Cyrus Mehta

Building the Legal Case to Challenge Trump’s Immigration Ban

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President Trump’s latest Proclamation  is a brazen attempt to rewrite US immigration laws under the guise of protecting Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Proclamation bans most noncitizens who will enter the United States as immigrants for 60 days from April 23, 2020.  Confirming the sham, Senior White House adviser Stephen Miller, according to a leaked private conference call recording, told supporters that Trump’s order to suspend immigration is part of a larger strategy to reduce overall immigration.  He said that “the most important thing is to turn off the faucet of new immigration labor” and that the temporary ban would limit “chains of follow-on migration.”

Following my initial reaction to the Proclamation, in this blog I point out all its inherent contradictions to make the case that it is legally infirm and is vulnerable to challenges in court.

Although the Proclamation purports to halt permanent immigration for 60 days it leaves open the possibility of revaluation on day 50 and extending the ban. The Proclamation also leaves open the possibility of introducing other measures possibly impacting the H-1B and L visa programs. There are indications that the administration will extend the Proclamation to also limit temporary work visas as well. A draft of another version of the order would have banned noncitizens seeking entry on B, H, E, J, L and O visas, and so it would not be unexpected if the ban is eventually extended to nonimmigrant visa entrants. It is ironic  that even immigration restrictionists are critical of the Proclamation as it does not go far enough, and so they will continue to exert pressure to extend the order and expand the restrictions.

Paradoxically, the Proclamation places green card holders on a lower pedestal than temporary workers tied to an employer under a pseudo economic theory that there is no way to protect Americans from the threat of competition from newly minted green card holders who can seek jobs in any sector. This false assumption is made even though some of the would be immigrants who have been banned were sponsored by employers because of their skills and who tested the US labor market for American workers prior to filing a green card application on their behalf. The Proclamation further cruelly blocks spouses and children of green card holders and even those who have won approvals based on their extraordinary ability or for being outstanding professors or researchers. Spouses and minor children of US citizens are exempted and so are physicians and nurses, along with others coming to perform work related to COVID-19.

But these exceptions are small crumbs to make it seem that the ban has a rationale, although this is clearly not so. The idea that a 60 day pause on permanent immigration will improve the unemployment situation in the US is farcical especially in light of the leaked Miller call that this is part of the administration’s long term strategy to lower immigration levels.  An editorial from of the Wall Street Journal published the day before the Proclamation was promulgated makes a compelling case that immigrants do not take away jobs, and it is in fact the reverse. Below is an extract:

Nearly all of the economic evidence shows that immigrants enhance American growth and jobs. Former Federal Reserve economist Madeline Zavodny, now at the University of North Florida, examined state employment levels and immigration for the National Foundation for American Policy in 2018. States with surges of immigration like Texas and Iowa had low jobless rates. “Having more immigrants reduces the unemployment rate and raises the labor force participation rate of U.S. natives within the same sex and education group,” she found.

Rather, the purpose of the Proclamation is political posturing to please Trump’s political base, while causing untold pain and suffering on people, both US citizens and would be immigrants, who will be prevented from uniting as a result of this ban. According to this chilling NY Times story, an angry and brooding Trump impulsively thought of issuing the order when he realized that he was not polling well in battleground states.

Although Trump claims to have derived the authority to ban immigrants under section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which he relied upon when he issued the travel bans and the third watered down version was upheld by the US Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii, there may be a basis to distinguish the latest Proclamation from his prior travel ban. The president cannot wholesale re-write laws enacted by Congress, and decide the sort of immigrant he prefers over another based on personal whim and prejudice. For example, EB-5 investors have been exempted from the ban while other would be immigrants who have properly obtained approvals under the law, and many who have waited for years in green card queues, have been improperly banned. While spouses and children of US citizens have been exempted, parents of US citizens have not. Diversity lottery winners are also included in the ban, and Trump’s hostility to them is apparent when he referred to them as hailing from “shithole” countries.  Trump’s disapproval of family-based immigration, which he pejoratively refers to chain migration, has no relation to protecting American workers during the COVID-19 crisis.

