David Isaacson

The Law Does Not Compel the Impossible– Or Does It?: Matter of C-C- and Awuku-Asare v. Garland

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“Lex non cogit ad impossibilia.” In English, as translated by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, that means: “The law does not compel the doing of impossibilities.” In 1948, citing this principle, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that a nonimmigrant seaman could not be deported for having failed to leave the United States timely when, at the time he was supposed to leave, he was in jail pending trial for a crime of which he was later acquitted. Matter of C-C-, 3 I&N Dec. 221, 222 (BIA 1948). But last week, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s removal order against a student who had failed to attend classes while in jail pending trial for a crime of which he was later acquitted. Awuku-Asare v. Garland, ___ F.3d ___, No. 19-9516 (slip op. March 16, 2021).

The BIA’s 1948 decision in Matter of C-C- is not publicly available online in its entirety (although it can be obtained from sources such as Westlaw and Lexis), as the Department of Justice’s online collection of precedent decisions only goes back to Volume 8 covering 1958-1960. The decision was, however, summarized in the more recent and thus publicly available Matter of Ruiz-Massieu, 22 I&N Dec 833 (BIA 1999), as follows:

Matter of C-C-, 3 I&N Dec. 221 (BIA 1948), involved an alien who was held in custody pending trial for a criminal charge past the time of his authorized stay. The Board held that he was not deportable as an overstay under the principle that the law does not compel the impossible. Id. at 222.

Matter of Ruiz-Massieu, 22 I&N Dec. at 841.

The original Matter of C-C- decision, which I will take the liberty of excerpting even without a hyperlink, provides additional details:

The appellant, a native and citizen of China, male, 44 years of age, last entered the United States at the port of Boston, Mass., July 30, 1947, as a seaman. He was admitted for a period not to exceed 29 days. The record indicates that the appellant intended to reship foreign at the time of said entry.

The appellant testified that he was arrested by customs officials at Boston the day after his arrival and charged with smuggling opium. The record indicates that he was acquitted of this charge in the District Court of the United States at Boston, Mass., on October 17, 1947. The warrant for the appellant’s arrest in deportation proceedings was issued October 1, 1947, while he was in custody awaiting trial on the narcotic charge and prior to his acquittal. He had been in custody since the day following his admission on July 30, 1947.

This case is to be distinguished from a case where the alien’s criminal act caused his incarceration. Here, by judicial finding, the appellant was not guilty of a criminal act. An alien cannot be prevented from departing from the United States in accordance with the terms of his admission and then be found deportable for not so departing. “Lex non cogit ad impossibilia.” The appellant should be given a reasonable period of time within which to depart. Failure to so depart would then render the appellant deportable.

Matter of C-C-, 3 I&N Dec. at 221-222.

Daniel Kofi Awuku-Asare recently found himself in somewhat similar circumstances to Mr. C-C-, except that he was a student charged with rape rather than a seaman charged with drug smuggling. As the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recounted in its March 16 opinion in Awuku-Asare v. Garland,

Awuku-Asare entered the country on a nonimmigrant F-1 visa and could lawfully remain in the United States so long as he complied with the conditions of his visa. Relevant here, maintaining an F-1 visa status requires maintaining a full course of study at an approved educational institution. But Awuku-Asare did not comply with this full-course-of-study requirement because he was incarcerated for approximately 13 months for a crime of which he was ultimately acquitted.

Awuku-Asare, slip op. at 2.

According to the Tenth Circuit, an Immigration Judge ordered Awuku-Asare removed and “[t]he BIA sustained the removability charge. . . determining that “[a]s a result of his arrest and detention,” Awuku-Asare could not “pursue the requisite ‘full course of study.’” Awuku-Asare, slip op. at 3. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(i)). Awuku-Asare was thus found removable under INA § 237(a)(1)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i), which provides that “Any alien who was admitted as a nonimmigrant and who has failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in which the alien was admitted or to which it was changed . . . or to comply with the conditions of any such status, is deportable.”

The Tenth Circuit upheld the removal order against Mr. Awuku-Asare, rejecting his argument that deportability for failure to maintain status requires “that the nonimmigrant’s failure to maintain status must have been caused by some affirmative act performed by the nonimmigrant or that the failure to maintain status was otherwise the nonimmigrant’s fault.” Awuku-Asare, slip op. at 7. Such an interpretation, the Tenth Circuit held, “necessarily adds text to an unambiguous statute. And that is something we cannot do.” Id.

