Tag Archive for: Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly

Cyrus Mehta

State Department’s Interpretation of Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly at Odds with BIA’s  

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In a previous blog, we analyzed Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012), a seminal Board of Immigration Appeals case which held that a departure under advance parole does not trigger the 10 year bar provision under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). The BIA reasoned that travel under a  grant of advance parole is different from a regular departure from the US, since the individual is given the assurance that they will be paroled back in the US to continue to seek the benefit of adjustment of status. Thus, traveling outside the US under advance parole does not trigger the 10 year bar. Although Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly interpreted the 10 year bar provision under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), its rationale has also  applied equally to the 3 year bar under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), but had never been officially confirmed.

On September 5, 2024, USCIS updated guidance on its website to state the following:

Furthermore, under Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec 771 (BIA 2012), a noncitizen who accrued more than 180 days of unlawful presence during a single stay and left is not inadmissible under INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) when they again seek admission, if they left the United States after first obtaining an advance parole document. While the Board of Immigration Appeals, in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, stated that its decision was limited to INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), the board’s reasoning in Matter of Arrabally applies equally to INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). For this reason, we apply the decision to both INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II).

This language makes clear that USCIS will apply Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly when making determinations of inadmissibility under INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) relating to the 3 year bar and INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) relating to the 10 year bar. The guidance also emphasizes that Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly applies equally to INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), although the BIA decision itself dealt only with INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). The corresponding section of the USCIS Policy Manual (Volume 8, Part O) has yet to be updated to reflect this guidance.

Matter of Arrabally and Yerabelly enables individuals to escape the 3 and 10 year bar when they depart the US under advance parole in various contexts. For instance, an applicant for adjustment of status can request advance parole, and a departure under such advance parole does not trigger the 3 and 10 year bar. Similarly, a DACA recipient who obtains advance parole and travels pursuant to this grant of advance parole also does not trigger the 3 and 10 year bar. The USCIS has also applied Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly to one who leaves the US pursuant to travel authorization under Temporary Protected Status.

The U.S. Department of State (DOS) policy surrounding INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)  is highly inconsistent with this USCIS guidance, however. In meeting with DOS on October 10, 2024 the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA)’s DOS liaison committee posed the following question:

“Members report instances where DACA recipients who have received Advance Parole have been determined to be inadmissible under the three- and/or 10-year bars. This is contrary to the Board of Immigration Appeals decision in Matter of Yarrabelly and Arrabelly…Can DOS confirm that consular officers are instructed to apply the Yerrabelly/Arrabelly holding and that, as such, any visa applicant who is traveling pursuant to the approval of Advance Parole would not require a waiver under INA§212(d)(3) for a violation of 212(a)(9)(B)? This would be consistent with USCIS’s recent update…”

 

DOS responded by stating:

In Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771(BIA 2012), the Board of Immigration Appeals held “that an alien who has left and returned to the United States under a grant of advance parole has not made a ‘departure . . . from the United States’ within the meaning of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.” The holding and discussion throughout Arrabally makes clear that advance parole allows a noncitizen who needs to leave and return to the United States to do so with the expectation that the noncitizen “will be presenting himself for inspection without a valid visa in the future” so that “he will, upon return, continue to pursue the adjustment of status application he filed before departing.” Arrabally in no way holds that advance parole can be used as a way to leave the United States and to obtain a visa (as opposed to pursuing an adjustment of status) without application of the congressionally mandated visa ineligibility for accrual of unlawful presence in excess of 180 days.

This Q&A is available online.

DOS’ policy will not recognize Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly if a noncitizen, for example, obtains DACA after age 18.5, leaves the U.S. on advance parole, and applies for an H-1B visa at a US consulate. Although this applicant departed the U.S. on advance parole, DOS would nonetheless consider them to have triggered the inadmissibility bar at INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i). In order to obtain an H-1B visa, the applicant would need a 212(d)(3) waiver of unlawful presence. Similarly, DOS is unlikely to apply Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly to one who left the U.S. under advance parole and seeks to be readmitted to the U.S. with an immigrant visa.

