A HOUSE OF MANY ROOMS: THE DIFFERENT PATHS TO CITIZENSHIP

By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

It is so refreshingly wonderful to think that what was once unthinkable could become a possibility – a bill to comprehensively reform our broken immigration system. Even  the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing last Tuesday, where there was a willingness to  legalize the 10+ million undocumented population, when in the past the tunnel vision mindset of the GOP controlled House was to find ways to either deport them or make it hard for them to remain in the US.

The fault line of contention in the debate is whether to grant a pathway to citizenship or not for those who will be able to legalize their status. Many House GOP leaders have stated that they would rather find a middle ground between deporting the undocumented people and providing them with citizenship, which is obviously being opposed by advocates for immigration reform.  Even the Obama White House is opposed to this. For instance, Raul Labrador, a rising GOP leader from Idaho in the House has said that he would vote for providing legal status to the undocumented, but not a green card, which would provide a path to citizenship. The rationale for this is that those who have not” played by the rules” should not be rewarded with a quick path to citizenship. But the underlying motive for denying a path to citizenship is the fear that these new citizens will vote against the Republican  party. On the other hand, Jose Garcia, a Democrat from Florida believes that not providing a path to citizenship would create an underclass in the US, which is not in keeping with American values. He also cites the examples of the French and German systems where immigrants are not allowed to become French or German, and this has resulted in the kind of social unrest in those countries that we have not seen in the US. It is worth noting that the heavyweight Republican from California, Darrell Issa,  has recently backed a path to citizenship. He stated, “Ultimately, if you’re allowed to remain in this country permanently, in almost all cases, there should be a path to citizenship. That is what Abraham Lincoln would have said. That’s what the Republican Party stands for.”

We too advocate for a path to citizenship in an immigration proposal that will legalize the status of undocumented workers. We also believe that if the GOP provides a path to citizenship, they need not fear losing them as future voters. Many immigrants can be wooed by the GOP as they too share conservative values, and making it through their own enterprise. Elections have consequences and demography is destiny, especially when it comes to politics. Not wanting to remain a permanent minority, or even lose control of the House of Representatives in the next election cycle, even the most stalwart immigrant bashers in the House GOP leadership are suddenly finding religion and coming to terms with the truth on immigration. Any repentance,  however forced or late is coming, should be accepted. Politics is, if nothing else, that most practical of professions.

Still, even under the most liberal proposal, citizenship is not likely to come automatically or even quickly. First, there will be a probationary period of legal status, and after some years, they will be allowed to apply for green cards. After obtaining a green card, one has to wait either five years, or three years (if married to a US citizen) to be able to naturalize. It is hoped that those opposed to citizenship because they believe that people will become citizens the day after a bill is enacted are educated about the long and arduous wait even under a system that provides a direct path to citizenship. A bi-partisan group of Senators also favor a path to citizenship, but have attached conditions before those legalized can obtain green cards, which is that Congress must first be satisfied that the border is under control. This too is being opposed by immigrant advocates and the White House as those in control of this trigger will always find an excuse to say that the border is not under control.

However much the authors of this blog want a pathway to citizenship without conditions, we also fervently hope that a once in a lifetime deal to reform the immigration system must not break down on the citizenship issue. There can be many other pathways to citizenship, and it is not true that the undocumented who get a legal status will be part of a permanent underclass.We would refute and reject any proposal that would render anyone legalized permanently ineligible for citizenship.First, let’s take a realistic view on how long folks have been waiting under the current immigration system. Many who have met all their conditions to apply for a green card have been waiting under a backlogged family or employment preference category for more than a decade. The India employment-based third preference is so backlogged that an Indian-born beneficiary of a labor certification filed today by an employer may have to wait for 70 years before he or she can apply for a green card!!  With respect to being on a path to citizenship, they have been worse off than an undocumented person who may legalize under a new immigration reform law.

Thus, the first order of priority in any comprehensive immigration proposal is to reform the existing legal immigration system. If we expand visa numbers available in the various immigrant visa categories, as well as create more pathways for people to become permanent residents, those already waiting should be able to become permanent residents more quickly and we would even have less illegal immigration in the future. Making legal immigration possible makes illegal migration unnecessary.The 10 million undocumented non-citizens who get legalized, but may not have a direct path to citizenship, could benefit and find other pathways through a reformed and expanded immigration system. Indeed, most of the undocumented who would legalize may already be working or have their own businesses. In a reformed immigration system, they should be able to apply for green cards through their employers or by virtue of having businesses relatively quickly, and then be on a path to citizenship. For example, an undocumented nanny who provides valuable childcare while the parents work, after obtaining a probationary legal status, should be able to get sponsored by an employer for a green card relatively easily and quickly under a reformed immigration system. The same should be true for one who has owned a business for a certain period of time and has hired US workers or has generated a certain amount of revenues over a few years.

Indeed, this is how all nonimmigrants get green cards, and then become US citizens. The only problem is that it is too hard and takes too long. Then, there are also few avenues for obtaining a green card. If the GOP refuses to provide a direct pathway to citizenship, or a path to citizenship based on conditions, or even if a direct path to citizenship takes a long time,  let’s not fuss too much about it and let’s get on with the goal of reforming the immigration system. In fact, we should use it as a bargaining chip to ensure that we reform the system in such a way that there would be many other readily available paths to citizenship. Then, not having a direct path through a legalization program may not matter so much!Now is the time to bring the undocumented from the shadows into the bright sunshine of freedom. By giving them a stake in society in a fair and balanced manner that respects the law and promotes our values, Congress will make us all proud and turn the page on the next chapter of the American story.

WHEN IS A TWEET AN ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENT?

Immigration attorneys have naturally adapted to the internet faster than attorneys in other practice areas. They were the among the first to set up their own web sites, and with the advent of social media have also happily adapted to Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin and other social networks. Using social media helps an immigration attorney to reach out to an audience very quickly, without expending huge marketing resources. Moreover, since the client base of an immigration attorney is not bound by a particular area or state (as immigration practice is mostly based on federal law), and can also be located across the globe, social media can help an immigration attorney reach out to them.

Still, an attorney needs to be mindful of the various ethical rules that would be applicable when using social media. This advisory will focus on the ethical rules concerning advertising, and reference will be made to the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, although attorneys are advised to also refer to their own state bar rules of professional conduct.

While this advisory is applicable to all social media messaging, Twitter will be its particular focus since it poses unique challenges compared to other social media. Twitter only allows one to communicate within 140 characters, which can be particular problematic if such messaging needs to include the various disclaimers following an attorney advertisement. Twitter is also more open than other social media sites since a follower does not need permission to follow you. Moreover, even non-followers can view your tweets, which can be constant and numerous. The whole essence of Twitter is to effectively fit your message within a limited number of characters while ethics rules constraining attorney advertising require a lot more verbiage.

While lawyers are permitted to advertise their services, they are bound by various ethical constraints.

Model Rule 7.1 states:

A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.

 

Also, many jurisdictions require that when a lawyer advertises his or her services, the words “Attorney Advertising” be stated in such a communication.

For example, this is what New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.1(f) requires:

Every advertisement other than those appearing in a radio, television or billboard advertisement, in a directory, newspaper, magazine or other periodical (and any web sites related thereto), or made in person pursuant to Rule 7.3(a)(1), shall be labeled “Attorney Advertising” on the first page, or on the home page in the case of a web site. If the communication is in the form of a self-mailing brochure or postcard, the words “Attorney Advertising” shall appear therein. In the case of electronic mail, the subject line shall contain the notation “ATTORNEY ADVERTISING.”

 

However, not every communication made by a lawyer would constitute an advertisement. If a lawyer wishes to quickly share an article in the New York Times as soon as it appears on comprehensive immigration reform onTwitter, would it constitute advertising? This lawyer may have a completely altruistic motivation, which is to share a timely and interesting article on immigration reform to her community of 3,000 followers on Twitter.On the other hand, the lawyer also hopes that by sharing this article, people would realize that the lawyer is on top of the latest developments and may be more inclined to retain her services. Thus, while such a communication does not overtly invite people to employ this lawyer’s services, it might be the underlying motivation of the lawyer to brand herself as someone who is on the top of her game and hope that people would reach out to her.

When does a tweet constitute an advertisement that will be subject to the various ethical constraints? For instance, New York Rules of Professional Conduct at Rule 1.0 defines advertisement as:

“Advertisement” means any public or private communication made by or on behalf of a lawyer or law firm about that lawyer or law firm’s services, the primary purpose of which is for the retention of the lawyer or law firm. It does not include communications to existing clients or other lawyers.

 

It is thus unclear whether the sharing of the New York Times article would constitute an advertisement as it does not suggest that its primary purpose is for the retention of the lawyer, and then require the attorney under the New York rules to indicate “ATTORNEY ADVERTISING.” Such a requirement with respect to a tweet, which only allows 140 characters, would also diminish the value of the impromptu and conversational tone of the Twitter message, although one should be cautioned that a disciplinary committee would not be concerned about a lawyer’s desire to preserve the spontaneous character of a tweet if it violated the constraints on attorney advertising.

If every tweet is considered an attorney advertisement, it would be virtually impossible to tweet anything at least under the New York Rules of Professional Responsibility. For instance, under New York Rules of Professional Conduct 7.1(d) and (e), statements that are likely to create an expectation about results the lawyer can achieve have to be accompanied by the following disclaimer: “Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.” Moreover, under 7.1(h) all advertisements shall include the name, principal law office address and telephone number of the lawyer or law firm whose services are being offered. Finally, 7.1(k) requires a copy of all advertisements to be retained for a period of 3 years following initial dissemination. This would require an attorney to keep a copy of each of his or her thousands of tweets for 3 years!

