the asylum applicant is eligible for work authorization and USCIS can issue an EAD. Thus, despite some elected officials urging the Biden administration to expedite the process for issuing the EAD for asylum seekers, the administration is hamstrung by the statute precluding an asylum applicant from applying earlier than 150 days from submitting an application, and then issuing the EAD only after 180 days from the submission of the application.

Some migrants need not wait for 180 days before becoming eligible for employment authorization, though. Pursuant to a special Department of Homeland Security (DHS) program, certain nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela may be paroled into the U.S. for a period of up to two years. Because these individuals are not asylum applicants, but rather have been paroled into the U.S., they are eligible to apply for an EAD immediately.

Similarly, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has recently begun using the CBP One app to schedule appointments for migrants seeking to enter the U.S. through a port of entry at the Southern border. According to a DHS fact sheet, “individuals who are processed into the United States are generally placed into immigration proceedings and, on a case-by-case basis, may be considered for a period of parole for up to two years to continue their immigration proceedings”. Migrants who entered the United States through this process are eligible to apply for an EAD immediately upon being paroled into the country, even if they applied for asylum less than 150 days prior. The Biden administration has recently begun sending text messages to migrants who are eligible for work authorization to encourage them to apply, as well as circulating QR codes that link to information about applying for work authorization.  While this is all salutary, the Biden administration should also process the EADs expeditiously for eligible applicants.

Adams’ assertion that migrants will destroy New York City is utterly misguided. He is foolishly playing into the hands of Republican politicians who have never been friendly towards asylum seekers.  Rather, immigrants have played an instrumental role in building New York City into what it is today. The city’s newest arrivals are equally eager to contribute, and Adams seemingly disregards the fact that many migrants are already authorized to apply for work authorization and entering a community that is ready to employ them. Once these migrants are employed they will contribute to New York City and the economy.  The key to ensuring that New York City can successfully welcome arriving migrants is not to vilify these individuals, but rather to ensure that eligibility for work authorization is extended to as many migrants as possible, and to facilitate the application process for those who are already eligible. This will be a win-win for migrants and New York City!

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Advancing the Dates for Filing in the State Department Visa Bulletin Will Restore Balance and Sanity to the Legal Immigration System

By Cyrus D. Mehta

The August 2023 Visa Bulletin is a disaster. Here are some of the highlights:

Establishment of Worldwide employment-based first preference (EB-1) final action date.  Rest of World countries, Mexico, and Philippines will be subject to a final action date final action date of August 1, 2023. It is likely that in October the category will return to “Current” for these countries.

Retrogression in employment-based first preference (EB-1) for India.  India will be subject to an EB-1 final action date of January 1, 2012. It is likely that in October the final action date will advance.

Retrogression in employment-based third preference (EB-3) for Rest of World countries, Mexico, and Philippines. The Rest of World, Mexico, and Philippines EB-3 final action date will retrogress in August to May 1, 2020.

Retrogression in family-based second preference (F-2A) for Rest of the World countries, China and India. The Rest of World, China, and India F2A final action date will retrogress to October 8, 2017.

.The bad news from the July 2023 Visa Bulletin continues into the August 2023 Visa Bulletin.  The India EB-2 final action date remains retrogressed at January 1, 2011. The India EB-3 final action date remains retrogressed at January 1, 2009. Still, the corresponding dates for filing  in the August 2023 visa bulletin are significantly more ahead than the final action date. For instance, the dates for filing for the F2A for all countries is current. The dates for filing for the EB-1 for the Rest of the World is current and for India is June 1, 2022. Yet, the USCIS has indicated that I-485 adjustment of status applications can only be filed in August 2023 under the dates for filing chart  if they are family-based while I-485 adjustment of status applications can only be filed in August 2023 under the final action dates chart if they are employment-based.

The USCIS should allow I-485 applications related to both family and employment-based petitions to be filed under the dates for filing chart. Indeed, in the face of massive retrogression in the Visa Bulletin, the Biden administration does have the authority to move the dates for filing to current. However, even before taking this radical step, which has a legal basis, the administration should  at least allow I-485 applications to be filed under the dates for filing in both the family and employment-based preferences.

The total allocation of visa numbers in the employment and family based categories are woefully adequate. §201 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets an annual minimum family-sponsored preference limit of 226,000.  The worldwide level for annual employment-based preference immigrants is at least 140,000.  INA §202 prescribes that the per-country limit for preference immigrants is set at 7% of the total annual family-sponsored and employment-based preference limits, i.e., 25,620. These limits were established in the Immigration Act of 1990, and since then, the US Congress has not expanded these limits for well over three decades. In 1990, the worldwide web was not in existence, and  since then, there have been an explosion in the number of jobs as a result of internet based technologies and so many related technologies as well as a demand for foreign skilled workers many of whom have been educated at US educational institutions.  Yet, the US legal immigration system has not kept up to timely give green cards to immigrants who contribute to the country. Due to the per country limits,  till recently it was only India and China that were backlogged in the employment based preferences, but now under the August 2023 Visa Bulletin all countries face backlogs. Still, India bears the brunt disproportionately in the employment-based categories, and one study has estimated the wait time to be 150 years in the India EB-2!

It would be ideal for Congress to eliminate the per country limits and even add more visas to each preference category. Until Congress is able to act, it would be easy for the Biden administration to provide even greater relief through executive action. One easy fix is to advance the dates for filing in the State Department’s Visa Bulletin so that many more backlogged beneficiaries of approved petitions can file I-485 adjustment of status applications and get  ameliorative relief such as an  employment authorization document (EAD), travel permission and to be able to exercise job portability under INA §204(j). Spouse and minor children can also avail of work authorization and travel permission after they file their I-485 applications.

There is a legal basis to advance the dates for filing even to current. This would allow many backlogged immigrants to file I-485 adjustment of status applications and get the benefits of adjustment of status such as the ability to port to a new job under INA 204(j), obtain travel permission and an EAD. Many more of the children of these backlogged immigrants would also be able to protect their age under the USCIS’s updated guidance relating to the Child Status Protection Act.

INA §245(a)(3) allows for the filing of an adjustment of status application when “an immigrant visa  is immediately available” to the applicant. 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) links visa availability to the State Department’s monthly Visa Bulletin. Pursuant to this regulation, an I-485 application can only be submitted “if the preference category applicant has a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in the Bulletin (or the Bulletin shows that numbers for visa applicants in his or her category are current).” The term “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3) has never been defined, except as in 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) by “a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in Bulletin” or if the date in the Bulletin is current for that category.

The State Department has historically never advanced priority dates based on certitude that a visa would actually become available. There have been many instances when applicants have filed an I-485 application in a particular month, only to later find that the dates have retrogressed. A good example is the April 2012 Visa Bulletin, when the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China were May 1, 2010. In the very next May 2012 Visa Bulletin a month later, the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China retrogressed to August 15, 2007. If the State Department was absolutely certain that applicants born in India and China who filed in April 2012 would receive their green cards, it would not have needed to retrogress dates back to August 15, 2007.  Indeed, those EB-2 applicants who filed their I-485 applications in April 2012 may still potentially be waiting and have yet to receive their green cards even as of today! Another example is when the State Department announced that the July 2007 Visa Bulletin for EB-2 and EB-3 would become current. Hundreds of thousands filed during that period (which actually was the extended period from July 17, 2007 to August 17, 2007). It was obvious that these applicants would not receive their green cards during that time frame. The State Department then retrogressed the EB dates substantially the following month, and those who filed under the India EB-3 in July-August 2007 waited for over a decade before they became eligible for green cards. More recently, the September 2022  Visa Bulletin had a final action date of December 1, 2014 for EB-2 India. In the next October 2022 Visa Bulletin the FAD for EB-2 India was abruptly retrogressed to April 1, 2012 and then further retrogressed to October 8, 2011 in the December 2022 Visa Bulletin. If a visa number was immediately available in September 2022, an applicant under EB-2 India with a priority date of December 1, 2014 or earlier should have been issued permanent residence.

These three examples, among many, go to show that “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3), according to the State Department, have never meant that visas were actually available to be issued to applicants as soon as they filed. Rather, it has always been based on a notion of visa availability at some point of time in the future.

Under the dual filing dates system first introduced by the State Department in October 2015, USCIS acknowledges that availability of visas is based on an estimate of available visas for the fiscal year rather than immediate availability:

When we determine there are more immigrant visas available for the fiscal year than there are known applicants, you may use the DFF Applications chart to determine when to file an adjustment of status application with USCIS. Otherwise, you must use the Application Final Action Dates chart to determine when to file an adjustment of status application with USCIS.

Taking this to its logical extreme, visa availability for establishing the dates for filing may be based on just one visa being saved in the backlogged preference category in the year, such as the India EB-3, like the proverbial Thanksgiving turkey. Just like one turkey every Thanksgiving Day is pardoned by the President and not consumed, similarly one visa can also be left intact rather than used by the noncitizen beneficiary.   So long as there is one visa kept available, it would provide the legal basis for an I-485 filing under a DFF, and this would be consistent with INA 245(a)(3) as well as 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1). This is reflected in the August  2023 Visa Bulletin as the first visa in the India EB-3 has a priority date of January 1, 2009. Hence, there is one available visa in the India EB-3 skilled worker, otherwise it would have stated “Unavailable.”  The   dates for filing could potentially advance and become current based on this available visa with a  January 1, 2009 priority date in the India EB-3, thus allowing hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries of I-140 petitions to file I-485 applications.

