Tag Archive for: Adjustment of Status

Cyrus Mehta

How Prosecutorial Discretion Saved Our Client

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By Cyrus Mehta and Jessica Paszko*

This is the story of our client Nadia Habib who was in immigration proceedings from 18 months till 31 years until an Immigration Judge granted her adjustment of status on November 21, 2023!

Nadia Habib came to the US in 1993 from Bangladesh when she was less than 2 years old with her mother Nazmin Habib. They were paroled into the US at JFK airport.  Some years later in June 1997 they were placed in removal proceedings in New York, and ordered deported in absentia on April 26, 2000 by an Immigration Judge. They did not show up in court on the day of their hearing due to an unfortunate misunderstanding as a result of Nazmin being seriously ill the day before.  Several efforts were made to reopen the in absenstia deportation order but to no avail. However, they continued to live their lives normally as a tightly knit family. Nazmin and her husband Jawad, who had a green card, had three more children in the US who were automatically citizens. Jawad supported the entire family as a yellow taxi driver in New York. Nadia continued to be vulnerable to deportation unlike her citizen siblings, although she showed great promise by doing well in school and getting admitted into the elite Bronx High School of Science in New York.

On September 10, 2011, Nazmin and Nadia, then 19 years old, received a bag and baggage letter from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ordering that they surrender for deportation on September 29, 2011. This letter brought their lives and the lives of their family and loved ones to a shocking halt. Nadia’s friends and other immigrant students quickly sprung to action, launching campaigns on Facebook and Twitter, in the hope that Nadia and her mother would be allowed to remain in the US with her father and her three US citizen siblings. On the fateful day she had to appear for deportation on September 29, members of the Youth Leadership Council gathered thousands of petition signatures and turned out over 100 people to rally in support of Nadia and Nazmin and to try to halt the deportation scheduled for that day at 11 am.  The community’s fervent efforts to keep Nadia and Nazmin from returning to Bangladesh that was entirely foreign to Nadia paid off. ICE halted the deportation order and decided to review their case. Though September 29, 2011 was marked with victory for Nadia and her mom, their immigration woes were far from over.

At that time when Nadia was about to get deported, President Obama began to be known as the Deporter-in-Chief. Although Obama was sympathetic towards immigrants, he wanted to also show that he was strict on enforcing the law as a way to get his Republican opponents in Congress to pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill.  As the deportations under Obama spiked in 2011 and 2012, until they reached a record high by 2013, the then ICE Director John Morton issued a landmark memo in 2011 providing detailed guidelines on how ICE officers should exercise prosecutorial discretion.

On September 30, 2011, which also happened to be Nadia’s 20th birthday, ICE issued a Stay of Removal Order for Nadia and Nazmin. This was the first exercise of prosecutorial discretion that would benefit Nadia and Nazmin and a birthday present that Nadia would never forget. Nadia and Nazmin approached our firm to seek representation. The case was so sympathetic and meritorious that we decided to take on the case pro bono. The goal was to find a pathway for Nazmin and Nadia to reopen their deportation orders and adjust status while keeping them in the US in the interim in an authorized capacity as long as possible.

On February 23, 2012, ICE also issued an order of supervision to both Nadia and Nazmin which required them to report in person to ICE on specified dates, usually once or twice a year. On June 15, 2012, the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Janet Napolitano issued a memorandum entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children”, officially establishing what would later be known as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. DACA came to be the second form of prosecutorial discretion that benefitted Nadia who clearly qualified as she came to the US well before the age of 16. After graduating from the Bronx High School of Science, Nadia pursued undergraduate studies at Stony Brook University and later obtained her master’s degree in architecture from The City College of New York. On the basis of DACA, Nadia was able to apply for an Employment Authorization Document (EAD) in September 2012. Since then, our firm helped Nazmin and Nadia comply with their annual appointments with ICE and apply for DACA extensions along with the EAD. Nadia had to report each year for her appointment with ICE even though she was authorized to remain in the US under DACA. Every time Nadia wanted to travel outside New York for a trip to another state, even over a long weekend, she had to ask for and receive permission from ICE.

In the meantime, Nadia’s US citizen brother filed Form I-130 on behalf of his mother Nazmin which was approved in early 2016. Jawad had not yet naturalized as his application had been erroneously denied and our appeal challenging the denial was pending. This I-130 served as the basis of our request to DHS to join our motion to reopen Nazmin’s removal so that Nazmin could apply for adjustment of status based on the approved I-130 petition filed by her US citizen child. A removal order can be reopened at any time if the government joins in a motion to reopen even though prior efforts to reopen the removal were unsuccessful. The ability of the government joining in a motion to reopen depends on the policies of the administration at any given time. We requested the government to join in the motion in September 2016, during the final year of the Obama administration based on Morton’s prosecutorial discretion policy. Donald Trump became president in 2017 and our request was pending, but the ICE attorney who got our request to join in the motion fortunately agreed to join in the motion to reopen Nazmin’s removal proceedings to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) even though by then prosecutorial discretion became non-existent under Trump’s new enforcement oriented immigration focus. In July 2017, the BIA granted our motion based on the government’s consent and remanded for further proceedings. After a nearly five year wait (since the I-485 application could not be tracked in the USICS bureaucracy until there was Congressional intervention), Nazmin was scheduled for an adjustment interview in March 2022 at a USCIS field office in Long Island where her adjustment of status application was finally granted.

Nadia was still not eligible to adjust status, so we could not request the government to join in the motion to reopen. Although Nadia’s father eventually naturalized, she was unable to adjust status through him as she was over 21 years old. Despite this, Nadia continued to be able to remain in the US thanks to DACA. When Nadia married her US citizen husband in 2020, he filed Form
I-130 on her behalf which was approved the following year. Following a similar path as her mother case, in January 2022, our firm submitted a request to DHS to join our motion to reopen Nadia’s removal order so that Nadia could apply for adjustment of status based on the approved I-130 petition filed by her husband. By then Joe Biden was President and he once again instructed ICE to exercise prosecutorial discretion. In November 2022, DHS consented to joining in the motion to reopen for the sole purpose of dismissal of removal proceedings. The following month, in December 2022, we submitted our joint motion to reopen Nadia’s removal proceedings to the BIA. In February 2023, the BIA granted our motion and reopened and remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings. In September 2023, we learned that Nadia had been scheduled for a merits hearing on November 1, 2023 by happenstance as neither Nadia nor our firm received the notice – imagine if the Immigration Judge would have again deported Nadia in absentia at the hearing. Our request to adjust Nadia’s status on the basis of her I-130 was unopposed by DHS, though the Immigration Judge could not grant the adjustment as the sealed medical report that we had delivered to the Immigration Court in advance of the November 1st hearing had not made its way to him. The Immigration Judge continued the hearing to November 17, 2023 where finally, after many trials and tribulations, Nadia was adjusted to lawful permanent resident status. Nadia’s order of supervision dissolved on that day too relieving her from reporting to ICE each year.

Nadia was 32 years old on the day she was granted adjustment of status, and before then she had been in some form of immigration proceeding since she was 17 months old. Today Nadia is a successful architect and her siblings are also equally successful. Through this period, Nadia benefited from prosecutorial discretion, but the path was never smooth. DACA was declared unlawful by a federal judge and its fate hangs in the balance till this day. Even after Biden became president, courts enjoined his prosecutorial discretion policies that were set forth in the memo of DHS Secretary Mayorkas, but we advocated, when requesting the government to join in the motion to reopen, that the government could still exercise discretion outside the priorities set forth in the Mayorkas memo. Despite the court block of the Mayorkas memo, the DHS retained the ability to exercise discretion and join in a motion to reopen. Imagine if Nadia did not receive the stay of removal in 2011 and was deported to Bangladesh after she had spent her whole life in the US. But for the prosecutorial discretion policies in place, Nadia would have been deported because of an in absentia deportation order that she received, over which she had no control and for no fault of her own. Nadia and Nazmin were also fortunate that ICE attorneys agreed to join in the motions to reopen despite the zigzagging prosecutorial discretion policies over three presidential administrations.

We are proud to have represented Nadia and Nazmin tenaciously and doggedly for well over 10 years in a pro bono capacity!

*Jessica Paszko is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Advancing the Dates for Filing in the State Department Visa Bulletin Will Restore Balance and Sanity to the Legal Immigration System

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By Cyrus D. Mehta

The August 2023 Visa Bulletin is a disaster. Here are some of the highlights:

Establishment of Worldwide employment-based first preference (EB-1) final action date.  Rest of World countries, Mexico, and Philippines will be subject to a final action date final action date of August 1, 2023. It is likely that in October the category will return to “Current” for these countries.

Retrogression in employment-based first preference (EB-1) for India.  India will be subject to an EB-1 final action date of January 1, 2012. It is likely that in October the final action date will advance.

Retrogression in employment-based third preference (EB-3) for Rest of World countries, Mexico, and Philippines. The Rest of World, Mexico, and Philippines EB-3 final action date will retrogress in August to May 1, 2020.

Retrogression in family-based second preference (F-2A) for Rest of the World countries, China and India. The Rest of World, China, and India F2A final action date will retrogress to October 8, 2017.

.The bad news from the July 2023 Visa Bulletin continues into the August 2023 Visa Bulletin.  The India EB-2 final action date remains retrogressed at January 1, 2011. The India EB-3 final action date remains retrogressed at January 1, 2009. Still, the corresponding dates for filing  in the August 2023 visa bulletin are significantly more ahead than the final action date. For instance, the dates for filing for the F2A for all countries is current. The dates for filing for the EB-1 for the Rest of the World is current and for India is June 1, 2022. Yet, the USCIS has indicated that I-485 adjustment of status applications can only be filed in August 2023 under the dates for filing chart  if they are family-based while I-485 adjustment of status applications can only be filed in August 2023 under the final action dates chart if they are employment-based.