There is no reason for DOS to restrict the interpretation in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly to one who departed the US under advance parole and will be returning to the US on advance parole rather than on a newly obtained visa at the US consulate. The BIA in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly correctly interpreted that one who leaves under advance parole does not effectuate a departure for purposes of triggering the 10 year bar under INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). If the individual chooses to return on a visa rather than advance parole, it should not change the fact that there was no departure under advance parole at the point in time when they left the US. Thus far, the USCIS has not restricted its interpretation in the same manner as DOS.

The DOS’s interpretation has also been inconsistent with the USCIS’s interpretation in other instances. For example, the DOS has  not recognized the Dates for Filing to protected the age of a child under the Child Status Protection Act as the USCIS has prudently done.  Now the DOS’s interpretation of Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly is also at odds with USCIS’s. Such inconsistent interpretations between the USCIS and DOS  only create further hardship and difficulties for noncitizens who are already struggling to navigate a complex and byzantine immigration system.

 

 

 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

David Isaacson

Matter of Douglas: The BIA Confirms That Brand X Can Sometimes be a Force For Good

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On October 17, 2013, its first day back to normal operations after the end of the recent federal government shutdown, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a precedential opinion, Matter of Douglas, 26 I&N Dec. 197 (BIA 2013).  At first glance, Matter of Douglas is about an interesting but obscure aspect of a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that was repealed more than a decade ago.  But perhaps more importantly, Matter of Douglas is also an example of the BIA using its authority to go against Court of Appeals precedent decisions under National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (“Brand X”), to the benefit of an immigrant and potential U.S. citizen rather than to the detriment of the immigrant.At issue in Matter of Douglas was former section 321(a) of the INA, repealed effective February 2001 by the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, which in relevant part replaced INA §321(a) with the simpler rule of current INA §320.  As Matter of Douglas explained, former §321(a)

provided that citizenship was automatically acquired by a child born outside the United States of alien parents under the following conditions:

(1) The naturalization of both parents; or
(2) The naturalization of the surviving parent if one of the parents, is deceased; or
(3) The naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents or the naturalization of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation; and if
(4) Such naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen years; and
(5) Such child is residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent last naturalized under clause (1) of this subsection, or the parent naturalized under clause (2) or (3) of the subsection, or thereafter begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years.

Matter of Douglas, 26 I&N Dec. in 198 (emphasis in original).The question in Matter of Douglas was the relevance of the order in which the conditions of former INA §321(a) were satisfied.  As the BIA explained, Mr. Douglas

was born in Jamaica on January 29, 1976, to his married parents, each of whom was a native and citizen of Jamaica. On December 14, 1981, [Mr. Douglas] entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident. [Mr. Douglas]’s mother was naturalized on April 13, 1988. His parents were divorced on July 25, 1990. [He] became 18 years old in 1994.

Matter of Douglas, 26 I&N Dec. at 198.  That is, Mr. Douglas’s mother became “the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents” under former INA §321(a)(3) only after she was naturalized, having been naturalized in 1988 and divorced in 1990.  Both of these events, however, happened while Mr. Douglas was a lawful permanent resident and before he reached the age of 18, in compliance with former INA §321(a)(4)-(5).In its earlier decision in Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2008), the BIA had held that “A child who has satisfied the statutory conditions of former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . before the age of 18 years has acquired United States citizenship, regardless of whether the naturalized parent acquired legal custody of the child before or after the naturalization.”  Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec. at 467.  Under this rule, Mr. Douglas would be a U.S. citizen.  Case law of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, as the BIA acknowledged, required that one seeking to show acquisition of citizenship under former INA §321(a)(3) demonstrate “that his [parent] was naturalized after a legal separation from his [other parent],” rather than before such a separation.  Jordon v. Att’y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 330 (3d Cir. 2005)(alterations in original) (quoting Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2005)).  In Matter of Baires, the BIA had noted the Third Circuit case law, but had indicated that “we are not bound by the Third Circuit decisions on which the Immigration Judge relied because this case is within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit.” 24 I&N Dec. at 469.  The proceedings in Matter of Douglas, however, had taken place within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit, and so the BIA had to decide whether to follow Matter of Baires or the Third Circuit’s decisions in Jordon and Bagot.