Although the Supreme Court upheld Trump’s travel ban that focused on mainly Muslim countries, and which is why it is also appropriately called the Muslim ban, it is not a foregone conclusion that courts will uphold this ban as it completely rewrites the law based on subjective opinions and pseudo economic theories that are not consistent with the INA. Trump has used INA § 212(f) to reshape immigration laws enacted by Congress that have nothing to do with travel bans and national security. These initiatives have received push back from lower courts.  On November 9, 2018, Trump issued another Proclamation invoking INA § 212(f), which banned people who cross the Southern border outside a designated port of entry from applying for asylum in the United States.  The Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security followed by jointly issuing a rule implementing the proclamation. The key issue is whether INA § 212(f) allowed a president like Trump with predisposed views against granting asylum to override entire visa categories or change the US asylum system?   INA § 208(a)(1) categorically allows any alien who is physically present in the United States to apply for asylum regardless of his or her manner of arrival in the United States “whether or not at a designated port of arrival.” Trump attempted to change that by virtue of the authority given to him in INA § 212(f) by not allowing people who cross outside a port of entry from applying for asylum. Never mind that the administration had virtually closed the designated ports of entry for asylum seekers, which forced them to cross the border through irregular methods. In East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Trump administration had unlawfully done what the “Executive cannot do directly; amend the INA”. Indeed, even in Trump v. Hawaii, the administration successfully argued that INA § 212(f) only supplanted other provisions that allowed the administration to bar aliens from entering the United States, but did not expressly override statutory provisions. Thus, INA § 212(f) could not be used as a justification to override INA § 208. The Supreme Court has temporarily stayed the injunction in a related case that prohibits asylum seekers on the Southern border from applying for asylum in the US if they have not applied in Mexico or Guatemala – and thus by implication East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump – from taking effect until the government’s appeal in the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court is decided. There has been no ruling on the merits of the case.

On October 3, 2019, Trump yet again invoked INA § 212(f) by issuing a Proclamation to ban intending immigrants from entering the United States if they did not have health insurance within 30 days of their arrival in the United States. Under the health insurance proclamation, an intending immigrant who has satisfied all statutory requirements set out in the INA will nevertheless be permanently barred from entering the United States if that person cannot show, to the satisfaction of a consular officer, that he or she either “will be covered by approved health insurance” within 30 days of entering the United States, or “possesses the financial resources to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical costs.” In Doe v. Trump, a federal district court in Oregon temporarily  blocked the health insurance proclamation through a nationwide injunction by relying on East Bay  Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, supra, which specifically held that a president cannot rely on INA  § 212(f) to amend the INA. In the health insurance case, Trump’s proclamation contradicts the public charge provision under INA 212(a) (4), which does not have a health insurance requirement. The Ninth Circuit has upheld the temporary order of the Oregon district court, although it has a strong dissent by Judge Bress criticizing the Oregon district court’s finding that INA $ 212(f) was unconstitutional  under the nondelegation doctrine. Under this doctrine, associated with separation of powers, Congress cannot delegate legislative powers to the president under INA § 212(f). This argument needs to be watched more closely as it is bound to play out further when the administration defends its authority under INA § 212(f) in this case and other cases.  The Supreme Court has not yet intervened in this case.

On January 31, 2020, Trump used his extraordinary broad powers under INA § 212(f) to expand his travel ban to six additional countries.  The affected countries are Nigeria, Eritrea, Sudan, Tanzania, Kyrgyzstan and Myanmar. The expanded ban comes about three years after the prior ban that was upheld by Trump v. Hawaii. Most of the countries targeted in this ban, like the prior travel ban, are countries with significant Muslim populations. Even Myanmar, where Buddhists constitute the majority, has a significant minority population comprising Muslims including the persecuted Rohingya people.  The administration spuriously argued that the new travel ban is vital to national security and the ban will remain “until those countries address their identified deficiencies” related to security and information-sharing issues. Unlike the prior travel ban, the more recent travel ban only restricts immigrants from Burma, Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan and Nigeria. The restrictions on Sudan and Tanzania are narrower as they only apply to immigrants who have won green cards under the diversity program. Like Trump’s latest Proclamation, this travel ban does not apply to nonimmigrants who visit the US temporarily such as tourists, students or workers under specialized work visa programs such as the H-1B for specialty occupations or L-1 for intracompany transferees. As explained in a prior blog, the justification that the administration  provided was that it is harder remove immigrants from the US is also spurious from a security perspective since all noncitizens are subject to the same removal process, able to contest the charges against them and are eligible for relief from removal. People placed in removal can remain in the US until they exhaust all their appeals.   Also the justification to restrict immigrants from Tanzania and Sudan who have won green card lotteries makes even less sense. Why would one who has won the lottery in Sudan and Tanzania pose more of a risk than someone who is immigrating on another basis? The January 31, 2020 travel ban reflects Trump’s abhorrence against DV lottery winners from poorer countries, and again, like the most recent Proclamation devalues permanent immigration to the US.

