Tag Archive for: 3 and 10 year bars

The Uncertain Path of the D-3 Waiver for DACA Recipients under Biden’s New Immigration Initiative  

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On June 18, 2024, the Biden administration announced two new immigration initiatives aimed at keeping families together. The first is a “parole in place” program which will provide a pathway for undocumented spouses of U.S. citizens to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs). In order to be eligible, the noncitizen spouse must have entered the U.S. without admission or parole and hold no immigrant or nonimmigrant status, and “must – as of June 17, 2024 – have resided in the United States for 10 or more years and be legally married to a U.S. citizen, while satisfying all applicable legal requirements.” DHS will evaluate these applications on a case-by-case basis, and will afford approved applicants a three-year period in which to apply for permanent residence.

The other process will enable Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients to more easily obtain employment-based visas. The measure will allow “DACA recipients and other Dreamers, who have earned a degree at an accredited U.S. institution of higher education in the United States, and who have received an offer of employment from a U.S. employer in a field related to their degree, to more quickly receive work visas.” Although many details about this measure are still forthcoming, it appears to involve the expedited issuance of an INA § 212(d)(3) waiver (D-3), which waives many grounds of inadmissibility, including the 3 and 10 year bars that arise from unlawful presence. In a news release corresponding with the Biden administration’s announcement, the U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs stated: “As part of this initiative, the Department will clarify existing guidance to consular officers related to when they should consider recommending that DHS grant a waiver of ineligibility, where applicable… These clarifications will describe when consular officers should consider recommending that the Department of Homeland Security waive ineligibility for these applicants on an expedited basis, in conjunction with visa applications overseas.  However, the processing steps will remain the same.” The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) will also be updated to “encourage consular officers to consider recommending expedited review of waiver requests in conjunction with certain nonimmigrant visa applications overseas, consistent with existing Department regulations and guidance…This will result in certain individuals to potentially more quickly receive work visas if DHS approves a waiver of ineligibility.”

Although DACA recipients can at present apply for a D-3 waiver in order to obtain an employment-based nonimmigrant visa, this process is rarely used in practice. When a DACA recipient who has been unlawfully present in the United States for a lengthy period of time leaves the United States to apply for an employment-based visa at a U.S. consulate abroad, they are likely to trigger the 3- or 10-year bars pursuant to INA § 212(a)(9)(B).Under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) a person who is unlawfully present for more than 180 days but less than 1 year, and who voluntarily departs the US prior to the commencement of proceeding is inadmissible if they seek admission within 3 years from the date of departure. Under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) a person who has been unlawfully present for more than one year, and who again seeks admission within 10 years from the date of the departure is inadmissible.

Minors do not accrue unlawful presence under INA§ 212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I), so a DACA recipient who applied for and received DACA before the age of 18.5 years would not trigger the 3- or 10- year bars. Since the grant of DACA stops the accrual of unlawful presence, they would have accrued less than 180 days of unlawful presence. An individual who obtained DACA after the age of 18.5 years and before 19 would trigger only the 3- year bar, having accrued more than 180 days but less than one year of unlawful presence. DACA recipients who obtained the benefit after the age of 19 would have been unlawfully present in the U.S. for a year or more, and would face the 10-year bar. Individuals could enroll in the DACA program up until they reach age 31, and participation in the program was  highest among those who were well over 18, so many DACA recipients will unfortunately face the full 10-year bar.

The question of whether or not the waiver will be granted is also a purely discretionary determination made by a consular officer, and the waiver application can take months to be adjudicated. The Foreign Affairs Manual directs consular officers to “consider the following factors, among others, when deciding whether to recommend a waiver: The recency and seriousness of the activity or condition causing the applicant’s ineligibility; The reasons for the proposed travel to the United States; and The positive or negative effect, if any, of the planned travel on U.S. public interests. Whether there is a single, isolated incident or a pattern of misconduct; and Evidence of reformation or rehabilitation.”  Thus, DACA recipients, and their prospective employers, currently have little assurance that a D-3 waiver will be granted when they leave the country for consular processing. If the waiver is not granted, the DACA recipient could be stranded outside the U.S. for up to 10 years.

Importantly, an individual can typically only spend a limited amount of time in an employment-based nonimmigrant status – for an H-1B nonimmigrant the maximum is 6 years – so DACA recipients who obtain an employment-based visa such as an H-1B will also need to find a path to remain in the U.S. on a long-term basis, including being sponsored for permanent residence by their employer. Even if the DACA recipient has received the D-3 waiver, this waiver only waives the ground of inadmissibility for the temporary nonimmigrant admission. If the DACA recipient is sponsored for permanent residence, the bars at INA § 212(a)(9)(B) will continue to trigger if the applicant applies for adjustment of status or applies for an immigrant visa overseas. Hence, they will need to wait for 3 or 10 years before they can get admitted as lawful permanent residents. Under USCIS policy, the 3 and 10 year bars can be spent in the US, which we have extensively discussed in a prior blog. The question is how can one wait for 10 years in lawful nonimmigrant status in the US before they can apply for adjustment of status?

Many DACA recipients are natives and citizens of Mexico or South American countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, or El Salvador, so they are likely to be eligible to file an employment-based adjustment of status application much more quickly than a beneficiary from a backlogged country such as India or China. In the June 2024 Visa Bulletin, for example, the Final Action Date for the employment-based third preference category (EB-3) is November 22, 2022 for India and the “rest of world”, but for India it is August 22, 2012. However, §104(c)  the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21)  allows a beneficiary’s H-1B status to be extended for three years at a time if they are the beneficiary of an employment-based I-140 immigrant visa petition, and are eligible to adjust status but for backlogs, caused by per-country limitations, in the employment-based first (EB-1), second (EB-2), or third preference (EB-3) categories. The H-1B status can be extended every three years until the backlogs caused by the per country limitation clears.  Because the priority date is likely to become current far more quickly for former DACA recipient not born in India who are the beneficiaries of I-140 petitions, they will be at a disadvantage when it comes to obtaining H-1B extensions beyond the sixth year, as they need to spend 10 years in the US before they can overcome the 212(a)(9)(B) ground of inadmissibility, which could complicate the process of remaining in a valid nonimmigrant status while they wait to apply for adjustment of status. An H-1B worker can also obtain a one year H-1B extension under AC21 §106(a) if at least 365 days have elapsed since the filing of a labor certification with the DOL or an immigrant visa petition with USCIS. See 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D). However, noncitizens are precluded from availing of this extension if they do not file for adjustment of status within one year of visa availability. 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D)(10). DACA recipients waiting to overcome 212(a)(9)(B) inadmissibility are thus unlikely to benefit from this provision.

Some DACA recipients may opt for the L-1 nonimmigrant path if they spend one year abroad for a subsidiary, parent, or branch of their US employer in a qualifying executive, managerial or specialized knowledge capacity. However, beware, that unlike one in H-1B status who may be able to keep on applying for extensions under AC 21, the shelf life of the L-1A status is 7 years, and 5 years for the L-1B status, as AC21 does not apply to L-1s. One way to get around spending 10 years in the US to overcome 212(a)(9)(B) inadmissibility is if the applicant is eligible for a waiver under INA §212(a)(b)(b)(v), which is based on a showing of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative such as a spouse or parent is a US citizen or lawful permanent resident. If an applicant has such a qualifying relative, they need not wait out the entire 10 years and can waive the ground of inadmissibility.

In conclusion, obtaining the D-3 waiver only allows the DACA recipient who faces the 3 or10 year bar to be admitted into the US as a nonimmigrant. If the DACA recipient needs to obtain permanent residence, they must either wait it out for 3 or 10 years in a nonimmigrant status before they can get admitted as permanent residents, or they need to qualify for a second waiver under INA 212(a)(b)(b)(v). Most DACA recipients may be better off remaining in DACA status rather than exchanging it for H-1B nonimmigrant status. Once they are in H-1B nonimmigrant status, they will have to remain with the employer who sponsored them and will not be able to seek employment in the open market so readily. Of course, the calculus of giving up DACA in exchange for the H-1B nonimmigrant status may change if the Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court deem DACA unlawful, or if President Trump is reelected and yanks DACA. It remains to be seen whether DACA could survive rescission efforts by a future Trump administration. When upholding DACA in 2020 in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, the Supreme Court found that the “reliance interests” of DACA recipients, who have enrolled in college, embarked on careers, started businesses, purchased homes, and married and had children in reliance on the DACA program, must be taken into consideration when deciding the future of the program. This case was discussed at length in a prior blog.

 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

A Practical Guide to Spending the 3 and 10 Year Bars in the US

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

 On June 24, 2022, USCIS issued a Policy Alert on inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)  This provision states that a noncitizen was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year will be inadmissible to the United States for 3 years after departure or removal, while an individual who has accrued more than one year of unlawful presence will be barred for 10 years. The Policy alert, which is included in Volume 8 of the USCIS Policy Manual,  clarified that a noncitizen who seeks admission after the 3- or 10- year bar has expired “is not inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(9)(B) even if the noncitizen returned to the United States, with or without authorization, during the statutory 3-year or 10-year period.” Further, “a noncitizen’s location during the statutory 3- or 10-year period and the noncitizen’s manner of return to the United States during the statutory period are “irrelevant” for purposes of determining inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)”, the alert stated. USCIS stated that noncitizens whose applications were denied because they had entered, or remained in, the U.S. during the period of inadmissibility may be able to file Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion to request that their applications be reopened.

Whether noncitizens can spend the 3-and 10-year bars in the United States has long been a source of uncertainty. In a 2008 blog, we discussed this issue in the context of a July 14, 2006 letter from Robert Divine, former Chief Counsel of the USCIS, to attorneys David P. Berry and Ronald Y. Wada. See AILA Doc. No. 08082930. In the letter, Mr. Divine confirmed that the 3-year inadmissibility period continues to run even if the noncitizen subsequently returned to the US on parole under INA §212(d)(5). The letter included the caveat that a noncitizen who is unlawfully present in the U.S., leaves, and later attempts to reenter would be inadmissible and could trigger additional bars.

The guidance laid out in the new policy guidance applies most readily to a noncitizen who has been unlawfully present in the U.S. departs and reenters on a nonimmigrant visa along with a nonimmigrant waiver under INA §212(d)(3). Individuals who are subject to the 3- and 10-year bars could seek to be admitted in a nonimmigrant status such as H-1B or O-1 with a §212(d)(3) nonimmigrant waiver and spend the bars in the US. After spending the 3- or 10- year bar in the US, this individual would no longer be inadmissible and be eligible to adjust status to permanent residence.  Of course, those who have a qualifying relative can obtain an immigrant waiver under 212(a)(9)(5) by demonstrating extreme hardship to that relative and would not need to spend all the 3 or 10 years before they can adjust status to permanent residence. The new policy guidance truly comes to the rescue of those who do not have qualifying relatives as they can spend the 3- or 10-year bars in the US and no longer be inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(9)(B).