Fortunately, the State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility recently issued a helpful ethics opinion clarifying under what circumstances would an attorney’s postings on social media websites be subject to the standards governing attorney advertising. The opinion provides the following examples of an attorney’s postings on her Facebook page, which has about 500 friends.

Example 1
 “Case finally over. Unanimous verdict! Celebrating tonight.”
Example 2

 

“Another great victory in court today! My client is delighted. Who wants to be be next?”
Example 3
 “Won a million dollar verdict. Tell your friends and check out my website.”
 Example 4
 “Won another personal injury case. Call me for a free consultation.”
 Example 5
“Just published an article on wage and hour breaks. Let me know if you would like a copy.”

 

California’s Rule 1-400 defining “communications,” which is similar to the New York rule 7.1(f), provides that “any message or offer made by or on behalf of a member concerning the availability for professional employment of a member or a law firm directed to any former, present or prospective client…”

The key determining factor, therefore, is whether an attorney communicates in such a way so as to make himself available for professional employment or for the purpose of retention of his services. Under this standard, according to the California ethics opinion, the following Facebook messages may or may not be communications:

“Case finally over. Unanimous verdict! Celebrating tonight.”

Example 1 is not a communication as it is not a message or offer “concerning availability of professional employment” regardless of the attorney’s subjective intent in sending it.  The opinion thus makes an important point. The communication must overtly suggest that the lawyer is available for professional employment, regardless of whether this was the attorney’s underlying motive in doing so.

“Another great victory in court today! My client is delighted. Who wants to be be next?”

The verbiage in Example 2 “Another great victory in court today! My client is delighted” standing alone is not a communication, but because of the additional text “Who wants to be next?” makes it a communication as it suggests availability for professional employment. Moreover, the opinion goes on to state that an attorney cannot disseminate communications regarding client testimonials unless there is an express disclaimer. The statement further violated California ethical rules as it included guarantees or predictions regarding the representation, which can be deceptive. The statement regarding “Who wants to be next” can be interpreted as who wants to be the next victorious client.

“Won a million dollar verdict. Tell your friends and check out my website.”
“Won another personal injury case. Call me for a free consultation.”

It is readily obvious that both Example 3 and Example 4 constitute communications and are thus subject to the restraints on attorney advertising.  Directing friends to “check out my website” suggests that people may consider hiring her after looking at her website. Even directing people to call for a free consultation can be viewed as a step towards seeking potential employment, and thus such anoffer also constitutes a communication.

“Just published an article on wage and hour breaks. Let me know if you would like a copy.”

According to the opinion, Example 5 did not constitute a communication since the attorney is merely relaying information regarding an article that she has published and is offering a copy. Even communications relating to availability of seminars or educational programs, or mailing bulletins or briefs, do not entail attorney advertising, according to the opinion.

Most immigration attorneys who use social media generally share articles and information, and under this California opinion, may not be constrained by the rules relating to attorney advertising. Still, it is unclear whether other states will follow this logic and important distinction.

Comment 8 to  New York Rules of Professional Responsibility Rule 7.1 is worth noting:

The circulation or distribution to prospective clients by a lawyer of an article or report published about the lawyer by a third party is advertising if the lawyer’s primary purpose is to obtain retentions. In circulating or distributing such materials the lawyer should include information or disclaimers as necessary to dispel any misconceptions to which the article may give rise. For example, if a lawyer circulates an article discussing the lawyer’s successes that is reasonably likely to create an expectation about the results the lawyer will achieve in future cases, a disclaimer is required by paragraph (e)(3). If the article contains misinformation about the lawyer’s qualifications, any circulation of the article by the lawyer should make any necessary corrections or qualifications. This may be necessary even when the article included misinformation through no fault of the lawyer or because the article is out of date, so that material information that was true at the time is no longer true. Some communications by a law firm that may constitute marketing or branding are not necessarily advertisements. For example, pencils, legal pads, greeting cards, coffee mugs, T-shirts or the like with the law firm name, logo, and contact information printed on them do not constitute “advertisements” within the definition of this Rule if their primary purpose is general awareness and branding, rather than the retention of the law firm for a particular matter.

It is advisable that any communication on Twitter, as well as other social media websites, should comport with the last example in the California opinion involving the sharing of information. However, any information written about a lawyer by a third party, which the lawyer then distributes, may constitute advertising. On the other hand, as noted in Comment 8, “[s]ome communications by a law firm that may constitute marketing or branding are not necessarily advertisements.”    A lawyer who chooses to communicate on Twitter in a way that would invite followers to use his services is doing so at his own peril.  It would be impossible to include all the disclaimers required by the ethical constraints in a tweet that can comprise only 140 characters! It is also debatable whether putting a one-time disclaimer in the Twitter header profile would suffice, such as “Tweets = ATTORNEY ADVERTISING.”  Twitter also does not allow you to include more than 160 characters of information in the profile such as the attorney’s address and other disclaimers.Moreover, a disciplinary authority might opine that every tweet ought to have included the required disclaimers since people viewing it in their Twitter feed will not bother to look at the header profile of the attorney. Still, putting a disclaimer in the profile would probably be the best good faith option for an attorney who wishes to use Twitter for attorney advertising. Indeed, New York’s Professional Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.1(f) requires the “Attorney Advertising” notation only on the home page of the law firm’s website, and by analogy, it could be argued that putting this notation only in the Twitter profile may comply with the rule. Another option with respect to a tweet that is an advertisement is to provide a link to another site that contains all the additional disclaimers, if applicable.

In conclusion, social media, especially Twitter, provide a valuable tool for an immigration attorney with limited resources to reach out to a global audience. In order not to get snared by the advertising constraints,  it is best for immigration attorneys to use social media to share information for marketing and branding, which in turn will create awareness of the attorney’s expertise and knowledge in the field. Until the ethics rules catch up, it would also be consistent with the spontaneous character of social media sites, especially Twitter, to use it to share information rather than to engage in outright advertising. Using Twitter in this way is likely to attract more followers than if the attorney used it for blatant advertising purposes only. Also, a tweet involving useful information is more likely to be “retweeted” than an advertisement.  There are other sources for attorney advertising, which unlike Twitter, would not constrain an attorney to include all the necessary disclaimers and requirements under the ethical rules.

SHABAJ V. HOLDER: HAS THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SPLIT WITH THE THIRD CIRCUIT ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN USCIS APPLICATION DENIALS? WHAT SORT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF USCIS LEGAL ERRORS REMAINS AVAILABLE?

On January 15, 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a precedential decision in the case of Shabaj v. Holder, No. 12-703.  Paulin Shabaj, the plaintiff in the case, had come to the United States in November 2000 with a false Italian passport and sought asylum.  His asylum application was ultimately denied, but while in asylum-only proceedings before an immigration court, he had married a U.S. citizen in July 2005.  Although USCIS determined Mr. Shabaj’s marriage to be bona fide and approved his wife’s I-130 petition, it denied his application for a waiver under INA § 212(i) of his inadmissibility due to his previous fraud, and denied his related application for adjustment of status.  Mr. Shabaj filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, challenging the determination of the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) that he had failed to demonstrate that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if he were removed from the United States.  The Second Circuit, in its recent decision, affirmed the District Court’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction to review this denial, even though Mr. Shabaj asserted “that CIS’s decision to deny his section 212(i) waiver application was erroneous as a matter of law.”  Shabaj, slip op. at 4.

As the Second Circuit indicated in Shabaj, there is a specific provision in the second subparagraph of section 212(i) stating that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver [of inadmissibility] under paragraph (1).”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(2).  There is also a more general provision regarding judicial review of discretionary relief, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under” various sections of the INA providing for discretionary relief, including INA § 212(i).  Shabaj sought to rely on the exception provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) that preserves jurisdiction over “constitutional claims or questions of law,” but the Second Circuit rejected this argument because § 1252(a)(2)(D) applies to “constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed in an appropriate court of appeals”; Shabaj had raised his arguments about the denial of his § 212(i) waiver not in a petition for review (his earlier petition for review from the Visa Waiver Program removal order against him having been denied previously, see Shabaj v. Holder, 602 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2010)), but in a suit before the district court.  Thus, because Shabaj, having participated in the Visa Waiver Program with his false Italian passport, was unable to seek to reopen his removal order and file a new petition for review, he could not obtain judicial review of the asserted legal errors in the USCIS denial of his § 212(i) waiver and adjustment application.

At first glance, there might appear to be a conflict between Shabaj and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pinho v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005).  Gummersindho Pinho, the plaintiff in that case, had been arrested and charged with three counts relating to possession of cocaine and intent to distribute it.  His application for New Jersey’s “Pre-Trial Intervention” (PTI) program was rejected because of a subsequently invalidated policy “against accepting into PTI any defendant against whom there was a viable case for possession with intent to distribute drugs at or near a school”,id. at 196, and in 1992 he pled guilty topossession of cocaine. He then sought post-conviction relief in 1997 based on the ineffective assistance of his criminal defense counsel.  At the hearing on Pinho’s ineffective-assistance claim, pursuant to prior discussions between Pinho’s then-counsel and the state prosecutor, it was explained that Pinho had been accepted into PTI, and his conviction was vacated and the charges dismissed.  Nonetheless, Pinho’s 2000 application for adjustment of status was denied by the then-INSon the theory that his 1992 guilty plea met the INA definition of a “conviction” despite having been vacated, rendering him inadmissible and ineligible for adjustment of status.

