Tag Archive for: Unconstitutional

Cyrus Mehta

Should Trump’s Lawyers Implementing Policies That Hurt Immigrants be Concerned About Violating Their Ethical Obligations? 

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On January 23, 2025, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Benjamine C. Huffman issued a memorandum entitled “Guidance Regarding How to Exercise Enforcement Discretion”, which directs ICE to take the following action: 

(1) For any alien DHS is aware of who is amenable to expedited removal but to whom expedited removal has not been applied:

     a. Take all steps necessary to review the alien’s case and consider, in exercising your enforcement discretion, whether to apply expedited removal. This may include steps to terminate any ongoing removal proceeding and/or any active parole status.

(2) For any alien DHS is aware of who does not meet the conditions described in (1) but has been granted parole under a policy that may be paused, modified, or terminated immediately under the January 20 memorandum:

a. Take all steps necessary to review the alien’s case and consider, in exercising your enforcement discretion, whether any such alien should be placed in removal proceedings; and

b. Review the alien’s parole status to determine, in exercising your enforcement discretion, whether parole remains appropriate in light of any changed legal or factual circumstances.

On January 6, 2023, the Biden Administration instituted a humanitarian parole program allowing certain nationals from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (CHNV) to apply for entry to  the U.S. for a temporary stay of up to two years. All individuals admitted through the CHNV program must have a U.S.-based supporter, pass security vetting, and meet other criteria. Parole is not an immigration status. During the two-year parole period, individuals may seek humanitarian relief or other immigration benefits, if they are eligible, and work during that time. See our blog for further details on the CHNV program. 

The Biden Administration committed to accepting 30,000 beneficiaries a month from across the four countries. Within the first six months of launching the program, over 35,000 Cubans, 50,000 Haitians, 21,500 Nicaraguans, and 48,500 Venezuelans came to the U.S. through the program. As of August 2024, almost 530,000 people have been granted parole through the CHNV program, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 

On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order terminating the CHNV program. The Huffman memorandum now allows  recipients of the CHNV program  who had been paroled into the United States to be expeditiously removed. It also includes nationals of Ukraine, Afghanistan  and Colombia who have been paroled under separate programs.  These individuals followed the rules established under the Biden administration in order to be paroled into the US in a safe, orderly and legitimate manner. They have now been blindsided and betrayed by the Trump administration. 

The devastating impact that this policy stands to have calls into question the conduct of the Trump administration lawyers involved in its development. We credit our colleague Michele Carney in providing input on ethical issues on the part of government lawyers in the Trump administration. ABA Model Rule 8.4 (c)-(d), (g) prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct that involves “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”, that is “prejudicial to the administration of justice”, or that “the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law”. By directing DHS officials to expeditiously remove some parolees, the memorandum could run afoul of ABA Model Rule 8.4(d) by depriving these individuals of due process. Termination of parole for some individuals could also be viewed as discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). If DHS’ implementation of the program results in a misrepresentation, a violation of ABA Model Rule 8.4(c) could also occur. The memorandum in itself may not be indicative of unethical conduct, but its implementation carries significant risk of violation of ethical rules by government lawyers in the Trump administration. 

In a previous blog, we discussed Trump’s executive order restricting birthright citizenship to only a child born in the US has one parent who is either a US citizen or a permanent resident. The granting of automatic citizenship to a child born in the US is rooted in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside.” In United States. V Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), the Supreme Court extended the Fourteenth Amendment to an individual who was born to  parents of Chinese descent and during a time when Chinese nationals were subjected to the Chinese exclusion laws:

The Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owning direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciles here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 

 On January 23, 2025 Judge Coughenhour in the US District Court Western District of Washington at Seattle issued a temporary injunction blocking the implementation of the executive order. During the hearing, Judge Coughenhour called the order “blatantly unconstitutional”, stating “There are other times in world history where we look back and people of goodwill can say, ‘Where were the judges? Where were the lawyers?’”. Judge Coughenour’s comments call into question ABA Model Rule 3.1, which states that a lawyer “shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law”. The  Trump administration’s restriction of birthright citizenship  could be viewed as a violation of Rule 3.1 if found to be unconstitutional. Rule 3.1 allows for good faith arguments for the “extension, modification, or reversal of existing law”, however, and it is likely that Trump administration lawyers would argue that the policy laid out in the new executive order falls within this exception. 