Take the example of a person who came to the US in B-2 status on January 1, 2020 and has remained in the US unlawfully long after the authorized stay ended on June 30, 2020. If this individual was offered a job in early 2022, got selected in the H-1B lottery and became the beneficiary of an H-1B visa petition with a start date of October 1, 2022, she would not be eligible to change status to H-1B on October 1, 2022 as she has been out of status. If she left the US to apply for an H-1B visa at a US Consulate, she would become subject to the 10-year bar and be denied the visa due to inadmissibility under INA §212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). However, she can request the US consul to recommend the nonimmigrant visa waiver under §212(d)(3). If the waiver is granted by the Admissibility Review Office within Customs and Border Protection, she can be admitted in H-1B status and be able to spend at least six years in H-1B status.

The standard for obtaining  a §212(d)(3) nonimmigrant waiver is quite broad. It does not require a showing of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative as one has to demonstrate to apply for the corresponding immigrant waiver under §212(a)(9)(v). In Matter of Hranka, 16 I&N Dec. 491, 492 (BIA 1978), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) explained the factors used to adjudicate a § 212(d)(3) waiver:

[T]here are essentially three factors which we weigh together.  The first is the risk of harm to society if the applicant is admitted.  The second is the seriousness of the applicant’s prior immigration law, or criminal law, violations, if any.  The third factor is the nature of the applicant’s reasons for wishing to enter the United States.

Matter of Hranka, 16 I&N Dec. at 492.

The BIA also clarified that “there is no requirement that the applicant’s reasons for wishing to enter the United States be ‘compelling.’”  Id.

Notwithstanding the broad standard set forth in Matter of Hranka, the waiver is still discretionary and can be easily refused by the Admissibility Review Office or not even be recommended by the US Consul. Individuals who have spent long periods unlawfully in the US and who leave, and then immediately request the waiver through the US Consulate can be denied in the exercise of discretion. Moreover, the chances are better when one is applying for an H-1B or L visa that clearly allows “dual intent”  as opposed to applying for an F-1 visa. In the latter instance, the US Consul can simply refuse the visa on the grounds that the applicant is presumed to be an intending immigrant under INA §214(b). H-1B and L visas are exempted from this presumption in §214(b). Even though an O visa is recognized as a “dual intent” visa under 8 CFR §214.2(o)(13), the recipient while being exempted from requiring a residence abroad must still return home at the end of the O-1 validity period. Therefore, even an O-1 visa applicant would be susceptible to a refusal under INA §214(b) when seeking a 212(d)(3) nonimmigrant waiver.

An individual who is subject to the 10-year bar and already in the United States in H-1B status can potentially wait the period out by getting one-year H-1B extensions beyond the sixth year under §106(a) of the American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act (AC 21). If this individual is born in India, she can become eligible for 3 year H-1B extensions under §104(c)  of AC 21.  As cautioned in our previous blog, though, one year extensions under AC 21 can potentially be denied under 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D)(10) if the individual has not filed his adjustment of status application within one year of the priority date becoming current, unless good cause is shown. USCIS has the discretion to excuse a failure to file an I-485 if the noncitizen establishes that the failure to apply was due to circumstances beyond his or her control. It is unclear whether USCIS might accept a good cause argument from an individual who wished to continue applying for H-1B extensions in order to spend the 10-year bar in the United States.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Judge Issues Nationwide Preliminary Injunction in Unlawful Presence Case: What Does the Injunction Mean for Current F, J, and M Nonimmigrants?

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Amani M. Abuhamra*

In a promising development for F, J, and M nonimmigrants battling unlawful presence policy, a federal district court in North Carolina has granted a preliminary injunction preventing USCIS from enforcing its problematic August 9, 2018 policy memo. The August 2018  Policy would render students in F, J and M status unlawfully present thus subjecting them to 3 and 10 year bars  from reentering the United States.

The May 3, 2019 Guilford College et al v. Mcaleenan et al opinion, issued by the Honorable Loretta C. Biggs, is an extraordinary nationwide injunction prohibiting USCIS and DHS from “enforcing the policy set forth in the August 2018 Policy Memorandum, in all its applications nationwide, pending resolution of this lawsuit.”

As previously discussed on our blog, the August 2018 Policy changed over 20 years of established practice by recalculating how ‘unlawful presence’ time is accrued for foreign students and exchange visitors. In doing so, USCIS blurred the line between established concepts of ‘unlawful presence’ and ‘unlawful status’, and instead made the two terms synonymous as it related to F, J, and M nonimmigrants.

Prior to the August 2018 Policy, unlawful presence time would not begin to accrue until the day, or day after, a formal finding was found that the nonimmigrant was out of status. In contrast, under the new policy nonimmigrants would begin accruing unlawful presence time the moment any violation of status occurred. Further, nonimmigrants would not receive any formal notice of a status violation, and any past violation that had been discovered would have begun accrual of unlawful presence. This drastic recalculation of unlawful presence time put many who would be unaware of any status violations at risk of being subject to 3-year or 10-year bars of admission should they accrue more than 180 days of unlawful presence. See INA §212(a)(9)(B)(i)&(II). Mistakes due to technicalities, human error, miscommunication, or ambiguity of rules would cause a nonimmigrant to fall out of status and accrue unlawful presence without their knowledge and without opportunity to cure the violation.

Plaintiffs in the Guilford College case sued DHS and USCIS alleging, among other things, that 1) USCIS had issued the August 2018 Policy in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for failure to observe the APA’s notice and comment procedures, and 2) the August 2018 Policy conflicted with statutory language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

The Court held that for the purposes of granting the Preliminary Injunction, the Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood to succeed on their challenges to the policy, and found that the Plaintiffs were “likely to suffer irreparable harm absent entry of a preliminary injunction.”

Promising decision for future litigation challenging USCIS policy memos

For immigration lawyers fighting harsh USCIS policies and denials of petitions on behalf of their clients, the possible ramifications of Judge Biggs Opinion and Order are promising.

The Court found the Plaintiffs likely to succeed in showing that the language, purpose, context, and effect of the USCIS policy rendered it a legislative rule. This is significant because “[f]or a legislative rule to be valid … it must have been promulgated in compliance with the APA’s notice and comment procedures [under U.S.C. § 553].” So, in failing to publish notice of its proposed policy change in the Federal Register, USCIS violated the APA, thus invalidating the policy.

This may open the door for future litigation challenging other USCIS policy memos issued without proper APA notice and comment procedure. Attorneys can now look to challenge other USCIS changes to policy that have legislative rule characteristics, and similarly subject them to challenge for failing to follow proper APA rulemaking procedure. These could include, for example, USCIS’s  October 23, 2017“Rescission of Guidance Regarding Deference to Prior Determinations of Eligibility in the Adjudication of Petitions for Extension of Nonimmigrant Status” and USCIS’s February 23, 2018 “Contracts and Itineraries Requirements for H-1B Petitions Involving Third-Party Worksites”. Both these policies, see blogs here and here, contradict existing regulations.  In fact, the February 23, 2018 policy requiring petitioners who place H-1B workers at third party sites to impossibly rigid itinerary and documentary requirements is being challenged in federal court. At a recent hearing on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgement, the judge sharply questioned the high rate of denials under this USCIS policy that plaintiffs allege was designed to kill the IT consulting industry business model.

Perhaps even more promising is the effect Judge Biggs decision will have on curtailing USCIS power to alter statutory construction by way of policy changes and promulgating regulations. The decision noted that based on the statutory text of the INA, the Court found it likely that unlawful presence does not begin when one becomes out of status. Therefore, the August 2018 Policy, in altering unlawful presence accrual to commence when one becomes out of status, most likely conflicts with the existing law and is invalid.

The Court’s decision on invalidating policy which conflicts with existing statute may be even more crucial for future challenges to USCIS policies. This is because without the ruling on statutory construction, the USCIS could essentially overcome a future policy challenge by simply engaging in notice and comment procedures beforehand. Attorney H. Ronald Klasko, who serves as co-counsel and immigration subject matter expert in the Guilford College litigation, thinks the Court’s decision instead makes it harder for USCIS to get around policy challenges, because “if the interpretation of unlawful presence embodied in [a] Memorandum conflicts with the INA as a matter of law, that defect could not be addressed even by properly promulgated regulations. Rather, it would require a statutory change from Congress.”

So what does the preliminary injunction mean for current F, J and M nonimmigrants and the immigration lawyers who advise them?

Though certainly a victory, there now exists some doubt and uncertainty regarding how much reliance can be placed on the Guilford College preliminary injunction. The nationwide injunction, which will prohibit enforcement of the unlawful presence policy by USCIS until the Court issues its final order, has left many unsure as to what the preliminary injunction means for currently at-risk nonimmigrants. Should the Court rule in favor of USCIS and the August 2018 Policy is reinstated, what would that mean for the nonimmigrants who were at risk of triggering bars to admission prior to the preliminary injunction? The following scenarios highlight this uncertainty:

Scenario 1: A PhD student on an F-1 visa travels out of the country after the May 3rd preliminary injunction is issued. Prior to the preliminary injunction, the student was at risk of triggering a 3-year-bar of admission for having accrued over 180 days of unlawful presence without his knowledge. This was due to a reporting mistake the school made in regards to his course load which caused him to inadvertently fall out of status. If the student returns to the country on an O-1 visa while the preliminary injunction is still in effect, and the Court then issues a final ruling upholding the August 2018 Policy shortly afterwards, will the student be found to be inadmissible under 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I)or(II)?

Scenario 2: A research scholar on a J-1 visa discovers she inadvertently violated her status months prior causing her to unknowingly accrue unlawful presence under the August 2018 Policy. Though she had not yet accrued 180 of unlawful presence when the preliminary injunction was ordered on May 3rd, she was close. Today the research scholar visits her attorney and informs him that tomorrow marks 180 days since she has fallen out of status. The Court has yet to issue its final ruling and the preliminary injunction is still in place. She is unsure whether she should leave the country tomorrow out of precaution of triggering a 3-year-bar of inadmissibility. She has a lot to lose if she were to travel today, and would like to remain in the country. She wants to know, should the Court lift the injunction in the near future, whether the days in which the government was enjoined from enforcing the policy are considered void from unlawful presence calculation, or whether the upheld 2018 August Policy is effective retroactively?

In scenarios like these, it is unclear how the government would rule. It may be difficult for attorneys to best advise their at-risk nonimmigrant clients due to this ambiguity. Leaving or not leaving the country during the period where the preliminary injunction is in effect should be carefully considered and discussed with clients, all options carefully weighed. It may be best to exercise abundant caution and leave not leave the US in Scenario 1 and leave the US in Scenario 2  Even if the Court lifts the preliminary injunction, it will at least order that the August 2018 Policy not be applicable while the preliminary injunction was in effect and takes effect prospectively. On the other hand, one can also be cautiously optimistic that the plaintiffs will prevail in their motion for summary judgment (expected in June 2019) and that the August 2018 Policy will effectively be rescinded by the Court. After all, a motion for preliminary injunction is only granted when there is a likelihood of success on the merits. There is also a risk that the Court of Appeals will overturn the lower court’s decision even if the plaintiffs prevail on the merits. Nevertheless, despite the risks, the Guilford College preliminary injunction is cause for celebration, and as Facebook’s founder Mark Zuckerberg once famously said, “The biggest risk is not taking any risk…”

(This blog is for informational purposes only, and should not be considered as a substitute for legal advice)

* Amani Abuhamra is pursuing her JD degree at Brooklyn Law School and is  currently an Extern at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

USCIS Finalizes Unlawful Presence Policy Putting F, J And M Nonimmigrants In Great Jeopardy

The USCIS finalized its unlawful presence policy for F, J and M nonimmigrants on August 9, 2018. The final policy makes no significant changes from the draft policy of May 10, 2018. My earlier blog noted the flaws in the draft policy, which persist in the final policy. The final policy incorrectly breaks down the distinction between violating status and being unlawfully present in the US. As of August 9, 2018, F, J and M nonimmigrants who have failed to maintain nonimmigrant status will start accruing unlawful presence.

Individuals who have accrued more than 180 days of unlawful presence during a single stay, and then depart, may be subject to 3-year or 10-year bars to admission, depending on how much unlawful presence they accrued before they departed the United States. See INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) & (II).  Individuals who have accrued a total period of more than one year of unlawful presence, whether in a single stay or during multiple stays in the United States, and who then reenter or attempt to reenter the United States without being admitted or paroled, are permanently inadmissible. See INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(1).

Prior to August 9, 2018,  foreign students (F nonimmigrants) and exchange visitors (J nonimmigrants) who were admitted for, or present in the United States in, Duration of Status started accruing unlawful presence on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigrant benefit or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first. F and J nonimmigrants, and foreign vocational students (M nonimmigrants), who were admitted until a specific date certain accrued unlawful presence on the day after their Form I-94 expired, on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigration benefit, or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first.

This will no longer be the case. Under the new policy effective August 9, 2018, any status violation will start the accrual of unlawful presence. The nonimmigrant will not be provided with any formal notice of a status violation, and any violation from the past that has been discovered would have already started the accrual of unlawful presence. According to the policy memo, the USCIS officer should consider information relating to the alien’s immigration history, including but not limited to:

  • Information contained in the systems available to USCIS;
  • Information contained in the alien’s record; and
  • Information obtained through a Request for Evidence (RFE) or Notice of Intent to Deny, if any.

The final policy purports to make one concession from the draft policy, which is that if a nonimmigrant in F, J or M nonimmigrant classification makes a timely filing for reinstatement of status, then unlawful presence will not accrue during the pendency of this request. In the case of students in F-1 status, a reinstatement application will be considered timely filed if the applicant has not been out of status for more than 5 months at the time of filing for a request for reinstatement under 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(16).  If the reinstatement request is approved, then the period of time an F-1 nonimmigrant was out of status prior to filing the application, along with the period of time during the pendency of the request, will not be counted as unlawful presence. If the reinstatement application is denied, the accrual of unlawful presence resumes on the day after the denial. Whether or not the application for reinstatement is timely filed, USCIS said, an F, J, or M nonimmigrant “whose application for reinstatement is ultimately approved will generally not accrue unlawful presence while out of status.”

USCIS also noted that the Department of State (DOS) administers the J-1 exchange visitor program, to include reinstatement requests. If DOS approves the reinstatement application of a J nonimmigrant, “the individual will generally not accrue unlawful presence from the time the J nonimmigrant fell out of status from the time he or she was reinstated,” USCIS said.

Unfortunately, most students may never know that they fell out of status until it is too late and they may never have an opportunity to file for reinstatement. Students will also likely be found to have violated status if they pursued practical training that is perceived as not being consistent with the regulations.

Esteemed colleague and immigration law expert Stephen Yale-Loehr has compiled a list of 50 examples how an international student might inadvertently or unknowingly fall out of status and start to accrue unlawful presence under the new guidance. Many of these examples arise from mistakes by the school.  For instance, a designated school officer (DSO) may mistakenly complete a record, which will indicate to a USCIS officer that the student has remained in the United States beyond the end date of the program, and may have also worked on campus in violation of F-1 status. Status violations can also result from inadvertent miscommunications between school officials. An undergraduate student receives permission from an academic advisor (but not the DSO) to drop a course. The student is now registered for 11 rather than 12 semester credit hours. Later, the USCIS deems her to be in violation of status and accruing unlawful presence.

The USCIS has already begun to lay traps in order to nab students who may have unwittingly violated status. Recent RFEs issued after the filing of a change of status request from F-1 to H-1B require a student to meticulously demonstrate that he or she maintained status during post-completion practical training, including proving that the student was not unemployed for more than the requisite amount of time. The student must also prove that the employment, including an unpaid internship, was related to the major field of study.  Here is one example inquiring whether a student maintained status during a routine period of optional practical training:

F-1 OPT: Students engaging in initial F-1 post-completion Optional Practical Training (OPT) may not accrue an aggregate of more than 90 days off unemployment during the initial post-completion OPT period. Students granted the 17-month OPT extension may not accrue an aggregate of more than 120 days of unemployment during the total OPT period including any initial OPT and the 17-month OPT extension. Students granted the 24-month OPT extension may not accrue an aggregate of more than 150 days of unemployment during the total OPT period including any initial OPT and the 24-month OPT extension. Further, students engaging in F-1 post-completion must engage in at least 20 hours or more per week of employment that is directly related to the student’s U.S. major of study. Lastly, unpaid internships may meet the OPT employment requirements if the internship is directly related to the student’s U.S. major of study and the internship complies with all labor laws. Please provide evidence that the beneficiary maintained the beneficiary’s F-1 status during post-completion OPT. Evidence may include but is not limited to the following:

-A list of all employers the beneficiary has worked for under post-completion OPT and the periods the beneficiary worked for those employers;

-Copies of all pay records/stubs for the beneficiary from the starting date of post-completion OPT to the present time; and

-Evidence that the beneficiary worked at least 20 hours or more per week in a position is directly related to the beneficiary’s U.S. major of study.

Similarly, maintaining status through Curricular Practical Training (CPT) is frequently challenged in RFEs by asking for evidence that the CPT was an integral part of the beneficiary’s degree program. The regulation at 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(1)(i) leaves undefined “curricular practical training program that is an integral part of an established curriculum” thus leaving it open for a subjective interpretation.  Also, where the CPT commenced immediately upon the student’s enrolment in the program, the USCIS questions whether immediate participation in CPT was required for the beneficiary’s studies.

A student can also be found to have violated status due to an ambiguity in the rules providing for the maximum amount of time in practical training. 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10) provides that a student may be authorized a total of 12 months of practical training, and becomes eligible for another 12 months when the student changes to a higher educational level. 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i) further provides that “students who have received one year or more of full time curricular practical training are ineligible for post-completion academic training.” This could be interpreted to mean that a student can receive more than one year of CPT, and such CPT is routinely granted by DSOs through the SEVIS system that is administered by ICE. But USCIS is now interpreting this to mean that the total time that a student is entitled in any sort of practical training is 12 months even though ICE, its sister agency, authorized more than 12 months of CPT. USCIS is disregarding the suggestion in 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i) that a student may be entitled to more than 12 months of CPT.

Upon receiving such an RFE, it is important to submit evidence to overcome USCIS’s doubts. Still, it may be difficult to challenge USCIS’s interpretation that the regulation at 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10) only authorizes a total of 12 months of practical training, even though 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i) appears to suggest that CPT can be granted in excess of 1 year. It may also be difficult to demonstrate to the USCIS’s satisfaction that the CPT was an integral part of an established curriculum. If the request for a change of status is not granted, the F-1 nonimmigrant would have started accruing unlawful presence as of August 9, 2018. In the event of the student departing later than February 5, 2020, he or she will be barred from entering the US for 3 years. After February 5, 2020, there will be no such grace period, and prior status violations that were in excess of 180 days will result in 3 year or 10 year bars to reentry upon the student departing the United States. The student may not be able to change or adjust status in the United States, and thus will be caught in a federally imposed Catch-22 situation.

The unlawful presence policy compounds the plight of the nonimmigrant who may also receive a Notice to Appear and be placed in removal proceedings under yet another USCIS policy designed to make life more difficult for law abiding nonimmigrants. Some are deciding to withdraw the request for change of status, upon receiving difficult to overcome RFEs, and leave the United States, prior to February 5, 2020, so that they can process their H-1B visas at a US consulate abroad. While such a strategy may allow the applicant to escape being issued a Notice to Appear, it could cause issues at the US consulate where a consul may still want the applicant to justify whether the CPT program was bona fide. On the other hand, if the applicant is placed in removal proceedings, and if voluntary departure is issued by an Immigration Judge prior to the accrual of unlawful presence of one year or more, then there is an escape hatch pursuant to INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). The 3 year bar does not apply to those who departed after the commencement of proceedings and before the accrual of 1 year of unlawful presence (as there is explicit language to this effect in the provision). If the voluntary departure order is issued after 1 year of unlawful presence,  then the ten-year bar would trigger under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) would apply. There is no escape hatch to the 10 year bar as there is to the 3 year bar whilst in removal proceedings. Further ethical and strategic considerations regarding representing beneficiaries of denied requests in removal proceedings can be found in my blog here.

The final policy will not just cause havoc to nonimmigrants snared with technical or perceived violations of status, but schools will also face liability for errors by DSOs. Challenging the policy in federal court is indeed the need of the hour, and there is an urgent need for universities, hospitals and research institutions to come forward as plaintiffs! The 3 and 10 year bars, or the permanent bar under INA § 212(a)(9)C), are extremely draconian and should only be triggered when the nonimmigrant goes beyond a date certain expiration date. This is consistent with the statutory definition of unlawful presence under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(ii), which provides:

“…an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.

The new policy blurs the difference between being out of status and unlawfully present, and thus violates INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(ii). If the USCIS wanted to so radically change its prior interpretation of unlawful presence for F, J and M nonimmigrants, it ought to have promulgated a rule through a more formal notice and comment under the Administrative Procedure Act. Finally, the policy violates the due process rights of these nonimmigrants as it imposes draconian penalties, 3 and 10 year bars, for status violations for which they never received formal warning and notice. All these are ripe grounds, among many others, for a successful challenge to this flawed policy in federal court!

 

USCIS Improperly Blurs Distinction Between Violation of Status and Unlawful Presence for F, J and M Nonimmigrants

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued a policy memorandum on May 10, 2018, “Accrual of Unlawful Presence and F, J, and M Nonimmigrants.” The memo abruptly revises previous policy guidance in the USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual relating to this issue. The new guidance is effective August 9, 2018, and after reading this blog, it is hoped that readers are sufficiently shocked and motivated to submit comments as the radical departure from previous policy will jeopardize the ability of many nonimmigrants, mainly foreign students, from returning to the United States for unwitting or inadvertent status violations.

There has always been a strict distinction between violating status and being unlawfully present in the United States. One can be in violation of status without being unlawfully present. Even if an F, J and M student dropped out of school or engaged in unauthorized work, he or she would be considered to have been in violation of status but not accruing unlawful presence. This is because an F, M and J nonimmigrant is usually admitted for a Duration of Status (D/S) rather than up to a certain date. An F, M or J can maintain status so long as they remain enrolled in the educational institution or participate in activities pursuant to that status, which is why they are admitted under D/S.  On the other hand, one who is the beneficiary of an approved H-1B or L nonimmigrant petition is admitted only up to the validity date of the petition. F, M and J nonimmigrants are not beneficiaries of prior approved petitions filed by sponsors.

The new policy states various ways in which F, J, and M nonimmigrants and their dependents begin accruing unlawful presence. For example, F, J, and M nonimmigrants who failed to maintain nonimmigrant status before August 9, 2018, will start accruing unlawful presence based on that failure on August 9, 2018, unless the nonimmigrant had already started accruing unlawful presence based on several scenarios under the prior policy discussed below.

Individuals who have accrued more than 180 days of unlawful presence during a single stay, and then depart, may be subject to 3-year or 10-year bars to admission, depending on how much unlawful presence they accrued before they departed the United States. See INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) & (II).  Individuals who have accrued a total period of more than one year of unlawful presence, whether in a single stay or during multiple stays in the United States, and who then reenter or attempt to reenter the United States without being admitted or paroled, are permanently inadmissible. See INA 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(1).

The new policy supersedes existing policy, which is that foreign students (F nonimmigrants) and exchange visitors (J nonimmigrants) who were admitted for, or present in the United States in, Duration of Status started accruing unlawful presence on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigrant benefit or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first. F and J nonimmigrants, and foreign vocational students (M nonimmigrants), who were admitted until a specific date certain accrued unlawful presence on the day after their Form I-94 expired, on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigration benefit, or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first.

By contrast, one admitted under an approved H-1B or L visa petition up to a certain date starts accruing unlawful presence after remaining beyond that date while a student who was admitted under D/S did not unless there was a violation of status finding by the USCIS or by an immigration judge. This holds true even with respect to a nonimmigrant admitted under a date certain visa. If the H-1B or L nonimmigrant violates status during the validity period of the admission, he or she will be in violation of status but will not accrue unlawful presence unless there is a formal finding by the USICS or an immigration judge.

The prior policy made more sense, and maintained the important distinction between maintenance of status and lawful or unlawful presence. The 3 and 10 year bars, or the permanent bar, are extremely draconian and should only be triggered when the nonimmigrant goes beyond a date certain expiration date. This is consistent with the statutory definition of unlawful presence under 212(a)(9)(B)(ii), which provides:

“….an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled

The new policy blurs the difference between being out of status and unlawfully present. Unlawful presence ought to only trigger when one goes beyond an expiration date and not when there is a contestable violation of status. If a student in F status is in violation of that status, he or she can be placed in removal proceeding and may contest the allegation in the proceeding. If the Immigration Judge orders the person removed based on the violation, then the unlawful presence period may commence upon the order. Similarly, when one who is in F status applies for a change of status, and the USCIS finds that the applicant violated status, which the applicant may have been able to contest,  unlawful presence may commence after such a finding.

Under the new policy, a nonimmigrant in F, J or M status may have unwittingly violated that status by not pursuing a full course of study or engaging in an unauthorized activity, and may never get notice of it until much later. Even F-1 students in post-completion practical training could potentially be deemed later to have engaged in unauthorized activity, such as not working in an area consistent with their field of study or a STEM trainee being placed at a third party client site, which USCIS has without notice abruptly disfavored,   or if a school’s curricular practical training does not meet the USCIS’s subjective interpretation of whether the school was in compliance when it authorized such training.   In the meantime, this person would have started accruing unlawful presence and triggered the 10 year bar to reentry upon departing the United States. The dependent spouse would also unfairly accrue unlawful presence as a result of a status violation by the principal spouse. This individual may never get a chance to contest the violation of status after the fact. Unlawful presence should only trigger when there is clear notice of remaining beyond an expiration date of authorized stay in the United States and not when there is a contestable allegation of violation of status. An F, J or M nonimmigrant is now in a worse off position than say an H-1B nonimmigrant admitted under a date certain validity period. A violation of status by the H-1B nonimmigrant during the period of authorized stay would not trigger unlawful presence.  Even after 9/11, when immigration policies concerning students were tightened, we did not see such a cynical change in policy for students as now under the Trump administration where they may not know in time of a status violation only to later realize they have unwittingly accrued unlawful presence triggering the 10 year bar.

This is my preliminary reaction to the new unlawful presence policy relating to F, M and J nonimmigrants. There will be many other good arguments that will be developed and interested persons, along with those who will be potentially affected by 3 and 10 year bars,  are strongly urged to send in comments before June 11, 2018. The memo will take effect on August 9, 2018, but the abrupt change in policy without any proper rationale or justification also potentially makes it ripe for litigation.

Expansion of the Provisional Waiver: Good News, But Could Be Better

On July 29, 2016, USCIS published in the Federal Register the final version of a previously-proposed rule expanding the provisional waiver program.  The new rule, Expansion of Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,244, was effective August 29, 2016, so the newly expanded program is now available.

The provisional waiver program, which first began in 2013 as discussed in a previous post by this author, pertains to certain applicants for an immigrant visa who will be inadmissible under INA §212(a)(9)(B) for three or ten years following their departure from the United States due to their previous unlawful presence in the United States of more than 180 days or at least one year—who face the so-called three-year bar or ten-year bar.  These applicants, under the provisional waiver program, can use Form I-601A to apply for and (provisionally) receive a waiver of inadmissibility under INA §212(a)(9)(B)(v), based on a showing of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative, before departing the United States to apply for an immigrant visa.  This is in contrast to the usual system of applying for a waiver on Form I-601, which in the immigrant-visa context is only possible after already leaving the United States and having one’s immigrant visa interview.

The most notable change effected by the new provisional waiver rule is a significant expansion of the set of those eligible to use the provisional waiver process.  Previously, the provisional waiver was only available to beneficiaries of a visa petition filed by an immediate relative, that is, a petition filed by a U.S. citizen spouse, son or daughter over age 21, or parent in the case of a beneficiary under 21.  It was also only available if the qualifying relative for the §212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver was a U.S. citizen, even though the statute allows a §212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver to be granted based on a showing of extreme hardship to a spouse or parent who is either a U.S. citizen or a Lawful Permanent Resident.

Under the new rule, on the other hand, the provisional waiver can be sought be anyone with a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident spouse or parent to whom extreme hardship is sought to be shown, and this is so independent of the basis that qualifies the applicant to apply for an immigrant visa in the first place.  For applicants who meet the other requirements for a provisional waiver, the new rule only requires that the applicant

Has a case pending with the Department of State, based on:

(A) An approved immigrant visa petition, for which the Department of State immigrant visa processing fee has been paid; or

(B) Selection by the Department of State to participate in the Diversity Visa Program under section 203(c) of the Act for the fiscal year for which the alien registered.

8 C.F.R. §212.7(e)(3)(iv) (2016).  It no longer matters whether the petition is an immediate-relative petition, a family-based preference petition, or an employment-based preference petition, and even winners of the diversity-visa lottery can make use of the provisional waiver program if they have a qualifying relative.

While the main text of the new rule arguably does not make clear whether this expansion includes derivative beneficiaries of preference petitions (who have a case based on accompanying or following-to-join a petition beneficiary rather than based on their own petition), several clues in the preamble to the rule strongly imply that it does.  The preamble to the new rule describes the proposed rule as having “proposed to expand the class of individuals who may be eligible for provisional waivers beyond certain immediate relatives of U.S. citizens to all statutorily eligible individuals regardless of their immigrant visa classification.”  81 Fed. Reg. at 50,245.  The preamble also describes “inclusion of derivative spouses and children” as a topic on which DHS received no comments.  Id. at 50,248.  Finally, and most clearly, the preamble says of a redesign of the Form I-601A that “DHS agrees with the need to collect additional information, as suggested by the commenters, in light of this final rule’s extension of eligibility for the provisional waiver to spouses and children who accompany or follow to join principal immigrants.”  Id. at 50,272.  Thus, it strongly appears that the rule’s reference to having a “case pending with the Department of State, based on . . . An approved immigrant visa petition,” 8 C.F.R. §212.7(e)(3)(iv)(A), is not restricted to instances in which the case pending with the Department of State is based on an approved immigrant visa petition for the applicant him- or herself.  The pending case may, rather, be based on an approved immigrant visa petition for the applicant’s spouse or parent, as well.  (Children will relatively rarely need to make use of a provisional waiver, since they are exempt from accruing unlawful presence for §212(a)(9)(B) purposes until age 18 pursuant to INA §212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I), but there will be some cases of unmarried derivative beneficiaries over the age of 18-and-a-half whose actual age or adjusted age under the Child Status Protection Act is under 21 and who therefore still qualify as children for purposes of accompanying or following-to-join their parent.)

Another expansion of the program relates to applicants who might conceivably face some other ground of inadmissibility.  The “reason to believe” standard regarding other potential grounds of inadmissibility, which had caused much confusion in the past, has been eliminated. 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,253-50,254, 50,262.  DHS will no longer deny a provisional waiver based on mere “reason to believe” that some other ground of inadmissibility besides INA §212(a)(9)(B) might apply.  However, 8 C.F.R. §212.7(e)(14)(i) will continue to provide that if some other ground of inadmissibility is found by DOS to exist at the time of the visa interview, the provisional waiver will automatically be revoked, and the applicant will need to seek a regular waiver of the unlawful-presence inadmissibility along a waiver of the other ground of inadmissibility (if a waiver of the other ground of inadmissibility is even available).  Thus, it will be crucial for applicants and their attorneys to ensure as best they can, before a provisional waiver applicant departs the United States for a visa interview, that no other grounds of inadmissibility will be found to exist.

Another expansion of the program relates to removal orders.  The bar on applications for provisional waiver by individuals in active removal proceedings that have not been administratively closed remains, but the bar on applications for those facing final removal, deportation, or exclusion orders has been modified.  81 Fed Reg. at 50,262.  Pursuant to new 8 C.F.R. §212.7(e)(4)(iv), such individuals with a final order can seek a provisional waiver if they have previously obtained permission to reapply for admission through an approved Form I-212 under 8 C.F.R. §212.2(j).  They cannot file the I-601A and I-212 concurrently, as DHS believes this would introduce procedural complications, related principally to the appealability of a denied I-212, that would undermine the efficiency gains sought from the provisional waiver.  Rather, individuals subject to a final order can only proceed with the I-601A application for provisional waiver after the Form I-212 has already been approved.  81 Fed. Reg. at 50,256, 50,259, 50,262.

