Blog | The Insightful Immigration Blog

Filing under the FY 2021 H-1B Cap; How will H-1B Registration Work?

January 8, 2020/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cora-Ann Pestaina

It’s the year 2020! We celebrate the start of a new decade and are hopeful for good things to come. Will the upcoming H-1B cap season be one of those good things? All we know for sure is that it will be different. Preparing for the cap season can be stressful but we recognize the stressors and, through trial and error, we have developed various coping strategies and mechanisms. But this year, we are not sure what to expect.

As background, the H-1B program allows U.S. companies to temporarily employ foreign workers in occupations that require the application of a body of highly specialized knowledge and a bachelor’s degree or higher in the specific specialty, or its equivalent. Congress has set a cap of 65,000 H-1B visas per fiscal year. An advanced degree exemption from the H-1B cap is available for 20,000 beneficiaries who have earned a U.S. master’s degree or higher from a U.S. institution of higher education. Each year, USCIS monitors the number of petitions received during the designated filing period and notifies the public when the H-1B numerical allocations have been met.

It was over a year ago, in December 2018, that USCIS first issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking announcing a rule that would revolutionize the H-1B cap process. The rule was made final on January 31, 2019 and amended the regulations governing cap-subject H-1B petitions, including those that may be eligible for the advanced degree exemption and setting forth an H-1B registration process. Ever since then, business immigration practitioners have been anticipating (or dreading?) the change. USCIS was unable to implement the registration process during the FY 2020 H-1B cap season but they previously announced that the process would definitely be implemented for the FY 2021 H-1B cap season and on January 9, 2020, USCIS published “Registration Requirement for Petitioners Seeking To File H–1B Petitions on Behalf of Cap-Subject Aliens” announcing that the agency had completed all requisite user testing and is implementing the registration process in advance of the H–1B cap season for FY 2021. Based all USCIS has released thus far, here is what we know about the registration process:

Employers seeking to file cap-subject H-1B petitions, or their authorized representatives, must complete a registration process that requires basic information about the H-1B employer and each requested H-1B worker. USCIS will open an initial registration period from March 1 through March 20, 2020.
There will be a non-refundable registration fee of $10 per for each H-1B registration submitted by petitioning employers.
If a specific employer submits more than one registration per beneficiary in the same fiscal year, all registrations filed by that employer relating to that beneficiary for that fiscal year will be considered invalid.
There is still no prohibition on a prospective H-1B beneficiary considering job opportunities with multiple employers which may seek to extend a job offer.
USCIS will provide step-by-step instructions on its website regarding how to register and employers and authorized representatives will be able to start setting up their registration accounts in advance of the registration period opening.
USCIS will post the date that employers and authorized representatives may start setting up accounts on its website.
Employers will be able to edit a registration up until the registration is submitted. An employer may delete a registration and resubmit it prior to the close of the registration period.
If a sufficient number of registrations are received, USCIS will use a computer-generated random registration selection process (lottery) to select enough registrations to meet the congressionally-mandated regular cap and the U.S. advanced degree exemption for fiscal year (FY) 2021.
The lottery will be conducted no later than March 31, 2020.
Employers with selected registrations will be eligible to file a cap-subject petition only for the beneficiary named in the registration. An employer may not substitute the beneficiary named in the original registration or transfer the registration to another employer.
USCIS will send notices electronically to all registrants with selected registrations. The notifications will be added to registration accounts. The account holder who submitted the selected registration will receive notification via email or text message stating that an action has been added to their account, and they will have to log in to see the full notice.
USCIS intends to notify registrants with selected registrations from the initial registration period no later than March 31, 2020.
After such selection, employers will be notified by USCIS of the exact amount of time allowed for filing the H-1B petition, which will in all cases be at least 90 days, but may be longer at the discretion of USCIS. Employers will have the ability to file their petitions as soon as eligible (i.e. by April 1) to allow the beneficiary to obtain cap-gap, if required.
USCIS may determine it is necessary to continue accepting registrations, or open an additional registration period, if it does not receive enough registrations and subsequent petitions projected to reach the numerical allocations.

According to the “H-1B Registration Workflow with Payment” that USCIS released in association with the proposed registration fee requirement, it appears that USCIS will require payment of the $10 registration fee through the Pay.gov portal. Employers may submit one combined registration fee payment for multiple prospective H-1B workers at the same time and the registration fee payment can be paid with either a debit or credit card, or with a withdrawal from a checking or savings account. It appears that USCIS will only require information such as employer and beneficiary names, addresses, employer identification number, and beneficiary date of birth and passport information. USCIS has stated that they will not evaluate the “quality” of the registration other than to eliminate duplicate submissions. USCIS recognizes that some employers may be more willing to submit a registration than they are willing to submit a complete H-1B cap-petition with filing fees under the old process. However, USCIS will not have any means to determine whether a registration is meritorious until after it is selected and a petition resulting from such registration is properly filed. Because some registrations will not lead to approved H-1B cap-petitions, USCIS plans to hold unselected registrations in reserve and will conduct additional selections if necessary.