Experts will disagree and take the position that Trump’s lawyers may be committing ethical violations in supporting policies that may be cruel and harmful to immigrants. Supporting blatantly unconstitutional actions may be cause for concern according to our colleague, Craig Dobson. Independent of the specific rules governing lawyer conduct, Trump’s lawyers should ensure that their actions align with the ideals of the profession, which prioritize fairness, justice, and upholding the rights of individuals. While Trump holds the office of President of the United States, he is not a lawyer, and is not beholden to the same ethical standards. Lawyers, by contrast, are called to uphold the laws of the United States and avoid perpetuating harm and injustice. 

 *Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Trump’s Executive Order Restricting Birthright Citizenship Is So Unconstitutional that Even the Supreme Court May Reject It

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On January 20, 2025, Inauguration Day, Donald Trump signed an executive order entitled “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship”, which interprets the language “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the Fourteenth Amendment to mean that U.S. citizenship does not extend to individuals born in the United States: 

1. when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, 

2. or when that person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.

The executive order further directs agencies not to “issue documents recognizing United States citizenship, or accept documents issued by State, local, or other governments or authorities purporting to recognize United States citizenship” to individuals falling within these categories. Further, the executive order specifies that it applies “only to persons who are born within the United States after 30 days from the date of this order”, and does not speak to whether the U.S. citizenship of a child who has already been born to two non-U.S. citizen or LPR parents will continue to be recognized. 

The American Civil Liberties Union has already sued the Trump administration over this executive order. The complaint argues that the Fourteenth Amendment was indented to confer U.S. citizenship on all persons born in the United States, regardless of the citizenship status of their parents, and asserts that the executive order violates the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1401, which mirrors the Fourteenth Amendment’s language, and the Administrative Procedure Act. 

The granting of automatic citizenship to a child born in the US is rooted in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside.”

Lost in the heated political rhetoric surrounding Trump’s executive order is that it is next to impossible to amend the hallowed Fourteenth Amendment, which was enacted to ensure birthright citizenship to African Americans after the Civil War, and following the infamous decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford  that held that African Americans could not claim American citizenship.   In  United States. V Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), the Supreme Court  extended the Fourteenth Amendment to an individual who was born to  parents of Chinese descent and during a time when Chinese nationals were subjected to the Chinese exclusion laws:

The Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owning direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciles here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 

Although in Elk v. Williams, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), those born within Native American tribes were not born “subject to the jurisdiction” of this country because they owed allegiance to their tribal nations rather than the United States,  this preclusion was  eventually eliminated by the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924. Even the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Cantu, Interim Decision #2748, broadly held that one who was born on a territory in 1935, the Horcon Tract, where the United States had impliedly relinquished control, but had not yet ceded it to Mexico until 1972, was born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States and thus a US citizen.

 Other lawsuits are sure to follow, and the executive order may be blocked by federal courts. As the recent decision on DACA in the Fifth Circuit, which enjoined the program only in Texas, demonstrates, a federal court decision could result in the different definitions of who is a U.S. citizen depending on the jurisdiction. Thus, even if plaintiffs prevail in the legal action in federal court in New Hampshire, the court may not issue a nationwide injunction. A Trump appointed federal judge in Texas in a different lawsuit may reach a different conclusion based on his or her interpretation of “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the Fourteenth Amendment.  Given its current conservative composition, however, Trump is hoping that the  Supreme Court may ultimately accept his administration’s reinterpretation of the “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” language and uphold the executive order. Even that is unlikely as the parents of a child who are undocumented or in nonimmigrant status are always subject to prosecution,  unlike a diplomat who enjoys immunity, and are thus subject to the jurisdiction of the US. It is also highly unlikely that nonimmigrant parents would be considered enemies during a hostile occupation of  a part of  US territory even if Trump might like to imagine so! 