Notwithstanding the prior Trump v. Hawaii ruling, it is imperative that the limits to INA § 212(f) be challenged as Trump can use this provision to radically transform immigration laws enacted by Congress, and without going through Congress to amend laws that he does not like. A challenge to the expanded ban will again give courts the ability to examine INA § 212(f).   The Supreme Court, disappointingly, held in Trump v. Hawaii   that INA § 212(f) “exudes deference to the President” and thus empowers him to deny entry of noncitizens if he determines that allowing entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” One should however  still give credit to prior lower federal court decisions that blocked the first and second versions of the travel ban, on the grounds that Trump exceeded INA § 212(f), which were far worse than the watered down third version that was finally upheld. Although the Supreme Court may have stayed the injunction in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, it has not ruled on the merits of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that Trump could not use INA § 212(f) to rewrite asylum law in the INA. The Supreme Court is yet to hear any challenge to the health insurance proclamation. The Ninth Circuit in both these cases did not disapprove of the reasoning by district court judges that Trump overstepped his authority notwithstanding the powers given to him under INA § 212(f). The latest Proclamation banning permanent immigration, if extended  beyond 60 days and even expanded  to other nonimmigrant visa categories, would provide another basis to test the limits of INA § 212(f) in federal court. Trump has rewritten the immigration law in the Proclamation according to whim and caprice that conflict with existing provisions in the INA. While the INA allows US citizens to sponsor spouses, minor children and parents as immediate relatives, Trump has rewritten the law to exclude parents of US citizens. Under the Proclamation, even adult children and siblings of US citizens have been banned.  Similarly, while the INA specifically allows permanent residents to sponsor spouses, minor children and adult unmarried children, the Proclamation excludes them all together. The exception of EB-5 investors from the ban is hardly surprising given the Trump and Kushner family’s involvement in real estate development, which attracts funding from foreign investors.

The first challenge to the Proclamation was filed on April 25, 2020 in the form of an emergency Temporary Restraining Order as part of  the challenge to the health insurance proclamation in  Doe v. Trump as plaintiffs in the class. They are underaged children of lawful permanent residents who will be adversely impacted by the latest Proclamation if they are unable to obtain immigrant visas before they age out. This is only the opening salvo attacking the Proclamation on a narrow basis, which will inspire others, including state attorney generals to also legally challenge it. In approving Trump’s first travel ban, the majority in Trump v. Hawaii made reference to Korematsu v. United States, This was the shameful Supreme Court case that allowed the internment of Japanese Americans after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Justice Sonia Sotomayor referencing this decision in her powerful dissent in Trump v. Hawaii. Justice Sotomayor found striking parallels between Korematsu and Trump’s travel ban. For example, they were both based on dangerous stereotypes about particular groups’ inability to assimilate and their intent to harm the United States.  In both cases, there were scant national security justifications. In both cases, there was strong evidence that there was impermissible animus and hostility that motivated the government’s policy. The majority rejected the dissent’s comparison of Trump’s supposedly facially neutral travel ban to Korematsu, but still took this opportunity to overrule Korematsu. Yet, when one carefully reviews Trump’s motivations behind the travel bans, especially after the second one and this Proclamation, they are not too different from the motivations that resulted in the forced internment of Japanese Americans. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor astutely reaffirmed that “[t]he United States of America is a Nation built upon the promise of religious liberty.” In her rejection of the legality of the travel ban, she observed that “[t]he Court’s decision today fails to safeguard that fundamental principle. It leaves undisturbed a policy first advertised openly and unequivocally as a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States’ because the policy now masquerades behind a façade of national-security concerns.”

It is time to revisit the Supreme Court’s overruling of Korematsu in Trump v. Hawaii. In that case, the Supreme Court opined that the first travel ban was facially neutral and took pains to distinguish it from the repugnant Korematsu decision. The subsequent use of Trump’s authority under INA § 212(f) confirms that the first travel ban was not neutral, and this Proclamation, along with other executive orders under INA § 212(f), are strikingly similar to Korematsu as they lack any rationale. Since the first travel ban took effect, thousands of intending immigrants from the banned countries, from infants to elderly parents, have been needlessly impacted and they pose no threat to national security.  The latest Proclamation’s justification is economic – the millions of job losses – than health related. The president should not be allowed to rewrite the INA based on periodic downturns in the economy since the last time Congress fixed the number of visas was in 1990, and there have been quite a few economic downturns since. Moreover, the waivers in the travel bans are a sham and are seldom granted. There are no waivers in the most recent Proclamation to those impacted, only exceptions.   INA § 212(f) must have limits, courts must hold, including the Supreme Court someday. Miller’s conference call to Trump’s supporters is the smoking gun, and Exhibit A, to show in court that Trump’s latest Proclamation is a chimera – it has nothing to do with COVID-19 but is part of the long term goal of this administration to reduce immigration levels. As president of the United States, Trump is still subject to laws enacted by the US Congress. He cannot be allowed to be King and change them through whim and caprice.

 

David Isaacson

My Comment on Proposed Affidavit of Support Revisions – Do You Have One Too?

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USCIS has recently proposed changes to the Form I-864, Affidavit of Support Under Section 213A of the Act, which is used by petitioners in family-based immigration cases and certain employment-based immigration cases to promise to provide required support to an immigrant as required under section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Similar changes are also proposed to the related Form I-864EZ, a simplified version of the affidavit of support for certain sponsors with straightforward tax situations, and Form I-864A Contract Between Sponsor and Household Member, used when the income of a household member other than the sponsored immigrant is to be counted towards meeting the minimum income requirement.

To summarize, in addition to changing language throughout the form and instructions in what USCIS claims is an effort “to better inform sponsors and household members of their support obligations”, USCIS has proposed substantive changes to the way in which the forms must be executed and the information that will need to be provided in them. USCIS has proposed to add the requirement that the forms be executed before a notary public, and that bank account information be collected from the sponsor or household member. There will also be an option for the sponsor or household member to submit a credit report.

Public comments on the proposed changes, according to USCIS, “are encouraged and will be accepted until May 11, 2020.” Comments can be submitted online at regulations.gov with reference to OMB Control Number 1615-0075, agency name/Docket ID USCIS- 2007-0029.

I have submitted a comment, which seemed worth reproducing here even though in principle it is available to the public already on regulations.gov. I would encourage readers who have their own concerns about the proposed revisions to submit comments as well. (A note, however, for anyone who agrees with my comment and was thinking of resubmitting it verbatim: identical comments are likely to be ignored, so it is better if you add or alter something to express your own views and not just mine.) My comment was as follows:

I write to comment regarding OMB Control Number 1615-0075, agency name/Docket ID USCIS- 2007-0029.

The proposed requirement that an I-864, I-864EZ or I-864A be notarized by a notary public would be in violation of federal statute, specifically section 1746 of Title 28, United States Code. That section provides:

“Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order, or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other than a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other than a notary public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form:
(1) If executed without the United States: “I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).

(Signature)”.
(2) If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: “I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).

(Signature)”.”

Congress has determined that in matters subject to federal law and regulation, any affidavit which would ordinarily be required to be taken before a notary public may instead be substituted “with like force and effect” by an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury including the appropriate language. USCIS has no authority to override this statute through a change in form instructions, If the instructions are not altered to allow for the possibility of an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 USC 1746, rather than a notarization, they will be in violation of the law.

USCIS is well aware of how to offer the option of a statement under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 USC 1746 instead of a notarized signature. Page 4, Part 4 of the Form G-639, Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Request, contains precisely this option. If USCIS insists on adding notarization or the equivalent to Forms I-864, I-864A, and I-864EZ, then it must provide the same option as on the G-639.

