BALCA CLARIFIES DOL’S POSITION ON PROOF OF PUBLICATION OF THE SWA JOB ORDER AND ADS PLACED BY PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT FIRMS UNDER PERM

As usual, BALCA (Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals) decisions are very important for practitioners as they offer crucial insights into how to avoid some of the pitfalls in preparing and filing a labor certification application under Program Electronic Review Management (PERM) or into what arguments can be made in response to the unfortunate receipt of a PERM denial notice. BALCA recently issued some notable decisions.

DOCUMENTATION OF THE SWA JOB ORDER
While the Department of Labor (“DOL”) is obsessed about the employer presenting proof of publication of its recruitment, BALCA recently held, in an en banc decision, A Cut Above Ceramic Tile, 2010-PER-00224 (Mar. 8, 2012), that based on the history of the PERM regulations and the plain language of 20 C.F.R. §656.17(e)(2)(i), proof of publication of the State Workforce Agency (“SWA”) job order is not required supporting documentation.
The PERM regulations at 656.17(e)(2)(i) require an employer filing a PERM application to place a job order with the SWA serving the area of intended employment for a period of 30 days. That same section of the regulations also states, “[t]he start and end dates of the job order entered on the application serve as documentation of this step.” Pursuant to 656.10(f), all documentation supporting the PERM application must be retained for five years after filing the application. 656.17(a)(3) mandates that the employer must furnish “required supporting documentation” to the Certifying Officer (“CO”) if the PERM application is audited. A substantial failure by the employer to provide the required documentation will result in a denial of the PERM application. 656.20(b).

In A Cut Above Ceramic Tile, the employer attested, on an ETA Form 9089 filed on January 8, 2007, that, as part of its domestic recruitment efforts for the position of Tile Setter, it placed a job order with the SWA in the area of intended employment from July 13 to August 12, 2006. On June 11, 2009, the DOL issued an audit notification, which included the request for a copy of the job order placed with the SWA downloaded from the SWA internet job listing site; a copy of the job order provided by the SWA; or other proof of publication from the SWA containing the content of the job order. As part of its audit response, the employer included a copy of its completed Employer Job Order Information Sheet from VaEmploy.Com, the SWA for the state of Virginia. Citing 656.20(b) as authority, the CO denied the PERM application based on the employer’s failure to provide proof of publication of the SWA job order containing the content of the job order, as requested in the audit notification letter. The CO found that the employer’s submission of the Employer Job Order Information Sheet did not show the final content of the job order as run by the SWA.

The Employer filed a motion for reconsideration of the PERM denial arguing that the PERM regulations provide that the SWA job order is documented by the start and end dates entered on the ETA Form 9089. The employer also argued that it had tried to obtain proof of publication from the SWA but had been informed that proof of the publication of its job order had been deleted. The CO affirmed the denial and forwarded to case to BALCA which also affirmed the denial and held that the employer’s documentation only showed that the job order was placed for the required 30-day period but did not provide proof of its contents.

The Employer then filed a petition for en banc review which BALCA granted to resolve the issue of whether a CO may deny certification of a PERM application based on the employer’s failure to provide proof of the publication of the SWA job order. BALCA invited the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) to file an amicus brief which it did. There was a conflict between BALCA panels because, in another case, Mandy Donuts Corp., 2009-PER-481 (Jan. 7, 2011), a BALCA panel compared the PERM regulations at 656.17(e)(2)(i) on placement of the job order and the regulations at 656.17(e)(1)(i)(B)(3) and 656.17(e)(2)(ii)(C) on placement of a newspaper advertisement and pointed out that the PERM regulations for documentation of proof of newspaper advertisements specifically require the employer to provide copies of the newspaper pages in which the advertisement appeared or proof of publication furnished by the newspaper. The panel held that the PERM regulations only require “placement” of the job order for 30 days which is documented by the start and end dates entered on the PERM application.The en banc panel in A Cut Above Ceramic Tile agreed with the Mandy Donuts panel and held that the distinction in the regulations is clear. The drafters of the regulation could easily have included a requirement that employers provide proof of publication of the SWA job order. In fact, the regulations governing the placement of a job order for the H-2B temporary nonagricultural labor certification program, also administered by the Employment and Training Administration (“ETA”) specifically require that the employer maintain a copy of the SWA job order or other proof of publication containing the text of the job order. 656.15(e)(1). The en banc panel reasoned that the ETA intentionally drafted the H-2B and the PERM SWA job orders regulations differently. In fact the ETA specifically stated in its response to comments regarding the audit process, that the employer is only required to provide the start and end date of the job order on the application to document the job order has been placed and the gathering of additional information on the job order from the SWA will not be necessary. See ETA, Final Rule, Implementation of New System, Labor Certification Process for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States [“PERM”], 69 Fed. Reg. 77326, 77359 (Dec. 24, 2004). Essentially, the CO does not have the power to request just any type of documentation and the employer’s application may only be denied under 656.20(b) when the absent documentation is required.

While this en banc decision may appear attractive, and is certainly useful when inheriting flawed cases, practitioners ought to continue the practice of printing copies of the job order to demonstrate good faith recruitment. The BALCA en banc panel made sure to comment, in note 5, that “the spirit and the context of the PERM regulations, which are grounded in attestations backed up by retained documentation to support attestations, strongly suggest that an employer should retain and be able to produce documentation about the content and dates of action on all elements of recruitment. We would anticipate that most employers recruiting in good faith will have retained documentation in some form to show the content of the job order, and if so be able to produce it.” However, it is now clear that failure to produce the SWA job order cannot be the sole basis for a PERM denial.

THE USE OF PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT FIRMS TO CONDUCT RECRUITMENT

Under 656.17(e)(1)(ii), when conducting recruitment for a professional position, the employer must conduct three additional recruitment steps to advertise the position. The employer may choose from ten forms of recruitment including the use of a private employment firm or placement agency. 656.17(e)(1)(ii)(F) states:

The use of private employment firms or placement agencies can be documented by providing documentation sufficient to demonstrate that recruitment has been conducted by a private firm for the occupation for which certification is sought. For example, documentation might consist of copies of contracts between the employer and the private employment firm and copies of advertisements placed by the private employment forms for the occupation involved in the application.

In Credit Suisse Securities, 2010-PER-103 (Oct. 19, 2010), BALCA rejected the employer’s argument that 656.17(f), requiring that advertisements placed in newspapers of general circulation or in professional journals state the name of the employer and provide a description of the vacancy specific enough to apprise U.S. workers of the job opportunity, was not applicable to the additional recruitment steps for professional occupations, and held that the regulation in fact governs all forms of advertisement. However, not all the additional recruitment methods for professional positions readily lend themselves to these requirements. For instance, when recruiting through private employment firms, it makes no business sense to indicate the name of the employer because an applicant could then bypass the headhunter and apply directly to the employer. Indeed, in Credit Suisse Securities, BALCA acknowledged in note 7 that the requirements of 656.17(f) only applies to advertisements, and that it was not making a determination with respect to job fairs, on-campus recruiting, private employment firms and campus placement offices.In World Agape Mission Church, 2010-PER-01117 (Mar. 23, 2012), the employer conducted recruitment for the professional position of “Pastor (Associate)” recruiting through a private employment agency as one of the three additional recruitment steps for professional positions. The CO issued an audit notification and, as part of its response to the audit notification, the employer submitted a letter from the private employment agency certifying that the agency had checked its database for any qualified applicants and had posted the job posting online. The job posting listed the job title, salary information, a job description, experience and education requirements, and that the position was full-time. The job posting was identifiable by a job number. The CO argued that the employer’s name must be included in an advertisement to ensure that the results of an employer’s test of the labor market are legitimate. The CO cited 656.17(f)(1), requiring that advertisements placed in newspapers of general circulation “name the employer.”BALCA noted its decision in Credit Suisse Securities but held that an advertisement placed by a private employment agency is different than one placed directly by the employer. BALCA referenced its decision in HSB Solomon, 2011-PER-2599 (Oct.25, 2011) that 656.17(f) does not apply to advertisements placed by private employment firms. However, World Agape Mission Church makes it clear that the employer still has a duty to recruit in good faith and to make the job opportunity clearly open to all U.S. workers even when using a private employment agency. Of particular note was the fact that the job posting provided applicants with sufficient information like the job title, job duties, and education/experience requirements, and even if it did not list the name of the employer, it listed a job number which matched the job number listed in the letter from the employment agency certifying its recruitment. This allowed the CO to match the listing to the agency’s advertisement even without the inclusion of the employer’s name in the posting.SUPERVISED RECRUITMENT

As the supervised recruitment train keeps barreling through, we have to keep on the lookout for any BALCA decisions to help guide us through the process. BALCA recently issued two decisions worth reading.In Kennametal, Inc., 2010-PER-01512 (Mar. 27, 2012), BALCA held that the employer had improperly rejected U.S. workers because it did not consider the possibility that certain applicants could become qualified after a reasonable period of on-the-job training. But most interestingly, BALCA held that the employer’s rejection of applicants for not possessing the requisite bachelor’s degree was unlawful and specifically listed examples of applicants who had an associates’ degree and 10 to 24 years of experience. BALCA held that because the employer indicated in its advertisements that it would “accept a combination of education, training and experience” (well-known to practitioners filing PERM applications as the Kellogg language based on Matter of Francis Kellogg94-INA-465 (Feb. 2, 1998) (en banc), the employer should have considered these applicants and interviewed them to further evaluate their skills. This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that the DOL routinely requests that employers list the Kellogg language in the supervised recruitment advertisements even where it is not applicable. Now, employers have to be alert to the fact that the DOL could then use that same Kellogg language against them to argue that they unlawfully rejected U.S. workers.In JP Morgan Chase & Co, 2011-PER-00635, BALCA upheld the CO’s denial of the PERM application under supervised recruitment because the employer did not list the addresses of the U.S. worker applicants in the body of its recruitment report as required under the supervised recruitment regulations at 656.21(e)(3) despite the fact that the employer had submitted copies of all the resumes which listed the U.S. addresses of the applicants.

Federal Court Reverses Unreasonable H-1B Denial For Market Research Analyst

Employers who file perfectly bonafide H-1B petitions for certain occupations face unreasonable denials from the USCIS. One H-1B occupation that is especially vulnerable to a denial is  Market Research Analyst. The USCIS’s rationale for the denial is that the occupation must require a degree in the actual position and not in closely related fields. Thus, even if it is acknowledged that a Market Research Analyst requires a degree in closely related fields such as business, marketing, economics, sociology or psychology,  but not  specifically in market research analysis, that can provide a basis for the USCIS to arbitrarily deny the H-1B petition. There is clearly no requirement that the specialized degree for entry into the occupation needs to be in a single academic discipline. This may be true for occupations such as law or medicine, but if the USCIS applies such narrow criteria, a lot of occupations will not qualify for the H-1B visa.

In Tapis Int’l v. INS, 94 F Supp. 2d 172 (D. Mass 2000), the beneficiary was sponsored for H-1B classification as a showroom manager  The petition was denied because the employer could not demonstrate that the position required a degree in showroom management, although the position required a degree in business administration, marketing or related field  as well as additional training or experience in the field of interior design.  In that case, the court reversed the denial on the ground that such a narrow agency interpretation would preclude any position from satisfying the “specialty occupation” requirements where a specific degree is not available in that field.

Yet, the USCIS continues to use this faulty interpretation in denying H-1B petitions. This is precisely what recently happened to an employer who sought H-1B visa classification for a foreign national in the specialty occupation of Market Research Analyst who had a degree in marketing and finance.  In Residential Finance Corporation v. USCIS2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32220, decided on March 12, 2012, Judge Gregory L. Frost of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (Eastern Division) chided U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for denying an H-1B petition to a market research analyst with a bachelor’s degree in closely related fields.

The issue before the court in Residential Finance Corporation was whether USCIS was incorrect in concluding that there was not a”specialty occupation” involved.  The court noted that a specialty occupation is one that requires attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.  A related definition provides that a specialty occupation requires theoretical and practical application of highly specialized knowledge.

Among other things, USCIS argued that although the Department of Labor’s Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) recognizes a baccalaureate degree as the minimum educational requirement for many market and survey research jobs, the OOH does not indicate that such a degree need be in a specific specialty directly related to market research.

In this case, the beneficiary had obtained a bachelor of science degree in marketing and finance.  The record indicated that a minimum requirement for entry into the position of market research analyst is the specialized course of study in which the beneficiary had engaged.

“Perhaps most bewildering is that Defendant rejected the evidence that [the beneficiary] would actually be performing these job duties if hired, despite no evidence to the contrary and no other apparent reason for failing to credit the evidence on this record,” the judge said.

Judge Frost continued: “Defendant continues to reject this record in favor of supporting a flawed denial. What Defendant overlooks is that the illogical leaps about which Plaintiff complains in its thorough briefing cannot be separated from the process in which Defendant engaged in its decision making.  Stated simply, Defendant did a poor job of keeping the record straight and its focus on the actual inquiry involved.”

The judge pointed out that USCIS expressly admitted “inexplicable errors” in its briefing, such as references to the wrong sections of the OOH, and that the agency’s decision appeared to identify the proffered position incorrectly as a marketing manager rather than a marketing analyst.

Judge Frost said that these errors were not the essentially inconsequential lapses that USCIS suggested.  Instead, he said, they constituted “a litany of incompetence that presents [a] fundamental misreading of the record, relevant sources, and the point of the entire petition.” If USCIS wants to deny a petition that will send the beneficiary to another country after 21 years of living in the United States, the judge said, “it should afford Plaintiff and [the beneficiary] a bare minimum level of professionalism, diligence, and reasoning.”  Noting that the record indicated that a market and survey researcher is a distinct occupation with a specialized course of study that includes multiple specialized fields, that the beneficiary had completed such specialized study in the relevant fields of marketing and finance, and that Residential Finance Corporation had sought to employ him in such a position, Judge Frost said that USCIS had ‘ignore[d] the realities of the statutory language involved and the obvious intent behind them.  The knowledge and not the title of the degree is what is important. Diplomas rarely come bearing occupation-specific majors.”

Judge Frost concluded that USCIS failed to meet the “fundamental threshold for rational decision making and has instead engaged in conduct that cannot be separated from the taint of the foregoing errors.”  He thus found that the denial of the petition was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and ordered that USCIS grant the petition and change the beneficiary’s status to H-1B nonimmigrant.

Employers and their attorneys should use these decisions to advocate for their clients in case the USCIS absurdly asserts that the position does not require a degree in a single academic discipline.  INA § 214(i) defines a specialized occupation as requiring “(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of specialized knowledge; and (B) attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.”  While it is true that INA § 214(i) requires a bachelor’s degree in a specific specialty for the position to qualify under the H-1B visa classification, it should be argued that this section does not restrict it to a degree in a single specialty.  For instance, a position for a computer programmer analyst could require a bachelor’s degree in specialties such as computer science, management information systems, mathematics, engineering or closely related fields. All of these specialties could qualify a person for this specialty occupation.  Congress could not have intended that INA § 214(i) be restricted to a single specialty, namely, computer science, and preclude the demonstration of other specialties, such as mathematics or engineering disciplines, that could also qualify a nonimmigrant for the specialty occupation of computer programmer analyst.

If your case is denied, do not lose hope.  You can always litigate a good case in federal court and try to get the same favorable outcome as in Residential Finance Corporation and Tapis International.

WILL THE REVISED USCIS Q&A ON ESTABLSHING THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP IN H-1B PETITIONS SAVE STAFFING COMPANIES?

By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

Since the issuance of the January 8, 2010 guidance memorandum by Donald Neufeld, concerning the employer-employee relationship in H-1B petitions (Neufeld Memo), especially when an employer places an H-1B worker at a third party client site, workers at IT consulting and staffing companies have been the most adversely impacted.  Indeed, it seems that the Neufeld Memo was designed to kill the staffing company.

The adverse effects of the Neufeld Memo have been felt most keenly by Indian nationals on H-1B visas who make up most of the workforce at such companies.  This legitimate IT business model, which has been readily embraced by US corporations, is associated with a distasteful term in immigration parlance, namely the “job shop,” whose presence has become ubiquitous with Indian beneficiaries of employment visa petitions. The heightened scrutiny, often leading to an arbitrary denial, is exercised even if the USCIS has approved the H-1B petition previously on the exact same facts. Most problematically, H-1B visa applicants face unreasonable and arbitrary treatment at US Consulates in India, and are subject to unnecessary demands for the same documentation even after they were submitted to the USCIS, resulting in denials or recommendations for revocation of their petitions. Most Indian H-1B visa holders are fearful of travelling to India presently out of fear that they will be denied a visa based on an approved petition.   CBP at ports of entry has also exercised this subjective scrutiny over Indian H-1B entrants in the IT consulting field at ports of entry.

On March 12, 2012, the USCIS issued a revised Q&A on the Neufeld Memo containing helpful language under Questions 5 and Question 13, which did not exist in the prior guidance dated August 2, 2011.

Q5: Am I required to submit a letter or other documentation from the end-client that identifies the beneficiary to demonstrate that a valid employer-employee relationship will exist between the petitioner and beneficiary if the beneficiary will perform services at an end-client/third-party location?

A5: No. While documents from the end-client may help USCIS determine whether a valid employer-employee relationship will exist, this type of documentation is not required. You may submit a combination of any documents to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the required relationship will exist. The types of evidence listed in the memorandum are not exhaustive. Adjudicators will review and weigh all the evidence submitted to determine whether you have met your burden in establishing that a qualifying employer-employee relationship will exist.

Q13:  The memorandum provides an example of when a computer consulting company had not established a valid employer-employee relationship. Are there any situations in which a consulting company or a staffing company would be able to establish a valid employer-employee relationship?

A13:  Yes. A consulting company or staffing company may be able to establish that a valid employer-employee relationship will exist, including where the beneficiary will be working at a third-party worksite, if the petitioning consulting or staffing company can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it has the right to control the work of the beneficiary. Relevant factors include, but are not limited to, whether the petitioner will pay the beneficiary’s salary; whether the petitioner will determine the beneficiary’s location and relocation assignments (i.e. where the beneficiary is to report to work); and whether the petitioner will perform supervisory duties such as conducting performance reviews, training, and counseling for the beneficiary. The memorandum provides a non-exhaustive list of types of evidence that could demonstrate an employer-employee relationship.

It is heartening to know that the failure to submit direct document from the end client will not be fatal. It is often times very difficult to obtain such a letter from the end client, especially when there are multi-vendor arrangements between the end client and the H-1B petitioner. Moreover, the end client may not want to be involved in any way in the visa petitioning process, without realizing that its reluctance to submit a letter can result in a denial of the H-1B petition and deprive it of a crucial worker for its project. The revised Q & A states that the petitioner “may submit a combination of any documents to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the required [employer-employee] relationship will exist.” It is hoped that USCIS will not willfully ignore this guidance. Also, consuls should note that the absence of direct documentation from the end client should not cause them to refuse the H-1B visa, and recommend to the USCIS that the H-1B petition be revoked.