The BIA chose to follow Matter of Baires, rather than Jordon and Bagot, and so found Mr. Douglas to be a U.S. citizen and terminated his removal proceedings.  Under Brand X, as the BIA explained, an administrative agency such as the BIA can sometimes be entitled to “Chevrondeference” pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) regarding its interpretation of a statute, even when there has been a prior court interpretation of the statute going the other way, so long as that court did not find that the statute unambiguously supported its interpretation.  Believing that its interpretation in Baires was a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and that Jordon and Bagot had not interpreted the statute to be unambiguous, the BIA concluded that under Brand X it could and would follow Baires, rather that Jordonand Bagot, even in the Third Circuit.

It appears that this may be the first time that the BIA has explicitly relied on Brand X to rule in favor of the immigrant respondent.  The BIA has, to be sure, previously rejected Court of Appeals case law that it thought to be incorrect in favor of a more immigrant-friendly approach. In Matter of F-P-R-, 24 I&N Dec. 681 (BIA 2008), for example, the BIA declined to follow the Second Circuit’s decision in Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172 (2d Cir 2006), and held that the one-year period in which a timely application for asylum may be made runs from the applicant’s literal “last arrival” even when that last arrival followed a relatively brief trip outside the United States pursuant to advance parole granted by immigration authorities (which the Second Circuit had held would not restart the one-year clock).  The proceedings underlying Matter of F-P-R-, however, appear to have taken place in the Ninth Circuit, not the Second, see 24 I&N Dec. at 682 (referring to “the absence of any controlling decisions on the issue from either the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit or the Board”), and so the BIA did not have to determine whether it would follow Joaquin-Porras within the Second Circuit.  Here, in contrast, the BIA held that it would not follow Jordon and Bagot even within the Circuit that had decided them.  And while there was a footnote in the BIA’s acclaimed decision inMatter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012) (regarding travel on advance parole by one who has accrued unlawful presence) that could be read as pointing in this direction, the BIA in Arrabally made much of the fact that it was addressing an aspect of the law that the petitioner in the Third Circuit’s previous decision in Cheruku v. Att’y Gen., 662 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2011), had not challenged, see Matter of Arrabally, 25 I&N Dec. at 775 n.6.  It appears that Matter of Douglas may be the first BIA decision to go flatly against a contrary Circuit precedent under Brand X and do so to the benefit of the immigrant respondent.

The possibility of using Brand X as a force for good has been raised before, notably by Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta in their articles on “The Tyranny of Priority Dates” and “Comprehensive Immigration Reform Through Executive Fiat”, as well as their post on this blog which explained how the BIA’s decision in Matter of Zeleniak, 26 I&N Dec. 158 (BIA 2013), implementing the Supreme Court’s striking down of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), effectively overruled the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision in Adams v. Howerton, 637 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982) in regard to recognition of same-sex marriages for immigration purposes.  Like Matter of F-P-R-, however, Matter of Zeleniak had not explicitly relied on Brand X.  In this regard, Matter of Douglas is a significant step forward.Of course, Brand X is not always a force for good.  Less than a year ago, for example, the BIA decided in Matter of M-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 46 (BIA 2012), that it would disregard the Third Circuit’s decision in Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006), and follow its own prior decision in Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), so as to consider even some crimes that are not aggravated felonies as “particularly serious crimes” which can bar withholding of removal.  The merits of Matter of M-H- (which this author considers dubious) are beyond the scope of this blog post, but it is only one example of the fact that the BIA can seek to rely on Brand X to strip applicants for relief of protection that a Court of Appeals has given them.  Also within the last year, the BIA invoked Brand X in Matter of Cortes Medina, 26 I&N Dec. 79 (BIA 2013), to find that violation of California Penal Code 314(1), regarding indecent exposure, was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, despite the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010).  Nor are these the only examples; an exhaustive list of all instances in which Brand X has been invoked by the BIA to the advantage of the Department of Homeland Security and the disadvantage of an immigrant would unnecessarily lengthen this blog post.Now that the BIA has acknowledged in Matter of Douglas that Brand X is not a one-way ratchet and can also work in favor of immigrants, however, it is important for practitioners to keep Brand X in mind when they are faced with unfavorable Court of Appeals case law interpreting an ambiguous immigration statute.  Especially where existing BIA case law in other circuits is more favorable, an unfavorable Court of Appeals decision in a particular circuit need not be the last word.

Cyrus Mehta

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: ADVENTURES WITH ARRABALLY AND YERRABELLY IN IMMIGRATION LAND

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By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

“Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.”

― Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland

Arrabally and Yerrabelly are not characters in a children’s fantasy story book. They were the respondents in a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals styled Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012), which to immigration attorneys is like a fairy tale story come true. The decision is magical, and truly benefits foreign nationals who are subject to the 3 and 10 year bars even if they travel abroad.

Indeed, Arrabally and Yerrabelly, husband and wife respectively, were unlawfully present for more than 1 year. A departure after being unlawfully present from the US for one year renders the individual inadmissible for a period of 10 years. Specifically, § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides:

Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who –

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more , and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible

A companion provision, INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) triggers a 3 year bar if the non-citizen is unlawfully present for more than 180 days and less than one year, and leaves the US prior to the commencement of removal proceedings.

The 3 and 10 year bars create a federal Catch-22. An individual who is unlawfully present cannot generally apply for lawful permanent residence in the US through adjustment of status unless he or she falls under limited exceptions. Such an individual who is ineligible to apply for a green card in the US must leave the US to process for an immigrant visa at an overseas consular post. But here’s the catch: If this person leaves the US he or she will trigger the bar and cannot return for 10 years. Thus, this person, even though approved for a green card, remains in immigration limbo.

Arrabally and Yerrabelly were unlawfully present too for more than 1 year, and would have triggered the 10 year bar had they “departed” the US. Fortunately, they were able to file Form I-485 applications for adjustment of status under an exception, INA § 245(i), after the employer’s I-140 petition got approved. § 245(i), which expired on April 30, 2001 but which could still grandfather someone if an immigrant petition or labor certification was filed on or before that date,  allows those who are out of status to  be able adjust status to permanent residence in the US. Due to a family emergency in India, they left the US under advance parole, which is a special travel dispensation one can obtain when one is a pending applicant for adjustment of status. At issue is their case was whether they effectuated a “departure” under advance parole and thus triggered the 10 year bar.

The DHS has always taken the position that leaving the United States under advance parole effectuates a departure and thus triggers the 10 year bar under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) if the individual is unlawfully present for one year.

The adjustment of status applications of Arrabally and Yerrabelly were denied on the basis that they were inadmissible for 10 years, and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge affirmed the DHS’s finding, but the BIA like magic reversed on the ground that their leaving the US under advance parole did not result in a departure pursuant to § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) thus rendering them inadmissible under the 10 year bar. The BIA reasoned that travel under a  grant of advance parole is different from a regular departure from the US, since the individual is given the assurance that he or she will be paroled back in the US to continue to seek the benefit of adjustment of status. Thus, traveling outside the US under advance parole does not trigger the 10 year bar. Although Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly interpreted the 10 year bar provision under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), its logic can apply equally to the 3 year bar under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I).

The decision now allows foreign nationals like Arrabally and Yerabelly, who may have been unlawfully present to travel outside the US on advance parole while their adjustment of status applications are pending without fearing the 10 year bar. But the decision opens up other amazing possibilities too. If a person is unable to adjust status by virtue of being out of status, and cannot do so under the § 245(i) exception, another exception is by adjusting status as an immediate relative of a US citizen. The spouse, minor child or parent of a US citizen can adjust status in the US even if they have violated their status. However, this individual must still be able to demonstrate that he or she was “inspected and admitted or paroled” in the United States under INA § 245(a) as a pre-condition to file an adjustment of status application in the US.  Thus, a person who enters the US surreptitiously without inspection is ineligible to adjust status to permanent residence in the US despite being married to a US citizen. Such a person may still have to proceed overseas at a US consulate for immigrant visa processing, and will need to overcome the 10 year bar through a waiver.  This would not be necessary if such immediate relative could be granted “parole-in-place” which at this point of time is only granted to spouses of military personnel in active duty. In the leaked July 2010 memorandum to USCIS Director Mayorkas, the suggestion is made that the USCIS “reexamine past interpretations of terms such as ‘departure’ and ‘seeking admission again’ within the context of unlawful presence and adjustment of status.”