Individuals subject to a voluntary departure period, however, still cannot apply for a provisional waiver while that voluntary departure period is in effect.  81 Fed Reg. at 50,256-50,257.  These individuals are considered by DHS as analogous to those still in removal proceedings, and then become ineligible at the conclusion of their voluntary departure period based on the alternative removal order which has taken effect.  However, it appears that one who overstays a voluntary departure period (and thus activates the alternative removal order) could theoretically apply for advance permission to reapply for admission under 8 C.F.R. §212.2(j), and then seek a provisional waiver if advance permission to reapply were granted—although there would be a significant risk that either or both of these applications would be denied in the exercise of discretion.  Strictly speaking, neither permission to reapply under INA §212(a)(9)(A)(iii) nor a waiver of inadmissibility under INA §212(a)(9)(B)(v) are covered by the ten-year bar on many discretionary benefits that results pursuant to INA §240B(d)(1)(B) when one fails to timely depart in compliance with a voluntary departure order, but it is unlikely that DHS would look favorably upon an overstay of voluntary departure followed soon thereafter by such applications.

The new rule also clarifies the circumstances under which reinstatement of a removal order will prevent application for a provisional waiver.  Mere eligibility for reinstatement is not sufficient.  Rather, a provisional waiver will be barred only if “CBP or ICE, after service of notice under 8 CFR 241.8, has reinstated a prior order of removal under section 241(a)(5) of the [INA], either before the filing of the provisional unlawful presence waiver application or while the provisional unlawful presence waiver application is pending.”  8 C.F.R. §212.7(e)(4)(v) (2016).  Of course, the fact that the bar extends to reinstatement while a provisional waiver application is pending does make it quite risky for one subject to reinstatement to file such an application.

Another way in which the new rule expands the pool of those eligible for a provisional waiver is by eliminating the previous prohibition on grants of provisional waivers to anyone for whom DOS had acted before January 2013 to schedule a visa interview.  81 Fed. Reg. at 50,254.  A pending immigrant visa case can qualify for a provisional waiver application regardless of when it commenced, so long as registration under the approved petition has not been terminated under INA 203(g).

DHS has not, however, expanded the provisional-waiver program in all of the ways that one might have hoped.  One notable omission is the refusal to expand the program to encompass other grounds of inadmissibility for which a waiver can be sought on Form I-601, such as inadmissibility due to past fraud under INA §212(a)(6)(C)(i) that can be waived under INA §212(i), or inadmissibility due to past smuggling under INA §212(a)(6)(E) that can be waived under INA §212(d)(11) when only one’s spouse, parent, son or daughter was smuggled.  No matter how sympathetic the case, a visa applicant who smuggled his or her own child across the border, or came to the United States years ago on a false passport, will not be eligible for a provisional waiver.  The provisional waiver remains available only to one who “Upon departure, would be inadmissible only under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) of the Act at the time of the immigrant visa interview.”  8 C.F.R. §212.7(e)(3)(iii) (2016).

The preamble to the final rule explains DHS’s reasons for refusing this sort of expansion with the following cryptic language:

Expanding the provisional waiver process to other grounds of inadmissibility would introduce additional complexity and inefficiencies into the immigrant visa process, create potential backlogs, and likely delay and adversely affect the processing of immigrant visas by DOS. Furthermore, USCIS generally assesses waiver applications for inadmissibility due to fraud, misrepresentation, or criminal history through an in-person interview at a USCIS field office. Because DOS already conducts a thorough in-person interview as part of the immigrant visa process, DHS believes that this type of review would be unnecessarily duplicative of DOS’s efforts.

81 Fed Reg. at 50,253.  At least in cases where inadmissibility is conceded and is straightforwardly subject to waiver – say, where a past entry had been with a photo-substituted foreign passport, or where one’s own child had been smuggled into the United States – it is not clear why waiving such inadmissibility would necessarily be more complex or duplicative than waiving inadmissibility due to past unlawful presence.

The genius of the provisional waiver, in its original form and its expanded form, is that it helps ensure family unity and avoid the perverse scenario in which U.S. citizens and LPRs must be separated from their relatives for an extended period of time and suffer the precise extreme hardship that an ultimately-granted waiver is designed to prevent.  This scenario is just as perverse when the inadmissibility being waived results from having smuggled one’s own spouse or child into the United States, or previously entered by fraud (but not in a provable way enabling adjustment of status as an immediate relative), as when it results from prior unlawful presence.

Unnecessary separation leading to extreme hardship could be reduced even further if consular officials of the Department of State, in connection with an approved provisional waiver, were willing to provide an indication of their views on any other potential grounds of inadmissibility before an applicant departed from the United States.  This is not consistent with current Department of State practice, but there seems no statutory bar to it if the governing regulations were amended appropriately.  Under the “pre-examination” procedure that was in place prior to the creation of adjustment of status, pursuant for example to 8 C.F.R. §142.9(b) (1943), consuls did provide written assurances regarding the sufficiency of an applicant’s documents, though a personal interview was still ultimately required.  The same sort of procedure could be put into place for provisional waivers: an applicant could submit a written record of conviction for a crime or written account of past actions thought to potentially constitute fraud or smuggling, and be advised in advance whether, if found to be credible, he or she would be denied a visa due to inadmissibility based on such a ground.  Any legal argument regarding the applicant’s potential inadmissibility on these bases could thus take place while the applicant was still in the United States, again avoiding the necessity of prolonged separation from qualifying relatives.

While the recent expansion of the provisional waiver is to be commended, including other waiveable grounds of inadmissibility, and allowing for definitive determinations regarding other grounds of inadmissibility before an applicant’s departure from the United States, would have made the program still better.  Perhaps these issues can be revisited in a future round of rulemaking.

Please Help Me: I Have Just Found Out That My I-94 Has Expired!

Mark Thomas (not the actual name of any client, of course) is suddenly living a nightmare. He has just discovered that he has remained in the U.S. well after the expiration date of the Form I-94 issued to him the last time he entered the U.S. in H-1B status. His employer has informed him that he might be out of status and he wants to terminate his employment because he thinks Mark is no longer eligible to work in the U.S. Mark’s first desperate instinct is to get on the next international flight to anywhere and then re-enter the U.S. to receive a new I-94. However, his attorney advises him that this is too risky and warns Mark – leave and he could be barred from re-entering the U.S. for years! Mark Thomas feels hopelessly stuck.

Every foreign national who has visited the U.S. whether for business or pleasure, is familiar with the all-important Form I-94. The I-94 is the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Arrival/Departure record. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issues the I-94 to document a foreign national’s admission into the U.S.  whether the individual is admitted as a nonimmigrant or is the process of adjusting status in the U.S.   U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) also issue the I-94 to foreign nationals who are extending their nonimmigrant status or changing from one nonimmigrant status to another in the U.S. This I-94 appears at the bottom of USCIS’ Form I-797A, Approval Notice indicating USCIS’ approval of the petition or application to extend or change the foreign national’s nonimmigrant status in the U.S.

Previously, whenever a nonimmigrant arrived in the U.S. by air or sea, he or she usually filled out a white arrival/departure record – the I‑94 (or green I-94W for foreign nationals entering on a visa waiver) – and presented it to the port’s CBP officer. The officer would then tear off the bottom portion of the form and stamp it to indicate the alien’s nonimmigrant status (i.e. B-2, L-1A, H-1B, etc.) and the expiration date of the alien’s authorized period of stay.  The I-94 was then stapled to a page of the alien’s passport, and upon departure, the alien had to turn in the I-94 at the port of departure as a record of timely departure.

CBP has now automated the I-94 process for all foreign nationals applying for admission at U.S. ports of entry. Air and sea travelers no longer need to complete the paper I-94 (or I-94W). CBP will still issue a paper I-94 at land border ports of entry and also to certain classes of aliens such as refugees and at other times CBP deems the paper I-94 to be appropriate. When issuing the electronic I-94, the CBP officer will stamp the foreign national’s passport with an admission stamp that indicates the class of admission; the date of admission and the admitted until date. Now, foreign nationals who need to present their I-94s as proof of their lawful status to employers, schools/universities or government agencies can access their CBP arrival/departure record information online at www.cbp.gov/I94.

Remaining in the U.S. beyond the period of authorized stay as granted on the I-94 may cause the foreign national to be out of status and unlawfully present in the U.S. Staying beyond the period authorized is a violation of U.S. immigration laws and may result in the foreign national being barred from reentering the U.S. in the future. More specifically, remaining in the U.S. for more than 180 days beyond the I-94 expiration date could cause the foreign national to be barred from reentering the U.S. for a period of three years and staying for more than one year beyond the I-94 expiration date could cause the foreign national to be barred from reentering the U.S. for a period of 10 years.

Unfortunately, many foreign nationals remain unaware of the importance of the I-94. Oftentimes, foreign nationals are confused as to which document governs their stay in the U.S. There could be one expiration date on the nonimmigrant visa stamped in their passport; another expiration date on the I-94 issued on Form I-797 by USCIS and yet another expiration date on the I-94 issued by CBP upon their last entry into the U.S. In some cases, foreign nationals and their employers can neglect to note the I-94’s expiration date and the foreign national could inadvertently remain in the U.S. well beyond the authorized period of stay possibly in violation of U.S. immigration laws. This is exactly what happened to Mark Thomas.

Mark is a national of Bermuda, who resides in Chicago, Illinois. Mark last entered the U.S. through Newark Airport in New Jersey on August 15, 2012 and presented his H-1B visa stamp valid until September 30, 2012 and his Form I-797, H-1B Approval Notice issued by USCIS indicating that his H-1B status in the U.S. had last been extended from January 1, 2012 until March 10, 2014. The Form I-797 bore an I-94 card on the bottom indicating an expiration date of March 10, 2014. At the airport, the CBP officer issued Mark an I-94 valid only until February 15, 2013, the same expiration date as Mark’s passport.

Under 8 CFR 214.1(a)(3)(i), any foreign national who applies for admission to the U.S. must present a valid passport and valid nonimmigrant visa unless either or both documents have been waived. The foreign national’s passport must be valid for a minimum of six months from the expiration date of the contemplated period of stay.  While the regulation requires the presentation of a passport with such validity dates, there is nothing mandating the DHS to grant the I-94 till the expiration date of the passport. Some countries have agreements with the U.S. whereby their passports are recognized as valid for return to the country concerned for a period of six months beyond the expiration date specified in the passport. The effect of these agreements is to extend the period of validity of the passport for six months beyond the expiration date appearing on the face of the document. The issue is discussed at 9 FAM 41.104 N2. The list of countries that extend passport validity for an additional six months after expiration is at 9 FAM 41.104 Exhibit I.

Mark presented CBP with a passport valid for at least six months but not valid for the full H-1B validity period indicated on the Form I-797A, Approval Notice. As a national of Bermuda, Mark’s passport ought to have been considered valid until August 15, 2013, six months beyond the expiration date listed in his passport. CBP issued Mark an I-94 with the same expiration date as the expiration date listed in his passport because, although the regulations do not mandate this, DHS appears to interpret “contemplated period of stay” in the regulation to correspond to the duration of the admission on the I-94. It appears that DHS does not want to grant a period of admission extending beyond the point that is six months prior to the actual expiration of the passport to line up with the regulatory requirement that the actual expiration date of the passport be six months past the expiration of the contemplated period of stay. Mark is realizing his problem now. What can Mark do?

Had Mark taken immediate note of his I-94 expiration date upon his entry in August 2012, Mark could have first sought to obtain an extension of his passport as soon as possible. Then, Mark or his attorney could have contacted the local CBP Deferred Inspection Site in Chicago where Mark lives or at Mark’s actual port of entry at Newark Airport to request that the I-94 expiration date be corrected to correspond with the end date of the I-94 issued by USCIS on Form I-797. This may or may not have been successful as it appears to depend on the particular CBP Deferred Inspection Site.  For instance, some CBP sites take the position that they can only correct this I-94 within 30 days of admission. Other CBP sites will not correct this I-94. And other CBP sites take the position that this I-94 does not even need to be corrected as I-94 on the Form I-797 governs.

If CBP refused to correct the I-94, Mark could have taken a quick trip outside the U.S. prior to February 15, 2013. If he re-entered the U.S. on a valid H-1B visa and he presented his Form I-797, H-1B Approval Notice valid until March 10, 2014 and his newly extended passport, CBP would have issued him an I-94 valid until March 10, 2014. If Mark was unable to travel, his employer could also have filed an H-1B petition for extension with the USCIS taking the position that Mark’s H-1B status was set to expire on February 15, 2013. But none of these things happened. Mark has now remained in the U.S. for more than 180 days beyond the expiration of his I-94.

As Mark’s attorney correctly advised him, it is too risky to travel now. If he travels, Mark will have to apply for a new H-1B visa at a U.S. Consulate abroad and there is the possibility that the Department of State could deny Mark’s visa application and find him inadmissible into the U.S. for 10 years. The only course of action now is for Mark’s employer to file an H-1B petition for extension of Mark’s H-1B status in the U.S. Mark’s employer can argue that Mark was properly maintaining H-1B status in the U.S. despite the expiration of the I-94 issued to him when he last entered the U.S. because the I-94 issued to him on the Form I-797, H-1B Approval Notice remains valid. On the strength of that same I-94, it can be argued that Mark’s employer could continue to employ him. As mentioned above, some CBP offices take the position that the I-94 issued with the Form I-797, Approval Notice governs, that despite the issuance of an I-94 with an expiration date of February 15, 2013, Mark could remain in the U.S. beyond February 15, 2013 and until the 2014 expiration date of his H-1B status as granted by USCIS and as indicated on the I-94 issued by USCIS. There has been no official guidance to indicate that CBP has officially taken this position.  H-1B extensions filed with USCIS on this basis, however, have been successful.

When filing the H-1B petition, Mark’s employer can also request that although the petition is being timely filed because Mark’s H-1B status will not expire until March 2014, should the USCIS take the position that Mark is not maintaining valid H-1B status, that USCIS forgive the unintentional delay in filing of the petition under 8 C.F.R. 214.1(c)(4). This regulation allows for an extension of stay for a beneficiary who has been unable to maintain his or her previously accorded status where it is demonstrated at the time of filing that (i) The delay was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner, and the Service finds the delay commensurate with the circumstances; (ii) The alien has not otherwise violated his or her nonimmigrant status; (iii) The alien remains a bona fide nonimmigrant; and (iv) The alien is not the subject of . . . removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act.

An H-1B extension filed on Mark’s behalf prior to March 10, 2014 will hopefully be approved presenting these arguments. However, there really is no substitute for the peace of mind that comes with ensuring that one never remains in the U.S. beyond the expiration date on the I-94. Foreign nationals need to remain vigilant when entering the U.S. making sure that they check their I-94 card (if issued one) or printout their I-94 from the CBP website. As attorneys, our best practice is encourage our clients to always update us on their travel dates and with copies of their I-94 upon re-entry into the U.S.

(The blog is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice.)

PAROLE IN PLACE: THE SECRET SAUCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM

By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

On November 15, 2013, the USCIS issued a Policy Memorandum formalizing the granting of parole to persons who are present in the United States without admission or parole and who are spouses, children and parents of US citizens serving in the US military or who previously served in the US military. While parole traditionally applies to those who seek to come to the United States, the expansion of this concept to those already here is known as “parole in place”.

According to this memo, military preparedness can be potentially adversely affected if active members of the military worry about the immigration status of their spouses, parents and children. The memo makes a similar commitment to veterans who have served and sacrificed for the nation, and who can face stress and anxiety because of the immigration status of their family members. Such persons can now formally apply for parole in place (PIP) through a formal procedure pursuant to the ability of the government to grant parole under INA section 212(d)(5)(A). PIP would allow them to adjust status in the US rather than travel abroad for consular processing of their immigrant visas and thus potentially triggering the 3 or 10 year bars.

As a quick background, an individual who is in the US without admission or parole cannot adjust status through an immediate relative such as a US citizen spouse, parent or son or daughter. This person is inherently inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i), which provides:

An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) renders an alien inadmissible under two related grounds: 1) an alien present in the US without being admitted or paroled or 2) an alien who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.

The grant of PIP to a person who is present in the US without being admitted or paroled can wipe out the first ground of inadmissibility in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). PIP would then also allow this person to adjust status in the US under section 245(a) – as the person needs to have been “inspected and admitted or paroled” – without needing to leave the US.  The ability to adjust status through PIP would obviate the need  to travel overseas and apply for the visa, and thus trigger the 3 or 10 year bar pursuant to INA section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and (ii). Since there will be no departure triggering the 3 and 10 year bars, this person would no longer need to file a waiver or an advance provisional waiver by demonstrating extreme hardship to a qualifying US citizen relative to overcome the 3 and 10 year bars before leaving the US.

So far so good, but how does one overcome the second ground of inadmissibility in section 212(a)(6)A)(i), which relates to “an alien who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General?” The memo skillfully interprets this clause as relating to an alien who is in the process of arriving in the US without inspection. Thus, the second ground only applies to an alien who is presently arriving in the US while the first ground applies to an alien who already arrived in the US without admission or parole. If the second ground is interpreted as applying to an alien who arrived in the past, then it would make the first ground superfluous, according to the memo. It would also then make the 3 year bar under INA section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) superfluous as a person who at any point arrived, if used in the past tense,  at a place or time other than designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security would be  permanently inadmissible rather than inadmissible for only 3 years. Thus, if the second ground of inadmissibility is no longer applicable with respect to an alien who has already arrived in the US, then the grant of PIP would allow such a person to adjust in the US by overcoming the first ground under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i).

The extension of PIP to the families of current or former military service men and women is a proper recognition of their contribution to the nation and an attempt to benefit those who have given so much to the rest of us.  While such logic is compelling, why not expand its application to other instances where aliens have served and strengthened the national interest or performed work in the national interest? How about granting PIP to families of, outstanding researchers striving to unlock the mysteries of science and technology, those with exceptional or extraordinary ability, and key employees of US companies doing important jobs for which qualified Americans cannot be found? And there is also a compelling interest in ensuring family unification so that US citizens or permanent residents may feel less stressed and can go on to have productive lives that will in turn help the nation.  All such people do us proud by making our cause their own and the need of their loved ones to come in from the shadows is real and present. Indeed, the non-military use of PIP was advocated by top USCIS officials several years ago in a memo to USCIS Director Mayorkas, a memo leaked by its critics who wished successfully to kill it.

In the face of inaction on the part of the GOP controlled House to enact immigration reform, granting PIP to all immediate relatives of US citizens would allow them to adjust in the US rather than travel abroad and risk the 3 and 10 year bars of inadmissibility. Such administrative relief would be far less controversial than granting deferred action since immediate relatives of US citizens are anyway eligible for permanent residence. The only difference is that they could apply for their green cards in the US without needing to travel overseas and apply for waivers of the 3 and 10 year bars.

The concept of PIP can be extended to other categories, such as beneficiaries of preference petitions, which the authors have explained in The Tyranny of Priority Dates. However, they need to have demonstrated lawful status as a condition for being able to adjust status under INA section 245(c)(2) and the memo currently states that “[p]arole does not erase any periods of unlawful status.” There is no reason why this policy cannot be reversed. The grant of PIP, especially to someone who arrived in the past without admission or parole, can retroactively give that person lawful status too, thus rendering him or her eligible to adjust status through the I-130 petition as a preference beneficiary. The only place in INA section 245 where the applicant is required to have maintained lawful nonimmigrant status is under INA section 245(c)(7), which is limited to employment-based immigrants. Family-based immigrants are not so subject. What about INA section 245(c)(2)’s insistence on “lawful immigration status” at the snapshot moment of I-485 submission?  Even this would not be a problem. For purposes of section  245(c) of the Act, current regulations already define “lawful immigration status” to include “parole status which has not expired, been revoked, or terminated.” 8 C.F.R. section 245.1(d)(v). Indeed, even if one has already been admitted previously in a nonimmigrant visa status and is now out of status, the authors contend  that this person should be able to apply for a rescission of that admission and instead be granted retroactive PIP. Thus, beneficiaries of I-130 petitions, if granted retroactive PIP, ought to be able adjust their status in the US.

There is also no reason why PIP cannot extend to beneficiaries of employment I-140 petitions. If this is done, would such persons be able to adjust status to lawful permanent resident without leaving the USA? In order to do that, they not only need to demonstrate lawful status, but also  to have maintained continuous lawful nonimmigrant status under INA section 245(c)(7), as noted above.  Is there a way around this problem? At first glance, we consider the possibility of using the exception under INA section 245(k) which allows for those who have not continuously maintained lawful nonimmigrant status to still take advantage of section 245 adjustment if they can demonstrate that they have been in unlawful status for not more than 180 days since their last admission. We would do well to remember, however, that 245(k) only works if the alien is “present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission.”  Is parole an admission? Not according to INA section 101(a)(13)(B). So, while retroactive PIP would help satisfy the 180 day requirement imposed by INA section 245(k)(2), it cannot substitute for the lawful admission demanded by section 245(k)(1). Even if an out of status or unlawfully present I-140 beneficiary who had previously been admitted now received nunc pro tunc parole, the parole would replace the prior lawful admission. Such a person would still not be eligible for INA section 245(k) benefits and, having failed to continuously maintain valid nonimmigrant status,  would remain unable to adjust due to the preclusive effect of section 245(c)(7). Similarly, an I-140 beneficiary who had entered EWI and subsequently received retroactive parole would likewise not be able to utilize 245(k) for precisely the same reason, the lack of a lawful admission. Still, the grant of retroactive PIP should wipe out unlawful presence and the 3 and 10 year bars enabling this I-140 beneficiary to still receive an immigrant visa at an overseas consular post without triggering the bars upon departure from the US. Thus, while the beneficiary of an employment-based petition may not be able to apply for adjustment of status, retroactive PIP would nevertheless be hugely beneficial because, assuming PIP is considered a lawful status, it will wipe out unlawful presence and will thus no longer trigger the bars upon the alien’s departure from the US.

