Cyrus Mehta

Opportunity Knocks in Disappointing Decision Vacating Stem Optional Practical Training Rule for Foreign Students

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Adversity is the mother of progress

Mahatma Gandhi

I was at first greatly disappointed to find out that a federal district court judge vacated the 2008 STEM Optional Practical Training rule that extended practical training to F-1 students by an additional 17 months. However, if one reads Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (WashTech) v. DHS closely, the decision does not look so bad and provides an opportunity for the Obama administration to further expand STEM practical training, as promised in the November 20, 2015 executive actions for skilled workers.

Foreign students can receive up to 12 months of OPT upon graduation. In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security under President Bush’s administration published regulations authorizing an additional 17-months extension of the OPT period for foreign students who graduated in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematical) fields. Plaintiffs WashTech challenged both the 12 month OPT and the STEM OPT. The challenge to the original 12 month OPT rule was dismissed, but on August 12, 2015, U.S. District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle vacated the rule that extended OPT by 17 months for a total period of 29 months for STEM graduates. The 2008 rule was published without notice and comment, and the court agreeing with the plaintiffs ruled that the DHS had not shown that it faced a true emergency situation that allowed the agency to issue the rule without notice and comment.

It is disappointing that Judge Huvelle granted plaintiffs standing in the first place on the flimsy ground that they were currently employed as computer programmers, who were a subset of the STEM market. [Contrast this with the DC Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in Arpaio v. Obama  two days later dismissing Sherriff Arpaio’s standing claim on the spurious grounds that the executive actions would serve as a magnet for attracting more undocumented immigrants to Arizona and fewer people would be deported as a result of these executive actions.] Although the plaintiffs in WashTech were not unemployed, Judge Huvelle speculated that “[a]n influx of OPT computer programmers would increase the labor supply, which is likely to depress plaintiffs’ members’ wages and threaten their job security, even if they remained employed.” It is also somewhat amusing that the judge found the F-1 and H-1B interrelated in order to justify that plaintiffs also had standing under the “zone of interests” doctrine. Without considering that the F-1 visa requires a non-immigrant intent while the H-1B allows for dual intent, the judge held that “F-1 and H-1B perform the interlocking task of recruiting students to pursue a course of study in the United States and retaining at least a portion of those individuals to work in the American economy.”

While this is the bad part of WashTech, the good news is that Judge Huvelle left intact the legal basis for the OPT rule on the ground that the DHS is entitled to deference under Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Pursuant to the oft quoted Chevrondoctrine, courts will pay deference to the regulatory interpretation of the agency charged with executing the laws of the United States when there is ambiguity in the statute. The courts will step in only when the agency’s interpretation is irrational or in error. The Chevron doctrine has two parts. Step 1 requires an examination of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If Congress had clearly spoken, then that is the end of the matter and the agency and the court must give effect to the unambiguous intent of the statute. Step 2 applies when Congress has not clearly spoken, then the agency’s interpretation is given deference if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute, and the court will defer to this interpretation even if it does not agree with it.

Judge Huvelle in WashTech agreed that under Step 1 of Chevron, the provision pertaining to F-1 students at INA 101(a)(15)(F)(i) is  ambiguous and that Congress has not clarified the word “student”. It prescribes the eligibility criterion for a student to enter the United States, but does not indicate what a student may do after he or she has completed the educational program. Under Step 2 on Chevron, the 2008 rule was held to be a reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous statutory provision.  For over 50 years, Judge Huvelle acknowledged, the government has allowed students to engage in practical training relating to their field of studies, which Congress has never altered. Indeed, in the Immigration Act of 1990, Congress included a three-year pilot program authorizing F-1 student employment for positions that were “unrelated to their field of study.” Congress would only do this, Judge Huvelle reasoned, because Congress recognized that practical training regulations long existed that allowed students to engage in employment in fields related to their studies. The decision goes into fascinating detail describing the history of practical training from at least 1947. Even after Congress overhauled the law in 1952, practical training continued, and still continued even after the Immigration Act of 1990 overhauled the H-1B visa by setting a numerical limit and imposing various labor protections. The decision also cites old Board of Immigration Appeals decisions recognizing practical training such as Matter of T-, 1 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1958), which noted that the “length of authorized practical training should be reasonably proportionate to the period of formal study in the subject which has been completed by the student” and only in “unusual circumstances” would “practical training…be authorized before the beginning of or during a period of formal study.”

Judge Huvelle finally and unfortunately, agreeing with the plaintiffs,  held that there was no emergency to justify the promulgation of the 2008 rule without notice and comment. H-1B oversubscription as a reason for the emergency in 2008 was “old hat” as the government conceded that the H-1B program has been consistently oversubscribed since 2004. Fortunately, Judge Huvelle sensibly realized that vacating the rule immediately would force “thousands of foreign students with work authorizations…to scramble to depart the United States.” Hence, the court stayed vacatur till February 12, 2016 during which time the DHS can submit the 2008 rule for proper notice and comment.  In the meantime, foreign students in STEM OPT have some respite, and those who are eligible for STEM OPT should be able to apply for a 17 month extension so long as they do so before February 12, 2016, although we need some affirmative guidance from the USCIS on this.

The DHS now has a golden opportunity to expand practical training through notice and comment even beyond a total of 29 months, and must do so on or before February 12, 2016 in compliance with the WashTech decision. Despite the protestations of Senator Grassley, who like WashTecstridently opposes the notion of foreign student practical training, Judge Huvelle’s decision has blessed the legal authority of the DHS to implement practical training under Chevrondeference. As discussed in my prior blog, Senator Grassley in his angry missive to the DHS had leaked that the DHS was  moving on new regulations to allow foreign students with degrees in STEM fields to receive up to a 24 month extension beyond the original 12 month OPT period even prior to the final Washtech decision.  If a student obtains a new degree, he or she can again seek a 24 month extension after the original 12 month OPT period. The proposed regulations would further authorize foreign graduates of non-STEM  degree programs to receive the 24-month extension of the OPT period, even if the STEM degree upon which the extension is based is an earlier degree and not for the program from which the student is currently graduating (e.g. student has a bachelor’s in chemistry and is graduating from an M.B.A. program).

While this will put tremendous pressure on the DHS to propose a rule for notice and comment before February 12, 2016, it would be well worth it before all talented foreign students who would otherwise benefit the United States are forced to leave. As a result of the H-1B cap, it is the STEM OPT that has allowed foreign students to be employed in the United States. The prospect of no STEM OPT combined with the limited number of H-1B visas annually would be devastating not only for the tech sector, but for American universities, foreign students and for the overall competitiveness of the United States.  WashTech may have successfully been able to obtain a vacatur of the 2008 rule effective February 12, 2016, but theirs is only a Pyrrhic victory since the court has essentially endorsed the legality of both the 12 month practical training periods and any extensions beyond that.

Cora-Ann Pestaina

BALCA, What Have You Been Up to so Far in 2015?

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I’m sure all PERM practitioners would agree that it’s always good (in fact necessary!) to check in with the Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA). One never knows what issues BALCA will comment on next and as we navigate those often treacherous PERM waters, we need all the help we can get! Here are a couple of recent BALCA tidbits.

BALCA applies Matter of Symantec

In Computer Sciences Corporation, 2012-PER-00642 (Jul 9, 2015) the Certifying Officer (CO) denied the PERM on the grounds that the Employer’s inclusion of the language, “Willingness to travel; may require work from home office” in its recruitment advertisements posted on its website and on a job search website, constituted terms and conditions of employment that exceeded those listed on the ETA Form 9089 in violation of 20 C.F.R. §656.17(f)(6).

As background, employers recruiting under PERM for a professional position must complete the mandatory recruitment steps required by 656.17(e)(1)(i) as well as three additional recruitment steps provided in 656.17(e)(1)(ii).

The Employer’s advertisements posted on its website and on the job search website were in satisfaction of two of the three required additional recruitment steps. In reversing the CO’s decision, BALCA simply cited its en banc decision in Symantec Corp., 2011-PER-1856 (July 30, 2014) which I previously blogged about in greater detail here, and held that 656.17(f) does not apply to additional forms of recruitment. The Employer dodged a bullet here.

BALCA finds that Employer’s letter was within the record and can be considered on appeal

Once a PERM is denied, if the Employer files a motion for reconsideration, under 656.24(g)(2), this motion can only include (i) documentation that the Department actually received from the employer in response to a request from the CO to the employer; or (ii) documentation that the employer did not have an opportunity to present to the CO, but that existed at the time the PERM was filed and was maintained by the employer to support the PERM application in compliance with 656.10(f).