Also welcome is the absence of the pejorative term “job shop” in the answer to Question 13, and the fact that the Q&A states that a consulting or staffing company can still demonstrate through the preponderance of the evidence that it has the right to control the work of the beneficiary, even though he or she may be at a third party client site. It also provides helpful tips on how the consulting or staffing firm can demonstrate a right of control through conducting performance reviews, training and counseling for the beneficiary. While the USCIS would doubtless prefer the daily assertion of actual control by the H-1B petitioner even though it has professed that the H-1B employer only exercise the right of control, it is encouraging to note that this latest guidance does indeed provide concrete examples that are truly indicative of “the right to control.” It would appear that, so long as the indicia of ultimate supervision are present, the absence of day-to-day review will not be fatal.  Such flexibility will not only restore a utilitarian suppleness to the H-1B but to other non-immigrant visa categories, notably the off-site L-1B intra-company transferee, where artificial notions of rigid control have also proved consistently at variance with contemporary business practice.

Beyond that, while the H-1B petitioner must always retain primary control, Neufeld redux does not demand total or exclusive control. This could mean, for example, that input from end users as part of performance reviews would not only be tolerated but sanctioned.  While the selection of locations and assignments remain the province of the H-1B petitioner, as they should, there is no reason why daily on-the-job consultations with end user management cannot take place consistent with retention of H-1B status. A distinction between first and last decisions as compared to every day tactical adjustments is good news for an economy still struggling to get back on its feet. Though this may not have been their intent, the drafters of this update have brought the Neufeld memorandum closer to what Judge Kessler had in mind when she dismissed the Broadgate complaint:

To summarize, the Court concludes the Memorandum establishes interpretive guidelines for the implementation of the Regulation, and does not bind USCIS adjudicators in their determinations of Plaintiffs’ H-1B visa applications

This latest guidance represents an unspoken but nonetheless enlightened attempt to align the Neufeld Memorandum with the way America works. If followed, it can help save H-1B petition requests from impending doom. The only remaining issue is whether this revised Q&A will be seriously followed by the USCIS officers, and in turn, by the US Consulates. Regardless,  an H-1B petitioner whose business model involves placing H-1B workers at third party client sites should actively rely on this revised Q&A when filing H-1B petitions or when responding to requests for evidence to assert its right of control over the beneficiary.

There is a larger reason why those of us who have so strenuously attacked the Neufeld Memorandum should welcome this revision. The absence of guidance is the lawyer’s worst nightmare. Without knowing how the game is played, the lawyer does not know when to advance or when to retreat. He or she is prone to putting in too much or not enough, placing undue emphasis on what is tangential while glossing over the truly essential. Some cases take an excessive amount of time to prepare while others are filed prematurely. Law becomes a high stakes poker game, justice by ambush. The USCIS adjudicator is also at sea. Uncertain what standards to employ, frustrated by  nagging suspicion that agile advocacy by an unscrupulous bar will win benefits for clients who do not deserve them, the line analyst at the Vermont or California Service Center faced with a subtle H-1B fact pattern looks in vain to Washington for clarity that does not come. The process becomes complex, complicated and expensive. Conflict replaces cooperation leading to litigation and micromanagement. There seems no exit. When nothing is certain, almost anything can happen.

That is where the Neufeld Memorandum and the August 2011 guidance left us (although the earlier guidance consistent with DHS’s policy to welcome entrepreneurs clarified how an owner of a company could get an H-1B visa). Not really knowing how the USCIS would interpret the third party placement of an H-1B temporary worker, we were left with a Hobson’s choice between bedlam and litigation. The only thing that was certain was the absence of certainty itself. That is why this most recent Neufeld Q&A is so welcome for it has within it the potential to restore clarity and stability to a singularly important question of law in the increasingly contentious H-1B debate at a time when both qualities were singularly lacking. Rhetoric is not reality, however, and the possibility that skeptical USCIS adjudicators will simply ignore this most recent guidance remains a disturbing possibility. We all know from bitter experience the gap between promise and performance. Good intentions in Washington DC can be frustrated quite well by sustained resistance in the trenches. If the wisdom of good men and women will prevail, this will not happen. Hopefully, the deliberate deployment and informed application of this newly minted wisdom will turn the Neufeld Memo from a symbol of intransigence into a  tool for nuanced adjudication. That will deserve the genuine approbation of all those who doubtless will wonder why the USCIS did not think of this earlier.

(The views expressed by guest author, Gary Endelman, are his and not of his firm, FosterQuan LLP)

THE PREJUDICE CAUSED BY SUMMARY REMOVAL AFTER VISA WAIVER ADMISSION: WHAT THE THIRD CIRCUIT MISSED IN VERA AND BRADLEY

In its decision earlier this month in the case of Vera v. Attorney General of the U.S., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a woman who had entered the United States at the age of 12 under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) could be removed without a hearing before an immigration judge, even though the government could not produce proof that she had actually waived her right to such a hearing. The Third Circuit in Vera relied on a presumption that the waiver must have been properly executed since this was required by statute in order for Ms. Vera to be admitted under the VWP, and also on the argument, first accepted by the Third Circuit in the case of Bradley v. Attorney General of the U.S., 603 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2010), that there was no prejudice to Ms. Vera from any lack of a knowing and voluntary waiver because the summary removal that she now faced was the same consequence that she would have faced if she had refused to sign the waiver. This second argument, similar to one made by the en banc Seventh Circuit in Bayo v. Napolitano, 593 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2010), appears to be based on a misunderstanding regarding the consequences of the different types of summary removals that can occur under the VWP.

Additional background details regarding the VWP, as well as regarding the original decision by the Seventh Circuit in Bayo (preceding the en banc decision relied upon by Bradley), are available in a March 23, 2009 article by this author on our firm’s website. For present purposes, it suffices to note that VWP entrants are required by statute, as noted in Vera and its predecessors, to waive their rights to contest removal other than on the basis of an application for asylum, or similar relief from removal based on the threat of persecution or torture. If a VWP entrant who has waived these rights is found inadmissible at the time of applying for admission, or is later found to be deportable, he or she may be summarily removed without a hearing, absent an application for asylum or related relief. There are, however, important differences between the consequences of summary removal upon initial application for admission under the VWP, and summary removal after admission under the VWP.

The procedures regarding determinations of inadmissibility and deportability under the VWP are set forth in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a)-(b), available online from the Government Printing Office. The provision regarding “Determinations of inadmissibility” at 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a) addresses the procedure by which “[a]n alien who applies for admission under [INA § 217], who is determined . . . not to be eligible for admission under that section or to be inadmissible to the United States . . . will be refused admission into the United States and removed.” 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a)(1). Relevant here, 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a)(3) provides that “Refusal of admission under paragraph (a)(1) of this section shall not constitute removal for purposes of the Act.”

With regard to those admitted under the VWP, on the other hand, 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b)(1) lays out the procedures for summary deportation of “[a]n alien who has been admitted to the United States under [the VWP] who is determined by an immigration officer to be deportable from the United States under one or more of the grounds of deportability listed in section 237 of the Act.” The immediately following paragraph, 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b)(2), makes clear that “Removal by the district director under paragraph (b)(1) of this section is equivalent in all respects and has the same consequences as removal after proceedings conducted under section 240 of the Act.”

The key distinction between an initial refusal of admission under 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a) and a later summary deportation under 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b), then, is that the former “shall not constitute removal for purposes of” the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), but the latter has the same consequences as removal after full-fledged removal proceedings under INA section 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. This distinction is important because removal under the INA has long-term consequences.

Most notably, one who has been removed is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A), for a period of time varying between five years and indefinitely, depending on the circumstances of removal. In the ordinary course, when a removal order is issued after proceedings that were not initiated upon the arrival of the person removed, and there is no question of a second removal or an aggravated felony conviction, the period of inadmissibility is ten years pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I). One who wishes to seek readmission before this period has lapsed must obtain special consent to reapply for admission, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii). Such permission to reapply for admission can be sought from USCIS by filing an application on Form I-212, but will be granted only in the exercise of discretion and not automatically.

Summary refusal of admission to a VWP applicant, under 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a), is not an order of removal for purposes of the INA according to 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a)(3), and thus does not lead to a requirement that the refused applicant seek special permission to reapply for admission. Summary removal of a VWP applicant subsequent to admission under 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b), on the other hand, has the same consequences as removal following ordinary removal proceedings according to 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b)(2), which is to say that it will lead to at least a ten-year bar on readmission under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I) absent special, discretionary permission to reapply.

Thus, it was incorrect for the Third Circuit to say in Bradley and again in Vera that “Had Bradley known the contents of the waiver and refused to sign, he would be in the same position as he is now – subject to summary removal without a hearing” and thus unable to obtain status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. Bradley, 603 F.3d at 241; Vera, slip op. at 20. The summary removal without a hearing that Mr. Bradley and Ms. Vera would have faced at the time of their initial applications for admission, if they had refused to sign the VWP waiver based on a true understanding of what it meant, carried no collateral consequence of future inadmissibility to the United States. The summary removal that they faced after admission, on the other hand, carried a penalty of inadmissibility for 10 years.

Had Ms. Vera been refused admission when she came to the United States as a minor because she refused to sign the VWP waiver or was found unable to understand it, she would not have faced any bar on readmission to the United States. Now, however, she will, if removed under 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b), be inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(9)(A) for a period of ten years. That alone would constitute the prejudice that the Third Circuit claimed was absent. Ms. Vera will also, if she is removed, likely be inadmissible for ten years under INA § 212(a)(9)(B), given her unlawful presence subsequent to admission, which she and Mr. Bradley would not have accrued if they had been refused admission because of refusal to sign a waiver—and which, even after they had accrued it, would not have precluded her or Mr. Bradley from adjusting status under INA § 245(a) based on a petition by a U.S. citizen immediate relative (such as a spouse) in the absence of the order of removal under 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b) that is at issue here, so that there is indeed prejudice in this regard as well from subjecting Ms. Vera and Mr. Bradley to the strictures of the summary removal process despite the asserted lack of a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights by either of them. The Third Circuit’s suggestion that there was no prejudice in Vera and Bradley appears to have been based on the assumption that refusal of VWP admission under 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a) and subsequent summary deportation under 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b) are legally identical procedures with identical consequences, but this is not the case.