In the meantime, the executive order creates much ambiguity and poses severe consequences for individuals who otherwise would have been U.S. citizens. The executive order applies not only to children of two undocumented parents, but also to the U.S. born children of parents who hold a valid nonimmigrant status, such as H-1B and H-4. How will a child as soon as it is born acquire H-4 status? One needs to be admitted into the US in H-4 status or change from another nonimmigrant status into H-4 status. Perhaps, the Trump administration may need to issue a regulation recognizing H-4 status of the child at the time of its birth.    As we noted in a prior blog, the best chance for Indian-born beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions who are trapped in the employment-based second (EB-2) and third (EB-3) preference backlogs to obtain permanent residence without waiting for several decades could be sponsorship by a U.S.-born adult child. Parents of children born after the effective date of the executive order may no longer have this opportunity. The executive order will cruelly create a permanent underclass of noncitizens. The child in H-4 status would have to leave the US when it turns 21 unless it finds a way to change to another nonimmigrant status or obtain permanent residence independently such as through marriage with a U.S. citizen. 

The executive order’s application to other categories of children born in the U.S. is unclear. For example, would U.S. citizenship extend to the child born to a mother in valid H-1B status, but who also had a pending I-485 application and is able to exercise portability under INA § 204(j)? Similarly, would a child born to a nonimmigrant mother be considered a U.S. citizen if the father is an anonymous sperm donor in the U.S.? Based on the plain language of the executive order, it appears likely that U.S. citizenship would not extend to either of these children. 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Update:  Since the publication of the blog, on January 23, 2025 Judge Coughenhour in the US District Court Western District of Washington at Seattle issued a temporary injunction stating “This is a blatantly unconstitutional order. Where were the lawyers when this decision was being made?”

Cyrus Mehta

No Matter How Many New Travel Bans Trump Issues, Maximum Power Does Not Mean Absolute Power

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Sophia Genovese-Halvorson

We have numerous justifiable concerns with the immigration policies of the Trump Administration on behalf of our clients and all Americans who feel that our values are being undermined, especially the Executive Order entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” Fortunately, courts across the country seem to agree except for one. Most notable were United States District Judge Robart’s nation-wide temporary restraining order (TRO) of the EO in the Western District of Washington and United States District Judge Brinkema’s Virginia-wide injunction against the EO in the Eastern District of Virginia. Due to these and many other orders, as well as heavy backlash, the Trump Administration has now stepped back and have stated that they will replace the January 27 EO with a new Executive Order sometime next week that will survive judicial scrutiny. It is our view, however, that even this new EO in whatever way repackaged will be unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

As a reminder, the January 27 EO suspended for 90 days the entry of persons from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days, and banned Syrian refugees indefinitely, unless they received an exemption from DHS for being a “religious-minority.” The EO immediately disrupted the lives of thousands of people, from non-immigrants, immigrants, LPRs, and even dual-citizen holders. The first suit against the EO came only a day after its enactment in the Eastern District of New York, which issued an emergency stay that temporarily blocked the government from sending people out of the country after they have landed at a U.S. airport with valid visas, including green card holders. There were several other injunctions that followed. Then the States of Washington and Minnesota filed suit in the Western District of Washington, requesting, among other things, a restraining order on the ban. Judge Robart issued a nationwide temporary restraining order against the ban, which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Judge Robart’s ruling on the merits is still pending. Meanwhile, Judge Brinkema in the Eastern District of Virginia granted a Virginia-wide injunction against the EO, citing specifically to the Establishment Clause.

President Trump continues to argue that the President has extensive powers granted to him under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), and proffers that the judiciary cannot exercise jurisdiction over an EO due to the plenary powers doctrine. In relevant part, INA § 212(f) states that,

Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.

However, as Judge Brinkema rightfully pointed out in her decision, “maximum power does not mean absolute power.” Aziz v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20889, at *11 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017). In her analysis, Judge Brinkema reaffirms that the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and that no one, not even the President, can violate its terms. Citing to landmark cases such as Zadvdas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (finding that the power of the Executive is “subject to important constitutional limitations,” holding that LPRs are entitled to due process rights, and that their indefinite detention is a violation of those rights), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (noting that the President’s Article II powers are subject to review, holding that citizens held as enemy combatants must be afforded due process rights, namely the meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for their detention), among others, she proves this point.

