Guidance To The Perplexed After USCIS Sneaks In Ban On Third-Party Placement Of STEM OPT Workers

Recently, without any prior notice, USCIS quietly updated its STEM OPT webpage to reflect a ban on the placement of STEM OPT workers at third-party client sites. As background, on March 11, 2016 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published a final rule amending regulations to expand Optional Practical Training (OPT) for students with U.S. degrees in Science, Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics (STEM). This new rule took effect on May 10, 2016 and replaced the 17-month STEM OPT extension previously available to STEM students most significantly expanding the extension period to 24 months. The rule set forth various requirements that must be met by schools, students and employers. Briefly, in order to obtain 24-month STEM OPT, the employer must have an Employer Identification Number (EIN) and be enrolled in the E-Verify program. The employment opportunity must be directly related to the student’s qualifying STEM degree and there must be an employer-employee relationship between the employer and the student.  Therefore, employment for staffing agencies where an employer-employee relationship is not maintained or other labor-for-hire arrangements will not qualify. Within 10 days of the employment start date, the student and the new employer must complete a Training Plan on Form I-983 and submit it to the Designated Student Officer (DSO). I previously blogged about STEM OPT here where I examined the Form I-983.

In another blog, I specifically examined whether the student could be employed at a third-party client site and argued that there isn’t anything in the governing regulations that expressly forbids this type of employment. The employer should be able to satisfactorily demonstrate the employer-employee relationship and its control over the student despite placement of the student at an end client site. The Form I-983 must, among other things: (1) Identify the goals for the STEM practical training opportunity, including specific knowledge, skills, or techniques that will be imparted to the student; (2) explain how those goals will be achieved through the work-based learning opportunity with the employer; (3) describe a performance evaluation process; and (4) describe methods of oversight and supervision. Although having the student work at a client site makes for a more difficult case, I opined that if the employer already has employees at that site who can implement the employer’s training program by providing the training, on-site supervision and evaluation of the student, then the Form I-983 ought to be approvable. Since the implementation of the STEM OPT rule, thousands of students have obtained the required authorization to receive their STEM OPT at third party client sites. This authorization required the full disclosure of the employment arrangement to the DSO.

USCIS recently updated its website to now state:

[T]he training experience must take place on-site at the employer’s place of business or worksite(s) to which U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has authority to conduct employer site visits to ensure that the employer is meeting program requirements. This means that ICE must always have access to a student’s worksite; if the student is sent to different worksite locations as part of the training opportunity, ICE must be able to access such worksite locations. For instance, the training experience may not take place at the place of business or worksite of the employer’s clients or customers because ICE would lack authority to visit such sites.

Based on this update, the placement of a STEM OPT worker at a third-party client site is apparently unacceptable because ICE lacks authority to visit third-party client sites.  No explanation was provided as to exactly why ICE supposedly lacks the authority to conduct a site visit on the premises of a third-party client if that client site had been clearly listed on an approved Form I-983. The Form I-983 sets forth that DHS may, at its discretion, conduct a site visit. It would be reasonable to conclude that by listing a third party client site as the student’s work location on the I-983, that the worksite is open to a site visit by ICE.

By updating the USCIS website with no prior notice and no opportunity for comment, USCIS has effectively created a state of confusion and has left employers and students, with previously approved Forms I-983, unsure of what action they must now take. Have employers been unknowingly violating the STEM OPT rule? Will USCIS now deny H-1B petitions for change of status for OPT students employed at third party client sites? Despite a denial of a request for a change of status, the underlying H-1B petition could still be approved but the STEM OPT worker would have to leave the US and apply for an H-1B visa abroad, a process that can come with its own set of issues such as administrative processing delays that can force the visa applicant to remain abroad for weeks or even several months.

Should employers scramble to relocate all STEM OPT workers to their headquarters or other office locations? And, if they do relocate them, would this change in worksite location be considered a material change necessitating a modification of the approved I-983? Based on how USCIS chose to update the STEM OPT rule, there are no immediate and definitive answers to these questions. However, some immigration attorneys are advising employers to relocate STEM OPT workers to headquarters or other office locations where there would be no question regarding ICE’s authority to conduct a site visit. On the issue of a relocation being a material change, while the regulations at 8 C.F.R. §214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(9)(ii) do not specifically list relocation as an example of a material change, relocation is considered a material change in the H-1B context which leads one to think that it would similarly be considered in the STEM OPT context. Also, there is the potential practical problem of the student not being at the location listed on the I-983 when ICE attempts to conduct a site visit. On the other hand, since USCIS claims that ICE would not go to a client site anyway, due to a supposed lack of authority to do so, then there is a good argument that a relocation is not a material change that necessitates a modification of the I-983.

