Tag Archive for: Matter of Rajah

Cyrus Mehta

Changes in Work From Home Policies After Labor Certification Has Been Filed

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Cyrus D Mehta and Jessica Paszko*

As a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, employers implemented telecommuting policies, and work-from-home became the norm for much of the workforce. Three years later, many of those employees are dusting off their lunchboxes and ironing their work suits as their employers call them back to the office. While the turning back of these policies may be met with groans from employees who grew comfortable in their home offices, for foreign nationals in the process of being sponsored for permanent employment, the change could mean something much worse than a mere change of work scenery. For instance, if the employer indicated in its test of the labor market that the position allows telecommuting and then later requires all employees to report to the office, could the labor certification be deemed invalid?

The PERM labor certification process is typically begun by submitting the Department of Labor (DOL) Form ETA 9141, Application for Prevailing Wage Determination (PWD). Some key “Job Offer Information” that ETA 9141 asks for in Section F is the job title (F.a.1), job duties (F.a.2), the minimum degree (F.b.1) and experience requirements (F.b.4), and whether the employer requires any special skills or other requirements (F.b.5). In F.b.5, the employer clearly must list any tools, software, or programs that the employee is required to know for the position, but the employer should also use this field to list other key information about the job, such as that telecommuting is permitted. The ETA 9141 also requires the employer to provide the full address of the place of employment (F.e). Based on the regulations’ definitions of employment and employer, the “place of employment” has been interpreted to mean a physical office or location in the U.S. Specifically, 20 CFR § 656.3 defines employer as a “person, association, firm, or a corporation that currently has a location within the United States to which U.S. workers may be referred for employment and that proposes to employ a full-time employee at a place within the United States . . . . An employer must possess a valid Federal Employment Identification Number (FEIN).”.  In the case of “roving employees”, the 1994 Barbara Farmer Memo states that the employer’s main or headquarters (HQ) office should be indicated as the worksite when a job opportunity will require a beneficiary to work in various locations throughout the U.S. that cannot be anticipated. Note, the information from the ETA 9141 automatically gets included in the ETA 9089, the DOL form used to electronically submit the labor certification, since the revised ETA 9089 took effect on June 1, 2023. Under the old ETA 9089, the employer had to repeat the information from the ETA 9141 in the relevant boxes. Many of the approved labor certifications are under the old ETA 9089.

Once the ETA 9141 is certified by the DOL, employers can move onto the second stage of the PERM process which is to conduct a series of mandatory and optional recruitment steps to confirm that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are “able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of application for a visa and admission into the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform the work”, i.e., the labor market test. 20 CFR § 656.1(a)(1). The employer’s advertisements must indicate all of the “Job Offer Information” that was listed in the ETA 9141, or in the old form it was the ETA 9089 and box H.14 was answered. The recruitment steps must be conducted in the area of intended employment that was listed in Section F.e. If an employer intends for an employee to work solely at a designated worksite, such as a company office or its HQ, then the ETA 9141 need only list one worksite location and the employer need only conduct recruitment in that area of intended employment. If the employer will permit the employee to perform work remotely from their home, then the ETA 9141 still need only list the employer’s main or HQ office as the worksite, but F.b.5 on the ETA 9141, and in turn each of the ads used in recruitment, should indicate that the employer will permit telecommuting from anywhere in the U.S.

Turning back to the question we posed at the outset – what should happen to a labor certification that indicated “telecommuting permitted” but where the employer later decides that all employees must report to the office five days a week? Arguably, the labor certification should not be deemed invalid in such a scenario because the labor market test was conducted in the area of intended employment, i.e., the company’s main office or HQ, which is where the foreign worker will need to report to. Additionally, by issuing the labor certification, the DOL determined that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified and available at the time of application for a visa and admission into the U.S. and at the place where the alien is to perform the work. Indeed, the employer, by indicating that telecommuting would be allowed, cast a wider net and potentially made the position “available” to more U.S. workers “at the place where the alien is to perform the work” since the U.S. applicant not need be physically present in the employer’s area of intended employment listed in the ETA 9141, Section F.e or in the old ETA 9089. Therefore, the labor certification should not be invalid as the employer properly made the two attestations required by it.