Pinho was not placed in removal proceedings, and so sought review of the denial of his adjustment application through a lawsuit in District Court “seeking a declaratory judgment that the denial of his adjustment of status was arbitrary, capricious and unlawful because his vacated state conviction should no longer be a bar to his eligibility for adjustment.”  422 F.3d at 198.  Despite the statutory bar on review of discretionary decisions, including the denial of an application for adjustment of status under INA § 245 (which is specifically mentioned among the types of discretionary relief covered by § 1252(a)(2)(B)), the Third Circuit found that the District Court had jurisdiction over this suit.  As the Third Circuit explained:

It is important to distinguish carefully between a denial of an application to adjust status, and a determination that an immigrant is legally ineligible for adjustment of status. This distinction is central to the question of subject-matter jurisdiction, and is easy to elide. Indeed, such distinctions are crucial to administrative law generally; the framework of judicial review of agency action that has evolved over the past half-century is grounded in a sharp distinction between decisions committed to agency discretion, and decisions, whether ‘ministerial’ or ‘purely legal,’ governed directly by the applicable statute or regulation. . . . Whatever the label, our case law distinguishes between actions which an agency official may freely decide to take or not to take, and those which he is obligated by law to take or not to take. In the case of adjustment of status, an eligible immigrant may have his application denied within the discretion of the agency. But the immigrant’s eligibility itself is determined by statute. To treat all denials of adjustment as discretionary, even when based on eligibility determinations that are plainly matters of law, is to fundamentally misunderstand the relationship between the executive and the judiciary.
. . . .

Determination of eligibility for adjustment of status — unlike the granting of adjustment itself —is a purely legal question and does not implicate agency discretion. . . . . The determination at issue here is precisely such a determination: whether under the applicable statutory language as interpreted by the BIA, Pinho was “convicted” so as to render him ineligible for adjustment of status. This is a legal question, not one committed to agency discretion.

Pinho, 422 F.3d at 203-204.  That is, the Third Circuit found that a District Court had jurisdiction over the claim that Pinho had been found ineligible for adjustment of status based on a legal error, even outside the context of removal proceedings.  At first glance, this would seem to reach the opposite result as Shabaj, under analogous circumstances.

The jurisdiction of the Second Circuitincludes New York, Connecticut, and Vermont, while the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit includes New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, as well as the U.S. Virgin Islands.  If there is a split between the Second and Third Circuits on this issue, therefore, it would mean that adjustment applicants in New York would have less access to judicial review than adjustment applicants in New Jersey.  There may, however, be a way to read Shabajand Pinho in harmony with one another.

Although it is not entirely clear from the decision in Shabaj what sort of legal error was alleged, there does not seem to have been any dispute that Mr. Shabaj required a waiver of inadmissibility due to his past fraud, or that his U.S. citizen wife was actually his wife and was actually a U.S. citizen.  Rather, the dispute was over whether he had sufficiently established that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if he were removed—a decision that the Second Circuit had held to be discretionary, see Camara v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 497 F. 3d. 121 (2d Cir. 2007).  In Pinho, on the other hand, the dispute was over whether Mr. Pinho was inadmissible at all.  The disputed determination of eligibility for adjustment in Pinho was, one might say, logically prior to the discretionary decision on the ultimate adjustment application, while the disputed determination of hardship in Shabaj was itself one that is deemed discretionary.

In the context of § 1252(a)(2)(D) jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law raised on a petition for review, it is possible for a reviewable legal error to exist even within a discretionary determination, if the adjudicating authority has used an incorrect legal standard or has committed some other legal error in making the discretionary determination.  In Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2010) (in which this author was counsel for the petitioner), for example, the Third Circuit found jurisdiction to hold that the agency could not consider the petitioner’s number of qualifying relatives as a factor necessarily weighing against her ability to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative for purposes of cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b)(1)(D).  Similarly, the Second Circuit in Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2009), found that the agency had made an error of law in its determination of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship “where . . . some facts important to the subtle determination of ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ have been totally overlooked and others have been seriously mischaracterized,” id. at 323.  Shabajmay stand for the proposition that the sort of legal error at issue in Pareja or Mendez, which is a part of the hardship analysis or other discretionary analysis, cannot be the basis of a lawsuit in district court; this is not necessarily inconsistent with the idea that a legal error like that at issue in Pinho, which is part of an eligibility determination logically prior to the discretionary analysis, can be the basis of such a lawsuit.  One could certainly argue with some force that the Pareja/Mendeztype of error should also be cognizable in district court, on the ground that the agency has no discretion to commit a legal error of any sort, but there is a potential distinction between the two sorts of legal error that could allow one to read Shabaj and Pinho as consistent with one another.

In any event, whether or not one reads Shabajto conflict with Pinho, it is at least clear that Shabaj should not prevent judicial review of USCIS denials of petitions or applications that are not made discretionary by statute.The decision to deny an immigrant petition for a relative or prospective employee (an I-130 petition, I-140 petition, or I-360 petition for a religious worker), for example, is not discretionary, because INA 204(b) states that the Attorney General “shall” approve the petition if he determines that the facts in the petition are true, and the alien for whom the petition is filed is an immediate relative as defined by statute or is eligible for the requested preference.  (This decision is normally now made by the Secretary of Homeland Security and her delegates within USCIS, although a BIA decision on an administrative appeal regarding an I-130 petition is still under the authority of the Attorney General.)  Thus, district courts have jurisdiction to review the denial of such petitions, as has been held in such cases as Ogbolumani v. Napolitano, 557 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2009);Ruiz v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 2009); Ayanbadejo v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2008); and Soltane v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 381 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2004).  Similarly, district courts should have jurisdiction to review denials of H-1B and other nonimmigrant visa petitions, as described in an earliest post on this blog by Cyrus D. Mehta, because the decision on those petitions as well is not specified by the statute to be in the discretion of the Attorney General: INA § 214(c)(1) states that “the question of importing any alien as a nonimmigrant under [various subparagraphs] shall be determined by the Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate agencies of the government, upon petition of the importing employer.” In Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010), the Supreme Court made clear that only decisions actually declared discretionary by statute can be immunized from judicial review, superseding some earlier Court of Appeals decisions which had suggested that decisions made discretionary by regulation could also be immune from review.  (At least one such pre-Kucana decision, CDI Information Services Inc., v. Reno, 278 F.3d 616 (6th Cir 2002), had refused on that basis to review the denial of an H-1B application for extension of stay.)

In addition to not precluding judicial review of denials of petitions or applications that are not explicitly made discretionary, Shabaj may not preclude judicial review of a USCIS denial of a discretionary waiver or adjustment application when the denial relates to an applicant who at that time or subsequently is the subject of an otherwise reviewable order of removal, even if the discretionary waiver or adjustment denial comes from USCIS rather than the immigration courts and the BIA—as could happen with many “arriving aliens” whose adjustment applications fall outside immigration court jurisdiction.  As the Shabaj opinion explained in footnote 4:

Although Shabaj is ineligible to reopen his removal proceedings and file a petition for review because of his participation in the Visa Waiver Program, see 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b), we do not mean to preclude a petitioner who is otherwise eligible to reopen proceedings from attempting to reopen those proceedings in order to raise legal challenges to hardship rulings by the AAO. Under those circumstances, as permitted by § 1252(a)(2)(D), we would have jurisdiction over any “constitutional claims or questions of law” raised by petitions for review to this court.

Shabaj v. Holder, slip op. at 6 n.4.  The process that this footnote seems to contemplate, in which a Court of Appeals could review an AAO decision in a petition for review from a removal order even though the authorities that issued the removal order did not themselves have any ability to address the AAO decision, would not be unprecedented.  Judicial review of an AAO decision denying an application for legalization under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 or the related LIFE Act Legalization provisions proceeds in this way, as explained in Orquera v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2003): the legalization applicant must become subject to an order of removal or deportation, and then petition for review of that order,to seek judicial review of the legalization denial, even though the immigration judge and the BIA cannot review the legalization denial during the removal proceedings.  If an arriving alien whose adjustment application or related waiver application is denied by USCIS later becomes subject to an order of removal, footnote 4 of Shabaj suggests that they could seek review of the USCIS determination on petition for review of the removal order, analogously to the process discussed in Orquera.

Even if an arriving alien is already the subject of an order of removal when their adjustment application or related waiver application is denied by USCIS, it should be possible to seek judicial review of that denial despite Shabaj, so long as there is no order under the Visa Waiver Program (or at least no valid order, since such orders are sometimes issued in error and can then be set aside on a petition for review).  As previously explained in an article by this author on our firm’s website, denial of an adjustment application made by an arriving alien against whom an order of removal is already outstanding could be analogized to the denial of an asylum application by an applicant who has been ordered removed under the Visa Waiver Program.  In both cases, the denial of the outstanding application enables the removal of the applicant, even though the denial is in some technical sense not a removal order.  Thus, just as the Second Circuit has found jurisdiction over a petition for review of the denial of an asylum application in asylum-only proceedings because such a denial is “the functional equivalent of a removal order,” Kanacevic v. INS, 448 F.3d 129, 134-135 (2d Cir. 2006), it should find jurisdiction over a petition for review of the denial of an adjustment application by an arriving alien against whom there is a final order of removal.  Alternatively, under Shabaj footnote 4, it may be possible for such an arriving alien to seek reopening of the removal proceedings to pursue such an arriving-alien adjustment application, which would presumably be denied under Matter of Yauri, 25 I&N Dec. 103 (BIA 2009) (in which the BIA held that it would not reopen proceedings for an arriving alien to apply for adjustment before USCIS because such reopening was not necessary to allow adjustment), and then petition for review of the denial of reopening and seek review of any adjustment or waiver denial in the context of that petition.