This same logic can be extended to beneficiaries of family-based I-130 petitions.

The administration simply needs to move the dates for filing to current or close to current. It can undertake this executive action through a stroke of a pen. However, if it needs to do this through rulemaking 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) could be easily amended (shown in bold) to expand the definition of visa availability:

An alien is ineligible for the benefits of section 245 of the Act unless an immigrant visa is immediately available to him or her at the time the application is filed. If the applicant is a preference alien, the current Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Bulletin will be consulted to determine whether an immigrant visa is immediately available. An immigrant visa is considered available for accepting and processing the application Form I-485 [if] the preference category applicant has a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in the Bulletin (or the Bulletin shows that numbers for visa applicants in his or her category are current) (“Final Action Date”). An immigrant visa is also considered available for submission of the I-485 application based on a provisional priority date (“‘Dates for Filing”) without reference to the Final Action Date. No provisional submission can be undertaken absent prior approval of the visa petition and only if all visas in the preference category have not been exhausted in the fiscal year. Final adjudication only occurs when there is a current Final Action Date. An immigrant visa is also considered immediately available if the applicant establishes eligibility for the benefits of Public Law 101-238. Information concerning the immediate availability of an immigrant visa may be obtained at any Service office.

 

The Biden administration has provided relief to hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals through executive actions such as humanitarian parole, now enforcing deportation against low priority individuals and extending DACA. The administration recently announced a Family Reunification Parole Initiative for beneficiaries of approved I-130 petitions who are nationals of Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, & Honduras. Nationals of these countries can be considered for parole on a case-by-case basis for a period of up to three years while they wait to apply to become lawful permanent residents. This is an example of the administration using its executive authority to shape immigration policy in the absence of meaningful Congressional action to reform the system. Indeed, this initiative can serve as a template to allow beneficiaries of approved I-130, I-140, and I-526 petitions to be paroled into the US while they wait for a visa number to become available, which under the backlogs in the employment and family preference categories, can take several years to decades. The Biden administration ought to likewise advance the DFF to current so that beneficiaries of family and employment petitions can file I-485 applications and get the benefits of employment authorization, advance parole and the ability to port to a new employer if the job is same or similar to the position that was the subject of the sponsorship for the green card. There  is also a parallel campaign to convince the administration to issue an EAD and advance parole for beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions, although this should be done in conjunction with advancing the dates for filing so that applicants can also file I-485 applications. Once the I-485 is filed applicants would also be able to port to same or similar jobs under INA §204(j) and keep intact the underlying labor certification and I-140 petition.  As we have shown in a related blog on the compelling circumstances EAD, if the EAD is not linked to an I-485 application and they do not have nonimmigrant status, holders of this EAD will have to leave the US to consular process for their immigrant visas and would also need another employer to sponsor them if they have left or cut ties with the original employer who sponsored them.  This would entail getting the new employer to start the whole labor certification process, which is perilous these days if the employer as laid off workers.

The Supreme Court in United States v.  Texas very recently rendered a blow to Texas and Louisiana in holding that they had no standing to challenge the Biden administration on federal immigration policy on enforcement priorities. As this analysis can also apply to challenges to other executive actions on immigration by states not friendly to pro immigrant executive actions, the Biden administration should move boldly and advance the DFF in the State Department Visa bulletin to restore balance and some semblance of sanity to the legal immigration system in the US.

National Interest Waiver Changes for STEM Graduates and Entrepreneurs, Along with Premium Processing, Will Benefit H-4 Spouses Seeking Work Authorization

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Jessica Paszko*

Earlier this year, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced that as of January 30, 2023, it would accept premium processing requests for all previously filed and newly filed petitions for National Interest Waivers (NIW) under the Employment-Based Second Preference (EB-2) category. For an additional filing fee of $2,500, USCIS will adjudicate these petitions within 45 days. This premium processing development coupled with last year’s update to the USCIS Policy Manual, which clarified how the National Interest Waiver can be used by science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) graduates and entrepreneurs, makes the National Interest Waiver more appealing than ever. We last covered the National Interest Waiver five years ago after the Administrative Appeals Office of the USCIS issued its precedent decision, Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884 (AAO 2016) which articulated a new National Interest Waiver standard.

As background, the National Interest Waiver is an immigrant petition for lawful permanent residence under the EB-2 category. In the ordinary course, a valid, permanent offer of employment in the U.S. and a labor certification application certified by the Department of Labor (DOL) are mandatory prerequisites to the filing of such an employment-based immigrant petition. However, the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT90) provided that the labor certification requirement in the employment-based second category may be waived and foreign nationals may qualify for the NIW in the sciences, arts, professions or business if they are: (1) members of the professions holding advanced degrees; or (2) foreign nationals of “exceptional ability” who will “substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural or educational interest, or welfare” of the United States, i.e. where the foreign national’s employment is deemed to be in the “national interest.”

In the updated Policy Manual, under the Specific Evidentiary Considerations for Persons with Advanced Degrees in STEM Fields heading, USCIS states, at the outset, that it was particularly interested in persons with advanced STEM degrees fostering progress in three areas, namely (1) “focused critical and emerging technologies”, (2) “other STEM areas important to U.S. competitiveness”, and (3) “national security.”

Critical and emerging technologies “are those are critical to U.S. national security, including military defense and the economy”. To identify a critical and emerging technology field, USCIS prompts officers to consider governmental, academic, and other authoritative and instructive sources, and all other evidence submitted by the petitioner. Officers may find that a STEM area is important to competitiveness or security in endeavors that will help the U.S. remain ahead of strategic competitors or adversaries or relates to a field that may contribute to the U.S. achieving or maintain technology leadership or peer statues among allies and partners. Moreover, the lists of critical and emerging technology subfields published by the Executive Office of the President, by either the National Science and Technology Council or the National Security Council, are listed as examples of authoritative lists which officers may consider. The Critical and Emerging Technologies List Update, issued in February 2022, defines critical and emerging technologies as “a subset of advanced technologies that are significant to U.S. national security.” It then goes on to list the critical and emerging technology areas that “are of particular importance to the national security of the United States” as well as a set of key subfields for each identified critical and emerging technology. We encourage readers to view the full list, but note the following subfields: supercomputing, edge computing, cloud computing, data storage, computing architectures, data processing and analysis techniques, distributed ledger technologies, digital assets, digital payment technologies, and digital identity infrastructure.

An indicator of STEM areas important to U.S. competitiveness is inclusion as a priority in the annual research and development priorities memo about the President’s budget issued jointly by the White House Director of the Office of Science Technology Policy and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. For example, the Memorandum on Research and Development Priorities (PDF) (August 2021) for President Biden’s FY2022 budget, where reference is again made to “critical and emerging technologies” including artificial intelligence, quantum information science, advanced communications technologies, microelectronics, high-performance computing, biotechnology, robotics, and space technologies.

U.S. national security objectives, which includes “protect the security of the American people; expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and realize and defend democratic values”, are outlined in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (PDF). The Policy Manual instructs that for purposes of National Interest Waiver policy and adjudications, “national security” refers to these three objectives.

Matter of Dhanasar provides that after eligibility for EB-2 classification has been established, USCIS may grant a NIW if the petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:

  • The foreign national’s proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance.
  • The foreign national is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor.
  • On balance, it would be beneficial to the United States to waive the requirements of a job offer and thus of a labor certification.

The Policy Manual reiterates that with respect to the first prong as set forth in Matter of Dhanasar, supra, as in all cases, the evidence must demonstrate that a STEM endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance. It notes that many proposed endeavors that aim to advance STEM technologies and research, whether in academic or industry settings, not only have substantial merit in relation to U.S. science and technology interests, but also have sufficiently broad potential implications to demonstrate national importance. At the same time though, the Policy Manual makes clear that “classroom teaching activities in STEM” are not, on their own, indicative of an impact in the field of STEM education more broadly, and therefore generally would not establish their national importance.