There are still many details yet to be divulged about the registration process but USCIS has promised to conduct outreach and training prior to the initial implementation of the registration system to allow the public the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the electronic registration process. In the meantime, this author believes that it makes the most sense to conduct a complete evaluation of any potential H-1B petition even prior to submitting the registration. For example, there ought to be preliminary discussions on education credentials, education evaluations, occupational classifications, wage levels, job descriptions, proving specialty occupation, etc. all before submitting a registration. It would be a terrible thing for an employer to be notified of a selection only to be later advised that their H-1B petition would likely be denied due to a degree or specialty occupation issue!

While one should anticipate that the new registration system will be up and running, there is still an outside chance that the system might not be ready, or may crash, and employers may at the last minute be asked to file full H-1B petitions in the first five business days of April 2020. Filers must be prepared for all eventualities, and this further underscores the need to ensure that the prospective employees for whom employers will file H-1B petitions must be properly screened for H-1B eligibility and that all available information and documentation is available to file meritorious cases.

What Kisor v. Wilkie Means For Auer Deference and USCIS’s Interpretation of its Regulations Relating to H-1B Visa Petitions

December 20, 2019/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus Mehta

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Sonal Sharma*

In Wilkie v. Kisor, the Supreme Court issued a significant decision regarding whether courts should still be paying deference to the government’s interpretation of its own regulations. Here’s some background on how we got to this deference standard.

Over 35 years ago, the Supreme Court established a two-step analysis in Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council for evaluating whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to administer is lawful. Under Step One, the court must determine whether Congress has clearly spoken to the precise question at issue in the plain terms of the statute. If that is the case, there is no need for the reviewing court to delve any further. Under Step Two, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the reviewing court must determine whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute. A permissible interpretation of the statute need not be the best interpretation or even the interpretation that the reviewing court would adopt. Step Two is commonly known as Chevron deference where the reviewing court grants deference to the agency’s permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute.

In Auer v. Robins, the Supreme Court held that the same Chevron type of deference applies to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. However, even under the Auer concept of deference, which gives federal agencies the right to interpret their own regulations.

It was thought that Kisor would strike the death knell for the Auer deference, but instead, the plurality provided more guidance on how to apply Auer and under what circumstances may a court not pay deference to the agency’s interpretation of its regulations notwithstanding Auer. The Kisor court opinion holds that the Auer doctrine “is potent in its place, but cabined in its scope”. Specifically, Justice Kagan noted that “this Court has cabined Auer’s scope in varied and critical ways-in exactly that measure, has maintained a strong judicial role in interpreting rule.” During oral arguments, Justice Gorsuch identified concerns of particular regulated classes such as “immigration lawyers” because it allows agencies to adopt binding interpretations without prior notice to the regulated entities. Justice Gorsuch touched the point at the heart of the opposition of Auer deference by noting that it comes in the way of courts performing their duty entrusted upon them under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) “to ‘decide all relevant questions of law’ and ‘set aside agency action’”. Despite the doubts, the Court decided that Auer deference is not “unworkable” and hence not required to be abolished entirely. However, it is required to be confined in its application.

The question before the Supreme Court was how much weight courts should give to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations. Auer deference rests on the presumption that even though not explicitly assigned, Congress intended that government agencies interpret regulations that have been crafted to implement the statute.

What happens when such a regulation itself is ambiguous? Who gets to decide what it means. For long, it has been established under Auer that administrative agencies are better suited to interpret such ambiguous gaps in their own regulations based on their “substantive expertise in the subject matter”.

In Kisor, Justice Kagan noted that the Supreme Court in Seminole Rock (which later became Auer deference) declared that “ [w]hen the meaning of [a regulation] is in doubt,” the agency’s interpretation “becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”. Justice Gorsuch concurring in the opinion noted that under the APA, the courts are directed to “determine the meaning of the any relevant agency action including any rule issued by the agency”. He further noted that under Auer deference, a court “adopts something other than the best reading of a regulation”. Critics of Auer deference have said that it takes away the fundamental authority of the court to decide what the actual interpretation of the law is. Under Kisor, the Supreme Court announced that Auer deference is now a “general rule” which will need analysis and scrutiny before it applies in a case.

The Supreme Court essentially “cabined the scope” of Auer deference, and set forth a three-step approach under Kisor. The court must determine that (i) the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous”- the court should reach this conclusion after exhausting all the “traditional tools” of construction; (ii) if the regulation is in fact genuinely ambiguous, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable; and (iii) even if it is a reasonable interpretation, does it meet the “minimum threshold” to grant the Auer deference requiring the court to conduct an “an independent inquiry” into if (a) it is an authoritative or official position of the agency; (b) it reflects its substantive expertise; (c) if the agency’s interpretation of the rule reflects “its fair and considered judgment”.

What kind of impact will Kisor have on challenges to recent USCIS denials?

There has been a surge in denials of H-1B petitions mostly on the basis that either the position doesn’t qualify as a specialty occupation or there is no employer-employee relationship because the beneficiary is placed at the third-party client location. AILA had filed an amicus curie brief in Kisor highlighting how Auer deference allows the agency to “circumvent the critical requirements of APA” especially by just changing the standards of review or interpretation of the regulations without public notice and comments. It also brought to the attention of the Court that Auer deference has been followed by courts, challenging the agency’s arbitrary decisions, so liberally that the courts deferred to the agency interpretation “based on nothing more than a brief filed in court, a letter posted on a website, or an internal memorandum sent to agency staff.” USCIS has been adopting a new interpretation of the regulations by just issuing internal memos and under the earlier deference standard, the courts have been allowing and accepting such interpretations.