In New York City Department of Education, 2012-PER-02753 (June 19, 2015), the CO first denied the PERM application on the grounds that the Employer failed to provide a recruitment report that accurately accounted for the number of applicants for the job opportunity. The Employer filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that it properly accounted for all applicants. The CO, ignoring this request for reconsideration, issued a second denial letter, finding that the Employer did not provide job-related reasons for its rejection of US workers. Based on the documentation the Employer had submitted with the audit response, it appeared that US workers were rejected because they expressed disinterest in the position but the CO also reviewed the Employer’s interview notes that stated the candidates were available “immediately” or “soon.” The Employer filed a second motion for reconsideration explaining, not only that the CO cannot ignore the first motion and issue a second denial, but, moreover, that it had indeed lawfully rejected the US workers. Along with its motion the Employer provided a letter from its Executive Director explaining the company’s interview process and the fact that the Employer made the determination to reject the applicants after they expressed their disinterest at a second interview.

Since the Employer failed to properly explain its interview process and reasons for rejection in its audit response, BALCA found that the CO was justified in his denial of the case. However, in forwarding the case to BALCA, the CO acknowledged the letter that the Employer submitted along with its second motion explaining its hiring process. The CO did not refuse to accept it on the grounds that it was barred under 20 CFR 656.24(g)(2). Under that regulation, since the Employer’s had previously had a chance to submit this letter with its audit response but did not and since this letter was not documentation that existed at the time the PERM was filed, the CO would have been justified in refusing to accept it. But since the CO did not, the letter became part of the record that BALCA had to consider upon appeal. With the letter fully explaining the Employer’s interview process, BALCA had no choice but to find that the US workers had been lawfully rejected.

The take away from this case is how important it is to fully respond to an audit request. Had the CO rejected the Employer’s letter, the denial would have been upheld.  As BALCA pointed out, the CO’s audit letter very clearly requested a report that lists the date(s) the employer contacted the US worker; the dates the employer interviewed the US worker; the specific reasons the US worker was rejected; and information that documents the employer contacted the applicant(s). In its audit response, the Employer failed to provide this detailed information.

BALCA held that an original signature is not required on the recruitment report but the report must be signed

In another case involving New York City Department of Education, BALCA upheld the denial of three PERMs finding that the typed name of the Executive Deputy Director at the bottom of the recruitment report did not constitute a valid signature. The CO had denied the Employer’s PERM after audit for failure to submit a signed report as required under 656.17(g)(1). The Employer, in its request for reconsideration, explained that it had a physically signed recruitment report in its audit file and this report, due to administrative error, simply was not included in the audit response. The Employer alternatively argued that the regulations do not require a handwritten signature and the typed name of the Employer’s Deputy Executive Director was satisfactory.  The CO transferred the file to BALCA where each of the Employer’s arguments were shut down.

BALCA held that the fact that the Employer had a physically signed copy of the recruitment report speaks to the fact that the typed name on the bottom of the report submitted with the audit response was not intended to be a signature. The Employer argued that “original signatures” are not required. BALCA agreed that 656.17(g)(1) does not require an original signature but again stated that the typed name on the bottom of the report was not intended to be a signature – original or otherwise. The Employer argued that fundamental fairness ought to prevail as it had only failed to submit the physically signed report due to administrative error. BALCA held that the Employer had been given an opportunity to submit the signed report with the audit response and failed to do so. Finally, the Employer argued that each statement in the recruitment report was verified by other documentation submitted with the audit response and therefore the omission of the physically signed report was immaterial. BALCA, using one of its favorite quotes, held that “PERM is…an exacting process.” Essentially, because a signature is a regulatory requirement under 656.17(g)(1), then there must be a signature, no matter how unfair it may seem in light of all the facts of the case.

It’s really a shame whenever something so simple and unintended leads to a PERM denial or in this case, three PERM denials. But it highlights the importance of checking and rechecking an audit response before it is submitted and the importance of having, if possible, more than one pair of eyes review the response prior to submitting it. PERM can be a very unforgiving process.

BALCA says US workers can be lawfully rejected for “lack of experience”

In Presto Absorbent Products, Inc., 2012-PER-00775 (May 26, 2015), the CO denied the PERM finding that the Employer failed to provide lawful reasons for rejection. The Employer’s recruitment report stated that the Employer received eight resumes and that the applicants lacked experience. The Employer also stated that “All applicants were reviewed to determine if they would be able and qualified to perform the duties of the position within a reasonable amount of on-the-job training. All applicants were determined not to have been able and qualified for the position even with a reasonable amount of on-the-job training.” BALCA held that the regulation does not indicate a level of specificity beyond what the Employer provided and that “lack of experience” is a lawful reason for rejecting applicants.

While it is indeed heartening anytime BALCA errs on the side of reason, I don’t think PERM practitioners ought to rely too heavily on this decision and it’s always best to be as specific as possible in providing the reasons for rejection of US workers. For instance, instead of “lacks the technological experience” it would be clearer to state, “lacks experience in the required technologies such as C++, Java & PL/SQL” and instead of “lacks experience” it might be better to say “applicant possesses only 2 years of experience but the position requires 5 years of experience.” Even if it may appear silly to have to spell out the obvious, it might be valuable time and money saved by preventing an erroneous denial.

BALCA comments on newspaper circulation and distance to the area of intended employment

In Pentair Technical Products, 2011-PER-01754 (Aug. 5, 2015), the Employer used the San Antonio Express newspaper (the “Express-News”) for its first Sunday newspaper advertisement to recruit for a professional position in Pharr, Texas. The CO denied the PERM on the grounds that the Express-News is circulated in San Antonio, Texas and not in the area of intended employment – Pharr, Texas.

Under 20 CFR § 656.17(e)(1)(i)(B)(1), one option for an employer’s mandatory print advertisements for a professional position is “[p]lacing an advertisement on two different Sundays in the newspaper of general circulation in the area of intended employment most appropriate to the occupation and the workers likely to apply for the job opportunity and most likely to bring responses from able, willing, qualified, and available US workers.”

In a motion for reconsideration, the Employer argued that the Express-News is circulated in Pharr, Texas. The Employer argued that it chose the Express-News as it is the largest newspaper with general circulation in Pharr in order to reach the largest number of US workers. The Employer’s attorney also argued that he had personally contacted the Express-News and a representative at the newspaper had verified that the paper is circulated in Pharr, Texas. The CO nevertheless found that his denial was valid because San Antonio is four hours away from Pharr, well outside commuting distance and so the Employer had failed to advertise in the area of intended employment.

BALCA found that the issue of whether or not San Antonio is outside normal commuting distance from Pharr is relevant only if the Express-News were only available in San Antonio and not in Pharr. However, the record established that the Express-News is a newspaper of general circulation in Pharr. Accordingly, the fact that it is published in San Antonio is of no legal consequence.

BALCA pointed out that when a single area of intended employment is served by multiple newspapers, the CO ought not to be concerned with which paper reaches the most people but rather with whether the newspaper reached the intended audience and is a “newspaper of general circulation in the area of intended employment.” As an example, BALCA stated that if Trenton, NJ is the area of intended employment, whether The New York Post is more “appropriate” than The Trenton Times because it has more readers is irrelevant and there is nothing in the regulations that requires an employer to utilize the newspaper with the highest circulation in the area of intended employment or the newspaper published closest to the area of intended employment.

At first look, the case appears to be very encouraging. As long as the newspaper reaches its intended audience, all is well. Not so fast. This is another one of those cases where BALCA’s decision is expressly limited to the precise facts of the case. BALCA takes time to point out that in this case the CO did not deny the PERM based on a finding that the Employer had failed to utilize the “most appropriate” newspaper. The only issue raised in the denial was whether the Employer placed a newspaper advertisement in the area of intended employment so that is the only issue that BALCA has addressed. As to whether Express-News was the newspaper “most appropriate” to the occupation for which the Employer was recruiting, we will never know.

It can be very difficult for employers to decide where to advertise. This case answers the question of whether it is permissible to advertise in The New York Times for a position in New Jersey. Yes, it is permissible because The New York Times is a newspaper of general circulation in New Jersey. But this case does not provide any guidelines for an employer struggling to determine which newspaper is “most appropriate.” For instance, in recruiting for a professional position in New York City, how does an employer decide between The New York Post vs. The New York Times? It is significantly more expensive to advertise in The New York Times and so an employer may not want to do that unless that newspaper is the only newspaper that would be permissible under the regulations. What statistics would that employer need to examine? Should that employer just assume that The New York Times is the newspaper most read by professionals and therefore The New York Times will always be “most appropriate” in recruiting for any professional position? In a footnote, BALCA mentioned that the Employer utilized The Monitor as the newspaper for the second Sunday advertisement and that this was not challenged by the CO. BALCA pointed out that the regulations refer to “newspaper” in the singular in requiring advertisements to be placed “in the newspaper of general circulation in the area of intended employment.” BALCA commented that the regulations do not appear to contemplate a situation where more than one newspaper is circulated in the area of intended employment and the newspapers are equally appropriate given the employment at issue and the workers likely to apply for the job. BALCA conveniently declined to comment on that issue. So while it is great that employers can choose any newspaper as long as it is one of general circulation in the area of intended employment, employers need to remain concerned about ensuring that the paper chosen is the “most appropriate” paper and it’s probably just best to use the same paper for both of the Sunday ads.