For the second prong, the person’s education and skillset are relevant to whether the person is well positioned to advance the endeavor. Here, the USCIS officer’s analysis involves assessing whether the person has an advanced degree, such as a Ph.D. which USCIS considers an especially positive factor. But the advanced degree must also be in a STEM field tied to the proposed endeavor and related to work furthering a critical and emerging technology or other STEM area important to U.S competitiveness or national security. Additionally, taking into account that doctoral dissertations and some master’s theses concentrate on a particularized subject matter, the person’s “scientific knowledge in a narrow STEM area” must also be considered in order to determine whether that specific STEM area relates to the proposed endeavor. Finally, the Policy Manual cautions that a degree in and of itself, is not a basis to determine that a person is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor, and urges petitioners to submit supplemental evidence, including letters from interested government agencies. Evidence that may demonstrate that the person is well-positioned to advance a proposed endeavor includes, but is not limited to:

  • Degrees, certificates, or licenses in the field;
  • Patents, trademarks, or copyrights developed by the person;
  • Letters from experts in the person’s field, describing the person’s past achievements and providing specific examples of how the person is well positioned to advance the person’s endeavor;
  • Published articles or media reports about the person’s achievements or current work;
  • Documentation demonstrating a strong citation history of the person’s work or excerpts of published articles showing positive discourse around, or adoption of, the person’s work;
  • Evidence that the person’s work has influenced the field of endeavor;
  • A plan describing how the person intends to continue the proposed work in the United States;
  • A detailed business plan or other description, along with any relevant supporting evidence, when appropriate;
  • Correspondence from prospective or potential employers, clients, or customers;
  • Documentation reflecting feasible plans for financial support (see below for a more detailed discussion of evidence related to financing for entrepreneurs);
  • Evidence that the person has received investment from U.S. investors, such as venture capital firms, angel investors, or start-up accelerators, and that the amounts are appropriate to the relevant endeavor;
  • Copies of contracts, agreements, or licenses showing the potential impact of the proposed endeavor;
  • Letters from government agencies or quasi-governmental entities in the United States demonstrating that the person is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor (see below for a more detailed discussion of supporting evidence from interested government agencies and quasi-governmental entities);
  • Evidence that the person has received awards or grants or other indications of relevant non-monetary support (for example, using facilities free of charge) from federal, state, or local government entities with expertise in economic development, research and development, or job creation; and
  • Evidence demonstrating how the person’s work is being used by others, such as, but not limited to:
    • Contracts with companies using products that the person developed or assisted in developing;
    • Documents showing technology that the person invented, or contributed to inventing, and how others use that technology; and
    • Patents or licenses for innovations the person developed with documentation showing why the patent or license is significant to the field.

 

Lastly, with respect to the third prong, the Policy Manual reminds us that it is the petitioner’s burden to establish that factors in favor of granting the waiver outweigh those that support the requirement of a job offer and thus a labor certification. In its evaluation of the third prong and whether the U.S. may benefit from the person’s entry, USCIS considers the following combinations of facts contained in the record to be a strong positive factor:

  • The person possesses an advanced STEM degree, particularly a Ph.D.;
  • The person will be engaged in work furthering a critical and emerging technology or other STEM area important to U.S. competitiveness; and
  • The person is well positioned to advance the proposed STEM endeavor of national importance.

USCIS considers the benefit to be “especially weighty” where the endeavor has the potential to support U.S. national security or enhance U.S. economic competitiveness, or when the petition is supported by letters from interested U.S. government agencies.

The expanded guidance will also benefit noncitizen entrepreneurs under the Matter of Dhanasar standard. They may submit evidence of ownership and a role in the U.S. entity; degrees, certifications, licenses and letters of experience; investments from outside investors; participation in an incubator or accelerator; awards or grants; intellectual property such as patents; published material on the petitioner and U.S. based entity; prospects of revenue generation and job creation; and letters and statements from credible third parties.

In comparison, eligibility under the Employment-Based First-Preference category (EB-1A) can be established through evidence of a one-time, major international award or fulfillment of at least three out of ten criteria. But even after the applicant has demonstrated evidence of at least three criteria, USCIS conducts a final merits determination where it considers the submitted evidence holistically and determines whether the applicant has sustained national or international acclaim and is among the small percentage of individuals who have risen to the top of their field of endeavor. Clearly, to qualify for a National Interest Waiver, one need not satisfy any set regulatory criteria or rise to the EB-1A level of acclaim or level of expertise, which can be quite difficult to establish.  Like the EB-1A, individuals may self-petition for the National Interest Waiver under EB-2 and need not be beholden to an employer.

The NIW on its face will have little utility for India or China born beneficiaries of I-140 petitions in the EB-2. The EB-2 for both these countries is retrogressed, and more so with India which according to the February 2023 State Department Visa Bulletin, the Final Action Date is October 8, 2011. Still, even if an Indian born EB-2 beneficiary obtains the NIW they will not be bound to any employer to file a new labor certification,  and can remain in H-1B status from employer to employer until their Final Action Date becomes current.  Another advantage of the NIW under EB-2 is that dependent spouses in H-4 status can receive work authorization once the I-140 on behalf of a principal beneficiary is approved and the dates for the country remain retrogressed. Currently the EB-2 is retrogressed worldwide at November 1, 2022. Therefore, in addition to H-4 spouses of India born beneficiaries of I-140 petitions, all H-4 spouses would be entitled to work authorization once the I-140 under the NIW is approved. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(9)(iv).   Given that there is now premium processing, the speed with which an H-4 spouse can obtain an EAD through the NIW than through the traditional employer sponsored labor certification process is significant.

Although the USCIS has broadened the evidentiary criteria for NIW petitions, it is still important to demonstrate that the national interest of the US will be advanced under the standards set forth in Matter of Dhanasar.  As the EB-1 has become muddied with the need to satisfy the final merits determination, the NIW may be easier to win under the expanded guidance for individuals in STEM and entrepreneurs and may be worth considering if one is born in a country other than India. However, even for those born in India, the NIW may have a significant benefit as it would allow the H-4 spouse to get employment authorization more rapidly.

(This blog is for informational purposes, and should not be relied up as a substitute for legal advice)

*Jessica Paszko is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta &  Partners PLLC. She graduated with a J.D. degree from Brooklyn Law School in 2021.

 

 

 

 

 

A Tale of Two Cases – Washtech v. DHS and Texas v. USA: To What Extent can the Executive Branch Allow Noncitizens to Remain and Work in the US

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

To what extent can the Executive Branch allow noncitizens to remain and work in the US when there is no explicit provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) covering these categories of noncitizens? Two courts of appeals have ruled differently in recent decisions. One court found authority while the other court did not. The D.C. Circuit addressed the question of F-1 students and whether they could remain in the U.S. after graduation for practical training. Citing DHS’ authority under INA § 214(a)(1) and the long history of post-graduation practical training, the court upheld OPT. The Fifth Circuit confronted a different issue – that of young people who came to the U.S. and whether they could remain in the country through deferred action. Finding that DACA exceeds DHS’ inherent authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, the court struck down the program, though deferred action is a well-established practice like OPT.

On October 4, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion in Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“Washtech v. DHS”). The case involved a challenge to the STEM Optional Practical Training (OPT) rules by the Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (Washtech), a union representing tech workers. DHS allows eligible students in STEM fields an additional 24 month OPT extension beyond the usual 12 month OPT period. Washtech argued that “the statutory definition of the F-1 visa class precludes the Secretary from exercising the time-and conditions authority to allow F-1 students to remain for school recommended practical training after they complete their coursework”. Washtech read INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i) as authorizing DHS to allow F-1 students to remain in the U.S. only until they have completed their course of study, as the provision does not specifically mention post-graduation practical training. The court affirmed a district court judgment that upheld DHS’ current OPT rules. The court reasoned that the STEM OPT extension is a valid exercise of DHS’ authority under in INA § 214(a)(1) to promulgate regulations that authorize an F-1 student’s stay in the U.S. beyond graduation. The court further noted that “practical training not only enhances the educational worth of a degree program, but often is essential to students’ ability to correctly use what they have learned when they return to their home countries. That is especially so in STEM fields, where hands-on work is critical for understanding fast-moving technological and scientific developments.” Judge Pillard, who authored the opinion, noted that the concept of post-coursework practical training for foreign students predates the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, pointing to a 1947 rule which “allowed foreign students ‘admitted temporarily to the United States . . . for the purpose of pursuing a definite course of study’ to remain here for up to eighteen months following completion of coursework for ‘employment for practical training’ as required or recommended by their school”. Under Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978), Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts its statutes without change. Practical training has been authorized even prior to the enactment of the INA in 1952.  In previous blogs, we have discussed Congressional authority for OPT at length, see here, here, here, and here.

In Texas v. U.S., decided on October 5, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program is unlawful, upholding an earlier decision by Judge Andrew Hanen of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Although the practice of deferred action, of which the DACA program is a form, has also existed for decades, the Fifth Circuit’s decision was much less favorable than that of the D.C. Circuit. The court reasoned that the DACA program exceeds DHS’ inherent authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, as “declining to prosecute does not transform presence deemed unlawful by Congress into lawful presence and confer eligibility for otherwise unavailable benefits based on that change”. Further, the court found that there is no “clear congressional authorization” for DACA. In light of a recent regulation promulgated by the Biden administration to “preserve and fortify” DACA, the case was remanded to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Although DACA lives for now, it remains on the respirator as both the district court and the Fifth Circuit have consistently held that DACA is not authorized by the INA, and notwithstanding the new regulation, may still be held to be unlawful.

Though the courts in these cases arrived at few different outcomes, the two decisions share at least one commonality – both made reference to the “major question” doctrine recently introduced in West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). There the Supreme Court held that “in certain extraordinary cases” where it is unclear whether an agency action was authorized by Congress, “given both separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent, the agency must point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ for the authority it claims”.  Such extraordinary cases where the “major questions” doctrine is invoked have vast economic and political significance.  Interestingly, the dissent in Washtech indicated that the issue of whether DHS’ 2016 OPT Rule exceeds its statutory authority is a “major question”. Finding that the major questions doctrine applied, the dissent in Washtech directed the district court upon remand to examine whether DHS had the authority to issue OPT regulations under this principle.

In footnote 206, the court in Texas v. USA cited West Virginia v. EPA in holding that DHS had no Congressional authority to implement DACA. The court also held that DACA did not pass the first step of the Chevron test, which asks “whether Congress has ‘directly addressed the precise question at issue.’” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The court in Washtech analyzed the OPT rule under the lens of Chevron also, but gave DHS’ interpretation of INA § 214(a)(1) deference.

If the major questions doctrine is implemented in this way, it could result in fewer agency actions receiving Chevron deference. Chevron gives the Biden administration the ability to interpret the INA by implementing OPT and DACA programs, so it is hoped that the major questions doctrine does not impede the application of this longstanding precedent. Moreover, immigration decisions unlike environmental cases ought not to be cases involving vast economic and political significance.  The majority decision in Washtech involved challenges to the INA provisions that provide the authority for noncitizens to remain in the U.S. The court gave due deference under Chevron to the executive’s interpretation of INA § 214(a)(1) and upheld OPT. The majority did not reference the “major questions” doctrine in Virginia v. EPA.  The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, held that  DHS cannot rely on INA § 103(a)(3) as a basis for implementing DACA, and cited Virginia v. EPA. This provision states that the DHS Secretary “shall establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of the Act.” This provision is comparable to INA § 214(a)(1), which the First Circuit held provided the basis for F-1 OPT. INA § 214(a)(1) provides that “[t]he admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations prescribe…….”

Although the Washtech case dealt with students, the D.C. Circuit’s decision can serve as a template for the Supreme Court to uphold the authority for other categories of noncitizens to remain in the U.S., including DACA recipients. The same deference that the D.C. Circuit afforded to the executive’s authorization of OPT ought to also be given to the government’s interpretation of INA § 103(a)(3) and 6 USC § 202(5) so that the DACA program is upheld.

Another interesting issue discussed in both cases is whether the Executive Branch can issue work authorization to noncitizens. The court in Washtech upheld the authority of the executive to grant employment authorization documents (EADs) under INA § 274(a)(h)(3), which has long provided authority for the Executive Branch to provide employment authorization to broad categories of noncitizens. The executive’s authority to grant EADs under this provision had been soundly rejected by the Fifth Circuit in the earlier DAPA decision and Judge Hanen’s lower court decision in Texas v. U.S. In footnote 37, Hanen’s decision makes reference to INA §274a(h)(3) as a definitional miscellaneous provision, which cannot provide the basis for DACA and the grant of EADs, while the First Circuit relied on the same provision as a statutory basis for OPT EAD.

Charles Dickens opened his A Tale of Two Cities with the following famous line: “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.” Like London and Paris in Dickens’ novel, Washtech and Texas are comparable in some respects and very different in others. Though Texas may represent the worst of times and the age of foolishness, Washtech ushers in an age of wisdom and the best of times for foreign students hoping to gain practical training in the U.S.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

The Legal Basis Underpinning the New Automatic Extension of Work Authorization for H-4, L-2 and E-2 Spouses, and Why It Must Still Be Challenged

Cyrus D. Mehta

The USCIS has been processing employment authorization requests for H-4 and L-2  spouses so slowly that they have been rendered virtually useless. By the time the applicant receives the employment authorization document (EAD) after 10 months, the job offer no longer exists. The experience is even more harrowing when the spouse begins working under the first EAD and has to apply for a renewal. By the time the renewal EAD comes through, the spouse would have been forced to stop working after the prior EAD expired and often loses her job. Most H-4  spouses who have availed of the EAD are mainly women and  spouses of Indian born H-1B visa holders who are caught in the crushing India employment-based backlogs under the second and third preferences.

Following a recent settlement in Shergill v. Mayorkas,  USCIS announced on November 12, 2021, that certain H-4, E, or L dependent spouses will qualify for an automatic extension provided under 8 CFR § 274a.13(d) if certain conditions are met.

The new policy provides that certain H-4, E or L dependent spouses qualify for automatic extension of their existing employment authorization and accompanying EAD if they properly file application to renew their H-4, E or L-based EAD expires, and they have an unexpired I-94 showing their status as an H-4, E or L nonimmigrant. The policy further provides that E and L dependent spouses are employment authorized incident to their status and therefore they are no longer required to file Form I-765 for an EAD but may still do so if they choose to request an EAD. Still, the E and L dependent spouse may only qualify for an automatic extension if they have an unexpired valid E-2 or L-2 status.

Accordingly, a document combination to include an unexpired Form I-94, Form I-797C (Notice of Action) showing a timely filed employment authorization document (EAD) renewal application, and facially expired EAD may be acceptable to evidence unexpired work authorization for employment eligibility verification (Form I-9) purposes.

Although this new policy is a positive step, as a practical matter, many H-4 spouses may not be able to avail of the automatic extension if they are unable to demonstrate an H-4 status beyond the expiration of their existing EAD. Most H-4 statuses and EAD end on the same date.

Even if an H-1B extension is filed on behalf of the principal spouse under premium processing six months before the existing H-1B status expires, the USCIS no longer processes the extension of the H-4 status in an expeditious manner. Thus, even if the H-1B status is renewed under premium processing within 15 days for an additional 3 years,  the H-4 status continues to remain pending and may or may not get approved before the expiration of the current H-4 status. If the H-4 status is not renewed prior to the expiration of the current H-4 status, the spouse will not be able to avail of the auto extension under the new policy.

It would thus behoove the USCIS to courtesy premium  process the H-4 status extension request along with the H-1B premium request. This used to be done prior to the imposition by the Trump administration of a mandatory biometrics appointment for an extension request filed by the spouse.  As a result of the new biometric requirement, the H-4 spouse’s extension request was  no longer processed along with the H-1B premium request.  Although the biometric requirement has been eliminated for H-4 spouse extension requests, the USCIS continues to process these cases at a snail’s pace. It is difficult to understand why the USCIS is unable to process the H-4 request along with the H-1B premium request at the same time as was done before the imposition of the biometric requirement.

Another way to get around the limitation of having H-4 status beyond the EAD is for the H-4 spouse to travel overseas and return with an I-94 that would have the same validity as the principal spouse’s H-1B status. However, if the H-4  spouse needs to obtain a new visa stamp, it is difficult to obtain consular appointments timely as a result of Covid-19.

Another work around would be for the H-4 spouse to go to Canada for less than 30 days and be readmitted under  automatic visa revalidation provided for trips to Canada or Mexico that are less than 30 days. The difficulty with this strategy, though, is that the CBP often admits the H-4 spouse under the same period of the existing status instead of admitting the spouse for an extended period that  would be coterminous with the H-1B spouse’s new status.

L-2 and E-2 spouses are in a better situation that H-4 spouses. INA 214(c)(2)(E) provides  statutory authority for dependent spouses of L nonimmigrants to be granted work authorization. INA 214(c)(2) provides similar work authorization for dependent spouses. Notwithstanding this statutory authorization that took effect on January 16, 2002 providing for work authorization incident to status,  USCIS was still insisting that L-2 and EAD spouses obtain an EAD through a policy memo authored by William Yates dated February 22, 2002, “Guidance on Employment Authorization for E and L Nonimmigrant Spouses, and for Determinations on the Requisite Employment Authorization for E and L Nonimmigrant Souses, and for Determinations on the Requisite Employment Abroad for L Blanket Petitions.” (Yates Memo).  The November 12, 2021 guidance has now rescinded the Yates Memo.

As a result of being recognized to be work authorized incident to status, L-2 and E-2 spouses will be able to work when their L-2 or E-2 status is extended. CBP will notate the I-94 to distinguish the L-2 or E-2 spouse from E and L children. Unlike the H-4 spouse who will need to apply for an EAD based on status that already extends beyond the EAD extension request, the L-2 spouse will be able to work as soon as the E-2 or L-2 status is granted. Similarly, the spouse who is admitted after travelling to the US in L-2 or E-2 spouse will also be issued an I-94 with a similar notation from the CBP and be work authorized after admission in that status. However, like with the H-4 spouse, when the L-2 spouse applies for an extension of that status, there will be no basis for an automatic extension of  work authorization until the L-2 status is approved.

On November 18, 2016, DHS promulgated the automatic extension of EAD regulation at 8 CFR 274a.13(d), which took effect on January 17, 2017. 8 CFR 274a.13(d) provides the legal underpinning for November 12, 2021 policy.  An applicant is eligible for automatic extension if the EAD renewal is timely filed and based on the same employment authorization category as shown on the face of the expiring EAD. See 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1)(i) and (ii). Under 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1)(iii) automatic extension may also apply where the EAD renewal application is “[b]ased on a class of aliens whose eligibility to apply for employment authorization continues notwithstanding expiration of the Employment Authorization Document and is based on an employment authorization category that does not require adjudication of an underlying application or petition before  adjudication of the renewal application, …. As may be announced on the USICS Web site.”