With this erroneous argument out of the way, the Third Circuit’s ruling in Vera appears to rest solely on the notion that a twelve-year-old girl must be presumed to have executed a knowing, voluntary, and meaningful waiver of her due process rights with regard to future removal from the United States simply because the governing statute and regulations indicate that the government ought to have required such a waiver prior to allowing her to enter the United States. That is a slender reed indeed, as discussed in a recent posting on the AILA Slip Opinion Blog. The Second Circuit’s decision in Galluzzo v. Holder, which the Third Circuit in Vera declined to follow and which held that a VWP entrant’s due process rights would have been violated (if prejudice were shown) when he was subjected to summary removal without any actual waiver, is significantly more convincing on that subject, and should be followed by other courts in the future. Indeed, it would make sense for even the Third Circuit, in the event of future panel or en banc reconsideration of Vera (or en banc reconsideration of its precedential value in a future case), to follow Galluzzo once the prejudice to someone in Ms. Vera’s situation has been explained.

Stop the Assault on Employment Immigration to the USA

At the behest of Senator Grassley (R-IA), the DHS Office of Inspector General recently issue a controversial report, The Effects of USCIS Adjudication Procedures and Policies on Fraud Detection by Immigration Service Officers. I wonder about the intentions of Senator Grassley who put a hold on the Fairness For High Skilled Immigrants Act, which passed the Republican controlled House of Representatives by a landslide on November 29, 2011. More recently, Senator Grassley also put a hold on the Startup Visa Act, which has also received bipartisan support. Is he truly concerned about the integrity of the system or is there a deeper hidden agenda. Mind you, he has also been a foe of immigration from India with his recent opposition to the use of the H-1B and B-1 visas by Indian IT professionals. It is amazing how one Senator, who has only one vote among 100 Senators, can have so much influence over immigration policy. It is time to speak out.The report stems from a pet concern of Senator Grassley, as expressed by Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith in a February 15, 2012 hearing  before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, about whether “senior [USCIS] leaders are putting pressure on employees to approve more visa applications, even if the applications might be fraudulent or the applicant is ineligible.”

The Inspector General interviewed 147 managers and staff, received 256 responses to an online survey, and reviewed USCIS policies related to the effort to detect benefit fraud. The report was based on testimonials, not empirical data. The report recommended process improvements, such as instituting more training and collaboration to improve the fraud referral process; developing additional quality assurance or supervisory review procedures to strengthen identification of names and aliases of those seeking an immigration benefit; performing nationwide onsite outreach efforts to discuss the performance management system with Immigration Service Officers (ISOs); developing standards to permit more time for an ISO’s review of case files; revising policy on requests for evidence (RFEs) to clarify the role that the requests play in the adjudication process; and developing a policy to “establish limitations for [USCIS] managers and attorneys when they intervene in the adjudication of specific cases.” The report stated that “special treatment of complainants fosters a sense among ISOs that USCIS inappropriately grants benefits in certain cases.”

The report noted that “[t]here may be a basis for clarifying adjudication policy for O visa petitions. A low approval rate is not one of them.” The Inspector General found that O visa petitions are granted at a high rate. “Quality assurance information we examined demonstrates that excessive O visa approvals are more likely than denials.” The report stated, “From January 2008 through March 2011, the California and Vermont service centers approved 40,719 of 44,386 O visa petitions (91.7%). This approval rate exceeds the approval rate for many other nonimmigrant worker petitions. During the same time period, the two centers approved 78.5% of H-1B (specialty occupations) and 76.1% of L-1B (specialized knowledge worker) petitions.”

The Inspector General’s report noted, however, that: (1) the testimonial evidence shared by interviewees may not represent views shared by other employees; (2) USCIS has taken action to diminish threats to the immigration benefits system; (3) general employee concerns about the impact of production pressure in the quality of ISO decisions “do not mean that systemic problems compromise the ability of USCIS to detect fraud and security threats; (4) “[n]o ISOs presented us with cases where benefits were granted to those who pose terrorist or national security threats”; and (5) “[e]ven those employees who criticized management expressed confidence that USCIS would never compromise national security on a given case.”

The report concluded, however, that “[e]ven with the additional security checks and process improvements USCIS has made in the past several years, national security and fraud concerns may require more thorough review of immigration applications and petitions.” The OIG noted that “[a]dditional documentation, or further insight gained through more interview questions, would ensure that ISOs have greater confidence before making a decision.” Also, the report suggests that “Congress may wish to raise the standard of proof for some or all USCIS benefit issuance decisions.”

As an immigration practitioner, the Inspector General’s conclusions about applications being granted  too easily have no bearing with reality.  A filing of an H-1B or L petition, especially in certain industries such as IT consulting, results in a lengthy and detailed RFE asking for every aspect of the job duties, elaborate itineraries and unrealistic work schedules (such as the percentage of time performing each duty)  and other unnecessarily and trivial information about the employer and the employment. This is true even if the USCIS has been approving an H-1B petition previously on the exact facts for the very same worker who must be now be on his 10th year in H-1B status. Also, in the case of an H-1B worker in an IT consulting company who is placed at a third party client, the employer has to repeatedly demonstrate that it has a right of control  under the Neufeld Memo over this worker’s employment even if the employer demonstrated this in great detail when it last filed a request for an H-1B extension.

Senator Grassley, I ask you to put yourself in the shoes of this H-1B worker who has an approved I-140 immigrant visa petition for the green card, but is still waiting endlessly for it, along with his family, only because of the long waits in the EB-2 or EB-3 for India. If you did not put a hold on the Fairness for High Skilled Immigrants Act, this H-1B worker may have received a green card by now or close to receiving one. He now needs to wait nervously each year for an approval, with the fear that the H-1B may be denied this time around even though it got approved under the same facts the year before and the year before that. If the H-1B gets denied this time under some arbitrarily invented heightened scrutiny standard,  he and his family will fall out of status and will have to most likely need to leave the US after working in the US legally for 10 years, paying taxes and otherwise contributing to the productivity of his employer and clients. He will also be forced to yank his brilliant children out of school disrupting their lives and causing great turmoil in their young  impressionable minds.

If the OIG report becomes USCIS policy, it will kill and stifle a US employer’s ability to bring in skilled foreign national workers on H-1B, L-1 and O-1 visas. Despite Senator Grassley placing a hold on the Startup Visa Act, the DHS in August 2011 announced initiatives for entrepreneurs who founded their own startups to be able to have the company file for an H-1B visa on their behalf. This initiative too will get killed because if the government wants to look for fraud for the sake of satisfying certain statistical requirements, it will find it by shifting the goal posts. Look how many times over the past 10 years the USCIS has redefined what it means by the US equivalent of an Indian bachelor’s degree or equivalent education, thus blowing apart I-140 petitions approved after the employer meticulously but unsuccessfully tested the US labor market. Or look how the Neufeld Memo has been aimed against a very successful business model that has served the needs of Fortune 500 US corporations. If we see stricter adjudications, the US will be deprived of the talents and vision of foreign entrepreneurs who have a burning desire to set up startups in the US even in the absence of the Startup Visa Act, which have the potential to do brilliantly well like Google, E-bay or Yahoo.

At the February 15, 2012 Congressional hearing, the testimony of Bo Cooper, former General Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, is worth noting. Summaries of other witnesses at this Congressional hearing can be found in our forthcoming March 2012 Immigration Update.  Mr. Cooper said that USCIS has released official data since the report came out. He noted that recent analysis shows that the data refute concerns “that USCIS may be institutionally biased toward unjustified approvals and that the agency observes policies that would suppress RFE issuance.” The data tell the opposite story, he said: “Particularly with respect to the key nonimmigrant categories for foreign professionals, denial rates and RFE rates have risen very sharply in recent years.”

The “most startling example,” Mr.Cooper said, appears in the L-1 program, which is used by multinational corporations to transfer managers, executives, and specialists into the United States. Noting that such visas “are an essential component of a huge range of productive economic activity in this country,” he said that L-1 visas are critical to attracting foreign investment that supports the creation of jobs for U.S. workers and are critical when U.S. companies acquire companies based oversees and need to have the acquired company’s specialists come to the United States to integrate their expertise and processes. L-1 visas are also critical to companies who need to bring specialists from their overseas affiliates into their research centers and operations in the United States, he noted. “Without predictable, reliable access to these visas, employers find themselves having to move jobs and projects to other countries.”

The data for employees with specialized knowledge in the L-1B program “shows a steep rise in denials and requests for evidence beginning in 2008,” he said, noting that the denial rate for L-1B petitions more than tripled in 2008 and is now at nearly quadruple the pre-2008 rate, at 27 percent in 2011. The RFE rate change is even starker, he said. From 2005 to 2011, the rate soared from 9 percent to 63 percent of L-1B cases.

He also noted that in the L-1A program for managers and executives being transferred within multinational corporations, the RFE rate rose from 10 percent in 2005 to 51 percent in 2011. Denial rates rose 75 percent over five years, from 8 percent in 2007 to 14 percent in 2011. In the H-1B program for professionals in specialty occupations, the denial rate increased from 11 percent in 2007 to 17 percent in 2011. Over a quarter of all H-1B filings generated an RFE in 2011.

Seen in the light of this data, Mr. Cooper said “there is no basis for the concern expressed in the OIG report that USCIS has an institutional bias in favor of approvals or against RFEs.” In fact, he said, the data show the opposite trend. Noting that USCIS said in its response to the OIG report that it is reviewing its RFE policy and aims to issue new RFE guidance this year, Mr. Cooper recommended that the new policy reflect “the needs of today’s business environment and the innovation economy,” and that it be monitored carefully once put into practice.

Finally, the Inspector General’s report asks that the standard for adjudicating visa petitions be raised from the “preponderance of evidence standard” to something higher, such as the “clear and convincing evidence” standard or the even higher standard used in criminal proceedings, which is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Under the preponderance of evidence standard, applicants have to demonstrate that the facts in their case are slightly more true than not true. Even though the preponderance of evidence standard requires a lesser degree of proof than the clear and convincing standard, this does not mean that it provides an invitation for fraud. The preponderance of evidence is the common standard used in civil proceedings, and allows the USCIS examiner to fairly evaluate very nebulous criteria while giving the benefit of doubt to the application, for instance, whether an O-1 visa applicant is extraordinary or not or whether an L-1B worker has specialized knowledge. If the applicant provided patently fraudulent documentation, he or she can be charged with the fraud ground of inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(c)(6) and there also exist tough criminal sanctions.  In any event, it does not seem that the USCIS is faithfully adhering to the preponderance of evidence standard even today, and officially raising the bar will surely serve as an invitation for USCIS officials to arbitrarily deny even more case without fairly weighing the evidence. This would further undermine the ability of US employers to use our employment-based immigration system in an effective and rational manner to benefit them and simultaneously make the US prosper.

THE SUPERVISED RECRUITMENT ROLLER COASTER -THE RIDE THUS FAR

You filed a spotless labor certification. It was a perfect case, a perfect employer and a perfect employee with the perfect qualifications. Yet, one day, there it was in the mail. The dreaded Notification of Supervised Recruitment (“NSR”). The Department of Labor (“DOL”) had long advised to expect increased Supervised Recruitment. You knew the possibility of receiving an NSR existed and had advised your client accordingly. Still, its arrival was disappointing. Initial indignation (“How dare they?”) gave way to resignation (“Oh well, that’s just the way the cookie crumbles.”) to actual enthusiasm (“Hey, this will give me chance to finally see what this crazy process is about!”). And so, assuring your client that all will be well, you took their hand and boarded the Supervised Recruitment roller coaster.

The DOL is authorized, under 20 C.F.R. § 656.21, to conduct Supervised Recruitment.  The article by Cyrus Mehta, Maggie Murphy and David Ware, Supervised  Recruitments in Tough Economic Times – Practical Tips For Compliance quoted Solicitor of Labor Gregory F. Jacob who said, “Supervised Recruitment is one of many tools the [Department of Labor] uses to safeguard the integrity of the permanent labor certification process and protect job opportunities for American workers. The department takes seriously its statutory responsibility to ensure that American workers have access to jobs they are qualified and willing to do.” This article also indicated that the DOL will target employers in industries with publicized layoffs in specific geographic locations, e.g. employers in the financial industry in New York City. The DOL may also target employers in the computer and auto industries. The DOL has begun to make good on its threat to increase Supervised Recruitment and like most practitioners, I am currently in the middle of the Supervised Recruitment process, with no telling where this ride will take me next. Based on experiences thus far, here is some of what can be expected.

Requests for extension may/may not be granted

The NSR describes the steps involved in the Supervised Recruitment process and gives the employer 30 calendar days, from the date of the NSR, to submit a draft advertisement and any additional information requested in the NSR. The NSR also indicates that the employer may submit a timely request for one extension of the 30-day timeframe by e-mailing the DOL at SR.processing@dol.gov. A good reason for an extension would be that you are a new attorney of record. However, the employer cannot rely on the mere timely submission of an extension request. The request must be officially granted.  The problem is that the DOL may respond within 1-2 days; may take longer than a week to respond; or may not respond! Moreover, there is also no guarantee that the response will be favorable. Because of this uncertainty, it is best to begin to prepare a response to the NSR which can be timely filed in the event that no response from the DOL has been received.

The requirements for the advertisement are different

The NSR lists the required content for advertisements. One immediately becomes aware that the rules under Supervised Recruitment are different from the PERM rules. Under Supervised Recruitment, the advertisement must contain the job title; the job duties; the work schedule; the education and experience requirements; the geographic location(s) of employment; the Kellogg language, “Any suitable combination of education, training or experience is acceptable;” the offered wage; and a list of any training to be provided to employees. The advertisement must direct applicants to submit their applications to the DOL’s Recruitment and Employment Office.

The NSR may also request additional documentation. For example, the DOL may require the employer to “explain any limitations on training…with regard to [the offered] position.” The DOL does not clarify what is meant by this request but asks that the employer note that a worker is able and qualified for the job opportunity if the worker can acquire the skills necessary to perform the duties involved in the occupation during a reasonable period of on-the-job training.

Requests for additional information

Once the draft advertisement has been submitted, the DOL may request additional information. For example, a draft ad requesting that applicants “must be willing to work in unanticipated locations across the US” may elicit a request that the employer establish the business necessity for this requirement. The employer will be given 30 calendar days from the date of the request within which to submit its response.

Making changes to the ad after it has been submitted

Once the draft advertisement has been submitted, it may be possible to make amendments to the ad by e-mailing the DOL. For instance, in one case, after the draft advertisement had been submitted to the DOL, the employer asked whether it could indicate that there were multiple, identical positions available within the company. The DOL responded favorably to an e-mail inquiry requiring only that the specific number of positions be indicated. However, it may not be possible to make a drastic amendment to the advertisement from what was stated in the PERM form.

Issues with recruitment

Once the employer’s draft advertisement has been approved, the DOL will issue its Recruitment Instructions.  The Recruitment Instructions are specific instructions informing the employer where and when the advertisement must run. Again, here, the recruitment process will differ from what is required under PERM.  For example, for a professional position, the DOL may require that a 30-day job order be placed with the State Workforce Agency (SWA); that the ad run in a specific major newspaper and online for 3 consecutive days including a Sunday; that the ad run on the employer’s website for 7 consecutive days; that the ad run on 2 other websites for 7 consecutive days; and that the employer post the Notice of Filing for 10 consecutive business days.  All of the recruitment must commence within 15 days of the date of the Recruitment Instructions notification.

The problem is, sometimes, it takes several days for the Recruitment Instructions notification to arrive in the mail. By the time the instructions arrive, the employer may only have 10 days left of the initial 15 days. Then, the employer may encounter problems with some of the recruitment steps. For instance, depending on the particular SWA, it may take up to 7 days to post the job order. To make matters worse, some SWAs may edit the posting (e.g. directing that applications be sent to the employer’s headquarters).  Some SWAs are notorious for randomly editing the job order even after it has been posted for a few days.  The word “sabotage” inevitably comes to mind but I digress. It is important to constantly and painstakingly check the contents of the job order.

Sometimes, the DOL will instruct that the advertisement be placed in the most expensive newspaper of general circulation. For instance, the DOL may instruct that an advertisement for a professional position in Edison, New Jersey, run for 3 consecutive days including a Sunday in the New York Times when the New Jersey Star Ledger is a perfectly appropriate and less expensive newspaper. Considering the extensive requirements for the advertisement (discussed above), it may cost several thousand dollars to run the ad in the newspaper.  Of course, the employer may e-mail the DOL to request a change of newspaper. But again, the DOL may respond in 1-2 days, may take a long time to respond or may never respond. Oftentimes, the employer is forced to simply pay the advertising fees.

The employer is required to e-mail a recruitment schedule to the DOL, no later than 15 days after the last placed advertisement.

Resumes

The DOL will not wait to gather any number of resumes but will forward them to the employer as they are received. In some cases, the resumes will only be sent to the attorney and in other cases, the attorney will only be cc’d on the communication.  If an attorney receives a resume, it is important that this be forwarded to the employer immediately upon receipt so that it can be appropriately evaluated. Also, it is important that the attorney not evaluate the resume before the employer does. Remember the DOL insists that the employer first consider a US worker applicant and not the attorney.  Employers are also required to consider any resumes that may be sent directly to them.

Expected next steps are that the DOL will issue its request for the final written Recruitment Report and will issue a determination whether to grant or deny the application.

I am sure that practitioners can provide countless anecdotes on their experiences with Supervised Recruitment. The only thing I think we can count on is that Supervised Recruitment is not going away. Stay tuned for more highlights from this journey that I have just embarked upon.

What a Company Needs to Know That Hosts but Does Not Employ Skilled Nonimmigrant Workers

I would like to share my article, Due Diligence Considerations For Companies Contracting With Vendor Service Providers, which appeared in the New Jersey Lawyer, October 2011 issue. This is an emerging area and it behooves corporations that contract with companies for skilled nonimmigrant workers on H-1B, L-1 or B-1 visas to know more about whom they are getting on board. Indeed, exercising greater due diligence can be a win-win for all the parties involved – the petitioning company, the end user client company and the nonimmigrant worker. In addition to protecting itself from potential liability, the client company by cooperating with the petitioning company on a number of fronts can also ensure a swift and more firm approval of the visa.

Many corporations in need of specialized skilled workers who are in short supply do not sponsor foreign nationals for their work permits. Instead, these companies contract with other entities that employ skilled workers, who in turn are then assigned to the client company for a specific project. This is especially true with information technology (IT) services, where foreign nationals on temporary visas predominate. While the obligations for a sponsoring employer are onerous, it is important for the end user client company to be vigilant to ensure that foreign national workers assigned to a company are working under the appropriate visa categories. In the event that the end user client has knowledge or encourages activities not authorized under these visa categories, there is potential for the company to be ensnared in criminal liability.  Even short of criminal liability, it is important to make sure due diligence has been done to avoid being caught up in an embarrassing investigation against a partner company.