There are two ways to achieve progress. Congress can change the law, which it persists in refusing to do, or the President can interpret the existing law in new ways, which he has done.  The holistic approach to parole for which we argue is a prime example of this second approach. The term “status” is not defined anywhere in the INA.  By ordinary English usage, “parolee status” is a perfectly natural way of describing someone who has been paroled. Parole is a lawful status in the sense that, by virtue of the parole, it is lawful for the parolee to remain in the United States, at least for the authorized period of time under prescribed terms and conditions. We credit David Isaacson for suggesting that there are other instances in the INA where lawful status does not automatically equate to nonimmigrant status: for examples, asylum status under INA Section 208 and refugee status under INA section 207 are lawful statuses, even though strictly speaking, neither an asylee nor a refugee is a nonimmigrant according to the INA Section 101(a)(15) definition of that term. The Executive can easily revise the memo for military families to declare parole under INA  section 212(d)(5) a status  because it has already declared parole a lawful status for NA 245(c)(2) purposes under 8 C.F.R. 245(d)(v), asylum a lawful status under INA section 208, and refugee a lawful status under INA section 207.  See 8 C.F.R. 245.1(d)(iii)-(iv). In all three cases, people are allowed into the United States in a capacity that is nether legal permanent residence nor, strictly speaking, nonimmigrant.  True, INA section 101(a)(13)(B) does say that parolees are not “admitted”, but is one who enters without admission and is granted asylum under INA 208 ever been “admitted” per the statutory definition of that term? Yet, such a person has a lawful status.

One of the biggest contributors to the buildup of the undocumented population in the US has been the 3 and 10 year bars.  Even though people are beneficiaries of immigrant visa petitions, they do not wish to risk travelling abroad and facing the 3 or 10 year bars, as well as trying to overcome the bars by demonstrating extreme hardship to qualifying relatives, which is a very high standard. Extending PIP to people who are in any event in the pipeline for a green card would allow them adjust status in the US or process immigrant visas at consular posts, and become lawful permanent residents. These people are already eligible for permanent residence through approved I-130 and I-140 petitions, and PIP would only facilitate their ability to apply for permanent residence in the US, or in the case of I-140 beneficiaries by travelling overseas for consular processing without incurring the 3 and 10 year bars. PIP would thus reduce the undocumented population in the US without creating new categories of relief, which Congress can and should do through reform immigration legislation.

There is no doubt that the memo for military families is a meaningful example of immigration remediation through executive initiative. Yet, it is one step in what can and should be a much longer journey. In the face on intractable congressional resistance, we urge the President to take this next step.

(Guest writer Gary Endelman is Senior Counsel at FosterQuan)

Waiving Goodbye to Unappealable Decisions: Indirect AAO Jurisdiction, or Why Having Your Appeal Dismissed Can Sometimes be a Good Thing

The USCIS Administrative Appeals Office, or AAO, has administrative appellate jurisdiction over a wide variety of USCIS decisions that are not appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals.  This jurisdiction is primarily set forth in a regulatory list that has been absent from the Code of Federal Regulations since 2003, but was incorporated by reference that year into DHS Delegation 0150.1.  Pursuant to that delegation, as manyAAOdecisionsstate, the AAO exercises appellate jurisdiction over the matters described at 8 C.F.R. 103.1(f)(3)(iii) as in effect on February 28, 2003.  (It has been previously pointed out by attorney Matt Cameron that a currently nonexistent jurisdictional regulation is an undesirable state of affairs for an appellate body; USCIS recently indicated in a July 2013 Policy Memorandum regarding certification of decisions that DHS intends to replace the list in the regulations in a future rulemaking.)

The regulatory list of applications over which the AAO has jurisdiction does not include Form I-485 applications for adjustment of status, with a minor exception relating to applications based on a marriage entered into during removal proceedings denied for failure to meet the bona fide marriage exemption under INA §245(e).  Thus, it would appear that the AAO would not have appellate jurisdiction over denials of adjustment applications, and that one’s sole administrative recourse if an adjustment application is denied would be to seek review before an immigration judge in removal proceedings, as is generally permitted (except for certain arriving aliens) by 8 C.F.R. §1245.2(a)(5)(ii).  But appearances can be deceiving.

Many, although not all, of the grounds for denial of an adjustment application are potentially subject to waiver under appropriate conditions.  If an application is denied because the applicant was found inadmissible under INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i) due to conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), for example, a waiver can be sought under INA §212(h) if either the criminal conduct took place more than 15 years ago, or the applicant can attempt to demonstrate that the applicant’s U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, son or daughter would face extreme hardship if the applicant were not admitted.  Similarly, one who is found inadmissible under INA §212(a)(6)(C)(i) due to fraud or willful misrepresentation (not involving a false claim to U.S. citizenship taking place after September 30, 1996) can seek a waiver of inadmissibility under INA §212(i) based on extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent.  Various other grounds of inadmissibility are waiveable as well.

While the AAO does not have jurisdiction directly over the denial of an adjustment application, the AAO does have jurisdiction over the denial of most waiver applications.  And in the AAO’s view, appellate jurisdiction to determine whether someone should have been granted a waiver necessarily includes jurisdiction to decide whether that applicant even needed a waiver in the first place.  If the AAO finds that a waiver was unnecessary, it will dismiss the waiver appeal and remand for further processing of the adjustment application.  That is, it will decide on appeal that the applicant was not, in fact, inadmissible, and thus in effect will have reviewed the denial of the underlying adjustment application even without regard to whether a waiver would be justified if one were indeed necessary.  Although this process does not appear to be documented in any precedential AAO decision, comparatively few AAO precedent decisions of any sort having been published, this exercise of indirect appellate jurisdiction by the AAO occurs with some frequency in non-precedential, “unpublished” decisions that have been made available online (generally by USCIS itself, or occasionally by other sources).

Dismissal of a waiver appeal as moot can occur in the context of a §212(h) waiver, for example, where the AAO finds that the applicant’s conviction was not for a CIMT (see also these additional decisionsfrom 2012; 2010; February, March, Apriland June of 2009; 2008; and 2007).  Even if the applicant does have a CIMT conviction, that AAO may conclude that the applicant’s only conviction for a CIMT qualifies for the petty offense exception under INA §212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) and thus does not give rise to inadmissibility (see also these decisions along the same lines from Januaryand Marchof 2009, 2008, and 2006).  Dismissal of a §212(h) waiver application as moot can also occur when the AAO finds that the applicant was not convicted of a crime at all given that the official disposition of a charge was a “Nolle prosequi, or that an applicant who was not convicted of a crime had not given a valid admission to the elements of a crime, in accordance with the procedural safeguards required by precedent, so as to give rise to inadmissibility in the absence of a conviction.  Outside the CIMT context, as well, the AAO can dismiss a §212(h) waiver appeal as moot upon a finding that no waiver is needed, such as when someone who was thought to have a waiveable conviction involving 30 grams or less of marijuana successfully points out on appeal that disorderly conduct under a statute not mentioning drugs is not an offense relating to a controlled substance.

In the context of a denial based on inadmissibility for fraud or misrepresentation, the AAO can dismiss an appeal from the denial of a §212(i) waiver as moot if it finds that the misrepresentation was not material (see also these decisions from 2010, 2009and 2007), or that an applicant who was victimized by others submitting a fraudulent application on his behalf without his knowledge did not make a willful misrepresentation, or that any misrepresentation was the subject of a timely retraction (see also this decision from 2006).  AAO dismissal of a §212(i) waiver appeal as moot can also be used to vindicate the legal principle that presenting a false Form I-94 or similar false documentation to an employer to obtain employment does not give rise to inadmissibility under §212(a)(6)(C)(i), and neither does procuring false immigration documentation from a private individual more generally, because a misrepresentation under 212(a)(6)(C)(i) must be made to an authorized U.S. government official.  Finally, AAO dismissal of a §212(i) waiver appeal as moot can occur where the only alleged misrepresentation occurred in the context of a legalization program which is subject to statutory confidentiality protection, such as the SAW (Special Agricultural Worker) program under INA §210 or a LULAC late legalization application or other application under INA §245A, and therefore any such misrepresentation cannot be the basis of inadmissibility under §212(a)(6)(C)(i) because of the confidentiality protection.

This sort of indirect AAO jurisdiction can also be used to correct errors regarding inadmissibility for unlawful presence under INA §212(a)(9)(B), if a waiver application is filed under INA §212(a)(9)(B)(v).  For example, in a 2012 decision involving an applicant who was admitted for duration of status (D/S) and had been incorrectly found to have accrued unlawful presence after failing to maintain status even absent any finding of such by USCIS or an immigration judge, contrary to the 2009 Neufeld/Scialabba/Chang USCIS consolidated guidance memorandum on unlawful presence, the AAO dismissed the appeal as moot upon finding that the applicant was not, in fact, inadmissible under §212(a)(9)(B).

The AAO’s indirect appellate jurisdiction over inadmissibility determinations has even been exercised where the initial inadmissibility determination was made not by a USCIS officer in the context of an application for adjustment of status, but by a Department of State consular officer in the context of a consular application for an immigrant visa.  In a 2009 decision, the AAO dismissed as moot an appeal from the denial of a §212(h) waiver by the Officer in Charge (OIC) in Manila, holding that the applicant did not require a waiver because the applicant’s admission to an examining physician that he had used marijuana in the past did not give rise to inadmissibility, and that Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a valid admission to the elements of a crime resulting in inadmissibility under similar circumstances) did not apply because the applicant and the office that made the decision were located in the Philippines rather than within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.  The AAO ordered “the matter returned to the OIC for further processing of the immigrant visa application.” It explained the source of its authority in this context as follows:

The Secretary of Homeland Security (and by delegation, the AAO) has final responsibility over guidance to consular officers concerning inadmissibility for visa applicants. See Memorandum of Understanding Between Secretaries of State and Homeland Security Concerning Implementation of Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, issued September 30, 2003, at 3.

Matter of X- (AAO June 17, 2009), at 4.

Nor was that Manila case an isolated exception, although the detailed explanation of the source of the AAO’s authority in the consular context that was contained in that decision is rarer that the exercise of the authority itself.  The AAO has also dismissed as moot an appeal of the denial of an application for a §212(h) waiver by the Mexico City district director in the case of an applicant who sought an immigrant visa in the Dominican Republic and had been convicted of a firearms offense which would properly give rise to deportability but not inadmissibility; dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Frankfurt, Germany OIC denying a §212(h) waiver for an applicant whom the AAO determined had not been convicted of a CIMT; dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Vienna, Austria OIC denying a §212(h) waiver for an applicant the AAO found had only been subject to juvenile delinquency proceedings not giving rise to a conviction for immigration purposes under Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2001); and dismissed another appeal from a decision of the Vienna OIC where the AAO found that the applicant’s conviction qualified for the petty offense exception.  Indeed, the AAO has exercised its indirect appellate jurisdiction over a consular inadmissibility determination in at least one appeal from a decision of the Mexico City district director where “the applicant did not appear to contest the district director’s determination of inadmissibility” but the AAO found that neither of the crimes of which the applicant had been convicted was a CIMT.  The AAO’s indirect appellate jurisdiction has also been exercised in a case coming from the New Delhi, India OIC where an applicant disputed his date of departure from the United States which started the running of the ten-year bar, and the AAO found that the applicant’s actual departure had been more than ten years prior and thus no §212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver was required.