Under the new Auer deference standard set forth in Kisor, a federal court will need to assess if that is the authoritative/official position of the agency. Because of these recent developments, it will be interesting to see how the agency will respond to the question regarding what has been their official position in approving these H-1B petitions for decades and how it has now changed without any change in the statute or regulations. All the recent policy memos shifting the USCIS’s position are not aligned with its prior statements, memos, and opinions. One example of such a shift is the memo issued in February 2018 relating to third-party worksites placements. The policy has been analyzed in detail in an earlier blog post here. With the issuance of this memo, USCIS rescinded three earlier memos, which provided guidance relating to supporting documents for H-1B petitions and also the itinerary requirements for the petitions involving more than one location. The USCIS issued this memo to be read as a supplementary guidance to the Employer-Employee Memo of 2010.

As to itineraries in case of placement at a location more than one, 8 CFR 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B) reads as follows:

Service or training in more than one location. A petition which requires services to be performed or training to be received in more than one location must include an itinerary with the dates and locations of the services or training and must be filed with the Service office which has jurisdiction over I-129H petitions in the area where the petitioner is located. The address which the petitioner specifies as its location on the I-129H petition shall be where the petitioner is located for purposes of this paragraph.

While interpreting the above mentioned regulation, the Itinerary memo of 1995 was issued which clearly stated that “since the regulation does not require that the employer provide the Service with the exact dates and places of employment” and that the “[t]he itinerary does not have to be so specific as to list each and every day of the alien’s employment in the United States”.

The Service followed this interpretation of the regulations for more than two decades. Precipitously, in February 2018, the USCIS issued the above mentioned new policy memorandum superseding the 1995 memo. Interestingly, the new February 2018 memo also interprets the same regulations quoted above and notes that “[t]here is no exemption from this regulatory requirement. An itinerary with the dates and locations of the services to be provided must be included in all petitions that require services to be performed in more than one location, such as multiple third-party worksites. The itinerary should detail when and where the beneficiary will be performing services”. (Emphasis added)

There is clearly a stark difference in the approach of the two memos interpreting the same regulations. The 2018 memo has already been challenged in court. See IT Serve Alliance v USCIS. It will be noteworthy if the Service would rely on Auer deference on this issue. Apparently, in their supplemental response brief in this litigation, the USCIS raised an argument of argumentum ad antiquitatem which means “this is right because we’ve always done it this way”. Does it mean that the USCIS essentially invoked the Auer deference (even if not in clear terms) arguing that this is agency practice to interpret its own regulations even if it is in contrast to its previous interpretation? Under the new standard, the court will have to make an independent inquiry as to reasonableness of the interpretation especially in this case when under the garb of it being an interpretive rule, the agency has tried to promulgate a legislative rule, which amends and adopts a new position inconsistent with the existing regulations. Under the new Kisor standard, the court will be equipped to delve into these inquiries and make a determinative finding if the deference is warranted.

With the surge in H-1B denials, there is also a rise in federal litigation challenging USCIS’s arbitrary interpretation of the regulations. One such case is Flexera Global Inc. v. USCIS, in which the plaintiff has sued USCIS after receiving multiple short-term approvals. USCIS has been rigidly enforcing an itinerary requirement relying on the February 2018 memo to issue approvals ranging from only a few months or weeks to even a few days (as short as one (1) day), despite requesting a full three-year validity period as allowed under the regulations. USCIS filed a motion to dismiss in this case asking the court to rule if under the regulations USCIS has the authority to issue short-term H-1B approvals and whether it needs to explain itself when doing so. USCIS has relied on 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(9)(iii)(A)(1), which authorizes the agency to approve a petition for “up to three years”. The regulation reads as follows:

H-1B petition in a specialty occupation. An approved petition classified under section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act for an alien in a specialty occupation shall be valid for a period of up to three years but may not exceed the validity period of the labor condition application.

USCIS has argued that when reasonably interpreting “up to three years” in the regulations, it has the authority to issue approval less than three years based on the evidence submitted by the petitioner as to period of the specific work assignments.

The plaintiff in response to a motion to dismiss has argued that the plain language of the regulations requires the agency to approve the petition for full three years. It can only be less than three years when granting three years will exceed the validity of the labor condition application. In 1998, USCIS proposed a rule, Petitioning Requirements for H Nonimmigrant Classification, 63 Fed. Reg. 30419, in an attempt to codify the prohibition on speculative/non-productive status through notice and comments rulemaking. It abandoned the proposed rule when Congress essentially denied its regulatory approach by passing the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (“ACWIA”), Title IV, Pub. L. 105-277 (October 21, 1998) codified at INA 212(n)(2)(C)(vii)(III).

Plaintiff has also argued that the requirement of demonstrating a specific work assignment for the requested validity is contradictory to INA 212(n)(2)(C)(vii)(III), which fixed the benching problem by expressly requiring employers to pay the prevailing wage to workers whether or not they are in productive status. Congress unequivocally entrusted DOL with the authority enforce the non-productive status provision through enforcement actions against employers.

The response to motion to dismiss also highlights a practical problem these short approvals are creating for the families of the H1-B beneficiaries which definitely was not the intention of the Congress. So, requesting specific work assignment evidence for a specific duration defies the Congressional mandate acknowledging the non-productive periods and DOL’s authority to regulate it.

Hence, USCIS practically has requested the court to defer to its interpretation of the above referenced regulation. However, under Kisor now, the court will delve into three-prong test explained earlier in the post.

There are numerous examples where USCIS has either have issued policy memos contradictory to its earlier position or have attributed a new interpretation to the regulations, which is inconsistent with its long-standing practice. Another example is “employer-employee relationship” issue.

The 2010 Employer-Employee memo referred to 8 CFR 214.2(h)(4)(ii) noting that the regulations do not provide enough guidance on definition of employer-employee relationship. It is worth noting here that the regulations does provide a regulatory definition of an “Employer” at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(4)(ii). The memo also specifically states that USCIS interprets it to be “conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine”. Despite the clear definition in the regulations and the agency’s official position that the common law standard applies, the agency has been interpreting the regulations much more restrictively and has been issuing the denials based on the lack of evidence of employer employee relationship even when it meets the standard mentioned in the regulations and common law. If USCIS will raise the Auer deference for the restrictive interpretation of the regulatory definition of “employer”, the court will have to go into a deep analysis of the regulations first to see if the definition of “employer” is ambiguous. Given the fact that the regulations recognize the possibility of employment at more than one location, argument that it is ambiguous as to the third party placement would not fly.

Under the new framework applicable for Auer deference, “Agency consistency” will play an important role. It will be hard for USCIS to explain how it has been changing its long-standing position and interpretation of the regulation without any statutory basis.

The regulated entities such as employers of H-1B workers have been deeply impacted by the earlier approach as it takes away the transparency from the process and deprives them of regulatory stability to plan for their business activities. For example, an H-1B holder has been working with a company for the last 10 years as software developer, which USCIS has long considered a specialty occupation. Suddenly, without any change in the statue or regulations and in blatant contrast to its earlier interpretation of the regulations under which it has approved multiple petitions for this candidate establishing that position of software developer qualifies as a specialty occupation, denies the petition declaring it not a specialty occupation. If that decision is challenged before the court and USCIS raises the Auer deference, the court now will first look at the definition of the “Specialty Occupation” and the criteria laid down in the regulations. At first step itself, the USCIS will have a challenge explaining the denial because the USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual (“AFM”) 31.3 (g) provides:

[A]lthough the definition of specialty occupation is included in the statute itself and the regulations are specific regarding the criteria for determining what qualifies as a specialty occupation…

Keeping this in mind coupled with the earlier decisions approving the same position as the specialty occupation, the court will now assess that if the statue and the regulations are not “genuinely ambiguous” then it should be interpreted “as is”. Even if USCIS can pass muster at the first step and second step of reasonableness, it will be troublesome for USCIS to justify the third step of the analysis, where the a court will take into consideration if it is an authoritative or official position of the agency; (b) it reflects it substantive expertise; (c) if the agency’s interpretation of the rule reflects “its fair and considered judgment”. As discussed in a prior blog, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) combined with INA 214(i)(1) clearly provides a broader definition of specialty occupation. The definition and requirements for qualification as specialty occupation has been analyzed by the courts in multiple cases such as Tapis International v INS, 94 F. Supp. 2d 172 and Residential Finance Corp. v. USCIS, 839 F. Supp.2d. 985(S.D. Ohio 2012). Despite the fact that the four criteria’s are in alternative, USCIS has been interpreting and applying the regulations in an erroneous way. The regulations nowhere mention that a bachelor’s degree in a specific specialty is a “must”. Rather, the regulations specifically mention that it is “normally” required or is a “common” requirement. If the USCIS were to raise Auer deference as to their interpretation of regulatory language “normally” or “common” to mean, “must”, the court will not defer to the agency’s interpretation of their own language. In most likelihood, under the first step of the Kisor analysis, the court will be able to establish the regulations are not ambiguous. It is as clear as it can be. Under the second step, it will be stimulating to see how the Service will justify the reasonableness of inventing a new meaning of simple words that gives away the legislative intent with the plain dictionary meaning.

A great example of a federal court applying Kisor in an immigration case is the recent Fourth Circuit decision Romero v Barr. The court in Romero overturned Matter of Castro-Tum where the Attorney General had issued an opinion that the IJ’s and BIA do not have the authority under the regulations to close the cases administratively. The court first held the plain language of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) unambiguously confers upon IJs and the BIA the general authority to administratively close cases such that an Auer deference assessment is not warranted. Even if these regulations are ambiguous, the court citing Kisor noted that Auer deference cannot be granted when the new interpretation results in “unfair surprise” to regulated parties especially when agency’s current “construction “conflict[ing] with a prior” one.” The Romero court further identified that “an agency may—instead of issuing a new interpretation that conflicts with an older one—set forth an interpretation for the first time that is contrary to an established practice to which the agency has never objected.” Romero v Barr is a great example of how and to what extent Kisor has narrowed the Auer deference restoring the authority of the court to analyze in detail if deference is warranted to agency interpretation. Specifically towards the “Agency Consistency” the court noted, “numerous petitioners have relied on this long-established procedural mechanism to proceed through the immigration process. To suddenly change this interpretation of the regulation undermines the significant reliance interests such petitioners have developed”.

Another case where the court has cited Kisor standard is Sagarwala v L Francis Cissna,. The court seemed to have dived straight into the second step of reasonableness deciding that such interpretation is “typically entitled to judicial deference” citing Auer v Robins. It appears that the court deferred to agency interpretation because it was not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent” with the regulations. Eventually, the court cited Kisor and agreed that the agency decision is “fair and considered judgment” under Kisor standard. The court noted “both the statutory and regulatory definitions of “specialty occupation” state that the position at issue must require the “attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in [a] specific specialty.” It is important to note that the complete text in INA is attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent. We have previously analyzed here that how USCIS does not consider the interpretation of “or its equivalent” as interpreted by the courts. At core of this case was whether the education requirements of the position were too broad. Perhaps, the plaintiff could not justify the requirements, which led the court to decide that USCIS reading is a reasonable one. Even if the result would have been same, it appears that the court did not conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the issue as required by the Kisor standard.

Further, the court in Sagarwala just assumed that the agency has the “substantive expertise”. It would have been true under Auer deference; however, we believe that Kisor changes that notion. Now, if the court has to delve into specific inquiry about the ambiguity of the regulations and the reasonableness of the interpretation, we believe that it also will be under court’s purview to assess if the agency truly has the substantive expertise, not generally as the regulating agency but on the specific technical requirements of the position to determine if the position is “complex enough” under one of the specialty occupation criteria especially when the agency always resort to discretion on a case to case basis.

We believe that under the Kisor standard, it will be hard for USCIS to argue that it has the substantive expertise over an opinion of an expert – in most cases a professor who has decades of experience in teaching and consulting in the specific field. In most cases, the USCIS wrongly disregards the opinion of a well-established expert with expertise through decades of years of demonstrated relevant experience, research, and study in contravention of the AAO decision in Matter of Skirball Cultural Center, ID 3752, 25 I&N Dec. 799 (AAO 2012), where it held that uncontroverted testimony of an expert is reliable, relevant and probative as to the specific facts of the issue. In fact, it does so without providing a cogent reason to reach the conclusion that the expert’s review of the duties of the position was “limited”. Often times, USCIS while disregarding the Expert Opinion relies on that the fact because the Expert did not visit the location and has only relied on the materials provided by the employer, the opinion is not credible enough. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

It is interesting to note that under these federal rules, an expert may base his/her opinions on facts or data that he has been made aware of (like providing detailed job duties to the expert for H-1B petitions) or upon using reliable principles and methods (like an expert’s extensive knowledge and experience in the field). According to the USCIS that is not a good enough standard for an expert professor to opine on whether the duties and job responsibilities of the position would require having the knowledge that is generally imparted through a bachelor’s degree in a specific field. Under the Kisor standard, the court should be able to analyze whether the expert opinion based on the detailed information provided by the employer is credible and sufficient to rule that the Expert has the substantive expertise on the matter than the agency where the adjudicating officer might not have the technical background to assess whether the duties are complex enough to meet the statutory and regulatory requirements.

Further, how will it justify the “fair and considered judgment” prong in Kisor when the agency blatantly disregard all the evidence presented under all the four regulatory prongs at 8 CFR 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) that establish a specialty occupation even though only one of the four criteria need to be met?

Under the ‘Buy American Hire American’ Executive Order, USCIS has been issuing new policies, based upon their current interpretation of regulations. The common denominator in challenging all these policy memos is that the regulations have not changed. Another example of a policy shift despite no change in statue or regulations is the new RFE and NOID memo. 8 CFR 103.2(b)(8) provides discretion to the adjudicating officer to issue RFEs and NOIDs in appropriate circumstances, OR to issue a denial without first issuing an RFE or a NOID in some circumstances. It is significant to note that the regulations (8 CFR 103.3(a)(i)) specifically mention that the discretion is not unfettered and the officer shall explain in writing the specific reasons for the denial. The regulations mention that the applicant or petitioner has to demonstrate the eligibility of the requested immigration benefit and demonstrating eligibility means each benefit request must be properly completed and filed with all initial evidence required by applicable regulations and other USCIS instructions. It also clarifies that the Burden of Proof lies with the applicant/petitioner to prove qualification for the requested benefit.

In June 2013, after the OIG published report requesting clarification as to when an RFE has to be issued, USCIS issued a memo clarifying to issue RFE or NOID unless denial is warranted by the statute. Under the 2013 memo, the emphasis was- an RFE is not to be avoided; it is to be used when the facts and the law warrant- to ask for more information and as to standard of discretion, it clarified that if totality of the evidence submitted does not meet the applicable standard– the officer should issue an RFE unless he or she determines there is no possibility that additional evidence available to the individual might cure the deficiency. The effect of the policy memo was only statutory denials could be issued without RFE. In July 2018, USCIS issued a new policy memo governing these issues, which superseded all earlier memos. The major turnaround on the policy under this memo was to restore the full discretion of the adjudicating officer to deny the cases not only when warranted statutorily but also due to a lack of initial evidence. It will be rousing to see if challenged in court how would USCIS defy that they have been reading and applying the regulations in a certain way and then suddenly decide to interpret it in a more restrictive way.

It is clear that the USCIS has been trying to override the legislative power of creating the law through expansive and erroneous interpretations of its own regulations rather than the delegated authority of implementing the law passed by the Congress. Multiple cases have been filed on grounds that USCIS has abused its discretion and the authority under the Auer deference by issuing inconsistent guidance and raising the evidentiary standards. If the agency will rely on the Auer deference in future H-1B litigation, plaintiffs who challenge denials should definitely invoke Kisor, which hopefully will create an uphill battle for the agency to fight and justify the change in its interpretation of a regulation as not just reasonable but also official, consistent, fair and considered. Our blog has provided potential plaintiffs with an overview on how to invoke Kisor in limiting Auer deference when seeking review in federal court over arbitrary H-1B denials.

* Guest author Sonal Sharma is a Senior Attorney at Jethmalani & Nallaseth PLLC in New York. Her practice involves both temporary nonimmigrant visa and permanent employment cases. She represents and advises clients – medium to large multinational corporate entities – from a wide variety of industries on intricate and comprehensive immigration matters.

How the Founding Values of Two Great Nations – United States and India – Can Get Hollowed Out Through Tweaks in their Immigration Laws

December 14, 2019/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus Mehta

Until President Trump of the United States and Prime Minister Modi of India came to power, it was unimaginable that democratically elected leaders could cynically tweak immigration laws to undermine the founding values of their nations.

America has unquestionably been viewed as a nation of immigrants and a beacon of liberty for the world’s persecuted until Trump came on the scene. Trump cruelly reduced refugee admissions to a trickle and toughened asylum laws. He has separated children from parents fleeing violence in Central American countries and virtually eliminated their ability to legally claim asylum under US immigration law. Most recently, our colleagues have been able to witness firsthand that the tent courts under Trump’s Remain in Mexico policy, are totally and shockingly lacking in due process. Worse still, Trump fulfilled his campaign pledge by imposing a travel ban on countries with mostly Muslim populations in the name of national security. All of these actions, and many more architected by Trump’s openly xenophobic Senior Advisor Steven Miller, have undermined American ideals symbolized by the Statue of Liberty. Even the new public charge rule has been designed to keep out less wealthy immigrants from countries that Trump derisively called “s-hole countries”. Trump’s then acting USCIS chief Cuccinelli uglily distorted the famous Emma Lazarus poem associated with Lady Liberty by saying, “Give me your tired and your poor who can stand on their own two feet and who will not become a public charge.”

Modi’s Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party got a second five year term after winning a thumping parliamentary majority in May 2019. India is the world’s largest democracy and 900 million people were eligible to vote in the last general election. Voter turnout in that election was the highest at 67%. While campaigning for the BJP, Amit Shah, now India’s powerful Home Minister, likened unauthorized immigrants from Bangladesh as termites and vowed to throw them in the Bay of Bengal. Soon after resuming power, the BJP revoked the autonomy of Kashmir in August, the only Muslim majority state in India, and detained its political leaders. Continuing on the same Hindu nationalist trajectory, the BJP pushed through the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) that amends the Citizenship Act of 1955. The CAA provides for a pathway to citizenship for Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and Parsis who came to India from Pakistan, Bangladesh or Afghanistan on or before December 31, 2014, even illegally, but excludes Muslims. Most of the immigrants who are in India since that time are Muslims. It is also interesting to note that CAA excludes Jews and potentially atheists, although if there are any who are affected, they may be very few in comparison to the millions of Muslim immigrants who have been living in India for decades. The BJP justifies the CAA as a means for sheltering persecuted minorities in neighboring countries, although this makes little sense as Muslims have borne the brunt of persecution in those countries especially the Ahmadiyya and Shia from Pakistan and the Rohingya from Myanmar.

The CAA is far more pernicious when viewed in conjunction with India’s controversial National Register of Citizens, which is part of the Indian government’s efforts to identify unauthorized immigrants in the northeastern state of Assam who allegedly came from neighboring Bangladesh, even though they have lived in Assam for decades. When the NRC was published in August, about 2 million people were not able to establish that they were in India since 1971. Most of them were Muslims and some of them were Hindus. The CAB will protect Hindus who are not on the NRC by affording them citizenship while Muslims who cannot prove that they are citizens will ultimately be kept in massive detention camps and ultimately deported. Home Minister Amit Shah, who like Steve Miller in Trump’s administration, is the mastermind behind these cruel and divisive policies, plans to extend the NRC across the country that will catch many more million Muslims suspected of being in India illegally. One should note that many of the affected Muslims live in abject poverty and have hardly preserved documents to establish their entry into India by a cutoff date many decades earlier. Many have also been valiant survivors of cyclones that ravage those eastern parts of India that might have washed away their homes, meagre belongings and documents.

Although Muslims have been subjected to discrimination and violence under the BJP administration, and the excellent profile of Modi in the New Yorker reveals why, the CAA takes this discrimination to a new level as it completely contradicts India’s founding ideal as a plural and secular nation. As the Economist has aptly commented, “To accept religion as a basis for speedier citizenship is to cock a snook at India’s own founding fathers, who proudly contrasted their vision of an open, pluralist society against the closed, Islamic purity of next-door Pakistan.”

Although Trump’s Muslim ban was successfully blocked by lower federal courts, the US Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii upheld a watered down version of it in a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice John Roberts, in writing the majority opinion, found that Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality (INA) “exudes deference to the President” and thus empowers him to deny entry of noncitizens if he determines that allowing entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Although Trump made various utterances regarding his animus towards Muslims during his campaign and even after he became president, the majority found the third version of the Executive Order to be neutral on its face and that it did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the US Constitution. Several of Trump’s other immigration policies such as his blocking of asylum seekers and public charge rule are still being reviewed by the courts.

CAA’s legitimacy will also soon be tested in the Indian Supreme Court. Article 14 of India’s Constitution provides, “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” It remains to be seen whether India’s Supreme Court strikes down CAA as unconstitutional or whether it will affirm a law that is blatantly discriminatory against Muslims just as the US Supreme Court upheld Trump’s Muslim ban. It is also rather strange to use religion as a litmus test for citizenship. How does one prove one’s religion, especially when he or she may be not openly practicing it? The fact that Muslims can apply for Indian visas, OCI status or citizenship under other provisions of the Citizenship Act is beside the point. CAA’s blatantly discriminatory intent will subject millions of Muslims to statelessness, detention and deportation while those of other religions even if unauthorized will get a smooth ride to Indian citizenship. It is no surprise that CAA has resulted in massive protests across India and an unjustified harsh police response.

While leaders like Trump and Modi tweak immigration laws for political advantage, they not just undermine the founding values of their nations but also cause great havoc and distress to millions of people. People who vote for them may perceive certain advantages, such as economic or otherwise, but they must also realize that those perceived benefits are hollow if the soul of the nation is eviscerated through cynical manipulation of the immigration laws.

Isn’t Being Extraordinary More Than Enough? There’s No Need for USCIS to Ask for a Prospective Benefit to the US

December 4, 2019/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus Mehta

By Cyrus Mehta and Patrick Matutina

We have previously blogged regarding The Curse of Kazarian v. USCIS in Extraordinary Ability Adjudications Under the Employment-Based First Preference. Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010),as interpreted by the USCIS, has resulted in a two part test for Extraordinary Ability petitions (EB-1). In the first part of the test, the USCIS has to determine whether the individual has demonstrated “sustained national or international acclaim. However, even after meeting the first part of the test, the individual has to establish through a vague and undefined “final merits determination” that he or she is extraordinary.

Evidence to demonstrate “sustained national or international acclaim” – the first part of the test – could be a one-time achievement such as a major international award (for example, a Nobel Prize, Oscar or Grammy). If the applicant is not the recipient of such an award then documentation of any three of the following is sufficient:

Receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards.
Membership in an association in the field for which classification is sought, which requires outstanding achievement of its members, as judged by recognized national or international experts.
Published material about the person in professional or major trade publications or other major media.
Participation as a judge of the work of others.
Evidence of original scientific, scholastic, artistic, athletic or business-related contributions of major significance.
Authorship of scholarly articles in the field, in professional or major trade publications or other media.
Artistic exhibitions or showcases.
Performance in a leading or cultural role for organizations or establishments that have a distinguished reputation.
High salary or remuneration in relation to others in the field.
Commercial success in the performing arts.

See 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x). An applicant may also submit comparable evidence if the above standards do not readily apply.

Post-Kazarian decisions have generally affirmed the two-part test and final merits determination analysis. Albeit at times seeming to nonetheless conflate the two tests in practice. (See Rijal v. USCIS, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (W.D. Wash. 2011), aff’d Rijal v. USCIS, 683 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2012) (criticizing the USCIS’s conclusion that a prize did not meet the evidentiary criterion of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards of excellence” but nonetheless finding that the petitioner did not suffer prejudice from these errors as it made those errors with an eye toward the ultimate merits determination). Recently, however, a disturbing pattern has emerged that practitioners must vigorously push back against.

To reiterate, an individual whose achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation, may obtain permanent residence in the United States under the employment-based first preference (EB-1) by establishing extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business or athletics. See INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(i). However, in addition to satisfying the provisions of INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(i), the individual must also show that she seeks entry to continue work in the area of extraordinary ability, and that her entry will also substantially benefit prospectively the U.S. See INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(ii) & (iii).

As we have shown, voluminous case law and policy memorandum may assist us in interpreting the provisions of INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(i). Recent Requests for Evidence (“RFE”) received by this office, however, suggest that the newest brick in the current administration’s “invisible wall” may be to require petitioners to respond to INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(iii), which has heretofore been unmoored from any authoritative interpretation.

We are seeing RFEs requesting extensive documentation to establish how the beneficiary’s entry will substantially benefit prospectively the United States pursuant to INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(iii). Here is an example from a very recent RFE received in November 2019:

Documentation to establish that the beneficiary’s entry will substantially benefit prospectively the United States

It must be shown how the beneficiary’s entry will substantially benefit prospectively the United States. The petition does not indicate that the beneficiary’s entry will substantially benefit prospectively the United States. Please submit evidence that the beneficiary’s entry will substantially benefit prospectively the United States. Evidence that may be submitted to satisfy this requirement includes, but is not limited to:

Letters from current or prospective employers, or individuals who work in the beneficiary’s field;
Other evidence explaining how the beneficiary’s work will be advantageous and of use to the interests of the United States on a national level

When faced with such a request, how should a Petitioner respond? On first brush it may seem prudent to substantively respond to such a request. But responding in such a manner could lead one down a veritable “rabbit’s hole” with no exit given the lack of authoritative guidance on the matter. One “middle path” approach may be to substantively respond to a request for evidence of prospective benefit, albeit while navigating without a GPS, while simultaneously, and forcefully, arguing that such evidence is nonetheless not required as discussed further below.