But what if the issue was flipped and now the employer wishes to allow telecommuting even though the ETA 9141 and subsequent recruitment did not indicate that telecommuting would be permissible? Here, the employer’s attestation that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified and available at the time of application for a visa and admission into the U.S. and at the place where the foreign worker is to perform the work may be called into question. By failing to indicate in its ads that workers could telecommute from anywhere in the U.S., the employer arguably made the position more restrictive as qualified U.S. applicants may have not applied to the position due to the location of the employer’s office or HQ, though they would have applied if telecommuting was allowed. Still, we would argue that the employer’s telecommuting change after the labor certification should not invalidate the labor certification. The Barbara Farmer Memo made clear that the employer’s main or HQ office should be indicated as the worksite when a job opportunity will require a beneficiary to work in various locations throughout the U.S. that cannot be anticipated. That HQ worksite in turn determines the course of the labor market test and where it is to be conducted. The labor certification should not be later deemed invalid just because the employer changes its mind as to whether or not telecommuting is allowed as the labor market test is still valid since it was conducted in the area of intended employment.

If the labor certification is approved but the I-140 petition still needs to be filed, it would behoove the employer to provide a justification in the support letter to the I-140 that the labor certification is still valid despite a change in work from home policy. Alternatively, the employer is only obligated to offer the position in accordance with the terms of the labor certification upon the grant of permanent residence. See Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127 (BIA 2009).  Thus, even if the work from home policies have currently changed, but the employer still wishes to offer the job in accordance with the labor certification, then there is no need for any further justification. Assuming that the employer does not intend to offer the position per the labor certification upon the grant of permanent residence, obtaining an I-140 approval after full disclosure has been made would be the ideal situation. If the I-140 petition is already approved, the employer could again go with the assumption that the underlying labor certification is valid despite the change in work from home policy and perhaps explain in the letter in support the I-485 or in the I-485J supplement, whichever is applicable. When there is doubt regarding the validity of the labor certification due to changes in work from home policies, and the I-140 is already approved, the employer can file a new labor certification and upon approval of the labor certification, file an I-140 petition and recapture the earlier priority date under 8 CFR § 204.5(e)(1).

Given the extraordinary time it takes to obtain labor certifications, starting again when there is a change in a work from home policy can be very burdensome especially when the foreign worker is running out of H-1B time. Our blog provides a legal basis for keeping the labor certification in intact when there is a change in work from home policies, and making full disclosure when submitting the subsequent I-140 petition and I-485 application.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be relied upon as substitute for legal advice)

*Jessica Paszko is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta &  Partners PLLC. She graduated with a J.D. degree from Brooklyn Law School in 2021.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta & Sophia Genovese

Making The Law Up As He Goes: Sessions Refers Another Case to Himself, This Time On Motions For Continuance

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Attorney General Jeff Sessions has yet again referred an immigration case to himself for review in Matter of L-A-B-R- et al, 27 I&N Dec. 245 (AG 2018). This time, AG Sessions asks:

An Immigration Judge is authorized to “grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2017); see also id. § 1240.6 (2017) (authorizing an Immigration Judge to “grant a reasonable adjournment either at his or her own instance or, for good cause shown, upon application”). In these cases, Immigration Judges granted continuances to provide time for respondents to seek adjudications of collateral matters from other authorities. Under what circumstances does “good cause” exist for an Immigration Judge to grant a continuance for a collateral matter to be adjudicated?

As noted, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 empowers Immigration Judges (IJs) to grant motions for continuance “for good caution shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.6, by contrast, allows IJs to grant reasonable adjournments either at their discretion, or “for good cause” upon request by one of the parties. Typically, these motions are filed by either the Respondent or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for a number of reasons. For example, the Respondent may motion for a continuance when they are awaiting adjudication of a case outside of Immigration Court, such as a pending I-130 or I-140 petition with USCIS or even an outside criminal or family law case that has bearing on the removal proceedings. Similarly, the government attorney for DHS may motion for a continuance when the attorney has an unexpected emergency, time conflict with the hearing date, or simply needs more time to prepare.

The BIA has sensibly addressed motions for continuance in several cases authorizing IJs to grant them when there is when there was a pending immigrant petition with the USCIS. In Matter of Hashimi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009), for example, the IJ granted the respondent four continuances on his removal proceedings to allow for USCIS to adjudicate his family-based immigrant visa petition. The IJ denied the respondent’s fifth motion to continue because he was expected to meet the Department of Justice’s “case completion goals,” which required completing cases within a reasonable period of time. The Third Circuit determined that the IJ’s denial based on case-completion goals was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. On remand, the BIA discussed relevant factors when “determining whether respondent should be allowed to continue ongoing removal proceedings pending the final adjudication of an I-130” filed concurrently with an adjustment of status application, given the conflicting needs of finality of removal proceedings and allowing the opportunity for respondent to apply for relief. Citing to Matter of Garcia, 16 I&N Dec. 653 (BIA 1978), the BIA stated that although the IJ should exercise favorable discretion when there is prima facie eligibility for a visa petition, this does not require that a continuance be granted in every case. The BIA held that in determining whether to continue proceedings where there is a pending visa petition, the IJ should consider a variety of factors, including, but not limited to: (1) the DHS response to the motion; (2) whether the underlying visa petition is prima facie approvable; (3) the respondent’s statutory eligibility for adjustment of status; (4) whether the respondent’s application for adjustment merits a favorable exercise of discretion; and (5) the reason for the continuance and other procedural factors. The focus is the apparent ultimate likelihood of success on the adjustment application. The IJ needs some basis to examine the viability of the underlying visa petition, the respondent’s statutory eligibility for adjustment, and the merits of the adjustment application. This may require the respondent to submit evidence, such as the visa petition, the adjustment application, any prior visa petitions denials, and any other supporting documentation. The BIA sustained the respondent’s appeal and remanded the record to the Immigration Judge to consider the factors and determine whether a continuance was warranted.

In Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127 (BIA 2009), the respondent was placed in removal proceedings after his employer filed for labor certification on his behalf. Over the period of 18 months, the respondent was granted 10 continuances for a variety of reasons, including to obtain counsel and prepare the case and to determine the status of the labor certification. The IJ denied the final motion to continue based on the pending labor certification because he “concluded that the respondent had had ‘sufficient time’ to obtain an approved labor certification.” While the matter was pending before the Second Circuit, the labor certification was approved but then later expired due to the respondent’s employer not filing a visa petition. On remand, the issue before the BIA was to provide a “reasoned set of standards explicating when continuances for labor certification are within the ‘range of permissible decisions’ available to an [IJ], and when they are not.” Id. at 129. The BIA held that as a general rule in the employment context, discretion in granting a motion to continue ongoing removal proceedings should be favorably exercised where there is a prima facie approvable visa petition and adjustment application. Furthermore, in determining whether good cause exists for a continuance in removal proceedings to await the adjudication of a pending employment-based visa petition or labor certification, an “Immigration Judge should first determine the alien’s place in the adjustment of status process and then consider and balance” the factors identified in Matter of Hashmi and any other relevant considerations. For example, a labor certification no longer being valid, and other similar types of evidence, might affect the case on remand or in the context of a motion to reopen. Furthermore, the BIA held that the pendency of a labor certification generally is not sufficient to grant a continuance in the absence of additional persuasive factors. Here, the BIA determined that remand was not warranted based on the new evidence that the labor certification, which was approved, had expired and there was no pending visa petition. While the respondent was a grandfathered alien who could have potentially been eligible for INA § 245(i) treatment, because there was no pending labor certification, the respondent could not establish prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status under INA § 245(i)(2)(A)-(B). The appeal was dismissed.

In Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), an IJ repeatedly continued a removal hearing pending the filing and adjudication of a family-based immigrant visa petition. During the final hearing, despite DHS’s opposition, the IJ granted the respondent’s motion to administrative closure, and the DHS filed an interlocutory appeal. The issue here was whether an IJ or the BIA has the authority to administratively close a case when one of the parties to the proceeding opposes. The BIA determined that there was fault in the general rule stated in Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 1996) that “a case may not be administratively closed if opposed by either party.” The BIA, in overruling Matter of Gutierrez, held that affording absolute deference to a party’s objection is improper and that the IJ or the BIA, in the exercise of independent judgement and discretion, has the authority to administratively close a case, regardless of party opposition, if it is otherwise appropriate under the circumstances. The BIA further held that when evaluating a request for administrative closure, the IJ should weigh all relevant factors presented in the case, including, but not limited to: (1) the reason administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to administrative closure; (3) the likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other action he or she is pursuing outside of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5) the responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate outcome of removal proceedings (for example, termination of the proceedings or entry of a removal order) when the case is recalendared before the IJ or the appeal is reinstated before the Board. In Avetisyan’s case, the visa petition had been pending for a long time through no apparent fault of the respondent or her husband, and there was no obvious impediment to the approval of the visa petition or ability of the respondent to successfully apply for adjustment of status. The BIA determined that the circumstances supported the exercise of the IJ’s authority to administratively close the case.

In Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 187 (A.G. 2018), AG Sessions referred Avetisyan to himself questioning whether there was any authority for IJs or the BIA to administratively close cases. Even if AG Sessions was able to overrule Ayetisyan and deny IJs the ability to administratively close cases, it was hoped that their ability to grant continuances would not be undermined. After all, there is explicit authority pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 for an IJ to grant a continuance for good cause. Depriving an IJ that ability, especially when there is an application pending that would allow the respondent to obtain permanent residency and moot the removal proceeding, would lead to a complete and total evisceration of Ayetisyan. Sessions can only achieve this if the basis to continue proceedings under Hashmi and Rajah are also overturned.