Is there any basis for continuing to employ STEM OPT workers at third-party client sites? Some immigration attorneys are advising employers to stay the course while we wait for additional guidance regarding USCIS’ update to its STEM OPT page. One main basis is the fact that the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) is governed by ICE and not by USCIS and therefore ICE ought to present any amendments to the program. Another reason is the fact that the mere modification of a web page does not have the same force as an amendment to the regulation or a Policy Memorandum. USCIS should issue a proposed regulation and allow a period for public comment. In addition, provided all the requirements are being met under the regulations found at 8 C.F.R. §214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(6)-(12), then the employer’s decision to continue to employ the STEM OPT worker at the third party client site may be justifiable. The following could serve as a reasonable defense although there is no guarantee that the DHS will agree:  Under 8 C.F.R. §214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(7)(ii), the I-983 clearly identified the goals of the training and explained how these goals would be met through a work-based learning opportunity with the employer and described the employer’s performance evaluation process including how oversight and supervision would occur at the third party client site perhaps by the employer’s more senior staff also stationed at that site.  This in turn may also meet the requirement under 8 C.F.R. §214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(10)(i) that the employer have sufficient resources and personnel to provide the training. Furthermore,  if ICE would be welcomed at the client site (similar to how USCIS site visits are welcomed in the H-1B context) where ICE could satisfy itself that the employer possesses and maintains the ability and resources to provide structured and guided work-based learning experiences (8 C.F.R. §214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(11)), then the mere fact that the STEM OPT worker is stationed at a third party client site ought not invalidate a previously approved placement.

Still, the practical fallout may not be worth it and employers and students alike are justifiably worried.  There are many unanswered questions and employers are hesitant to make any changes when it is not clear that these changes are actually required under the regulations. It appears that this is yet another way that USCIS is seeking to comply with President Trump’s Buy American, Hire American Executive Order that allegedly protects US workers. The ultimate success of a challenge to USCIS’ modification of their webpage is therefore hard to predict. But what is also clear is that the STEM OPT rule ought to encompass all kinds of modern work arrangements, including working at third party sites. US businesses should not be deprived of the opportunity to engage talented foreign students. DHS ought to bear in mind that the industries which rely on assigning workers to third party client sites – such as the Information Technology industry – are the industries that give American businesses that necessary competitive edge. It is not clear how seeking to destroy theses industries by wholly affecting how they do business is supposed to make America great again.


Reinterpreting the 90 Day Misrepresentation Provision in the Foreign Affairs Manual

As we previously blogged, the State Department abruptly amended the Foreign Affairs Manual in September 2017 to provide consular officers with broader grounds to find that foreign nationals misrepresented their intentions when they came to the United States on nonimmigrant visas. A finding of fraud or misrepresentation under INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) can result in a permanent ground of inadmissibility.

To reiterate, the updated FAM provision at 9 FAM 302.9-4(B)(3)(g)(2) covers instances of conduct that may be inconsistent with representations that visa applicants made to consular officers when applying for nonimmigrant visas or to DHS officers at US ports of entry at the time of admission. The inconsistent conduct must have occurred within 90 days of entry, and the FAM instructs consular officers to presume that the applicant’s representations about engaging in status compliant activity were willful misrepresentations of his or her intention to seek a visa or entry into the United States. If the foreign national engaged in conduct inconsistent with his or her nonimmigrant status more than 90 days after entry, no presumption of willful misrepresentation arises, although consular officers may still find facts that provide a reasonable belief that the foreign national misrepresented his or her purpose of travel at the time of applying for a visa or admission into the US. Although this provision is popularly known as the “90 Day Misrepresentation Rule ”, the FAM is not  codified law or regulation, but merely sub-regulatory guidance for consular  officials abroad.

The FAM cites the following examples of inconsistent conduct that can result in a presumption of willful misrepresentation:

    1. Engaging in unauthorized employment;
    2. Enrolling in a course of academic study, if such study is not authorized for that nonimmigrant classification (e.g. B status);
    3. A nonimmigrant in B or F status, or any other status prohibiting immigrant intent, marrying a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident and taking up residence in the United States; or
    4. Undertaking any other activity for which a change of status or an adjustment of status would be required, without the benefit of such a change or adjustment.

A literal reading of the four criteria seem to suggest that the inconsistent activity resulting in a presumption of misrepresentation must have occurred in the absence of filing an application for change of status or adjustment of status that would otherwise authorize such an activity.  The way the FAM provision literally reads is contrary to how this has previously been understood, which is that if a foreign national filed an adjustment or change of status application within 90 days of entry, it created a rebuttable presumption that the person misrepresented his or her intentions upon initial entry. Prior to the introduction of the new FAM provision, it was similarly understood that filing a change of status or adjustment of status application within 30 days created a rebuttable presumption of fraud or willful misrepresentation. If such an application was filed more than 60 days later, there would be no such presumption.

Let’s carefully start our analysis with the fourth criterion under 9 FAM 302.9-4(B)(3)(g)(2)(b)(iv):

Undertaking any other activity for which a change of status or an adjustment of status would be required, without the benefit of such a change or adjustment.

Assume that a person is admitted into the United States in B-2 status for purposes of tourism but who is also an exceptional violinist. Suppose this person begins to get paid for violin performances within 30 days of admission. Such an activity would likely be inconsistent with the purpose of the B-2 visa and she would probably be presumed to have misrepresented her intentions under the 90 day guidance. On the other hand, if this person’s employer first files a change of status from B-2 to O-1B (a visa for people who can show extraordinary ability in the arts or extraordinary achievement in the motion pictures or television industry) on the 30th day, and she only begins to concertize as a violinist after the O-1B petition and request for change of status from B-2 to O-1B is approved, a literal reading of the fourth criterion suggests that the 90 day rule has not been implicated. This person undertook the work activity “for which a change of status would be required” and should not be presumed to have misrepresented under INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) even though the change of status application was filed within 90 days.