Here are a few examples of how an end user company can get unwittingly caught up with liability. If the end user company urgently needs software engineers through its IT contracting company for a project, a manager within the end user company may be requested to write a let­ter as a client of the contracting compa­ny to justify the need for its employee overseas to visit the U.S. on a B-1 visa. If this letter indicates that the software engineer is required for meetings, or to conduct an analysis of the project to be subsequently worked on overseas (a per­missible B-1 activity), but the actual pur­pose is for the engineer to actually par­ticipate in programming and working on the solution in the U.S., it may come back to haunt the end user company if there is a criminal investigation against the IT contracting company. Therefore, when drafting such a letter, it is important to ensure that the proposed activities discussed in the letter are per­missible B-1 activities, and when the foreign national arrives, he or she engages in activities that are consistent with the listed activities.

Similarly, under a January 8, 2010, USCIS guidance memorandum by Donald Neufeld, concerning employer/employee relationship in H-1B petitions, especially where an H-1B employer places employees at a third-party site, it is important for the sponsoring employer to demonstrate that it exercises the right of control over its non-citizen employee if he or she is placed at a third-party client site. In order to win an H-IB approval, the petitioning employer generally requests confirmation from its client company about the H-IB worker’s assignment arrangement at its location, and that it is the employer who actually exercises the ultimate control over the employment. The end user client company, often through lay­ers of middlemen vendors, must take care that the letter accurately describes the arrangement. On the one hand, the issuance of such a letter confirms that the company is not the employer, thus eliminating a situation where it may be held liable as an employer for wages and benefits. On the other hand, there may be situations where the petitioning enti­ty exercises no control over the H-IB worker’s employment, and the person reports directly to a manager with the client company rather than the petitioner. In the post Neufeld Memo era, client companies may also want to cooperate with the petitioning company to allow a representative to visit the client location to evaluate its employee’s performance and to provide regular assessments and feedback of the nonimmigrant worker’s performance to the petitioning employer even while the immediate supervision lies with the client company.

Care should, therefore, be taken not to inadvertently misrepresent the nature of the assignment at the company.  Moreover, the petitioner must demonstrate that the position being filled by the H-1B worker at the company requires a bachelor’s degree or higher in a specialty.  Here too, the client must take the utmost precautions to not misrepresent the minimum requirements of the position.  Some end user companies choose not to issue letters as they are not obligated to do so. If however they really need the services of the skilled nonimmigrant worker for a project, it would be more prudent for them to cooperate with respect to such a letter – as well as confirming who exercises immediate supervision and ultimate control – as that would allow the nonimmigrant to win the visa approval while giving the client company an opportunity to also conduct due diligence regarding the hosting of such an individual.

Moreover, if an H-1B worker is assigned to a client location, DOL regulations require that the petitioning employer must have posted notice at two conspicuous places where the work is actually performed informing about the occupational classification, wages offered, period of employment and the work location, among other things. While the petitioner is solely responsible for posting the notice at the physical location, it would behoove the responsible officer at the client company to cooperate with the posting in order to ensure that its contractor is fully compliant with the attestation requirements.

Finally, the USCIS’s fraud detection national security division may also pay a “friendly” surprise visit to the client company to ensure that the work location and other terms of employment are consistent with the H-1B petition. Similarly, specialized knowledge workers on L-1B visas at client locations must satisfy the FDNS investigator that they are under the “control and supervision” of the petitioning company, and this person should also be implementing a product or application of the contracting company or deploying a methodology that is unique to the petitioning company. Moreover, any letters issued by the client company can also be verified via a surprise call from the State Department when the foreign national applies for the nonimmigrant visa at the US consulate.

By exercising due diligence, a client company can avoid an investigation, which even if not targeted against it can still generate bad publicity, as well as potential liability. More important, by cooperating with the petitioning company, the nonimmigrant visa petition can withstand scrutiny while it is being processed, and can potentially result in a quicker and surer approval, resulting in the skilled nonimmigrant worker being able to come on board to work on a critical project for the client company.

Immigration Reform Through Green Card Stories

Green Card Stories is a gem of a book, and I feel inspired to write about it. Written by award winning journalist, Saundra Amrhein, with stunning photographs by award winning photographer, Ariana Lindquist, the book puts a human face on immigration through the journeys of 50 individuals who got their green cards. My good friends, Laura Danielson and Steve Yale-Loehr, produced the book with a lot of dedication and tenacity. Hopefully, their hard work will reap rewards resulting in more rational and humane immigration laws.

Most Americans, whatever their view on immigration may be, tend to see immigrants whom they may know with a different lens, especially if they are co-workers, friends, neighbors or parents in the same school community. Even if immigrants may be demonized in the current political climate, especially those who are undocumented, when one gets to actually know this person,   you may probably not view him or her with the same bias. This is what Green Card Stories tries to do. One gets to like the immigrants portrayed in the book even if you do not know them in person. In fact, they all magically come alive when you read their stories and the photographs also reveal facets that no amount of words will ever tell.

Take the example of Francis Price, who is photographed as a successful person meditating on his journey in his well appointed home adorned with tasteful art. He came to the US from Jamaica with $25 to become a businessman in the United States who also served as a trustee of the University of Rochester, his alma mater. Somewhere along the way after he received his green card and built businesses employing hundreds of people, he was put into deportation when applying for citizenship because of the mistake of his lawyer in Jamaica who had not finalized his divorce to his former wife. It was thus discovered after several years that he wrongfully entered as the single son of a sponsoring parent when he was actually married. Fortunately, while in deportation, his current US citizen wife again sponsored him for a green card, while he applied for a waiver to forgive the past violation, and the Immigration Judge again granted him the green card.

Or Gulnahar Alam, whom I represented pro bono, who escaped  a horrific domestic violence situation in Bangladesh,  only to find herself working grueling domestic jobs for families in the New York area. She applied for political asylum and won, being one of the first to assert that domestic violence constituted a form of persecution. Today, she is a well known advocate on behalf of immigrant domestic workers, won several awards,  and works for a diabetes education project among minorities at New York University.

There is also the amazing story of Mikel Murga from Spain, who now teaches at MIT, and who got his green card three times. He abandoned his first green card after returning to his country, but gave up the second green card, so that his minor son could accompany him as a derivative under the third green card. While most immigrants are lucky to be able to get green cards just once, Murga is quoted while looking quite the professor in his portrait, “That’s what makes America unique – not how rich it is, they say there are many opportunities, but the most important opportunity is the opportunity to reinvent yourself.” There are 47 other equally inspiring and poignant stories, including one on Jerry Yang who went on to found Yahoo. Read them.

Putting a human face to immigration is the best way to convince others about who they are and the benefits they bring to this country through their struggles, inspiration, ambition and successes. It is also an effective way to counter the lies about immigrants espoused by a loud and vocal minority. The canard against immigrants is an old one.  This is what the first Select Committee of the House of Representatives to study immigration concluded in the 1850s:

that the number of emigrants from foreign countries into the United States is increasing with such rapidity as to jeopardize the peace and tranquility of our citizens, if not the permanency of the civil, religious, and political institutions of the United States… Many of them are the outcasts of foreign countries; paupers, vagrants, and malefactors….sent hither at the expense of foreign governments, to relieve them from the burden of their maintenance.

One would have thought that this kind of sentiment would have ended by the second decade of the 21st century, but don’t we hear the same things about immigrants today?  Today, it is fashionable in some quarters even by Presidential candidates, members of Congress and state officials to espouse attrition by enforcement, which is a policy to make life so harsh, brutish and unbearable for undocumented immigrants that they will “self deport” themselves. Acknowledging that it would be very costly, if not impossible, to deport the millions of undocumented immigrants, a May 2005 report of Center of Immigration Studies, an anti-immigration organization, writes this in support of attrition:

But there is a third way that rejects this false choice, and it is the only approach that can actually work: Shrink the illegal population through consistent, across-the-board enforcement of the immigration law. By deterring the settlement of new illegals, by increasing deportations to the extent possible, and, most importantly, by increasing the number of illegals already here who give up and deport themselves, the United States can bring about an annual decrease in the illegal-alien population, rather than allowing it to continually increase. The point, in other words, is not merely to curtail illegal immigration, but rather to bring about a steady reduction in the total number of illegal immigrants who are living in the United States. The result would be a shrinking of the illegal population to a manageable nuisance, rather than today’s looming crisis.

This is analogous to the approach a corporation might take to downsizing a bloated workforce: a hiring freeze, some layoffs, plus new incentives to encourage excess workers to leave on their own.

This attrition by enforcement policy has spawned draconian anti-immigration laws such as Arizona’s SB 1070 and Alabama’s HB 56, which aim to banish undocumented immigrants from the state even though they may be pursuing legal status under federal law or legitimately defending themselves in federal removal proceedings. Their goal is to make it a crime if it is suspected that a person is in the state unlawfully (even though under federal law some may remain in the US), for not carrying documentation, and for harboring and transporting unauthorized immigrants. HB 56 goes further by requiring children to provide proof of immigration status prior to enrollment in public schools, and restricting unauthorized immigrants from engaging in contracts and business transactions. Many of these nasty provisions have been temporarily blocked for now, but they can gain a new lease of the life if the US Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of such laws later this year.