As in Matter of C-C-, however, the interpretation of the statute that led to the issuance of an order against Mr. Awuku-Asare would seem to have required him to do the impossible. He could no more attend classes in person at his college while incarcerated than C-C- could have left the United States while incarcerated. (Attendance at other educational programs for incarcerated inmates likely would not have sufficed, since maintenance of F-1 student status requires attendance at “an institution of higher learning which awards recognized associate, bachelor’s, master’s, doctorate, or professional degrees,” 8 CFR 214.2(f)(6)(ii), as well as the completion of proper transfer procedures with the assistance of the new receiving school, 8 CFR 214.2(f)(8).) The BIA and then the Tenth Circuit, however, did not follow Matter of C-C- and give Mr. Awuku-Asare the benefit of the principle “Lex non cogit ad impossibilia.”

It appears that Matter of C-C- may not have been cited by the BIA or by Mr. Awuku-Asare’s counsel before the Tenth Circuit (he represented himself before the Immigration Court and BIA, see Awuku-Asare, slip op. at 3-4 fn.1.). At least, it is not cited in the Tenth Circuit’s decision, even to explain why it would not apply. It is possible that neither counsel nor the Court found the decision because it pertains to a slightly different mechanism of removability than was at issue in Awuku-Asare: Mr. C-C- had been charged with overstaying his admission, which would today be the subject of a charge under INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), not INA § 237(a)(1)(C)(i). But Matter of C-C- remains good law today, and it would appear to have been relevant here. Particularly faced with an unrepresented respondent, the BIA ought to have taken it upon itself to cite Matter of C-C- and distinguish it if appropriate. It evidently did not do so because the issue was not raised below, however, and it is possible that Mr. Awuku-Asare’s appointed counsel at the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not raise the argument because it would not have been properly exhausted (as a general rule, courts do not consider arguments on review of removal proceedings that were not made during those removal proceedings). The Tenth Circuit was relatively forgiving about broadly construing the arguments that Mr. Awuku-Asare did make below without a lawyer, but declined to consider one argument that was made to it but had not been made below. Awuku-Asare, slip op. at 3-4 fn 1.

In the end, the problem here may be that attending college classes while imprisoned, pending trial for a crime of which he was acquitted, was not the only impossible thing that the law required Mr. Awuku-Asare to do. By statute, a respondent in removal proceedings only has a right to counsel “at no expense to the government”, INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362, and not a right to publicly-funded appointed counsel, such as is provided to defendants in criminal proceedings under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as interpreted in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). If a respondent in removal proceedings cannot afford to pay a lawyer, and cannot find a lawyer to represent him or her pro bono (without fee), then he or she may have to proceed without a lawyer. Immigration law is sufficiently complex, however, that effectively representing oneself without a lawyer is often no more possible than attending classes at one’s college while in prison. Certainly, it would have been extremely difficult for Mr. Awuku-Asare to become aware of Matter of C-C- on his own.

New York State and New York City have provided funding for representation of detained respondents through the New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, meaning that a detained respondent like Mr. Awuku-Asare would have received free representation if he had been in New York. Other jurisdictions have begun similar programs as well. There is also limited federal funding for representation of unaccompanied children and certain people deemed incompetent due to a mental disorder. Ultimately, as the American Immigration Council has explained, Congress and the Biden Administration should amend the INA and its implementing regulations to provide a right to publicly-funded counsel for those unable to afford it, so that people like Mr. Awuku-Asare do not have their cases decided without regard to relevant law simply because they cannot afford a lawyer.

Cyrus Mehta

CSPA Triumphs in Cuthill v. Blinken: Child of Parent who Naturalizes Should not be Penalized

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By Cyrus D. Mehta

One of the unresolved conundrums in our immigration law is the inability of children of lawful permanent residents to be protected under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) when their parents naturalize to US citizenship. The CSPA was enacted to ensure that a child remained under the age of 21 in order to obtain permanent residency with the parent or to stay in a more advantageous family visa category. Sure enough, the CSPA protects the age of a minor child of a who has been sponsored for permanent residency by the parent who is a green card holder even when the child turns 21. Unfortunately, based on erroneous government policy, the goal of the CSPA gets thwarted when the parent of this child naturalizes especially after the child’s biological age is over 21 years.

The Second Circuit in Cuthill v. Blinken recently clarified by holding that a child of a permanent resident whose age is protected under the CSPA ought to be able to continue to claim age protection under the CSPA even when the parent naturalizes to US citizenship.

Section 2 of the CSPA, codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act, protects the age of minor children of US citizens under the age of 21. These minor children are termed Immediate Relatives (IR) under INA 201(b)(2)(A)(i). When a US citizen parent files an I-130 petition for an IR minor child, the child’s age will be frozen under 21 even if there is a delay in the grant of permanent residency and the biological age of the child crosses 21. See INA 202(f)(1).

What happens when a minor child of a permanent resident naturalizes? The child automatically converts from the Family Second (2A) to the IR category. If the biological age of the child is under 21 at the time of the parent’s naturalization, the child’s age pursuant to INA 201(f)(2) freezes. Even if there is a delay in the grant of permanent residency and the child’s biological age is over 21, the child’s statutory age remains frozen under 21.

So far so good. What happens if the child’s biological age under the F2A was over 21 but was protected under the CSPA?  Section 3 of the CSPA protects the age of a child who is the beneficiary of a F2A petition under a special formula. This is how it works:

When the Family 2A petition becomes current under the State Department Visa Bulletin, one has to look at the age of the child on the first day of the month when the F2A becomes current.  If the biological age of the child is over 21 at that time, the age can be subtracted by the amount of time the I-130 petition took to get approved from the date of filing. If this subtraction reduces the age of the child under 21, the child can remain under F2A rather than slide into the less favorable Family 2B preference (F2B), which applies to unmarried sons and daughters of permanent residents. There is clearly a big advantage of remaining under F2A rather than F2B. The F2A is current under the March 2021 Visa Bulletin while the F2B cutoff date in the worldwide category is July 22, 2015.

Although the age of the child is protected under F2A, when the parent naturalizes, the USCIS has taken the position that the age could no longer be protected. Thus, the child gets penalized when the parent became a US citizen. It also leads to the absurd result of inhibiting the parent from naturalizing as the child is better off remaining the child of a lawful permanent resident than a citizen.

These were precisely the facts in Cuthill v. Blinken. On September 29, 2016, when Veronica Cuthill was a permanent resident, she filed an I-130 petition for her daughter, Tatiana Maria Diaz de Junguitu Ullah, who was exactly 19 years 9 months and 6 days old. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) took 363 days to process the I-130 petition and approve it.  Although the daughter’s biological age exceeded 21 while she was waiting for the F2A visa, under the CSPA formula the daughter remained in the F2A preference.

On June 25, 2018, while Diaz was waiting for an F2A visa, Cuthill naturalized as a US citizen. At that time Diaz was still statutorily eligible under the F2A visa based on the 363 days of subtraction of processing time from her biological age. Cuthill sought to convert Diaz’s F2A petition for an IR visa, but the State Department instead notified her that Diaz would be placed in the Family First Preference (F1) queue rather than be considered an IR.

The key issue is whether Cuthill’s daughter Diaz could remain in F2A or whether she would convert into F1. If the daughter converted from F2A to F1, it would cause a great setback. Under the March 2021 Visa Bulletin, the cutoff final action date for F1 beneficiaries is August 8, 2015.  The F2A, on the other hand, is current.

INA 201(f)(2) allows a conversion from F2A to IR when the parent naturalizes. This provision is reproduced below:

Age of parent’s naturalization date – In the case of a petition under section 204 initially filed for an alien child’s classification as a family-sponsored immigrant under section 203(a)(2)(A), based on the child’s parent being lawfully admitted to permanent residence, if the petition is later converted, due to the naturalization of the parent, to a petition to classify the alien as an immediate relative under section (b)(2)(A)(i), the determination described in paragraph (1) shall be made using the age on the date of the parent’s naturalization (emphasis added).

The question before the Second Circuit was whether “the age on the date of the parent’s naturalization” is the biological age of the child or the CSPA age of the child? Judge Katzmann writing the decision for the three judge panel, acknowledged that “although no one will ever accuse the CSPA of being reader-friendly” ingeniously found a textual path to hold that it is the CSPA age and not the biological age that counts. Although INA 203(h)(1)(A) (which protects the age of F2A beneficiaries) and INA 201(f)(2) (which protects the age of IRs) are separate sections within the INA, there is a connection between the two as they both reference the definition of a child under INA 101(b)(1).

Under INA 101(b)(1), a child is “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age.” However, the definition of the child is modified under INA 203(h)(1)(A) for F2A children. As noted, under this provision, a child’s CSPA age under F2A can be reduced to under 21 even if the biological age has exceeded 21 by subtracting the age based on the amount of time the I-130 petition took to get approved. Since INA 201(f)(2) also references INA 203(a)(2)(A), there is a connection between the two sections, and the child’s  age can be interpreted as the CSPA age rather than the biological age when the parent naturalizes, and thus Diaz should convert from F2A to the uncapped IR rather than remain in the backlogged F1.

Judge Katzmann did not end the analysis here, but examined the broader purpose of the CSPA.  “We examine Congress’s purpose in enacting the CSPA, and it is there that we find our clincher: The legislative history shows a clear desire by Congress to fix the age-out problem for all minor beneficiaries, and there is nothing to suggest that Congress intended to exclude beneficiaries like Diaz,” Judge Katzmann wrote.

The government’s argument of insisting that Diaz move from F2A to F1 after her mother Cuthill naturalized ran counter to CSPA’s purpose of to protect child beneficiaries from aging out of their age-dependent visas. While reliance on legislative purpose is often criticized since Congress is a divided body, with respect to the CSPA, Judge Katzmann emphasized that it passed the House by a unanimous 416-0 vote, then passed the Senate by a unanimous vote and again passed the House again by a unanimous vote.  “Penalizing people for becoming citizens runs counter to the entire family-based visa scheme,” Judge Katzmann said.  Finally, Judge Katzmann also did not give Chevron deference to a prior decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, Matter of Zamora-Molina, 25 I&N Dec. 606, 611 (BIA 2011),  in which the BIA adopted the same flawed interpretation as the government tried  to unsuccessfully advance in Cuthill. When the intent of Congress is clear, a court need not give deference to an agency’s interpretation of the statute.

The Second Circuit in Cuthill v. Blinken follows the  Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tovar v. Sessions that also  held that the naturalization of a parent ought not to adversely impact the protected age of the child under the CSPA. Both these courts of appeals have ruled correctly and consistently with the purpose of the CSPA. Rather than appealing to the Supreme Court, it is about time that the  DHS and the State Department under President Biden issue a policy to ensure that the holdings of the Second and Ninth Circuits be uniformly implemented  – at the USCIS and State Department – for all children whose age is protected under F2A and whose parents subsequently naturalize.

If these decisions are not implemented uniformly, parents of children whose age is protected under the F2A will be inhibited from naturalizing to US citizenship. If they go ahead and naturalize, children will be involuntarily converted into the F1 category, which is hopelessly backlogged. Such a result could not have been the intent of Congress when it spoke with one voice to pass the CSPA,  and two courts of appeals, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, have correctly held that  INA 203(h)(1) and INA 201(f)(2), when read together,  unambiguously  provide a pathway for children to gain permanent residency as immediate relatives even when their parents become US citizens.

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

President Biden Must Reject Trump Era H-1B Lottery Rule and Work Visa Travel Ban

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By: Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On March 3, 2021, Democratic Senator Dick Durbin and Republican Charles Grassley submitted a letter to new DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas urging the DHS to implement the Trump administration’s H-1B lottery final rule entitled “Modification of Registration Requirement for Petitioners Seeking to File Cap-Subject H-1B Petitions”, which was published in the Federal Register on January 8, 2021. The final rule would replace the current H-1B lottery system with a preference-based system that prioritizes workers earning higher wages. Originally set to go into effect on March 9, 2021, implementation of the rule was postponed until at least December 31, 2021.  It is a shame that Senator Durbin would throw his support behind a clearly ultra vires regulation of the Trump era that is designed to hurt small businesses, start-up companies and keep the U.S. from retaining the best and brightest foreign students from entering the U.S. workforce.   If allowed to go into effect during this year’s H-1B lottery, the rule will have a devastating impact on international students, entry-level workers, and employees of non-profits, all of whom tend to earn modest salaries.

The Biden administration’s welcoming immigration policies have been a breath of fresh air, but one must keep in mind that certain members of the administration disfavor the H-1B visa program, viewing it erroneously as a source of “cheap labor” that threatens the interests of U.S. workers. The H-1B visa indeed requires employers to pay the higher of the prevailing wage or actual wage paid to similarly situated workers in the company.  Distrust of the H-1B program could explain why President Biden selectively rescinded Proclamation 10014, but not Proclamation 10052, which restricts the entry of individuals who were outside the United States without a visa or other immigration document on the effective date of the Proclamation, June 24, 2020, and are seeking to obtain an H-1B visa, among other categories. We have discussed Proclamation 10052 in detail in a previous blog. In its last days, the Trump administration extended Proclamation 10052 to March 31, 2021.

Given the tremendous hardship it causes to noncitizens subject to the ban, the Biden administration ought to allow Proclamation 10052 to expire on March 31 rather than further extending it. Better still, the Biden administration should rescind it even before March 31 as every day causes hardship to those who have been adversely impacted. The affirmative rejection of 10052 would symbolically also demonstrate that Proclamation 10052 is based on the same xenophobic premise that led to the rejection of Proclamation 10014.  The Proclamation already conflicts with several of the Biden administration’s early immigration policies. Proclamation 10052 was based on the same tired and xenophobic narratives as Proclamation 10014, which Biden has already rescinded.  Section 5(c)(iii) of the Proclamation, which aims to prevent “aliens” (a term the Biden administration has pointedly avoided using) with final orders of removal from obtaining eligibility to work in the United States does not comport with Biden’s new priorities memo, which would allow such noncitizens to seek work authorization under an order of supervision. A provision at Section 5(b) in Proclamation 10052 requires measures to prevent noncitizens seeking admission under the EB-2 or EB-3 categories from disadvantaging U.S. workers under INA 212(a)(5)(A). Biden’s February 2, 2021 Executive Order entitled “Restoring Faith in Our Legal Immigration Systems and Strengthening Integration and Inclusion Efforts for New Americans”, on the other hand, lauds the contributions of immigrants to the U.S. economy and promised to reduce barriers to naturalization.

Biden’s U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021 also reflects a certain reluctance on the part of the Biden administration to address the H-1B visa program. The sweeping bill is largely favorable to immigrants, featuring as its keystone a path to legal status for undocumented noncitizens who were present in the United States as of January 1, 2021. The bill also endeavors to reduce the backlogs in the employment and family based categories by adding additional numbers and not counting dependent family members, among other ameliorative measures.  However, the bill had comparatively little to say about H-1B visas. One of the few provisions that did address the program empowers DHS to “issue regulations to establish procedures for prioritizing such [nonimmigrant] visas based on the wages offered by employers”, which concerningly echoes Trump’s H-1B lottery rule. While the issuing of more green cards to skilled workers is indeed welcome and absolutely necessary, there also needs to be a complimentary work visa program that allows employers to quickly employ much needed skilled workers and which also provides a bridge to the green card. Also another glaring lacuna in the bill is the absence of the much needed startup visa that would incentivize foreign national entrepreneurs to found companies in the US, which in turn could grow and create jobs for Americans in addition to creating paradigm shifting technologies.

If the Biden administration truly wishes to act in the best interest of the U.S. economy it must reject the idea, whether it is championed by opponents of skilled immigration on the left or the right,  that H-1B workers are a threat to the United States. The administration must seek to delay the implementation of the H-1B lottery rule and rescind it notwithstanding Senator Durbin’s support for it. Indeed, Senator Durbin, teaming up with known immigration foe Senator Grassley (who has never repudiated Trump),  has been a constant and irrational foe of the H-1B program for over two decades and his opposition to the H-1B is not a reasoned voice and lacks credibility. Proclamation 10052 also does not benefit U.S. workers by separating talented H-1B employees from their families and preventing them from performing critical jobs in the United States. As Stuart Anderson points out in a recent Forbes article, many H-1B workers are employed in the computer and tech field, which has not seen significant increases in unemployment during the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, large numbers of positions remain open in this field and would likely go unfilled without highly skilled H-1B workers. With no cogent economic justification remaining to support it, it is hoped that Proclamation 10052 soon goes the way of Proclamation 10014.

According to an earlier Forbes article,  “H-1B visas are important because they generally represent the only practical way for high-skilled foreign nationals, including international students, to work long-term in the United Sates and have the chance to become employment-based immigrants and U.S. Citizens. In short, without H-1B visas nearly everyone from the founders of billion-dollar companies to the people responsible for the vaccines and medical care saving American lives would never have been in the United States.”. The H-1B lottery rule, if implemented, will clearly provide a disincentive for international students to pursue higher education in the US. By eliminating the chances of entry level students from obtaining H-1B visas, they will pursue educational opportunities in other countries, which in turn will adversely impact American universities. As AILA’s comment to the H-1B lottery rule points out, international students comprise over 5% of the total number of students enrolled in higher education in the U.S., and contribute billions of dollars to the American economy. See “AILA and the Council Submit Comments Opposing USCIS Proposal to Create Wage-Based Selection Process for H-1Bs”, AILA Doc. 20120234 (Dec. 2, 2020). Talented foreign students have long flocked to U.S. universities, so losing this population would not only financially devastate American educational institutions, but also result in the loss of this source of talented entry-level workers. The notion that foreign students after completing a year or two of OPT or STEM OPT will be able to command Level 4 wages and thus compete for H-1B visas under the new rule is a canard.

United States companies, too, depend on H-1B workers. U.S. employers have long recruited highly skilled and highly education H-1B visa holders to fill entry-level STEM positions. With foreign students comprising the vast majority of graduates of some STEM programs in the United States, there are simply not enough qualified U.S. workers to fill all open positions in many fields. See AILA Doc. 20120234, supra. By effectively foreclosing the H-1B visa as an option for entry-level workers who are not yet earning enormous salaries, the H-1B lottery rule will cause untold disruption and economic harm to U.S. employers who rely on H-1B talent. With some H-1B workers filling critical roles in healthcare and research to combat COVID-19, the potential for harm extends beyond the mere economic and could further delay the United States’ recovery from the pandemic. See AILA Doc. 20120234, supra. If talented H-1B workers go elsewhere for employment, the United States would also lose its ability to attract the “best and brightest” who have made contributions of untold significance to the United States. When the Immigration Act of 1990 revised the H-1B visa and set a 65,000 cap, the internet had not taken off. Since then there have been immense technological leaps, while the H-1B cap continues to remain at 65,000 with a paltry 20,000 added for those with master’s degrees in 2004. Still, it is H-1B visa holders who have contributed to advances in technology and who have ultimately become CEOs of companies like Google and Microsoft. The new H-1B lottery rule will kill the ability of attracting talented foreign nationals on H-1B visas who will ultimately greatly contribute to the US.

Finally, the fact that the H-1B visa is used by IT consulting companies should not be a justification to promulgate the new H-1B lottery rule. The use of IT consulting companies is widespread in America (and even the US government contracts for their services), and was acknowledged by Congress when it passed the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (AVWIA) by creating onerous additional attestations for H-1B dependent employers. The current enforcement regime has sufficient teeth to severely punish bad actors.  IT consulting employers who hire professional workers from India unfortunately seem to be getting more of a rap for indiscriminately using up the H-1B visa. Even the Durbin-Grassley letter falsely accuses outsourcing companies for gaming the H-1B lottery system without taking into account the limited supply of H-1B visa numbers and the increased demand for skilled workers each year. However, it is this very business model that has provided reliability to companies in the United States and throughout the industrialized world to obtain top-drawer talent quickly with flexibility and at affordable prices that benefit end consumers and promote diversity of product development. This is what the oft-criticized “job shop” or “body shop” or “outsourcing company” readily provides. By making possible a source of expertise that can be modified and redirected in response to changing demand, uncertain budgets, shifting corporate priorities and unpredictable fluctuations in the business cycle itself, the pejorative reference to them as “job shop” is, in reality, the engine of technological ingenuity on which progress in the global information age largely depends.

By continuing to limit and stifle the H-1B program, either through a new H-1B lottery rule or by perpetuating Proclamation 10052, U.S. employers will remain less competitive and will not be able to pass on the benefits to consumers. We need more H-1B visa numbers rather than less. We also need to respect H-1B workers rather than deride them, even if they work at an IT consulting company, as they too wish to abide by the law and to pursue their dreams in America.  The best way to reform the H-1B program is to provide more mobility to H-1B visa workers. By providing more mobility, which includes being able to obtain a green card quickly.  H-1B workers will not be stuck with the employer who brought them on the H-1B visa, and this can also result in rising wages within the occupation as a whole. Mobile foreign workers will also be incentivized to start their own innovative companies in America, which in turn will result in more jobs. This is the best way to reform the H-1B visa program, rather than to further shackle it by making it harder to win the H-1B lottery.

The comment period closes on THIS WEDNESDAY March 10 at 11:59 pm ET. We would highly recommend that everyone submit their own comment supporting the delay of the rule and the need for further review of the rule, underscoring why a delay is necessary because implementation cannot be rushed through right before cap season, why the rule is unlawful, and why the economic data does not support the rule as written.  You can submit your own comment here:

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/02/08/2021-02665/modification-of-registration-requirement-for-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b-petitions#open-comment

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a Law Clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.