HOW VIABLE IS THE POINTS SYSTEM?

By Felicia Zeidman

Editor’s Note: While we will soon be deliberating about the merits of various proposals to comprehensively reform the US immigration system, the Canadian-based points system may be proposed as it was part of earlier comprehensive immigration reform proposals, especially the 2007 compromise Senate bill. Under existing US immigration law, an employer generally sponsors a foreign national based on a need and is required to test the US labor market through labor certification.  This week, guest blogger Felicia Zeidman will examine Canada’s points assessment and explore whether it can fit into a US immigration reform proposal. One of the criticisms of the points system is that it  fails to match the prospective immigrant to an employer, and there are cases of many Ph.Ds ending up driving taxis. The question, however, is whether employability should be the sole determining factor or whether it should assess the immigrant’s overall ability to successfully adapt in the new country?  Ms. Zeidman is a U.S. and Canadian-licensed lawyer practicing from New York and New Jersey, and can be reached at  646 789 2224 or in Canada at 416 459 8958, email Felicia_Zeidman@visaserve.com

Canada maintains immigration legislation with an objective to pursue the social, cultural and economic benefits of immigration. The method of achieving this goal is consistently being tweaked by policy-makers and legislators and subject to collected data that will shape the type of immigration Canada will seek in any particular period. While Canadians might argue about the assessment of data and what conclusions should be drawn from it for the creation of current policy, the background ethos of the nation includes a strong gratitude to the waves of immigration that arrived and successfully built sectors of industry while influencing all manner of next-generation development. These background factors in policy-making will not strike Americans as particularly unique and are grounded in common 19th and 20th century experiences in the U.S. and Canada. This article will discuss the ‘points test’ of the Canadian immigration procedure, the likes of which is not utilized in U.S. immigration practice and provides an illustration of how procedure, if not policy, between the two heavily industrialized nation-neighbours is in fact different.

Canada has utilized a points system for the partial assessment of certain classes of applicants in its recent immigration programs. A points system breaks down what are perceived to be the most important of the applicant’s abilities so that the his/her overall likelihood of success – both for his/her own integration and the meeting Canada’s needs – can be determined. The more points an applicant gets, the stronger his/her application. The system awards point for age, with more points awarded for youthful workers; it awards points for education; it awards points for language ability; work experience; a job offer; and similar experiences of a spouse. Most recently the points system was an integrated part of the federal skilled worker program, building on the requirement that a worker be in one of 29 particular occupations, with a year of experience in the profession. The federal skilled worker program awarded permanent residency before the individual even landed on Canadian soil, a significant benefit which will be referenced later in this article.

In addition to the professional experience requirements of the federal skilled worker program, the applicant had to score 67 points on the test out of a possible 100, without any one element of the test absolutely requiring achievement, and officer discretion was available should an applicant score under 67 points. The 67-point rule made some difficult-to-accomplish test elements (getting a job offer, for instance, which garnered 10 points) possible to abrogate by achieving high points in another part (perhaps taking all 24 points available for language ability in English and French). Some parts of the test were in practice nearly impossible to abrogate, as points for education and age, for example, were such a large percentage of the overall test.

It should be noted the points system is likely being revamped as is Canada’s federal skilled worker program which encourages the immigration of certain professionals. Over the last decade, the program has gone from relying entirely on a points assessment to requirements that the applicant also be experienced in a certain profession. The federal skilled worker program has been altered several times over the last few years, and this year is no different as the program has been ‘closed for renovation’ since July 2012 with an opening date of May 2013. Announcements from the government have clarified that the revamped federal skilled worker program which opens in May will include, amongst others, a renewed emphasis on youthful workers, language ability of the applicant and spouse, and in-Canada experience. It is unknown whether the points test will continue to be a central assessment tool but the concept of stressing certain factors does appear to remain.

A U.S. Immigration lawyer would label the Canadian system outlined above as ‘self-sponsorship’. This is because the U.S. System does not have a program that includes a points and professions test in order to find an individual immigration-worthy; an individual seeking to immigrate to the U.S. without relying on family sponsorship is most likely to rely upon very high-level expertise or in-country, ongoing work experience. (The overall procedural distinctions are for another article). It can be argued that the Canadian system, where it relies on points, assesses a more raw potential in applicants: age; education; language; experience. How do we ferret out elements of the U.S. System that might include assessments similar to a points test? We look at the elements of the points test as they are embedded in an individual’s capacity for and achievement of ongoing employment. In other words, insofar as professional experience and education (awarding many points on the Canadian test) has made a potential immigrant employable, he/she can proceed down the employment and perhaps the permanent residency paths of the United States.

The Canadian assessment is larger-scale. In the Canadian assessment, being employable is a significant element of the points test; one needs to consider only that it is part of the federal skilled worker program assessment. However, the federal skilled worker is awarded permanent residency before the individual lands on Canadian soil, so it makes sense to integrate raw potential for overall success in and contributions likely to Canada. For example, the spouse’s adaptability factor may not impact job success, but it is part of the points test because it impacts overall family adaptability. An age assessment of under 50 will not be important for many potential jobs, but it is a significant part of the points test because it will impact on Canada’s future work force and the test is meant to bring in younger workers.

This is the interesting part about the integration of a points test. It doesn’t have to be strictly related to any one class of immigration and can be part of a much larger policy. Although many would argue that employment and employability are the most critical factor in an immigrant, and there are dozens of Canadian immigration programs which are indeed employment-driven, the points test takes into elements outside of success at any one job and seeks to bring an immigrant with overall likelihood of success and contribution capacity. The question for policy-makers is whether or not this larger assessment fits in with the country’s immigration practice.

THE IRRELEVANCY OF ANTI-IMMIGRATION MOVEMENTS

America has been founded on the noble notion of welcoming immigrants. Even the American Declaration of Independence cites this as one of the failings of England’s monarch King George III, and thus a justification for the revolution: “He  has endeavored to prevent the Population of these States; for the purpose obstructing the Laws of Naturalization of Foreigners, refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.” George Washington loftily viewed the United States as “an asylum to the oppressed and the needy of the earth.”Yet, there has always been an historical ambivalence towards immigrants. After each group of immigrants settled in the new country, they pulled up the draw bridge and felt that newcomers would not be as worthy as them. Thus, anti-immigration movements have always existed throughout the nation’s history and continue to exist today through groups such as Federation of American Immigration Reform, Center for Immigrant Studies and NumbersUSA. Individual anti-immigration leaders such as Kris Kobach, the architect of the Arizona and other restrictive immigration state laws, have also existed from time immemorial. This is the bad news. Anti-immigration groups and leaders will continue to exist.

The good news, however, judging from history, is that each anti-immigration group or movement has never survived for too long. They soon became irrelevant while the inexorable flow of immigrants into the United States has continued and continues even today. America’s greatness has been the triumph of immigrants who have gone on to benefit the country over the forces that have opposed them.

The Staff Report of the Select Commission On Immigration And Refugee Policy, US Immigration Policy And The National Interest (1981), provides a vivid glimpse of the anti-immigration movements from the past. I draw liberally from this report to make my point.  Between 1830 and 1860, when there was virtually unrestricted immigration, 4.5 million immigrants arrived into the United States. Amongst them were Irish and Germans who were Catholic, and there was an over simplified view that Catholics would never be good citizens as they were beholden to the Pope and subject to the orders from the church. Samuel Morse, well known as the inventor of the telegraph and Morse code, was also a nutty xenophobe, who warned:

How is it possible that foreign turbulence imported by shiploads, that riot and ignorance in hundreds of thousands of human priest-controlled machines should suddenly be thrown into our society and not produce turbulence and excess? Can one throw mud into pure water and not disturb its clearness?

This is the time when political parties such as the Know Nothing movement emerged with the objective of preventing foreigners from participating in national affairs. One of the pamphlets of the Know Nothing party warned:

It is notorious that the grossest frauds have been practiced on our naturalization laws, and that thousands and tens of thousands have every year deposited votes in the ballot box, who could not only not read them, and knew nothing of the nature of the business in which they were engaged, but who had not been six months in the country, and, in many cases, hardly six days.

Yet, immigrants kept on marching into the US. After the Civil War, the demand for labor increased and about 2.5 million Europeans came each decade from 1860-1880. During the 1880s, the number doubled to 5.25 million and another 16 million immigrants entered over the next quarter century. The Germans and Irish were by now assimilated, and the Know Nothing party had disappeared, but newer immigrants became the scapegoats as they appeared more foreign than the older immigrants. Jews and Italians became the targets of accusations that they could never become 100 percent Americans. A leading sociologist of his time Edward Ross stated that Jews were “the polar opposite of our pioneer breed. Undersized and weak muscled, they shun bodily activity and are exceedingly sensitive to pain.” Regarding Italians, Ross noted that they “possess a distressing frequency of low foreheads, open mouths, weak chins, poor features, skewed faces, small or knobby crania and backless heads.” Towards the end of his life, Ross moved away from these views.

Hardworking Chinese immigrants were also accused of never being able to assimilate. Indeed, similar to Arizona today leading the anti-immigrant movement against the influx of Mexicans in recent years; in 1876, a California State Senate Committee described the Chinese as follows:

They fail to comprehend our system of government; they perform no duties of citizenship..They do not comprehend or appreciate our social ideas…The great mass of the Chinese…are not amenable to our laws…They do not recognize the sanctity of an oath..