The Ninth Circuit that affirmed Judge Robart’s TRO also provided precedent on the reviewability of the Executive, citing to Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (specifically noting that the political branches cannot “switch the Constitution on or off at will” and providing the right of habeas review to a non-citizen outside the US) and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (noting that Courts are empowered to review whether or not “Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing” the “regulation of aliens.”). The Ninth Circuit goes so far to say that even under Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), the Court can review the actions of the Executive branch, noting that but for their ability to review, there would be no “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” test to measure executive exercises of immigration authority.

In short, there is no doubt that Trump’s Executive Orders are subject to review when there is an alleged violation of the Constitution. But what specifically is unconstitutional about Trump’s ban? Or a rewrite of the ban even if it does not apply to lawful permanent residents or non-immigrants who have already been in the United States? One indication of the new EO by DHS Secretary Kelly is that it would give time for people to come back in , and would presumably include the same 7 nations whose nationals would be barred from future entries.

The Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause argument has great merit, and it is the opinion of these authors that this argument will likely prevent Trump from prevailing on even his latest Executive Order, where it is likely he will include even non-Muslim countries, so as to appear non-discriminatory. The Virginia Court, in relevant part, explains that,

“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” The Supreme Court has articulated various tests for determining whether that command has been violated. The first such test is that the law “must have a secular…purpose.” “In the past, [this] test has not been fatal very often, presumably because government does not generally act unconstitutionally, with the predominant purpose of advancing” one religion over the other. The secular purpose requirement “‘nevertheless serves an important function,’” because “[b]y showing a purpose to favor religion, the government sends the…message to…nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members.” This message of exclusion from the political community is all the more conspicuous when the government acts with a specific purpose to disfavor a particular religion. (internal citations omitted).

(Aziz, at *13-14).

In order to assess whether there was discriminatory intent in the January 27 EO, Judge Brinkema cites heavily to statements made by Trump during his campaign, especially noting that a “Muslim Ban” was a central feature of his platform. She also pointed to post-election and post-inaugural interviews where he speaks about the need to prioritize Christian refugees. She also cites to a particularly intriguing quote by Rudy Giuliani, who stated after the EO’s enactment, that “when [Trump] first announced it, he said ‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a commission together. Show me the right way to do it legally.’…And what we did was, we focused on, instead of religion, danger—the areas of the word that create danger for us…Which is a factual basis, not a religious basis. Perfectly legal, perfectly sensible. And that’s what the ban is based on. It’s not based on religion. It’s based on places where there are [sic] substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into our country.” Additionally, Judge Brinkema noted that post-hoc statements by DHS Secretary Kelly and White House Chief Counsel proclaiming that this is not a Muslim ban will be given little weight because we are looking to past intent in our analysis.

These statements taken together go to show that the ultimate aim of the Trump Administration is to ban Muslims. Even in light of the new EO, which may or may not include non-Muslim majority countries, these statements cannot be washed away. The intent to ban Muslims is there. The intent to violate the Establishment Clause, without outright saying it, is there. “‘The world is not made brand new every morning,’ a person is not made brand new simply by taking the oath of office.” Aziz, at *15. Trump’s new EO is only being reissued because he and his Administration know it is likely that his January 27 EO is unconstitutional. Essentially, the new EO will be a repackaging of the old. The intent, therefore, remains to ban Muslims. This is the case even if the new EO proposes to ban future entrants. While people with no ties to the US may not have the same constitutional rights as lawful permanent residents, such a person who wishes to visit a US citizen relative or attend a US educational institution could still likely be able to challenge an unconstitutional EO pursuant to Boumediene v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.

Balancing the Government and State’s Interests

Given that plaintiffs can likely prevail on the Establishment Clause argument, the government must prove that its national security concerns are bona fide. This means that the government must present evidence to support its assertions that these EOs are vital for the preservation of national security. Judge Brinkema again notes that in the Virginia case, the government failed to provide any evidence to support their claim. The Ninth Circuit also noted that no evidence had been proffered to point to terrorist threats of nationals from the original seven banned countries. In fact, Judge Brinkema states that the only evidence offered in this regard is the declaration of 10 national security experts who declared that the January 27 EO only serves to make the country less safe. It is possible, though, that a court may follow what the Massachusetts district court in Louhghalam v. Trump did, and grant the President this authority and not find discriminatory intent (although the court rendered this decision to justify not extending the injunction indefinitely, which it did initially, and did not analyze the discriminatory intent).