The USCIS should allow I-485 applications related to both family and employment-based petitions to be filed under the dates for filing chart. Indeed, in the face of massive retrogression in the Visa Bulletin, the Biden administration does have the authority to move the dates for filing to current. However, even before taking this radical step, which has a legal basis, the administration should  at least allow I-485 applications to be filed under the dates for filing in both the family and employment-based preferences.

The total allocation of visa numbers in the employment and family based categories are woefully adequate. §201 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets an annual minimum family-sponsored preference limit of 226,000.  The worldwide level for annual employment-based preference immigrants is at least 140,000.  INA §202 prescribes that the per-country limit for preference immigrants is set at 7% of the total annual family-sponsored and employment-based preference limits, i.e., 25,620. These limits were established in the Immigration Act of 1990, and since then, the US Congress has not expanded these limits for well over three decades. In 1990, the worldwide web was not in existence, and  since then, there have been an explosion in the number of jobs as a result of internet based technologies and so many related technologies as well as a demand for foreign skilled workers many of whom have been educated at US educational institutions.  Yet, the US legal immigration system has not kept up to timely give green cards to immigrants who contribute to the country. Due to the per country limits,  till recently it was only India and China that were backlogged in the employment based preferences, but now under the August 2023 Visa Bulletin all countries face backlogs. Still, India bears the brunt disproportionately in the employment-based categories, and one study has estimated the wait time to be 150 years in the India EB-2!

It would be ideal for Congress to eliminate the per country limits and even add more visas to each preference category. Until Congress is able to act, it would be easy for the Biden administration to provide even greater relief through executive action. One easy fix is to advance the dates for filing in the State Department’s Visa Bulletin so that many more backlogged beneficiaries of approved petitions can file I-485 adjustment of status applications and get  ameliorative relief such as an  employment authorization document (EAD), travel permission and to be able to exercise job portability under INA §204(j). Spouse and minor children can also avail of work authorization and travel permission after they file their I-485 applications.

There is a legal basis to advance the dates for filing even to current. This would allow many backlogged immigrants to file I-485 adjustment of status applications and get the benefits of adjustment of status such as the ability to port to a new job under INA 204(j), obtain travel permission and an EAD. Many more of the children of these backlogged immigrants would also be able to protect their age under the USCIS’s updated guidance relating to the Child Status Protection Act.

INA §245(a)(3) allows for the filing of an adjustment of status application when “an immigrant visa  is immediately available” to the applicant. 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) links visa availability to the State Department’s monthly Visa Bulletin. Pursuant to this regulation, an I-485 application can only be submitted “if the preference category applicant has a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in the Bulletin (or the Bulletin shows that numbers for visa applicants in his or her category are current).” The term “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3) has never been defined, except as in 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) by “a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in Bulletin” or if the date in the Bulletin is current for that category.

The State Department has historically never advanced priority dates based on certitude that a visa would actually become available. There have been many instances when applicants have filed an I-485 application in a particular month, only to later find that the dates have retrogressed. A good example is the April 2012 Visa Bulletin, when the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China were May 1, 2010. In the very next May 2012 Visa Bulletin a month later, the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China retrogressed to August 15, 2007. If the State Department was absolutely certain that applicants born in India and China who filed in April 2012 would receive their green cards, it would not have needed to retrogress dates back to August 15, 2007.  Indeed, those EB-2 applicants who filed their I-485 applications in April 2012 may still potentially be waiting and have yet to receive their green cards even as of today! Another example is when the State Department announced that the July 2007 Visa Bulletin for EB-2 and EB-3 would become current. Hundreds of thousands filed during that period (which actually was the extended period from July 17, 2007 to August 17, 2007). It was obvious that these applicants would not receive their green cards during that time frame. The State Department then retrogressed the EB dates substantially the following month, and those who filed under the India EB-3 in July-August 2007 waited for over a decade before they became eligible for green cards. More recently, the September 2022  Visa Bulletin had a final action date of December 1, 2014 for EB-2 India. In the next October 2022 Visa Bulletin the FAD for EB-2 India was abruptly retrogressed to April 1, 2012 and then further retrogressed to October 8, 2011 in the December 2022 Visa Bulletin. If a visa number was immediately available in September 2022, an applicant under EB-2 India with a priority date of December 1, 2014 or earlier should have been issued permanent residence.

These three examples, among many, go to show that “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3), according to the State Department, have never meant that visas were actually available to be issued to applicants as soon as they filed. Rather, it has always been based on a notion of visa availability at some point of time in the future.

Under the dual filing dates system first introduced by the State Department in October 2015, USCIS acknowledges that availability of visas is based on an estimate of available visas for the fiscal year rather than immediate availability:

When we determine there are more immigrant visas available for the fiscal year than there are known applicants, you may use the DFF Applications chart to determine when to file an adjustment of status application with USCIS. Otherwise, you must use the Application Final Action Dates chart to determine when to file an adjustment of status application with USCIS.

Taking this to its logical extreme, visa availability for establishing the dates for filing may be based on just one visa being saved in the backlogged preference category in the year, such as the India EB-3, like the proverbial Thanksgiving turkey. Just like one turkey every Thanksgiving Day is pardoned by the President and not consumed, similarly one visa can also be left intact rather than used by the noncitizen beneficiary.   So long as there is one visa kept available, it would provide the legal basis for an I-485 filing under a DFF, and this would be consistent with INA 245(a)(3) as well as 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1). This is reflected in the August  2023 Visa Bulletin as the first visa in the India EB-3 has a priority date of January 1, 2009. Hence, there is one available visa in the India EB-3 skilled worker, otherwise it would have stated “Unavailable.”  The   dates for filing could potentially advance and become current based on this available visa with a  January 1, 2009 priority date in the India EB-3, thus allowing hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries of I-140 petitions to file I-485 applications.

This same logic can be extended to beneficiaries of family-based I-130 petitions.

The administration simply needs to move the dates for filing to current or close to current. It can undertake this executive action through a stroke of a pen. However, if it needs to do this through rulemaking 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) could be easily amended (shown in bold) to expand the definition of visa availability:

An alien is ineligible for the benefits of section 245 of the Act unless an immigrant visa is immediately available to him or her at the time the application is filed. If the applicant is a preference alien, the current Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Bulletin will be consulted to determine whether an immigrant visa is immediately available. An immigrant visa is considered available for accepting and processing the application Form I-485 [if] the preference category applicant has a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in the Bulletin (or the Bulletin shows that numbers for visa applicants in his or her category are current) (“Final Action Date”). An immigrant visa is also considered available for submission of the I-485 application based on a provisional priority date (“‘Dates for Filing”) without reference to the Final Action Date. No provisional submission can be undertaken absent prior approval of the visa petition and only if all visas in the preference category have not been exhausted in the fiscal year. Final adjudication only occurs when there is a current Final Action Date. An immigrant visa is also considered immediately available if the applicant establishes eligibility for the benefits of Public Law 101-238. Information concerning the immediate availability of an immigrant visa may be obtained at any Service office.

 

The Biden administration has provided relief to hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals through executive actions such as humanitarian parole, now enforcing deportation against low priority individuals and extending DACA. The administration recently announced a Family Reunification Parole Initiative for beneficiaries of approved I-130 petitions who are nationals of Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, & Honduras. Nationals of these countries can be considered for parole on a case-by-case basis for a period of up to three years while they wait to apply to become lawful permanent residents. This is an example of the administration using its executive authority to shape immigration policy in the absence of meaningful Congressional action to reform the system. Indeed, this initiative can serve as a template to allow beneficiaries of approved I-130, I-140, and I-526 petitions to be paroled into the US while they wait for a visa number to become available, which under the backlogs in the employment and family preference categories, can take several years to decades. The Biden administration ought to likewise advance the DFF to current so that beneficiaries of family and employment petitions can file I-485 applications and get the benefits of employment authorization, advance parole and the ability to port to a new employer if the job is same or similar to the position that was the subject of the sponsorship for the green card. There  is also a parallel campaign to convince the administration to issue an EAD and advance parole for beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions, although this should be done in conjunction with advancing the dates for filing so that applicants can also file I-485 applications. Once the I-485 is filed applicants would also be able to port to same or similar jobs under INA §204(j) and keep intact the underlying labor certification and I-140 petition.  As we have shown in a related blog on the compelling circumstances EAD, if the EAD is not linked to an I-485 application and they do not have nonimmigrant status, holders of this EAD will have to leave the US to consular process for their immigrant visas and would also need another employer to sponsor them if they have left or cut ties with the original employer who sponsored them.  This would entail getting the new employer to start the whole labor certification process, which is perilous these days if the employer as laid off workers.

The Supreme Court in United States v.  Texas very recently rendered a blow to Texas and Louisiana in holding that they had no standing to challenge the Biden administration on federal immigration policy on enforcement priorities. As this analysis can also apply to challenges to other executive actions on immigration by states not friendly to pro immigrant executive actions, the Biden administration should move boldly and advance the DFF in the State Department Visa bulletin to restore balance and some semblance of sanity to the legal immigration system in the US.

Cyrus Mehta

Helping Afghans and Ukrainians Progress from Parole to Temporary Protected Status to Permanent Residence

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By Cyrus Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In light of the recent crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) has been at the forefront of discussions around how the United States can assist individuals who are fleeing these two countries. On March 3, 2022, Ukraine was designated for TPS for an 18 month period. On March 16, 2022, the Department of Homeland Security also announced the designation of Afghanistan for TPS for a period of 18 months.

Generally, TPS provides a temporary immigration status to nationals of countries fraught with armed conflict or other disasters. In order to be eligible for TPS, an individual must be a national of a country designated for TPS, have been continuously present in the U.S. since the date of the designation, have continuously resided in the U.S. since a date specified by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and not be inadmissible to the United States. In the case of Ukraine, the requirement that applicants must have continuously resided in the United States since April 11, 2022 will render many  Ukrainian nationals ineligible for TPS, as many individuals fleeing the war would not have arrived in the United States by that date. Individuals who are granted TPS receive a stay of deportation and temporary authorization to work in the United States.

The Uniting for Ukraine program that would allow Ukrainians to enter the US under humanitarian parole was announced on April 21, 2022. Thus, those who will get paroled into the US under Uniting for Ukraine will not be eligible for TPS.  However, several thousand Ukrainians who came to Mexico  after the Russian invasion in February 20, 2022 and got paroled into the US from the Southern border prior to April 11, 2022 will be eligible for TPS.

On the other hand, Afghans have been applying for  humanitarian parole prior to and  after the US withdrew from Afghanistan on August 30, 2021. A recent New York Times report states that of the 43,000 humanitarian parole applications received by USCIS since July 2021, the agency has processed less than 2,000. Of those processed applications, 1,500 were denied and 170 were approved as of February 11, 2022. While the humanitarian parole program for Afghans has been a disappointment, those who have been paroled into the US already prior to March 16, 2022 can apply for TPS.

Though it provides an important temporary form of relief for some nationals of countries experiencing a crisis, TPS is, by its very nature, temporary and does not provide foreign nationals with a pathway to permanent residence or citizenship in the United States. Thus, one must look for other alternatives for individuals who wish to seek permanent residence in the United States. Foreign nationals who have a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident relative may be able to file a family-based adjustment of status application, but some family preference categories are extremely backlogged. Skilled TPS recipients who can find a U.S. employer to sponsor them may instead be eligible to file an employment-based adjustment of status application. There are no backlogs for most TPS-designated countries, and spouses and minor children of the primary applicant may also file adjustment of status applications. In addition, foreign nationals of extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics may be eligible for an employment-based, first-preference visa, which does not require employer sponsorship or a Labor Certification.

However, complications arise when a TPS recipient who entered the U.S. without inspection wishes to apply for permanent residence. Pursuant to INA § 245(a), an individual must have been inspected and admitted  or paroled into the United States in order to be eligible to apply for adjustment of status. A foreign national who was inspected and paroled into the United States would be eligible for adjustment of status, but an individual who entered without inspection would not. In a previous blog, we analyzed the Supreme Court’s decision in Sanchez v. Mayorkas, which holds that a grant of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) does not constitute an admission under INA § 245(a) for purposes of adjustment of status. However, the decision seems to leave open whether a grant of TPS could “cure” a short lapse in the status of an individual who was inspected and admitted to the U.S., but later fell out of status. In her opinion, Justice Kagan gives the example of an individual who was out of status for a few months before receiving TPS, potentially implying that receiving TPS ends an individual’s time out of status, if this duration would otherwise have exceeded 180 days and rendered the individual unable to adjust under INA § 245(k). Additionally, the decision could imply that a grant of TPS could qualify as a “lawful nonimmigrant status”, which could assist individuals who would otherwise have been ineligible to file and adjustment of status application under INA § 245(c)(7).

While TPS is no doubt an important tool for aiding individuals who have fled Ukraine or Afghanistan, not all nationals of these countries will be eligible and a grant of TPS does not provide a path to permanent residence in the U.S. Thus, some TPS recipients, or individuals from TPS-designated countries who are ineligible, may be able to utilize employment-based immigrant visa petitions as a path to permanent residence.  Thus, one who was initially paroled into the US and then was granted TPS would be able to apply for adjustment of status if he or she became the beneficiary of an employment based I-140 petition after an employer obtained labor certification. The parole would fulfill the requirement  under INA 245(a) that the applicant have been inspected and admitted or paroled into the US. The subsequent grant of TPS would then confer “lawful nonimmigrant status” to that applicant and thus render him or her eligible for adjustment of status under INA §245(c)(7).  However, TPS recipients who entered without inspection will be ineligible to apply for adjustment of status. For individuals who were inspected and admitted to the U.S., though, but later had a lapse in status, a grant of TPS could render them again eligible for permanent residence.

There will be large numbers who will enter the US on humanitarian parole under Uniting for Ukraine but will not be eligible to receive TPS as they would have entered the US well after the cut off date of April 11, 2022. If a parolee is sponsored by an employer through labor certification, he or she will not be eligible for adjustment of status as parole is not considered a lawful nonimmigrant status under INA  § 245(c)(7).  This person will have to process at a US Consulate overseas after the I-140 petition is approved. Fortunately, Ukrainian nationals can have their cases processed at the US Consulate in Frankfurt rather than in Kiev. On the other hand, a parolee would still be able to adjust status under 245(a) as an immediate relative. Similarly, a parolee who becomes the beneficiary of an I-130 petition under a family preference category will also be able to adjust status as the requirement to be in “lawful nonimmigrant status” under 245(c)(7) only applies to beneficiaries of employment-based petitions and not family-based petitions. Indeed, one in parole status would be considered  to be in a lawful status under 8 CFR 245.1 (d)(1)(v) for purposes of adjusting status under a family-based petition but not an employment-based petition.

There are pathways for people who have been paroled to become permanent residents, and even more  pathways for those who have subsequently received TPS. Given the low unemployment rate and shortage of workers in the US, employers should look to not just be hiring Ukrainians and Afghans as parolees or in TPS status, but must also endeavor to sponsor people with parole and TPS for permanent residence through a labor certification, an I-140 petition and the filing of an I-485 adjustment of status application. Those who may not be eligible for adjustment of status because they are parolees can still proceed to a US Consulate for an immigrant visa following the approval of the I-140 petition.

The sponsoring of  workers based on their true worth skills would allow them to pursue better jobs and careers. Presently, people on TPS or parole may have employment authorization, but many are in jobs that may not match their skills. How many times has one been driven by a taxi driver who was a doctor or engineer in their own country or received groceries from a delivery person who may have previously been an accountant?   An employer who commits to hiring and then sponsoring a foreign national worker on parole or TPS based on their real skills creates a win-win situation for both.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Frequently Asked Questions on Transferring the Underlying Basis of an I-485 application from an I-140 petition under India EB-3 to an I-140 under India EB-2

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Update – January 21, 2022

On January 21, 2022, USCIS released new guidance on requests to transfer the underlying basis of an I-485 to a different employment-based immigrant category based on another Form I-140. The guidance states that USCIS may, in its discretion grant a transfer of underlying basis if the following criteria are met:

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Cyrus Mehta

Sanchez v. Mayorkas: Although TPS Is Not An Admission, Justice Kagan’s Opinion Leaves Open Avenues for TPS Recipients to Adjust Status as Nonimmigrants

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On June 7, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Sanchez v. Mayorkas, holding that a grant of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) does not constitute an admission under INA § 245(a) for purposes of adjustment of status. Though overall a disappointing decision, the Court’s opinion may nonetheless leave open some options for some TPS recipients who want to obtain their green cards.

Sanchez v. Mayorkas involved the plight of Jose Santos Sanchez, an El Salvadoran national who entered the United States without inspection in 1997 and was subsequently granted TPS based on a series of earthquakes in his home country. In 2014, Sanchez, together with his wife, Sonia Gonzalez, sought to adjust status after more than 20 years of residence in the United States, but the USCIS denied his application on the grounds that “[a] grant of TPS does not cure a foreign national’s entry without inspection or constitute an inspection and admission of the foreign national”.

Sanchez challenged the denial, and the District Court ruled in his favor, holding that an LPR “’shall be considered as’ having ‘lawful status as a nonimmigrant’ for purposes of applying to become an LPR”. See Santos Sanchez v. Johnson, 2018 WL 6427894, *4 (D NJ, Dec. 7, 2018). The District Court further held that INA §244(f)(4) requires TPS holders to be treated “as though [they] had been ‘inspected and admitted.’” The Third Circuit, though, reversed, holding that “a grant of TPS does not constitute an ‘admission’ into the United States.” Sanchez v. Secretary U. S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 967 F. 3d 242, 252 (2020).

The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Kagan, held that an individual who entered the United States without inspection is not eligible to adjust status under INA §245 by virtue of being a TPS recipient. The Court drew a distinction between the concept of “admission” and one’s immigration status, noting that there are several categories of individuals who have nonimmigrant status without having been admitted to the United States (alien crewmen, crime  victims in U visa status, etc.).

Though unfortunate that the Court did not consider a grant to TPS to be an admission under INA § 245(a), Justice Kagan’s opinion includes some interesting language that may leave open some avenues for TPS recipients to adjust status. On pages 8-9 of the opinion, the Court held that TPS recipients will be considered to have nonimmigrant status, which is needed to adjust status under §245. Thus, an individual who was admitted to the United States in lawful B-2 status for example, but fell out of status before being granted TPS might be able to adjust status, having satisfied both the “admission” and “nonimmigrant status” requirements.

Thus, it is unclear whether a grant of TPS “wipes out” a lapse in one’s nonimmigrant status, no matter the duration. Justice Kagan gives the more narrow example of an individual who was out of status for a few months before receiving TPS, potentially implying that TPS ends an individual’s time out of status who otherwise would have exceeded 180 days and been unable to adjust under INA § 245(k). However, a noncitizen relying on §245(k) to adjust status would not need to have received TPS, or any other nonimmigrant status, to file an employment based I-485 within 180 days of admission.  On the other hand, INA §245(k) could still potentially come to the rescue if the individual is granted TPS status within 180 days of the admission but then seeks to file for adjustment of status 180 days after the admission. The grant of TPS would have put the person back in nonimmigrant status within the 180 days from the admission, even if they file an adjustment application after 180 days.

Justice Kagan’s opinion can be interpreted even more broadly to support the idea that a grant of TPS “wipes out” a lapse in the nonimmigrant status and thus overrides INA §§§ 245(c)(2), (7) and (8), when the lack of a lawful status impedes an individual’s ability to adjust status. Under INA §245(c)(2) an applicant for adjustment of status even if admitted (other than an immediate relative) is precluded from applying for adjustment of status if they are in unlawful status at the date of filing the application or who have failed to maintain continuously a lawful status since entry into the US. INA § 245(k) allows one who was admitted to apply for adjustment of status under the first three employment-based preferences and the employment-based fourth preference as a religious worker if they have failed to maintain lawful status for not more than 180 days. But INA § 245(k) is inapplicable to one who is applying for adjustment of status under a family-based preference.  A grant of TPS at any point in time, if Justice Kagan’s opinion is interpreted broadly, should once again render an applicant eligible for adjustment of status whether they are filing an adjustment application under a family based preference or  an employment-based preference even 180 days beyond the admission and the grant of TPS.

INA § 245(c)(7) similarly precludes adjustment of status to that of an immigrant under INA § 203(b) (the five employment-based preferences) for one who is not in a lawful nonimmigrant status. A grant of TPS ought to wipe out this impediment. INA § 245(c)(8) disqualifies one from adjusting status who accepted employment while unauthorized. Under the broader interpretation of Justice Kagan’s opinion, the grant of TPS ought to also remove this impediment under INA § 245(c)(8) too.

While the Supreme Court nixed the ability of TPS applicants to adjust status if they were not admitted, there are still some bright spots if one carefully parses through Justice Kagan’s opinion. Under the broadest interpretation of Justice Kagan’s opinion, TPS applicants, if they were initially admitted, should continue to claim that they are eligible to adjust status under both the family and employment preferences by virtue of receiving nonimmigrant status.

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a Law Clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Cyrus Mehta

Coping with Delays Facing H-4 and L-2 Spouses When They Have a Pending Adjustment Application – Part 2

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By Cyrus Mehta and Isabel Rajabzadeh*

Although H-4 and L-2 extensions continue to be delayed since our  last blog  “Coping with Delays Facing H-4 and L-2 Spouses”,  we highlight another issue,  which adds further hardship for H-4 and L-2 spouses faced with unjust processing delays. In October 2020, the EB-3 Dates for Filing in the Visa Bulletin advanced significantly, which allowed many born in India to file Form I-485, Adjustment of Status (AOS) applications. The surge in AOS cases, coupled with the H-4/L-2 processing delays, have left many with the inability to travel abroad as they await both their H-4/L-2 extension and Advance Parole (AP) processing. This blog tackles the threat to abandonment of AOS when traveling internationally while AP and H-4/L-2 are processing. We also discuss the complex interplay with employment authorization for H-4/L-2 spouses who have pending AOS applications.

Preserving H-4 and L-2 Status When an AOS is Pending

Since the H-1B and L visas allow for dual intent, it is possible to maintain H or L nonimmigrant status while an AOS application for permanent residence has been filed.

Due to the delays in the processing of H-4/L-2 extensions and requests for EAD, travelling abroad poses a conundrum. In order to preserve the AOS that is still processing, one needs to have either AP or valid H-4/L-2 status before leaving. Accordingly, 8 CFR 245.2(a)(4)(ii)(B)-(C) outlines two distinct pathways. Under (B), it allows those with approved AP to leave the country and then subsequently return in AP without abandoning their AOS, absent any specific situations outlined in the regulation. Under (C), the same is true for those who leave in H-4/L-2 status and return in H-4/L-2.

In 2000, the Cronin Memo was published and clarified that although an H-1B or L is considered  to be paroled after entering the United States via AP, he/she is still able to apply for an extension of H-1B or L if there was a valid and approved petition. Upon the granting of the H-1B or L extension, the grant of parole would be terminated, and the H-1B applicant would then be admitted into the relevant H-1B status. Although the Cronin Memo contemplates one who is already in H-1B and L status before traveling abroad and being paroled via AP, it could also apply to one who has a pending extension of  H-1B or L-1 status application and who traveled abroad under AP and was paroled into the US. Likewise, upon the approval of the H-1B or L-1 request, the parole would be terminated, and the beneficiary would be admitted in H-1B or L status. This allows the H-1B beneficiary to travel abroad while simultaneously preserving the AOS when both the H-1B and AOS are pending.

There is an inherent vagueness as to whether the Cronin memo applies to derivatives since H-4s and L-2s are not mentioned in the memo in respect to this issue. One may however argue, through anecdotal experience, that the Cronin Memo should apply to H-4s and L-2s and therefore, the H-4/L-2 should be able to enter the United States in AP and be able to switch to H-4/L-2 status once the H-4/L-2 extension is approved.

Preserving Adjustment of Status When Advanced Parole and H-4 are Pending 

What happens when an H-4 has a pending AOS and has not received AP or H-4 approval but wants to travel based on an emergency? This issue is two-fold and is specifically applicable to those whose prior H-4/L-2 statuses have expired and have timely filed their extensions but still await processing. As mentioned before in our prior blog, although the H-4 can get a visa stamp at a US consulate, the AOS may be deemed abandoned if the H-4 left the US without H-4 status or AP.

In this scenario, the only recourse for the H-4 is to apply for an emergency AP by calling the USCIS 800 number to schedule an appointment with the local USCIS office, however, it is not definite that one will be able to connect to a live-person, let alone convince the USCIS that the emergency qualifies for expeditious AP processing.

Does an L-2 Spouse Need an EAD?  

Out of the many downfalls of the H-4/L-2 processing delays, one of the most significant is the Employment Authorization Document (EAD) processing gaps afflicting families around the nation. At large, this issue has subjected many spouses and their families to financial struggle, and it remains a leading issue that the USCIS and the Biden administration must immediately resolve. The hardship is compounded by the fact that there are delays in the processing of the EAD under both the AOS and the H-4/L-2.  Nonetheless, there may be an arguable legal basis for an L-2 spouse to engage in employment without obtaining an EAD.

In the Matter of Do Kyung Lee, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that employment authorization is incident to E-2 status. INA 214(e)(6) explicitly states that an E-2 spouse shall be authorized to engage in employment.  In this unpublished  decision, the BIA reasoned that the regulation at 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(2) only specified that the dependent spouse and child of an E-1 visa holder must apply for work authorization, but the same regulation did not specifically state that the spouse of an E-2 must do the same. The Court held that since INA 214(e)(6) specifically authorized the E-2 spouse to engage in employment, the E-2 spouse’s failure to apply for an EAD did not result in a violation of status. Based on the reasoning of this BIA decision, the same logic can be applied to L-2 spouses since INA 214(c)(2)(E) explicitly authorizes L-2 spouses to engage in employment. The regulations at 8 CFR 274a.12 do not have a specific category for L-2 spouses, and USCIS requires L-2 spouses to use the catchall reserved provision under 8 CFR 274a.12(a)(18).

Nevertheless, this is still a gray area and E-2 and L-2 spouses are therefore still recommended to apply for an EAD. Even if the reasoning of this unpublished BIA decision is accepted by the USCIS, a lack of EAD could potentially trigger I-9 noncompliance issues with respect to the employer as ICE may not recognize the holding of an unpublished BIA decision.

The reasoning of this BIA decision is not appliable to H-4 spouses as there is no explicit INA provision that specifically authorizes H-4 spouses to engage in employment. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Obama administration specifically created a regulation which authorizes EAD for an H-4 under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(26), based on implied authority in the INA to issue work authorization to any class of noncitizens. The Trump administration tried to unsuccessfully rescind the rule as it was hostile towards H-4 EADs, but could not get it past the Office of Management and Budget. The Trump administration then imposed the biometric requirement for every I-539 extension, which in turn delayed the grant of the H-4 EAD. The pandemic that followed in March 2020 caused further delays and backlogs.

Conclusion

We reiterate our request that the Biden administration remove the biometric requirement imposed by the prior Trump administration when an I-539 application is filed. The justification by the Trump administration, as revealed in a recent WSJ article, that the biometric requirement was necessary so that dependents did not misrepresent themselves is spurious. Until 2019, there was never a biometric requirement when dependents filed I-539s, and there were no widespread incidents of such misrepresentations. Many of these dependents were already vetted when they obtained H-4 and L-2 visa stamps at US consulates. Moreover, subjecting infants and toddlers seeking H-4 and L-2 extensions to this is downright cruel. Eliminating this unnecessary biometric requirement will go a long way in eliminating the delays facing H-2 and L-2 spouses as they can then be processed under the premium processing request filed through the principal spouse’s H-1B or L-1 petition. The DHS should also initiate premium processing for EAD requests since Congress authorized additional premium processing last year. Finally, since INA 214(c)(2)(E) explicitly authorizes an L-2 spouse to engage in employment, what is the need to require the L-2 spouse to go through the lengthy process of applying for an EAD? Under the logic of the BIA decision in Do Kyung Lee, an E-2 or L-2 spouse who engages in employment without an EAD will not be viewed as engaging in unauthorized employment. Therefore, even if the Biden administration cannot speed up EAD processing quickly, it can officially pronounce that L-2 and E-2 spouses need not obtain an EAD.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

* Isabel Rajabzadeh is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC and is admitted to practice law in New York.

 

Cyrus Mehta

The Fascinating Confluence of Temporary Protected Status, Removal and Employment-Based Adjustment of Status

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Immigration Judge Ila C. Deiss’ summary order shows how one who is granted Temporary Protected Status can adjust to permanent resident status through an I-140 petition filed by an employer.

Here are the facts based upon which IJ Deiss issued the order:

The Respondent is a native and citizen of Nepal who arrived in the United States in 2006 in F-1 student status. In 2007 he stopped going to school and began working without authorization. He affirmatively filed for asylum in 2008, but his asylum claim was not granted and he was placed in removal proceedings in the same year. An Immigration Judge denied his asylum claim in 2010 and he was granted voluntary departure. Respondent appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal in 2011. Respondent then filed a Petition for Review in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, which was denied in 2014. His case was then remanded to the Immigration Judge and was subsequently Administratively Closed based on a grant of Temporary Protected Status. In 2015, as a result of a massive earth quake, the Attorney General designated Nepal for Temporary Protected Status. Respondent, as a citizen of Nepal, applied for and was granted TPS in the same year and continued to be a recipient of TPS registration at the time of the decision.

Respondent’s employer filed an I-140 petition to the USCIS on his behalf in 2019, and in the same year, Respondent concurrently filed an I-485 adjustment of status application with the court.  The legal question before IJ Deiss was whether the Respondent was eligible for adjustment of status.

Earlier, in Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2017), the Ninth Circuit held that TPS constitutes an admission for purpose of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under INA 245(a). A foreign national who enters the United States without inspection, which was the case in Ramirez v. Brown, does not qualify for adjustment of status even if married to a US citizen since s/he does not meet the key requirement of INA § 245(a), which is to “have been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.” However, both Ramirez, and another case in the 6th Circuit with the same facts,   Flores v. USCIS, 718 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2013), held that as a matter of statutory interpretation, Congress intended TPS recipients to be considered “admitted” for purposes of INA 245(a). Thus, even if the foreign national entered without inspection, the grant of TPS constituted an admission thus rendering the TPS recipient eligible for adjustment of status. Of course, the other conditions of INA 245(a) must also be met, which is not be inadmissible as well as have a visa that is immediately available. The disqualifications to adjustment of status in INA 245(c)(2) such as working without authorization, being in unlawful status or failing to maintain lawful status since entry are not applicable to immediate relatives of US citizens, who are spouses, minor children and parents.

The courts in Ramirez and Flores relied on INA § 244 (f)(4), which provides:

(f) Benefits and Status During Period of Protected Status – During a period in which an alien is granted temporary protected status under this section-

(4) for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245 and change of status under section 248, the alien shall be considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant

Both courts read the above phrase, especially “for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245 and change of status under section 248” to be in harmony with being “admitted” for purposes of adjustment of status. As § 244(f)(4) bestows nonimmigrant status on a TPS recipient, an alien who has obtained nonimmigrant status is deemed to be “admitted.” Thus, at least in places that fall under the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, TPS recipients who have been granted nonimmigrant status under INA 244(f)(4) could potentially adjust status to permanent residence as immediate relatives of US citizens. Those who have entered without inspection in these two circuits need not travel outside the US under advance parole in order to become eligible to adjust status under § 245(a). On the other hand, those not in the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuit who were not previously admitted will need to travel under advance parole to become eligible for adjustment of status as immediate relatives by availing of Matter of Arrabelly and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012). Under this decision, a departure under advance parole does not trigger the 3 and 10-year unlawful presence bars pursuant to INA 212(a)(9)(B).

In a prior blog titled Potential Adjustment of Status Options After the Termination of TPS, I raised the question whether the holdings in Ramirez and Flores could apply to TPS recipients who are beneficiaries of an approved I-140 petition under the employment-based first, second, third and fourth preferences. I postulated that the “answer arguably is ‘yes” under § 245(k) provided they fall under the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.

IJ Deiss’ order in the San Francisco Immigration Court, which falls under the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, now confirms that §245(k) can rescue such persons even if they are in removal proceedings. § 245(k) exempts applicants for adjustment of status who are otherwise subject to the § 245(c)(2) bar based on unauthorized employment or for not maintaining lawful status provided they are present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission and subsequent to such admission have not failed to maintain lawful status or engaged in unauthorized unemployment for more than 180 days. § 245(k) also waives the bars under §§ 245(c)(7) and (c)(8) that otherwise apply to employment-based adjustment applicants.  Thus, even if the TPS recipient may have not been in lawful status prior to the grant of TPS, the grant of TPS resulted in the individual being admitted into the US. If this person files within the TPS validity period, 245(k) should allow this person to adjust to permanent residence, as IJ Deiss also held.

The attorney for the respondent, Emily Wilson,  in arguing for 245(k) eligibility relied on a USCIS memo by Acting Associate Director, Donald Neufeld, titled Applicability of Section 245(k) to Certain Employment Based Adjustment of Status Applications filed under Section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This memo correctly interprets 245(k) by stating that “adjudicators must only examine the 180 day period from the date of the alien’s last lawful admission to the United States and must not count violations that occurred before the alien’s last lawful admission.” In the instant case, the Respondent’s last lawful admission to the United States was his grant of TPS in 2015. Ms. Wilson went on to argue, “Under a plain reading of the regulation and USCIS’ guidance on the applicability of 245(k) it is clear that only violations of 245(c)(2), (c)(7), and (c)(6) that occurred after the TPS grant are relevant in this case. Since the Respondent has no violations of 245(c)(2), (c)(7), and (c)(8) since his TPS grant on [redacted] 2015 he is eligible to adjust status to lawful permanent resident under §§ 245(a) and 245(k) of the INA.”

Another interesting aspect of this case is that the grant of TPS constituted another admission, thus resenting the clock, although the Respondent was previously admitted in F-1 status. In Ramirez and Flores, the adjustment applicants had entered without inspection, and conceptually, it is easier to admit someone who was previously not admitted. However, there is nothing in the reading of  §244(f)(4) that should preclude someone from being admitted again, as in the instant case,  even if previously admitted in a nonimmigrant status prior to the TPS grant.

There are other interesting things to ponder about. Although the Trump administration has sought to terminated TPS for Nepal, under the court ordered stipulation in Bhattarai v. Neilsen the TPS designation for Nepal remains in effect. I would argue that even assuming TPS for Nepal was terminated at the time IJ Deiss rendered her decision, 245(k) ought to allow a respondent in removal proceedings to adjust status. Although INA 244(f)(4) bestows lawful nonimmigrant status to a current TPS recipient, that grant of nonimmigrant status also previously admitted the TPS recipient into the United States. The fact that she was once admitted through the TPS grant cannot vanish just because she is no longer a TPS recipient, and she ought to be eligible to adjust status under 245(k) so long as she has not stayed in the US greater than 180 days from the termination of TPS designation. Once a person has been admitted, the person is still considered to have been admitted for 245(a) purposes even if the period of stay under TPS expires. I would further argue that this should apply to a § 244(f)(4) implied admission as much as it does to any other kind of admission. If you are necessarily admitted because you have gone from having entered without inspection to being in nonimmigrant status, that does not cease to have been the case because your nonimmigrant status later goes away. Finally, Ms. Wilson correctly pointed out in footnote 1 in her decision that a derivative may also benefit under § 245(k), according to the USCIS 245(k) memo, and so the Respondent’s spouse who presumably is also a TPS recipient along with her spouse is also eligible to apply for adjustment of status.

Note that § 245(k) is only applicable to I-485 applications filed under the employment-based first, second, third and fourth preferences. With respect to family-based preference petitions, USCIS has taken the position that anyone who has ever failed to maintain continuously a lawful status will not be eligible for adjustment of status (although there is one outlier federal district court decision, See Figueroa v. Rodriguez, No. CV-16-8218 -PA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128120 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2017)). Hence, the beneficiary of an I-130 filed by a permanent resident on behalf of his spouse will likely not be able to adjust status if he was not in status prior to the grant of TPS. Also, one who needs to travel outside the United States in order to become eligible for adjustment of status under § 245(a) as an immediate relative, especially those outside the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, will not be able to avail of § 245(k) to adjust pursuant to an employment-based I-140 petition as § 245(k) only applies to one who has been admitted rather than paroled into the United States..

Unfortunately, the beneficial impact of a TPS grant for employment-based adjustment applicants is only applicable to those within the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuit. It is also important to note that the Eleventh Circuit in Serrano v. Unites States Attorney General, 655 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2011) held that TPS was not an admission for purposes of adjustment under INA 245(a). A class action, filed by the American Immigration Council, is designed to replicate the Ramirez and Flores decisions in all Circuits that have not yet ruled and has been awaiting a decision from the district court judge for over a year in the Eastern District of New York. In the interim, the issue is now pending in the Third, Fifth, and Eight Circuits and the AIC has filed amicus briefs in all of them. There is a strong statutory argument that the grant of TPS constitutes an admission under § 244(f)(4), and thus allows one to adjust status both as an immediate relative and also through an employment-based I-140 petition under § 245(k). This logical and unambiguous interpretation should ultimately be adhered to by all courts.

(Hats off to Emily Wilson who was the Respondent’s attorney!)

Cyrus Mehta

Potential Adjustment of Status Options After the Termination of TPS

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As President Trump restricts immigration, it is incumbent upon immigration lawyers to assist their clients with creative solutions available under law. The most recent example of Trump’s attack on immigration is the cancellation of Temporary Protected Status for more than 200,000 Salvadorans. David Isaacson’s What Comes Next: Potential Relief Options After the Termination of TPS comprehensively provides tips on how to represent TPS recipients whose authorization will soon expire with respect to asylum, cancellation or removal and adjustment of status.

I focus specifically on how TPS recipients can potentially adjust their status within the United States through either a family-based I-130 petition or an I-140 employment-based petition for permanent residency. A September 2017 practice advisory from the American Immigration Council points to two decisions from the Ninth and Sixth Circuit, Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2017) and Flores v. USCIS, 718 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2013), holding that TPS constitutes an admission for purpose of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under INA 245(a).

In both these cases, the plaintiffs previously entered the United States without inspection, and then became recipients of TPS grants and subsequently married US citizens. At issue in both those cases was whether they were eligible for adjustment of status under INA 245(a) as beneficiaries of immediate relative I-130 petitions filed by their US citizen spouses. Both the decisions answered this question in the affirmative.

A foreign national who enters the United States without inspection does not qualify for adjustment of status even if married to a US citizen since s/he does not meet the key requirement of INA 245(a), which is to “have been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.” However, both Ramirez and Flores held that as a matter of statutory interpretation, Congress intended TPS recipients to be considered “admitted” for purposes of INA 245(a). Thus, even if the foreign national entered without inspection, the grant of TPS constituted an admission thus rendering the TPS recipient eligible for adjustment of status. Of course, the other conditions of INA 245(a) must also be met, which is to be eligible to receive a visa and not be inadmissible as well as have a visa that is immediately available. The disqualifications to adjustment of status in INA 245(c)(2) such as working without authorization, being in unlawful status or failing to maintain lawful status since entry are not applicable to immediate relatives of US citizens, who are spouses, minor children and parents.

The courts in Ramirez and Flores relied on INA 244 (f)(4), which provides:

(f) Benefits and Status During Period of Protected Status – During a period in which an alien is granted temporary protected status under this section-

(4) for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245 and change of status under section 248, the alien shall be considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant

Both courts read the above phrase, especially “for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245 and change of status under section 248” to be in harmony with being “admitted” for purposes of adjustment of status. As INA 244(f)(4) bestows nonimmigrant status on a TPS recipient, an alien who has obtained nonimmigrant status is deemed to be “admitted.” Thus, at least in places that fall under the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, TPS recipients who have been granted nonimmigrant status under INA 244(f)(4) could potentially adjust status to permanent residence as immediate relatives of US citizens.

The next question is whether a TPS recipient can also adjust status to permanent residence if s/he is the beneficiary of an approved I-140 petition under the employment-based first, second, third and fourth preferences. The answer arguably is “yes” provided the applicant resides in a place that falls under the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. INA 245(k) will come to their rescue, which applies to the employment-based first to fourth preferences.

A TPS recipient from El Salvador who is concerned that her TPS designation will terminate on September 9, 2019 may wish to request her employ to file a labor certification on her behalf. If the labor certification is approved, after an unsuccessful test of the US labor market for her experience and skills, the employer may file an I-140 petition and potentially a concurrent I-485 adjustment of status application. The EB-2 and EB-3 priority dates for a person born in El Salvador are current in the February 2018 visa bulletin, and likely to remain current over the foreseeable future.

INA 245(k) exempts applicants for adjustment who are otherwise subject to the INA 245(c)(2) bar based on unauthorized employment or for not maintaining lawful status provided they are present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission and subsequent to such admission have not failed to maintain lawful status or engaged in unauthorized unemployment for more than 180 days. Thus, even if the TPS recipient may have not been in lawful status prior to the grant of TPS, the grant of TPS resulted in the individual being admitted into the US. If this person files within the TPS validity period, 245(k) should allow this person to adjust to permanent residence.

I would posit that this person would be eligible under 245(k) to apply for adjustment of status within 180 days from the expiration of the TPS status. This may well be the case if there is a delay in the processing of the labor certification or if there is a retrogression in the priority date.  Although INA 244(f)(4) bestows lawful nonimmigrant status to a current TPS recipient, that grant of nonimmigrant status also previously admitted her into the United States. The fact that she was once admitted through the TPS grant cannot vanish just because she is no longer a TPS recipient, and she ought to be eligible to adjust status under 245(k) so long as she has not stayed in the US greater than 180 days from the termination of TPS designation. Once a person has been admitted, the person is still considered to have been admitted for 245(a) purposes even if the period of stay under TPS expires. I would argue that this should apply to a INA 244(f)(4) implied admission as much as it does to any other kind of admission. If you are necessarily admitted because you have gone from having entered without inspection to being in nonimmigrant status, that does not cease to have been the case because your nonimmigrant status later goes away.

A person who was previously admitted in a nonimmigrant status, but who then fell out of status prior to the grant of TPS, may also arguably be considered admitted once again under 245(k) upon receiving a grant of TPS. One could argue that the TPS is the last admission for 245(k).  However, the argument is probably stronger for one who entered without inspection, since traditionally only the granting of status to someone previously not admitted is a new “admission”—going out of status and back in doesn’t have the same tradition of being characterized that way.

Note that 245(k) is only applicable to I-485 applications filed under the employment-based first, second, third and fourth preferences. With respect to family-based preference petitions, USCIS has taken the position that anyone who has ever failed to maintain continuously a lawful status will not be eligible for adjustment of status. Hence, the beneficiary of an I-130 filed by a permanent resident on behalf of his spouse will not be able to adjust status if he was not in status prior to the grant of TPS. The AIC practice advisory cites Figueroa v. Rodriguez, No. CV-16-8218 -PA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128120 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2017), which held to the contrary that TPS cures the prior lack of status for a family preference beneficiary, but since this is a decision from a district court it has no precedential value and should not be relied upon.  Of course, if his spouse becomes a US citizen, then he qualifies as an immediate relative and also eligible to adjust status if admissible despite having not maintained status prior to the TPS grant, or even if the TPS terminates, as immediate relatives are exempt from the 245(c)(2) bar.

Those who do not reside in the Sixth and Ninth Circuit can also adjust by availing of Matter of Arrabelly and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012). Under this decision, a departure under advance parole does not trigger the 3 and 10-year unlawful presence bars pursuant to INA 212(a)(9)(B). Thus, a TPS recipient may apply for advance parole, leave the United States and be paroled back into the United States (although beware that under the Trump administration, CBP could deny entry to one with advance parole). The departure would not trigger the unlawful presence bars and the parole would be recognized for purposes of adjusting under INA 245(a) as having been “inspected and admitted or paroled.” Note, though, that the entry into the United States under parole would only render one eligible for adjustment of status as an immediate relative, and not under an approved I-140 preference petition since INA 245(k) only applies to one who has been admitted rather than paroled into the United States. The parole entry would also not help a preference beneficiary under an approved I-130. Although parole could be considered a lawful status (as the INA 245(c)(7) bar only applies to employment-based I-140s that are not subject to the 245(k) exception) for purposes of adjustment of status based on a family preference I-130, the applicant must demonstrate that s/he never previously violated lawful status. Proceeding overseas for consular processing, where filing an adjustment of status application may not be possible, may trigger the 3 and 10-year bars if the TPS recipient previously accrued unlawful presence prior to the grant of TPS. Even if the TPS recipient departs the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole, it is not clear whether the US Consulate will recognize Matter of Arrabelly and Yerrabelly in situations where the person departs under advance parole but intends to return on an immigrant visa. Thus, those who plan to proceed for consular processing who have accrued the requisite unlawful presence to trigger the 3 and 10-year bars should only proceed if they can obtain a provisional waiver of the bars based on extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

What is quite certain presently is the ability to adjust status as an immediate relative if the TPS recipient resides within the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) or the Ninth Circuit (California, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands). It is also important to note that the Eleventh Circuit in Serrano v. Unites States Attorney General, 655 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2011) held that TPS was not an admission for purposes of adjustment under INA 245(a).  As David pointed out in his blog, those who reside outside those two Circuits, except in the Eleventh Circuit,  might still be able to pursue adjustment of status on the same theory if they are willing to litigate in federal court following any denials. An applicant can litigate by bringing an action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.  701 in federal district court. Alternatively, if the applicant is placed in removal proceedings, s/he can argue these theories before an Immigration Judge, and if unsuccessful to the Board of Immigration Appeals and subsequently in a Court of Appeals. Further details on various litigation strategies may be provided in a subsequent blog.  Even if a TPS recipient resides within the jurisdiction of the Sixth or Ninth Circuit, it is not clear whether the USCIS will accept an argument for adjustment of status through an I-140 employment-based petition under INA 245(k). This uncertainty gets exacerbated where the TPS grant has already expired and the I-485 is being filed within 180 days of its final expiration date.  Hence, the TPS recipient planning to deploy an adjustment of status strategy under 245(k) must also be prepared to litigate even if residing within the jurisdiction of the Sixth or Ninth Circuit. Under the Trump administration, when immigration benefits have suddenly been curtailed for long time TPS recipients, it may be worth adopting creating adjustment of status strategies, and if USCIS does not accept them, to consider litigating until there is success as was the case in the Ramirez and Flores decisions.

(This blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as a substitute for independent legal advice supplied by a lawyer familiar with a client’s case.)

David Isaacson

Some Preliminary Reactions to the Oral Argument in United States v. Texas

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As most readers of this blog will likely be aware, the Supreme Court heard oral argument today in the case now captioned United States v. Texas, regarding the lawsuit brought by Texas and a number of other states to stop implementation of DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans) and expanded DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals).  The transcript of the argument is now available online, although the audiotape will not be available until later in the week.  There has been much media coverage of the argument, including by the always-insightful SCOTUSBlog, and a number of media organizations and commentators have suggested that the Court may divide 4 to 4, thus leaving the Fifth Circuit’s decision intact and preventing DAPA and expanded DACA from going into effect at this time.  While that is a possibility, however, there are also some reasons to be optimistic that it may not come to pass.

I do not wish to recap all of the voluminous coverage of the argument by the media and commentators, but will focus in this blog post primarily on one or two things that I have not seen highlighted by other commentators. However, there is one observation about the argument, not original to me, which does seem worth passing along, and which falls under the heading of reasons for optimism.  As Chris Geidner has pointed out in his review of the oral argument on Buzzfeed, Justice Anthony Kennedy, who is often seen as a swing vote in cases where the Court is closely divided, raised the possibility that the more appropriate way for Texas to have proceeded would have been to challenge the application of the regulation granting employment authorization to deferred action beneficiaries, 8 C.F.R. §274a.12(c)(14), under the Administrative Procedure Act.  Justice Sotomayor discussed with Solicitor General Verrilli on page 31 of the transcript the possibility that, if Texas had wanted to attack the 1986 regulation that allows employment authorization under many circumstances including deferred action, they could have petitioned the agency for rulemaking under section 553(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act.  If that failed, they could then have gone to court.  Instead, Texas went directly into court without first raising its concerns with the agency—a procedural shortcut which a majority of the Court may not be willing to tolerate.  This is separate from the constitutional concern, also discussed at length during the argument, that Texas may not have standing to attack DAPA where its asserted injury relates to its own decision to subsidize the issuance of driver’s licenses to certain classes of individuals.

Another notable portion of the oral argument was the discussion of the outsized importance that the plaintiff States have attached to the brief mention in the DAPA memorandum of “lawful presence”. As Marty Lederman explained in a post on the Balkinization blog prior to the oral argument, the significance of “lawful presence” in this context relates primarily to eligibility for certain Social Security and Medicare benefits, as well as to the tolling of unlawful presence for purposes of potential future inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(9)(B).  Neither of these things, however, has anything to do with the injury that Texas alleges.  Nor are they of particularly great significance in the context of DAPA as a whole.  Professor Lederman had described the lawful-presence argument as “the smallest of tails wagging a very large dog”, a phrase that Solicitor General Verrilli expanded upon (or should I say contracted upon?) on page 32 of the oral argument transcript by noting that the lawful-presence issue was “the tail on the dog and the flea on the tail of the dog.”  (He also returned to the basic “tail of the dog” formulation on page 88, in his rebuttal.)  If necessary, he offered, the Court could simply take a “red pencil” and excise the offending phrase from the memo, and this would be “totally fine” with the government.

Just as the issue of “lawful presence” lacks a connection to the injury Texas alleges, it was also discussed at the oral argument how even the employment authorization that is a much more important component of DAPA as it would operate in practice, and which seems to be what Texas is in large part challenging, does not really relate to Texas’s alleged injury. As Solicitor General Verrilli and also Thomas Saenz, arguing for intervenor prospective DAPA beneficiaries, pointed out, Texas, under its current policy, gives driver’s licenses based on the granting of deferred action itself, rather than based upon employment authorization.  Even if the federal government restricted itself to deferring any removal action against the intended beneficiaries of DAPA – as Texas, in the person of its Solicitor General Scott Keller, seemed to concede on page 50 of the transcript that it would have the authority to do – and simply, as Justice Ginsburg suggested, gave out ID cards noting the low priority status of the beneficiaries, Texas would still, under its current policy, apparently have to give those beneficiaries subsidized driver’s licenses.  Thus, besides the other problems with Texas’s claim that it is harmed sufficiently by DAPA to have standing to challenge it, there is the problem of redressability.  A decision forbidding the federal government to give out employment authorization documents, or declare “lawful presence”, under DAPA, while still permitting it to defer removal actions against DAPA’s beneficiaries, would not actually solve the problem that Texas is claiming DAPA has caused.  It is, instead, merely a convenient hook for what is actually a political dispute.  Solicitor General Verrilli returned to this point in his rebuttal argument, noting that Texas had offered no response to it.

Another notable portion of the oral argument relating to employment authorization was the discussion of how, as Justice Alito asked on page 28 of the transcript, it is “possible to lawfully work in the United States without lawfully being in the United States?” As Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli attempted to explain, while this may seem peculiar, employment authorization based on a mere pending application for lawful status, such as an application for adjustment of status or cancellation of removal, is quite common.  Many, many people receive such authorization pursuant to the administrative authority recognized by 8 U.S.C. §1324a(h)(3), as discussed in my prior blog post Ignoring the Elephant in the Room: An Initial Reaction to Judge Hanen’s Decision Enjoining DAPA and Expanded DACA.  The suggestion that such authorization cannot exist would wreak havoc on our immigration system as we now know it.  As Solicitor General Verrilli pointed out on page 31 of the transcript, reading the §1324a(h)(3) authority as narrowly as suggested by the plaintiffs would eliminate well over a dozen of the current regulatory categories of employment authorization.  It would, to quote from Solicitor General Verrilli’s rebuttal argument at page 89, “completely and totally upend the administration of the immigration laws, and, frankly, it’s a reckless suggestion.”

Indeed, as I pointed out in a blog post several years ago, there are many circumstances under which even someone subject to a removal order can be lawfully granted work authorization.  Those whose asylum applications were denied in removal proceedings but who are seeking judicial review of that denial, for example, may obtain employment authorization under 8 C.F.R. §274a.12(c)(8).  An applicant for adjustment of status under INA §245 or cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents under INA §240A(b) who has his or her application denied by an immigration judge and the BIA, is ordered removed, and petitions for judicial review of the order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) on the ground that a legal or constitutional error has been made in adjudicating the application, may also renew employment authorization.  Even outside the context of judicial review, an applicant for adjustment who was ordered removed as an arriving alien, and who is nonetheless applying to USCIS for adjustment of status pursuant to Matter of Yauri, 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009), can be eligible for employment authorization.

The anomaly of concurrent authorization to work in the United States and lack of authorization to be here, paradoxical though it may have seemed to Justice Alito, can exist even with respect to some of the forms of employment authorization authorized by very specific statutory provisions, rather than under the general authority of 8 U.S.C. §1324a(h)(3)—the forms of employment authorization that even Justice Alito and Texas acknowledge should exist. In 8 U.S.C. §1158(d)(2), for example, Congress specifically indicated that while “an applicant for asylum is not entitled to employment authorization . . . such authorization may be provided under regulation by the Attorney General.”  The implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. §208.7(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c) make clear that such employment authorization is renewable pending the completion of administrative and judicial review of a denial of the asylum application.  Thus, an asylum applicant whose application was denied, resulting in an order of removal, and who is seeking judicial review of that order, can obtain renewed employment authorization.

Admittedly, in some cases, a court of appeals can grant a stay of the order of removal for an asylum applicant in this situation, pending adjudication of the petition for review—which one might consider a form of authorization to be in the United States. But a stay of removal is not a precondition for a grant of employment under 8 U.S.C. §1158(d)(2) and 8 C.F.R. §274a.12(c)(8), either in theory or in practice.  It is fairly common for asylum applicants who are not detained to pursue judicial review without a stay of removal and to renew their employment authorization while doing so.  They are authorized to work in the United States, even though in theory they are not authorized to be here.  As long as they are here, because the government has not thought it worth removing them during the pendency of their court case, they can lawfully work.

Given Justice Alito’s follow-up question about whether the categories of persons who had employment authorization without lawful presence were “statutory categories”, however, it is also worth emphasizing that other kinds of employment authorization besides those specifically authorized by statute can persist even in the face of a removal order. Employment authorization based on a pending application for adjustment of status or cancellation of removal, under 8 C.F.R. §274a.12(c)(9) and 8 C.F.R. §274a.12(c)(10), does not stem from the sort of type-specific statutory authorization at 8 U.S.C. §1158(d)(2).  Nonetheless, these types of employment authorization, which have been granted for many years in significant volume with little controversy, can be obtained by someone with a final removal order who is seeking judicial review of that order, or who is seeking adjustment of status under Matter of Yauri.  To the extent Justice Alito meant to imply that the seeming paradox of authorized employment without authorized presence could only be justified by a specific statutory authorization, this too was an inaccurate description of the world of immigration law since long before DAPA.

While the discussion at oral argument of employment authorization separate from lawful status did not go so far as to address this issue of employment authorization for those subject to orders of removal, it did seem that the Solicitor General’s emphasis on the sheer scale of those grants of employment authorization may have made an impact on Chief Justice Roberts.  The Chief Justice, at the end of Solicitor General Verilli’s rebuttal, returned to the question of how many of these sorts of employment authorization documents are issued, and the answer on page 90 that there were 4.5 million in the context of adjustment of status since 2008 and 325,000 for cancellation of removal was the last substantive portion of the argument transcript.  This was potentially a strong closing argument, which may be a hopeful sign.

Attempting to predict the outcome of a case from oral argument is always a risky endeavor, and we will have to wait and see what the Court actually does. Nonetheless, it is my hope that the above observations may perhaps provide some additional insight.

Cyrus Mehta

When is a Visa “Immediately Available” for Filing an Adjustment of Status Application?

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Central in the Mehta v. DOS lawsuit is whether the administration is authorized to establish a dual date system in the Department of State’s (DOS) Visa Bulletin, which it did for the first time in October 2015. When the DOS first issued the October 2015 Visa Bulletin on September 9, 2015, it established a filing date, which allowed applicants to file for adjustment of status much earlier than the final action date. On September 25, 2015, in a revised October 2015 Visa Bulletin, the administration abruptly moved back some of the filing dates by at least two years, thus depriving thousands from filing I-485 adjustment of status applications on October 1, 2015. A lawsuit was filed challenging this revision in the filing dates, including a motion for a temporary restraining order. The government has filed pleadings in opposition to the TRO, which includes a declaration from Charlie Oppenheim.

INA 245(a)(3) allows for the filing of an I-485 application for adjustment of status when the visa is “immediately available” to the applicant. 8 C.F.R. 245.1(g)(1) links visa availability to the Department of State’s (DOS)  monthly Visa Bulletin. Pursuant to this regulation, an I-485 application can only be submitted “if the preference category applicant has a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in the Bulletin (or the Bulletin shows that numbers for visa applicants in his or her category are current).” The term “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3) has never been defined, except as in 8 C.F.R. 245.1(g)(1) by “a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in Bulletin” or if the date in the Bulletin is current for that category.

DOS has historically never advanced priority dates based on certitude that a visa would actually be available. There have been many instances when applicants have filed an I-485 application in a particular month, only to later find that the dates have retrogressed. A good example is the April 2012 Visa Bulletin, when the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China were May 1, 2010. In the very next May 2012 Visa Bulletin  a month later, the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China retrogressed to August 15, 2007. If the DOS was absolutely certain that applicants born in India and China who filed in April 2012  would receive their green cards, it would not have needed to retrogress dates back to August 15, 2007.  Indeed, those EB-2 applicants who filed their I-485 applications in April 2012 are still waiting and have yet to receive their green cards even as of today! Another example is when the DOS announced that the July 2007 Visa Bulletin for EB-2 and EB-3 would become current. Hundreds of thousands filed during that period (which actually was the extended period from July 17, 2007 to August 17, 2007)  . It was obvious that these applicants would not receive their green cards during that time frame. The DOS  then retrogressed the EB dates substantially the following month, and those who filed under the India EB-3 in July-August 2007 are still waiting today.

These two examples, among many, go to show that “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3), according to the DOS, have never meant that visas were actually available to be issued to applicants as soon as they filed. Rather, it has always been based on a notion of visa availability at some point of time in the future. The following extract from The Tyranny of Priority Dates, where Gary Endelman (who is now an Immigration Judge and is not participating in this blog)  and I in 2010 proposed the concept of a provisional date for filing I-485 applications  is worth noting:

It can be further argued that 245(a)(3), which requires that the alien have an available visa “at the time his application is filed,” cannot be read literally to preclude the initial filing of an adjustment application when its conditions are not met, as opposed to merely precluding the approval of such application. Otherwise ordinary concurrent filing (such as an I-140 and I-485) even as it exists today would be impermissible, because, as immigration judges periodically point out in the course of denying motions for continuance, someone who does not have an approved visa petition necessarily does not have an available visa number.

As David Isaacson has observed, there are other contexts under existing law in which one cannot simply assume that the date of “application” or date of “filing” referred to in statute or regulation means the date the application papers are filed in the ordinary sense of the word. Rather, such terms sometimes mean something closer to the date of final adjudication. So in In re Ortega-Cabrera, the examination of good moral character for the ten years “immediately preceding the date of the application” under INA § 240A(b)(1)(A) was held to entail examination of good moral character during the ten years immediately preceding the final decision in the case, not the ten years immediately preceding the date the application papers were initially filed as a physical matter. 23 I&N Dec. 793 (BIA 2005). Similarly, in In re Garcia, the Board of Immigration Appeals interpreted a regulation allowing special-rule cancellation for an alien who “has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of [seven] years immediately preceding the date the application was filed,” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(b)(2), to be satisfied where “the respondent accrued [seven] years of continuous physical presence prior to the issuance of a final administrative decision for purposes of establishing eligibility for relief.” 24 I&N Dec. 179, 183 (BIA 2007). 

One could thus analogize and alternatively argue that the requirement of INA § 245(a)(3) that the alien have an available visa “at the time his application is filed” actually means that there must be an available visa at the time the application is finally adjudicated. In effect, what we are ultimately saying in both cases is that the official time of “filing” for statutory purposes does not have to correspond to the date when the application papers are physically submitted and ancillary benefits are granted. Although Section 6 of the 1976 Act to Amend the INA, Pub. L. No. 94-571 § 6, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976),substituted the word “filed” for the word “approved” in INA § 245(a)(3), it should not cripple our argument that the statutory moment of “filing” is not necessarily the same thing as the moment the papers are submitted or the moment that ancillary benefits are granted.

The October 2015 Visa Bulletin announced on September 9, 2015 replaced the single priority date with a filing date and a final action date. The final action date is when the beneficiary will be eligible to receive his/her green card, but the new filing date is when the beneficiary will be eligible to file an I-485 application consistent with 8 C.F.R.  245.1(g)(1), and if the beneficiary files an I-485 application, he or she will get the benefits thereof such as an Employment Authorization Document (EAD), advance parole and protection of the beneficiary’s child from aging out under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA).

Although this appears to be novel, the dual filing dates in the October 2015 Visa Bulletin essentially formalize DOS’ historical practice. Under the filing date, it is now formally acknowledged that visa availability is not defined by when visas can actually be issued to the beneficiary. The October 2015 Visa Bulletin views visa availability more broadly, as has been the DOS’ historic practice,  as “dates for filing visa applications within a time frame justifying immediate action in the application process.” The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announcement relating to the October 2015 Visa Bulletin, available at http://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-announces-revised-procedures-determining-visa-availability-applicants-waiting-file-adjustment-status, also expansively interprets visa availability as “eligible applicants” who “are able to take one of the final steps in the process of becoming U.S. permanent residents.”  These DOS and USCIS announcements provide more flexibility for the DOS to move the filing dates forward, and possibly make them even current. Although both versions of the October 2015 Visa Bulletin indicate that DOS will consult with the USCIS, this is consistent with  22 C.F.R 42.51(b), which assigns primary responsibility to the DOS in controlling visas, but considering applicants for adjustment of status as reported by officers of the DHS.

Taking this to its logical extreme, visa availability for establishing the filing date may be based on just one visa being saved in the backlogged preference category, such as the India employment-based third preference (EB-3), like the proverbial Thanksgiving turkey. Just like one turkey every Thanksgiving Day is pardoned by the President and not consumed, similarly one visa can also be left intact rather than used by the foreign national beneficiary.   So long as there is one visa kept available, it would provide the legal basis for an I-485 filing through the earlier filing date, and this would be consistent with INA section 245(a)(3) as well as 8 C.F.R  245.1(g)(1). Filing dates could potentially advance and become current. Therefore, there was no legal basis to retrogress the priority dates in the revised October 2015 Visa Bulletin. Rather the government could have advanced them. My declaration in support of plaintiff’s TRO in Mehta v. DOL further elaborates on the Thanksgiving turkey concept to provide a legal basis for the filing dates to move forward rather than backward.  My declaration concludes, as follows:

Even if the government claims that it miscalculated the number of visas actually available regarding the filing date so as to justify moving the filing dates backwards, a filing date under the October 2015 Visa Bulletin can be established without regard to whether visas can actually be issued to an applicant. All that is needed is that a single visa should be potentially available for purposes of establishing the filing date.  Accordingly, the DOS and the USCIS ought to have left intact the filing dates that were announced in the first version of the October 2015 Visa Bulletin.

Accordingly, the new filing date system established in the October 2015 Visa Bulletin allows for the filing of an I-485 application without regard to whether visas can actually be issued. On October 1, 2015, which is the start of the new fiscal year, visas will be made available in each of the preferences as statutorily prescribed, as well as to the countries within each of the preferences. It is acknowledged that there will be more foreign national applicants needing the visas than the visas that will be made available for the fiscal year. However, the filing date ought to be established based on the fact that there is a visa available in the preference category.  Even if the government claims that it miscalculated the number of visas actually available regarding the filing date so as to justify moving the filing dates backwards, a filing date under the October 2015 Visa Bulletin can be established without regard to whether visas can actually be issued to an applicant. All that is needed is that a visa should be potentially available for purposes of establishing the filing date.

If the administration wishes to restore the filing dates in the October 2015 Visa Bulletin that were initially announced on September 9, 2015, and they should, there is a clear legal basis for doing so and it will be consistent with the DOS’s historic interpretation of  “immediately available” under INA 245(a)(3) and 8 C.F.R. 245.1(g)(1). Moreover, since “immediately available” has not been precisely defined and is ambiguous, under Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), such a view of visa availability would  constitute a permissible interpretation of the statute by the DOS, which is the federal agency that has been charged to primarily administer the control of visa numbers.In its opposition to the lawsuit,  the government has not disavowed the elastic concept of visa availability through the dual date system.   It justifies the revisions in the second October 2015 Visa Bulletin so as to bring the filing date within 8-12 months of the final action date, but does not provide any mathematical calculations, other than the fact that there has been a retrogression in the priority dates between the September and October visa bulletins. However, the notion of visa availability, as viewed by the government, under INA 245(a)(3) is still elastic, whether the applicant is 8-12 months away or 5 years away or 10 years away. It would be one thing if the government argued that its acceptance of I-485s would lead to their immediate approval and grants of green cards, but they instead assert that the revised filing dates move the applicant to within 8-12 months of the final action date. It would be significant if the INA or even a regulation said that visa availability is determined either by the fact that green cards should be immediately issued or should not be more than 8-12 months from being issued, but there is none of that sort of precision in the INA or the 8 CFR.   Accordingly, it is not outside the government’s statutory authority to restore the September 9, 2015 dates or to even bring them to current under the elastic notion of visa availability, which is consistent with “immediately available” under INA 245(a)(3).

The October 2015 Visa Bulletin, according to the Oppenheim Declaration,  imported the concept of qualifying dates for visa processing at consulates into filing dates, which would apply to both consular processing and adjustment of status applications. Prior to the October 2015 Visa Bulletin, qualifying dates for consular processing purposes apart from allowing the applicant to take the necessary steps for becoming documentarily qualified, did not have any legal significance in the sense that the child’s age did not lock in under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) based on a qualifying date. Moreover, INA 245(a)(3) was only applicable to filing adjustment of status applications within the US, and this provision did not apply to qualifying dates. The October 2015 Visa Bulletin acknowledged the administration’s broader understanding of viewing visa availability so as to allow applicants to file under  INA 245(a)(3), and seek ancillary benefits such as 204(j) portability and also protecting the age of the childunder the CSPA. In effect, the qualifying date was elevated to have the same legal significance as the old priority date. Obviously, the government has not acknowledged this in its papers, but what the October 2015 Visa Bulletin did was legally significant, and the abrupt departure from the initially announced October 2015 Visa Bulletin was arbitrary and capricious causing hardship to thousands of applicants who were set to file I-485 applications,   thus warranting a lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act and other grounds.

The whole idea of priority dates is not to prevent immigration but to regulate it. That is not what is happening today. If you are from Mexico or the Philippines, the family-based quotas delay permanent migration to the United States to such an extent that it is virtually blocked. The categories might just as well not exist for most people. If you are from China or India with an advanced degree, the implosion of the employment-based second preference (EB-2) and third Preference (EB-3) categories does not regulate your coming permanently to the United States; it makes it functionally impossible. While the bonds that unite family members can be expected to survive many years of waiting, and even this is painfully excruciating, how many employers will wait a decade for an engineer or geophysicist? Will the business need still exist by the time the priority date becomes current? Will the business itself? In a labor certification case, what relevancy will a determination of unavailability concerning qualified American workers retain after such a long wait? Is it fair to keep the worker tied to a single employer for so long?

In conclusion, the elastic notion of visa availability that has always been practiced, and which has been formalized in the October 2015 Visa Bulletin, is consistent with Congressional intent to not prevent immigration. A broader interpretation of visa availability better serves the purposes of the INA, and it must prevail.