The proposed requirement to provide bank account information is also in severe tension with the statute. 8 USC 1183a(g)(6) clearly provides that certified copies of tax returns, accompanied by a written statement under oath or under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28 regarding such copies, are the primary means of demonstrating means to maintain the required level of income, and that the possibility of proving assets is an additional form of “flexibility” offered where necessary:

“(6) Demonstration of means to maintain income
(A) In general
(i) Method of demonstration

For purposes of this section, a demonstration of the means to maintain income shall include provision of a certified copy of the individual’s Federal income tax return for the individual’s 3 most recent taxable years and a written statement, executed under oath or as permitted under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, that the copies are certified copies of such returns.

(ii) Flexibility

For purposes of this section, aliens may demonstrate the means to maintain income through demonstration of significant assets of the sponsored alien or of the sponsor, if such assets are available for the support of the sponsored alien.”

It does not demonstrate “flexibility” to require sponsors, or sponsored aliens, to prove their assets or related information in circumstances where the certified copies of the sponsor’s tax returns provided under 8 USC 1183a(g)(6) already establish ability to maintain sufficient income. Doing so is therefore inconsistent with the statutory structure.

Moreover, there are good practical reasons for sponsors not to want to provide information regarding their bank accounts unnecessarily. In the event of lost or misdirected mail, for example, such information could facilitate the theft of funds from the sponsor by anyone who were to inappropriately come into possession of the I-864, I-864A or I-864EZ. USCIS has no statutory basis to impose this risk on those who can demonstrate sufficient income through their tax returns.

These proposed changes appear to represent an inappropriate effort by USCIS to hinder family-based immigration authorized by Congress, without statutory authority to do so. They should be rejected.

Cyrus Mehta

FAQ for Green Card Holders during the COVID-19 Period

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I have received inquiries from lawful permanent residents, or green card holders, who are outside the United States and have been unable to return to the United States in the COVID-19 period. They are unable to return either because there are no flights out of the country to the US or they feel vulnerable to contracting the infection or they may have unfortunately contracted the infection.

These green card holders are understandably concerned as their inability to return to the US is due to no fault of their own.  If a lawful permanent resident is unable to return to the US within a year, the green card technically becomes invalid for reentry to the US. This does not mean that the person ceases to be a lawful permanent resident, and it can still be asserted that lawful permanent residence has not been abandoned.

Similarly, a reentry permit allows a green card holder to remain outside the US for two years. One who is outside the US with a reentry permit must return back prior to the expiration of the reentry permit. Otherwise, if the person remains outside the US beyond the date of the reentry permit, the reentry permit is technically invalid as a travel document, although the person can still claim to be a lawful permanent resident.

Green card holders stuck outside the US have to also be mindful about their eligibility for naturalization. The eligible applicant must have at least 2.5 years of physical presence in the US in the past 5 years prior to filing the application. If the applicant has been married to a US citizen for 3 years, then the eligible applicant must have 1.5 years of physical presence in the US.  Spouses and children who obtained lawful permanent residence as a result of being subject to extreme cruelty by a US citizen are also allowed to apply for naturalization after 3 years. Furthermore, the applicant must be continuously residing in the US during the relevant 5 or 3 year period. An applicant who has been outside the US for more than six months is deemed to have broken continuity of residence. This presumption of breaking continuous residence can be rebutted if the applicant can show that the applicant did not terminate his or her employment in the United States or obtain employment while abroad; the applicant’s immediate family members remained in the United States; and the applicant retained full access to or continued to own or lease a home in the United States.

Below are my brief answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) by concerned green card holders during the COVID-19 crisis.

1.I am unable to return to the US as all flights have been cancelled in my country. Will I have any problems if I return to the US in excess of 180 days from my last departure?

If a green card holder seeks admission to the US after being outside for more than 180 days, he or she will again be considered as an applicant seeking admission into the US under INA 101(a)(13)(C)(ii). While you may be subject to more scrutiny at the port of entry as an applicant seeking admission, you will likely not be denied admission for abandoning permanent residency especially if the reason for not travelling back within 180 days was due to COVID-19 restrictions. Regardless of whether you are returning within or in excess of 180 days, there may be other grounds under which you will be treated as an applicant for admission pursuant to INA 101(a)(13)(C).

2. I am unable to return to the US as all flights have been cancelled in my country. Will I have any problems if I return to the US in excess of 1 year from my last departure?

The green card (Form I-551) is technically invalid for reentry into the US if you have spent in excess of 1 year outside the US from your last departure. If your reason for not coming back was related to COVID-19, you should apply for a Returning Resident (SB-1) Visa at the US Consulate as soon as it reopens to the public and explain that your inability to return was due to circumstances beyond your control. You must still demonstrate that you never abandoned permanent residence by demonstrating that you are returning from a temporary visit abroad, continued to  maintain ties with the US and that you always harbored an intention to resume permanent residency.

The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1997) of what constitutes a temporary visit abroad is generally followed:

A trip is a temporary visit abroad if (a) it is for a relatively short period, fixed by some early event; or (b) the trip will terminate upon the occurrence of an event that has a reasonable possibility of occurring within a relatively short period of time. If as in (b) the length of the visit is contingent upon the occurrence of an event and is not fixed in time and if the event does not occur within a relatively short period of time, the visit will be considered a “temporary visit abroad” only if the alien has a continuous, uninterrupted intention to return to the United States during the visit.

3. What if the US Consulate refused the SB-1 Visa, or has not resumed operations soon enough, and I have spent in excess of 1 year overseas from my last departure?

If your green card (Form I-551) has not expired, you may wish to travel directly to the US and assert at the port of entry that you never abandoned permanent residency. While this is more risky than applying for an SB-1 visa, the Customs and Border Protection official has discretion to waive you into the US even without a technically valid I-551. The CBP official may ask you to complete Form I-193, Application for Waiver of Passport and/or Visa and pay the requisite filing fee. In the event that the CBP official does not waive you into the US, as a lawful permanent resident you have the right to have an Immigration Judge review your claim, and the burden of proof is on the government through clear and convincing evidence that you abandondoned permanent residency.

4. As a result of being unable to travel back to the US, I have gone beyond the expiration date of my reentry permit?

My responses to Questions 2 and 3 are equally applicable to one who has stayed beyond the expiration date of the reentry permit.

5. Can I attempt to renew the reentry permit while stuck overseas?

No. You can only apply for a reentry permit while you are physically in the US.

6. How will my being stuck outside the US in excess of 180 days but less than 1 year impact my ability to naturalize?

You have to demonstrate that you have been physically present in the US for half of the relevant period – 5 years or 3 years (if married to a US citizen for 3 years) – preceding the filing of the N-400 application. In other words, you must demonstrate that you have physically spent at least half of 5 or 3 years in the US. Each day you spend outside the US may erase the time you have already accumulated until you get readmitted into the US and gain more days. Of course, if you have already accumulated days that exceed the threshold, you would still have sufficient time to spare.

If you are on the cusp, and will likely have less than half of the required time of physical presence in the US because of your forced stay outside the US, then you may wish to consider filing the N-400 application from overseas in order to lock in the required physical presence.

If you meet the physical presence test, you have to also demonstrate that you did not break continuity of residence, and so remaining outside the US in excess of six months will lead to a rebuttable presumption that you broke continuous residence. Under current law, one can rebut the presumption by demonstrating that you did not move your residence or seek employment overseas, or your immediate family members remained in the US. There is no accommodation in the existing rules regarding remaining outside the US due to circumstances beyond your control. Still, an applicant is nevertheless encouraged to use a COVID-19 related ground to also rebut the presumption of breaking continuity of residence.

7. How will my being stuck outside the US in excess of 1 year impact my ability to naturalize?

Unfortunately, whatever physical presence that was accumulated will be erased, and you will need to wait 4 years and 1 day before you can file Form N-400 again, provided you have the requisite physical presence as discussed above, and you have also been continuously residing during the relevant period. The USCIS Policy Manual suggests that an applicant apply after 4 years and 6 months to avoid the presumption of a break in continuity of residence.

8. Are there any exceptions if I am unable to meet the requirements of naturalization if I am stranded overseas?

Yes. Spouses of US citizens who are employed abroad for certain organizations may not need to meet the physical presence of residence requirement. Most people who avail of this exception are spouses of US citizens working for an American corporation or its subsidiary abroad that is engaged in the development of foreign trade or commerce of the US,  but see Chapter 4 – Spouses of US Citizens Employed Abroad of the USCIS Policy Manual for further details and other exceptions.