In 1907, when the flow of immigrants reached a high water mark, Congress appointed the Dillingham Commission, which premised its work on racist theories of superior and inferior people, and that the newer immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were not capable of becoming successful immigrants. The Dillingham Commission concluded, somewhat similar to the rationale for the existence of today’s anti-immigrant organizations (although without the blatant racist overtones that cannot be expressed in a more politically correct era):

  • 20th century immigration differed markedly from earlier movements of people to the United States;
  • The new immigration was dominated by the so-called inferior peoples – those who were physically, mentally and linguistically different, and therefore, less desirable thaneither native-born or early immigrant groups; and
  • Because of the inferiority of these people, the United States no longer benefited from a liberal immigration admissions policy and should, therefore, impose new restrictions on entry.

The anti-immigration movements and commissions from the 19th and early 20th centuries have been completely discredited, and reading some of their diatribe against the immigrants from those days makes one hold one’s nose. 2013 promises to herald immigration reform. After the reelection of President Obama in 2012 based on support from the burgeoning Latino population and other minorities, it has dawned upon even some opponents of immigration about the need to reform the broken immigration system thus blunting some of the rhetoric of the anti-immigration groups. As our elected representatives go on with their deliberations to propose reform legislation, they will continue to be pressured by today’s KnowNothings with their false view that today’s immigrants cannot assimilate and will undermine America. If history is any guide, be sure that today’s anti-immigration groups, along with their views on immigration, will likely become irrelevant as their counterparts from yesteryears. A group that exists solely to hate, fear, suspect and create negative attitudes about certain people cannot last for too long. Indeed, it is the views of those who stood up against the anti-immigration forces that have held up through the passage of time, and will continue to remain more forceful and triumphant.In conclusion, Lincoln’s letter to Joshua Speed in 1855 when he was wrongly accused of being a member of the Know Nothing party is worth noting:

I am not a Know-Nothing. That is certain. How could I be? How can anyone who abhors the oppression of negroes, be in favor of degrading classes of white people? Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. As a nation, we begin by declaring that “all men are created equal.” We now practically read it “all men are created equal, except negroes.” When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read “all men are created equal, except negroes, and foreigners, and catholics.” When it comes to this I should prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretence of loving liberty-to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy.

USCIS Issues Provisional Waiver Final Rule: Beginning in March, Some Waivers of the 3- or 10-Year Bars May Be Sought Before Departing the United States

One year ago, a previous post on this blog by Cyrus Mehta and this author discussed the issuance by USCIS of a proposed rule allowing certain applicants for a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars to obtain such a waiver on a provisional basis before departing from the United States.  It has been a long wait for the final rule, as USCIS needed to allow time to receive public comments (one of which was submitted by our firm) and then took a substantial amount of time to analyze the comments and determine what changes to make to the proposal, but the wait is finally over.USCIS first announced the final ruleand made an advance copy available on January 2, 2013, and the final rule was officially published in the Federal Registeron January 3.  The rule will take effect on March 4, 2013, and sometime before then USCIS will publish the Form I-601A that is to be used to apply for a provisional waiver.

The provisional waiver rule does not change the substantive standard that one must satisfy in order to obtain a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bar that one incurs upon accruing more than 180 days or a year of unlawful presence respectively.  In order to obtain a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), it is always necessary to show that the waiver applicant’s spouse or parent, who is a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) of the United States, will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is not permitted to remain in the United States.  However, under the new rule, certain applicants will be able to make this showing before they depart the United States to apply for a visa, which should dramatically shorten the amount of time that they need to spend abroad.  If an applicant is seeking a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars based extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen qualifying relative (rather than an LPR), and has an approved petition as an “immediate relative” of a U.S. citizen – that is, as the U.S. citizen’s spouse, parent, or unmarried child (under the age of 21 while taking into account the Child Status Protection Act, although only applicants age 17 or older may seek provisional waivers and younger applicants would not need them because unlawful presence for these purposes does not accrue until age 18)– then the applicant may seek a provisional waiver before departing from the United States, and only go abroad to apply for an immigrant visa after the provisional waiver has already been issued.  This process is subject to various restrictions, some of which are discussed further below, but that is the basic idea.

By allowing some waiver applications to be adjudicated while the applicant remains within the United States, the provisional waiver process should significantly reduce the period of time when the U.S. citizen relative of a successful waiver applicant is subject to the cruel irony that inheres in the current process.  Under the current system, where the waiver application is filed while the applicant is abroad after an immigrant visa interview, and the applicant then remains abroad during the months it takes to adjudicate the waiver application, the qualifying relative must undergo months of the very same extreme hardship that the waiver is intended to avoid!  At least with regard to U.S. citizen qualifying relatives of applicants who are immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, and who face no other ground of inadmissibility besides unlawful presence, this new provisional waiver process should remove much of that cruel irony.  It should also encourage applications by some waiver applicants who were unwilling to travel outside the United States to apply for a waiver because of the risk of long-term separation if the waiver were denied.

One detail to keep in mind is that the U.S. citizen relative to whom extreme hardship is shown in a provisional waiver application need not necessarily be the same U.S. citizen relative who has petitioned for an applicant.  Indeed, the U.S. citizen petitioner need not even be a possible qualifying relative for the 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver.  A child is not a qualifying relative for purposes of obtaining a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars, but an applicant who is sponsored by a U.S. citizen son or daughter over twenty-one years of age, and thus qualifies as an immediate relative, would be able to qualify for a provisional waiver if he or she could show extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen parent in the event that the applicant were not allowed to return to the United States– even though a U.S. citizen parent cannot sponsor an adult son or daughter as an immediate relative.  Or, an applicant with a U.S. citizen spouse, who cannot show that his or her spouse will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is not allowed to return to the United States, could instead obtain a provisional waiver by showing that a U.S. citizen parent will suffer extreme hardship in the applicant’s absence.

Another important detail, which has been changed from the proposed rule, is that applicants in removal proceedings will be able to seek a provisional waiver iftheir proceedings are administratively closed and have not been recalendered.  Administrative closure, most recently addressed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Avetisyan, is a process in which a case is taken off the active calendar of an Immigration Court or the BIA without actually being terminated; one might compare it to an indefinite continuance of the case.  Traditionally, it has occurred with the consent of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), although Avetisyan allows for it to be sought without DHS consent, a possibility which might prove useful in the provisional-waiver context.  Administrative closure has often occurred recently in the contextof the DHS exercise of prosecutorial discretion in favor of those who are lower priorities for removal so that DHS can focus its efforts on removing those who are its higher priorities for removal, such as those with serious criminal convictions—the process discussed in a June 17, 2011 memorandum from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton.It is admirable that USCIS realized, upon reviewing comments on the proposed rule, that no purpose would be served by denying the opportunity to apply for a provisional waiver to those whom ICE is not actively seeking to remove in any event.

One interesting consequence of this new eligibility for those with administratively closed removal cases relates to the process created by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in its October 16, 2012 opinion entitled In the Matter of Immigration Petitions for Review Pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in order to avoid having to spend court time unnecessarily reviewing a removal order in cases where ICE would anyway not seek to execute the order, has created an automatic 90-day waiting period during the processing of petitions for review (although one which can be ended early by either side) to allow for discussion of whether the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is appropriate.  In cases where the Office of Immigration Litigation that is representing the government on the petition for review determines in consultation with ICE that a case is low-priority and suitable for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the case will be remanded to the BIA for administrative closure.  Thus, at least in the Second Circuit, and perhaps in other Circuits which may come to follow the lead of the Second Circuit, some who have already received final orders of removal, but who would be eligible for a provisional waiver absent such final order and have petitioned for review of the order, should be able to return their case to an administratively closed state under the new process and then apply for a provisional waiver.

In another positive development, the final rule has retreated somewhat from the initial USCIS position that the provisional waiver process would only allow for what one might call a single bite at the apple, permitting neither appeal nor re-filing, so that an applicant who was denied a provisional waiver could only proceed with the process by departing from the United States and re-applying for a conventional waiver from abroad.  Although an administrative appeal is still not available, an applicant whose application for a provisional waiver is denied will be permitted under the final rule to file a new application (with the appropriate filing fee).

Not all the news from the final rule is good news, however.  Unfortunately, despite the urging of many commenters, the provisional waiver process will not be available to those who are currently in removal proceedings, unless their proceedings have been administratively closed and not recalendared.  It will also not be available to those who are currently subject to a final removal or deportation or exclusion order—even though those subject to such orders have long been able to file a stand-alone I-212 application for advance permission to reapply for admission prior to departure from the United States, under 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(j).  Unless those subject to a final order can get the case reopened and administratively closed (as for example could be possible on remand from a Court of Appeals), it appears they will need to follow the conventional waiver process from abroad, despite the resulting hardship to qualifying relatives.

The provisional waiver process also will not apply to those who are inadmissible for reasons other than the 3- or 10-year bar resulting from previous unlawful presence.  Although the above-mentioned previous post on this blog, and our official comment submitted to USCISalong the same lines, advocated that provisional waivers should be available in contexts such as alleged fraud for which a waiver is needed under INA section 212(i), USCIS chose not to accept that suggestion.  However, USCIS has held out the possibility of perhaps extending the provisional waiver process to other contexts once it has had a chance to observe how the initial, narrower version of the provisional waiver process works in practice.

Another restriction worth noting is that the provisional waiver will not be available to those who have already been scheduled for an immigrant visa interview as of January 3, 2013.  The key question is not when the interview was scheduled to take place, or whether the applicant attended the interview, but whether the Department of State’s National Visa Center (NVC) had already acted to schedule a consular interview by January 3.  If the NVC had scheduled a visa interview by January 3, the provisional waiver process will not be available.  If the NVC had not acted to schedule an interview by January 3, then the subsequent scheduling of an interview will not remove one’s eligibility for the provisional waiver, although in the interest of efficiency prospective waiver applicants with a case before the NVC are advised to notify the NVC of their intent to seek a provisional waiver before an interview is scheduled.  The NVC has already begun sending emails to some prospective visa applicants advising them that they must inform the NVC of their intent to seek a provisional waiver, by sending an email to NVCI601A@state.gov, and that failure to do so would delay the visa application.

For additional background on the final provisional waiver rule, interested readers may wish to review posts about it on the “AILA Leadership Blog” of the  American Immigration Lawyers’ Associationand the “Lifted Lamp” blog of Benach Ragland LLP.  The New York Times has also reported on the new provisional waiver rules.  Despite all of its imperfections, the final provisional waiver rule is a very positive development, an important step along the road of reducing unnecessary hardship to the qualifying relatives of waiver applicants.

Top 10 Posts on The Insightful Immigration Blog In 2012

Thank you for reading and supporting The Insightful Immigration Blog.  Listed below are the top 10 most viewed blogs in 2012. We will continue to provide insightful commentary on contemporary immigration issues in 2013, and wish all of our supporters and well wishers a very happy New Year! While these are the 10 most viewed blogs, each blog is a carefully crafted gem, and we invite you to read all of them.

1. EDGE SAYS INDIAN 2- YEAR MASTER’S DEGREE FOLLOWING 4-YEAR BACHELOR’S IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO US MASTER’S DEGREE, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2012/01/edge-says-indian-4-year-bachelors.html

2. HR 3012: A GOOD BILL SADDLED WITH A BAD AMENDMENT, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2012/07/hr-3012-good-bill-saddled-with-bad.html


3. STATE DEPARTMENT’S VISA OFFICE TAKES BROADER VIEW OF “SOUGHT TO ACQUIRE” PROVISION UNDER THE CHILD STATUS PROTECTION ACT, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2012/01/state-departments-visa-office-takes.html

4. DEFERRED ACTION: THE NEXT GENERATION, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2012/06/deferred-action-next-generation.html 

5. FLEUTI LIVES! THE RESTORATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2012/04/fleuti-lives-restoration-of.html

6. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: ADVENTURES WITH ARRABALLY AND YERRABELLY IN IMMIGRATION LAND, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2012/08/athrough-looking-glass-adventures-with.html

7.  THE SUPERVISED RECRUITMENT ROLLER COASTER -THE RIDE THUS FAR, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2012/02/supervised-recruitment-roller-coaster.html

8. THE H-1B PROCESS GETS EVEN HARDER: DOL PROPOSES DRAMATIC CHANGES TO THE LCA FORM, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2012/07/the-h-1b-process-gets-even-harder-dol.html

9. DRUGS AND INADMISSIBILITY, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2012/01/drugs-and-inadmissibility.html

10.   BALCA CLARIFIES DOL’S POSITION ON PROOF OF PUBLICATION OF THE SWA JOB ORDER AND ADS PLACED BY PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT FIRMS UNDER PERM, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2012/04/balca-clarifies-dols-position-on-proof.html

Can Piers Morgan Be Deported for His Comments on Gun Control?

At the time of writing this blog, more than 48,000 people have signed a petition on the White House website asking that CNN talk show host be deported for his comments on gun control in the wake of the mass shootings at Sandy Hook school.

According to one of the two petitions, “We demand that Mr. Morgan be deported immediately for his effort to undermine the Bill of Rights and for exploiting his position as a national network television host to stage attacks against the rights of American citizens.”

The White House is obligated to respond if the petition gathers 25,000 signatures within 30 days. Mr. Morgan, a British citizen, is not a citizen of the United States. Non-citizens can be deported from the US for a number of immigration offenses, but can Mr. Morgan’s strident comments favoring gun control truly lead to his deportation?

Not really, based on a quick analysis of some of the relevant provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Mr. Morgan certainly doesn’t seem to be seeking “the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the Government of the United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means,” and so he is clearly not deportable under INA 237(a)(4)(A)(iii).  Nor is he one who “endorses or espouses terrorist activity”, under INA 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII), and so he’s not inadmissible under that broad provision.  And there’s no reason to think that opposition to the Second Amendment would have serious adverse foreign policy consequences. Indeed, it is more likely the reverse given the international outrage against proponents of gun ownership, especially the ownership of automatic assault weapon, that led to the killings of 20 defenseless children and 6 others. So INA 212(a)(3)(C) does not apply.

Mr. Morgan has nothing to fear, if he indeed fears being deported from the United States, and the petitioners are truly wasting their time and losing more and more credibility  in the wake of an increasing number of gun related deaths. While the United States is clearly not the envy of the world with regard to its obsession for gun ownership that results in more homicides than most other nations, it can at least boast of freedom of speech enshrined in the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights. Anyone, citizen or non-citizen, whether within or outside the US, has the right to peacefully advocate for a change to the US Constitution, including a re-evaluation of the Second Amendment that forms the basis for people to easily own guns, including assault weapons that lead to the tragic and senseless slaughter of innocents.

RESUME REVIEW IN THE PERM PROCESS

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Department of Labor (DOL) has a statutory responsibility to ensure that no foreign worker (or “alien”) is admitted for permanent residence based upon an offer of employment absent a finding that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified and available for the work to be undertaken and that the admission of such worker will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers similarly employed.  INA § 212(a)(5)(A)(i).The DOL fulfills this responsibility by determining the availability of qualified U.S. workers before approving a permanent labor certification application and by ensuring that U.S. workers are fairly considered for all job opportunities that are the subject of a permanent labor certification application.  Accordingly, the DOL relies on employers who file labor certification applications to recruit and consider U.S. workers in good faith.

Attorneys, agents, and foreign workers are prohibited from interviewing and considering U.S. workers during the permanent labor certification process, as described in 20 C.F.R. § 656.10 (b)(2)(i) and (ii). However, the DOL does not prohibit attorneys and agents from performing the analyses necessary to counsel their clients on legal questions that may arise with respect to this process.  The employer, and not the attorney or agent, must be the first to review an application for employment, and must determine whether a U.S. applicant’s qualifications meet the minimum requirements for the position, unless the attorney or agent is the representative of the employer who routinely performs this function for positions for which labor certifications are not filed.

The DOL has indicated that good faith recruitment requires that an employer’s process for considering U.S. workers who respond to certification-related recruitment closely resemble the employer’s normal consideration process. Yet, real world recruiting is at times impossible when the DOL sets forth “unreal” recruitment standards for employers! As an attorney who regularly counsels employers filing PERM labor certifications, I have found that one of the most difficult concepts for some employers to grasp is the resume review process and how it ought to be conducted in the PERM process.It’s hard for an employer to comprehend why they have to continue to assess an applicant who upon receipt of an e-mail from the employer, responded that he was “away” and would get back to the employer at some point in the following week; or an applicant who, when contacted, had no recollection that he had even applied for the job and needed to be informed of the job opportunity and the employer’s business; or an applicant who only listed “Software Engineer” as his experience leaving the employer unclear as to what skills he may possess. As reasons for rejection of applicants, employers sometimes state,“applicant is far too overqualified and I would never hire him for this position” or “these applicants went to foreign universities and I know they require sponsorship.” While these reasons may be acceptable in the employer’s normal consideration process, neither is a valid reason for rejection in the PERM process.Some employers become frustrated and push back. I find that I very often have to preface my comments with “We are not operating in the real world here…”

Currently, and for some time now, every PERM audit letter requests verification of the unavailability of US workers. A request for resumes and applications for all US workers who applied for the job opportunity seems to have become the standard. The DOL specifically wants to review documentation of the employer’s contact with applicants and its assessment of the qualification of applicants.Yet, other than the expectation that the employer conduct “good faith” PERM recruitment, the DOL has not issued significant guidance with regard to resume review. But it is possible to glean some information from recent decisions by the Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA). In particular, two specific cases, involving Supervised Recruitment, shed some light on how the DOL expects employers to conduct resume reviews.

In Matter of Goldman Sachs & Co., 2011-PER-01064 (June. 8, 2012), the employer, indicated on the ETA Form 9089 that it would accept for the position of Financial Analyst, “any suitable combination of education, training and experience,” language well-known to practitioners filing PERM applications as the Kellogg language based on Matter of Francis Kellogg, 94-INA-465 (Feb. 2, 1998) (en banc). During Supervised Recruitment, the employer submitted an expert opinion to the DOL detailing why thirty-five U.S. worker applicants had each been rejected without interview. As examples, BALCA highlighted one applicant who was rejected despite his “substantial academic business credentials” and because he did not possess “narrowly focused” experience necessary for the position and another applicant who the employer described as having “a long and varied career in accounting and financial reporting” but lacking in certain specific experience. The Certifying Officer (CO) denied the labor certification finding that the employer rejected U.S. workers for other than job related reasons. The CO specifically emphasized that the employer had indicated its willingness to accept “any suitable combination of education, training or experience” and had not taken the time to explore and evaluate the suitability of the applicants’ education, training or experience. The DOL cited 20 C.F.R. § 656.24(a)(2)(b) and stated that “where there is a reasonable possibility the applicant may meet the job requirements, it is incumbent on the employer to further investigate the U.S. applicant’s qualifications.” In its request for reconsideration, the employer argued, inter alia, that it has no duty to interview candidates who fail to show on their resumes that they satisfy the major job requirements.

BALCA held that the CO did not question the employer’s business necessity for its job requirements, but instead questioned the fact that the employer rejected without interview applicants who appeared facially qualified for the position and did not address how they were unqualified even possessing a combination of education, training and experience. BALCA upheld the CO’s denial and cited Blessed Sacrament School, 96-INA-52, slip op. at 3 (Oct. 29, 1997) which held that where the applicant’s resume shows a broad range of experience, education and training that raises a reasonable possibility that the applicant is qualified even if the resume does not expressly state that he or she meets all the requirements, an employer bears the burden of further investigating the applicant’s credentials.

The takeaway from Goldman Sachs, and the concept that can be difficult to explain to employer clients, is that regardless of how convinced the employer may be that the U.S. worker applicant is unqualified for the position based only on his resume, if there is even a hint that the applicant may appear qualified to the untrained eye of a CO, it is worth the employer’s time to interview the applicant. During an interview, the employer can zero in on the specific requirements of the offered position and better assess the applicant’s qualifications.

In JP Morgan Chase & Co., 2011-PER-01000 (Jul. 16. 2012), the employer’s requirements included “Proficiency in Excel or Access,…understanding of databases (Lotus Notes and SharePoint), must have experience liaising with a technology team to develop/update product enhancement tool, databases and work flow engines…” The CO denied the case after concluding that U.S. worker applicants had a combination of education, training and experience equivalent to the employer’s job requirements and could acquire Access and SharePoint skills while on the job.

Rather than focusing, as it did in Goldman Sachs, on whether or not the employer had a duty to interview the U.S. workers to better assess their qualifications, the key issue for BALCA was whether or not the employer’s stated minimum requirements were established as a business necessity. BALCA stated that the employer had submitted a business necessity explanation in its Recruitment Report detailing why it requires an understanding of Lotus Notes and SharePoint and why job training was not feasible; the CO did not contend that these requirements were unduly restrictive; and the resumes of the U.S. worker applicants showed that they did not have the required skills. Based on this, BALCA held that the CO cannot dismiss the employer’s stated requirements and substitute his judgment for the employer’s.

Confused much? The JP Morgan case emphasizes the importance of submitting a compelling business necessity argument in response to PERM audits. That way, if and when the employer rejects U.S. workers, the reason will be clear to the CO. But does the employer have to interview when the applicant’s resume does not list all the requirements or not? I think the clear answer is that the employer should always err on the side of interviewing the applicants. If there is even a hint of a question as to whether the applicant may appear qualified, the employer should interview. If the applicant failed to list the one technology required for the position but listed 5 similar technologies, the employer should interview. If the employer has stated that it will accept any combination of education, training and experience and the applicant has broadly listed his experience as simply “Software Engineer,” the employer should interview. While the DOL claims that the employer’s consideration of these applicants should resemble its normal consideration process, it just cannot. In normal consideration processes, the employer may utilize its judgment to reject any applicant deemed unqualified.  When it comes to the PERM process, the employer must go out of its way to demonstrate to the DOL that it has, in good faith, tried it’s best to find a U.S. worker to fill the offered position. In addition, the employer should take pains to explain in great detail, if audited, specifically why each applicant was not qualified for the offered position, providing evidence of any interviews and other communication with the applicants.

USCIS and the Lack of Procedures for Surviving Relative Petitions Under INA § 204(l)

By: Myriam Jaidi

Congress passed a noble law in 2009 to protect surviving family members who were the derivatives of employment-based and other categories of petitions and applications.  Specifically, the law provides that certain categories of individuals could continue to have petitions, adjustment applications and related applications adjudicated so long as they were residing (not necessarily present, but residing) in the United States at the time the qualifying relative died and continuing to reside in the United States.  The statute specifically states that the named categories of individuals “shall have” a “pending or approved” petition of the type listed in subsection 2 of the statute “and any related applications adjudicated notwithstanding the death of the qualifying relative . . . .”  INA § 204(l)(1)(emphasis added).

This blog will focus on the problems arising in the context of surviving relatives of beneficiaries of employment-based petitions who have filed adjustment applications.  Given the backlogs in the EB-3 category for India for example making people wait decades before their priority dates become current, there may be more and more surviving relatives to deal with.  This blog seeks to help shed some light on surviving relative cases and highlight some of the overall problems with the lack of clear guidance from USCIS on what surviving relatives should do and how their requests will be handled.

The statute is worth reviewing in its entirety to demonstrate how odd it is that USCIS treats surviving relatives differently based on whether an I-140 has been approved or remains pending:

(l)  SURVIVING RELATIVE CONSIDERATION FOR CERTAIN PETITIONS AND APPLICATIONS-

(1) IN GENERAL- An alien described in paragraph (2) who resided in the United States at the time of the death of the qualifying relative and who continues to reside in the United States shall have such petition described in paragraph (2), or an application for adjustment of status to that of a person admitted for lawful permanent residence based upon the family relationship described in paragraph (2), and any related applications, adjudicated notwithstanding the death of the qualifying relative, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security determines, in the unreviewable discretion of the Secretary, that approval would not be in the public interest.

(2) ALIEN DESCRIBED- An alien described in this paragraph is an alien who, immediately prior to the death of his or her qualifying relative, was–

(A) the beneficiary of a pending or approved petition for classification as an immediate relative (as described in section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) );

(B) the beneficiary of a pending or approved petition for classification under section 203 (a) or (d) ;

(C) a derivative beneficiary of a pending or approved petition for classification under section 203(b) (as described in section 203(d) );

(D) the beneficiary of a pending or approved refugee/asylee relative petition under section 207 or 208 ;

(E) an alien admitted in `T’ nonimmigrant status as described in section 101(a)(15)(T)(ii) or in `U’ nonimmigrant status as described in section 101(a)(15)(U)(ii) ; or

(F) an asylee (as described in section 208(b)(3) ).

As you can see, the law helps a host of categories of individuals, but here we will use the example of families who suffered the loss of a member who had been sponsored by an employer, with the sole difference being that in one case the I-140 had been approved and in the other the I-140 remains pending.  In both cases, the families have been able to file their green card applications.

Mahjouba and Karim came to the United States from Morocco, two young children in tow, when Mahjouba was sponsored by a company on an H-1B visa.  After two years, the company was so impressed with her work that they sponsored Mahjouba for an immigrant visa.  The immigrant petition on Form I-140 was filed premium processing on her behalf and quickly approved.  When her priority date became current, the family submitted their adjustment of status applications, along with advance parole and work authorization applications.  Karim used his EAD and started working.  When the family traveled, he used his advance parole.

Henri and Helene came from France when Henri was sponsored for an H-1B, and they also brought their children.  After a few years of working with the company, he was sponsored for an immigrant visa.  The immigrant petition on Form I-140 was filed regular processing, and remains pending along with the adjustment applications, which were filed concurrently because Henri’s priority date was current at the time of filing.  Helene decided to use her EAD to work and her advance parole to travel, instead of depending on her H-4, while the immigrant petition for her husband and the families’ adjustment applications were pending.

Tragedy strikes both families.  Mahjouba became very ill and died from a rare form of cancer.  Henri was hit by a drunk driver and killed.

The families are in similar straits – the person sponsored by an employer has been killed.  Their dependents are residing in the United States, grieving and wondering what will happen to us now?

It seems quite clear from the statute that Karim and his kids and Helene and her kids should be protected in the same way.  So long as they meet the requirements of the law – that is, at least one member of each family was residing in the United States at the time of death and will continue to reside in the United States, their “pending or approved” petitions and adjustment of status applications should continue to be adjudicated as if the death had not occurred, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security decides that approval would not be in the public interest.  Thus, they should be able to renew their EAD and AP documents, and continue to work and travel and ultimately get their green cards.

Unfortunately, because USCIS took the position in Policy Memorandum, Approval of Petitions and Applications after the Death of the Qualifying Relative , PM-602-0017 (December 16, 2010) (“Policy Memo”) (and in the Adjudicator’s Field Manual sections it revised pursuant to that memorandum) issued December 16, 2010, that pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(iii)(B), an approved I-140 is automatically revoked when the individual sponsored dies, Karim and his family will not have the same security of knowing their petitions will proceed and may be subject to a different, more intense standard, i.e. to request “humanitarian reinstatement.”  I say “may” be subject to the more exacting standard because the policy memorandum is not clear on the matter, and does give an adjudicating officer an “out” by stating “reinstatement is generally appropriate as a matter of discretion, if section 204(l) of the Act and Chapter 10.21 of the AFM [Adjudicator’s Field Manual] would support approval of the petition if it were still pending.”  Policy Memo at p. 15 (and AFM 10.21(7)).

As the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman, and many others, have noted, in taking the position that an approved I-140 is automatically revoked by the death of the beneficiary, thus requiring humanitarian reinstatement, USCIS guidance “does not align with the purpose and plain language” of the statute.  The bifurcated approach is unfair, unnecessary and nonsensical.  Why would a pending I-140 petition be treated more favorably than an approved I-140 petition, as the approved petition has been vetted and completed and revoking it works a hardship on derivative beneficiaries that Congress intended to prevent by enacting INA § 204(l)?  At the very least, they should be treated the same – that is what the law in fact dictates.  The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) made an interesting argument in comments it submitted on USCIS’s draft memorandum.  Specifically, AILA demonstrated that the automatic revocation provision does not apply where INA § 204(l) applies.

The automatic revocation regulations purport to revoke an approved petition only “upon the death of the petitioner or the beneficiary,” so they can be seen as having no operation, because §204(l) preserves the petition the moment before death.  Therefore, the “immediately prior to the death” language of §204(l) trumps the “upon the death” language of the regulations on automatic revocation at 8 CFR §205.1. For the §204(l) eligible beneficiary, therefore, automatic termination has no effect on the already approved petition. This holds true for all §204(l) eligible beneficiaries, including those who cannot currently avail themselves of humanitarian reinstatement

See AILA Comment on USCIS Draft Memorandum: “Approval of Petitions and Applications after the Death of the Qualifying Relative; New INA Section 204(l) updates the AFM with New Chapter 20.6 and an Amendment to Chapter 21.2(h)(1)(C)” (June 1, 2010) at p.6.

Putting aside the unfairness (if we can bring ourselves to do that), what do Karim and Helene need to do, how can they embrace the protection Congress has provided for their families?  Unfortunately, as the Ombudsman determined, “no clear process is available for survivors to request benefits from USCIS under INA section 204(l).”  See Ombudsman Report at p. 2.

Reviewing the policy memorandum and AFM section 10.21 gives no hint of what Helene should do.  There are no instructions for individuals whose qualifying relative’s petition was still pending at the time of death.  Presumably it and related application will continue to be processed and the family can use and renew their EAD and AP to work and travel, respectively, without issue.  Maybe.  More on that aspect below.

Karim can get some direction from AFM 10.21(7).  That section, as noted above, dictates that Mahjouba’s I-140 petition was automatically revoked upon her death and that Karim needs to look to AFM 21.2(h)(1)(C) for guidance on reinstating Mahjouba’s petition and obtaining the protection of INA § 204(l).  Before going on to that, note that USCIS will not give effect to Mahjouba’s employer’s request to withdraw the I-140 approval after her death “since the employment-based petitioner no longer has any legal interest in the immigration of the principal beneficiary’s widow(er) or children.”  AFM 10.21(c)(3).

So, what does Karim need to do?  AFM 21.2(h)(1)(C) directs someone in Karim’s position to “send a written request for reinstatement to the USCIS service center or field office that approved the petition except that, if the beneficiary has properly filed an application for adjustment of status with USCIS, the written request should be submitted to the USCIS office with jurisdiction over the adjustment application.”  This section also directs that the request must include a copy of the approval notice for the revoked petition and the death certificate of the qualifying relative.

Although it is not stated in this section, to comply with the requirements of the statute, Karim would need to include proof of his residence in the United States at the time of his wife’s death and that he continues to reside in the United States.  In addition, it would be prudent for him to include a copy of each family member’s I-485 receipt notice, which should include each individual’s alien number, all of which could assist USCIS in matching up the request to each family member’s file.

Once the request is submitted, USCIS takes the position that a request like Karim’s, because it involved an I-140 that was previously approved and in USCIS’s view automatically revoked, is a request for humanitarianreinstatement, is discretionary, and may be denied “if the director decides that humanitarian reinstatement is not warranted.”  AFM 21.2(h)(1)(C).  The section goes on to state:

While there are no other rules or precedents on how to apply this discretionary authority, reinstatement may be appropriate when revocation is not consistent with “the furtherance of justice,” especially in light of the goal of family unity that is the underlying premise of our nation’s immigration system. In particular, reinstatement is generally appropriate as a matter of discretion, if section 204(l) of the Act and Chapter 10.21 of this AFM would support approval of the petition if it were still pending.

It is unclear what guidance, given the lack of “other rules and precedents”, terms like “may be appropriate” or “generally appropriate” provide to the adjudicating officer, but one would hope that given Congress’s intent to protect individuals in Karim’s position, and the fact that the statute clearly states it covers those with “pending or approved” petitions, that, barring other grounds of ineligibility, the I-140 should be reinstated and the adjustment applications and related applications should continue, as if his wife had not died.Presumably, Helene could submit a similar packet to ensure the protections of §204(l) are applied to her and her family.  In her case, she need not request reinstatement, but presumably she too would need to provide proof of her spouse’s death, and demonstrate residence in the United States at the time of his death and her intent to continue to reside in the United States.  Because her husband’s I-140 is still pending, the best guess is that she needs to send the information to the Service Center processing his I-140.

As pointed out above, there is no clear system in place for how USCIS handles these requests, acknowledge these requests, process these requests, or give notice to family members about these requests.  Because there are no regulations, no form, and no guidelines other than what may be “appropriate”, there is little a family can do but contact USCIS or perhaps even the Ombudsman’s office to try to get acknowledgement that their applications are being adjudicated.

A big question arises with regard to travel.  It would appear that the ability to travel after submission of the request by someone in Helene’s position might be a bit safer than someone in Karim’s position, given that Henri’s pending I-140 petition remains pending.  But what happens if the request is still pending or is denied while the family is out of the country, using their valid advance parole documents to travel?  Clearly if the request has been denied, the family should not travel and if they are outside the country they could get stranded, as this has happened to similarly situated individuals.  But if the request is still pending, should Karim and his family take the risk of traveling?  One would counsel probably not, because even though the advance parole document was valid when they left the country and remains, on its face, valid and no notice of its revocation has been given, CBP might not honor the documents at the border if they see that the underlying I-140, upon which all other applications depend, has been automatically revoked and not yet reinstated by USCIS.

One last diversion: what about those individuals who have an approved or pending EB-3 I-140, are from countries with severely backlogged priority dates like India, and therefore have not yet been able to file an adjustment application?  What does an individual in H-4 status do when his or her H-1B spouse dies?  The statute clearly states that individuals in this category should be covered, see INA § 204(l)(2)(C), but for how long?  It is unclear whether the “continuing to reside” requirement applies only to getting the revoked I-140 reinstated or reaffirmed, or whether the individual would have to remain, waiting decades for the priority date to become current.  The Policy Memo provides little clear guidance:

Because section 204(l) of the Act does not waive the standard eligibility requirements for applying for adjustment, an alien who did not already have an adjustment application pending when the qualifying relative died may not be able to seek adjustment in every case in which a pending petition was approved, or an approved petition was reinstated, under section 204(l) of the Act.  An alien whose petition has been approved or reinstated under new section 204(l) of the Act, but who is not eligible to adjust status, would not be precluded from applying for an immigrant visa at a consular post abroad.2  The approval of a visa petition under section 204(l) of the Act does not give an alien who is not eligible for adjustment of status, and who is not in some other lawful immigration status, a right to remain in the United States while awaiting the availability of an immigrant visa.

Footnote 2 states:

The alien must have been continuing to reside in the United States in order for the petition to have been approved.  Once it has been approved, however, the alien’s departure to obtain a visa would not change the fact that the alien met the residence requirements when the officer adjudicated the petition.

One interpretation of this language from the Policy Memo is that the individual is only required to continue to reside in the United States until the I-140 has been reinstated or reaffirmed.  The implication therefore is that the person can then leave the United States to wait for the priority date to become current and apply for an immigrant visa via consular processing, although note that the Foreign Affairs Manual has not been updated to take the provisions of INA § 204(l) into account.  And after they have waited 20 or 30 years in India (one report has estimated that the EB-3 India wait is 70 years!), how will they get the National Visa Center to prompt their case into active status?

Since the H-4 spouse can no longer maintain status once his or her H-1B spouse has died, he or she may be able to remain in the United States for 180 days past the death of his or her spouse and take harbor in INA 245(k).  Or he or she could arguably wait in the United States until 180 days after their valid I-94 expires and then leave to consular process.  But given the backlogs, 180 days could never be enough time, and INA § 204(l) does not protect against grounds of ineligibility not related to the death of the spouse (so, INA 245(c) could make an overstay spouse ineligible to adjust and if such spouse leaves to consular process, they might trigger the 3 or 10 year bar and would need a waiver – a waiver they could only get if they had some qualifying relative, as their deceased spouse could not serve as that qualifying relative in this example because he or she was not yet a lawful permanent resident or citizen).

These individuals could try to change to another nonimmigrant status, but again the decades they might have to wait make this seem untenable – how long can one really remain a student?  If they do not have the appropriate qualifications for an H-1B, or keep getting unlucky under the H-1B cap, what to do?  One could perhaps try to request deferred action on humanitarian grounds given the humanitarian purpose behind INA § 204(l), from the Department of Homeland Security in order to avoid accruing unlawful presence while waiting for the priority date to become current to leave the country in order to consular process, but would DHS grant such a request?  There is no guidance as to that issue.  Clearly, the backlog of priority dates is a missing link in the protection that INA § 204(l) was meant to provide.

USCIS should take up the Ombudsman’s November 26, 2012 recommendations as soon as possible and conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking to create or designate a standard form, establish a receipt protocol, and an adjudication process that is in compliance with the actual statute.  USCIS should stop regarding these requests as discretionary (“shall be adjudicated”), publish instructions for applicants and petitioners and track and monitor the processing of surviving relative requests.  The loss of a family member is enough of a burden, USCIS should not double down on that burden by failing to institute clear procedures to give families comfort and clarity as to their ability to have their applications adjudicated, and feel safe to travel and work.  Moreover, one would hope that the backlogs will be cleared up but in the interim, the problem posed by backlogs in the surviving spouse context should be taken up by USCIS or even by Congress.