Tellingly, many of the people profiled in Green Card Stories could have been snared under these draconian state laws or stricter federal laws prior to getting their green cards. Their stories also show how terribly complex our immigration laws can be, and how easily someone can fall through the cracks. Even while there may be anti-immigrant sentiment, what is most touching in many of the stories is how they were helped by the kindness of strangers in America, which has left a lasting impression on them. The more stories we tell about immigrants desiring to do well in America for themselves and their children, the less scope will there be for politicians and hate groups to dehumanize them in the abstract. After all, immigrants are people, like everyone else, with the same dreams, aspirations, vulnerabilities and frailties. The policies of attrition and self-deportation view undocumented immigrants as vermin that can be quietly driven away notwithstanding the fact that they have loved ones here and have set down strong roots. However, this is less likely to happen if Americans get to know them more from their stories. It is only then that more Americans will come to realize that the better solution is to reform our broken immigration system that would be able to tap into the industry and aspirations of immigrants of all stripes, such as the ones in Green Card Stories, rather than to deport them – and everyone will be better off.

WORKING : H-4 SPOUSES GET TO TAKE A STEP FORWARD, BUT IS IT A GIANT ONE?

By Gary Endelman and Cyrus Mehta

Sometimes it takes a while for a sound idea to gain acceptance. Granting employment authorization to H-4 spouses is a good example. In late March 2010, the authors urged In The Tyranny of Priority Dates that this be done, with or without an employment authorization document (EAD). A few months later, then USCIS General Counsel Roxanna Bacon, Service Center Operations Head Donald Neufeld and Field Operations Chief Debra Rogers recommended precisely this same step to USCIS Director Alejandro Mayorkas, but only for those “H-4 dependent spouses of H-1B principals where the principals are also applicants for lawful permanent residence under AC 21.” Memorandum, Administrative Alternatives to Comprehensive Immigration Reform (posted as AILA InfoNet Doc. 10073063 on July 30, 2010). The memo was leaked by those who wanted to defeat any administrative initiatives and they did so. There matters stood until a few days ago on January 31, 2012 when the Department of Homeland Security brought this idea back to life. The announcement includes other goodies too, but this is what it specifically says about the possibility for an H-4 spouse to work:

  • Provide work authorization for spouses of certain H-1B holders.

This proposed change to the current DHS regulation would allow certain spouses of H-1B visa holders to legally work while their visa holder spouse waits for his or her adjustment of status application to be adjudicated. Specifically, employment will be authorized for H-4 dependent spouses of principal H-1B visa holders who have begun the process of seeking lawful permanent resident status through employment after meeting a minimum period of H-1B status in the U.S. This effort will help retain talented professionals who are valued by U.S. employers and who seek to contribute to our economy.

Those who dig a bit deeper on the government’s regulatory agenda site find a key qualifier that severely limits the benefit granted. Some H-4 spouses it seems are more deserving of the right to work than others: employment authorization is to be extended only to those “H-4 spouses of principal H-1B nonimmigrants who have begun the process of seeking lawful permanent resident status through employment and have extended their authorized period of admission or “stay” in the U.S. under section 104(c) or 106(a) of Public Law 106-313 also known as the American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act.” This means that no H-4 spouse whose H-1B principal has not spent more than 6 years in the USA will be eligible to apply for an EAD. At a minimum, a PERM labor certification or I-140 would have to have been filed, and even approved to qualify for the 3 year H extension under Section 104(c) of AC 21, if less than 365 days had elapsed since submission. After all this, while it seems as if we should celebrate, how loud should the cheering be?

There is no need for the USCIS to adopt such an exceedingly narrow interpretation. After all, if we look at the essentially unlimited authority granted by INA 274A(h)(3)(B), it seems clear that the USCIS can grant employment authorization to anyone at any time for any purpose. As our insightful colleague David Isaacson has cogently pointed out, under these circumstances, an EAD can be issued to someone who is not attached to either a PERM or an approved I-140. Indeed, an H-4 spouse whose H-1B principal is the beneficiary of an approved family-based third preference I-130 benefits not at all since such approval would not sustain a 7th H year under AC 21. Save for National Interest Waivers and Persons of Extraordinary Ability, which do not need a job offer, the right of an H-4 spouse to work is conditioned upon the willingness of the H-1B principal’s employer to sponsor his/her mate for LPR status, something over which the H-4 spouse has no control.

There is nothing in the INA that prevents an H-4 spouse from working. This prohibition is purely an act of regulation. That being the case, what prevents the USCIS from taking a more generous view? We would do well to remember that the unavailability of an EAD outside the adjustment of status context forces people into the H-1B category who might not otherwise need or even want to be there. Allowing all H-4 spouses to work would ease the pressure on the H-1B category and, by so doing, serve to diminish opposition to all employment-based immigration. While it is true that the H-1B is subject to an annual limitation each year, most other nonimmigrant work visas do not have an annual cap. Beyond that, America suffers when the nation forgets that many talented H-1B beneficiaries choose not to stay here because their H-4 spouses are unable to work. See Matt Richtel , Tech Recruiting Clashes with Immigration Rules, N.Y.Times, Apr.12, 2009.

Truth be told, there is no need for any H-4 spouse to apply for an EAD. Why not simply include H-4 spouses as part of 8 CFR Section 274a.12(a) so that they could work incident to status? This is a simple yet elegant way to ameliorate the extreme economic hardship that our system needlessly inflicts upon H-4 spouses. In fact , why limit this to H- 4 spouses? There is nothing to prevent the Executive from granting work authorization to teenage children on H-4 visa status.

There is no reason why an H-4 spouse should have to wait for years before being allowed to work. Since both the H and L categories are clothed with dual intent – both visa categories allow the holder to apply for a green card from the very outset – the H-4 spouse should be treated exactly like the L-2 spouse when it comes to applying for an EAD. Indeed, the H-4 spouse may be more deserving of a work permit if the wait for the green card under the employment based second and third preferences can take several years, or even decades, especially if the spouses are born in India or China. In fact, despite a cap on H1B visas compared to unlimited L migration, AC21 makes it possible, and certainly more frequent, for the H4 spouse to remain in the USA far longer than the L-2 counterpart, thus making the need for employment authorization more not less compelling. If the USCIS wants to limit the scope of this benefit, allow it to be conditioned upon the filing of a non-frivolous labor certification, or I-140 if no labor certification is required, regardless of how long the H-1B has been in the United States. This would advance the national interest by enhancing the incentive for H-1Bs to come to the United States and remain here, despite chronic visa backlogs.

Ours is a policy of audacious incrementalism designed to maximize the remedial possibilities within the INA as it now exists while waiting for something better, namely congressional enactment of comprehensive immigration reform. Not only is it fitting and proper for the USCIS to formulate immigration policy on highly minute technical issues of surpassing importance, it is no exaggeration to contend that the Constitution expects this to happen. Indeed, without this, who would do it? Far from crossing the line and infringing upon the authority of Congress, what we ask the USCIS to do augments Congressional prerogatives by providing a practical way forward. For those who say that we ask too much too soon, we respond with one simple question, the same one that Hillel the Sage asks in Ethics of the Fathers: “If not now, when?”

(The views expressed by guest author, Gary Endelman, are his and not of his firm, FosterQuan LLP)

DRUGS AND INADMISSIBILITY

By Myriam Jaidi

From the Comedy Central Show “South Park”(Season 2, Episode 204). The scene: Chef, an adult, is speaking with 4th graders Stan, Kyle, Kenny, and Cartman:

    Chef: I just want to tell you that drugs are bad.
    Stan: We know, we know, that’s what everybody says.
    Chef: Right, but do you know why they’re bad?
    Kyle: Because they’re an addictive solution to a greater problem, causing disease of both body and mind with consequences far outweighing their supposed benefits.
    Chef: And do you have any idea what that means?
    Kyle: No.
    Cartman: I know. Drugs are bad because if you do drugs you’re a hippy, and hippies suck.
    Chef: Look children: this is all I’m gonna say about drugs. Stay away from them. There’s a time and a place for everything and it’s called college. Do you understand?
    Children: Yes!

If Chef had been speaking to non-U.S.-citizens, he should have stopped at “Stay away from them,” given the draconian state of our immigration laws relating to any type of drugs, including marijuana, despite the fact that it has been decriminalized in many jurisdictions in the United States.

We learn in various contexts that drugs are bad, and we should just say no. The exchange above references some of the documented problems with drugs – their use or overuse can result in disease of both body and mind and other serious consequences. Nevertheless, many people identify with the statement Chef makes above. The assumption or joke being that many Americans will have or have had experiences with alcohol and/or drugs, such as marijuana, in college. This assumption may be good for a laugh, but for non-US citizens drugs (meaning controlled substances, for non-medical use) are not only bad, using drugs can lead to inadmissibility on various grounds including public health, criminal, and misrepresentation.

The ground of inadmissibility that comes to mind immediately is the criminal ground under INA INA 212(a)(2)(A)(II). If someone has a criminal conviction relating to a controlled substance, or even admitted to committing the crime, he or she is inadmissible and there is no waiver, although, in certain circumstances, enumerated in INA 212(h)(1), it may be possible to obtain a waiver where the crime “relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana.” Please note that convictions involving controlled substances (other than a single offense involving less than 30 grams of marijuana for personal use) and having been or being a drug addict or abuser are treated similarly harshly after admission into lawful permanent resident status has been granted. These are both grounds of deportability under INA 237 INA 237(a)(2)(B). This blog addresses issues prior to being admitted as a lawful permanent resident.

What if someone used drugs but was never arrested for it? For example, what if Stan, who is not a US citizen, now lives in New York and went to college in New York on an F-1 visa. In college, during his freshman year, Stan made friends with a group of people that smoked pot a couple of times a week. After freshman year, he stopped smoking pot. After he completes his studies, he is sponsored by a company for an H-1B visa and is working in New York. A few years later, he meets and falls in love with Wendy, a UScitizen. They get married and she wants to sponsor him for a green card. Stan goes to a Civil Surgeon to get the required medical exam done on Form I-693. In the course of providing his medical history, Stan tells the Civil Surgeon, without being asked, that he smoked pot twice a week during his freshman year in college. He doesn’t think it is a big deal — as Chef implied, a lot of people use marijuana in college.