It is clear AG Session seeks to discourage motions for continuance as a way to maximize the deportations of noncitizens even if they have a meritorious pending applications for permanent residency that would otherwise thwart their deportations. In the Department of Justice’s Backgrounder on EOIR Strategic Caseload Reduction Plan, for example, Sessions blames IJs’ low productivity levels and rising backlogs on “representatives of illegal aliens have purposely used tactics designed to delay the adjudication of their clients’ cases” such as motions for continuance. Moreover, in the July 2017 EOIR Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 17-01: Continuances, IJs were urged to limit the grant of continuances, stating that “the delays caused by granting multiple and lengthy continuances, when multiplied across the entire immigration court system, exacerbate already crowded immigration dockets.”

But limiting continuances in the name of efficiency is a smokescreen. Discouraging motions for continuances will not make delays go away in the immigration court system. Respondents will appeal the denial of continuances into the courts of appeal of each circuit, which will result in remands back to the immigration courts in addition to clogging the circuits. This used to be the case prior to Hashmi and Rajah, where remands from the circuit court resulted in the further clogging up of immigration dockets. Moreover, if the USCIS processes cases in a tardy manner, and respondents in removal are unable to legitimately seek a continuance, there will be an increasing number of mandamus lawsuits against the agency to compel USCIS to process the case more expeditiously. The BIA’s reasoning in Hashmi, Rajah and Avetisyan was based on common sense and fairness. If there was a reasonable basis for a respondents in removal proceeding to demonstrate that they would ultimately get permanent residency but for a delay in processing of the visa petition or the priority date not being current, why deprive respondents of permanent residency by deporting them?  The federal courts understood this too, and will continue to do so if we do so if respondents cannot get continuances for good cause in removal proceedings.

Thus, in Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591 (2004), the Seventh Circuit found that an IJ had abused his discretion when the ground for the continuance was a pending labor certification.  The Court noted that the IJ’s denial was based simply on the fact that the labor authorities had not yet acted rather than issues particularized to the petitioner’s circumstances such as the lack of bona fides of the labor certification or other grounds pertaining to national security or criminal issues. In another Seventh Circuit decision, Ahmed v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 669 (2006), the court went even further than Subhan in holding that the IJ’s denial of a continuance ignored the fact that the petitioner was the “grandfathered” beneficiary under INA 245(i) of an I-130 petition even though the petitioner had yet to have a labor certification filed on his behalf. Of course, some courts upheld an IJ’s decision to deny continuance if the respondent’s underlying applications were not meritorious, see e.g. Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549 (2006), but the frameworks established in Hashmi and Rajah for providing for a continuance based on the merits of the underlying applications for permanent residence are sound and should not be upset. They provide IJs with discretion to grant continuances, and at the same time, authorize IJs to deny continuances when the pending request for permanent residency lacks merit.

There is no need for Sessions to undermine a framework that is working, and also less need to further erode the independence of IJs to judiciously exercise discretion based on their own sense of fairness and efficiency. Decisions to not grant continuances of IJs have been upheld by federal courts post-Hashmi and Rajah when the priority date was a long way away or when an I-601 waiver supporting an adjustment was denied and its appeal was pending. See e.g. Luevano v. Holder, 660 F.3d 1207 (2011); Kwak v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1140 (2010). On the other hand, IJs’ decisions that did not follow the Hashmi and Rajah factors have been overturned. See e.g., Ferrera v. AG, No. 11-14074 (11th Cir. 2013); Simon v. Holder, 654 F.3d 440 (2011). This is clear evidence that the system is working and does not need Sessions’ interference.  Avetisyan along with Hashmi and Rajah also view the immigration system as a whole with all its warts and imperfections. These decisions take into account the inefficiencies resulting in delays of approving I-130s and I-140s, along with retrogression in priority dates. If the immigration system worked more efficiently, there would be less need to place people in removal proceedings. But if people are placed in removal proceedings as a result of these inefficiencies, why not continue their proceedings, or even temporarily close their proceedings, until such time that they can obtain the benefit and terminate proceedings – which should not have been started in the first place? If Sessions is unable to see it this way when he reconsiders BIA decisions to undermine Avetisyan, Hashmi and Rajah, he is not doing so to create efficiency but to further his animus and hostility against immigrants.

(The authors thank Eleyteria Diakopoulous for her assistance in providing research for this article. Ms. Diakopoulous is a student at Brooklyn Law School and is presently an Extern at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC)