By Cyrus D. Mehta and Ramya Mahesh
The question of immigration benefits to same sex couples is still a far cry in India. India not only disallows same sex marriages, it also currently criminalizes relationships between same sex partners, terming them as unnatural. Section 377[i] of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”), an archaic law, was introduced in 1861 during the British rule in India, which criminalized “carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal” with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
The struggle to strike down Section 377 of the IPC as unconstitutional has been a long one, spearheaded by several activists from Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”) fighting for the rights of the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender (LGBT) community. On July 2, 2009, a historic judgment[ii] decriminalizing homosexuality was passed by the Delhi High Court in favor of Naz Foundation, an NGO working in the fields of HIV/AIDS intervention and prevention and for the rights of the LGBT community. An appeal was filed challenging this decision in the Supreme Court of India. On December 11, 2013, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Delhi High Court,[iii]thereby criminalizing homosexual intercourse between consenting adults. The apex court shifted the onus onto parliament to decide whether to repeal the provision, arguing that the courts could not make such decisions under the existing laws. The apex court further observed that there was “no constitutional infirmity” in the 377 law. This judgment has sparked widespread condemnation throughout India and internationally, and has been criticized as regressive. Naz Foundation plans to file a review petition challenging the decision of the Supreme Court soon.
As Indian law does not recognize same sex marriages, there are no provisions in Indian law according immigration benefits to same sex partners.It is therefore not possible to qualify for an entry visa to accompany one’s partner who may be entering India on a long term employment visa. At the most, the partner can come to India on tourist visa (for a maximum period of 180 days).
However, there have been isolated incidents and trends worth reporting. In November 2013, a senior IFS officer was demoted from her post in the Ministry of External Affairs (“MEA”) passport and visa division for refusing a visa to the same sex spouse of an American diplomat.[iv] She refused the visa on the ground that same sex marriages are not legal in India and the diplomat’s spouse could not therefore be granted a diplomatic visa and recognized as a “spouse” in India. A senior official in the MEA’s American division suggested that although there is no rule in India to give visa to a gay couple, the diplomat’s partner could be given visa as a family member as it had been done in the past. In light of India’s opposition to the arrest of its Deputy Consul General in New York, one politician from the Bhartiya Janata Party has shrilly suggested that the same sex partners of American diplomats be prosecuted under Section 377 as a retaliatory measure. It is hoped that this inappropriate statement be viewed as an isolated one and not consistent with mainstream opinion.
As for domestic and unmarried partners, Indian law did not, till recently recognize the relationships between domestic, live-in partners. On June 17, 2013, the Madras High Court held[v]that for a valid marriage, all customary rights need not be followed and subsequently solemnized. As long as the couple is not disqualified by law from marrying each other, and a third party’s rights are not affected, the couple can be declared to be spouses by the court. This declaration would be on the basis of whether they have had a sexual relationship. The Court held that if a woman aged 18 and above, and a man aged 21 and above, have a sexual relationship, they will be treated as husband and wife, especially if the woman becomes pregnant. Even if the woman does not become pregnant, if there is “strong documentary evidence to show existence of such relationship,” they will still be termed “husband” and “wife.” However, this ruling is only applicable to the state of Tamil Nadu and cannot be enforced elsewhere in India.
In a recent judgment of November 26, 2013, the Supreme Court of India had dealt with the issue of live-in relationships but it was within the purview of the Domestic Violence Act 2005 (the “DV Act, 2005”). The Supreme Court has held[vi]that a “live-in relationship” would not amount to a “relationship in the nature of marriage” falling within the definition of “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act, 2005 if the lady in such a relationship knew that the male partner was already married. All live-in relationships are not relationships in the nature of marriage, but they can still come within the ambit of the DV Act, 2005.. The judgment was delivered by a Division Bench of Justices KS Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose in an appeal filed by one Indra Sarma (Appellant) against the decision of the Karnataka High Court. This ruling will only apply to domestic partners of opposite sexes and will not be applicable to same sex partners in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Suresh Kumar Koushal case[vii]
It has to be kept in mind that as these issues are very recent and path-breaking as far as Indian laws are concerned, there has been no recognition, thus far, in Indian law, of same sex partners or domestic / unmarried partners with respect to Indian immigration. It is quite obvious that if India does not change its outlook to according benefits to same sex spouses or partners, it will be disadvantageous to the country as fewer people may wish to travel to India for tourism and business. More important, failure to recognize same-sex relationships, especially in light of a regressive penal provision in 377, is not in keeping with the principles and traditions of the world’s largest democracy country that has otherwise accommodated diverse people and beliefs through its history.
Update: In a very positive development, the Indian government filed a review petition in The Supreme Court on December 20, 2013 challenging the earlier judgment upholding Section 377 stating, “Section 377 IPC, insofar as it criminalizes consensual sexual acts in private, falls foul of the principles of equality and liberty enshrined in our Constitution.”
(Guest writer Ramya Mahesh is an Associate at Little & Co., one of the oldest and most highly reputed law firms in Mumbai, India)
[i] Section 377: Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[vii] Supra , see footnote 3.
Mark Thomas (not the actual name of any client, of course) is suddenly living a nightmare. He has just discovered that he has remained in the U.S. well after the expiration date of the Form I-94 issued to him the last time he entered the U.S. in H-1B status. His employer has informed him that he might be out of status and he wants to terminate his employment because he thinks Mark is no longer eligible to work in the U.S. Mark’s first desperate instinct is to get on the next international flight to anywhere and then re-enter the U.S. to receive a new I-94. However, his attorney advises him that this is too risky and warns Mark – leave and he could be barred from re-entering the U.S. for years! Mark Thomas feels hopelessly stuck.
Every foreign national who has visited the U.S. whether for business or pleasure, is familiar with the all-important Form I-94. The I-94 is the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Arrival/Departure record. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issues the I-94 to document a foreign national’s admission into the U.S. whether the individual is admitted as a nonimmigrant or is the process of adjusting status in the U.S. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) also issue the I-94 to foreign nationals who are extending their nonimmigrant status or changing from one nonimmigrant status to another in the U.S. This I-94 appears at the bottom of USCIS’ Form I-797A, Approval Notice indicating USCIS’ approval of the petition or application to extend or change the foreign national’s nonimmigrant status in the U.S.
Previously, whenever a nonimmigrant arrived in the U.S. by air or sea, he or she usually filled out a white arrival/departure record – the I‑94 (or green I-94W for foreign nationals entering on a visa waiver) – and presented it to the port’s CBP officer. The officer would then tear off the bottom portion of the form and stamp it to indicate the alien’s nonimmigrant status (i.e. B-2, L-1A, H-1B, etc.) and the expiration date of the alien’s authorized period of stay. The I-94 was then stapled to a page of the alien’s passport, and upon departure, the alien had to turn in the I-94 at the port of departure as a record of timely departure.
CBP has now automated the I-94 process for all foreign nationals applying for admission at U.S. ports of entry. Air and sea travelers no longer need to complete the paper I-94 (or I-94W). CBP will still issue a paper I-94 at land border ports of entry and also to certain classes of aliens such as refugees and at other times CBP deems the paper I-94 to be appropriate. When issuing the electronic I-94, the CBP officer will stamp the foreign national’s passport with an admission stamp that indicates the class of admission; the date of admission and the admitted until date. Now, foreign nationals who need to present their I-94s as proof of their lawful status to employers, schools/universities or government agencies can access their CBP arrival/departure record information online at www.cbp.gov/I94.
Remaining in the U.S. beyond the period of authorized stay as granted on the I-94 may cause the foreign national to be out of status and unlawfully present in the U.S. Staying beyond the period authorized is a violation of U.S. immigration laws and may result in the foreign national being barred from reentering the U.S. in the future. More specifically, remaining in the U.S. for more than 180 days beyond the I-94 expiration date could cause the foreign national to be barred from reentering the U.S. for a period of three years and staying for more than one year beyond the I-94 expiration date could cause the foreign national to be barred from reentering the U.S. for a period of 10 years.
Unfortunately, many foreign nationals remain unaware of the importance of the I-94. Oftentimes, foreign nationals are confused as to which document governs their stay in the U.S. There could be one expiration date on the nonimmigrant visa stamped in their passport; another expiration date on the I-94 issued on Form I-797 by USCIS and yet another expiration date on the I-94 issued by CBP upon their last entry into the U.S. In some cases, foreign nationals and their employers can neglect to note the I-94’s expiration date and the foreign national could inadvertently remain in the U.S. well beyond the authorized period of stay possibly in violation of U.S. immigration laws. This is exactly what happened to Mark Thomas.
Mark is a national of Bermuda, who resides in Chicago, Illinois. Mark last entered the U.S. through Newark Airport in New Jersey on August 15, 2012 and presented his H-1B visa stamp valid until September 30, 2012 and his Form I-797, H-1B Approval Notice issued by USCIS indicating that his H-1B status in the U.S. had last been extended from January 1, 2012 until March 10, 2014. The Form I-797 bore an I-94 card on the bottom indicating an expiration date of March 10, 2014. At the airport, the CBP officer issued Mark an I-94 valid only until February 15, 2013, the same expiration date as Mark’s passport.
Under 8 CFR 214.1(a)(3)(i), any foreign national who applies for admission to the U.S. must present a valid passport and valid nonimmigrant visa unless either or both documents have been waived. The foreign national’s passport must be valid for a minimum of six months from the expiration date of the contemplated period of stay. While the regulation requires the presentation of a passport with such validity dates, there is nothing mandating the DHS to grant the I-94 till the expiration date of the passport. Some countries have agreements with the U.S. whereby their passports are recognized as valid for return to the country concerned for a period of six months beyond the expiration date specified in the passport. The effect of these agreements is to extend the period of validity of the passport for six months beyond the expiration date appearing on the face of the document. The issue is discussed at 9 FAM 41.104 N2. The list of countries that extend passport validity for an additional six months after expiration is at 9 FAM 41.104 Exhibit I.
Mark presented CBP with a passport valid for at least six months but not valid for the full H-1B validity period indicated on the Form I-797A, Approval Notice. As a national of Bermuda, Mark’s passport ought to have been considered valid until August 15, 2013, six months beyond the expiration date listed in his passport. CBP issued Mark an I-94 with the same expiration date as the expiration date listed in his passport because, although the regulations do not mandate this, DHS appears to interpret “contemplated period of stay” in the regulation to correspond to the duration of the admission on the I-94. It appears that DHS does not want to grant a period of admission extending beyond the point that is six months prior to the actual expiration of the passport to line up with the regulatory requirement that the actual expiration date of the passport be six months past the expiration of the contemplated period of stay. Mark is realizing his problem now. What can Mark do?
Had Mark taken immediate note of his I-94 expiration date upon his entry in August 2012, Mark could have first sought to obtain an extension of his passport as soon as possible. Then, Mark or his attorney could have contacted the local CBP Deferred Inspection Site in Chicago where Mark lives or at Mark’s actual port of entry at Newark Airport to request that the I-94 expiration date be corrected to correspond with the end date of the I-94 issued by USCIS on Form I-797. This may or may not have been successful as it appears to depend on the particular CBP Deferred Inspection Site. For instance, some CBP sites take the position that they can only correct this I-94 within 30 days of admission. Other CBP sites will not correct this I-94. And other CBP sites take the position that this I-94 does not even need to be corrected as I-94 on the Form I-797 governs.
If CBP refused to correct the I-94, Mark could have taken a quick trip outside the U.S. prior to February 15, 2013. If he re-entered the U.S. on a valid H-1B visa and he presented his Form I-797, H-1B Approval Notice valid until March 10, 2014 and his newly extended passport, CBP would have issued him an I-94 valid until March 10, 2014. If Mark was unable to travel, his employer could also have filed an H-1B petition for extension with the USCIS taking the position that Mark’s H-1B status was set to expire on February 15, 2013. But none of these things happened. Mark has now remained in the U.S. for more than 180 days beyond the expiration of his I-94.
As Mark’s attorney correctly advised him, it is too risky to travel now. If he travels, Mark will have to apply for a new H-1B visa at a U.S. Consulate abroad and there is the possibility that the Department of State could deny Mark’s visa application and find him inadmissible into the U.S. for 10 years. The only course of action now is for Mark’s employer to file an H-1B petition for extension of Mark’s H-1B status in the U.S. Mark’s employer can argue that Mark was properly maintaining H-1B status in the U.S. despite the expiration of the I-94 issued to him when he last entered the U.S. because the I-94 issued to him on the Form I-797, H-1B Approval Notice remains valid. On the strength of that same I-94, it can be argued that Mark’s employer could continue to employ him. As mentioned above, some CBP offices take the position that the I-94 issued with the Form I-797, Approval Notice governs, that despite the issuance of an I-94 with an expiration date of February 15, 2013, Mark could remain in the U.S. beyond February 15, 2013 and until the 2014 expiration date of his H-1B status as granted by USCIS and as indicated on the I-94 issued by USCIS. There has been no official guidance to indicate that CBP has officially taken this position. H-1B extensions filed with USCIS on this basis, however, have been successful.
When filing the H-1B petition, Mark’s employer can also request that although the petition is being timely filed because Mark’s H-1B status will not expire until March 2014, should the USCIS take the position that Mark is not maintaining valid H-1B status, that USCIS forgive the unintentional delay in filing of the petition under 8 C.F.R. 214.1(c)(4). This regulation allows for an extension of stay for a beneficiary who has been unable to maintain his or her previously accorded status where it is demonstrated at the time of filing that (i) The delay was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner, and the Service finds the delay commensurate with the circumstances; (ii) The alien has not otherwise violated his or her nonimmigrant status; (iii) The alien remains a bona fide nonimmigrant; and (iv) The alien is not the subject of . . . removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act.
An H-1B extension filed on Mark’s behalf prior to March 10, 2014 will hopefully be approved presenting these arguments. However, there really is no substitute for the peace of mind that comes with ensuring that one never remains in the U.S. beyond the expiration date on the I-94. Foreign nationals need to remain vigilant when entering the U.S. making sure that they check their I-94 card (if issued one) or printout their I-94 from the CBP website. As attorneys, our best practice is encourage our clients to always update us on their travel dates and with copies of their I-94 upon re-entry into the U.S.
(The blog is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice.)
By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta
The oath ceremony is often one of the most significant and profound in an immigrant’s journey towards American citizenship. It signifies the end of the immigrant experience and is the final threshold before one’s acceptance as a citizen. It is also a happy moment, and the ceremony is generally accompanied by a stirring speech from a judge or well-known public official. Still, the oath, as prescribed by section 337 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), requires a serious commitment from the immigrant to forever renounce former allegiances, and also insists that the naturalization applicant take the oath without mental reservation or evasion. People may still wish to keep their former citizenship even while becoming American citizens for a number of reasons, such as ease of travel to the country to conduct business or to continue to access the country’s social security and healthcare system. Our blog examines the impact of the oath on the immigrant’s desire to retain his or her citizenship of the former country. At journey’s end, we suggest that, contrary to popular assumption or common understanding, American law is much more tolerant towards and accepting of dual citizenship than most of us, lay and lawyer alike, have ever believed.
The current format of the oath of allegiance is as follows:
“I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God.”
When a UK citizen takes such an oath and becomes an American citizen, what is the effect of this oath on his or her UK citizenship? The oath requires the intending citizen to “absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance” to any country that he or she has been a citizen. At the same time, it does not seem that this individual is required to give up UK citizenship. Moreover, since the United States manifestly cannot alter the relationship that any subject or citizen has with the country of their birth or prior citizenship, the import of the naturalization oath lies exclusively as an expression of American attitude and belief. The requirement to renounce all allegiance to your former country does not mean that you have to cease being a citizen of that country. The concept of dual citizenship or dual nationality has long been recognized, and the State Department in recognizing dual nationality states, “A U.S. citizen may acquire foreign citizenship by marriage, or a person naturalized as a U.S. citizen may not lose the citizenship of the country of birth. U.S. law does not mention dual nationality or require a person to choose one citizenship or another.”
UK does not seem to mind when its citizens takes up the citizenship of another country, including American citizenship, which requires the taking of the oath of allegiance. German citizens, in order to retain their citizenship while obtaining the citizenship of another country, must file a Beibenhaltungsgenehmigung prior to applying for American citizenship. Some attorneys have reported isolated instances of naturalization examiners denying the N-400 application on ground that such a person will not be able to take the US oath of allegiance without reservation. Moreover, the Beibenhaltungsgenehmigung asks for the applicant’s personal information such as name, address, date of birth, and the length of residence outside Germany. The form also asks about the applicant’s ties to Germany and detailed reasons why the applicant has to become a citizen of US or another country. No declaration of primary or exclusive allegiance to Germany is required nor does the German procedure demand or expect any act in derogation of US citizenship.
INA section 349 specifies several conditions under which a US citizenship may be lost. These include:
At no time is the newly minted naturalized American required to give up his or her foreign passport nor is the subsequent use of such passport a potentially expatriating act under INA 349. If Congress had wanted to make post-naturalization travel on a foreign passport a potentially expatriating act, it knew full well how to do so. Under the well-known doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“ the express mention of one thing is the exclusion of all others”), such a conspicuous omission is a clear indication that the naturalized citizen does not endanger his or her American citizenship by future travel on a foreign passport, so long as she leaves and enters the United States on an American passport as required by INA 215(b).
The primary effect of recent developments in the US regarding dual citizenship has been to add the requirement that loss of citizenship can only result when the person in question intended to give up his citizenship. At one time, the mere performance of the above (or certain other) acts was enough to cause loss of US citizenship. In Kawasita v United States, 343 US 717, 753(1952) the Supreme Court held that dual citizenship is “ a status long recognized in the law…the concept of dual citizenship recognizes that a person may have and exercise rights of nationality in two countries and be subject to the responsibilities of both. The mere fact that he asserts the rights of one citizenship does not, without more, mean that he renounces the other… when one has a dual citizenship, it is not necessarily inconsistent with his citizenship in one nation to use a passport proclaiming his citizenship in the other…” The trend in US law in recent decades has clearly and consistently been in favor or accepting dual citizenship. Former INA 352(a)(1) deprived a naturalized citizen of citizenship for residence in country of birth within 3 years of naturalization, which was found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Schneider v. Rusk, 401 US 815 (1971) and repealed in 1978. US citizens used to lose their citizenship for voting in foreign elections before the Supreme Court ruled otherwise in Afroyim v. Rusk, 377 US 163(1967) . In 1980, the Supreme Court in Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) reaffirmed that US citizenship could not be taken away from a citizen absent the voluntary performance of an expatriating act done with the intent to give it up. Even the State Department since 1990 has adopted an administrative premise that a “routine” oath of allegiance to a foreign country that does not explicitly require the renunciation of US citizenship will be presumed to have been performed with the intent to retain such citizenship.
Afroyim and Terrazas, by making it more difficult to lose US citizenship, also served to cause the State Department to become more accepting of dual allegiance. Danny Terrazas had obtained a Certificate of Mexican Nationality. Even though he lost his US citizenship, the effect of his case was to make the USA more accepting of dual citizenship by making US citizenship more secure in a constitutional sense. This is further discussed at 7 FAM 1254(e):
“In light of Terrazas, the Department now presumes that U.S. citizens who naturalize as citizens of a foreign state or who declare their allegiance to a foreign state intend, absent evidence to the contrary, to retain their U.S. citizenship (22 C.F.R 50.40(a) and 7 FAM 1222). A U.S. citizen may readily rebut this presumption by either signing the “Statement of Voluntary Relinquishment of U.S. Citizenship” contained in DS-4079 (“Request for Determination of Possible Loss of United States Citizenship”) or by executing a written statement under oath indicating that he or she naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state or declared his or her allegiance to a foreign state voluntarily with the intention of relinquishing U.S. citizenship.” 7 FAM 1254(e)
Readers may also want to consult 7 FAM 1222(a) which contains the post-1990 State Department presumption that naturalization in a foreign state, without more, is presumed by our State Department to have been done with an intent to retain USC status and will not therefore cause loss of US citizenship.
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the US ratified a series of expatriation treaties (the “Bancroft treaties”, named after American diplomat George Bancroft). The intent of these treaties was to prevent dual citizenship by providing for automatic loss of citizenship by foreigners who obtained US citizenship, or by Americans who obtained foreign citizenship. As a result of the various Supreme Court decisions on dual citizenship, however, the Bancroft treaties became legally unenforceable, and all of them have by now been formally abrogated by the US. One of these treaties (the one with Sweden) is mentioned in the Supreme Court’s decision in Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). The Bancroft treaties marked a rejection by the US of the common law doctrine of permanent allegiance that dates back to an old English case from 1608 called Calvin’s case. Precisely because of its unique historical origins, born out of revolution and a rejection of the British monarchy, the US developed the notion of expatriation, that one can give up citizenship and acquire new allegiances.
The acceptance of dual citizenship represents a uniquely American return to the concept of permanent allegiance but in a new way. Under the Bancroft 19th century approach, the US embraced the right of its citizens to give up their old allegiances and become Americans. Indeed, the same Congress that defined citizenship in the 1866 Civil Rights Bill and the 14th Amendment, made the right of expatriation part of the corpus of US immigration law. Act of July 27, 2868, c h.249, Sect. 1, 15 Stat. 223 (now codified as INA 349(a)(6) and (7)) (“the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”) Now, in the 21st century, while expatriation remains a fundamental constitutional right, we are moving towards what may be called the “globalization of citizenship,” a more elastic but no less durable concept. Originally, common law denied the individual right to stop being a subject of the Crown. Now, the US embraces the right of naturalized citizens to retain their old allegiances while adding new ties to the USA. In effect, citizenship is shorn of its prior exclusivity and endowed with an expansiveness that it previously lacked so that a naturalized or birth right citizen can enjoy the privileges and protections of full membership in the American polity while still being able to retain traditional identities or benefit from the addition of new ones.
The final question is why do we need citizenship as a basis for defining the people of a country? There may come a time when a distinction between a citizen and a non-citizen may be as abhorrent as distinguishing people by the color of their skin. But until then, in a famous article by Alexander Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 Arizona Law Review 369 (1973), Professor Bickel makes a point very much in alignment with our question, namely that one of the key reasons for the stability of the American political system, one of the “secret sauces” as we would like to say, that has contributed to the acceptance and efficacy of our constitutional framework is the fact that traditionally citizenship does not play a supreme role nor endow its holders with rights and privileges far in excess of others. “It is gratifying,” he observes “that we live under a Constitution to which the concept of citizenship means very little.” Bickel at 367. “Had citizenship been that important to the Founding Fathers, surely they would have bothered to define it. Ironically, the surpassing relevance of citizenship lies not in the privileges it preserves or in the distinctions it enshrines but in what Bickel terms its “minimalist role.”” It is precisely such modesty that serves to broaden opportunity for all, to give non-citizens what Jefferson called a “stake in society” so that even those who are not citizens identify the nation’s success and well being with their own.
Immigration law does not evolve in a vacuum but mirrors the society writ large. So, for example, the 1952 Act was chock full of ideological grounds of exclusion in the depths of the Cold War. The 1965 abolition of the national origins quota as an international civil rights bill passed the year after the 1964 civil rights act and the same year as the voting rights act. The American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act was passed at the height of Clinton prosperity So, with the growing acceptance of dual citizenship the fact that more Americans work abroad than ever before, that American business has gone global, that jet travel has long since become common and is no longer the province of the rich or powerful, that growing numbers of Americans go to college and beyond, that the world is increasingly flat with transfer of technology crossing national boundaries- all of this has made the world smaller, more of a global village. As this has happened, as our horizons have widened, the notion of dual allegiance has become more commonplace and more acceptable to Americans own sense of what kind of a people they are and what manner of nation we have become.
(Guest author Gary Endelman is the Senior Counsel of FosterQuan)
There are a number of unfortunate cases where the parent abandons lawful permanent resident (LPR) status by staying outside the United States resulting in the child’s LPR status also being abandoned. Should the child’s LPR status be deemed abandoned even if the child had no intention to abandon that status?
The answer, unfortunately, is “Yes,” but there might still be grounds for putting up a fight. There is a precedent decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, Matter of Zamora, 17 I&N Dec. 395 (BIA 198), which holds that if the parent abandons his or her LPR status while the child is in the custody and control of the parent, then the parental abandonment may be imputed to the child. The reasoning in Matter of Zamora is based on the premise that a minor child cannot legally possess an intent to remain in the United States distinct from his or her parent’s intent. Even the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual acknowledges that a child under the age of 16 years is not considered to possess a will or intent separate from that of the parent with regard to a protracted stay abroad. 9 FAM 42.22 N5.
Essentially, an LPR must be returning from a temporary visit abroad under INA § 101(a)(27) in order to avoid a charge of abandonment. The term “temporary visit abroad” has been subject to much interpretation by the Circuit Courts. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1997) is generally followed:
A trip is a ‘temporary visit abroad’ if (a) it is for a relatively short period, fixed by some early event; or (b) the trip will terminate upon the occurrence of an event that has a reasonable possibility of occurring within a relatively short period of time.”If as in (b) “the length of the visit is contingent upon the occurrence of an event and is not fixed in time and if the event does not occur within a relatively short period of time, the visit will be considered a “temporary visit abroad” only if the alien has a continuous, uninterrupted intention to return to the United States during the visit.
Therefore, when an LPR is unable to establish that the trip abroad was temporary under the formula established in Singh v. Reno, and thus deemed to have abandoned that status, it would be imputed to the child. I question whether it is good policy as there may be a number of situations where a child may possess a separate intention from that of the parent. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Khoshfahm v. Holder, 656 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2011), while affirming Zamora, raised this possibility by citing the example of LPR parents who leave the country, but leave their child in the US to attend school or live with a relative. Under the principle set forth in Zamora, the parents’ length of stay abroad, along with a lack of continuous intent to return to the US, could result in a finding that they had abandoned status, but it would be unreasonable to impute the parents’ abandonment to the child who never left the US. There are other situations too, where say an abusive parent who is an LPR takes the child abroad and does not allow the child to return back to the US. This would result in an unfair outcome, and is inconsistent with prevailing immigration policy. The Violence Against Women Act ensures that battered spouses, children and other relatives do not need to depend on the abuser’s status to apply for immigration benefits by enacting INA sections 204(a)(1)(A) and (1)(B), which allow battered spouses of US citizens and permanent residents to self-petition for permanent residency even when the abusive spouse either refuses to sponsor or has withdrawn support on a previously filed I-130 petition. The intent of an abusive parent can also be considered as analogous to the fraudulent conduct of a parent, which is not imputed to the innocent child. See Singh v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 400, 409-410 (6th Cir. 2006).
The argument to not attribute any abandonment by the parent on the child is further bolstered when the parent legally ceases to be a custodial parent, possibly due to the abusive relationship, and this is supported by the State Department guidance at 9 FAM 42.22 N5(c), which provides:
In the case of LPR children who you believe spend more than one year outside the United States as a result of an abduction by a non-custodian parent, please contact Overseas Citizen’s Services, Office of Children’s Issues (CA/OCS/CI) and the Post Liaison Division (CA/VO/F/P) to determine the proper course of action. While a returning resident visa is the preferred way for the child to return to the United States and be admitted in the proper status, a non-custodial parent may not be willing to cooperate in order to complete the returning resident visa process. CA/OCS/CI, CA/VO/F/P, and CA/VO/L/A can advise you on options in coordination with DHS to allow the child to travel back to the United States.
The Ninth Circuit in Khoshfahm also held that a child can have his or her own intent upon reaching 18th, which is like the State Department’s policy, although the State Department cuts off the age at 16. Thus, a child should be able to establish his or her own intent independent o the parent’s intent after 16 or at least by 18.
It was thus heartening to find an unpublished decision by Immigration Judge Philip J. Montante, Jr. on AILA InfoNet at Doc. No. 13112247 (posted 11/22/13), which held that the abandonment of LPR status by a divorced parent could not be imputed to the child who was under the age of 18 where the divorce decree specifically required the child to travel to the US to visit her father resided in order to maintain her US residency. The child was also able to demonstrate that she visited her father in the US several times. Hats off to attorney Eric Schulz in Buffalo, NY, who was the attorney for the child respondent!
When an LPR child finds himself or herself in such a situation and has been outside the US for more than a year without a valid reentry permit, the child may be eligible to apply for an SB-1 visa as a returning legal permanent resident at a US consular post. Alternatively, the child can also arrive at a port of entry in the US and be prepared to submit a Form I-193 waiver under INA section 211(b) as a returning legal permanent resident who has a valid Form I-551 (green card) but has been outside the United States for more than one year. This is risky, however, because If the child is not waived into the US, then the child will be issued a Notice to Appear, alleging that he or she is an immigrant not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document required by the INA. The NTA will most likely charge the child as being subject to removal pursuant to INA section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Although the child will be subject to a removal hearing before an Immigration Judge, where an alien has a colorable claim to returning resident status, the government bears the burden of proving abandonment of lawful status “by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” See e.g. Matadin v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008).
Attorneys representing LPR children who have been deemed to have abandoned their LPR status through imputation should, where the facts warrant, be prepared to chip away at the principle set forth in Zamora. It is no longer fair to reflexively impute the abandonment of a parent’s LPR status onto a child, especially in situations where the child has expressed an intent contrary to the parent.
(This blog is for informational purposes only, and should not be considered as a substitute for legal advice)
In Delays for Overseas Spouses of US Citizens Seeking Green Cards I reported about the slowdown in the processing of I-130 petitions filed by US citizens on behalf of immediate relatives, such as spouses, minor children and parents, who are outside the United States. As a result of widespread concern about the delays, the USCIS seems to have reacted positively and sent the following e mail to its stakeholders:
From: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services [mailto:uscis@public.govdelivery.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 20, 2013 3:38 PM
Subject: USCIS Message: Update on the processing times of Form I-130s filed by U.S. citizens for their eligible immediate relatives
Dear Stakeholder,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has received communications from the public expressing concerns regarding extended processing times for Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed by U.S. citizens for their eligible immediate relatives. USCIS provides information below in response to the concerns expressed.
USCIS has focused on these Forms I-130 for the very reason that affected members of the public have expressed their concerns; the importance of family unity. Last month, in an effort to expedite the adjudication of these cases, USCIS began transferring stand-alone Forms I-130 filed by U.S. citizens for their immediate relatives from USCIS’s National Benefits Center to its Nebraska, Texas, and California Service Centers. This shift improves USCIS’s ability to adjudicate the cases in a timely manner.
If your case was transferred, USCIS will send you a notice listing the transfer date and where your case will be processed. Your original receipt number will not change and this will not further delay the processing of your case. USCIS will take action on your case within 60 days of the transfer date listed in your notice.
We have recently updated the USCIS website at www.uscis.gov<http://www.uscis.gov/> with processing times for Form I-130 cases filed by U.S. citizens for their eligible immediate relatives. Please check the processing times<https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/processTimesDisplay.do> for your petition before inquiring about your case. If your case is transferred to another USCIS office, you should refer to the processing times for the office that has received your case.
You can check the status of your case at www.uscis.gov<http://www.uscis.gov/> by entering your receipt number in the “Check Status<https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/Dashboard/CaseStatus.do>” field. Additionally, you can sign up to receive automatic case status updates<https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/jsps/selectusertype.jsp;jsessionid=bacEczm0-YrdshKqQwGgu> by email as your case is processed. If you have not received a decision on your case within the published processing time, you may submit an inquiry using e-Request<https://egov.uscis.gov/e-request/Case.do> or contact the National Customer Service Center (NCSC) at 1-800-375-5283. For TDD hearing impaired assistance, please call 1-800-767-1833. When making any case status inquiries, you should reference your original receipt number and indicate that your case was transferred to a new location.
If you have filed a Form I-130 and you receive a request for evidence or any other type of communication from USCIS, please read the notice carefully to ensure that you respond to the same service center that sent you the notice.
If you move while your case is pending, you can change your address on the USCIS website<https://egov.uscis.gov/crisgwi/go?action=coa> or contact the NCSC so that USCIS can notify you of any further action on your case. It is important that you notify USCIS of any change of address as soon as possible after moving.
We appreciate the concerns that members of the public have expressed on this important subject. We are mindful of those concerns and are addressing them with great diligence.
USCIS Public Engagement Division
As an aside, the class of US citizens who can file I-130 petitions on behalf of overseas relatives may be expanding to even dead petitioners. I heard today that attorney Michael Piston was able to obtain an approval for the unmarried son of a U.S. citizen mother who died after her I-130 petition filed on his behalf was approved. The son was outside the U.S. and could not take advantage of INA section 204(l), which allows beneficiaries to apply for a green card if they were in the US at the time of the petitioner’s death. Humanitarian reinstatement was also denied. Mr. Piston, who is widely admired for successfully pushing the envelope on interpretations of our immigration laws, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California contending that the unmarried son of a U.S. citizen remained the unmarried son of a U.S. citizen even after the citizen died. The USCIS settled the law suit and approved the I-130 petition. Such a law suit could not have been successful outside the court in California where it was initiated because the Ninth Circuit in Federiso v. Holder, 605 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2010), held in the context of the INA section 212(a)(1)(H)(I)) waiver that the “spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States” does not mean that they have to be the spouse, parent, son or daughter of a “living citizen of the United States.” This ruling, which currently is limited to California and other states that come within the ambit of the Ninth Circuit, could potentially be extended to beneficiaries of I-130 petitions too where the citizen has died, and theoretically allow the estates of deceased US citizens to file I-130 petitions on behalf of qualifying relatives who are overseas.
In any event, it is heartening to know that the USCIS heard the widespread concerns of “living” US citizens who justifiably want to unite with their loves ones as quickly as possible. It is hoped that the USCIS could also respond to the concerns of other stakeholders, such as US companies, who often have a hard time transferring their specialized knowledge employees on L-1B visas into the US as a result of unreasonable denials. Our immigration laws have been designed to promote family unity as well as promote economic well-being, and the USCIS would clearly be benefitting the national interests of the country it yielded to the concerns of all legitimate stakeholders who depend on the fair and expeditious processing of immigration benefits applications.
By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta
On November 15, 2013, the USCIS issued a Policy Memorandum formalizing the granting of parole to persons who are present in the United States without admission or parole and who are spouses, children and parents of US citizens serving in the US military or who previously served in the US military. While parole traditionally applies to those who seek to come to the United States, the expansion of this concept to those already here is known as “parole in place”.
According to this memo, military preparedness can be potentially adversely affected if active members of the military worry about the immigration status of their spouses, parents and children. The memo makes a similar commitment to veterans who have served and sacrificed for the nation, and who can face stress and anxiety because of the immigration status of their family members. Such persons can now formally apply for parole in place (PIP) through a formal procedure pursuant to the ability of the government to grant parole under INA section 212(d)(5)(A). PIP would allow them to adjust status in the US rather than travel abroad for consular processing of their immigrant visas and thus potentially triggering the 3 or 10 year bars.
As a quick background, an individual who is in the US without admission or parole cannot adjust status through an immediate relative such as a US citizen spouse, parent or son or daughter. This person is inherently inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i), which provides:
An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.
Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) renders an alien inadmissible under two related grounds: 1) an alien present in the US without being admitted or paroled or 2) an alien who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.
The grant of PIP to a person who is present in the US without being admitted or paroled can wipe out the first ground of inadmissibility in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). PIP would then also allow this person to adjust status in the US under section 245(a) – as the person needs to have been “inspected and admitted or paroled” – without needing to leave the US. The ability to adjust status through PIP would obviate the need to travel overseas and apply for the visa, and thus trigger the 3 or 10 year bar pursuant to INA section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and (ii). Since there will be no departure triggering the 3 and 10 year bars, this person would no longer need to file a waiver or an advance provisional waiver by demonstrating extreme hardship to a qualifying US citizen relative to overcome the 3 and 10 year bars before leaving the US.
So far so good, but how does one overcome the second ground of inadmissibility in section 212(a)(6)A)(i), which relates to “an alien who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General?” The memo skillfully interprets this clause as relating to an alien who is in the process of arriving in the US without inspection. Thus, the second ground only applies to an alien who is presently arriving in the US while the first ground applies to an alien who already arrived in the US without admission or parole. If the second ground is interpreted as applying to an alien who arrived in the past, then it would make the first ground superfluous, according to the memo. It would also then make the 3 year bar under INA section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) superfluous as a person who at any point arrived, if used in the past tense, at a place or time other than designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security would be permanently inadmissible rather than inadmissible for only 3 years. Thus, if the second ground of inadmissibility is no longer applicable with respect to an alien who has already arrived in the US, then the grant of PIP would allow such a person to adjust in the US by overcoming the first ground under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i).
The extension of PIP to the families of current or former military service men and women is a proper recognition of their contribution to the nation and an attempt to benefit those who have given so much to the rest of us. While such logic is compelling, why not expand its application to other instances where aliens have served and strengthened the national interest or performed work in the national interest? How about granting PIP to families of, outstanding researchers striving to unlock the mysteries of science and technology, those with exceptional or extraordinary ability, and key employees of US companies doing important jobs for which qualified Americans cannot be found? And there is also a compelling interest in ensuring family unification so that US citizens or permanent residents may feel less stressed and can go on to have productive lives that will in turn help the nation. All such people do us proud by making our cause their own and the need of their loved ones to come in from the shadows is real and present. Indeed, the non-military use of PIP was advocated by top USCIS officials several years ago in a memo to USCIS Director Mayorkas, a memo leaked by its critics who wished successfully to kill it.
In the face of inaction on the part of the GOP controlled House to enact immigration reform, granting PIP to all immediate relatives of US citizens would allow them to adjust in the US rather than travel abroad and risk the 3 and 10 year bars of inadmissibility. Such administrative relief would be far less controversial than granting deferred action since immediate relatives of US citizens are anyway eligible for permanent residence. The only difference is that they could apply for their green cards in the US without needing to travel overseas and apply for waivers of the 3 and 10 year bars.
The concept of PIP can be extended to other categories, such as beneficiaries of preference petitions, which the authors have explained in The Tyranny of Priority Dates. However, they need to have demonstrated lawful status as a condition for being able to adjust status under INA section 245(c)(2) and the memo currently states that “[p]arole does not erase any periods of unlawful status.” There is no reason why this policy cannot be reversed. The grant of PIP, especially to someone who arrived in the past without admission or parole, can retroactively give that person lawful status too, thus rendering him or her eligible to adjust status through the I-130 petition as a preference beneficiary. The only place in INA section 245 where the applicant is required to have maintained lawful nonimmigrant status is under INA section 245(c)(7), which is limited to employment-based immigrants. Family-based immigrants are not so subject. What about INA section 245(c)(2)’s insistence on “lawful immigration status” at the snapshot moment of I-485 submission? Even this would not be a problem. For purposes of section 245(c) of the Act, current regulations already define “lawful immigration status” to include “parole status which has not expired, been revoked, or terminated.” 8 C.F.R. section 245.1(d)(v). Indeed, even if one has already been admitted previously in a nonimmigrant visa status and is now out of status, the authors contend that this person should be able to apply for a rescission of that admission and instead be granted retroactive PIP. Thus, beneficiaries of I-130 petitions, if granted retroactive PIP, ought to be able adjust their status in the US.
There is also no reason why PIP cannot extend to beneficiaries of employment I-140 petitions. If this is done, would such persons be able to adjust status to lawful permanent resident without leaving the USA? In order to do that, they not only need to demonstrate lawful status, but also to have maintained continuous lawful nonimmigrant status under INA section 245(c)(7), as noted above. Is there a way around this problem? At first glance, we consider the possibility of using the exception under INA section 245(k) which allows for those who have not continuously maintained lawful nonimmigrant status to still take advantage of section 245 adjustment if they can demonstrate that they have been in unlawful status for not more than 180 days since their last admission. We would do well to remember, however, that 245(k) only works if the alien is “present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission.” Is parole an admission? Not according to INA section 101(a)(13)(B). So, while retroactive PIP would help satisfy the 180 day requirement imposed by INA section 245(k)(2), it cannot substitute for the lawful admission demanded by section 245(k)(1). Even if an out of status or unlawfully present I-140 beneficiary who had previously been admitted now received nunc pro tunc parole, the parole would replace the prior lawful admission. Such a person would still not be eligible for INA section 245(k) benefits and, having failed to continuously maintain valid nonimmigrant status, would remain unable to adjust due to the preclusive effect of section 245(c)(7). Similarly, an I-140 beneficiary who had entered EWI and subsequently received retroactive parole would likewise not be able to utilize 245(k) for precisely the same reason, the lack of a lawful admission. Still, the grant of retroactive PIP should wipe out unlawful presence and the 3 and 10 year bars enabling this I-140 beneficiary to still receive an immigrant visa at an overseas consular post without triggering the bars upon departure from the US. Thus, while the beneficiary of an employment-based petition may not be able to apply for adjustment of status, retroactive PIP would nevertheless be hugely beneficial because, assuming PIP is considered a lawful status, it will wipe out unlawful presence and will thus no longer trigger the bars upon the alien’s departure from the US.
There are two ways to achieve progress. Congress can change the law, which it persists in refusing to do, or the President can interpret the existing law in new ways, which he has done. The holistic approach to parole for which we argue is a prime example of this second approach. The term “status” is not defined anywhere in the INA. By ordinary English usage, “parolee status” is a perfectly natural way of describing someone who has been paroled. Parole is a lawful status in the sense that, by virtue of the parole, it is lawful for the parolee to remain in the United States, at least for the authorized period of time under prescribed terms and conditions. We credit David Isaacson for suggesting that there are other instances in the INA where lawful status does not automatically equate to nonimmigrant status: for examples, asylum status under INA Section 208 and refugee status under INA section 207 are lawful statuses, even though strictly speaking, neither an asylee nor a refugee is a nonimmigrant according to the INA Section 101(a)(15) definition of that term. The Executive can easily revise the memo for military families to declare parole under INA section 212(d)(5) a status because it has already declared parole a lawful status for NA 245(c)(2) purposes under 8 C.F.R. 245(d)(v), asylum a lawful status under INA section 208, and refugee a lawful status under INA section 207. See 8 C.F.R. 245.1(d)(iii)-(iv). In all three cases, people are allowed into the United States in a capacity that is nether legal permanent residence nor, strictly speaking, nonimmigrant. True, INA section 101(a)(13)(B) does say that parolees are not “admitted”, but is one who enters without admission and is granted asylum under INA 208 ever been “admitted” per the statutory definition of that term? Yet, such a person has a lawful status.
One of the biggest contributors to the buildup of the undocumented population in the US has been the 3 and 10 year bars. Even though people are beneficiaries of immigrant visa petitions, they do not wish to risk travelling abroad and facing the 3 or 10 year bars, as well as trying to overcome the bars by demonstrating extreme hardship to qualifying relatives, which is a very high standard. Extending PIP to people who are in any event in the pipeline for a green card would allow them adjust status in the US or process immigrant visas at consular posts, and become lawful permanent residents. These people are already eligible for permanent residence through approved I-130 and I-140 petitions, and PIP would only facilitate their ability to apply for permanent residence in the US, or in the case of I-140 beneficiaries by travelling overseas for consular processing without incurring the 3 and 10 year bars. PIP would thus reduce the undocumented population in the US without creating new categories of relief, which Congress can and should do through reform immigration legislation.
There is no doubt that the memo for military families is a meaningful example of immigration remediation through executive initiative. Yet, it is one step in what can and should be a much longer journey. In the face on intractable congressional resistance, we urge the President to take this next step.
(Guest writer Gary Endelman is Senior Counsel at FosterQuan)
Infosys is one of India’s most storied IT companies with a roster of impressive clients in the US, including named Wall Street Banks, Silicon Valley companies, retail chains, insurance companies and manufacturers. With a footprint all over the world and known for its integrity and probity, it thus came as a surprise that the United States accused Infosys of malfeasance in procuring visas for its foreign national employees to come to the US.
The US Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security, launched an investigation in 2011 into Infosys’s alleged misuse of B-1 business visas. The investigation was spurred by a whistleblower’s law suit that made similar allegations, which got dismissed. On October 30, 2013, Infosys reached a settlement agreeing to pay a civil fine of $34 million to the US government, the biggest fine ever paid for an immigration case, but did not admit to the allegations of fraud and malfeasance.
There are plenty of lessons one can take away from the Settlement Agreement upon an objective review. Despite the seriousness of the allegations, Infosys did not incur any criminal liability. For instance, the government accused, among other things, the IT giant for bringing its employees on B-1 business visas to the United States to actually perform work. The government further accused Infosys of generating invitation letters to US consular officials indicating that their purpose of travel was for “meetings” and “discussion” when the true purpose was to work in the US, which can only be performed under the more onerous H-1B visa, such as coding and programming. Infosys, on the other hand, countered that it has always used the B-1 visa for legitimate purposes and not to circumvent the H-1B visa. Infosys also stated that the Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual permits other activities under the B-1 visa provided that they are incident to international trade or commerce, including those alleged by the US to be improper, such as coding and programming. The government also accused Infosys of directing its employees to misrepresent that they would be performing work at the location stated on the Labor Condition Application (LCA) underlying the H-1B visa petition, when they would actually be going to work at another location. Infosys also denied this accusation. Infosys, however, admitted to violations concerning its obligations to verify employees on form I-9. Still, despite the denial of any fraud or malfeasance, Infosys paid a humongous fine of $34 million.
It was indeed the ambiguity in the B-1 rules that snared Infosys and it was the same ambiguity in the B-1, which ultimately saved it from criminal liability. This is evident in the statement of the lead prosecutor in the case, Shamoil Shipchandler, who is quoted in a Wall Street Journal article:
“It’s not 100% clear what someone who holds a B-1 visa can actually do,” he said. For example, placing someone within a company for six months to do in-house tech support is an improper use of a B-1 visa. But if a consultant helps refine software during a meeting with a client, as part of a larger project, that could be seen as an appropriate use of a visitor visa, Mr. Shipchandler said. “It’s a murky area, but for our purposes they misled consular officials.”
As we noted in a prior blog on the B-1 category, the B-1 business visa remains one of the “most ill-defined” visas but plays a very important role in providing flexibility to business travelers. While the B-1 visa is associated with visiting the US to participate in meetings and negotiate contracts, it can have broader purposes. For example, the “B-1 in lieu of H-1B” was created to facilitate travel to the US of individuals who would otherwise qualify for an H-1B visa, but only needed to come to the United States for a limited period of time. In the current controversy over the B-1 visa, scant attention has been paid to the “B-1 in lieu of the H-1B,” which permits broader activities than the regular B-1 visa, albeit for a short period of time. Indeed, many of the activities that have been alleged to be outside the scope of the B-1 may be permissible under the “B-1 in lieu of the H-1B.” The case law with respect to business visitors only adds to the confusion over the definition of “business” in the US. In Matter of Hira, 11 I. & N. Dec. 824, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that the term “business” does not include ordinary labor for hire, but is limited to intercourse of a commercial character. The BIA concluded that an alien entering with a B-1 visa to “study the US business market”, who on behalf of his employer (a Hong Kong based manufacturer of custom made men’s clothing), took orders from, and the measurements of, prospective customers in the United States whom he did not solicit; and who then sent the orders, together with the purchase price, to his employer overseas, was engaged in “intercourse of a commercial character,” and was eligible for B-1 visitor for business classification. The BIA specifically stated that Hira’s sojourn in the US was of a “temporary character” and he clearly intended to continue his foreign residence at the termination of his authorized stay. The profits of Hira’s B-1 activities also accrued to the foreign entity. The BIA, however, also clarified that the nature of the business activity itself need not be temporary. The BIA held that for B-1 purposes, the business relationship may be of a continuing or long standing nature. The only condition in this respect is that each visit be temporary in duration. While applicants can make their best case under the ambiguous standards of the B-1 visa in a forthright manner, deception and malfeasance can never be tolerated.
Even though Infosys is allowed to continue to access US visas in the future under the settlement, which also expressly ensures that past investigations or alleged wrongful conduct will not be used to prejudice future applications, this episode is a wakeup call for others to ensure that corporations exercise good governance with respect to immigration matters. There is bound to be stricter scrutiny in the future of all applicants, and there is little doubt that Congress in future legislation may also use the Infosys example to tighten the ability for IT consulting firms to access business and work visas, as it has already accomplished in S. 744. Still, this episode can prove to be a valuable teaching moment for Infosys and other IT consulting firms. One of the conditions under the settlement agreement is that Infosys will provide more detailed description of the activities that will be performed when an applicant applies for a B-1 visa. As the B-1 visa allows a wide range of permissible activities, a best industry practice can evolve to specify the proposed activities in some detail, and the legal basis for them, when applicants apply for a B-1 visa or at the time of seeking admission at a port of entry. As a quid pro quo, it is hoped that the government will also seriously adjudicate such applications on their merits.
The work location indicated in the LCAs of H-1B workers in the IT consulting industry are also bound to change after the initial filing. Interestingly, the settlement agreement does not suggest that the employer file an amended H-1B petition, and instead, only alleged that Infosys did not submit a new LCA covering the new location. In the future, employers should immediately file new LCAs to cover the new locations after the original location has changed, and make disclosure at the time of applying for a visa or at the port of entry. It may also be prudent for the employer to proactively file LCAs in future anticipated locations, whenever feasible, in case there is a change in the work location, thus obviating the need to submit one after the H-1B petition is already approved. It is further hoped that the government will not insist on the more cumbersome and expensive H-1B amendment, which was not suggested in the settlement agreement.
It goes without saying that employers must also be compliant with their I-9 obligations. While there have been no dearth in enforcement actions for I-9 violations, the action against Infosys was novel as it involved allegations of misuse of the B-1 visa in addition to the I-9 violations, while Infosys countered by saying that its use of the B-1 was proper. Despite the settlement, the scope of the B-1 visa continues to remain ambiguous, although it would behoove employers to articulate the reasons for the B-1 visa in an application and then to have their employees abide by the terms and conditions upon visiting the US.
As noted in a prior blog, it is important too for the end user client company to be vigilant to ensure that foreign national workers assigned to the company are working under the appropriate visa categories. In the event that the end user client has knowledge or encourages activities not authorized under these visa categories, there is potential for the company to be ensnared in criminal liability. Even short of criminal liability, it is important to make sure due diligence has been done to avoid being caught up in an embarrassing investigation against a partner company. If the end user company urgently needs software engineers through its IT contracting company for a project, a manager within the end user company may be requested to write a letter as a client of the contracting company to justify the need for its employee overseas to visit the US on a B-1 visa. If this letter indicates that the software engineer is required for meetings, or to conduct an analysis of the project to be subsequently worked on overseas (an obviously permissible B-1 activity), but the actual purpose is for the engineer to actually participate in programming and working on the solution in the U.S., it may come back to haunt the end user company if there is a criminal investigation against the IT contracting company. Therefore, when drafting such a letter, it is important to ensure that the proposed activities discussed in the letter are permissible B-1 activities, and when the foreign national arrives, he or she engages in activities that are consistent with the listed activities. Of course, if the foreign national is assigned to perform work at the client company, the end user must ensure that the worker has an appropriate work visa such as the H-1B visa. End user clients must cooperate with the sponsoring employer to post the LCA at their sites.
Some years ago Wal-Mart was criminally investigated for engaging janitors as independent contractors when it knew that they were not authorized to work in the US. The investigation ended with a consent decree in 2005 where Wal-Mart like Infosys did not also acknowledge any wrong doing, although the practices that have emerged from that episode with respect to ensuring that even employees of independent contracting companies have I-9s have become the gold standard. While its reputation has taken a beating – not to mention that Indian heritage IT firms even if compliant have borne the brunt of intense governmental scrutiny in recent years – Infosys also has the opportunity to develop gold standard best practices in the B-1 and other arenas (such as tracking work sites of their employees under the LCA) to not only comply with the terms of the settlement but to also assure its prestigious clients who must be anxious after the settlement.
Infosys should consider itself fortunate that it did not go down in flames like Enron or Anderson, and has been given another chance. It must seize this opportunity to redeem itself by elevating standards and best practices, which others will follow and which the government will hopefully honor. In conclusion, the following quotefrom US Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas is worth noting:
“Infosys persuaded me and our partners that they could be fully fledged legal participants in the immigration process of the United States, so we’ll see,” Bales said. He added that Infosys hired American workers and was valuable to the American economy, and “we’re not in the business of putting people out of business when they provide value.”
By Myriam Jaidi
An individual seeking to transfer to the United States as a manager or executive (specialized knowledge employees will not be addressed in this blog) comes to you for help. She may be interested in opening a new office, or may be transferred to an existing company that has been operating for more than one year. In either event, the business involved is a small one and your client may be the only employee or one of few employees.
In light of the August 2013 report from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) (OIG-13-107), you know you face an uphill battle, but one that may be winnable. We note that the 2006 OIG report on the L nonimmigrant category was mandated by law (section 415 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. 108-447), but the 2013 report was issued at the request of Senator Grassley, specifically to examine the potential for fraud or abuse in the L-1 category. Senator Grassley has been a well known critic of immigration and is more likely than not to suspect fraud as he done with other categories, such as the H-1B and B visas, among others. Despite the potentially negative driving force behind the impetus for the report, it provides valuable insights and guidance on the L category, and some very important nuggets for practitioners filing for small businesses.
One important take-away of the OIG report, that we as practitioners have doubtless noticed, is that adjudication of L petitions has been inconsistent across various fields. “We reviewed L-1 petitions ranging from the restaurant industry to the information technology field, and concluded that adjudicators reach different decisions despite similar fact patterns.” It is some comfort for practitioners, who sometimes stand amazed at the different outcomes for similar petitions, that the OIG has identified this reality and raised it as a problem.
The OIG conducted domestic and international field work, interviewing USCIS and CBP personnel, as well as consular officials, as well as managers within both the DHS and the Department of State, and found vulnerabilities in various areas, and here we focus on their critique of new office Ls and extensions. The OIG states that new office petitions (and to some extent, extensions thereof) “are inherently susceptible to abuse because much of the information in the initial petition is forward-looking and speculative.” Specific problems the OIG identified in its file reviews of new office petitions included the following:
The report concludes that given the integrity risks and uncertainty at issue in new office petitions, they are “sometimes” approved erroneously. As practitioners we know that such petitions are sometimes denied erroneously as well. It is unclear how often erroneous approval occurs, or how widespread the problem is. The way the OIG report frames the issue, emphasizing improper approvals without further information on actual numbers, may result in a backlash against approval of new office L-1As, even strong cases. (The fact that the approval numbers declined drastically after the 2006 OIG report was issued (57,218 in 2007 to 33,301 in 2011) does raise the possibility that companies may face more difficulty in getting new office petitions approved after this particular report sinks in.)
In light of this bias, practitioners will need to use the information in the OIG report to strengthen new office petitions, as well as extensions, especially for small businesses. Initially, we should address what makes a business a “small” business. The H-1B fraud indicators (less than 25 employees, less than $10 million in gross income, less than 10 years in existence) are not helpful in the L context because if they were applied, most small businesses would not be able to pass muster. The L statute and regulations are structured such that a single person may open a new office in the United States pursuant to valid L-1 status. However, as the excerpt from the OIG report above demonstrates, the smaller the company in terms of number of employees, and funding, the more suspect the application. This is because the smaller the operation, the logic goes, the less likely the individual will be performing primarily qualifying duties, and the less likely the organization can support someone in a managerial or executive position. The statutory definitions specifically indicate that size may be taken into account in “determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive capacity”, however, where this is done, the government must “take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, component, or function in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of the organization, component, or function.” INA 101(a)(44)(C).
If the company will initially have only one or a small number of employees, it is important to present clearly what the beneficiary will be doing during the start-up or initial phases, and how his or her duties may change over time as the business develops. Presenting a clear road map of development and duties will help you avoid the label of a fatally vague business plan. Demonstrate that the beneficiary may initially set up the business, rent office space, hire subordinates and/or contract for services such as accounting, payroll, even marketing and public relations, but once these decisions are made and implemented and she has assured administrative and operational support, she will focus on managerial or executive duties. Explain what her duties will be and why, support that explanation with the relevant facts and figures from a detailed business plan, and present a reasonable projection of what her future duties will be based on the type of organization, its expected needs at the one-year mark (and beyond), and the position she is slated to fill. Explain any non-qualifying duties to further distinguish the time spent on qualifying duties. In addition, if the beneficiary receives support from abroad, explain how that support ensures the development and continuing operation of the company, and how it supports the argument that the beneficiary is serving in a managerial or executive role. Finally, if during a first year some event beyond the petitioner’s or beneficiary’s control has significantly negatively impacted the petitioner’s business and therefore its business plan, such as a natural disaster like Hurricane Sandy, such an occurrence should be explained in an extension petition. Under such circumstances, where the business has been negatively impacted, the petitioner may suggest to USCIS that if it is not inclined to approve the extension for two years under the circumstances, it could approve the petition for one year and have the petitioner make a stronger showing once it has regrouped after the event, at the next extension.
In some instances, such as in cases where the beneficiary will be serving as a “functional manager,” it may be arguable that hiring workers is crucial to managing the essential function. For example, where the beneficiary manages the sales function, an important part of doing so would be to ensure a sales team is in place to carry out the actual sales. Though the OIG specifically lists hiring workers are a nonqualifying duties (see page 19), practitioners may still be able to demonstrate that in fact such a duty is a part and parcel of managing a specific function, and ensuring that the manager is not engaging in the function managed. Of course, it is important, given the guidance, to ensure that the individual is not primarily hiring employees, but the fact of hiring employees need not be dismissed out of hand as nonqualifying.
In providing an overview of the qualifying duties, and in order to dispel the presumption of “nonqualifying work as a central part” of the position, it is recommended to provide an estimate of the percentage of time the beneficiary will spend on each duty. Of course, this can be a painful exercise, particularly because a beneficiary’s broader duties may not be easily dissected into meaningful minute-by-minute tasks. While attempting to trying to break up the duties, you may want to emphasize that these percentages are only an approximation as in the real world, especially involving a manager or executive with high level duties, it is often difficult to pinpoint the exact percentage of time devoted to each duty by the very nature of the high level position. Unlike a worker in a non-managerial clerical or factory job, where the employer assigns the duties in a precise manner, a top level manager who performs at the highest level within an organization must multi-task, and many of the duties may overlap. A successful manager or executive is also required to adapt to challenges and a changing business environment, in order to maximize growth for the organization. Given the discretionary role of a high level manager or executive, it would at times undermine that role if a strict percentage of time was assigned to each and every duty as it would prevent the manager or executive from innovating, adapting or taking risks. Risk-taking is vital for growth, innovation and job creation, which requires the qualities of flexibility, adaptability and the ability to change in the face of new business trends. Nevertheless, it is important to elicit and sift through the beneficiary’s duties. Have them assist you in developing as specifically as possible what tasks she does and the time she tends to allocate to each. This will allow the beneficiary to present the clearest picture of the beneficiary’s work and credibly demonstrate that she spends the majority of her time on qualifying duties. As an aside, it is not clear what percentage of managerial or executive duties meets the “primarily” threshold, though a general guideline, echoed in USCIS statements (specifically, R. Divine, “Comments on OIG Draft Report: A review of Vulnerabilities and Potential Abuses of the L-1 Visa Program,” (Jan. 10, 2006) (included as Exhibit E to the 2006 OIG report)), is that primarily means a “majority of the time.” Use this as a guide, but keep in mind that the more qualifying duties the better, and the stronger the argument that each duty is a qualifying duty, the better.
In its list of suspect cases included above, the OIG specifically singled out “gas stations or convenience stores” as examples of cases where “initial staffing structures . . . raise questions about the future need for an L-1A manager or executive.” There is nothing in the law that precludes the ability of Petitioners that run gas stations, convenience stores, or similar small businesses, to obtain approval for L-1 transferees. This may not be possible for the average mom-and-pop gas station or single convenience store owner, but where the petitioner starts with one operation, such as a gas station or convenience store as an anchor investment, and demonstrates that it is expanding or intends to expand to further investments under the guidance of a function manager who is responsible for the essential function of business development, a sufficiently strong case can be made. Under INA § 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) and (iii), a function manager does not need to be supervising other managerial or professional employees in order to qualify for L-1A visa classification. Crucial in these cases is showing that the function manager is relieved from performing non-qualifying duties by subordinate staff, whether they are professional or not. Moreover, the petition would have to demonstrate that additional investments are being planned and pursued by the beneficiary pursuant to his or her mandate of strategic management, growth and investment. Again, specifics are very important – show the steps the beneficiary is taking to pursue investments (emails, letters of intent, etc.), the financing involved in such investments, explain why such action is properly taken by a function manager, someone with high level authority to commit the petitioner to a course of action or expenditure of funds.
A variety of types of small businesses can successfully petition for a transferring manager or executive (or specialized knowledge) employee. Successful cases may involve varying amounts of capitalization, salaries, numbers and types of employees, and various levels of interaction and support by the foreign entity, whether administrative, operational, or financial. The key appears to be the level of detail provided, the fact that such detail is borne out in a well diversified set of supporting documents illustrating each point made the petition, and that all issues, including elements of a position that may be nonqualifying, are clearly explained. Such detail can help to overcome the suspicion the OIG has with regard to smaller companies, or companies that are family owned and operated. In the case of family businesses, the petitioner should explain the family relationships involved and make clear the role each family member will play in the business, and their qualifications for such roles. The OIG has indicated that family based operations have been a vehicle for fraud, so a cautious practitioner will need to disabuse them of this presumption by hitting the issue head on and demonstrating the validity of the managerial or executive employment.