It should be noted that this interpretation must be viewed from the State Department’s perspective that resulted in this guidance in the FAM. The USCIS, which adjudicates visa petitions within the US, will not be bound and the DOS is not trying to ask other agencies to follow this interpretation. Thus, what the DOS is really saying is that if the USCIS approves such a change of status petition that was filed within 90 days, a consular official will not find a person inadmissible for misrepresentation, if the USCIS already approved it. According to the way 9 FAM 302.9-4(B)(3)(g)(2)(b)(iv) literally reads, which a DOS official confirmed recently at a conference,  the 90 day guidance is not implicated if the foreign national files a change of status or adjustment of status application even within 90 days and then seeks to engage in conduct consistent with the new status. The guidance is implicated, rather, if the foreign national engages in conduct that is inconsistent with their present status such as working while in B-2 status without first filing and obtaining a change of status that would authorize such work activity. In other words, filing a change or adjustment of status application within 90 days of entry ought not create a presumption of willful misrepresentation for a consular officer especially if it was approved by the USCIS.

This interpretation, while at first blush appears not to square with the third criterion,  9 FAM 302.9-4(B)(3)(g)(2)(b)(iii) (“A nonimmigrant in B or F status, or any other status prohibiting immigrant intent, marrying a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident and taking up residence in the United States”)  may be harmonized if it is read in conjunction with the fourth criterion at 9 FAM 302.9-4(B)(3)(g)(2)(b)(iv)(Undertaking any other activity for which a change of status or an adjustment of status would be required, without the benefit of such a change or adjustment”).

This nuanced reading may run contrary to the way the presumption of misrepresentation has always been understood, which has meant that a nonimmigrant who entered on a B-2 visa, married a US citizen and applied for adjustment of status within 90 days would presumptively be found to have made a misrepresentation at the time of entry. Such a reading may not be universally accepted and obviously should not be relied upon until it gains more acceptance by all the agencies. It may never gain acceptance since the same language in current 9 FAM 302.9-4(B)(3)(g)(2)(b)(iv) existed under the old version of the 30-60 day rule too and was never interpreted in this way previously.   The USCIS has questioned adjustment applicants regarding their intention at the time of admission when they filed soon after entry into the US. Also, when one files a change of status from B-2 to F-1, the USCIS often questions when the applicant contacted the school from the time of admission in order to gage the applicant’s true intention and whether it was contrary to the purpose under the B-2 visa. Still, the literal reading ought to be invoked as a defense to those who have been accused of misrepresentation, but never engaged in inconsistent activity prior to filing an application for change of status or adjustment of status.

This reading also makes perfect policy sense. It makes little sense to penalize a student who has been living lawfully for years in F-1 status, and who after travelling abroad on a brief vacation marries his fiancée and files an adjustment of status application within 90 days. Under a literal reading of the FAM guidance, the presumption of fraud or misrepresentation is not implicated, although under the way it has been traditionally understood, it would be because the student unfortunately took this vacation abroad prior to his marriage and the filing of the adjustment application within 90 days. Moreover, the literal reading does not totally eviscerate the presumption of fraud or misrepresentation. The 90 day guidance would still apply to those who violate immigration laws. Thus, a person who enters as a tourist and starts working within 90 days without filing for a change of status to a nonimmigrant work visa status would implicate the rule when she next visits the US Consulate for a new visa. The prior activity would have resulted in a rebuttable presumption of fraud or misrepresentation, and she may be found inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i). However, if this same person, like the violinist in our prior example, followed the law and started working only after the O-1B request for a change of status was approved, the 90 day rule ought not be implicated.

Furthermore, a person would not be able to get away when there is obvious evidence of a misrepresentation at the time of applying for a visa or upon admission. For example, if a person applies for a business visa supported by documentation to further a business purpose in the US, and upon entry, does not conduct any business activities whatsoever but instead seeks admission at a school and applies for change of status to F-1, that person would most likely be found inadmissible for misrepresenting that there was a business purpose to visit the US when there was none. A literal reading would only likely eliminate a presumption of misrepresentation where the person otherwise came to the US pursuant to the stated purpose and then applied for a change of status to perform another activity within 90 days.

The literal reading of the 90-day provision in the FAM also supports the dual intent doctrine. Notwithstanding the codification of dual intent in statute and regulation, there is a recognition of inherent dual intent in all nonimmigrant visa categories. In Matter of Hosseinpour, 15 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1975), the Board of Immigration Appeals following earlier precedents held that “a desire to remain in this country permanently in accordance with the law, should the opportunity to do so present itself, is not necessarily inconsistent with lawful nonimmigrant status.” Thus, conflating a desire to remain in the United States upon the occurrence of certain conditions is not inconsistent with any nonimmigrant visa classification at the time of applying for the visa or admission. See e.g. Garavito v. INS, 901 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1990) (the filing of an immigrant visa petition on behalf of a foreign national does not negate nonimmigrant intent). Even the most recent change in the F-1 nonimmigrant standard implicitly allows dual intent, specifically stating that “the hypothetical possibility that the applicant may apply to change or adjust status in the United States in the future is not a basis to refuse a visa application.” 9 FAM 402.505(E)(1). Thus, persons should not be penalized if they wish to enter the US to engage in activities that may be inconsistent with their initial visa provided they pursued activities consistent with the initial purpose and then successfully file change of status or adjustment of status applications that would permit them to pursue those other activities.

While our blog by no means should serve as a green light for people to file applications to change status or adjust status within 90 days, its purpose is to at least create awareness of another way of reading the 90 day provision that makes perfect sense as it encourages lawful conduct and awareness of a potential defense to those who are found inadmissible when they filed applications within 90 days to seek permission to engage in activities that may have not been consistent with their original visa.


Beware The Gap: USCIS’s Policy Changes Cause Headaches and Confusion for F-1 Change of Status Applicants

There’s never any good news coming from USCIS these days.  The agency’s treatment of applicants changing status to F-1 is another prime example of a confusing policy change that has no basis in law and regulation, and which severely hurts the U.S.’s ability to hold on to talented students.  To fully grasp the ridiculousness of modern day USCIS, we should take a trip back through relevant policy interpretations dating back to legacy INS.  We can start in April 2012 when the administration under President George W. Bush, frightened by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, published an interim rule in the Federal Register.  You can see from the preamble to the interim rule exactly the kind of xenophobic policy the administration was trying to implement, which has only gotten worse today:

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 highlight the need of the Service to maintain greater control over the ability of an alien to change nonimmigrant status once the alien has been admitted to the United States. This interim rule will allow the Service to fully review any request from a B nonimmigrant to change nonimmigrant status to that of full-time student before allowing the alien to enroll in a Service-approved school. The elimination of the ability of a B nonimmigrant to begin classes before receiving the Service’s approval of the change of nonimmigrant status is also consistent with the Act’s requirement in section 101(a)(15)(B) that a B nonimmigrant not be a person coming to the United States for the purpose of study.

The interim rule was effective upon publication, and was announced in a Memo from Johnny N. Williams, the Executive Associate Commissioner of the Office of Field Operations (Williams, Ex. Assoc. Comm. Field Operations, Requiring Change of Status from B to F-1 or M-1 Nonimmigrant Prior to Pursuing a Course of Study, HQISD 70/6.2.2 (Apr. 12, 2002)).  The new rule required a B-1/B-2 visitor to first obtain a change of status to F or M status before starting school.  If a visitor had already started school, the change of status application would be denied.  The rule became effective April 12, 2002 and the policy was codified in 8 CFR §214.2(b)(7).  Going further, the change of status application needed to be timely filed before the B-1/B-2 status expires and within 30 days of the start of school.  The latter requirement seems to stem from USCIS’s interpretation of 8 CFR §214.2(f)(5)(i), part of which states:

An F-1 student may be admitted for a period up to 30 days before the indicated report date or program start date listed on Form I-20.  The student is considered to be maintaining status if he or she is making normal progress toward completing a course of study.

Then, a case brought before the Maryland District Court in 2011 challenged USCIS’s interpretation of this regulation.  In Youseffi v. Renaud, 794 F.Supp.2d 585 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2011), the Plaintiff Narges Youssefi entered the U.S. in B-2 status and was granted a B-2 extension through December 27, 2007.  After receiving a request from her employer back in Iran that she stay in the U.S. and take classes to improve her English language skills, Ms. Youssefi decided to apply to take English classes, acquired an I-20, and listed November 3, 2008 as the start date for her classes on the Form I-20.  She timely filed a change of status application from B-2 to F-1 on June 25, 2008.  USCIS denied her application, reasoning that she had failed to maintain her current nonimmigrant status up to 30 days before the start of classes and was therefore ineligible for a change of status.  The Plaintiff appealed the case all the way up to district court.  The court in Youseffi grappled with USCIS’s interpretation of 8 USC §1258, 8 CFR §248.1(b), and 8 CFR §214.2(f)(5)(i) that a B-2 to F-1 change of status applicant must maintain active B-2 status up to the 30 days before the school program start date, and not just until the change of status application is filed.  First and foremost, the court found that the statutory language at INA §248 is inherently ambiguous, as it “implies that the USCIS may not grant a change of status to someone who has failed to ‘maintain’ his or her nonimmigrant status, but it does not define what it means to ‘maintain’ status.  It is unclear from the statute whether a nonimmigrant must continue to maintain her status only until she petitions for a change in classification, or whether she must continue to maintain it until USCIS grants her new nonimmigrant status.”  Youseffi v. Renaud, 794 F.Supp.2d 585, at 593.  But then the court looked at 8 CFR §248.1(b) where it found language that clarified the ambiguity in favor of the applicant:

Section 248.1(b) states that “a change of status may not be approved for an alien who failed to maintain the previously accorded status or whose status expired before the application or petition was filed, except that failure to file before the period of previously authorized status expired may be excused in the discretion of the Service ….” 8 C.F.R. § 248.1(b). Under the plain language of the regulation, an applicant may be eligible for a change of status even if she failed to file before her previously authorized status expired. The ultimate decision of whether to excuse the applicant’s lapse lies within “the discretion” of the USCIS.