These recent cases highlight the “little” things that can lead to a big denial of a PERM. Just reading these cases creates heightened awareness of potential issues and naturally leads to better and more focused reviews of documentation prepared during the PERM process and documentation submitted to the Department of Labor.
Cyrus Mehta

TO AMEND OR NOT TO AMEND: USCIS ISSUES FINAL GUIDANCE ON MATTER OF SIMEIO SOLUTIONS

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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued final guidance on July 21, 2015, instructing when an employer should  file an amended or new H-1B petition following Matter of Simeio Solutions, LLC (Simeio). In Simeio, a precedent decision issued on April 9, 2015, the Administrative Appeals Office concluded that changes in the H-1B beneficiary’s places of employment, resulting in the obtaining of a new Labor Condition Application (LCA), constituted a material change to the terms and conditions of employment as specified in the original petition, thus necessitating the filing of an amended petition.

What is significant about the final guidance is that it extended the deadline to file an amended H-1B petition to January 15, 2016 from the previously suggested deadline of August 15, 2015. It also sends a mixed signal about whether USCIS will take punitive action regarding moves prior to Simeio that were not followed by the filing of an amended H-1B petition.

USCIS applies Simeio in its final guidance, by confirming that a petitioner must file an amended or new H-1B petition if the H-1B employee is changing his or her place of employment to a geographical area requiring a corresponding LCA to be certified to USCIS, even if a new LCA is already certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and posted at the new work location.  Prior to Simeio, employers relied on informal USCIS guidance indicating that so long as a new LCA was obtained prior to placing an H-1B worker at a new worksite, an amended H-1B petition was not required. See Letter from Efren Hernandez III, Dir., Bus. And Trade Branch, USCIS, to Lynn Shotwell, Am. Council on int’l Pers., Inc. (October 23, 2003). The AAO explicitly stated in Simeio, footnote 7, that the Hernandez guidance has been superseded. Once a petitioner properly files the amended or new H-1B petition, the H-1B employee can immediately begin to work at the new place of employment, provided the requirements of section 214(n) of the INA are otherwise satisfied. The petitioner does not have to wait for a final decision on the amended or new petition for the H-1B employee to start work at the new place of employment.

The final guidance also notes, as the draft guidance did, regarding when a petitioner does not need to file an amended or new H-1B petition. If a petitioner’s H-1B employee is moving to a new job location within the same area of intended employment, for example, a new LCA is not generally required. Therefore, provided there are no changes in the terms and conditions of employment that may affect eligibility for H-1B classification, the petitioner does not need to file an amended or new H-1B petition. The petitioner must still post the original LCA in the new work location within the same area of intended employment.

The language in the USCIS guidance is similar, whether by design or by coincidence,  to what I had suggested in prior blogs entitled When An Amended Petition Is Not Required Even After Matter Of Simeio Solutionsand AAO Firmly Tethers H-1B Workers To An LCA Like Dog Is To A Leash, and this is encouraging since the USCIS can be receptive to a lawyer’s blog relating to important immigration policy. Here is the example that I provided regarding when a new move would not trigger a new LCA and thus obviate the filing of an H-1B amendment:

So a move to a new job location within New York City would not trigger a new LCA, although the previously obtained LCA would need to be posted at the new work location. This could happen if an entire office moved from one location to another within NYC, or even if the H-1B worker moved from one client site to another within NYC.

The final guidance similarly states:

For example, an H-1B employee presently authorized to work at a location within the New York City metropolitan statistical area (NYC) may not trigger the needs for a new LCA if merely transferred to a new worksite in NYC, but the petitioner would still need to post the previously obtained LCA at the new work location. See 20 CFR 655.734. This is required regardless of whether an entire office moved from one location to another within NYC, or just the one H-1B employee.

Similarly, with respect to short-term placements under certain circumstances and as suggested in my prior blog, a petitioner may place an H-1B employee at a new worksite for up to 30 days, and in some cases 60 days (where the employee is still based at the “home” worksite) without obtaining a new LCA or having to file an amended or new H-1B petition.

Also, if an H-1B employee is only going to a non-worksite location and there are no material changes in the authorized employment, the petitioner does not need to file an amended or new H-1B petition. A location is considered “non-worksite” if: (1) the H-1B employee is going to a location to participate in employee developmental activity, such as a management conference or staff seminar; (2) the H-1B employee spends little time at any one location; or (3) the job is “peripatetic in nature,” such as in a situation where the employee’s job is primarily at one location but he or she occasionally travels for short periods to other locations “on a casual, short-term basis, which can be recurring but not excessive (i.e., not exceeding 5 consecutive workdays for any one visit by a worker who spends most work time at one location and travels occasionally to other locations.)”

Although in its prior draft guidance, USCIS said that Simeio would apply retroactively, the final guidance is more equivocal and sends a mixed signal. On the one hand, the final guidance states that the USCIS would “generally” not take adverse actions against employers that fail to file amended petitions based on moves that may have triggered a new LCA prior to April 9, 2015. On the other hand, the USCIS gives employers a “safe harbor period” in which they may choose to file amended H-1B petitions by January 15, 2016. With respect to moves that have taken place after April 9, 2015 but prior to August 19, 2015, amended H-1B petitions must be filed by the new deadline of January 15, 2016. Regarding any moves after August 19, 2015, the employer must file an amended or new H-1B petition before the H-1B employee starts working at the new place of employment not covered by an existing approved H-1B petition, and not subject to any of the above discussed exceptions to filing a new LCA.

While the USCIS has indicated that it will not generally take adverse action against employers for moves that did not result in the filing of an amended H-1B petition prior to April 9, 2015, employers should file  amended petition out of an abundance of caution. If an employer chooses not to file, and take advantage of the safe harbor period until January 15, 2016 by filing before that deadline, it will be doing so at its own peril, and any adverse action taken, may result in a finding that the H-1B worker did not maintain status. The Department of Labor may also factor the failure to file an amended H-1B petition when penalizing an employer for violations under the LCA regulations at 20 CFR 655. Moreover, neither the Department of State or Customs and Border Protection may be bound by the USCIS final guidance regarding not taking adverse action against an employer.

If the adverse action is taken against the employer based on a retroactive application of Simeio, can the employer challenge it? Generally, the retroactive application of a rule created through agency adjudication is disfavored. In Velasquez-Garcia v. Holder,  760 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 2014), the Seventh Circuit considered whether the “sought to acquire” standard for a child’s age to get protected under the Child Status Protection Act by the BIA in Matter of O. Vazquez could be applied retroactively. The Seventh Circuit in Velasquez-Garcia applied the following factors: (1) Whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well-established practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard.

Under the criteria established in Velasquez-Garcia, it can certainly be said that Simeio is a case of first impression under the first consideration and that the retroactive application of Simeio would impose a great burden on an employer under the fourth consideration. What is less clear is whether Simeio represents an abrupt departure from well established past practice under the second consideration and whether there was a former rule that employers relied on. The Efren Hernandez letter of October 23, 2003, was hardly a rule as it did not constitute an agency decision or even a form instruction, and despite the existence of the Hernandez letter, there were many instances when DOS recommended revocation of an H-1B petition where the job location had changed, and the USCIS often went ahead and revoked such petitions. There were also other instances when the the USCIS after a site visit revoked H-1B petitions when the H-1B worker was no longer at the original location.  The Hernandez letter is thus a relatively thin reed to rest on. Under the fifth consideration, the government will probablyhave success in arguing that there is a general interest in uniformly applying immigration law, and unlike the CSPA that has a remedial purpose in protecting the age of a child, filing amended H-1B petitions ensures that employers have properly accounted for changes in employment not previously disclosed in the original H-1B petition.  In sum, an employer may not have a clear cut basis in challenging the retroactive application of Simeio, and this is all the more reason for employers to take advantage of the safe harbor and file amended H-1B petitions for moves made even prior to  Simeio.  Furthermore, although publishing a rule through notice and comment under the Administrative Procedures Act would have been more appropriate, the government may be able to successfully argue that the promulgation of a rule was not necessary as the final guidance was a clarification on how to enforce Simeio.

The final guidance is not all doom and gloom, and we can end on a more upbeat note. Although the burdens will be high for employers in filing amendmentsand Simeo was unnecessary, the final guidance makes clear that an H-1B employee can start working at the new location after the H-1B amendment has been filed. If an amendment is still pending, the final guidance makes reference to the Memorandum from Michael Cronin (June 19, 2001) that allows H-1B employees who have ported to new employers and have only receipt notices, to be admitted into the US based on a valid H-1B visa stamp and that the validity date of the prior H-1B approval. Thus, an H-1B worker who is the subject of an H-1B amended petition can similarly be admitted into the United States on the basis of the receipt notice, and the prior H-1B validity date, provided the individual also has an H-B visa stamp. Also, just as serial H-1B porting is allowed, so can H-1B amendments be filed serially if job locations change before the approval of the prior amendment, although the denial of any H-1B petition will result in the denial of all successive requests to amend. This would only happen if the H-1B beneficiary’s status expired while successive amendments were pending. If an amendment is denied, but the original petition is still valid, the H-1B employee may return to the place of employment covered by the original petitionprovided that employee is able to maintain valid status at the original place of employment.