The Civil Surgeon’s role is to perform a medical exam to determine whether a person who is applying for adjustment of status within the United Statesmay be inadmissible to the United States on public health grounds. (Outside the United States, a similar role is performed by a “panel physician”.) They request a medical history and conduct a physical exam to ensure that a person does not have tuberculosis, syphilis and other sexually transmitted diseases, leprosy and other communicable diseases noted in 42 CFR 34.2(b)(4) – (9). They also inquire about physical health and medications a person may be taking to ensure that any vaccines the individual might need are not contraindicated.

According to the Center for Disease Control Immigration Requirements: Technical Instructions for Physical or Mental Disorders with Associated Harmful Behaviors and Substance-Related Disorders (hereinafter“CDC TI”), drug screening is not a routine part of the medical exam. See CDC TI at p.11. However, there is a section on the Form I-693 addressing Drug Abuse/Drug Addiction (see Form I-693 at p.3). In order to complete this section, Civil Surgeons are instructed to “evaluate the applicant’s history, behavior and physical appearance when determining if drug screening should be performed.” CDC TI at p.11. If a Civil Surgeon reviews an applicant’s medical history with them and in the course of doing so sees no tell-tale signs of drug use or abuse, they may not ever inquire about recreational drug use. If they do inquire, however, and an individual lies and the truth is later discovered, the individual could potentially, based on the certification on the Form I-693, be subject to civil or criminal penalties, be found inadmissible for fraud under INA 212(a)(6)(C)(i), be at risk of having any immigration benefit derived from the medical exam revoked, and could be subject to removal from the United States.

Many Civil Surgeons do not inquire, but some do. The CDC TI for Civil Surgeons provides a table (at page 12) of indicators that drug screening might be necessary. Among the indicators provided is the following: “history of any substance abuse or dependence.” The terms “drug abuse” and “drug addiction”(aka dependence) are defined in the regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as follows:

    Drug abuse. The non-medical use of a substance listed in section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act, as amended (21 U.S.C. 802) which has not necessarily resulted in physical or psychological dependence.

    Drug addiction. The non-medical use of a substance listed in section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act, as amended (21 U.S.C. 802) which has resulted in physical or psychological dependence.

42 CFR 34.4(g) & (h). These terms are further elucidated in the CDC TI, which draws information from the DSM and states as follows:

    the DSM criteria for substance dependence, either on alcohol or other psychoactive substances are characterized by compulsive long-term use of the substance despite significant substance-related physical, psychological, social, occupational, or behavioral problems. Tolerance and withdrawal are often associated with substance dependence.

    Substance abuse is characterized by a pattern of recurrent substance use despite adverse consequences and impairment. To establish any substance-related diagnosis, the examining physician must document the pattern of use and behavioral, physical, and psychological effects associated with the use or cessation of use of that substance.

CDC TI at p.6. In our hypothetical, the Civil Surgeon conducting the medical exam for Stan might see Stan’s use of marijuana throughout his freshman year in college as drug abuse, drug addiction, or neither. If she determines that Stan’s behavior actually does not fall within either category, she will indicate “No Class A or B Substance (Drug) Abuse/Addiction” on the I-693.

If the Civil Surgeon determines that Stan’s circumstances do indicate he is either an abuser or addict, there are various options the Civil Surgeon might pursue. She might collect evidence from Stan to determine whether Stan is in“full remission.” “Full remission” is another term taken from the DSM and it is defined as a period of at least 12 months during which no substance use has occurred. CDC TI at p.14. If she determines that Stan was either a drug abuser or drug addict but has been through full remission, she could classify Stan as Class B and mark the appropriate box on the I-693. A Class B finding does not make a person inadmissible under the public health grounds but could trigger an inquiry as to whether Stan’s condition might make him inadmissible under INA 212(a)(4) as likely to become a public charge. Health is one of the factors that statute requires adjudicators to take into consideration in determining whether someone might be inadmissible as a public charge. Thus USCIS would look into whether Stan’s past problems make it likely that Stan might become a public charge. According to the Foreign Affairs Manual (the Adjudicator’s Field Manual does not currently contain guidance on the issue of public charge, as the section for that topic is “reserved”),someone is likely to become a “public charge” if they are likely to become primarily dependent on the U.S. Government for subsistence either through cash assistance for income maintenance or institutionalization for long-term care at U.S. Government expense. See 9 FAM 40.41 N.2.

What else might the Civil Surgeon do? If the Civil Surgeon determines that Stan has a Class A issue, Stan will be inadmissible on public health grounds unless and until a finding of remission is made that can move him to Class B. If the Civil Surgeon decides she wants more information before reaching a diagnosis, she could also defer her diagnosis to a later date. If the Civil Surgeon decides to defer diagnosis, she would provide Stan with instructions on what steps he would need to take, what information he would need to provide, and the time frame for providing the information to her. If the Civil Surgeon feels that she will not be able to reach a conclusion regarding Stan’s condition, she can also refer Stan to a specialist consultant for further analysis on the drug issue. The specialist consultant’s findings would then be reflected on the I-693.

Could the information Stan provided to the Civil Surgeon about his past drug use trigger any other issues for him with regard to inadmissibility? Depending on exactly what Stan said and what the Civil Surgeon explained in response about the illegality of Stan’s freshman year marijuana habit, Stan might be inadmissible under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) if he is found to have admitted “committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)).”

How could this happen? How could a visit to the doctor turn into a trigger of a criminal ground of inadmissibility? It could happen if certain criteria established by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) are met (or even if they are not and the person lives in the Ninth Circuit, as noted below). The BIA set forth the following requirements for a validly obtained admission: (1) the admitted conduct must constitute the essential elements of a crime in the jurisdiction in which it occurred; (2) the applicant must have been provided with the definition and essential elements of the crime in understandable terms prior to making the admission; and (3) the admission must have been made voluntarily. See Matter of K-, 7 I&N Dec. 594 (BIA 1957). These requirements have been strictly followed in published BIA cases, and only in the Ninth Circuit have some of the Matter of K- factors been effectively ignored, arguably without a sufficient justification. See Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2002).

In Stan’s case, whether or not his discussion with the Civil Surgeon would make him inadmissible under this section of the law would depend on exactly what he said he did, what the elements of the crime in that specific jurisdiction are, whether the Civil Surgeon provided him with the definition and essential elements of the crime in understandable terms, and whether his admission was voluntary.

Does the analysis change if the Civil Surgeon never asked about drug use? If the Civil Surgeon had not asked Stan and Stan had not offered the information there should be no issue. The Civil Surgeon made a determination based on her medical knowledge and observation of Stan that there was no reason to pursue any drug testing or line of questioning. Stan has not technically misrepresented anything because he was never asked about drug use and therefore did not misrepresent his past.

However, there is a question on the adjustment of status application (Form I-485) that Stan may have trouble answering: “Have you knowingly committed any crime of moral turpitude or drug related offense for which you have not been arrested?” The question on the Form I-485 (and the question regarding inadmissibility on the DS-260, for consular processing of an immigration visa, which is presented differently but raises the same issues) contains many legal terms Stan may not understand. In addition, because the question is on a form with which there can be no discussion and no interaction, clearly the requirements for an admission under Matter of K have not been satisfied. Furthermore, it would be very difficult for applicants to know that they have committed a crime for which they have not been charged or arrested, because one would have to figure out the applicable law, the elements of the crime or crimes, and whether all the elements of any crime have been satisfied. We have a complex penal law system in the United States. It requires the charging authority to determine the applicable law in each particular case and then demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that all the elements of that law were satisfied in order for a person to be convicted. This cannot happen on a form.

If Stan had ever been arrested for possession, he could only be convicted if the prosecution established all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including proving that the substance was in fact marijuana by doing a lab test. For all Stan knows, he may have been smoking oregano during his freshman year. Then there is the question of whether Stan’s use of marijuana is equivalent to“possession” of marijuana in a manner that, under New York law, is prohibited. All of these issues must be pondered before the question can be answered.

The outcome might be different depending on the circumstances – if Stan had mentioned it to the Civil Surgeon, if the Civil Surgeon had pursued the line of questioning, the answer might be different. If Stan had gone to rehab for an addiction issue and his drug use had been confirmed, the result of the analysis might be different, impacting the appropriate answer to the question on Form I-485. The question can only be answered after an in-depth analysis on a case-by-case basis.

Even in the scenarios discussed here– where Stan had revealed his drug use to the Civil Surgeon or to the rehab program – and a determination was made that he was not inadmissible under the public health ground, can it be argued that he should not then face a sort of“double jeopardy” by being implicated under the criminal ground of inadmissibility? Disclosure was made and Stan legitimately cleared the issue of inadmissibility on a public health ground. It seems reasonable that clearing the public health ground should not leave an individual subject to the criminal ground. If Congress wanted one potentially subject to the public health ground of inadmissibility to remain inadmissible under the criminal ground, then Congress would not have provided a way to overcome the public health ground of inadmissibility. Congress would have collapsed drug use or abuse under one ground of inadmissibility. How to answer the question on the forms and the issue of the interplay between the various grounds of inadmissibility are issues that could be the focus of another article, and we raise the issue here to provide a glimpse of its complexity.

The upshot here is that the humorous, somewhat cavalier attitude about drugs displayed in U.S. pop culture by no means reflects the reality faced by those present in the United States who are not citizens. For non-citizens the “Just Say No” slogan developed in the 1980s has greater meaning given the stunning consequences non-citizens face if they do engage in use of controlled substances.