Id.  (Emphasis added).  The court concluded that 8 CFR §248.1 allows USCIS to use its discretion to excuse applicants who apply for a change of status and whose prior status remained valid at the time of filing but later expired.  Id.  The court went on to review this same regulation against 8 CFR §214.2(f)(5)(i), and found that the latter regulation is silent on situations like in Youseffi where the applicant’s prior status expired more than 30 days prior to the program start date.  It then remanded the case to USCIS which the court found could excuse a change of status applicant who filed while the prior status is valid but which later expired.

Since Youseffi, however, no higher federal court has addressed USCIS’s interpretation of these regulations.  And in the last few years, USCIS’s views have moved further away from a reasonable plain meaning understanding of the statute and regulations.

Case in point, a few years ago, immigration attorneys began reporting USCIS denials of applications to change status from B-2 to F-1 where the applicant had timely filed while his prior status was valid, the program start date indicated on the Form I-20 was within 30 days of the expiration of the underlying status, but then because of lengthy processing times at USCIS service centers, the school’s Designated School Official (DSO) had to defer the program date in SEVIS.  The effective result was that although it was still within 30 days of the initial start date listed on the Form I-20, the applicant’s prior status had expired more than 30 days before the new program start date.  There were so many incidents of this that the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) was prompted to send a letter to Leon Rodriguez, then-Director of USCIS and the agency’s Chief Counsel, Ur Mendoza Jaddou.  The letter, dated December 15, 2016 (and available here for AILA members), explained how USCIS was erroneously denying these applications by misinterpreting 8 CFR §248.1(b), 8 CFR §214.2(f)(5)(i), and Form I-539 instructions to require B-2 to F-1 change of status applicants to maintain their B-2 statuses up to 30 days before a new program start date even though the original start date was only deferred because of USCIS’s own extremely lengthy processing times.  AILA’s letter again reasoned that USCIS’s interpretation of these regulations went far beyond what they state, and that in fact nowhere in the regulations does it state that change of status applicants have to maintain their prior status so that they remain in that prior status until 30 days before the program start date.  AILA pointed to the fact that even the court in Youseffi cited Unification Church v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 581 F.2d 870, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating, in dicta, that it “appears to be the position taken” in 8 CFR §248.1 that “an applicant nonimmigrant must continue to maintain his ‘status’ only until he petitions for a change in classification,” not “until his petition is granted”); and Salehpour v. INS, 761 F.2d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The plain regulatory language [of section 248.1] allows an applicant to file for change of classification up to the last day of his prior authorized stay.”).  Moreover, USCIS practice had been to routinely approve these types of change of status applications, and the I-539 instructions even stated that a change of status applicant “must maintain [his] current, or other, nonimmigrant status up to 30 days before the report date or start date of the course of study listed on Form I-20 or [the] requested change of status may not be granted.”  (Emphasis added).  The I-539 instructions clearly state that USICS is to rely on the date listed on the I-20 when adjudicating the application, and not a deferred start date that’s listed by the DSO on SEVIS.  AILA then argued that “bridge petitions” that the applicant would file to extend the B-2 even while the change of status to F-1 is pending are not only cost prohibitive, they cause confusion to applicants, force USCIS to adjudicate unnecessary applications, which in turn lengthen already long processing times, and additionally creates issues around the “intent” of the applicant who already filed to change a status from temporary visitor to temporary student and then has to file an extension of a temporary visitor status.  Moreover, at the time of the letter, AILA’s members found that USCIS’s bridge petition requirement for B-2 to F-1 change of status applicants was inconsistently applied, where some B-2 extension applications were denied because it went against B-2 intent, or returned because they were not required.

Seemingly in answer to all the complaints from stakeholders about the inconsistent application of the bridge application requirement, USCIS decided in April 2017 to formalize the new policy.  USCIS updated its website to formally require B-1/B-2 to F-1 or M-1 change of status applicants whose status will expire more than 30 days before the initial F-1 or M-1 program start date, or whose program start dates had to be deferred because of USCIS processing times, to file a second Form I539 requesting an extension of the B-1/B-2 status and pay a separate fee for that application.  By the way, if the change of status application takes so long that the first extension time runs out, the applicant must file another extension of status application with another fee, and keep going until the original change of status has been approved.

Then, to cause even more confusion, and in a completely unhinged and callous move, USCIS decided to apply this “new” policy to pending B-1/B-2 change of status applications that were filed before USCIS posted its guidance.  How do we know?  Because USCIS issued Requests for Evidence (RFEs) to these applicants!  In these RFEs, USCIS states that the applicant’s underlying B-1/B-2 statuses had expired and that the F-1/M-1 start date had been deferred to a date more than 30 days after the B-1/B-2 status expired.  And by virtue of the new policy, which again was posted after the change of status application had been filed, USCIS requests evidence through the RFE that either the applicant submitted the additional Form I-539 application to extend her B-1/B-2 status, or if the applicant had not (and let’s again recall that the policy was adopted after the application was filed, and there is no indication on the USCIS website that it would apply retroactively to pending applications), that the applicant file the new I-539 now and ask USCIS to excuse the late filing pursuant to 8 CFR §214.1(c)(4).

Let’s recap what we have so far.  USCIS decided in April 2017 that it will require B-1/B-2 extension of status applications filed even if an application to change status is already pending, and is applying this policy to already filed change of status applications, and all without issuing a formal policy memorandum or undergoing a normal notice and comment period.  USCIS merely posted new “guidance” on its website, provides no statutory or regulatory basis for this change, and does not explain what happens to the B-1/B-2 extension of status applications once they are filed.

The result of USCI’s failure (or perhaps refusal) to undergo a formal notice and comment period for a sweeping policy change is that applicants and other stakeholders are simply not well informed about USCIS’s requirements, usually to detrimental and often disastrous results.  What had started off as USCIS’s formalization of its policy toward B-1/B-2 to F-1/M-2 change of status applicants has recently expanded to affect all other nonimmigrants who want to change status in order to remain in the U.S. to study.  USCIS’s original website posting of the new “guidance” referred exclusively to B-1/B-2 status holders changing status to F-1 or M-1 (the original website post has been preserved by AILA, and can be viewed here by members).  A careful review of the most recent USCIS website discussing this policy, which was most recently updated in February 2018, shows that the policy has been extended to every nonimmigrant whose status will expire more than 30 days before the F-1 and M-1 program start date.  There is no specific mention of B-1/B-2 status holders.  The full relevant language from the website is pasted here:

What if I Have a Gap in Status?

If your current nonimmigrant status will expire more than 30 days before your F-1 or M-1 program start date and you wish to remain in the United States until your start date, you must find a way to obtain status all the way up to the date that is 30 days before your program start date (“bridge the gap”). For most people, you will need to file a separate Form I-539 to request to extend your current status or change to another nonimmigrant status, in addition to your other Form I-539 application to change to student status. If you do not file this separate request prior to the expiration of your status, USCIS will deny your Form I-539 request to change to F-1 or M-1 status. Please continue to check the USCIS processing times while your Form I-539 change of status request is pending to determine if you need to file a request to extend or change your nonimmigrant status.

  • Note that because of processing times, your F-1 or M-1 program start date may be deferred to the following academic term or semester because USCIS did not make a decision on your Form I-539 change of status application before your originally intended F-1 or M-1 program start date. In that instance, you will need to obtain status all the way up to the date which is 30 days before yournew program start date. If you had already filed an I-539 to bridge the original gap, you may need to file another I-539 to bridge the new gap.

Because extending or changing nonimmigrant status to bridge the gap and changing to F-1 or M-1 status are two distinct benefits, you must pay a separate filing fee for each request. See the User Fee Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 9701.

How does this expanded policy look in practice?  Let’s say that an H-4 child of an H-1B worker is going to age out because she is turning 21.  Meanwhile her parents intend to maintain their H-1B and H-4 statuses, extending them in 3-year increments, so that they can remain long-term in the U.S. until the H-1B parent’s I-140 priority date is current and they can adjust status to lawful permanent residents.  It bears noting that the reason why our H-4 applicant’s parents are still in H-1B and H-4 statuses and need to extend them in 3-year increments under §104(c) of the American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act is because they are caught in the never-ending green card backlogs under the employment-based second (EB-2) or employment-based third (EB-3) preferences and by virtue of being born in India or China.  Otherwise, the parents, along with our H-4 applicant who was their minor child, would have long ago obtained their green cards and the H-4 student would not have had to go through this ordeal.  Our H-4 student has already been enrolled in college and has been otherwise maintaining her valid H-4 status.  Following prior USCIS guidance and the guidance of her DSO, she decides to timely file a change of status application to F-1 so that she does not have to interrupt her studies by applying for an F-1 abroad and then returning to the U.S.  As most stakeholders know, I-539 applications for a change of status notoriously take a long time for USCIS to process.  So she waits, even after her H-4 has expired, thinking that she is in a “period of stay authorized by the Attorney General” as she had timely filed her change of status application.  And then bam!  She is hit with a denial.  Why?  Because she did not maintain her status or seek a change of status to another nonimmigrant category so that she could be “in status” within 30 days of the program start date indicated on the I-20.  Yes, folks.  USCIS now requires even H-4 nonimmigrants applying to change status to F-1 to apply to change status to B-1/B-2 in order to stay “in status” until 30 days within the program start date.  And USCIS does not even bother with issuing RFEs requesting proof that the applicant has maintained status until within 30 days of the program start date.  The Service will simply issue a denial and it’s up to the applicant now to determine whether she can stay in the U.S. as her unlawful presence started tolling when the denial was issued, and whether it is even possible to appeal this nonsensical decision.

What is particularly irksome about USCIS’s policy changes is that the usual notice and comment period would have, even if brief, provided some notice to stakeholders.  But here, USCIS simply changed a bit of language on its website and everyone is expected to know the new requirements, abide by them, and live with harsh results for failing to follow them.  Empirically, we are aware that school DSOs were not given any notice or guidance by USCIS on this new policy and its expansion to other nonimmigrant categories.  Thus, our lowly applicant who relied on the advice of the DSO would not have known to request a change of status to B-2 to bridge the gap until her change of status to F-1 is approved.  She is instead punished with a harsh denial, the inability to continue her studies, and potentially having to leave the U.S. in order to apply for an F-1 abroad which comes with its own set of issues, not the least of which could be questions over the applicant’s nonimmigrant intent and problems with demonstrating ties to her home country if she has been living in the U.S in H-4 status since she was a young child.

There is already a brain drain occurring in the U.S. thanks to the Trump administration’s xenophobic policies combined with the EB-2 and EB-3 backlogs.  Fewer students want to come to study in the U.S.  It’s harder for companies to hire highly educated and skilled foreign workers.  The backlogs in the EB-2 and EB-3 preferences are also causing skilled immigrants from India to leave the U.S. for countries like Canada in total desperation.  Foreign born entrepreneurs are facing difficult challenges starting their businesses here in the U.S.  One prime reason that people have upended their lives to come to the U.S. is to pursue the “American dream” for their children – to give them a chance to obtain excellent education and take advantage of the economic, social, and cultural opportunities in the U.S.  This dream turns into a nightmare when the child on the H-4 visa ages out and is unable to seamlessly change status to F-1.  No immigrant parent wants his child to be in a worse off situation than him because of our Byzantine immigration system.  And now we will see even fewer nonimmigrants try to attend school because of USCIS’s new, cumbersome, and costly policy discussed in this blog.  Worse, if USCIS continues to issue new policy changes without a notice and comment period, we will likely see more confusion, more heartbreak, and more completely nonsensical and costly requirements all without the barest minimum in explanation from our government.  Beware the gap, indeed.

Analyzing the Definition of a Specialty Occupation Under INA 214(i) to Challenge H-1B Visa Denials

In recent denials of H-1B petitions, the USCIS has been taking the position that the occupation for which H-1B classification is sought must require a degree in the specific field.  This position runs contrary to the definition of a specialty occupation. An occupation that may require a degree is diverse fields may also qualify.  Denials resulting in the wholesale reading out of qualifying occupations will likely continue when H-1B cases selected under the FY 2019 cap are adjudicated. A careful analysis of the statutory definition of specialty occupation provides a good starting point to challenge such denials.

Under INA § 214(i)(1) a “specialty occupation” is  defined as an occupation that requires

–Theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and

-Attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States

The regulation at 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) parrots INA § 214(i)(1) by defining “specialty occupation” as follows, except that the regulation requires a bachelor’s degree in “a” specific specialty while the statute requires a bachelor’s degree in “the” specific specialty, which may be a distinction without a meaningful difference:

Specialty occupation means an occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor’s degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

At issue is whether the occupation, in order to qualify for an H-1B visa, must require a bachelor’s degree in the specific specialty. A lawyer would qualify as a specialty occupation as only a degree in law would allow entry into the occupation. But INA § 214(i)(1) reads more broadly. It also ought to encompass a marketing analyst, even though this occupation may require a bachelor’s degree in diverse fields such as marketing, business or psychology. Unfortunately, the USCIS does not always agree. Is the USCIS correctly interpreting INA §214(i)(1).

The answer lies with how the phrase in the parenthetical “or its equivalent” is interpreted in INA § 214(i)(1). In Tapis International v INS, 94 F. Supp. 2d 172, the court held that a “position may qualify as a specialty occupation if the employer requires a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent. For the “equivalent” language to have any reasonable meaning, it must encompass …….various combinations of academic and experience based training. It defies logic to read the bachelor’s requirement of “specialty occupation” to include only those positions where a specific bachelor’s degree is offered.” The phrase “or its equivalent” in INA 214(i)(1) is distinct from what the H-1B beneficiary is required to possess to qualify for specialty occupation.  INA 214(i)(2) sets forth separate requirements, such as completion of a bachelor’s degree or experience in the specialty through progressively responsible positions relating to the specialty. Therefore, the phrase “or its equivalent” actually broadens the requirement for a bachelor’s degree is a specific specialty to encompass “not only skill, knowledge, work experience, or training ….. but also various combinations of academic and experience based training.” See Tapis, supra. Thus, if an occupation requires a generalized degree, but specialized experience or training, it should still qualify as a specialty occupation. The AAO often cites Royal Siam Corp v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139 (First Cir. 2007) for the proposition that a general purpose degree is not sufficient to meet the definition of a specialty occupation. In Royal Siam Corp, the First Circuit stated that a degree requirement in a specific specialty-one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position-is given more weight by the agency than a requirement for a generic degree. Thus, if the position carefully outlines the specialized degrees or experience that are essential to perform the duties of the position duties, it should be distinguished from the holding in Royal Siam Corp.

If USCIS does not consider this interpretation of “or equivalent”, it would be impossible to classify most occupations for H-1B classification. Under Residential Finance Corp. v. USCIS, 839 F. Supp.2d. 985(S.D. Ohio 2012), the court found that “[t]he knowledge and not the title of the degree is what is important. Diplomas rarely come bearing occupation specific majors. What is required is an occupation that requires highly specialized knowledge and a prospective employee who has obtained the credentialing indicating possession of that knowledge.” The AAO has accepted this finding and has added that when there are disparate fields listed as minimums into the field, the petitioner must establish “how each field is directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position such that the required body of highly specialized knowledge is essentially an amalgamation of these different specialties.” Matter of N-L-, Inc. AAO August 3, 2016.

Accordingly, there is a clear basis to challenge a USCIS denial on grounds that the occupation does not always require a degree in the specific specialty or that the degree may be too generalized, especially where an employer has taken pains to connect the specialized duties with the degree requirement. Indeed, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) is further  consistent with INA § 214(i) as it provides several ways in which a petitioner can establish that the position can qualify as a specialty occupation.  Those criteria are:

(1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;

(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;

(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or

(4) The nature of the specific duties are so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

8 CFR § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).  The petitioner is required only to show that the position meets one of the four criteria. Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000), which the USCIS also relies on when denying H-1B petitions,   held that the four criteria in 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) were only necessary conditions, but not necessary and sufficient conditions to establish that the occupation is a specialty occupation. In other words, an employer may under prong 3 require a bachelor’s degree for an occupation that ordinarily never requires a degree, but that may still not meet the statutory definition of a specialty occupation under INA § 214(i)(1). On the other hand, if the employer provides probative evidence of its need for a bachelor’s degree, and that its past hiring practices were also consistent with that need, as well as consistent with industry standards, the USCIS ought to accept the employer’s justification for a bachelor’s degree in a specialized field under the preponderance of evidence standard.

For a petition that has a proffered position of computer systems analyst, for example, USCIS has been selective in its reading of the Occupational Outlook Handbook in order to justify a denial on the ground that a bachelor’s degree in a computer science is not always a requirement. A denial often focuses on the following language in the OOH:

A bachelor’s degree in a computer or information science field is common, although not always a requirement. Some firms hire analysts with business or liberal arts degrees who have skills in information technology or computer programming.


Although many computer systems analysts have technical degrees, such a degree is not always a requirement. Many analysts have liberal arts degrees and have gained programming or technical expertise elsewhere.

Petitioners and their attorneys should closely review the OOH themselves rather than rely on the few sections USCIS provides in its denial. If attorneys do this, they will realize that USCIS chooses to leave out an important section of the educational requirements that “[m]ost computer systems analysts have a bachelor’s degree in a computer-related field.” USCIS ignores this language in order to support its faulty determination that a bachelor’s degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is not normally the minimum requirement for the position and that the degree requirement is not common to the industry under the first and second criteria of 8 CFR §214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). However, where the regulation uses the words “normally” and “common” it would be erroneous to determine that a proffered position is not a specialty occupation merely because not all employers require a bachelor’s degree. If most employers require a bachelor’s degree, this should be sufficient to meet the statutory definition of a specialty occupation.

Next Generation Tech., Inc. v. Johnson, No. 15 cv 5663 (DF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165531, at *30-31 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2017) emphasized that if “most” computer systems analysts have a bachelor’s degree in the appropriate field, as is provided in the OOH, then it follows that the degree is “normally” required for the position, and thus, the position qualifies as a specialty occupation.” In (Redacted Decision) 2012 WL 4713226 (AAO February 08, 2012), and  consistent with the Next Generation Tech reasoning, the AAO has explained in at least 2,415 unpublished decisions that “USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations.” For computer scientists, for example, the OOH provides that “[m]ost computer and information research scientists need a master’s degree in computer science or a related subject, such as computer engineering.” This illustrates that, provided the specialties are closely related, a minimum of a bachelor’s degree or higher in more than one specialty satisfies the “degree in the specific specialty” requirement of INA § 214(i)(1)(8). In reversing the CSC’s denial of a petition, Residential Finance said that the “premise that the title of a field of study controls ignores the realities of the statutory language involved and the obvious intent behind them. The knowledge and not the title of the degree is what is important. Diplomas rarely come bearing occupation-specific majors.”

It is clear that both USCIS and the courts have repeatedly held that where most employers in an occupation require a bachelor’s degree in a narrow range of majors, or a related major, or its equivalent, it is a specialty occupation. In situations where the OOH is unhelpful, such as with respect to a Food Service Manager, where the OOH makes clear that a bachelor’s degree is not always required to enter the field, the employer must take pains to even further describe the specialized and complex duties of the position within the context of the employer, and potentially rely on the fourth prong of 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(4)(iii) for establishing the specialty occupation. The fourth prong provides that “the nature of specific duties are so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree. See 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(4); Fred 26 Importers, Inc. v. DHS, 445 F. Supp.2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2006)(although agreeing that the degree must directly relate to the position where an HR manager did not have a degree in HR management, reversed AAO for ignoring evidence, including expert opinion, that the duties were specialized and complex). Indeed, 8 CFR §214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4), arguably like in Tapis, recognizes that INA 214(i)(1) requires that the specialty occupation encompasses a bachelor’s degree in the specific specialty “or its equivalent”.

INA §214(i)(1) clearly provides for a broader interpretation of a specialty occupation. The USCIS is erroneously interpreting this provision when denying H-1B cases. The denials have become more rampant under President Trump’s Buy American Hire American Executive order, and we have blogged extensively on this unfortunate trend, herehere and here.  There is a good basis to challenge these H-1B denials based on the statutory provision itself.