The page on the USCIS Website listed 15 categories for automatic extension of their employment authorization or EAD. However, the November 12, 2021 USCIS Policy Memo acknowledges that E and L as well as H-4 spouses were missing from this list, as follows:

These broad categories were not included because at the time the automatic extension authority was established in 2016, USCIS determined that these applicants are in a category that first requires adjudication of an underlying application before their EAD renewal application can be adjudicated.[citation omitted]. While that is a permissible interpretation of the regulation, upon further review and consideration, USCIS recognizes that this interpretation does not contemplate the situation where the E, L, and H4 dependent spouse has already been granted a new period of authorized stay and such individual is eligible for employment authorization past the expiration of his or her EAD while the renewal Form I-765 application is pending. Under this scenario, the possible risk the provision at 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1)(iii) sought to avoid—the risk that a Form I-765 renewal applicant’s eligibility for employment authorization will lapse during the automatic extension period—is not present. As such, it is reasonable for USCIS to expand the list of categories eligible to receive automatic EAD extensions to include this narrowly defined category of E, L, and H-4 dependent spouses to mitigate the risk of experiencing gaps in employment authorization and documentation while their renewal Form I-765 is pending, in light of their continued employment eligibility past the expiration date of their EAD.

The USCIS believes that this change in interpretation is permissible under 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1)(iii) that speaks broadly of “class” and “category.” As these terms are undefined and thus ambiguous, under the broad deference courts have granted to a government agency to interpret its own ambiguous regulation, see Auer v. Robbins, 519 US 452 (1997) as modified by Kisor v. Wilke, 588 US ___ (2019), USCIS believes it has the discretion to interpret these terms and tailor designated categories to emerging circumstances and to fulfill the primary purpose of the EAD auto-extension.

While one agrees that USCIS does have discretion to reinterpret 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1(iii) to include auto extensions for H-4, L-2 and E-2 spouses, this is not the most satisfactory outcome and should be challenging the USCIS to do more.

For starters, if the USCIS processes extension requests of H-4, L-2 and E-2 statuses more rapidly, this problem will be resolved. It should not be taking upwards of 6 months to process such status extension requests when the biometric requirement has been done away with. The Edakunni v. Mayorkas lawsuit seeks to force USCIS to speed up processing times.   USCIS can include courtesy premium processing of H-4, L-2 and E-2 status request  applications that  are part of a request for premium processing of the principal spouse’s H-1B, L-1 or E petition. Also do not forget that Congress in HR 8837 has authorized premium processing of many more petitions and applications, including applications to change or extend status as well as applications for employment authorization.

More important, the USCIS need not be cabined by the restrictive language in 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1)(iii) which provides for automatic extension where the EAD renewal application is “[b]ased on a class of aliens whose eligibility to apply for employment authorization continues notwithstanding expiration of the Employment Authorization Document and is based on an employment authorization category that does not require adjudication of an underlying application or petition before  adjudication of the renewal application.” While the USCIS has threaded the difficult needle in its November 12, 2021 policy by justifying that 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1)(iii) is nevertheless applicable if there is already an underlying status, the USCIS has authority under the INA to craft a whole new regulation that does not depend on automatic extension only if there is an underlying L-2, H-4 or E-2 status.

Furthermore, 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1)(iii) can potentially be challenged as being inconsistent with INA 214(c)(2)(E) and INA 214(e)(2) that provide work authorization incident to status to L-2 and E-2 spouses. Nowhere does it  state in these INA provisions that a spouse who has been admitted in L-2 or E-2 status  must remain in status in order to avail of an automatic extension of work authorization when applying for an extension of that status. Although there is not direct INA reference for H-4 authorization incident to status, the H-4 EAD rule is based on the general authority given to the DHS under INA 103(1) and 274A(h)(3)  that allows it to grant work authorization to any noncitizen. Even under these general provisions there is no requirement that there must be an underlying nonimmigrant status in order to avail of automatic work authorization extension. Even if INA 214(c)(2)(E) and INA 214(e)(2) can be read to mean that a spouse is precluded from availing of an auto extension once the status has expired, 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1)(iii) might still be inconsistent with the general authority to provide work authorization under INA 274A(h)(3).

Under its authority under INA 274A(h)(3),  DHS may wish to promulgate a regulation similar to 8 CFR 274a.12(b)(20) that provides for an automatic extension of work authorization for 240 days when a petition to extend nonimmigrant status has been timely filed on behalf of a nonimmigrant through the same employer prior to the status expiring. The 240 day automatic extension will be denied if the petition requesting the extension is denied prior to the 240 days.  The spouse should also be able to avail of a similar period of 240 days of automatic work authorization even if the underlying H-4, L-2 or E-2 status has expired so long as the request was made before the status had expired.  If the underlying request for extension of status is denied prior to the 240 days, the automatic work authorization will be denied.

While the new H-4, L-2 and E-2 work authorization policy of November 12, 2021 is a step in the right direction, it should  not become the permanent policy of the USCIS as it is far from perfect. As long as the USCIS delays in the processing of routine requests for extension of status and work authorization continue to persist, the regulations need to be changed in order to allow spouses to continue working regardless of whether there is an underlying nonimmigrant status or not.

 

Coping with Delays Facing H-4 and L-2 Spouses When They Have a Pending Adjustment Application – Part 2

By Cyrus Mehta and Isabel Rajabzadeh*

Although H-4 and L-2 extensions continue to be delayed since our  last blog  “Coping with Delays Facing H-4 and L-2 Spouses”,  we highlight another issue,  which adds further hardship for H-4 and L-2 spouses faced with unjust processing delays. In October 2020, the EB-3 Dates for Filing in the Visa Bulletin advanced significantly, which allowed many born in India to file Form I-485, Adjustment of Status (AOS) applications. The surge in AOS cases, coupled with the H-4/L-2 processing delays, have left many with the inability to travel abroad as they await both their H-4/L-2 extension and Advance Parole (AP) processing. This blog tackles the threat to abandonment of AOS when traveling internationally while AP and H-4/L-2 are processing. We also discuss the complex interplay with employment authorization for H-4/L-2 spouses who have pending AOS applications.

Preserving H-4 and L-2 Status When an AOS is Pending

Since the H-1B and L visas allow for dual intent, it is possible to maintain H or L nonimmigrant status while an AOS application for permanent residence has been filed.

Due to the delays in the processing of H-4/L-2 extensions and requests for EAD, travelling abroad poses a conundrum. In order to preserve the AOS that is still processing, one needs to have either AP or valid H-4/L-2 status before leaving. Accordingly, 8 CFR 245.2(a)(4)(ii)(B)-(C) outlines two distinct pathways. Under (B), it allows those with approved AP to leave the country and then subsequently return in AP without abandoning their AOS, absent any specific situations outlined in the regulation. Under (C), the same is true for those who leave in H-4/L-2 status and return in H-4/L-2.

In 2000, the Cronin Memo was published and clarified that although an H-1B or L is considered  to be paroled after entering the United States via AP, he/she is still able to apply for an extension of H-1B or L if there was a valid and approved petition. Upon the granting of the H-1B or L extension, the grant of parole would be terminated, and the H-1B applicant would then be admitted into the relevant H-1B status. Although the Cronin Memo contemplates one who is already in H-1B and L status before traveling abroad and being paroled via AP, it could also apply to one who has a pending extension of  H-1B or L-1 status application and who traveled abroad under AP and was paroled into the US. Likewise, upon the approval of the H-1B or L-1 request, the parole would be terminated, and the beneficiary would be admitted in H-1B or L status. This allows the H-1B beneficiary to travel abroad while simultaneously preserving the AOS when both the H-1B and AOS are pending.

There is an inherent vagueness as to whether the Cronin memo applies to derivatives since H-4s and L-2s are not mentioned in the memo in respect to this issue. One may however argue, through anecdotal experience, that the Cronin Memo should apply to H-4s and L-2s and therefore, the H-4/L-2 should be able to enter the United States in AP and be able to switch to H-4/L-2 status once the H-4/L-2 extension is approved.

Preserving Adjustment of Status When Advanced Parole and H-4 are Pending 

What happens when an H-4 has a pending AOS and has not received AP or H-4 approval but wants to travel based on an emergency? This issue is two-fold and is specifically applicable to those whose prior H-4/L-2 statuses have expired and have timely filed their extensions but still await processing. As mentioned before in our prior blog, although the H-4 can get a visa stamp at a US consulate, the AOS may be deemed abandoned if the H-4 left the US without H-4 status or AP.

In this scenario, the only recourse for the H-4 is to apply for an emergency AP by calling the USCIS 800 number to schedule an appointment with the local USCIS office, however, it is not definite that one will be able to connect to a live-person, let alone convince the USCIS that the emergency qualifies for expeditious AP processing.

Does an L-2 Spouse Need an EAD?  

Out of the many downfalls of the H-4/L-2 processing delays, one of the most significant is the Employment Authorization Document (EAD) processing gaps afflicting families around the nation. At large, this issue has subjected many spouses and their families to financial struggle, and it remains a leading issue that the USCIS and the Biden administration must immediately resolve. The hardship is compounded by the fact that there are delays in the processing of the EAD under both the AOS and the H-4/L-2.  Nonetheless, there may be an arguable legal basis for an L-2 spouse to engage in employment without obtaining an EAD.

In the Matter of Do Kyung Lee, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that employment authorization is incident to E-2 status. INA 214(e)(6) explicitly states that an E-2 spouse shall be authorized to engage in employment.  In this unpublished  decision, the BIA reasoned that the regulation at 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(2) only specified that the dependent spouse and child of an E-1 visa holder must apply for work authorization, but the same regulation did not specifically state that the spouse of an E-2 must do the same. The Court held that since INA 214(e)(6) specifically authorized the E-2 spouse to engage in employment, the E-2 spouse’s failure to apply for an EAD did not result in a violation of status. Based on the reasoning of this BIA decision, the same logic can be applied to L-2 spouses since INA 214(c)(2)(E) explicitly authorizes L-2 spouses to engage in employment. The regulations at 8 CFR 274a.12 do not have a specific category for L-2 spouses, and USCIS requires L-2 spouses to use the catchall reserved provision under 8 CFR 274a.12(a)(18).

Nevertheless, this is still a gray area and E-2 and L-2 spouses are therefore still recommended to apply for an EAD. Even if the reasoning of this unpublished BIA decision is accepted by the USCIS, a lack of EAD could potentially trigger I-9 noncompliance issues with respect to the employer as ICE may not recognize the holding of an unpublished BIA decision.

The reasoning of this BIA decision is not appliable to H-4 spouses as there is no explicit INA provision that specifically authorizes H-4 spouses to engage in employment. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Obama administration specifically created a regulation which authorizes EAD for an H-4 under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(26), based on implied authority in the INA to issue work authorization to any class of noncitizens. The Trump administration tried to unsuccessfully rescind the rule as it was hostile towards H-4 EADs, but could not get it past the Office of Management and Budget. The Trump administration then imposed the biometric requirement for every I-539 extension, which in turn delayed the grant of the H-4 EAD. The pandemic that followed in March 2020 caused further delays and backlogs.

Conclusion

We reiterate our request that the Biden administration remove the biometric requirement imposed by the prior Trump administration when an I-539 application is filed. The justification by the Trump administration, as revealed in a recent WSJ article, that the biometric requirement was necessary so that dependents did not misrepresent themselves is spurious. Until 2019, there was never a biometric requirement when dependents filed I-539s, and there were no widespread incidents of such misrepresentations. Many of these dependents were already vetted when they obtained H-4 and L-2 visa stamps at US consulates. Moreover, subjecting infants and toddlers seeking H-4 and L-2 extensions to this is downright cruel. Eliminating this unnecessary biometric requirement will go a long way in eliminating the delays facing H-2 and L-2 spouses as they can then be processed under the premium processing request filed through the principal spouse’s H-1B or L-1 petition. The DHS should also initiate premium processing for EAD requests since Congress authorized additional premium processing last year. Finally, since INA 214(c)(2)(E) explicitly authorizes an L-2 spouse to engage in employment, what is the need to require the L-2 spouse to go through the lengthy process of applying for an EAD? Under the logic of the BIA decision in Do Kyung Lee, an E-2 or L-2 spouse who engages in employment without an EAD will not be viewed as engaging in unauthorized employment. Therefore, even if the Biden administration cannot speed up EAD processing quickly, it can officially pronounce that L-2 and E-2 spouses need not obtain an EAD.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

* Isabel Rajabzadeh is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC and is admitted to practice law in New York.

 

Not Sure Whether to Laugh or Cry: How the Border Patrol’s Harassment of an Oregon Comedian Shows Why It Should Not Be Checking Documents Within the United States

In late January, Oregon comedian Mohanad Elshieky was briefly detained by the Border Patrol while traveling on a Greyhound bus in Spokane, Washington.  He recounted the incident on Twitter, and it was also reported by a number of news organizations.  In summary, the agents boarded the bus at the Spokane Intermodal Bus Station and began questioning passengers about their citizenship.  When Mr. Elshieky admitted to the Border Patrol agents that he was not a U.S. citizen but informed the agents that he had been granted asylum in the United States, the agents rejected the Employment Authorization Document (EAD) and driver’s license that he offered them, and asserted that he was “illegal”.  After questioning Mr. Elshieky for roughly 20 minutes outside the bus in freezing weather, and checking by phone with supervisors, the agents finally allowed Mr. Elshieky to reboard the bus and go on his way.

The Border Patrol, attempting to justify its action, appears to have sent the following statement to several news organizations, at least one of which reproduced it in full.  I reproduce the statement below in full as well to avoid any suggestion that I am taking language out of context:

“Agents from the U.S. Border Patrol’s Spokane Station encountered an individual on Sunday at the Spokane Intermodal Bus Station who was not in possession of the immigration documents required by law.

While performing transportation checks, agents made contact with Mohanad Elshieky. Mr. Elshieky stated he was from Libya and presented the agents with an Oregon driver’s license and an Employment Authorization Card (EAD). As with anyone who needs to have their immigration status verified, Mr. Elshieky was asked to exit the bus. After the approximately 20 minutes needed to verify his status, Mr. Elshieky was allowed to board the bus and continue his travels without delay.

According to 8 USC 1304(e), all immigrants 18 years and older are required to carry immigration documents showing they are in the United States legally. Neither an EAD nor a driver’s license is considered a valid document to satisfy this law. A valid I-94, which is given to all immigrants when legally entering the United States, or paperwork showing a person is currently in the asylum process, which is given to the asylee by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, would have worked to resolve this inquiry quickly.

For decades, the U.S. Border Patrol has been performing enforcement actions away from the immediate border in direct support of border enforcement efforts and as a means of preventing trafficking, smuggling and other criminal organizations from exploiting our public and private transportation infrastructure to travel to the interior of the United States. These operations serve as a vital component of the U.S. Border Patrol’s national security efforts.

Although most Border Patrol work is conducted in the immediate border area, agents have broad law enforcement authorities and are not limited to a specific geography within the United States. They have the authority to question individuals, make arrests, and take and consider evidence. The Immigration and Nationality Act 287(a)(3) and 8 USC 1357 state that Immigration Officers, without a warrant, may “within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States…board and search for aliens in any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States and any railcar, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle.” A reasonable distance is defined by 8 CFR 287 (a)(1) as 100 air miles from the border.”

The notion that there is a comprehensive registration scheme currently in operation, which registers all aliens and requires them to carry certain documents, has been contested in an article by Professor Nancy Morawetz and Natasha Fernandez-Silber that is very much worth reading, but for present purposes we can take it as given.  The more important point here is that the Border Patrol, even in its statements to the media, appears to be unaware of what that registration scheme actually says.

The provision of law cited by the Border Patrol for the proposition that “all immigrants 18 years and older are required to carry immigration documents showing they are in the United States legally”, 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e), states that “Every alien, eighteen years of age and over, shall at all times carry with him and have in his personal possession any certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card issued to him pursuant to subsection (d).”  The referenced subsection (d), in turn, states that

Every alien in the United States who has been registered and fingerprinted under the provisions of the Alien Registration Act, 1940, or under the provisions of this chapter shall be issued a certificate of alien registration or an alien registration receipt card in such form and manner and at such time as shall be prescribed under regulations issued by the Attorney General.

8 U.S.C. § 1304(d).  The statute makes clear that its structure will be fleshed out by regulations.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 264.1 then sets out in detail what documents qualify as evidence of alien registration for purposes of the statute.  It states:

The following forms constitute evidence of registration:

Form No. and Class

I-94, Arrival-Departure Record—Aliens admitted as nonimmigrants; aliens paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; aliens whose claimed entry prior to July 1, 1924, cannot be verified, they having satisfactorily established residence in the United States since prior to July 1, 1924; and aliens granted permission to depart without the institution of deportation proceedings.

I-95, Crewmen’s Landing Permit—Crewmen arriving by vessel or aircraft.

I-184, Alien Crewman Landing Permit and Identification Card—Crewmen arriving by vessel.

I-185, Nonresident Alien Canadian Border Crossing Card—Citizens of Canada or British subjects residing in Canada.

I-186, Nonresident Alien Mexican Border Crossing Card—Citizens of Mexico residing in Mexico.

I-221, Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing—Aliens against whom deportation proceedings are being instituted.

I-221S, Order to Show Cause, Notice of Hearing, and Warrant for Arrest of Alien—Aliens against whom deportation proceedings are being instituted.

I-551, Permanent Resident Card—Lawful permanent resident of the United States.

I-766, Employment Authorization Document.

Form I-862, Notice to Appear—Aliens against whom removal proceedings are being instituted.

Form I-863, Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge—Aliens against whom removal proceedings are being instituted.

Note to paragraph (b):

In addition to the forms noted in this paragraph (b), a valid, unexpired nonimmigrant DHS admission or parole stamp in a foreign passport constitutes evidence of registration.

8 C.F.R. § 264.1(b).  (Emphasis added.)

The regulation clearly lists an “I-766, Employment Authorization Document” as a form of “evidence of alien registration.”  This is in stark contrast to the Border Patrol spokesperson’s assertion that “Neither an EAD nor a driver’s license is considered a valid document to satisfy this law.”  In fact, an EAD is indeed considered a valid document to satisfy the law—although apparently not to satisfy the Border Patrol.

The Border Patrol spokesperson’s assertion that “A valid I-94, which is given to all immigrants when legally entering the United States, or paperwork showing a person is currently in the asylum process, which is given to the asylee by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, would have worked to resolve this inquiry quickly” fares little better on close examination.  Many nonimmigrants can indeed print a Form I-94 from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) website, although paper Forms I-94 are no longer routinely issued upon entry into the United States, and one assumes that the Border Patrol did not expect Mr. Elshieky to have a printer with him.  But Mr. Elshieky’s I-94 issued upon entry to the United States, if he had had it with him, would have revealed only that he had once been a J-1 (exchange visitor) nonimmigrant, a status he no longer held—which would be of little use to the Border Patrol in their efforts to determine whether he was here legally now.  And some asylees, who initially entered without inspection but were subsequently granted asylum, would not have such an I-94 from their time of entry anyway.

What the Border Patrol spokesman presumably meant was that Mr. Elshieky should have been carrying a Form I-94 indicating his current asylum status, as opposed to his former J-1 status.  But while some asylees will indeed possess such a document, the regulations quoted above specify a Form I-94 as evidence of alien registration only for limited classes of people, and asylees are not among them:

I-94, Arrival-Departure Record—Aliens admitted as nonimmigrants; aliens paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; aliens whose claimed entry prior to July 1, 1924, cannot be verified, they having satisfactorily established residence in the United States since prior to July 1, 1924; and aliens granted permission to depart without the institution of deportation proceedings.

8 C.F.R. § 264.1(b).  Moreover, not all asylees will have a Form I-94.  It is supposed to be issued following a grant of asylum by an immigration court or by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), but this is not done contemporaneously with the grant.  The Form I-94 is issued by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) within the Department of Homeland Security, while the immigration courts and BIA are part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) located within the Department of Justice, and the government lawyers who will have the asylee’s file at the moment of the grant are part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  The issuance of an I-94 by USCIS following a grant of asylum by an immigration judge or the BIA has, from this author’s personal experience, sometimes taken months, depending on how long it takes for the relevant file to be transferred.

As for the Border Patrol spokeman’s suggestion that Mr. Elshieky ought to have presented “paperwork showing a person is currently in the asylum process, which is given to the asylee by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,” this misses the mark on two levels.  First, such paperwork is not listed in 8 C.F.R. § 264.1(b) as evidence of alien registration.  And second, Mr. Elshieky was not, and never claimed to be, “currently in the asylum process”; he correctly informed the Border Patrol that he had already been granted asylum.

The bottom line, therefore, is that the Border Patrol got the law wrong.  I would respectfully suggest that this misunderstanding by the Border Patrol, including not only the agents on the ground but the agency’s own official spokesperson, is illustrative of a broader problem.

The Border Patrol, according to its spokesperson’s statement, believes that “[a]lthough most Border Patrol work is conducted in the immediate border area, agents have broad law enforcement authorities and are not limited to a specific geography within the United States. They have the authority to question individuals, make arrests, and take and consider evidence.”  Whether or not this is correct as a description of the Border Patrol’s statutory and regulatory authority, it does not appear to be correct as a description of what they are qualified to do and should be doing.

Enforcement of U.S. immigration laws is, and historically has been, divided among multiple agency components.  Enforcement of the laws within the interior of the United States is performed by what is now ICE and used to be a component of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) within the Department of Justice.  There has been recent debate about whether to abolish ICE and return that enforcement function to within the Department of Justice, an issue beyond the scope of this blog post, but the important point here is that there has always been a component of the government performing this function which was not the Border Patrol.  Even within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), of which the Border Patrol is a component, it is the Office of Field Operations (OFO), the officers in black uniforms whom one encounters at airports and other ports of entry, who have the primary responsibility for determining whether people arriving at the borders of the United States are admissible under our complex immigration laws—not the green-uniformed Border Patrol.  And when applicants seek immigration benefits from within the United States, or the government seeks to remove them from the United States, the relevant legal determinations are generally made either by USCIS, a descendant of the former INS, within the Department of Homeland Security, or by the immigration courts and BIA in EOIR within the Department of Justice.  All of these agency components have specialized training in the nuances of immigration law, and must have it in order to perform their functions.  The Border Patrol is not in the same position.

This author would respectfully suggest that the Border Patrol’s place in the overall immigration-enforcement scheme should be limited to determining whether people who are trying to cross the border, or have very recently done so and are still very near the border, have passed (or will pass) through a port of entry for inspection, or have crossed elsewhere to avoid inspection.  In the former case, when someone passes through a port of entry, CBP OFO can analyze the details of their situation.  In the latter case, the Border Patrol can hand over recent entrants without inspection to ICE (or perhaps in the future a revamped INS) and the immigration courts, and in certain cases to USCIS asylum officers for an analysis of a claimed fear of persecution.  But when someone is not a recent border-crosser in close proximity to the border, the Border Patrol is not the agency component qualified to determine whether they are properly maintaining some status in the United States or potentially ought to be processed for removal proceedings.

This is so whether or not someone in the interior of the United States is encountered less than 100 miles from the border, as was apparently the case here.  (The Spokane bus station is evidently 90-something miles from the U.S.-Canada border in a straight line, although Google Maps suggests that actually driving from there to the border would take roughly 108 miles.)  As the American Civil Liberties Union has pointed out, roughly two-thirds of the U.S. population lives within 100 miles of some U.S. border, if one includes the water boundaries of the United States.  Operating within that 100-mile zone does not equate to only patrolling the actual border and only seeking out people who appear to have recently crossed it.  Spokane, Washington, is not on the border with Canada, and I very much doubt that the Border Patrol agents who questioned Mohanad Elshieky really thought that he had just entered from Canada without inspection.

Checking documents within the United States to enforce the immigration laws in the interior of the United States is not the Border Patrol’s job, or at least should not be.  As the case of Mohanad Elshieky illustrates, forcing the square peg of the Border Patrol into the round hole of interior enforcement can produce deeply problematic results.  The Border Patrol should stick to patrolling the border, and leave interior enforcement and legal interpretation to better-qualified agency components.

Preemption of Arizona Driver’s License Policy Provides Another Basis for Supreme Court to Uphold President’s Deferred Action Programs

On August 15, 2012, when the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) program took effect, Arizona’s then Governor Janet Brewer tried everything in her book to de-legitimize DACA in Arizona. DACA would not confer lawful or authorized status, according to an Arizona executive order signed by Governor Brewer. Arizona’s Motor Vehicle Division announced that it would not accept an employment authorized document (EAD) issued to DACA recipients pursuant to 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(14) with code C33 as proof that their presence was authorized under federal law for purpose of granting a driver’s license.

In 2013, the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) further tried to justify its animus to DACA by revising its policy to only recognize EADs if 1) the applicant has formal immigration status; 2) the applicant is on a path to obtain formal immigration status; or 3) the relief sought or obtained is expressly pursuant to the INA. Under these new criteria, Arizona refused to grant driver’s licenses not only to DACA recipients but also to beneficiaries of traditional deferred action and deferred enforced departure. It continued to grant driver’s licenses only from applicants with EADs pursuant to 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(9), those who had filed adjustment of status applications, or 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(10), those who had applied for cancellation of removal. Under this revision, even one who received deferred action other than DACA under 8 CFR274a.12(c)(14) would now be deprived of a driver’s license.

On April 5, 2016, the Ninth Circuit in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer held that these arbitrary classifications defining authorized status were preempted under federal law and has finally put to rest Arizona’s “exercise in regulatory bricolage.” Although the Ninth Circuit also found that these distinctions between different EADs likely violated the Equal Protection Clause, in order to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudications, the Court also found that these arbitrary classifications under Arizona’s law were preempted as they encroached on the exclusive federal authority to create immigration classifications. The latest ruling permanently enjoins Arizona’s policy of depriving DACA and other deferred action recipients driver’s licenses, following an earlier ruling that affirmed a preliminary injunction of the same executive order.

While Arizona sought to exalt the status of an EAD that was obtained when one sought adjustment of status or cancellation of removal, the Ninth Circuit gave short shrift to such arbitrary classification. There is no difference if one receives an EAD though cancellation of removal or through deferred action as submitting a cancellation application does not signify that the applicant is on a clear path to formal legal status. Such an application could well be denied. In this regard, noncitizens holding an EAD under C9 or C10 are in no different a position than one who has received an EAD pursuant to DACA under C33. The following extract from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is worth quoting:

Arizona thus distinguishes between noncitizens based on its own definition of “authorized presence,” one that neither mirrors nor borrows from the federal immigration classification scheme. And by arranging federal classifications in the way it prefers, Arizona impermissibly assumes the federal prerogative of creating immigration classifications according to its own design

Arizona Dream Act Coalition thus provides another basis for the Supreme Court in United States v. Texas to uphold the expanded deferred action programs as part of President Obama’s November 20, 2014 executive actions, especially the Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) and extended DACA. There is simply no difference between an EAD granted under DACA as an EAD granted based on an application for relief, such as adjustment of status or cancellation or removal. Indeed, it is INA section 274A(h)(3), which provides the authority for a granting of EADs under both DACA and based on application for adjustment of status or cancellation of removal. According to the Ninth Circuit ruling, “DACA recipients and noncitizens with (c)(9) and (c)(10) EADs all lack formal immigration status, yet the federal government permits them to live and work in the country for some period of time, provided they comply with certain conditions.”

INA 274A(h)(3) provides:

As used in this section, the term “unauthorized alien” means, with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General

If INA 274A(h)(3) is discredited, as suggested by the Fifth Circuit in Texas v. USA for the purpose of justifying a grant of EADs under DAPA ,  many other justifications for providing an employment authorization document (EAD) would collapse.  The reason the EAD regulations are principally located in 8 CFR 274a is that the authority for most of them has always been thought to stem from INA 274A(h)(3). While many of the 8 CFR 274a.12(a) EADs have some specific statutory authorization outside of INA 274A(h)(3), which is why they exist incident to status, many 8 CFR 274a.12(c) EAD categories are based on INA 274A(h)(3) in just the same way that  8 CFR 274a.12(c)(14) EADs for deferred action are.  People with pending adjustment applications under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(9), including the “class of 2007” adjustment applicants, pending cancellation applications under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(10), pending registry applications under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(16), all get EADs based on that same statutory authority.  Even the B-1 domestic workers and airline employees at 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(17) have no separate statutory authorization besides 274A(h)(3). Some (c) EADs have their own separate statutory authorization, such as pending-asylum 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(8) EADs with their roots in INA 208(d)(2), and 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(18) final-order EADs with arguable roots in INA 241(a)(7), but they are in the minority.  And even some of the subsection (a) EADs have no clear statutory basis outside 274A(h)(3), such as 8 CFR 274a.12(a)(11) for deferred enforced departure.  If the Fifth Circuit’s theory is taken to its logical conclusion, it would destroy vast swathes of the current employment-authorization framework.

It is thus important for the Supreme Court to uphold the Administration’s authority to implement DAPA and extended DACA as part of its broad authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, and its authority to grant EADs under INA 274A(h)(3). While on first brush Texas v. USA is not a preemption case, the  Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States132 S.Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012), articulated the federal government’s authority  to exercise prosecutorial discretion rather elaborately, which can be deployed to preclude states from opposing this federal authority under dubious standing theories:

A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials…… Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all. If removal proceedings commence, aliens may seek asylum and other discretionary relief allowing them to remain in the country or at least to leave without formal removal….

Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service. Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s international relations. Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state maybe mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon return. The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.

The Ninth Circuit, on the eve of oral arguments to be presented before the Supreme Court on April 18, 2016 in United States v. Texas, has provided added impetus for the upholding of President Obama’s deferred action programs. A grant of an EAD under DACA or DAPA is not any less than a grant of EAD to an applicant seeking lawful status through an adjustment of status application or by seeking cancellation of removal. All of these EADs stem from INA 274A(h)(3), which ought to be upheld as a legal basis for the executive to grant work authorization to noncitizens as part of its discretionary authority. Moreover,  it should also not make a difference whether the EAD stems from an application that would ultimately result in permanent residence, such as adjustment of status or cancellation of removal, or through a grant of deferred action. The executive branch has equal authority to grant adjustment of status or deferred action, provided certain conditions are met, from which separately ensue EADs to a noncitizen. The latest Ninth Circuit ruling in Arizona Dream Coalition could not have made this clearer.

Impact of Texas v. USA on Other Executive Actions Involving Employment Authorization

Although the Fifth Circuit in Texas v. USA ruled against the Administration on November 9, 2015 by upholding the preliminary injunction against implementation of President Obama’s program to grant deferred action to certain groups of undocumented persons, the ruling may impact other executive actions that President Obama had announced on November 20, 2014, especially relating to skilled immigrants. It is thus important for the the Supreme Court to reverse this erroneous decision to not only allow the Administration to implement Deferred Action for Parental Accountability program  and the expanded Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival program (collectively referred to as DAPA in the decision), but to also allow the Administration to grant other kinds of administrative relief such as interim employment authorization to immigrants who face great hardship and are deprived of the benefits accorded to them under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The majority’s ruling in the Fifth Circuit went even further than Judge Hanen’s decision in the lower district court by holding that DAPA was not authorized under any INA provision. Judge Hanen’s ruling suggested that if the Administration had followed the notice and comment procedure under section 553 of the Administrative Procedures Act, DAPA could have survived judicial scrutiny. The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, held that since DAPA implicated “questions of deep economic and political significance,” Congress would have expressly authorized DHS, which it did not do. Hence, DAPA was a substantive APA violation under section 706(2) as it was not authorized under the INA. Thus, promulgating a rule at this juncture will not help to save DAPA.

One of the INA provisions relied on by the government to implement DAPA is INA section 274(h)(3), which provides:

As used in this section, the term “unauthorized alien” means, with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General.

While the ability to of INA 274A(h)(3) to provide authority to the Administration was  completely overlooked in Judge Hanen’s decision (and his flawed decision is discussed in David Isaacson’s excellent blog entitled IGNORING THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: AN INITIAL REACTION TO JUDGE HANEN’S DECISION ENJOINING DAPA AND EXPANDED DACA), the Fifth Circuit took notice of INA 274(h)(3), but gave it short shrift by observing that this provision, which is listed as a miscellaneous definitional provision is an unlikely place to find authorization for DAPA.

Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s gloss, INA 274A(h)(3)  gives the Attorney General, and now the Secretary of Homeland Security, broad  flexibility to authorize an alien to be employed, thus rendering the alien not an “unauthorized alien” under the INA.  Indeed, INA 274(h)(3) was invoked by the DHS in promulgating a rule providing employment authorization for H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B visa holders in the US who are caught in the employment based second and third preference backlogs. INA 274A(h)(3) will also most likely be invoked when the DHS promulgates a rule to grant work authorization to beneficiaries of approved employment-based I-140 petitions who are waiting for their green cards in the backlogged employment preferences.

Indeed, if INA 274A(h)(3) is discredited, as suggested by the Fifth Circuit,  many other justifications for providing an employment authorization document (EAD) would collapse.  The reason the EAD regulations are principally located in 8 CFR 274a, after all, is that the authority for most of them has always been thought to stem from INA 274A. While many of the 8 CFR 274a.12(a) EADs have some specific statutory authorization outside of INA 274A(h)(3), which is why they exist incident to status, many 8 CFR 274a.12(c) EAD categories are based on INA 274A(h)(3) in just the same way that  8 CFR 274a.12(c)(14) EADs for deferred action are.  People with pending adjustment applications under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(9), including the “class of 2007” adjustment applicants, pending cancellation applications under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(10), pending registry applications under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(16), all get EADs based on that same statutory authority.  Even the B-1 domestic workers and airline employees at 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(17) have no separate statutory authorization besides 274A(h)(3). Some (c) EADs have their own separate statutory authorization, such as pending-asylum 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(8) EADs with their roots in INA 208(d)(2), and 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(18) final-order EADs with arguable roots in INA 241(a)(7), but they are in the minority.  And even some of the subsection (a) EADs have no clear statutory basis outside 274A(h)(3), such as 8 CFR 274a.12(a)(11) for deferred enforced departure.  If the Fifth Circuit’s theory is taken to its logical conclusion, it would destroy vast swathes of the current employment-authorization framework.

It is thus important for the Supreme Court to uphold the Administration’s authority to implement DAPA as part of its broad authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, without the need to undermine INA 274A(h)(3). As I have advocated in FIFTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT ON PREEMPTION CAN PROVIDE OBAMA WITH PATH TO VICTORY IN TEXAS v. UNITED STATES, the government’s authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, which includes deferred action, is non-justiciable and notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit decision, never required rule making. The dissenting opinion in the Fifth Circuit decision thankfully held that deferred action, which is a quintessential exercise of prosecutorial discretion, is non-justiciable.  Indeed, one of the principal reasons why state regulations have been held to  conflict with federal immigration law is because they interfere with the Administration’s ability to exercise prosecutorial discretion. While on first brush Texas v. USA is not a preemption case, it would still provide a basis for any cantankerous state politician to sue the federal government, under the broad and dubious standing theory  that the Fifth Circuit provided to Texas, whenever the federal government chooses to exercise prosecutorial discretion. While the DACA program of 2012 will be the most vulnerable, if the Supreme Court were to uphold the Fifth Circuit’s majority decision, another court would hopefully reach another conclusion with respect to INA 274A(h)(3) as providing the authority to the Administration to grant work authorization in many other contexts.

The Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States132 S.Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012), articulated the federal government’s authority  to exercise prosecutorial discretion rather elaborately:

A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials…… Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all. If removal proceedings commence, aliens may seek asylum and other discretionary relief allowing them to remain in the country or at least to leave without formal removal….

Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service. Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s international relations. Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state maybe mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon return. The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.

The majority of the Supreme Court  justices ought to  latch onto the dissenting opinion, which is the correct opinion, and should reverse the preliminary injunction on the ground that the President’s executive actions regarding DAPA are non-justiciable, and thus leave alone INA 274A(h)(3). The Administration ought to be provided flexibility to provide ameliorative relief, especially EAD under INA 274A(h)(3) to a number of non-citizens needing relief. The prime example are those who have to wait for decades in the India EB-2 and EB-3 backlogs for their green card, even though they have otherwise fulfilled all the conditions. Due to the lack of a current priority date, beneficiaries who are otherwise approved for permanent residence ought to be able to obtain EADs, and the same also should apply to H-4 spouses of H-1B visa holders who are caught in the employment based backlogs. Also, researchers, inventors and founders of startup enterprises ought to be paroled into the US and issued EADs under the broad authority provided in INA 274A(h)(3), and this too is one of the initiatives contemplated in the President’s  November 20, 2014 executive actions.  There are many good reasons why the Administration should be allowed to issue work authorization to noncitizens, and INA 274A(h)(3) ought not be reinterpreted to curtail this flexibility.