Practitioners and petitioners should also be aware that beginning in the first quarter of 2014, USCIS’s Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) expects to conduct post-adjudication domestic L-1 compliance site visits. The OIG recommended that “USCIS make a site visit a requirement before extending 1-year new office petitions.” The USCIS concurred and plans to being doing such site visits prior to granting an extension in a new office. Beneficiaries should be advised of the potential for a site visit to ensure that if an FDNS representative comes by, that everyone at the business knows who the beneficiary is and direct the FDNS officer to the person who will answer questions about the petition most accurately.
That the OIG report demonstrates that the government may view petitions filed by small businesses unfavorably is helpful to petitioners in illustrating how they need to improve petitions they file, and where they need to provide explanations and documentation to further demonstrate the credibility of a petition. Petitioners should also highlight that small businesses are a recognized engine of a recovering economy, as borne out by reports published by organizations like the November 2009 report by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, and articles by Thomas Friedman, and other reputable writers addressing economic issues. The statutes and regulations governing the L category themselves recognize the importance of new and small businesses, despite the government suspicion of them. As discussed on numerous occasions on this blog, USCIS has also recognized the importance of entrepreneurs and small business in the context of its “Entrepreneurs in Residence” initiative. In addition to presenting a strong, well-documented petition, practitioners can balance the negatives presented by the OIG against the positives presented by the USCIS in the context of its support of entrepreneurs, and include a short discussion of the significance of small businesses, even family businesses, in the context of economic recovery and growth.
The OIG reports from 2013 and 2006, along with the USCIS memoranda responding to each report, are required reading for practitioners representing petitioners filing new office Ls and extensions thereof. In addition to the regulations, these documents provide essential guidance on how to strengthen cases for new and/or small businesses.
On October 17, 2013, its first day back to normal operations after the end of the recent federal government shutdown, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a precedential opinion, Matter of Douglas, 26 I&N Dec. 197 (BIA 2013). At first glance, Matter of Douglas is about an interesting but obscure aspect of a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that was repealed more than a decade ago. But perhaps more importantly, Matter of Douglas is also an example of the BIA using its authority to go against Court of Appeals precedent decisions under National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (“Brand X”), to the benefit of an immigrant and potential U.S. citizen rather than to the detriment of the immigrant.At issue in Matter of Douglas was former section 321(a) of the INA, repealed effective February 2001 by the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, which in relevant part replaced INA §321(a) with the simpler rule of current INA §320. As Matter of Douglas explained, former §321(a)
provided that citizenship was automatically acquired by a child born outside the United States of alien parents under the following conditions:
(1) The naturalization of both parents; or
(2) The naturalization of the surviving parent if one of the parents, is deceased; or
(3) The naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents or the naturalization of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation; and if
(4) Such naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen years; and
(5) Such child is residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent last naturalized under clause (1) of this subsection, or the parent naturalized under clause (2) or (3) of the subsection, or thereafter begins to reside permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years.
Matter of Douglas, 26 I&N Dec. in 198 (emphasis in original).The question in Matter of Douglas was the relevance of the order in which the conditions of former INA §321(a) were satisfied. As the BIA explained, Mr. Douglas
was born in Jamaica on January 29, 1976, to his married parents, each of whom was a native and citizen of Jamaica. On December 14, 1981, [Mr. Douglas] entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident. [Mr. Douglas]’s mother was naturalized on April 13, 1988. His parents were divorced on July 25, 1990. [He] became 18 years old in 1994.
Matter of Douglas, 26 I&N Dec. at 198. That is, Mr. Douglas’s mother became “the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents” under former INA §321(a)(3) only after she was naturalized, having been naturalized in 1988 and divorced in 1990. Both of these events, however, happened while Mr. Douglas was a lawful permanent resident and before he reached the age of 18, in compliance with former INA §321(a)(4)-(5).In its earlier decision in Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2008), the BIA had held that “A child who has satisfied the statutory conditions of former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . before the age of 18 years has acquired United States citizenship, regardless of whether the naturalized parent acquired legal custody of the child before or after the naturalization.” Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec. at 467. Under this rule, Mr. Douglas would be a U.S. citizen. Case law of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, as the BIA acknowledged, required that one seeking to show acquisition of citizenship under former INA §321(a)(3) demonstrate “that his [parent] was naturalized after a legal separation from his [other parent],” rather than before such a separation. Jordon v. Att’y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 330 (3d Cir. 2005)(alterations in original) (quoting Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2005)). In Matter of Baires, the BIA had noted the Third Circuit case law, but had indicated that “we are not bound by the Third Circuit decisions on which the Immigration Judge relied because this case is within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit.” 24 I&N Dec. at 469. The proceedings in Matter of Douglas, however, had taken place within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit, and so the BIA had to decide whether to follow Matter of Baires or the Third Circuit’s decisions in Jordon and Bagot.
The BIA chose to follow Matter of Baires, rather than Jordon and Bagot, and so found Mr. Douglas to be a U.S. citizen and terminated his removal proceedings. Under Brand X, as the BIA explained, an administrative agency such as the BIA can sometimes be entitled to “Chevrondeference” pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) regarding its interpretation of a statute, even when there has been a prior court interpretation of the statute going the other way, so long as that court did not find that the statute unambiguously supported its interpretation. Believing that its interpretation in Baires was a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and that Jordon and Bagot had not interpreted the statute to be unambiguous, the BIA concluded that under Brand X it could and would follow Baires, rather that Jordonand Bagot, even in the Third Circuit.
It appears that this may be the first time that the BIA has explicitly relied on Brand X to rule in favor of the immigrant respondent. The BIA has, to be sure, previously rejected Court of Appeals case law that it thought to be incorrect in favor of a more immigrant-friendly approach. In Matter of F-P-R-, 24 I&N Dec. 681 (BIA 2008), for example, the BIA declined to follow the Second Circuit’s decision in Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172 (2d Cir 2006), and held that the one-year period in which a timely application for asylum may be made runs from the applicant’s literal “last arrival” even when that last arrival followed a relatively brief trip outside the United States pursuant to advance parole granted by immigration authorities (which the Second Circuit had held would not restart the one-year clock). The proceedings underlying Matter of F-P-R-, however, appear to have taken place in the Ninth Circuit, not the Second, see 24 I&N Dec. at 682 (referring to “the absence of any controlling decisions on the issue from either the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit or the Board”), and so the BIA did not have to determine whether it would follow Joaquin-Porras within the Second Circuit. Here, in contrast, the BIA held that it would not follow Jordon and Bagot even within the Circuit that had decided them. And while there was a footnote in the BIA’s acclaimed decision inMatter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012) (regarding travel on advance parole by one who has accrued unlawful presence) that could be read as pointing in this direction, the BIA in Arrabally made much of the fact that it was addressing an aspect of the law that the petitioner in the Third Circuit’s previous decision in Cheruku v. Att’y Gen., 662 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2011), had not challenged, see Matter of Arrabally, 25 I&N Dec. at 775 n.6. It appears that Matter of Douglas may be the first BIA decision to go flatly against a contrary Circuit precedent under Brand X and do so to the benefit of the immigrant respondent.
The possibility of using Brand X as a force for good has been raised before, notably by Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta in their articles on “The Tyranny of Priority Dates” and “Comprehensive Immigration Reform Through Executive Fiat”, as well as their post on this blog which explained how the BIA’s decision in Matter of Zeleniak, 26 I&N Dec. 158 (BIA 2013), implementing the Supreme Court’s striking down of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), effectively overruled the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision in Adams v. Howerton, 637 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982) in regard to recognition of same-sex marriages for immigration purposes. Like Matter of F-P-R-, however, Matter of Zeleniak had not explicitly relied on Brand X. In this regard, Matter of Douglas is a significant step forward.Of course, Brand X is not always a force for good. Less than a year ago, for example, the BIA decided in Matter of M-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 46 (BIA 2012), that it would disregard the Third Circuit’s decision in Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006), and follow its own prior decision in Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), so as to consider even some crimes that are not aggravated felonies as “particularly serious crimes” which can bar withholding of removal. The merits of Matter of M-H- (which this author considers dubious) are beyond the scope of this blog post, but it is only one example of the fact that the BIA can seek to rely on Brand X to strip applicants for relief of protection that a Court of Appeals has given them. Also within the last year, the BIA invoked Brand X in Matter of Cortes Medina, 26 I&N Dec. 79 (BIA 2013), to find that violation of California Penal Code 314(1), regarding indecent exposure, was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, despite the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010). Nor are these the only examples; an exhaustive list of all instances in which Brand X has been invoked by the BIA to the advantage of the Department of Homeland Security and the disadvantage of an immigrant would unnecessarily lengthen this blog post.Now that the BIA has acknowledged in Matter of Douglas that Brand X is not a one-way ratchet and can also work in favor of immigrants, however, it is important for practitioners to keep Brand X in mind when they are faced with unfavorable Court of Appeals case law interpreting an ambiguous immigration statute. Especially where existing BIA case law in other circuits is more favorable, an unfavorable Court of Appeals decision in a particular circuit need not be the last word.