(This blog is for informational purposes, and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cora-Ann Pestaina

LCA Posting Requirements at Home During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Do I Post on the Refrigerator or Bathroom Mirror?

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“The LCA is to an H-1B worker like a leash is to a dog.” (Cyrus Mehta and Myriam Jaidi, The LCA in the Age of Telecommuting). In the midst of the global pandemic that is COVID-19, these words have never seemed truer.  Across the US, employers of H-1B workers are understandably very concerned about how to handle forced changes in the employment of their H-1B workers. Employers have had to make the difficult decisions such as to shut down completely, lay off employees, lower salaries, reduce employees’ hours of work, place employees on furlough or have them work from home. In last week’s blog, FAQ on Changes in Salary and Other Working Conditions for H-1B Workers During the COVID-19 Crisis, Cyrus Mehta provided a list of frequently asked questions (FAQ) seeking to provide some guidance to US employers. But one issue keeps on rearing its ugly head, how exactly can an employer ensure compliance with the Labor Condition Application (LCA) posting requirements when the H-1B worker is forced to work from a worksite (such as his/her home) that was not intended at the time the LCA was filed?

As background, the LCA ensures that notice is provided to US workers about the fact that an H-1B worker is being sought, the occupational classification, the wages offered, the period of employment, locations at which the H-1B worker will be employed, and that the LCA and accompanying documents are available for public inspection. See 20 CFR § 655.734. The notice must be posted at the “place of employment”, which means the worksite or physical location where the work actually is performed by the H–1B, H–1B1, or E–3 nonimmigrant. See 20 CFR § 655.715. So one’s home in the age of virtual cloud-based desktops and Zoom video can conceivably constitute “place of employment.”

As explained in the FAQ, if the H-1B worker relocates to the home within the area of commuting distance from the original workplace, a new LCA need not be obtained, but notice must still be given at the new place of employment. If the H-1B worker relocates to a home outside the area of intended employment, a new LCA has to be obtained and the employer must file an amended petition. “Area of intended employment” means the area within normal commuting distance of the place (address) of employment where the H–1B nonimmigrant is or will be employed. See 20 CFR §655.715.

Employers have run into issues due to the fact that employees are hesitant to post LCAs at their home. They are understandably resistant to the idea of broadcasting their yearly salary to everyone currently sheltering in place due to COVID-19 (e.g. in-laws or au pairs) and they may also be unable to even print the LCA at home due to lack of a printer. There is constant pushback from employers and pleas for an alternative. Unfortunately, the Department of Labor (DOL) has not set forth any guidance upon which the employer can confidently rely. In the above referenced blog, The LCA in the Age of Telecommuting, the authors discussed the fact that however absurd it may sound, it might still be advisable to file an LCA for the worker who telecommutes (if the home location was not contemplated when the LCA was filed), and have the worker post the LCA in two conspicuous locations in his or her home or the location from which he or she is telecommuting. In the alternative, the LCA notice provision may be satisfied by an electronic posting directed to employees in the relevant occupation classification. Pursuant to 20 CFR 655.734(a)(ii)(B), such electronic posting may be accomplished:

by any means [the employer] ordinarily uses to communicate with its workers about job vacancies or promotion opportunities, including through its “home page” or “electronic bulletin board” to employees who have, as a practical matter, direct access to these resources; or through e-mail or an actively circulated electronic message such as the employer’s newsletter. Where affected employees at the place of employment are not on the “intranet” which provides direct access to the home page or other electronic site but do have computer access readily available, the employer may provide notice to such workers by direct electronic communication such as e-mail (i.e., a single, personal e-mail message to each such employee) or by arranging to have the notice appear for 10 days on an intranet which includes the affected employees (e.g., contractor arranges to have notice on customer’s intranet accessible to affected employees).

Electronic posting is not foolproof. The rules governing electronic posting do not make clear who has to be notified – all employees everywhere and anywhere who fall within the same “occupational classification” (how narrowly or broadly should that be interpreted?) or only those in the “area of intended employment.” But, on how to effectuate a compliant electronic notification, see Cyrus Mehta’s blog, “Nuts and Bolts of Complying with the H-1B Notice Requirements”. An employer can post notice on its own website or on a web portal of an LCA hosting service, but must still inform affected workers of the existence of this web posting through notification via e-mail, the company intranet, through Slack channels or by providing hard copy notification of the existence of the notice on the website.

Then, in the minutes of an October 13, 2017 meeting between the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) and the DOL Wage and Hour Division (WHD) there was this question and answer:

10. Many H-1B workers are now working remotely from their homes, instead of the employer’s office. If the employer has an LCA for its office but then will allow the H-1B worker to work remotely from home in a geographic area of employment that is not covered by the LCA, is the employer required to file a new LCA prior to the H-1B worker being allowed to work from home (assuming that the short-term placement option does not apply)? Is an employer required to complete the LCA notifications for an H-1B worker who will be working from home? If so, how/where should these notifications be posted at the H-1B employee’s home?

WHD Response: WHD does not expect employees to post at their houses. If the worker will be working at HQ and at home, the employer should post at HQ. Unless one of the short-term placement exceptions apply, the employer will need to file a new LCA for the employee’s home location if the employee will be working at a home location that is not within normal commuting distance of the location on the existing LCA covering the employee.

That unclear response provided no comfort that there would be no future penalty for failing to post an LCA at an employee’s home during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Most recently, on March 20, 2020 the DOL’s Office of Foreign Labor Certification answered FAQs that addressed COVID-19 impacts to OFLC operations and employers. The following question and answer was included:

4. I am an employer with an approved Labor Condition Application (LCA). Due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, I may need to move workers on an H-1B, H-1B1, and/or E-3 visa to worksite locations unintended at the time I submitted the LCA for processing by OFLC. Do I need to file a new LCA if the worksites are located in the same area of intended employment? If not, what are my notice obligations for moving the workers to the new worksite locations?

If an employer’s H-1B employee is simply moving to a new job location within the same area of intended employment, a new LCA is not generally required. See 20 CFR 655.734. Therefore, provided there are no changes in the terms and conditions of employment that may affect the validity of the existing LCA, employers do not need to file a new LCA. Employers with an approved LCA may move workers to other worksite locations, which were unintended at the time of filing the LCA, without needing to file a new LCA, provided that the worksite locations are within the same area of intended employment covered by the approved LCA. Under 20 CFR 655.734(a)(2), the employer must provide either electronic or hard-copy notice at those worksite locations meeting the content requirements at 20 CFR 655.734(a)(1) and for 10 calendar days total, unless direct notice is provided, such as an email notice. It is important to note that if the move includes a material change in the terms and conditions of employment, the employer may need to file an amended petition with USCIS. Notice is required to be provided on or before the date any worker on an H-1B, H-1B1, or E3 visa employed under the approved LCA begins work at the new worksite locations. Because OFLC acknowledges employers affected by the COVID-19 pandemic may experience various service disruptions, the notice will be considered timely when placed as soon as practical and no later than 30 calendar days after the worker begins work at the new worksite locations. Employers with an approved LCA may also move H-1B workers to unintended worksite locations outside of the area(s) of intended employment on the LCA using the short-term placement provisions. As required for all short-term placements, the employer’s placement must meet the requirements of 20 CFR 655.735. The short-term placement provisions only apply to H-1B workers.

Requiring the H-1B worker to post at home makes no sense as there are no other workers in that home. Some of our esteemed colleagues believe that since the H-1B worker is the only worker at the home location, e-mailing the LCA notification to that worker, without requiring a posting in two ridiculous conspicuous locations – such as one on the refrigerator and the other on the bathroom mirror – would be the most appropriate way to handle it.

At the end of the day, the lack of various concessions in the midst of a global pandemic does nothing to ease fears that employers who fail (with good reason) to properly post the LCA for their H-1B workers could be penalized following a DOL audit. Knowing the various issues employers face during the pandemic, will the chances of an audit actually increase once everyone is able to go back to work? Will the DOL seize the opportunity to say “gotcha?” It remains to be seen and of course, the hope is that any DOL auditor will exercise discretion and not impose any penalty against an employer with a history of compliance. But, at this point, it is still a significant risk. Unless and until the DOL says otherwise, the refrigerator and the bathroom mirror may have to come into play.