Perhaps most interestingly, it appears that the AAO will even exercise its indirect appellate jurisdiction over inadmissibility determinations in some cases where the applicant has failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the relevant waiver, although the only examples that this author have been able to find of this involve the AAO’s indirect jurisdiction over USCIS adjustment denials rather than consular-processing of an immigrant visa.  In a 2006 decision, an applicant who had not provided any evidence that his wife was a Lawful Permanent Resident who could serve as a qualifying relative for either a §212(i) waiver or a §212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver was found not to be inadmissible because he had made a timely retraction of any misrepresentation, and had accrued no unlawful presence due to last departing the United States in 1989.  In a 2009 decision, an applicant who had pled guilty to hiring undocumented workers, and who had been found inadmissible under INA §212(a)(6)(E)(i) for alien smuggling and appealed the denial of his application for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA §212(d)(11), was found not inadmissible by the AAO, which withdrew the district director’s contrary finding—even though the district director had found that the applicant did not meet the requirements of §212(d)(11), and seems very likely to have been right about that, since §212(d)(11)applies only to an applicant who “has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only an individual who at the time of the offense was the alien’s spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the United States in violation of law.”  And in 2010, the AAO declared moot a waiver application under INA §212(g) by an individual infected with HIV who apparently had not established any relationship with a qualifying relative, on the ground that in January 2010 the Centers for Disease Control had removed HIV from the official list of communicable diseases of public health significance, and therefore HIV infection was no longer a ground of inadmissibility.  Some potentially difficult ethical and practical questions would need to be resolved before deliberately filing a waiver application on behalf of an applicant ineligible for such waiver in order to obtain AAO review of whether the applicant was inadmissible at all, but it is at least a possibility worthy of further analysis.

So when an application for adjustment of status, or even for a consular-processed immigrant visa, is denied, it is important to keep in mind that an appeal may be available even if it does not appear so at first glance, and that establishing the necessary hardship to a qualifying relative to support a waiver application is not necessarily the only way to win the case.  If a waiver of the ground upon which the denial was based is at least theoretically available, so as to support AAO jurisdiction over the denial of that waiver, then one can leverage the waiver to seek AAO review of whether a waiver was necessary in the first place.

USCIS Issues Provisional Waiver Final Rule: Beginning in March, Some Waivers of the 3- or 10-Year Bars May Be Sought Before Departing the United States

One year ago, a previous post on this blog by Cyrus Mehta and this author discussed the issuance by USCIS of a proposed rule allowing certain applicants for a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars to obtain such a waiver on a provisional basis before departing from the United States.  It has been a long wait for the final rule, as USCIS needed to allow time to receive public comments (one of which was submitted by our firm) and then took a substantial amount of time to analyze the comments and determine what changes to make to the proposal, but the wait is finally over.USCIS first announced the final ruleand made an advance copy available on January 2, 2013, and the final rule was officially published in the Federal Registeron January 3.  The rule will take effect on March 4, 2013, and sometime before then USCIS will publish the Form I-601A that is to be used to apply for a provisional waiver.

The provisional waiver rule does not change the substantive standard that one must satisfy in order to obtain a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bar that one incurs upon accruing more than 180 days or a year of unlawful presence respectively.  In order to obtain a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), it is always necessary to show that the waiver applicant’s spouse or parent, who is a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) of the United States, will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is not permitted to remain in the United States.  However, under the new rule, certain applicants will be able to make this showing before they depart the United States to apply for a visa, which should dramatically shorten the amount of time that they need to spend abroad.  If an applicant is seeking a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars based extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen qualifying relative (rather than an LPR), and has an approved petition as an “immediate relative” of a U.S. citizen – that is, as the U.S. citizen’s spouse, parent, or unmarried child (under the age of 21 while taking into account the Child Status Protection Act, although only applicants age 17 or older may seek provisional waivers and younger applicants would not need them because unlawful presence for these purposes does not accrue until age 18)– then the applicant may seek a provisional waiver before departing from the United States, and only go abroad to apply for an immigrant visa after the provisional waiver has already been issued.  This process is subject to various restrictions, some of which are discussed further below, but that is the basic idea.

By allowing some waiver applications to be adjudicated while the applicant remains within the United States, the provisional waiver process should significantly reduce the period of time when the U.S. citizen relative of a successful waiver applicant is subject to the cruel irony that inheres in the current process.  Under the current system, where the waiver application is filed while the applicant is abroad after an immigrant visa interview, and the applicant then remains abroad during the months it takes to adjudicate the waiver application, the qualifying relative must undergo months of the very same extreme hardship that the waiver is intended to avoid!  At least with regard to U.S. citizen qualifying relatives of applicants who are immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, and who face no other ground of inadmissibility besides unlawful presence, this new provisional waiver process should remove much of that cruel irony.  It should also encourage applications by some waiver applicants who were unwilling to travel outside the United States to apply for a waiver because of the risk of long-term separation if the waiver were denied.

One detail to keep in mind is that the U.S. citizen relative to whom extreme hardship is shown in a provisional waiver application need not necessarily be the same U.S. citizen relative who has petitioned for an applicant.  Indeed, the U.S. citizen petitioner need not even be a possible qualifying relative for the 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver.  A child is not a qualifying relative for purposes of obtaining a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars, but an applicant who is sponsored by a U.S. citizen son or daughter over twenty-one years of age, and thus qualifies as an immediate relative, would be able to qualify for a provisional waiver if he or she could show extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen parent in the event that the applicant were not allowed to return to the United States– even though a U.S. citizen parent cannot sponsor an adult son or daughter as an immediate relative.  Or, an applicant with a U.S. citizen spouse, who cannot show that his or her spouse will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is not allowed to return to the United States, could instead obtain a provisional waiver by showing that a U.S. citizen parent will suffer extreme hardship in the applicant’s absence.

Another important detail, which has been changed from the proposed rule, is that applicants in removal proceedings will be able to seek a provisional waiver iftheir proceedings are administratively closed and have not been recalendered.  Administrative closure, most recently addressed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Avetisyan, is a process in which a case is taken off the active calendar of an Immigration Court or the BIA without actually being terminated; one might compare it to an indefinite continuance of the case.  Traditionally, it has occurred with the consent of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), although Avetisyan allows for it to be sought without DHS consent, a possibility which might prove useful in the provisional-waiver context.  Administrative closure has often occurred recently in the contextof the DHS exercise of prosecutorial discretion in favor of those who are lower priorities for removal so that DHS can focus its efforts on removing those who are its higher priorities for removal, such as those with serious criminal convictions—the process discussed in a June 17, 2011 memorandum from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton.It is admirable that USCIS realized, upon reviewing comments on the proposed rule, that no purpose would be served by denying the opportunity to apply for a provisional waiver to those whom ICE is not actively seeking to remove in any event.

One interesting consequence of this new eligibility for those with administratively closed removal cases relates to the process created by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in its October 16, 2012 opinion entitled In the Matter of Immigration Petitions for Review Pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in order to avoid having to spend court time unnecessarily reviewing a removal order in cases where ICE would anyway not seek to execute the order, has created an automatic 90-day waiting period during the processing of petitions for review (although one which can be ended early by either side) to allow for discussion of whether the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is appropriate.  In cases where the Office of Immigration Litigation that is representing the government on the petition for review determines in consultation with ICE that a case is low-priority and suitable for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the case will be remanded to the BIA for administrative closure.  Thus, at least in the Second Circuit, and perhaps in other Circuits which may come to follow the lead of the Second Circuit, some who have already received final orders of removal, but who would be eligible for a provisional waiver absent such final order and have petitioned for review of the order, should be able to return their case to an administratively closed state under the new process and then apply for a provisional waiver.

In another positive development, the final rule has retreated somewhat from the initial USCIS position that the provisional waiver process would only allow for what one might call a single bite at the apple, permitting neither appeal nor re-filing, so that an applicant who was denied a provisional waiver could only proceed with the process by departing from the United States and re-applying for a conventional waiver from abroad.  Although an administrative appeal is still not available, an applicant whose application for a provisional waiver is denied will be permitted under the final rule to file a new application (with the appropriate filing fee).

Not all the news from the final rule is good news, however.  Unfortunately, despite the urging of many commenters, the provisional waiver process will not be available to those who are currently in removal proceedings, unless their proceedings have been administratively closed and not recalendared.  It will also not be available to those who are currently subject to a final removal or deportation or exclusion order—even though those subject to such orders have long been able to file a stand-alone I-212 application for advance permission to reapply for admission prior to departure from the United States, under 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(j).  Unless those subject to a final order can get the case reopened and administratively closed (as for example could be possible on remand from a Court of Appeals), it appears they will need to follow the conventional waiver process from abroad, despite the resulting hardship to qualifying relatives.

The provisional waiver process also will not apply to those who are inadmissible for reasons other than the 3- or 10-year bar resulting from previous unlawful presence.  Although the above-mentioned previous post on this blog, and our official comment submitted to USCISalong the same lines, advocated that provisional waivers should be available in contexts such as alleged fraud for which a waiver is needed under INA section 212(i), USCIS chose not to accept that suggestion.  However, USCIS has held out the possibility of perhaps extending the provisional waiver process to other contexts once it has had a chance to observe how the initial, narrower version of the provisional waiver process works in practice.

Another restriction worth noting is that the provisional waiver will not be available to those who have already been scheduled for an immigrant visa interview as of January 3, 2013.  The key question is not when the interview was scheduled to take place, or whether the applicant attended the interview, but whether the Department of State’s National Visa Center (NVC) had already acted to schedule a consular interview by January 3.  If the NVC had scheduled a visa interview by January 3, the provisional waiver process will not be available.  If the NVC had not acted to schedule an interview by January 3, then the subsequent scheduling of an interview will not remove one’s eligibility for the provisional waiver, although in the interest of efficiency prospective waiver applicants with a case before the NVC are advised to notify the NVC of their intent to seek a provisional waiver before an interview is scheduled.  The NVC has already begun sending emails to some prospective visa applicants advising them that they must inform the NVC of their intent to seek a provisional waiver, by sending an email to NVCI601A@state.gov, and that failure to do so would delay the visa application.

For additional background on the final provisional waiver rule, interested readers may wish to review posts about it on the “AILA Leadership Blog” of the  American Immigration Lawyers’ Associationand the “Lifted Lamp” blog of Benach Ragland LLP.  The New York Times has also reported on the new provisional waiver rules.  Despite all of its imperfections, the final provisional waiver rule is a very positive development, an important step along the road of reducing unnecessary hardship to the qualifying relatives of waiver applicants.