Notwithstanding the lack of “parole in place” for all applicants,  in yet another ground breaking case, Matter of Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010), the BIA held that someone who presents herself at the border, but is waived through, is still inspected for purposes of adjustment eligibility. For example, a person who is a passenger in a car, and is waived through a border post at the Mexico-US border can still establish a lawful entry into the US. Matter of Quilantan can be further extended to someone who enters the US with a photo-switched fraudulent non-US passport. Such a person has also been inspected, albeit through a fraudulent identity. Foreign nationals in such situations, if they can prove that they were inspected, can qualify to apply for their green cards in the US through adjustment of status if they marry a US citizen or are the minor children or parents of US citizens.  They may however be subject to other grounds of inadmissibility, such as fraud or misrepresentation, but they can at least file those waivers with an I-485 application in the US. While it is true that in another feat of administrative innovation, the DHS has proposed that some can apply for the waiver of the 3 and 10 year bars in the US prior to their departure, this rule may not extend to applicants who are applying for an additional waiver, such as to overcome the fraud ground of inadmissibility.

Despite Matter of Quilantan, USCIS examiners during an adjustment of status interview require corroborating evidence of this admission, and may not accept only the sworn statement of the applicant regarding the manner of his or her entry into the US. They may want to actually see the photo-switched passport, which may no longer in the possession of the applicant.  Such a person may still be found ineligible to adjust status despite being inspected and admitted in the above manner under Matter of Quilantan. But if this person, after filing an adjustment of status application, left the US under advance  parole and returned to the US, he or she would be considered  “paroled” into the US and qualify for a new adjustment of status application as an immediate relative of a US citizen. If the first I-485 application is denied, he or she could file this second application where the “parole” would be a clearer basis for adjustment eligibility than the initial “waived through” or fraudulent admission.  Moreover, under Matter of Arrabally and Yerabelly, this individual would not have triggered the 10 year bar during travel under advance parole during the pendency of the first adjustment application. Travelling abroad under advance parole during the first adjustment application without triggering the 10 year bar could give an applicant a second bite at the apple in filing another adjustment application if the first one gets denied for lack of evidence of an admission. There is one caveat though. This is still an untested theory but the authors do not see why it could not be argued in the event of a denial of the first adjustment application, assuming it was filed in good faith and denied only because of lack of corroboration of the admission. Using Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly in the manner we propose seeks to do just that. Once again, as with the concept of parole, we seek to build on past innovation to achieve future gain.

Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly can come to the rescue of DREAMers too. In our recent blog, DEFERRED ACTION: THE NEXT GENERATION, June 19, 2012, we proposed extending the holding of Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly to beneficiaries of deferred action. There are bound to be many who will be granted deferred action who will also be on the pathway to permanent residence by being beneficiaries of approved I-130 or I-140 petitions.  As already explained, unless one is being sponsored as an immediate relative, i.e. as a spouse, child or parent of a US citizen, and has also been admitted and inspected, filing an application for adjustment of status to permanent residence will generally not be possible for an individual who has failed to maintain a lawful status under INA § 245(a). Such individuals will have to depart the US to process their immigrant visas at a US consulate in their home countries. Although the grant of deferred action will stop unlawful presence from accruing, it does not erase any past unlawful presence. Thus, one who has accrued over one year of unlawful presence and departs the US in order to process for an immigrant visa will most likely face the 10 year bar under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). While some may be able to take advantage of the proposed provisional waiver rule, where one can apply in the US for a waiver before leaving the US, not all will be eligible under this new rule.  A case in point is someone who is sponsored by an employer under the employment-based second preference, and who may not even have a qualifying relative to apply for the waiver of the 10 year bar.

Since the publication of our blog, the USCIS has issued extensive guidelines for consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) in the form of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), which will take effect on August 15, 2012.  We were pleasantly surprised to find in the FAQ that those granted deferred action beneficiaries can apply for advance parole.  It is yet unclear whether one who has been granted deferred action and who has accrued unlawful presence and travels under advance parole can take advantage of Arrabally and Yerrabelly and the current FAQ does not suggest it.  At this point, a DACA applicant should assume that Arrabally and Yerrabelly will not apply, and an individual who has accrued over one-year of unlawful presence and leaves even under advance parole could face the 10-year bar.    Still, there is no reason for Arrabally and Yerabelly’s magic to not apply in this case too. Here too, the individual will be leaving the US under advance parole, which under Matter of Arrabally and Yerabelly, did not effectuate the departure under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). This is something worth advocating for with the USCIS as the DACA program unfolds. Obviously, USCIS will tread carefully as it is already facing criticism from opponents of the program, including members of Congress. Yet, applying Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly to young people who have been granted a fresh lease of life would be a logical extension.  The FAQ also indicates that the USCIS will only grant advance parole if one is travelling for humanitarian purposes, education purposes or employment purposes. Again, the FAQ does not expand on what humanitarian, education or employment purposes mean.  A deferred action beneficiary with an approved I-130 or I-140, which has become current for green card processing, can conceivably apply for advance parole based on humanitarian purposes to apply for immigrant visa at the consular post overseas.   His or her departure under advance parole, if Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly applies, will not trigger the 10 year bar. If this person successfully comes back on an  immigrant visa to be granted permanent residence upon admission, query whether the holding will still apply.  After all, the BIA in Arrabally and Yerrabelly contemplated a return as a parolee and not as a permanent resident.  Yet, again, just as the BIA performed magic when interpreting “departure” to not apply to those leaving the US under advadnce parole, there is no reason for the USCIS to not stretch it to a scenario where the deferred action beneficiary will leave on advance parole, thus not triggering the 10 year bar, in order to return to the US as an immigrant.  This is clearly not the current position of the USCIS as articulated in its FAQ.  The purpose of our blog is to advance interpretations that would be favorable for DREAMers down the road.

On the other hand, Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly can be more readily applied to those who otherwise would not be able to adjust status if they made an entry without inspection but were immediate relatives of US citizens. Such people would not need to process an immigrant visa at a US consulate overseas if they could adjust status.  Unlike an adjustment of status applicant, a DACA applicant can file an application for deferred action even if he or she entered without inspection. If later, this applicant, now granted deferred action, married a US citizen, he or she could leave under advance parole and not trigger the 10 year bar. At the same time, he or she would have also been paroled back into the US, making him or her eligible to adjust status, which prior to the parole would not have been possible. This fact pattern clearly falls under the four corners of Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly as opposed to someone proceeding overseas under advance parole and returning as a permanent resident. Yet, we reiterate, at this point, it is not at all clear whether Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly will apply to deferred action beneficiaries who travel abroad, and they should seek the advice of competent legal counsel before they wish to apply for advance parole in order to travel.

While DACA is clearly not designed to create a pathway to permanent residence, Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly can facilitate this indirectly through independent I-130 or I-140 petitions that were filed on behalf of the deferred action beneficiary. Although only Congress can change the law, the President can find new ways to expand the relief available under current law. Our proposal would relieve the Administration from the burdens of extending deferred action every two years (assuming the program lasts for that long) once the beneficiary is granted permanent residence. After all, until Congress acts to reform our broken immigration system, it behooves us to be wildly creative, even to the extent of imagining that fairy tales might become reality, like what the BIA achieved in Matter of Arrabelly and Yerrabelly. Indeed, precisely because DACA is a remedial initiative, it deserves and should be granted the most generous administration infused with the central goal of remaining true to the reasons that inspired its creation. For this to happen, we turn to the wisdom of Albert Einstein:

When I examine myself and my methods of thought, I come to the conclusion that the gift of fantasy has meant more to me than any talent for abstract, positive thinking
All we have to do is dream!
Cyrus Mehta

Deferred Action: The Next Generation

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By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

President Obama at last came through with a bold memorandum on June 15, 2012, executed by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, granting deferred action to undocumented people. The Administration has always had authority to grant deferred action, which is a discretionary act not to prosecute or to deport a particular alien. While critics decry that Obama has circumvented Congress, the Administration has always had executive branch authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, including deferred action, which is an expression of limited enforcement resources in the administration of the immigration law. It makes no sense to deport undocumented children who lacked the intention to violate their status and who have been educated in the US, and who have the potential to enhance the US through their hard work, creativity and determination to succeed.

We have always advocated that the Administration has inherent authority within the INA to ameliorate the hardships caused to non-citizens as a result of an imperfect and broken immigration system. In Tyranny of Priority Dates, we argued that the Administration has the authority to  allow non-citizens who are beneficiaries of approved family (I-130) or employment-based (I-140) petitions affected by the crushing backlogs in the priority date system to remain in the US through the grant of parole under INA 212(d)(5) based on “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefits.” When the DREAM Act passed the House in 2010, but narrowly failed to garner the magic super majority of 60 in the Senate, we proposed that the President could also grant similar parole to DREAM children as well as deferred action in our blog, Keeping Hope Alive: President Obama Can Use His Executive Power Until Congress Passes The Dream Act.

The new memorandum directs the heads of USCIS, CBP and ICE to exercise prosecutorial discretion, and thus grant deferred action, to an individual who came to the United States under the age of 16, has continuously resided in the US for at least 5 years preceding the date of the memorandum and was present in the US on the date of the memorandum, and who is currently in school, or has graduated from school or obtained a general education certificate, or who is an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States. Moreover, this individual should not be above the age of thirty and should also not have been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise poses a threat to national security or public safety. This directive further applies to individuals in removal proceedings as well as those who have already obtained removal orders. The grant of deferred action also allows the non-citizen to apply for employment authorization pursuant to an existing regulation, 8 CFR § 274a(c)(14).

While this memorandum is indeed a giant step in providing relief to a class of immigrants who have been out of status for no fault of their own, we propose other incremental administrative steps so that such individuals, even after they have been granted deferred action and work authorization, can obtain permanent residence. We are mindful, as the accompanying FAQ to the memorandum acknowledges, that the grant of deferred action does not provide the individual with a pathway to permanent residence and “[o]nly the Congress, acting through its legislative authority, can confer the right to permanent lawful status.”  But just as people were skeptical about our ideas for administrative action when we first proposed them, some of which has come to fruition, we continue to propose further administrative steps that the President can take, which would not be violative of the separation of powers doctrine.

There are bound to be many who have been granted deferred action to also be on the pathway to permanent residence by being beneficiaries of approved I-130 or I-140 petitions. Unless one is being sponsored as an immediate relative, i.e. as a spouse, child or parent of a US citizen, and has also been admitted an inspected, filing an application for adjustment of status to permanent residence will not be possible for an individual who has failed to maintain a lawful status under INA § 245(a). Such individuals will have to depart the US to process their immigrant visas at a US consulate in their home countries. Although the grant of deferred action will stop unlawful presence from accruing, it does not erase any past unlawful presence. Thus, one who has accrued over one year of unlawful presence and departs the US in order to process for an immigrant visa will most likely face the 10 year bar under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). While some may be able to take advantage of the proposed provisional waiver rule, where one can apply in the US for a waiver before leaving the US, not all will be eligible under this new rule.  A case in point is someone who is sponsored by an employer under the employment-based second preference, and who may not even have a qualifying relative to apply for the waiver of the 10 year bar.

We propose that the USCIS extend the holding of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012) to beneficiaries of deferred action. In Arrabelly and Yerrabelly, the BIA held that an applicant for adjustment of status, who leaves the US pursuant to a grant of advance parole, has not effected a departure from the US in order to trigger the 10 year bar under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). If a beneficiary of deferred action is granted advance parole, this person’s trip outside the US under this advance parole ought not to be considered a departure. Such facts would square with Matter of Arrabelly and Yerrabelly if the individual returned back to the US under advance parole. However, here, the individual may likely return back on an immigrant visa and be admitted as a permanent resident. That might be hard to sell to the government – how can you apply for a visa at a consulate in a foreign country and still not leave USA? Still, this idea has merit as it is the initial “departure” under advance parole that would not be a trigger for the bar to reentry, not the subsequent admission as an immigrant. In the leaked July 2010 memorandum to USCIS Director Mayorkas, the suggestion is made that the USCIS “reexamine past interpretations of terms such as ‘departure’ and ‘seeking admission again’ within the context of unlawful presence and adjustment of status.” Using  Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly in the manner we propose seeks to do just that. Once again, as with the concept of parole, we seek to build on past innovation to achieve future gain.