(The information contained in this blog is of a generalized nature and doe snot constitute legal advice).

Cyrus Mehta

Update on Indian Three–Year Degrees and Postgraduate Diplomas

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The greatest bane for green card aspirants with Indian degrees is the uncertainty that they will be recognized as single source degrees. If an Indian degree is recognized as the single source equivalent of a US four-year bachelor’s degree, it can provide the basis for an I-140 immigrant visa petition under the employment-based second preference (EB-2) for permanent residency. If an Indian degree cannot be recognized as a single source four-year degree, the potential green card candidate slides into the employment-based third preference (EB-3). While both the India EB-2 and EB-3 are moving at a snail’s pace, there is still a dramatic difference between the EB-2 and EB-3 for India. One sponsored by an employer in the India EB-2 can hope to get a green card  within 10 years, but one caught in the India EB-3 would need to wait for several decades!

A three-year Indian degree on its own will never make it into EB-2 as it is not considered the equivalent of a four-year US degree. See Matter of Shah, 17 I&N Dec. at 244 (Reg. Comm. 1977). Till recently, even a three-year degree combined with a post-graduate diploma (PGD), even if technically equivalent to a US bachelor’s degree,  was not considered a single source degree. To be classified under the EB-2  pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the position must require an advanced degree or its equivalent, which the USCIS in 8 CFR section 204.5(k)(2) defines as a foreign four-year single source bachelor’s degree equivalent to a US degree plus five years of post baccalaureate experience. Ron Wada, who is the undisputed guru of degree equivalency issues, reports that in some instances the USCIS has been recognizing that an Indian three year degree followed by a post graduate diploma may qualify as an exception to the “single-source degree rule.” See Wada, The Nth Degree: Issues and Case Studies In Degree Equivalency – 2015 Update, 20 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 475, May 15, 2015.

Not all combinations of three-year bachelor’s degrees and post graduate diplomas will qualify under this exception and thus be found to be comparable to a US bachelor’s degree. The Electronic Database for Global Education (EDGE) created by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO) has to confirm that the PGD should either be issued by an accredited university recognized by the University Grants Commission or should be an institution approved by the All-India Council for Technical Education (AICTE).

In most of the unpublished decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) involving non-university PGDs found through a computerized  search, such as for example Matter of X (identifying information redacted), 2013 Immigr. Rptr. LEXIS 2177, 2013 WL 5296297 (INS), the following extract is worth noting:

According to EDGE, a three-year Bachelor of Science degree from India is comparable to “two to three years of university study in the United States.” EDGE further discusses postgraduate diplomas, for which the entrance requirement is completion of a two- or three-year baccalaureate degree. EDGE states that a postgraduate diploma following a two-year bachelor’s degree represents attainment of a level of education comparable to one year of university study in the United States. EDGE also states that a postgraduate diploma following a three-year bachelor’s degree represents attainment of a level of education comparable to a bachelor’s degree in the United States. However, the “Advice to Author Notes” section states:

Postgraduate Diplomas should be issued by an accredited university or institution approved by the All-India Council for Technical Education (AICTE). Some students complete PGDs over two years on a part-time basis. When examining the Postgraduate Diploma, note the entrance requirement and be careful not to confuse the PGD awarded after the Higher Secondary Certificate with the PGD awarded after the three-year bachelor’s degree.

The evidence in the record on appeal did not establish that the beneficiary’s postgraduate diploma was issued by an accredited university or institution approved by AICTE, or that a two- or three-year bachelor’s degree was required for admission into the program of study

This AAO decision demonstrates that not only must the PGD be approved by AICTE, but the entrance requirement for a PGD must also be after the completion of a two or three year bachelor’s degree, and not after the completion of high school.

Not all PGDs will qualify and one must carefully check whether it has been recognized by AICTE. For instance, courses at the ever familiar NIITor Aptech institutes in India are not approved by AICTE. Nor are most of  the programs offered at the Center for Development of Advance Computing (CDAC), unless the CDAC courses are offered in conjunction with universities  and result in degrees.  It is very important to get the PGD assessed by an experienced credential evaluation service, which should check that the PGD has not only been recognized by AICTE but admits students after they have generally completed a three-year degree.

The USCIS has always been niggardly in recognizing Indian degrees, especially three-year degrees, so as to qualify under the EB-2. The recent recognition of some non-university PGDs, obtained after a three year degree, provides some respite to many who would otherwise be caught in the endless India EB-3 backlogs. A  recent Times of India article reveals that India Inc. invested $15 billion in the United States and created 91,000 jobs. Despite this enormous boost to the US economy, Congress has done nothing to reduce the EB-2 and EB-3 backlogs for India, and the USCIS has been slow to recognize that Indian degrees, or combinations, equate to comparable US four-year degrees. The recognition of certain PGDs  following a three-year degree program is therefore welcome, but the USCIS must still go a long way in being more generous in welcoming skilled Indian nationals to the United States.

 (The author thanks Natalie Araujo of the The Trustforte Corporation for sharing some of her insights)

Cyrus Mehta

History Will Trump Donald

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Donald Trump, the billionaire real estate mogul and GOP Presidential candidate, has called Mexican immigrants rapists and drug dealers who are demoralizing the country. His popularity among a certain section in the Republican party has surged as a result, and Trump continues to stand by his demagogy.

Trump’s latest foray into immigrant scapegoating for political gain is nothing knew. Anti-immigration movements have been around since this nation’s inception, and Trump is following in their footsteps. The good news is that they became irrelevant very quickly, and so will Trump.

Between 1830 and 1860, when there was virtually unrestricted immigration, 4.5 million immigrants arrived into the United States. Amongst them were Irish and Germans who were Catholic, and there was an over simplified view that Catholics would never be good citizens as they were beholden to the Pope and subject to the orders from the church. Samuel Morse, well known as the inventor of the telegraph and Morse code, was also a nutty xenophobe, who warned:

 

How is it possible that foreign turbulence imported by shiploads, that riot and ignorance in hundreds of thousands of human priest-controlled machines should suddenly be thrown into our society and not produce turbulence and excess? Can one throw mud into pure water and not disturb its clearness?

TheKnow Nothing movement emerged in the 1850s with the objective of preventing the Irish from participating in national affairs. One of the pamphlets of the Know Nothing party warned:

It is notorious that the grossest frauds have been practiced on our naturalization laws, and that thousands and tens of thousands have every year deposited votes in the ballot box, who could not only not read them, and knew nothing of the nature of the business in which they were engaged, but who had not been six months in the country, and, in many cases, hardly six days.

After the Irish got assimilated, Jews and Italians in the latter part of the 19th century became the targets of accusations that they could never become 100 percent Americans. A leading sociologist of his time Edward Ross stated that Jews were “the polar opposite of our pioneer breed. Undersized and weak muscled, they shun bodily activity and are exceedingly sensitive to pain.” Regarding Italians, Ross noted that they “possess a distressing frequency of low foreheads, open mouths, weak chins, poor features, skewed faces, small or knobby crania and backless heads.”

Trump’s remarksover 120 years later about Mexicans are not too different, and in the same vein as the anti-immigrant demagogues that preceded him:

“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending the best,” Trump said last month when he announced that he was seeking the Republican nomination. “They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists and some, I assume, are good people, but I speak to border guards, and they’re telling us what we’re getting.”

The good news is that many corporations, including Macy’s, NBC, ESPN and two celebrity chefs, have severed business ties with the real estate magnate. While Trump’s popularity may grow with a certain segment within the Republican party, he and his party should always remember the drubbing that Mitt Romney got in the 2012 Presidential elections when he advocated that immigrants “self deport” from the United States. Trump will viciously sue for breach of contract, and it is hoped that courts will be sympathetic to possible defenses that the contracts may have became impossible to follow through by the other party caused by Trump’s inflammatory remarks. Any business association with Trump will cause embarrassment to the other contracting party resulting in business losses, it can be argued.

Trump’s hypocrisy also comes through loud and clear since many of his properties have been built on the backs of the hard and honest labor of immigrants, and the current construction of a luxury hotel in Washington DC may have undocumented immigrants, according to a Washington Post article.  In response to whether he has hired undocumented workers, Trump cavalierly and insensitively said in a CNN interview, “I can’t guarantee it. … I wish they’d give us the names. We would get rid of them immediately.” This statement is legally problematic. An employer verifies all employees on Form I-9, and the USCIS Handbook, M-274, provides clear instructions to employers.  If the documents that were submitted by the new hire are facially valid, an employer does not have a clear basis to terminate a worker soley based on a tip that the worker is not legally in the country.

Indeed, the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Practices at the Department of Justice remains especially vigilant against employers who may indulge in discriminatory practices. In an OSC letter to an employer dated October 14, 2011, the OSC provided the following caution regarding employers responding to anonymous tips on an employee’s immigration status:

OSC cautions employers to respond to anonymous tips with restraint because these tips may be based, in whole or in part, on such factors an individual’s presumed citizenship status, national origin, accent, or cultural customs. Such factors are not relevant in determining whether an individual is authorized to work in the United States. In addition, whether an employer should respond to an anonymous tip depends upon the specific facts at hand, including the credibility and substantive nature of the information provided.

An employer is only under a duty to investigate further if it knows or has knowledge that would lead a reasonable person to believe that an individual is not authorized to work in the United States, and a clear example would be if the employer received specific information from the government that certain employees have committed document fraud. See Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1989); New El Rey Sausage v. INS, 925 F.2d 1153 (9thCir. 1991). By that token, a mismatch letter from the Social Security Administration that an employee’s name and number may not match should not give rise to a conclusion that the employee is not authorized to work in the United States as the mismatch may be caused for a number of other reasons. The same reasoning should apply to an anonymous tip that lacks credibility.

Probably Trump does not care to know these nuances, but he should if he dismisses workers on tips and suspicions especially if the documents verified on the Form I-9 are bona fide, or his company may be penalized by OSC for unfair immigration related employment practices. This would further damage his party’s credibility with Hispanic and new American voters if not already damaged, as Trump shared the podium with Sheriff Joe Arpaio who has a federal conviction for racial profiling.

Like all the other anti-immigrant personalities and movements who have come before him, Trump too will become irrelevant and will be consigned to the trash bin of history if he continues to indulge in demagogy against Mexican immigrants. Even if Trump tries to justify his anti-immigrant remarks by linking immigrants to crime, these unfortunate incidents are isolated when compared to crimes perpetrated by American citizens. Indeed, immigrants tend to have lower crime rates than the general population.  Trump has been losing business, and his towers if still emblazoned with his name will also embarrass, and will probably soon be viewed in the same way like other symbols that are now despised such as the Confederate flag.

David Isaacson

RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA: HOW DOES IT IMPACT U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW?

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By David A. Isaacson

Earlier this month, President Obama announced that the United States would soon be re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba.  The White House website indicates that the President will be “working to re-establish an embassy in Havana in the next coming months.”  U.S. immigration law currently treats natives and citizens of Cuba differently from people from other countries in a variety of respects.  This new development raises the question whether resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba will have any impact on that different treatment of Cuban nationals.
Perhaps the best-known aspect of U.S. immigration law that provides distinctive treatment to natives and citizens of Cuba is Public Law 89-732 of 1966, generally known as the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA).  (Its official title was “An Act to adjust the status of Cuban refugees to that of lawful permanent residents of the United States, and for other purposes.”)  Under the CAA, natives or citizens of Cuba who have been admitted or paroled into the United States, and have been physically present for a total of one year (until the Refugee Act of 1980 the requirement was two years) are eligible for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident.  Eligibility for adjustment under the CAA also extends to the spouse and child of a Cuban applicant, even if not themselves Cuban, so long as they reside with the Cuban native or citizen in the United States or qualify as abused spouses and children of a qualkifying Cuban principal under amendments to the Violence Against Women Act.
Applicants for adjustment of status under the CAA must in general be admissible, although they are not subject to the bars to adjustment of status at INA §245(c).  Also, according to the 1967 decision of the former INS in Matter of Mesa, the public-charge ground of inadmissibility which is currently at INA 212(a)(4)does not apply to adjustment under the CAA.  Adjustment under the CAA is a discretionary benefit, but USCIS has said in its Adjudicator’s Field Manual that its officers should, “in weighing the discretionary factors, keep in mind the nature of the CAA and the political situation in [Cuba].”
Unlike applicants for asylum under INA §208 or refugee status under INA §207, applicants under the CAA, which predates both of those provisions, do not need to show a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground or otherwise establish that they meet the definition of a refugee under INA §101(a)(42).   One recent proposed amendment to the CAA would have required applicants under the CAA to attest to their status as political refugees and face potential loss of their status if they were to return to Cuba, but current law has no such requirement.
The CAA itself does not depend on the presence or absence of U.S. diplomatic relations with Cuba.  Thus, with respect to potential applicants whom DHS chooses to admit or parole into the United States, adjustment under the CAA will remain available.  However, there is a related benefit granted to natives and citizens of Cuba under U.S. immigration law, which may determine whether they can seek adjustment under the CAA at all, and which will be affected by the resumption of diplomatic relations.
Under section 235(b)(1) of the INA, most applicants for admission to the United States are subject to an expedited removal process whereby they can face quick removal from the United States unless they establish either a credible fear of persecution or that they were previously admitted as lawful permanent residents or granted refugee status or asylum.  (This author has previously discussed how judicial review of an expedited removal order may be available for certain returning nonimmigrants.)  However, INA 235(b)(1)(F)states that these provisions “shall not apply to an alien who is a native or citizen of a country in the Western Hemisphere with whose government the United States does not have full diplomatic relations and who arrives by aircraft at a port of entry.”  This provision appears to have been enacted for the benefit of natives and citizens of Cuba, the only “country in the Western Hemisphere with whose government the United States [did] not have full diplomatic relations” when the modern expedited-removal process was enacted in 1996 by IIRIRA.  Under section 235(b)(1)(F), natives and citizens of Cuba who arrive at a U.S. airport cannot be subjected to expedited removal.
At least if one reads section 235(b)(1)(F) literally, however, resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba will remove Cuban natives and citizens from its coverage, leaving them subject to expedited removal at airports.  Perhaps one could argue that the provision refers to a fixed set of countries with which the United States had no diplomatic relations as of the enactment of IIRIRA, but a contrary literal reading is at least possible. Since one who is expeditedly removed after failing to establish a credible fear of persecution generally will not then be paroled or admitted into the United States, greater availability of expedited removal for natives and citizens of Cuba following resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba would indirectly reduce the availability of adjustment under the CAA.
DHS is not required to place Cuban natives or citizens into expedited removal proceedings simply because they are eligible for such treatment, however.  As the BIA clarified in Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, a case involving natives and citizens of Cuba who had applied for admission at a land port of entry rather than an airport and thus were not covered by 235(b)(1)(F), DHS has prosecutorial discretion to place arriving aliens in removal proceedings under INA §240 even if they would otherwise be amenable to expedited removal.  DHS also has discretion to parole such arriving aliens under INA §212(d)(5) rather than placing them into any sort of removal proceedings.
For this reason, the resumption of diplomatic relations will not have an effect on the availability of CAA relief unless DHS wishes it to.  However, natives and citizens of Cuba who are considering arriving at a U.S. airport in order to seek parole and ultimately adjustment of status under the CAA should keep in mind that, following the resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba, they will be at greater risk of expedited removal.
Cyrus Mehta

Keeping Tabs On a Non-Citizen’s Eligibility For Health Coverage Under The Affordable Care Act

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President Obama’s healthcare law, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), is here to stay especially after the law withstood a challenge in King v. Burwell that allows the federal government to provide subsidies to poor and middle class people to buy health insurance on a nationwide basis.

Even non-citizens who are lawfully present may access the health exchange to buy insurance under the ACA. Many non-citizens will also be subject to the individual mandate or “individual shared responsibility provision” if they do not maintain essential health coverage. It is thus important to keep track of a non-citizen’s eligibility as well as when such an individual may be penalized on his or her next tax return for not maintaining essential coverage, which has been explained in Who is Lawfully Present Under the Affordable Care Act?

Becoming Lawfully Present After Enrollment Period Has Closed

The next open enrollment period for 2016 starts November 1, 2015 and ends January 31, 2016. The last open enrollment closed on February 15, 2015. What if a non-citizen becomes eligible for ACA coverage between February 15, 2015 and November 1, 2015?

Take the example of a US citizen who has sponsored her parents, John Smith and Jane Smith, under the immediate relative category through the filing of an I-130 petition while they were outside the United States. They came to the United States on June 25, 2015 as permanent residents upon the approval of the I-130 and the issuance of immigrant visas at the consular post overseas. A permanent resident is a qualified alien who is eligible for coverage on a health exchange and is also subject to the mandate. Although the open enrollment closed on February 15, 2015, John and Jane are eligible under the 60 day special enrollment period because they just became permanent residents after the prior enrollment period closed on February 15, 2015. Assuming that they do not have minimum essential coverage as yet, if John and Jane do not take advantage of the special enrollment period and get coverage in the first full month during which they are present for the entirety of the month, they will be subject to a penalty when they file their tax returns for 2015. Even if John and Jane choose to return to their original country for two years on a reentry permit to wrap up their business and sell their home, they must still enroll for health coverage or qualify for an exception, which includes qualifying under the foreign earned income exclusion pursuant to section 911(d)(1)(A) or 911(d)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code. This is more fully explained in the blog entitled The Impact of Obamacare on Green Card Holders Who Reside Outside the United States.

Let’s discuss another example of a person who applies for permanent residence from within the United States. Maria Fernandez entered the United States on a B-2 visitor’s visa on January 1, 2009 and has remained ever since. She overstayed her authorized stay as a visitor after July 1, 2009. As a result of overstaying her B-2 visa status, she is not considered lawfully present under the ACA. On April 1, 2015, Maria married a US citizen, who filed an I-130 petition on her behalf and she concurrently filed an I-485 application for adjustment of status. Under the definition of “lawfully present” in 45 CFR 152.2(4)(vii), she is not yet lawfully present as the underlying I-130 visa petition has not been approved. For immigration purposes, Maria will be considered lawfully present as an adjustment application, but some of the definitions of “lawfully present” under the ACA are not in harmony under immigration law. However, if Maria obtains employment authorization as an adjustment applicant, she will be considered lawfully present pursuant to 45 CFR 152.2(4)(iii). Suppose Maria obtains employment authorization on July 1, 2015, although the next open enrollment starts on November 1, 2015 and assuming she does not have minimum essential coverage, Maria will be eligible for the special 60 day enrollment period under 45 CFR 155.420(d)(3).

If on the other hand, Maria does not apply for employment authorization as an adjustment applicant pursuant to 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(9), she will not be considered lawfully present until after her I-130 petition is approved or when she becomes a lawful permanent resident, whichever is earlier.

Special enrollment is available when “[t]he qualified individual, or his or her dependent, which was not previously a citizen, national, or lawfully present individual gains such status.”  45 CFR 155.420(d)(3). It is unclear whether special enrollment would be available to someone who was previously lawfully present, then fell out of status, and now regains another status.  However, it would be bizarre if this rule precluded someone who had ever been lawfully present in their life previously. If the rule was applied so rigidly, someone like Maria in the above example would not qualify for special enrollment and would have to wait for the next open enrollment on November 1, 2015. Even visitors in B-2 status may be considered lawfully present under the ACA, but they may not be required to seek health coverage if they have not yet become tax residents.  Special enrollment ought to cover anyone who goes from not being lawfully present to being lawfully present.

Lawfully Present Non-Citizens with Low Incomes

Lawful Permanent residents are excluded from Medicaid unless they have had this status for at least 5 years under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). The Children’s Health Insurance Program of 1997 (CHIP), however,  allows pregnant women and children lawfully residing in the United States to access both Medicaid and CHIP even if they have not resided in the United States for five years. Not all states, though, have lifted the 5 year waiting period for CHIP coverage.  Although newly minted LPRs with low incomes may not be able to access Medicaid within the first five years unless they qualify for CHIP, the ACA provides subsidies to eligible non-citizens, which are now protected even if offered through the federal health exchange after King v. Burwell. Lawfully present non-citizens with incomes up to 250% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) are eligible for cost sharing subsidies, and those up to 400% of the FPL are eligible for tax credits to offset the costs of purchasing private plans. Due to the 5 year Medicaid ban, lawfully present immigrants that have incomes under 100% of the FPL can also receive subsidies and tax credits that their US citizen counterparts are precluded from obtaining in states that have refused to expand Medicaid.  Although the Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius upheld the constitutionality of the ACA, it also gave states the choice of whether or not to expand Medicaid. At the time of writing, 30 states including the District of Columbia have opted for expanded Medicaid.

Low income non-citizens who avail of either Medicaid or other subsidies will not be rendered a public charge for immigration purposes.  According to USCIS policy, “Non-cash or special purpose cash benefits that are generally supplemental in nature and do not make the person primarily dependent on the government for subsistence do not impact a public charge determination.” On the other hand institutionalization for long term care through Medicaid or other subsidies would be considered as a factor in making a public charge determination.

Conclusion

In King v. Burwell, Chief Justice Roberts who wrote the majority opinion stated that “Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them.” Since the ACA is here to stay and will most likely be firmly entrenched in the nation’s DNA like Social Security and Medicare, many qualified and lawfully present non-citizens will also be able to access benefits the ACA and may also become subject to the mandate. At this point, undocumented immigrants or recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) cannot access the health exchanges or avail of the subsidies. Some states may have their own rules, so for example in New York, DACA recipients and other ‘permanent residents under color of law” (PRUCOL) can still avail of Medicaid since the New York Court of Appeals in Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello held that PRWORA violated New York’s Equal Protection Clause.  The ACA is becoming more and more linked to immigration issues. While an immigration practitioner need not be an expert in other disciplines, he or she must be aware of eligible statuses for coverage under the ACA, the deadlines for enrollment and when the 60 day special enrollment may become available and the potential for someone to be subject to additional payment to the IRS for failing to obtain coverage, unless the client can qualify for an exemption.

Cyrus Mehta

Extension of STEM Optional Practical Training for Foreign Students Under President Obama’s Executive Actions?

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Senator Grassley’s latest angry missive to the DHS protests the proposed increase of F-1 student Optional Practical Training (OPT), which was part of President Obama’s  executive actions of November 20, 2014.  While the Senator’s rant against any beneficial immigration proposal is nothing unusual, it reveals for the first time DHS plans to unveil an OPT  extension regulation relating to its promise to retain skilled foreign talent. It is also refreshing that the Obama Administration is endeavoring to implement a key executive action, especially after a  noted immigration blogger justifiably began to wonder whether the Obama Administration was fulfilling its promise or not.

According to Senator Grassley’s letter dated June 8, 2015, the DHS is moving forward with new regulations on OPT

– allowing foreign students with degrees in STEM fields to receive up to two 24-month extensions beyond the original 12-month period provided under OPT regulations, for a total of up to six years of post-graduation employment in student status; and

– authorizing foreign graduates of non-STEM U.S. degree programs to receive the 24-month extension of the OPT period, even if the STEM degree upon which the extension is based is an earlier degree and not for the program from which the student is currently graduating (e.g. student has a bachelor’s in chemistry and is graduating from an M.B.A. program).

Presently, students can receive up to 12 months of OPT upon graduation. In 2008, the DHS published regulations authorizing an additional 17-months extension of the OPT period for foreign students who graduated in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematical) fields. The Senator’s letter also seems to suggest that the agency is considering that employers will certify that they have not displaced US workers.  The STEM OPT extension is presently subject to a legal challenge by the  Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (Washtech). See Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS, Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-529.   Plaintiffs have alleged that the OPT STEM extension period is a deliberate circumvention of the H-1B visa cap in violation of Congressional intent, and have also been granted competitor standing, which recognizes that a party suffers injury when a government agency lifts regulatory restrictions on competitors or allows increased competition.

Notwithstanding Senator Grassley’s protest and the lawsuit, this is good news for foreign students, especially those who were not selected in the H-1B visa lottery for FY2016.  While the current lawsuit could potentially thwart the  efforts of the administration to extend STEM OPT especially in the face of mounting law suits,  we can also take comfort in an earlier failed legal challenge against STEM OPT.

Soon after the DHS extended OPT from twelve months to twenty-nine months for STEM students, the Programmers Guild sued DHS. in Programmers Guild v. Chertoff, 08-cv-2666 (D.N.J. 2008), challenging the regulation, and initially seeking an injunction, on the ground that DHS. had invented its own guest worker program without Congressional authorization. The court dismissed the suit for injunction on the ground that DHS was entitled to deference under Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under the oft quoted Chevrondoctrine, courts will pay deference to the regulatory interpretation of the agency charged with executing the laws of the United States when there is ambiguity in the statute. The courts will step in only when the agency’s interpretation is irrational or in error. The Chevron doctrine has two parts: Step 1 requires an examination of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If Congress had clearly spoken, then that is the end of the matter and the agency and the court must give effect to the unambiguous intent of the statute. Step 2 applies when Congress has not clearly spoken, then the agency’s interpretation is given deference if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute, and the court will defer to this interpretation even if it does not agree with it. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), while affirming Chevron, held that if there is an ambiguous statute requiring agency deference under Chevron Step 2, the agency’s interpretation will also trump a judicial decision interpreting the same statute. Brand Xinvolved a judicial review of an FCC ruling exempting broadband Internet carrier from mandatory regulation under a statute. The Supreme Court observed that the Commission’s interpretation involved a “subject matter that is technical, complex, and dynamic;” therefore, the Court concluded that the Commission is in a far better position to address these questions than the Court because nothing in the Communications Act or the Administrative Procedure Act, according to the Court, made unlawful the Commission’s use of its expert policy judgment to resolve these difficult questions.

The District Court in dismissing the Programmers Guild lawsuit discussed the rulings in Chevron and Brand X to uphold the DHS’s ability to extend the student F-1 OPT regulation. Programmers Guild appealed and the Third Circuit also dismissed the lawsuit based on the fact that the Plaintiffs did not have standing. Programmers Guild, Inc. v. Chertoff, 338 Fed. Appx. 239 (3rd Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 13, 2009) (No. 09-590). While the Third Circuit did not address Chevronor Brand X – there was no need to – it interestingly cited Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978), which held that Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts its statutes without change. Here, the F-1 practical training regulation was devoid of any reference to the displacement of domestic labor, and Congress chose not to enact any such reference, which is why the Programmers Guild lacked standing.

So, why is Washtech again challenging the STEM OPT extension after another challenger had previously failed? This is because the DC Circuit is a favorable court to get standing, which it has already been granted. Even if plaintiffs ultimately prevail on their competitor standing theory, which requires them to show that they are direct and current competitors to F-1 students, plaintiffs still have an uphill task. The plaintiffs rely on International Bricklayers Union v. Meese (another reason why they have commenced legal action in the DC Circuit),  which struck down an INS Operating Instruction that allowed foreign laborers to come to the US on B-1 visas to install equipment or machinery after it had been purchased from an overseas seller. The court in International Bricklayers agreed with the plaintiffs that the laborers were not properly in the United States on a B-1 business visa, which under INA 101(a)(15)(B) precluded one from “performing skilled or unskilled labor.” In fact, Congress had enacted the H-2B visa for this sort of labor pursuant to INA 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).

On the other hand, the provision pertaining to F-1 students at INA 101(a)(15)(F)(i) is more ambiguous. It prescribes the eligibility criterion for a student to enter the United States, but does not indicate what a student may do after he or she has completed the educational program. For over 50 years, the government has allowed students to engage in practical training after the completion of their studies, which Congress has never altered.  Thus, a court should be more inclined to give deference to the Administration’s interpretation of INA 101(a)(15)(F)(i) under Chevron and Brand X even if it expanded STEM OPT beyond the maximum available  period of 29 months. From a policy perspective, the Administration should be given room to expand STEM OPT in order to retain skilled talent in the United States. Global competition for STEM students has increased dramatically, and many countries have reformed their immigration systems to attract such students. American innovation will fall behind global competitors  if we cannot find ways to attract foreign talent especially after they have been educated at American universities.

Senator Grassley’s misgivings about extending STEM OPT  are misplaced, and it is fervently hoped that the Administration will not pay heed to his letter and cynically scrap the program after putting up a show that it had tried it’s best. If extended STEM OPT is implemented, it will provide the impetus for the implementation of other key executive actions such as allowing entrepreneurs to be paroled into the United States and permitting beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions to work and enjoy job mobilityeven if their priority dates have not become current. Each and every action will surely get challenged, but the Administration should fight on and prevail, like it did when the motion to preliminarily enjoin the granting of work authorization to H-4 dependent spouses failed.

Cyrus Mehta

PUTTING DISNEY AND H-1B VISAS IN PERSPECTIVE

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By Cyrus D. Mehta

Most who read Julia Preston’s New York Times article on Disney laying off its qualified programmers to be replaced with Indian  programmers on H-1B visas at HCL America are understandably outraged. The fact that Disney axed its employees – an iconic American  company that has promoted happiness, gentleness  and well being– has let down people even more. There have been more than 3,000 mostly angry comments to the article.

If we put aside the Indian H-1B worker for a minute, no one will doubt that it is business reality for companies to contract out many of their functions, such as IT, accounting or human resources. This practice is not limited to employers using foreign labor, and it is a widespread practice for companies to cut costs by reducing overhead such as payroll and benefits. Would there be similar outrage if an American law firm contracted away its human resources functions and stopped hiring additional HR personnel? Or if an entrepreneur wanted to sell a newly designed stroller with interesting gizmos in the US market, but arranged to have the manufacturing done in China? While we all feel badly for the American workers who may have been laid off, this is an unavoidable part of the quantum advances that have been made in globalization and the information technology revolution, which does not just involve access to foreign skilled labor (even if outside the United States) but even automation and robotics. Tom Friedman once famously said this in his NYT column “Average is Over”:

In the past, workers with average skills, doing an average job, could earn an average lifestyle. But, today, average is officially over. Being average just won’t earn you what it used to. It can’t when so many more employers have so much more access to so much more above average cheap foreign labor, cheap robotics, cheap software, cheap automation and cheap genius. Therefore, everyone needs to find their extra — their unique value contribution that makes them stand out in whatever is their field of employment. Average is over.

This is not to suggest that the laid off American workers in the Disney episode were average, but it is fervently hoped that the benefits that accrue in contracting away functions in this new era of globalization will allow companies to engage in innovations that will  ultimately benefit consumers, which in turn will create more, albeit different, jobs in the United States. Even Disney said that after its reorganization that allowed it to focus on more innovations, it had a net gain of 70 jobs and has created 30,000 new jobs in the past decade.

While the media highlights the cases of Disney and SoCalwhere US workers are laid off and replaced by H-1B workers of an IT consulting company, most employers hire H-1B workers to supplement their workforce and not to replace their workforce. The H-1B visa cap is too small with only a total of 85,000 annual slots, and I personally have represented employers and  talented H-1B workers who can no longer be employed because they were not selected under the H-1B visa lottery. It is unfortunate that US employers lost talented foreign workers, many of whom have been educated at US universities. Lower costs, as is commonly believed,  is not the driving factor in hiring H-1B workers . The employer has to pay the higher of the prevailing wage or the actual wage it pays similarly situated workers, and so it is generally difficult for an H-1B worker to replace a US worker because they are cheaper. The employer has to also pay filing fees ranging from upwards of $2,325 to $5550, plus lawyers’ fees, besides the mandated prevailing wage.

Contrary to how the H-1B visa program is portrayed in the media, an employer does not have to first find a US worker before hiring an H-1B worker, or be concerned about displacing American workers at client locations such as Disney,  unless the employer is dependent on H-1B workers or has been found to have been a willful violator. See INA 212(n)(1)(E), (F) and (G) & INA 212(n)(3)(A). But even a dependent H-1B employer or willful violator need not recruit for a US worker first, or be concerned about displacement,  if it pays the H-1B worker over $60,000 or the worker has a Master’s degree. See INA 212(n)(3)(B).  The employer has to pay the higher of the prevailing or the actual wage among the workers that it employs and not which Disney employs. The replacement H-1B worker relating to the skill needed for Disney’s new technology platform need not have 10 years of experience, but probably less experience, and can be paid accordingly but still at the prevailing wage.

Critics of the H-1B program seize upon INA 212(n)(1)(A)(ii), which  states that an employer “will provide working conditions for such [an H-1B] nonimmigrant that will not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed.”  They argue that it is this provision that renders what happened at Disney to be in violation of the spirit of the law, if not the letter of the law.  But this is hardly the case. INA 212(n)(1)(A)(ii) represents the second of four attestations that a non-dependent employer makes on a Labor Condition Application. 20 CFR 655.732(b) defines “working conditions” to “include matters such as hours, shifts, vacation periods, and benefits such as seniority-based preferences for training programs and work schedules.” The first attestation is that the employer agrees to pay the higher of the prevailing or actual wage. The third attestation that the employer makes is that there is no strike or lock-out in the occupational classification at the place of employment. The fourth and final attestation requires the employer to provide notice to the bargaining representative, and if none exists, then it must be posted at the place of employment for 10 days.

INA 212(n)(1)(A)(ii) does not mandate that the employer has to first recruit US workers. Elsewhere in INA 212(n) it is clear that only a dependent employer or one found to be a willful violator, who has no exempt H-1B workers, is required to recruit US workers and be concerned about displacing American workers at client sites. See INA 212(n)(1)(E), (F) and (G). While it intuitively makes sense for the employer to be required to test the US labor market before hiring all H-1B workers and be concerned about displacing a US worker, the H-1B visa is a temporary visa, and there is also the countervailing policy interest for employers  to be able to expeditiously hire foreign national workers to urgently execute projects. If they wish to sponsor them for permanent residence, there is an elaborate procedure for the employer to first certify that there was no willing or qualified worker for the position. H-1B workers have to also be paid the higher of the prevailing or actual wage, and at times the prevailing wage mandated by the Department of Labor seems to be higher than what it is in reality in many occupations.

The use of IT consulting companies is widespread in America (and even the US government contracts for their services), and was acknowledged by Congress when it passed the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (AVWIA) by creating onerous additional attestations for H-1B dependent employers. The current enforcement regime has sufficient teeth to severely punish bad actors.  IT consulting employers who hire professional workers from India unfortunately seem to be getting more of a rap for indiscriminately using up the H-1B visa. However, it is this very business model has provided reliability to companies in the United States and throughout the industrialized world to obtain top-drawer talent quickly with flexibility and at affordable prices that benefit end consumers and promote diversity of product development. This is what the oft-criticized “job shop” or “body shop” readily provides. By making possible a source of expertise that can be modified and redirected in response to changing demand, uncertain budgets, shifting corporate priorities and unpredictable fluctuations in the business cycle itself, the pejorative reference to them as “job shop” is, in reality, the engine of technological ingenuity on which progress in the global information age largely depends.  Such a business model is also consistent with free trade, which the US promotes vehemently to other countries (including the protection of intellectual property rights of its pharmaceutical companies that keep life saving drugs high), but seems to restrict when it applies to service industries located in countries such as India that desire to do business in the United States through their skilled personnel. US companies and IT consulting companies should engage in more public relations efforts to highlight the overall benefits of their collaborations, which in the case of the Disney episode was admittedly not enough.

By continuing to limit and stifle the H-1B program, US employers will remain less competitive and will not be able to pass on the benefits to consumers. We need more H-1B visa numbers rather than less. We also need to respect H-1B workers rather than deride them, even if they work at IT consulting company, as they too wish to abide by the law and to pursue their dreams in America.  The best way to reform the H-1B program is to provide more mobility to H-1B visa workers. By providing more mobility, which includes being able to obtain a green card quickly,  H-1B workers will not be stuck with the employer who brought them on the H-1B visa, and this can also result in rising wages within the occupation as a whole. Mobile foreign workers will also be incentivized to start their own innovative companies in America, which in turn will result in more jobs. This is the best way to reform the H-1B visa program, rather than to further shackle it with stifling laws and regulations, labor attestations and quotas.

Cyrus Mehta

Fifth Circuit Precedent On Preemption Can Provide Obama With Path to Victory In Texas v. United States

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After a split Fifth Circuit panel declined to lift Judge Hanen’s preliminary injunction in Texas v. United States blocking President Obama’s two executive actions that could defer the deportations of an estimated 4.4 million people, the score was 2 in favor of Texas and 0 for President Obama.  One of the memorable quotes in the Rocky movie about boxing is apt here, “[I]t ain’t how hard you hit; it’s about how hard you can get hit, and keep moving forward.”

Although President Obama has been hit hard, his legal team has to keep moving forward and there is plenty to look forward to that can ultimately win the day for the 4.4 million who will benefit from deferred action.  Although there has been substantial analysis regarding the flaws in the latest decision, scant attention has been paid to a 2013 decision of the Fifth Circuit that held that a local ordinance penalizing  landlords and occupants for not being lawfully present in the United States was preempted under federal immigration law.  This decision may provide a narrow path to victory for President Obama.

In Villas at Parkside Partners v. Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5thCir. 2013), the Fifth Circuit struck down a Farmers Branch, TX, ordinance on preemption grounds because it conflicted with federal law regarding the ability of aliens not lawfully present in the United States to remain in the US. The Fifth Circuit also noted that the federal government’s ability to exercise discretion relating to removal of non-citizens is a key reason for a state or local regulation of immigration being preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution:

Whereas the Supreme Court has made clear that there are “significant complexities involved in [making] . . . the determination whether a   person is removable,” and the decision is “entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government,” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 236 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[T]he structure of the immigration statutes makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which eventually will be deported.”), the Ordinance allows state courts to assess the legality of a non-citizen’s presence absent a “preclusive” federal determination, opening the door to conflicting state and federal rulings on the question.

Texas v. United States, on first brush, is not a preemption case as it does not involve a state law regulating immigration that conflicts with federal law. Plaintiff states challenged President Obama’s executive actions, mainly on grounds that the President did not issue a rule prior to implementing deferred action for parents who have citizen or permanent resident children in the US (DAPA) or expanded deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA). Still, the Fifth Circuit’s panel refusing to stay the preliminary injunction of  Judge Hanen  does not bode too well for federal preemption of immigration law and policy, which has been upheld not only by the Fifth Circuit in Farmers Branch, but also by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012),   which articulated:

A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials…… Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all. If removal proceedings commence, aliens may seek asylum and other discretionary relief allowing them to remain in the country or at least to leave without formal removal….

Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their   families,  for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service. Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s international relations. Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state maybe mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon return. The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.

When the actual merits of Judge Hanen’s injunction are considered by another panel of judges in the Fifth Circuit, they will hopefully take notice of Farmer’s Branch that was decided en banc, which upheld the federal government’s ability to exercise discretion in the removal of aliens under the preemption doctrine. Interestingly, Judges Smith and Elrod, who  decided against President Obama in the Fifth Circuit, were also among the dissenting judges in the Farmers Branch case.

The key issue in Texas v. United States is whether states should be even permitted to sue the federal government on immigration enforcement policy. If President Obama loses in the Fifth Circuit on the actual appeal, and the Supreme Court upholds it, then this would be an open invitation for any cantankerous state politician to bring a law suit against the federal government over an immigration policy that he or she dislikes. The ability of a state to harass the federal government could be endless. For instance, the federal government can invoke its authority to parole aliens into the United States under INA 212(d)(5), and could bring in a large group of people into the US for humanitarian reasons, such as victims of atrocities by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. A state opposed to the paroling of these aliens can potentially sue the federal government if it can manufacture some harm that would befall it, like Texas did, that it would be costly for the state to issue drivers licenses to them. Similarly, a state could sue the federal government for granting deferred action to victims of domestic violence or crime victims or widows and widowers of US citizens, like the federal government has done in the past. These sorts of challenges from states would undermine the long established doctrine that immigration policy is within the purview of the federal government and Congress. Another concern for upholding preemption of federal immigration law from interference by states is the concern about the relationship between immigration and foreign affairs. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).  If a state were allowed to sue each time the federal government issued a policy and blocked it, this would upset the long acknowledged preemption doctrine relating to immigration. If there is a disagreement in how the Executive Branch implements immigration policy, it is for Congress to intervene by changing the law rather than for states like Texas to file a law suit.

Judge Higginson’s dissenting opinion (who also wrote the majority opinion in Farmers Branch) in the Fifth Circuit’s decision refusing to lift the stay correctly opined that President Obama’s executive actions are non-justiciable as they are internal executive enforcement guidelines. The dissenting opinion appropriately relied on the Supreme Court decision in Heckler v. Chaney,  470 U.S. 821 (1985), which held  “that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agencies absolute discretion.”  Whether executive enforcement guidelines provide deferred action to millions rather than thousands or hundreds should not make them any more or less amenable to a legal challenge by a state. So long as the President does not grant legal status, which he cannot do under the INA (and both Judge Hanen and the majority in the Fifth Circuit confused legal status with lawful presence), it should not make a difference under Heckler v. Chaney whether deferred action is granted to thousands of spouses of military personnel or to millions of parents of citizen and permanent resident children.  Charles Kuck and othershave forcefully proposed that President Obama should publish a rule in the Federal Register, and this would weaken plaintiffs’ chief claim that the President violated the Administrative Procedure Act by not proposing a rule for public notice and comment when implementing DAPA and DACA. While this is an intriguing idea, it would also be a cop out. Every new enforcement decision would have to go through the notice and comment procedure under the APA out of fear of inviting more law suits from states, and this would again undermine the preemption doctrine relating to immigration.

Indeed, one of the concurring opinions in Farmers Branch acknowledged that the largely federal discretionary immigration enforcement system, including the grant of deferred action,  would be upset if a state regulation conflicted with it, and relied on Arizona v. USAby opining:  “The Court held that the statute stood as an impermissible obstacle to the design and purposes of the largely discretionary immigration enforcement system Congress created because it could result in “unnecessary harassment of some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or someone assisting with a criminal investigation) whom federal officials determine should not be removed” and ultimately “would allow the State to achieve its own immigration policy.” [citation omitted]. Because such state-to-state variance “is not the system Congress created,” the Court held that the Arizona statute “violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.””

There are many arguments that may ultimately carry the day for the Obama administration and its ability to bring relief to millions who are a low enforcement priority. In Crane v. Johnson, the federal government was victorious in a law suit against the previous 2012 DACA program as the Fifth Circuit held that Mississippi lacked standing since its claim to injury was speculative.  Texas, however, has been able to manufacture a more cogent harm regarding the burdens that would be caused in the issuance of new driver licenses. Regardless of the merits of a state’s standing claim, standing would be moot if the claim is non- justiciable as Judge Higginson found, and  Farmers Branch should provide the basis for this on the ground that a state cannot upset the preemption doctrine on immigration. It is no secret that Texas v. United States is a political fight as the plaintiff states are Republican, and the judges that have ruled against Obama have been appointed by Republican Presidents.  It is also true that the majority of judges in the Fifth Circuit are Republican appointees, but Farmers Branch was also decided en banc in the Fifth Circuit, and the panel that considers the appeal will be bound by its own precedent.