It is clear to us, and hopefully to a court that hears the new challenge,  that the discriminatory intent will still exist in this new EO, thereby remaining in violation of the Establishment Clause. While it remains unclear if courts will find that this new EO puts forth facially legitimate national security concerns, it will still possess discriminatory intent, specifically banning Muslims, and will fail under the “bona fide” prong put forth in Kleindienst. See also American Academy of Religions v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115 (2009).  If the EO is found to possess facially legitimate national security concerns, but also formed in bad faith, it will be up to the courts to decide if these national security concerns have enough muster to overcome constitutional constraints. But history has repeatedly shown that national security concerns have been conveniently and falsely invoked even to deprive US citizens of their rights as with the shameful internment of Japanese Americans.

These national security concerns, in our opinion,  are invalid and cannot even pass the facially legitimate prong. Immigrants and refugees face numerous screenings before being granted admission into the United States. In addition, the immigration process can take years. The government in the January 27 EO proceedings failed to offer evidence that these processes were defective in their ability to screen out security threats. Further, it is unlikely that a terrorist would go through the trouble of filing an nonimmigrant/immigrant petition, only to be vetted several times over, then be subjected to a consular interview, and then still have to make it through Customs and Border Protection. It is an inefficient means to their end. Even attempting to ban prospective entrants who have not had ties with the United States cannot be justified if the ban violates the Establishment Clause. Since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803),  the Supreme Court has recognized that when a government action is in conflict with the Constitution, it is for the judiciary to say what the law is. This is the wonderful balance that preserves American democracy. White House advisor Stephen Miller was wrong to assert that an unelected judge cannot check the President’s power in the area of immigration. The will of the majority, even in a democracy, cannot trample upon the rights of others. If that happens, the judiciary applies the breaks on such abuse of power so as to protect those who are trampled upon by the majority.

But most importantly, the majority of people seeking to temporarily visit or immigrate to the United States are peaceful people. Just because they share a different religion, worldview, or skin tone than some Americans does not mean that they are somehow violent or a threat. In fact, the opposite is true. Immigrants have been critical in the continued advancement of our country. From science and technology, to social ingenuity and progress, immigrants have helped to continue moving our country forward. To equate immigrants or non-immigrants, especially those from Muslim-majority countries with terrorists is not only bigoted, but it is simply untrue. Profiling all people from a specific country cannot serve as a proxy for individualized suspicion and guilt. It is also a sloppy law enforcement technique as an individual who desires to harm the country can evade being part of the profile. There are other smart law enforcement techniques that have been successfully deployed to track and apprehend people who intend to do us harm than profiling all people of a country.

President Trump derives his authority to assert maximum power through the plenary power doctrine, which arose from a Supreme Court case in the late 1800s, Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, that upheld the racist Chinese Exclusion Act. In the 21st century, after the United States has made such strides in civil rights, women’s rights, and marriage equality, there is no longer place for plenary power as a justification to violate the Constitution. Allowing President Trump to assert such maximum power, based on the plenary power doctrine, only takes America back more than a hundred years after all the progress that has been achieved. The plenary power, as asserted in the travel ban EO, also sends a wrong message to the world that America is no longer a welcoming place for people to travel, do business, temporarily work, or to make a permanent home. Being unwelcoming, arbitrary and intolerant is inconsistent with the notion of America as a great nation. On this President’s Day, it is important to reflect whether now is the opportune moment to reassess the plenary power doctrine that was grounded in a racist law whose purpose was to exclude Chinese nationals just as the current or future EO is aimed against banning Muslims. It is high time for the courts to once and for all recognize the supremacy of the Constitution over the president’s absolute power.

[Sophia Genovese-Halvorson, who is pursuing her JD degree at Brooklyn Law School,  is a Legal Intern at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC]