If the US Does Not Eradicate Vaccine Inequality, the Requirement of COVID Vaccinations for Many Green Card Applicants Will Result in a De Facto Ban

By Cyrus D. Mehta

Effective October 1, 2021, with few exceptions, those applying for permanent residence (green card) must be vaccinated against COVID-19, now classified as a “Class A inadmissible condition,” the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced. The CDC explained that the COVID-19 vaccination meets the criteria for required vaccinations and is a requirement for applicants eligible for the vaccine regardless of evidence of immunity, a negative COVID-19 test, or prior COVID-19 infection. The new vaccine requirements apply to a foreign national filing an I-485 application for adjustment of status and completing the I-693 medical examination with a designated USCIS civil surgeon or to a foreign national applying for an immigrant visa or refugee status at a US consulate and undergoing a medical examination with a panel physician.

With respect to I-485 adjustment applicants, the CDC  has stated that the applicant “must complete the COVID-19 vaccine series and provide documentation of vaccination to the civil surgeon in person before completion of the medical examination.” The COVID-19 vaccination requirement differs from previous requirements in that “the entire vaccine series (1 or 2 doses depending on formulation) must be completed in addition to the other routinely required vaccines. COVID-19 vaccinations can now be given at any time, without regard to the timing of other vaccinations.” Acceptable vaccines include Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, and Janssen (Johnson & Johnson).

Panel physicians in countries outside the US may accept vaccines authorized for emergency use or approved by the US Food and Drug Administration  or vaccines listed for emergency use by the World Health Organization. In addition to the three vaccines used in the US, the WHO lists many other vaccines used outside the US such as AstraZeneca, Covishield and Covaxin, Sputnik, Sinopharm and Sinovac, among others. Given that the US vaccines are not widely available in many countries, it is good news that other vaccines will be recognized when intending immigrants overseas must be vaccinated against Covid-19.

Waivers are available for  under both circumstances if the vaccine is not age appropriate, the vaccine is medically contraindicated, or the applicant does not have access to one of the approved vaccines in their home country. Applicants may also apply for an individual waiver on religious or moral grounds.

According to reports, the Biden administration also is developing plans for a COVID-19 vaccine mandate for almost all foreign visitors to the United States, with some exceptions. Note though that proof of the vaccination does not exempt international travelers from the preexisting requirement of presenting proof of a negative Covid-19 test within three days of boarding an international flight to the US.

As there is a great disparity in vaccination programs across the world, the mandating of vaccines for green card applicants and visitors may hinder the ability of people to easily come to the US. According to the NY Times vaccine tracker, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.html, the UAE has the highest percentage of  fully vaccinated people within its population (76%), while the percentage of fully vaccinated people in countries such as India (10%),  Senegal (3.5%) and Haiti (<0.1%) is abysmally low.

Until now, even if a country was subject to a Covid ban, one applying for an immigrant visa is exempted from the ban.  The lack of vaccine access in a country will surely hinder the immigrant visa process and impose a de facto ban. Those who have won the DV lottery must be processed for the immigrant visa by September 30 each year, and a delay in getting fully vaccinated by the deadline will result in the loss of an immigrant visa under this category. This is not to suggest we should object to the mandatory vaccination of intending immigrants before arriving in the US because of the lack of vaccine availability in many countries, especially in low and lower-middle income countries,  that send many immigrants to the US.  Indeed,  the US needs to ensure in concert with the WHO that there is no vaccine inequality and people from all over the world must have quick and easy access to vaccines. It is a sad state of affairs that vaccine hesitant people in the US refuse to get vaccinated when there is so much  vaccine availability while it is difficult to get a vaccine in other countries.

Finally, we have consistently maintained that the Covid proclamations imposing travel restrictions are ineffective in curbing the spread of the coronavirus as they are riddled with exceptions. US citizens, permanent residents and noncitizens with US citizen or permanent resident children are exempted from the ban. So are those who can obtain national interest exception waivers on a variety of grounds. On the other hand, those subject to the ban have to suffer immeasurable hardships by remaining separated from employers and family members who are in the US. It will make more sense if the US insists that everyone entering the country be fully vaccinated rather than subject countries to Covid Proclamations. However, to make this a worthy goal, the US as a global leader must ensure vaccine equality to everyone in the world. Ensuring equality would be in the interest of the US and the whole world as it would create the best chance to eradicate the coronavirus pandemic once and for all.

 

 

“The Process By Which Removability Will Be Determined”: How the Recent District Court Decision Ordering the Reinstatement of MPP Contradicts Itself

On Friday, August 13, U.S. District Judge Matthew J. Kacsmaryk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas issued an Opinion and Order ruling in favor of the states of Texas and Missouri in a lawsuit that they had brought against the Biden Administration, seeking to force the Administration to reinstate the so-called “Migrant Protection Protocols” (MPP) created by the Trump Administration.  Human Rights First, among others, had previously observed that MPP was more aptly described as Migrant Persecution Protocols; I will use only the initials from this point on, since they can apply either way.

The gist of MPP was the return of asylum applicants to Mexico, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C), while their applications were pending. As the American Immigration Council explained, many applicants were placed in grave danger in Mexico, and many were unable to return to the United States for their hearings at the appointed time. Upon taking office, the Biden Administration suspended new enrollments into the program on January 20, 2021, and terminated the program on June 1. Texas and Missouri sued to overturn that decision.

The Opinion and Order, the effect of which was stayed for seven days to allow an emergency appeal, held that the termination of MPP violated the Administrative Procedure Act and 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Judge Kacsmaryk therefore vacated the June 1 memorandum terminating MPP, and ordered the government

to enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such a time as it has been lawfully rescinded in compliance with the APA and until such a time as the federal government has sufficient detention capacity to detain all aliens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1255 without releasing any aliens because of a lack of detention resources.

Opinion and Order at p. 52, ¶ 3.

There are a great many problems with the reasoning supporting the Opinion and Order, which I am sure will be elucidated in the coming days by others. Rather than seeking to give a comprehensive account of everything wrong with the Opinion and Order, however, I want to focus here on one particular issue: assuming that it is meant to have significant practical effect, the Opinion and Order is internally contradictory. While it is not completely clear what exactly the government is being ordered to do, the only way for the answer not to be, “almost nothing”, is for various statements in the Opinion and Order to be incorrect.

To see the problem, it is necessary to look at the text and structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1225, one of the two statutes that Judge Kacsmaryk held the government to be violating by terminating MPP.  In particular, the relevant section is 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), which divides applicants for admission into two groups, those processed under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and those processed under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2):

(b) Inspection of applicants for admission

(1) Inspection of aliens arriving in the United States and certain other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled

(A) Screening

(i) In general

If an immigration officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this title, the officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution.

(ii) Claims for asylum

If an immigration officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this title and the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer under subparagraph (B).

(iii) Application to certain other aliens

(I) In general

The Attorney General may apply clauses (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph to any or all aliens described in subclause (II) as designated by the Attorney General. Such designation shall be in the sole and unreviewable discretion of the Attorney General and may be modified at any time.

(II) Aliens described

An alien described in this clause is an alien who is not described in subparagraph (F), who has not been admitted or paroled into the United States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility under this subparagraph.

(B) Asylum interviews

(i) Conduct by asylum officers

An asylum officer shall conduct interviews of aliens referred under subparagraph (A)(ii), either at a port of entry or at such other place designated by the Attorney General.

(ii) Referral of certain aliens

If the officer determines at the time of the interview that an alien has a credible fear of persecution (within the meaning of clause (v)), the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.

(iii) Removal without further review if no credible fear of persecution

(I) In general

Subject to subclause (III), if the officer determines that an alien does not have a credible fear of persecution, the officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review.

(II) Record of determination

The officer shall prepare a written record of a determination under subclause (I). Such record shall include a summary of the material facts as stated by the applicant, such additional facts (if any) relied upon by the officer, and the officer’s analysis of why, in the light of such facts, the alien has not established a credible fear of persecution. A copy of the officer’s interview notes shall be attached to the written summary.

(III) Review of determination

The Attorney General shall provide by regulation and upon the alien’s request for prompt review by an immigration judge of a determination under subclause (I) that the alien does not have a credible fear of persecution. Such review shall include an opportunity for the alien to be heard and questioned by the immigration judge, either in person or by telephonic or video connection. Review shall be concluded as expeditiously as possible, to the maximum extent practicable within 24 hours, but in no case later than 7 days after the date of the determination under subclause (I).

(IV) Mandatory detention

Any alien subject to the procedures under this clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.

(iv) Information about interviews

The Attorney General shall provide information concerning the asylum interview described in this subparagraph to aliens who may be eligible. An alien who is eligible for such interview may consult with a person or persons of the alien’s choosing prior to the interview or any review thereof, according to regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. Such consultation shall be at no expense to the Government and shall not unreasonably delay the process.

(v) “Credible fear of persecution” defined

For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “credible fear of persecution” means that there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum under section 1158 of this title.

(C) Limitation on administrative review

Except as provided in subparagraph (B)(iii)(III), a removal order entered in accordance with subparagraph (A)(i) or (B)(iii)(I) is not subject to administrative appeal, except that the Attorney General shall provide by regulation for prompt review of such an order under subparagraph (A)(i) against an alien who claims under oath, or as permitted under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, after having been warned of the penalties for falsely making such claim under such conditions, to have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, to have been admitted as a refugee under section 1157 of this title, or to have been granted asylum under section 1158 of this title.

(D) Limit on collateral attacks

In any action brought against an alien under section 1325(a) of this title or section 1326 of this title, the court shall not have jurisdiction to hear any claim attacking the validity of an order of removal entered under subparagraph (A)(i) or (B)(iii).

(E) “Asylum officer” defined

As used in this paragraph, the term “asylum officer” means an immigration officer who-

(i) has had professional training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques comparable to that provided to full-time adjudicators of applications under section 1158 of this title, and

(ii) is supervised by an officer who meets the condition described in clause (i) and has had substantial experience adjudicating asylum applications.

(F) Exception

Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an alien who is a native or citizen of a country in the Western Hemisphere with whose government the United States does not have full diplomatic relations and who arrives by aircraft at a port of entry.

(G) Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize or require any person described in section 1158(e) of this title to be permitted to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title at any time before January 1, 2014.

(2) Inspection of other aliens

(A) In general

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

(B) Exception

Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an alien-

(i) who is a crewman,

(ii) to whom paragraph (1) applies, or

(iii) who is a stowaway.

(C) Treatment of aliens arriving from contiguous territory

In the case of an alien described in subparagraph (A) who is arriving on land (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States, the Attorney General may return the alien to that territory pending a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

The process described in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), applicable to applicants for admission who are inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7), is known as expedited removal. Such applicants for admission are given the opportunity to establish that they have a credible fear of persecution, but are otherwise removed without proceedings before an immigration judge.  Applicants for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), on the other hand, are, with limited exceptions for crewmen and stowaways, to be placed into removal proceedings before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, otherwise known as INA § 240.

The BIA held in Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2011),  that DHS has prosecutorial discretion to place people into removal proceedings under INA § 240 even if they could also be placed in expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). For roughly a decade, therefore, and well before MPP was invented, the decision of whether to place an applicant for admission into expedited removal proceedings has been one for DHS to make.

The authority for MPP, as noted above, is 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C). This authority applies only to those who otherwise fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). It does not apply to anyone subjected to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). This is why all those placed in MPP were issued Notices to Appear and put into removal proceedings under INA § 240, otherwise known as 8 U.S.C. § 1229a: such proceedings were necessary in order for them to fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).  There has been dispute over whether DHS can, under the statute, permissibly treat asylum applicants in this way, but there does not appear to be any dispute that if asylum applicants can be returned to Mexico under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C), it must be because they have been placed in INA § 240 removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).  (Under current regulations, those applicants who establish credible fear during expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) are also ultimately placed into INA § 240 removal proceedings, but the Administration that designed MPP did not think this an inevitable feature of the statutory structure, instead attempting to promulgate a rule that would have placed such applicants in asylum-only proceedings.)

The question, then, is what, if anything, Judge Kacsmaryk’s Opinion and Order has to say about the initial decision whether to place a particular applicant for admission into expedited removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or directly into 8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).  Logically, there are two possibilities. Either the Opinion and Order is meant to affect that decision, requiring it to be made “in good faith” under the auspices of the MPP program that the Opinion and Order sought to preserve, or it is not meant to affect that decision at all.

Taking the latter possibility first, if the Opinion and Order is not meant to affect the decision whether to place an applicant for admission into expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), then it would seem to have very little practical effect. If the government is just as free to place anyone into expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) as it was before the Opinion and Order was issued, then the Opinion and Order will only apply to those applicants whom the government independently decides to place straight into § 1229a removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).  Only those people would be properly subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C), the underlying authority for the MPP.  But if the government is not constrained by the Opinion and Order in making the decision whether to follow the § 1225(b)(1) track or the § 1225(b)(2) track, then there may be few people processed under § 1225(b)(2) at all. Perhaps the only applicants who will be so processed are those who cannot be subjected to expedited removal proceedings, such as those who are not inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (which covers fraud and false claims to U.S. citizenship), or 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (which covers those without proper documents), but are thought to be inadmissible on some other basis—say, Lawful Permanent Residents with certain criminal convictions thought to render them inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). The effect of the Opinion and Order might then be largely academic, although still problematic in a limited number of cases.

One would think this probably was not what Judge Kacsmaryk had in mind. If so, however, then he must have meant for the Opinion and Order to have some impact on the decision whether or not to place particular applicants for admission into § 1225(b)(1) expedited removal proceedings, as opposed to processing them under § 1225(b)(2).  The problem is that this would contradict several statements made in the Opinion and Order, statements which provided critical underpinnings for Judge Kacsmaryk’s determination that he had the authority to issue the Opinion and Order in the first place.

First, in addressing why the jurisdictional bar of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) purportedly does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over this suit, the Opinion and Order says:

42. Section 1252(b)(9) states: “Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this Section.” (emphasis added). This Section functions as a limit on where aliens can seek judicial review of their immigration proceedings.

43. But the Supreme Court has recently stated: “As we have said before, § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar where those bringing suit are not asking for review of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability will be determined.” [DHS v. ] Regents [of the University of California], 140 S. Ct. [1891,] 1907 [(2019)] (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841, 875–76 (2018) (plurality opinion) (internal marks omitted)). “And it is certainly not a bar where, as here, the parties are not challenging any removal proceedings.” Id.

Opinion and Order at 29.

If the Opinion and Order means to exert control over the determination whether applicants for admission should be placed in expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or processed under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) so that they can be subjected to MPP, however, then it makes no sense to say that “those bringing suit are not asking for review of . . . the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability will be determined.” They very much are. The states bringing suit, on this interpretation, are asking for review of the decision to place certain applicants for admission in expedited removal proceedings, where removability will be determined under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and they cannot be returned to Mexico while their cases are pending, as opposed to placing those applicants in immediate § 1229a removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), so that the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C) can apply and the applicants can be returned to Mexico under MPP. In this respect, the case is not like the challenge to the recission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) in Regents, which did not implicate a decision to seek removal or the process by which removability would be determined, given that the DACA recission did not involve commencement of removal proceedings against anyone. A broad interpretation of the Opinion and Order’s mandate that MPP be implemented would necessarily involve the commencement of a specific type of removal proceedings, under § 1225(b)(2) and § 1229a, as opposed to the commencement of proceedings under § 1225(b)(1).

This is not the only such contradiction in the Opinion and Order.  Later, addressing why the decision to terminate MPP is not “committed to agency discretion” and thus unreviewable, the Opinion and Order states:

Moreover, the MPP program is not about enforcement proceedings at all. Any alien eligible for MPP has already been placed into enforcement proceedings under Section 1229a. The only question MPP answers is where the alien will be while the federal government pursues removal — in the United States or in Mexico.

Opinion and Order at 32.  That is true if, and only if, the Opinion and Order does not mean to have any impact on the initial decision whether to place particular applicants for admission into expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), as opposed to regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a by way of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). But in that case, as discussed above, the Opinion and Order would not accomplish what it seems intended to accomplish.

As a crowning touch, the Opinion and Order says near the end: “Nothing in this injunction requires DHS to take any immigration or removal action nor withhold its statutory discretion towards any individual that it would not otherwise take.” Opinion and Order at 53. Again, it is not entirely clear what this means. But if DHS is truly not required to “take any immigration or removal action . . . that it would not otherwise take”, then it cannot be compelled to operate the MPP, because a necessary predicate of the MPP is the action of placing applicants for admission into immediate § 1229a removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) rather than placing them into expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1).

At bottom, the problem here may be that like the MPP itself, the Opinion and Order makes background assumptions that are not supportable when examined more closely. Like the MPP, the Opinion and Order seems superficially sensible when examined from a certain perspective.  But like the MPP, the seeming logic of the Opinion and Order does not withstand closer scrutiny.

Matter of Castro-Tum is Dead Everywhere Except in the Sixth Circuit: It Must be Buried There Too

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In a previous blog, we argued that Matter of Castro- Tum, a Trump era decision by then Attorney General Jeff Sessions should be withdrawn. Matter of Castro -Tum held that Immigration Judges (IJs) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) do not have the authority to administratively close cases, unless expressly authorized by a previous regulation or a previous judicially approved settlement.

Numerous Circuit Court decisions overturned Castro-Tum. In 2019, the Fourth Circuit in Romero v. Barr held that the language “may take any action…..appropriate and necessary for the disposition” of the case” at 8 CFR §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) & 1003.10(b) unambiguously confers upon IJs and the BIA the general authority to administratively close cases. Meza-Morales v. Barr, decided by the Seventh Circuit in 2020, also concluded that the “immigration regulations that grant immigration judges their general powers [are] broad enough to implicitly encompass that [administrative closure] authority.” Most recently, the Third Circuit in Sanchez v. Attorney General, held that 8 CFR §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) unambiguously grant IJs and the BIA general authority to administratively close cases by authorizing them to take “any action” that is “appropriate and necessary” for the disposition of cases. The Court in Sanchez relied on the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, which held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations will only be entitled to deference if the following criteria are met: i) that the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous” — the court should reach this conclusion after exhausting all the “traditional tools” of construction; (ii) if the regulation is genuinely ambiguous, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable; and (iii) even if it is a reasonable interpretation, whether it meets the “minimum threshold” to grant Auer deference, requiring the court to conduct an “independent inquiry” into whether (a) it is an authoritative or official position of the agency; (b) it reflects the agency’s substantive expertise; and (c) the agency’s interpretation of the rule reflects “its fair and considered judgment.”

We have advocated for Attorney General Garland to overturn Castro- Tum and reinstate its predecessor, Matter of Avetisyan, which held that the IJs and the BIA may administratively close removal proceedings, even if a party opposes, if it is otherwise appropriate under the circumstances, and that IJs or the BIA should weigh all relevant factors in deciding whether administrative closure is appropriate. In prior blogs, see here and here, we have argued that Avetisyan sets a more common sense standard for administrative closure that and would go a long way towards clearing the Immigration Court’s backlogged dockets.

On July 15, 2021, the Attorney General issued a decision in Matter of Cruz-Valdez that takes exactly this position, overruling Castro-Tum in its entirety and holding that “[i]mmigration judges and the Board should apply the standard for administrative closure set out in Matter of Avetisyan…” The Respondent in the case was a Mexican national who had moved for administrative closure of his case while he filed a Form I-601A, Application for Provisional Unlawful Presence Waiver, with USCIS. Pursuant to 8 CFR § 212.7(e)(4)(iii), a noncitizen is not eligible for an I-601A waiver “unless the[ir] removal proceedings are administratively closed and have not been recalendared at the time of filing the application”. Respondent’s motion was denied by the IJ and the BIA on appeal on the grounds that Castro-Tum prevented administrative closure of the case.

AG Garland’s decision noted that three courts of appeals have rejected Castro – Tum, “holding that administrative closure is ‘plainly within an immigration judge’s authority’ under Department of Justice regulations”, while only the 6th Circuit upheld it in Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2020). Even the 6th Circuit eventually ruled that IJs and the BIA do have the authority to administratively close cases for the purpose of allowing noncitizens to apply for provisional unlawful presence waivers, however. See Garcia-DeLeon v. Garland, No. 20-3957 (6th Cir. 2021). The decision also pointed to the 2020 DOJ final rule codifying Castro-Tum, Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative Closure, 85 Fed. Reg. 81588, 81598 (Dec. 16, 2020), which is currently the subject of a nationwide preliminary injunction and undergoing reconsideration by the DOJ, as further justification for overruling Castro-Tum. Because Castro-Tum departed from longstanding practice regarding administrative closure, AG Garland held that IJs and the BIA should revert to the standards for administrative closure laid out in cases like Avetisyan.

Though largely a victory for administrative closure, AG Garland’s decision will not apply in the 6th Circuit, which has upheld Castro – Tum. The Sixth Circuit in Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr viewed 8 CFR §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) as unambiguously precluding a general administrative closure authority. The Supreme Court held in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) that an agency need not acquiesce to a circuit court’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute.  However, even if Brand X applies to an ambiguous regulation rather than a statute, it probably cannot be harnessed here by the Attorney General to reinterpret the relevant regulatory provisions as conferring on IJs and the BIA the authority to administratively close cases because the Sixth Circuit appears to have found that those provisions were not, in fact, ambiguous. Therefore, the AG Garland in Matter of Cruz-Valdez appears to have correctly ascertained that this decision to overturn Castro Tum would not apply in the Sixth Circuit.  One solution to this dilemma is the promulgation of a new regulation that would supersede the Sixth Circuit’s unfavorable interpretation. Indeed, rulemaking in this area is already under consideration, and formed one of the principal bases for the AG’s decision in Matter of Cruz-Valdez.

Though not without some limitations, AG Garland’s decision to withdraw Castro-Tum and reinstate Avetisyan should be celebrated. This decision will help to relieve the immigration court backlog, and will aid in the adjudication of removal cases that require the resolution of questions not within the jurisdiction of IJs or the BIA. As such, Matter of Cruz-Valdez is an important step towards President Biden’s goal of returning to a fair and humane immigration system.

(This blog is for information purposes, and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice).

* Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

The Sinking Immigration Court: Change Course, Save the Ship

By Stacy Caplow*

Immigration Court, where hundreds of judges daily preside over wrenching decisions, including matters of family separation, detention, and even life and death, is structurally and functionally unsound. Closures during the pandemic, coupled with unprecedented backlogs, low morale, and both procedural and substantive damage inflicted by the Trump Administration, have created a full-fledged crisis. The Court’s critics call for radical reforms. That is unlikely to happen. Instead, the Biden Administration is returning to a go-to, cure-all solution: adding 100 Immigration Court judges and support personnel[1] to help address the backlog that now approaches 1.3 million cases.[2]

No one could oppose effective reform or additional resources. Nor could anyone oppose practical case management changes that do not require legislation and that could expedite and professionalize the practice in Immigration Court. Linked with a more transparent and more inclusive process for selecting Immigration Judges, these changes would make the Immigration Courts more efficient, more accurate and fairer but not at the expense of the compelling humanitarian stakes in the daily work of the Court. Immediate changes that do not require legislation but do require the will to transform the practice and culture of the Court would be a major step forward in improving the experiences and the outcomes in Immigration Court.

 

I. Changes to the Practices and the Culture of the Immigration Court

 Immigration hearings are adversarial. While the stakes are very high and often punitive—removal, ongoing detention, family separation—the proceedings are civil. Yet this court bears little resemblance to typical civil litigation settings in both the pretrial or trial context. Most of the characteristic judicial tools regulating litigation are absent: pretrial discovery, pretrial settlement or status conferences to resolve or narrow issues, rare stipulations, or enforcement tools to require government lawyers to participate in a meaningful way until shortly before the hearing.

Generally, no Trial Attorney [TA] from the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor [OPLA], a division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE], the prosecutors in Immigration Court, is assigned to or takes responsibility for a case until a few weeks prior to an individual hearing.[3]  If a case is pending for several years, as so many are these days, except in the rare instance, it is impossible to have any kind of substantive discussion in advance about the conduct of the hearing, possible forms of settlement or alternative relief, narrow issues. Stipulations are rare or unhelpfully last minute. There are no enforcement tools that require government attorneys to participate in a meaningful way until shortly before the hearing. This can and should be changed. The Immigration Court can adopt practices familiar in civil and criminal tribunals around the country. Common litigation management tools could expedite and rationalize Immigration Court proceedings.

 

1. Assign Trial Attorneys to Cases Promptly

A TA should be assigned to review a case at the earliest possible time following the initial Master Calendar appearance where pleadings are entered. At a minimum, a TA should be assigned at the request any Respondent who wants to discuss a case regardless of when the hearing is scheduled. The government lawyers in Immigration Court, like prosecutors in any busy court, can handle a caseload without waiting until the last minute to review the claim. In order to foster meaningful discussions, these TA assignments should occur as soon as the respondent has completed her evidentiary filings.

The positive impact of a prompt TA assignment system will benefit everyone—Respondents, TAs, and the IJs. For example, although many cases require a credibility finding based on in-person testimony, some claims simply do not. If there is no basis for doubting credibility in light of the evidence, and the law is clear, a one, two or three-year wait for a decision is unconscionable. Under the current system, the TA does not review the submissions until shortly before the hearing. Faced with cases in which credibility is not an issue, more often than not, the TA does not seriously contest the facts or the eligibility for relief once she has reviewed the submissions. This results in half-hearted cross-examination, if there is any at all, and a quick grant of relief without opposition. Unfortunately, this happens only after years of delay and anxiety as well as extensive preparation often requiring logistical headaches and inconveniences to witnesses. Earlier, thorough case assessment could avoid the stress to Respondents of a life on hold, could result in fewer or more focused hearings, and could accomplish timeliness and efficiency goals of EOIR.

2. Require Pre-Hearing Conferences

The EOIR Practice Manual provides for a Pre-Hearing Conference.[4] This tool, commonplace in other kinds of courts, is rarely used. Neither Immigration Judges nor TAs routinely invite or encourage pre-hearing conferences. Following the lead of many civil and criminal courts, there should be a regularly scheduled status conference in every case upon a simple request from either party, conducted as expeditiously as possible after the pleadings at the Master Calendar. This could achieve great efficiencies and fairer outcomes.

A mandatory pre-hearing conference would necessitate assigning an individual ICE Trial Attorney to a case well in advance of the hearing. For an effective conference, a Respondent’s lawyer would generally need to submit evidence and even a memorandum of law. A process similar to a summary judgment motion might result. If the Trial Attorney concedes that there are no factual disputes or lack of credibility, the judge could decide the legal basis for relief. This procedure might require an abbreviated hearing, an oral argument, or could be decided on written submissions.

A few prototypical cases illustrate how this might work. Imagine an asylum seeker who has suffered or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of sexual orientation who comes from a country whose homophobic laws and oppression of people who are LGBTQ are undisputed. If the asylum seeker is credible, well settled law would surely warrant a granted of asylum. Or suppose a woman who was subjected to genital circumcision has medical records confirming this condition. Again, under well-settled law she is likely to be granted asylum. Or a one-year filing deadline bar could be resolved without the need for testimony based on written submissions. These issues could be resolved at a pre-hearing conference. Another set of cases might involve requests for Cancellation of Removal. The pre-hearing conference could conclude that objective evidence satisfies most of the statutory factors. This could narrow the case so that the Immigration Judge would only hear evidence relevant to the hardship determination. If the Trial Attorney reviewed the evidence and conceded that the hardship standard had been satisfied, this could eliminate the need for a hearing altogether.

Immigrants and their advocates shoulder the burden of multi-year delays and suffer from the resulting uncertainty and angst. Meanwhile, they build lives despite their unpredictable future, increasing the harsh impact of eventual deportation. During the interval, immigration advocates’ caseloads multiply. Years later, when a hearing is finally held, the consequences of delay are substantial. Court submissions need updating. Legal claims may be affected by changes in the law. Witnesses may be unavailable. Memories may fade. The is particularly harsh for asylum seekers whose credibility is at the heart of any immigration hearing[5] but whose trauma may have affected their ability to recall events, particularly the persecution they would prefer to forget. Accelerating resolution through pre-hearing processes following a full presentation of the claim by the Respondent and a full review of the evidence by the government would divert cases from the court’s hearing dockets.

A serious and sincere discussion of the claims and the evidence might resolve cases more expeditiously. Relief could be granted without a hearing. In some instances, TAs could choose to terminate the proceedings through an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Good case management, effective communication, and open-mindedness are imperative to making the system work more smoothly and more quickly.

3. Enforce the Practice Manual Equably

After years without any standardized practices, the EOIR published a Practice Manual.[6]  This guidance was a welcome development. On its face, it appears to govern all aspects of practice neutrally. A closer reading of the Manuel, however, reveals how one-sided these rules and the practice they govern really are. The everyday reality is even more blatantly lopsided because only Respondents’ attorneys actually do the work that the Manual regulates. The power imbalance between the parties and the close relations between the immigration bench and the prosecutors is embedded in the contents, language and impact of the Manual

In most cases before IJs the burden of proof to secure relief is on the Respondent, once removability is established.[7]  This means that Respondents, represented in only about 60% of all cases,[8] submit all of the evidence to support their application for relief. In the Manual, there are detailed rules relating to filings, motions and the conduct of hearings down to the types of tabs, cover sheets, identifiers for motions, cover pages, tables of contents, proof of service, witness lists and hole-punching. Submissions must be filed and served at least 30 days in advance of the hearing (up from 15 in a prior version of the Manual)

Since government lawyers rarely submit any evidence other than proof of removability if the Respondent does not concede, none of these rules affect their workload. On the rare occasion that the ICE lawyers do file a proposed exhibit, they often do so on the day of the hearing—with impunity since the IJs permit this. In a typical court, flagrant disobedience of the rules would be sanctioned without prejudice to the other party. More typically a Hobson’s choice is given to the Respondent:  accept the poor service or postpone the case. These days, postponement can mean years. The Respondent, anxious and prepared for that day’s testimony, is likely to opt for the former letting the government ignore the rules with the IJs permission.

This is an example of how IJs could behave more forcefully—preclude the evidence. Or cite the government for contempt in egregious cases. Instead, a tolerance of  lazy lawyering only inspires even less compliance with the rules

4. Encourage Prosecutorial Discretion as a Case Management Tool

Resolving a case through an exercise of prosecutorial discretion [PD] is another tool available to, but rarely employed by, the government. IJs cannot force Trial Attorneys to take certain actions relating to the merits of a case, but they can review the evidence in a pre-trial conference and make a strong suggestion about the best resolution.

The May 2021 Interim Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities is a vehicle for re-evaluating prosecutorial discretion [PD] as part of the holistic case management reforms that will benefit the TAs. the Immigration Court and the Respondents.[9]  The Interim Guidance reestablishes priorities and encourages a resuscitation of vigorous prosecutorial discretion. The guidance gives express permission to the Trial Attorneys to consider prosecutorial discretion even in the absence of a request.[10] Its reference to “mutual interest” strives to break down the adversarial barriers that obstruct judiciously exercised discretion and encourages shared problem-solving.

Some OPLA offices have established protocols for submitting requests for prosecutorial discretion. It is too early to tell whether this change in policy will result in a change in culture in the field. In the past, requests were not very successful despite encouraging guidelines and priorities.[11] But even if the Trial Attorneys do not take initiative, at the very least, there is a structure in which to engage in serious discussions about the direction of a case on the court’s docket. While the ultimate exercise of discretion belongs exclusively to the TAs, IJs could and should identify and encourage active consideration of appropriate cases for PD at a Pre-Hearing Conference.

 5. Apply Disciplinary Rules to Government Lawyers as well as Immigration Advocates

Lawyer disciplinary rules must be applied equally to ICE attorneys as well as attorneys for Respondents. This recommendation may seem obvious. Yet, the 2018 Policy Guidance promulgated by the EOIR raised serious concerns.[12] It established policies and procedures for reporting ineffective assistance of counsel or other violations of rules of professional conduct identified by the EOIR itself. Of course, protecting immigrants against unscrupulous or incompetent lawyers is a worthy goal. But these disciplinary rules apply only to immigrant advocates and not government lawyers.[13] EOIR should promptly issue equivalent guidance that applies to ICE attorneys who might commit ethical violations. In the absence of attempts by EOIR to be evenhanded, the 2018 policy guidance is a troubling example of bias within the court system.

6. Be Attentive to Professional Standards in the Courtroom

All of these practical manifestations of the imbalance of power—the reluctance to regulate, sanction or discipline—and the very environment of the courtroom expose the cozy connection between the immigration bench and the prosecution and destroy any fiction of independence. IJs preside in courts in which former colleagues (perhaps friends) appear. They chitchat with the government lawyers while Respondents sit in the room, often in a cone of incomprehension. The appearance if not the reality of this relationship is visible to any observer. The integrity and objectivity of the court is seriously undermined by these everyday departures from appropriate courtroom conduct. The obvious and easy remedy for this appearance of partiality inferred from the comradery between the prosecutor and the judge would be a change in atmosphere to elevate the inside of these courtrooms to the same degree of dignity and seriousness that all courtrooms should possess.

 

II. Changes to the Selection Process of Immigration Court Judges

 

To transform the present obstacles to effective judicial performance, remove the damaging management directives of the former administration. As so many commentators already have suggested, roll back the heavy-handed Attorney General imposed operating guidelines relating to case management to restore a system of logical adjudication priorities[14] and remove the Damoclesean sword of quantitative performance metrics or quotas which only encourage hasty outcomes that devalue the stakes involved in most hearings. These steps require only will, not legislation or rule making. While a return to the old normal will not fully address the structural capture of this court by the Department of Justice [DOJ] and the widely divergent outcomes between courts,[15] restoring decision making to IJs will improve morale and incentivize judges to be independent thinkers without fear of interference or reprisals.[16]

The Attorney General recently took significant steps to reverse many of the more controversial and harmful administrative policies inflicted by the prior administration that limit the ability of Immigration Judges to decide their cases carefully and fairly.[17]  But more can be done.

Changes to the eligibility criteria and the selection process for Immigration Judges also would make a difference both to how the Court operates and how its integrity is perceived by the people appearing before it and by the public.

 

1. The Past Decade of Immigration Court Growth

Injecting new resources into the Immigration Courts is a common prescription for a system that is overloaded, backlogged, and inefficient. This approach seems sensible, and it has indeed been tried but without much success. Between 2017 and the end of 2020 more than 330 judges were added to the ranks in an effort to reduce the enormous backlog. The table below shows the exponential growth in judges.

Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics

Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics[18]

 

Over that same four-year period, almost 100 courtrooms were added, totaling 474 at the end of 2020.[19] Now, approximately 535 immigration judges preside over 68 immigration courts and three adjudications centers.[20]

Despite the infusion of resources, waiting times have grown to an average of 54 months.[21]  Although the Executive Office of Immigration Review asserts that, “The timely and efficient conclusion of cases serves the national interest,”[22] today many hearings are adjourned for as long as two or three years. Swift and certain justice after a full and fair removal proceeding eludes most people.

While some of this eye-popping number of pending matters is attributable to the influx of asylum-seekers at the southern border,[23] Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] also has been filing new removal cases.[24] In addition, the pandemic shut most of the courts for more than a year. These external forces have been intensified pressures, but they are not the root causes of the Court’s dysfunction. Adding more judges will not solve the well-recognized structural defects of the court itself.

An immigration  bench that has been populated to serve political goals lacks genuine independence and is subject to political branch dictates.[25]  The Trump Department of Justice only further diminished judicial independence by imposing performance metrics,[26] limiting the exercise of discretion,[27] litigating to decertify the judges’ union,[28] muzzling individual judges,[29] and radically changing longstanding legal principles.[30] On its own website, the stature of this tribunal is degraded to “quasi-judicial,” dropping the pretense of independence and reducing its stature.[31]

The breakdown of the court is also attributable to recent mismanagement decisions and its almost total departure from normal litigation practices that prevents judges from supervising their caseloads and promptly presiding over life-altering deportation proceedings. Administrative inefficiencies that have longed plagued this court only worsened under the policies adopted by the four-year, multi-faceted Trump assault on immigration. Old cases languished while new cases poured in.

In light of this grim reality, the time has come to rethink of some embedded assumptions and practices, particularly those that do not have to wait for structural court reform.

2. Surveying the Newly Appointed Immigration Judges

The job of Immigration Judge, as one IJ famously said, consists of hearing “death penalty cases in a traffic court setting.[32] Immigration Court needs to be staffed by experienced judges committed to applying the law with both rigor and compassion. Immigration Judges need to be able to use the tools that judges normally employ in other settings to administer their courts effectively. Knowledgeable, fair-minded, even-tempered, confident and courageous judges should be the norm.

The following collective profile of the newest IJs has been noted widely but some aspects deserve a bit more detailed attention because they call into question whether this goal can be achieved if past practices are simply replicated as more IJs are appointed.

a. Government Enforcement Background

From 2017 to 2020, the Department of Justice hired 166 judges who were drawn predominantly from current or former employees of one or more government-side immigration prosecution, enforcement or related agencies.[33] Filling the bench with lawyers from this career path is not new, or particularly surprising, since these are candidates who actually do have a deep knowledge of the law and a familiarity with the court. But a career in enforcement risks distorting objectivity and impartiality.

Prior Government Immigration Enforcement Experience

There is, however, a striking imbalance among the IJs with considerable immigration practice backgrounds. A review of their biographies reveals that only a handful—about 10 or 11—worked in either private practice or public interest organizations representing immigrants. Thus, one of the two obvious source of experienced immigration attorneys—immigrant advocates—is barely represented.

Another conclusion that these numbers forcefully imply is that not only are government-side lawyers overly represented but, even when the few former immigrant advocates are added to this group, close to half of new IJs appear to have no discernable knowledge of immigration law or experience in immigration practice.[34]

Lawyers with government immigration careers are not the only former law enforcement employees sitting on the Immigration Court bench.

 

  • Fifty-four percent of new IJs’ credentials include past positions as either federal and/or state prosecutors, or both.

Prior Prosecutorial Experience

  • Many have military records (often in combination with prosecutorial pasts), an advantage in the selection process. But they report no immigration law experience.

Military Legal Experience (Including JAG)

Many individual biographies include a combination of these experiences—e.g., government enforcement jobs, prior prosecutorial positions and military service. At the risk of overgeneralizing, there are many common characteristics in these backgrounds that could discourage independence, critical or creative thinking, as well as produce intolerance for inefficiency, aggressive advocacy or other challenges to authority.

 

b. Judicial Experience

Prior judicial experience would seem to be a plus but only a handful of the new IJs, 46, have sat on any bench, all of which are state-level tribunals or courts with no obvious immigration jurisdiction.

Prior Judicial Experience

The haste to seat these judges and put them to work with minimal training[35] and little opportunity for ongoing mentorship by experienced judges, only incentivizes them to rush through hearings, and predisposes them to deny applications accompanied by incomplete or sloppy reasoning.[36] Just as more judges are being added, veteran judges are leaving the bench, some in reaction to the new pressures to perform.[37]  As witnesses to the degrading of the court, the increasingly active and expanding Round Table of Former Immigration Judges has been a vocal critics both before Congress and as amicus curiae.[38]

 

c. Legal Experience

Generally, ascent to the judiciary occurs after a lawyer acquires expertise in a legal field, and demonstrates maturity, judgment and capacity. Knowledge of the law, an even temperament, impartiality and the ability to make reasoned decisions are the basic qualities associated with judging. Lawyers usually requires years of legal experience to gain and deepen these qualities. The requirement of seven years post-bar admission seems quite minimal.

Years of General Legal Experience

The survey showed that most new IJs do have more than the minimum amount of

experience. But, when their years in practice is seen are measured by the kind of experience the majority of these seasoned lawyers have—government enforcement—it is fair to conclude that their often extensive and formative careers opposing or obstructing relief and challenging credibility have shaped their judicial outlook.

d. Bias in Results

The opaque selection process seems to yield judges with questionable qualifications and possible biases.  The data tends to confirm the prediction that the newly appointed IJs with these credentials are granting fewer requests for asylum relief.[39] According to EOIR’s own statistics, the denial rate since 2018 increased from a range of 20-32%) to continuously increasing ranges of 31.75% to 54.53% by 2020.[40]

Looking at the list of individual IJs the change is even more obvious. Between 2013 and 2018, 58 judges denied asylum more than 90% of the time, and 69 judges denied asylum between 80-90% of the time.[41] Over the five-year period 2015-2020, the number of IJs who denied asylum more than 90% of the time rose to 109 and the number denying asylum between 80-90% of the time rose to 111.[42] While some toughening of legal standards imposed by the prior administration might account for a portion of this upsurge in denials,[43] the coincidence between these dramatic numbers and the infusion of new IJs appointed by the Trump Department of Justice is hard to ignore.

 

e. A Better Judicial Selection Process

 

An infusion of new personnel in the near future provides an opportunity to look closely at and reform the appointment process of Immigration Judges to make it less vulnerable to political influences. By many accounts, it was intensely politicized over the past four years. Appointment to the court is governed by the Department of Justice, allowing the country’s chief prosecutor to unilaterally advance a frequently biased agenda.[44] This undeniable conflict is nothing new but it demeans the integrity of the bench. Even worse, the opaqueness of the selection process shields an agenda that is suspect, based on the profile of the IJs appointed over the past four years.[45]

A cleaner, more transparent merit selection process, typical of most judicial systems, would enhance the reputation of the Court and might attract a more diverse applicant pool through a recruitment process that is attractive to a wider range of applicants. The work is very demanding, but it pays well.[46]

In addition, the criteria for the job, are now absurdly undemanding.  Aside from a law degree and licensure in any U.S. jurisdiction, an applicant must have

[A] full seven (7) years of post-bar experience as a licensed attorney preparing for, participating in, and/or appealing formal hearings or trials involving litigation and/or administrative law at the Federal, State or local level. Qualifying litigation experience involves cases in which a complaint was filed with a court, or a charging document (e.g., indictment or information) was issued by a court, a grand jury, or appropriate military authority. Qualifying administrative law experience involves cases in which a formal procedure was initiated by a governmental administrative body.[47]

Knowledge of or experience in immigration law is not an expressed job qualification although it may be an advantage.

Without the need for legislative reform, the Department of Justice and the EOIR could improve the perception and reality of the Immigration Court selection process. Simple improvements include the following steps:  1) elevating the selection standards to require more than 7 years’ experience and more direct knowledge of immigration law; 2) assuring a neutral merit selection process that incentivizes. applications from immigrant advocates; 3) opening the selection process for more public input; 5) improving training and oversight that emphasizes competence more than productivity; 6) restoring morale by recognizing and respecting the responsibility placed on IJs and treating them not as employees but as judicial officers; and 7) overseeing and questioning the basis for abnormally high denial rates.

 

III. Conclusion

 

Is there a life preserver on this sinking ship?  Courts reopening following the pandemic are facing an unprecedented backlog with cases already postponed years into the future. The new Administration, in the position to institute real reform to the way business is conducted, has started to steer in a positive direction due to a now shared interest of the Court and ICE to address the burdensome and shameful backlog. This is a potentially defining moment when change may actually happen. Meanwhile, the new administration is articulating goals to ameliorate not only the backlog but to seriously change enforcement priorities. If these two agents of potential change take advantage of the crisis that is affecting everyone involved with the system to work collaboratively with each other and consult sincerely with the immigrant advocates bar and other stakeholders, there may be some hope. To make this happen, a true cultural change must occur at every level. A few small steps have been taken: The EOIR is reacting to the prosecutorial discretion directive but the jury is still out on the buy-in to any kind of genuine reform.[48]

Like a lifeboat, survival depends on a commitment to problem-solving, trust and collaboration until rescue arrives. Someday structural reform may truly reshape the court to enough to eliminate the qualifier quasi. IJs will become full-fledged judges capable of making legally sound decisions in courtrooms where dignity, respect, patience and compassion are the norm without fear of retribution. Give the judges the tools they need to manage their courtrooms and the parties to achieve goals of integrity, efficiency and fairness. Recalibrate the balance between the parties. Recognize the demands of presiding over life-altering matters on their own wellbeing by giving them the resources, the power and the trust to be full-fledged judges.

Until then, directives from the top down are an important start; transformation still depends on change in the field in order to bring this court in conformity with general adjudication norms and practices, as well as to successfully implement the policy instructions that have the potential address the court crisis from the government’s standpoint without sacrificing fairness and humanitarian considerations.


Guest author Professor Stacy Caplow teaches Immigration Law at Brooklyn Law School where she also has co-directed the Safe Harbor Project since 1997.

 

Footnotes

[1] President Biden’s proposal is part of his overall budget planning, See Letter from Executive Office of the President, Apr. 9, 2021, at 22:

Supports Efforts to Reduce the Immigration Court Backlog. In order to address the nearly     1.3 million outstanding cases before the immigration courts, the discretionary request makes   an investment of $891 million, an increase of $157 million or 21 percent over the 2021             enacted level, in the Executive Office for Immigration Review. This funding supports 100       new immigration judges, including support personnel, as well as other efficiency measures to        reduce the backlog.

available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/FY2022-Discretionary-Request.pdf.  See also Fact Sheet: President Biden Sends Immigration Bill to Congress as Part of His Commitment to Modernize our Immigration System, Jan. 20, 2021, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-president-biden-sends-immigration-bill-to-congress-as-part-of-his-commitment-to-modernize-our-immigration-system/.

 

[2] TRAC Immigration, The State of the Immigration Courts: Trump Leaves Biden 1.3 Million Case Backlog in Immigration Courts, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/637// (last visited July 28, 2021). This statistic is complicated and does not fully account for all matters since some have been “inactive” thereby excluded from the final figure. Id. at n. 1. The Executive Office of Immigration Review reports 1,277,152 pending cases as of the first quarter of FY2021 i.e. Dec. 31, 2020. See https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/637/ (last visited July 28, 2021).

 

[3] “The Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) is the largest legal program in DHS, with over 1,250 attorneys and 290 support personnel. By statute, OPLA serves as the exclusive representative of DHS in immigration removal proceedings before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, litigating all removal cases including those against criminal aliens, terrorists, and human rights abusers.” See https://www.ice.gov/about-ice/opla.

 

[4] “Pre-hearing conferences are held between the parties and the Immigration Judge to narrow issues, obtain stipulations between the parties, exchange information voluntarily, and otherwise simplify and organize the proceeding.” OCIJ Practice Manual, Sec. 4.18, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-policy-manual/4/18.

[6] Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, Practice Manuel, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-policy-manual/part-ii-ocij-practice-manual (updated March 24, 2021).

 

[7] INA § 240 (c)(4).

 

[8] Interestingly, while there is general consensus that representation makes a huge difference to positive outcomes, the denial rate for asylum increased12% between 2108 and 2020 notwithstanding representation. Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics Current Representation Rates, available at

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1062991/download(Date generated April 2021).

 

[9]  John D. Trasivina, U.S. Immigration & Customs and Enforcement, Interim Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities INA § 240 (c)(4)(C), May 27, 2021, available at , https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/opla/OPLA-immigration-enforcement_interim-guidance.pdf.

 

[10] Id. at 7-8.

 

[11]  An example of the policies for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during the Obama administration is the Policy Memorandum Number: 10075.1 issued by John Morton, then Director of ICE entitled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, June 17, 2011, available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.

 

[12] Internal Reporting of Suspected Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Professional Misconduct, PM 19-06, Dec. 18, 2018.

 

[13] AILA Letter to Director James McHenry, February 15, 2019 (AILA Doc. No. 192159 (on file with author).

 

[14] See, e.g., Recommendations for DOJ and EOIR Leadership To Systematically Remove Non-Priority Cases from the Immigration Court Backlog, AILA Doc. No. 21050301

(posted 5/3/2021), available at file:///Users/stacycaplow/Downloads/21050301.pdf.

 

[15] Philip G. Schrag, Andrew I. Schoenholtz and Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Refugee Roulette. (2011). NEED FULL CITE For example, in the Atlanta Immigration Court, every judge’s denial rate exceeds 90% in contrast to the New York Immigration Court where 29 judges deny in less than 30% of cases. TRAC Immigration, Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts
FY 2015-2020, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2020/denialrates.html.

 

[16] This essay does not address the longstanding arguments advanced for an independent Article I Court.  For a selection of perspectives on that see, e.g., Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13-1 Bender’s Immig. Bull. 3, 5 (2008) (the author is an Immigration Judge); Maurice Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 San Diego L. Rev. 1, 18 (1980) (the author was the retired Chair of the Board of Immigration Appeals); American Bar Association Commission on Immigration, Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Create independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, Feb. 2010 and Update 2019, available at. https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2019/03/aba-commission-to-recommend-immigration-reform/(containing more than 100 specific recommendations); AILA, Featured Issue: Immigration Courts, available at, https://www.aila.org/advo-media/issues/all/immigration-courts; Hearing before House Committee on the Judiciary, Courts in Crisis: The State of Judicial Independence and Due Process in U.S. Immigration Courts, Jan. 29.2020, available at, https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2757; New York City Bar Association, Report on the Independence of the Immigration Courts, Oct. 21, 2020, available at https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/reports-listing/reports/detail/independence-of-us-immigration-courts. Statement of Immigration Judge A. Ashley Tabbador on behalf of National Association of Immigration Judges before House Committee on the Judiciary, Jan. 29, 2020, available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU01/20200129/110402/HHRG-116-JU01-Wstate-TabaddorA-20200129.pdf. https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/19070802-pdf-1.pdf. Other voices include the Roundtable of Former Immigration Judges, law professors (see, e.g., Letter to Attorney General Merrick Garlard, available at, https://www.aila.org/File/Related/21050334a.pdf) and the Marshall Project, Is It Time to Remove Immigration Courts From Presidential Control?, Aug. 28, 2019, available at https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/08/28/is-it-time-to-remove-immigration-courts-from-presidential-control; Federal Bar Ass’n, Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, https://www.fedbar.org/government-relations/policy-priorities/article-i-immigration-court/ (last visited May 17, 2021; Mimi Tsankov, Human Rights Are at Risk, ABA Human Rts. Mag., Apr. 20, 2020, available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/immigration/human-rights-at-risk/.

 

[17] Attorney General Garland has been actively withdrawing decisions issues by his predecessors. See, e.g., Matter of A-C-A-A, 28 I&N Dec. 351 (A.G. 2021), vacating in its entirety Matter of A-C-A-A, I&N Dec. 84 (A.G. 2020) and restoring discretion to IJs in case management; Matter of Cruz Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326(A.G. 2021), overruling Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018) and restoring ability of IJs to administratively close cases. These decisions also free up Trial Attorneys to exercise PD.

 

[18] Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242156/download (last visited June 1, 2021).

 

[19] Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics Number of Courtrooms, available at  https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248526/download Data collected as of April 2021).

 

[20] Executive Office of Immigration Review, Workload and Adjudication Statistics, Tables 25 and 25A, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/workload-and-adjudication-statistics (data collected as of April 21, 2021).

 

[20]  Dept. of Justice, EOIR, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge-bios  (last visited May 29, 2021).

[21] TRAC, The State of the Immigration Courts: Trump Leaves Biden 1.3 Million Case Backlog in Immigration Courts, available at, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/637/.

[22] Memorandum from the Attorney General for the Executive Office of Immigration Review, Renewing Our Commitment to the Timely and Efficient Adjudication of Immigration Cases to Serve the National Interest, Dec. 5, 2017, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1041196/download.

[23] The total number of pending cases from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras is 715,557. An additional 212, 859 cases from Mexico raise the total to 928,416. Id. at Appendix Table 3. Backlogged Immigration Court Cases and Wait Times by Nationality.

[24] Austin Kocher, ICE Filed Over 100,000 New Cases and Clogged the Courts at the Peak of the Pandemic, Documented, Sept 16, 2020, available at, https://documentedny.com/2020/09/16/ice-filed-over-100000-new-cases-and-clogged-the-courts-in-the-peak-of-the-pandemic/ (last visited May 18, 2021).

[25] Patt Morrison, How the Trump administration is turning judges into ‘prosecutors in a judge’s robe.’ L.A. Times, Aug. 29, 2018., available at, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-ol-patt-morrison-judge-ashley-tabaddor-20180829-htmlstory.html/

[26] Memorandum of James McHenry, Director, Executive Office of Immigration Review, Case Priorities and Performance Metrics, Jan. 17, 2018, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1026721/download.

 

[27] Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 272 (A.G. 2018).

 

[28] U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (Agency) and National Association of Immigration Judges International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Judicial Council 2, 71 FLRA No. 207 (2020).

 

[29] Amiena Khan & Dorothy Harbeck (IJs), DOJ Tries to Silence the Voice of the Immigration Judges—Again! The Federal Lawyer, Mar.Apr. 2020; available at https://immigrationcourtside.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Immigration-TFL_Mar-Apr2020.pdf; Laila Hlass et al., Let Immigration Judges Speak, Slate, oct. 24, 2019, available at, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/10/immigration-judges-gag-rule.html.

[30] Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G.2018) (virtually disqualifying victims of domestic violence and gang violence for asylum). See also, Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, effective date, Jan. 11, available at 2021https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/11/2020-26875/procedures-for-asylum-and-withholding-of-removal-credible-fear-and-reasonable-fear-review.

[31] Executive Office of Immigration Review, Immigration Judge, available at

https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/immigration-judge-16 (last visited May 15, 2021).

[32] IJ Dana Marks provided this unforgettable description on Immigration Courts: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), Apr. 2, 2018, available at  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fB0GBwJ2QA&t=11s (last visited May 20, 2021).

[33] These charts were prepared from the biographical information contained in EOIR announcements of new IJs appointed by an Attorney General serving in the Trump administration between May 2017 and April 2021. The government agencies include The Office of Principal Legal Advisor [OPLA] is the prosecution branch of Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] which in turn is a branch of Department of Homeland Security [DHS]. The Office of Immigration Litigation [OIL], a division of the Department of Justice [DOJ] that represents the government in federal court.

 

[34] In a picture of the newly installed judges sitting in the New York Immigration Court, 8 of the judges previously worked for immigration enforcement agencies, 3 had represented immigrants and 3 had no prior immigration practice experience. Beth Fertig, Presiding Under Pressure, NY Public Radio, May 29, 2019, available at, https://www.wnyc.org/story/presiding-under-pressure.

 

[35] Training now is only a few weeks rather than months. Reade Levinson, Kristina Cooke & Mica Rosenberg, Special Report: How Trump administration left indelible mark on U.S. immigration courts, Mar. 8, 2021 (describing inter alia) the selection and abbreviated training processes), available at, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-trump-court-special-r/special-report-how-trump-administration-left-indelible-mark-on-u-s-immigration-courts-idUSKBN2B0179.

 

[36] This is not necessarily a new criticism. For example, more than 15 years ago, Judge Richard A. Posner decried “the systematic failure by the judicial officers of the immigration service to provide reasoned analysis for the denial of applications for asylum.”  Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F. 3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2004).

[37] Eighty-two experienced Immigration Judges have resigned since 2017. TRAC Immigration, More Immigration Judges Leaving the Bench, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/617/. See also Outgoing SF Immigration Judge Blasts. Immigration Court as ‘Soul Crushing,’ Too Close to ICE, S.F. Chronicle, May 19 2021, available at https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Exclusive-Outgoing-SF-immigration-judge-blasts-16183235.php;  Immigration Judges are quitting or retiring early because of Trump, L.A. Times, Jan. 27, 2020, available at, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-01-27/immigration-judges-are-quitting-or-retiring-early-because-of-trump; Why This Burned-Out Immigration Judge Quit Her Job, The Immigration Post, Feb. 27, 2020, available at, https://www.theimmigrationpost.com/why-this-burned-out-immigration-judge-quit-her-job/; Katie Benner, Top Immigration Judge Departs Amid Broader Discontent Over Trump Policies, NY Times, Sept. 13, 2019, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/us/politics/immigration-courts-judge.html; Hamed Aleaziz, Being An Immigration Judge Was Their Dream. Under Trump, It Became Untenable, BuzzFeed News, Feb. 13,2019, available at, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/immigration-policy-judge-resign-trump; Ilyce Shugall, Op-Ed, Why I Resigned as an Immigration Judge, L.A.Times, Aug. 4, 2019, available at, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-08-03/immigration-court-judge-asylum-trump-policies.

[38] See, e.g., Statement to the House Judiciary Committee on Immigration Court Reform, Jan. 29, 2020 (36 signers) available at, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU01/20200129/110402/HHRG-116-JU01-20200129-SD022.pdf; Brief for Amici Curiae Former Immigration Judges in Support of Petitioner, Barton v. Barr, 140 U.S. 1142 (2020).

 

[39] In FY 2020, the denial rate for asylum, withholding or removal or CAT relief increased to 71.6 percent, up from 54.6 percent in FY 2016. 73.7 percent of immigration judge decisions denied asylum. TRAC Immigration, Asylum Denial Rates Continue to Climb, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/630/ (last visited May 116, 2021); see also, Paul Moses & Tim Healy, Here’s Why the Rejection Rate for Asylum Seekers Has Exploded in America’s Largest Immigration Court in NYC, Dec. 2, 2019, available at, https://www.thedailybeast.com/heres-why-the-rejection-rate-for-asylum-seekers-has-exploded-in-americas-largest-immigration-court-in-nyc.

 

[40] Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics, Asylum Statistics, Data Generated: April 19, 202, available at  https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248491/download

 

[41] TRAC Immigration, Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts
FY 2013-2018, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2018/denialrates.html.

 

[42] TRAC Immigration, Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts
FY 2015-2020, available at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2020/denialrates.html

 

[43] Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G.2018).

 

[44] The Attorney General has the power to certify matters for their review. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (h).

 

[45] Tanvi Misra, DOJ hiring changes may help Trump’s plan to curb immigration, Roll Call, May 4, 2020, available at, https://www.rollcall.com/2020/05/04/doj-hiring-changes-may-help-trumps-plan-to-curb-immigration; Tanvi Misra, DOJ changed hiring to promote restrictive immigration judges, Roll Call, Oct. 29, 2019, available at, https://www.rollcall.com/2019/10/29/doj-changed-hiring-to-promote-restrictive-immigration-judges/; see James R. McHenry III, Director EOIR, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Immigration Judge and Appellate Immigration Judge Hiring Process , Feb. 19, 2019, available at, https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/general_topics/eoir_hiring_procedures_for_aij/download. The DOJ has been called out in the past for making political appointments during the last Republican administration, see Monica Goodling, et al., Office of the Inspector General, Attorney General, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the, Chapt. 6, Evidence and Analysis: Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals Member Hiring Decisions, July 2008.

 

[46] As of January 2020, the lowest starting salary is $138, 630 and ultimately caps at $181,500. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 2020 Immigration Judge Pay Rates, available at,

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1236526/download.

 

[47] EOIR, Immigration Judge, https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/immigration-judge-7. This website refers to a section called “How You Will Be Evaluated” which appears nowhere. Military service assures a strong preference.

 

[48] Jean King, Acting Director, Policy Memo 21-25 Provides EOIR policies regarding the effect of Department of Homeland Security enforcement priorities and initiatives, June 11, 2021.