As an alternative we propose, as we did in The Tyranny of Priority Dates, that the government, in addition to the grant of deferred action, also grants parole in place on a nunc pro tunc or retroactive basis under INA 212(d)(5).  For instance, the USCIS informally allows spouses of military personnel who would otherwise be unable to adjust under INA § 245(a) if they were neither “inspected and admitted or paroled” to apply for “parole in place.” The concept of parole in place was also proposed in the leaked memo. Interestingly, in this memo, a prime objective of granting parole in place was to avoid the need for consular processing of an immigrant visa application: “By granting PIP, USCIS can eliminate the need for qualified recipients to return to their home country for consular processing, particularly when doing so might trigger the bar to returning.”  This would only be the case, however, where the adjustment applicant is  married to a US citizen, or is the minor child or parent of a US citizen,  and need not be barred due to lack of an inspection or admission. Because we advocate a much wider extension of parole in place, the need for retroactivity, both for the parole and companion employment authorization becomes readily apparent. The use of parole in place, while not common, is certainly not without precedent and, as the leaked memo recites, has been expansively utilized to promote family unity among military dependents. For our purposes, “applicants for admission who entered the US as minors without inspection” were singled out as a class for whom parole in place was singularly suitable.

Upon such a grant of parole in place retroactively, non-immediate relatives who have not maintained status may also be able to adjust status.   Such a retroactive grant of parole, whether in the I-130 or I-140 context, would need to be accompanied by a retroactive grant of employment authorization in order to erase any prior unauthorized employment.  We acknowledge that it may be more problematic for the individual to be eligible for adjustment of status through an I-140 employment-based petition rather than an I-130 petition, since INA § 245(c)(7), requires an additional showing of a lawful nonimmigrant status, in the case of an employment-based petition under INA § 203(b).  Still,  the grant of nunc pro tunc parole will wipe out unlawful presence, and thus this individual can leave the US and apply for the immigrant visa in the US Consulate in his or her home country without the risk of  triggering the 3 or 10 year bar.

One conceptual difficulty is whether parole can be granted to an individual who is already admitted on a nonimmigrant visa but has overstayed. Since parole is not considered admission, it can be granted more readily to one who entered without inspection.  But this impediment can be overcome: It may be possible for the government to rescind the grant of admission, and instead, replace it with the grant parole under INA § 212(d)(5). As an example, an individual who was admitted in B-2 status and is the beneficiary of an I-130 petition but whose B-2 status has expired can be required to report to DHS, who can retroactively rescind the grant of admission in B-2 status and be retroactively granted parole.

There may be other obstacles for individuals in removal proceedings or with removal orders, but those too can be easily overcome. If the individual is in removal proceedings, if he or she is also eligible for deferred action, such removal proceedings can be terminated and he or she can also receive a grant of nunc pro tunc parole, thus rendering him eligible for adjustment of status in the event that there is an approved I-130 or I-140 petition. Even a person who already has a removal order can seek to reopen the removal order through a joint or consent motion with the government for the purposes of reopening and terminating proceedings, and this person too could potentially file an adjustment application, if he or she is the beneficiary of an I-130 upon being granted  nunc pro tunc parole, and the beneficiary likewise could travel overseas for consular processing without risking the 10 year bar.

We of course would welcome Congress to act and pass the DREAM Act, as well as Comprehensive Immigration Reform, so that this memorandum does not get reversed or discontinued in the event that a new Administration takes over from January 2013. However, until Congress does not act, the June 15, 2012 memo does provide welcome relief for young people, but it still leaves them in a limbo with only deferred action. The elephant in the room may be whether the USCIS has the capacity to deal with hundreds of thousands of requests for deferred action. In the absence of congressional action, the agency lacks the capacity to charge special fees for this purpose. Consequently,  all relevant federal agencies, including ICE and CBP, must willingly but swiftly reassign existing personnel now devoted to less urgent tasks so that the President’s initiative of last Friday does not become a dead letter. Our proposal for an additional grant of nunc pro tunc parole in place to individuals who have already been conferred deferred action will at least allow them to enter the regular immigration system and hope to adjust status to permanent residence, or consular process, and thus on the path to citizenship, should they become the beneficiaries of approved family or employment-based petitions. Again, as we noted earlier, and as we noted in Tyranny of Priority Dates, we are not asking for the executive branch to create new forms of status. We are only asking for the Executive to remove barriers to the ability of otherwise deserving applicants for permanent residents to take advantage of the existing system. We want to emphasize there is nothing in the INA that prevents the immediate adoption of our recommendations just as there was nothing in the INA that prevented last Friday’s memorandum. We also want to emphasize that I-130’s and I-140s will still be necessary. We do not want to create a new system, only to allow the old one to work more effectively. The future is ours to shape. For those who lack faith, we remind them of Tennyson’s injunction in Ulysses: “Come my friends, ‘tis not too late to seek a newer world.”