A request to show “substantial benefit” at a national level would be more appropriate if the I-140 petition was filed requesting a “national interest waiver” of the Labor Certification Application requirement of EB-2 Petitions under INA §203(b)(2)(B)(i). Briefly, under the standard articulated in Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884 (AAO 2016), after eligibility for EB-2 classification has been established, USCIS may grant a national interest waiver if a Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:

The foreign national’s proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance.
The foreign national is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor.
On balance, it would be beneficial to the United States to waive the requirements of a job offer and thus of a labor certification.

Such a conflation between the EB-1 criteria and the National Interest Waiver is clearly inappropriate. INA §203(b)(2)(B)(i) explicitly requires that the job offer and labor certification be waived if the foreign national will serve the national interest of the United States. INA §203(b)(1)(A) requires the foreign national to demonstrate that he or she is a person of extraordinary ability. In fact, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service determined over two decades ago that the regulations do not require the submission of any such evidence prospective benefit in relation to EB-1 Petitions. See letter from E. Skerrett, Chief, Immigrant Branch, Adjudications, INS (Mar. 8, 1995), reprinted in 72 Interpreter Releases 445–47 (Mar. 27, 1995) (“prospective advantage” may generally be assumed except in rare instances where an extraordinary foreign national’s field of work might somehow be detrimental to U.S. interests). Crucially, the regulations do not specifically define prospective advantage, and it has subsequently been interpreted very broadly. See e.g. Matter of Price, 20 I&N Dec. 953 (Assoc. Comm. 1994) (golfer of beneficiary’s caliber will substantially benefit prospectively the United States given the popularity of the sport). See Special Considerations Relating to EB-1 Cases, Adjudicator’s Field Manual Ch. 22.2, USCIS (November 27, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-6330/0-0-0-6423.html. See also Buletini v. INS, 860 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Mich 1994) (“the assumption [is] that persons of extraordinary ability working in their field of expertise will benefit the United States”). Moreover the USCIS Policy Memorandum, which invented the two-part test from its interpretation of Kazarian, is silent regarding how to interpret INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(iii). Therefore, the substantial benefit criterion is ordinarily met through the other two criteria under INA §§203(b)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). There is also no independent regulation implementing INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(iii). Indeed, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(5), while acknowledging that the EB-1 does not require a job offer, requires evidence that the foreign national is coming to the United States to work in the area of expertise, this is to meet INA §203(b)(1)(A)(A)(ii), and if this is met, then the person has also implicitly been able to demonstrate that they will prospectively benefit the United States. The RFE requiring evidence of prospective benefit to the United States through letters from employers and others invents a regulation in violation of the notice and comment requirement under the Administrative Procedures Act.

It remains to be seen if this indeed a new theatre in the current administration’s war on immigrants. However, practitioners should remain vigilant in their watch and continue to push back on such attempts to apply standards such as this, which are fundamentally ultra vires. Practitioners must continue to attempt to have USICS accept that the petitioner meets 3 out of the 10 criteria, and then fight USCIS under step 2 final merits determination, and finally reiterate that the substantial benefit criterion is ordinarily met through the other two criteria under INA §§203(b)(A)(i) and (II). Under a burden shifting approach, the Petitioner should be deemed qualified, and the burden should be on the Service to reject the Petitioner pursuant to INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(iii) based on specific and substantiated reasons. To do otherwise could allow the curse of Kazarian to continue to grow unchecked and untethered from legal principle.

“Safe” Third Country Agreements and Judicial Review in the United States and Canada

November 27, 2019/0 Comments/in Blog/by David Isaacson

The subject of safe third country agreements, or as the U.S. government has begun calling them “Asylum Cooperation Agreements”, has been in the news lately in both the United States and Canada. The U.S. and Canada have had such an agreement with one another since 2002, implemented pursuant to section 208(a)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(A), and section 208.30(e)(6) of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in the U.S., and pursuant to section 101(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and sections 159.1-159.7 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR) in Canada.

The idea of a safe third country agreement (STCA) as it has traditionally existed, as between the U.S. and Canada, is that the two countries agree that many applicants for asylum or refugee status, who have first come to one of the two countries should apply in that country where they first arrived, rather than going to the other country to apply. If both countries have “generous systems of refugee protection,” as the preamble to the U.S.-Canada STCA puts it, then there may arguably be efficiency in relegating people to apply for asylum in the first of the two countries that they reach.

The U.S.-Canada STCA covers only people who make a claim at a land border port of entry or are being removed from one of the two countries through the territory of the other. It does not apply to citizens of either country or stateless persons last habitually residing in either country. It also has other exceptions for applicants who have certain family members with lawful status in the country where they wish to make a claim, or whose family members already have ongoing asylum/refugee claims in that country, or who are unaccompanied minors, or who either have a valid visa for the country where they wish to apply or did not need a visa for that country but did for the other. In addition, each country may exempt additional applicants whom it determines to process itself on the basis that it is in its public interest to do so. These exceptions are laid out at Articles 2, 4, and 6 of the agreement itself, and are also detailed at 8 C.F.R.§ 208.30(e)(6) and at IRPR sections 159.2 and 159.4-159.6.

As many refugee claimants have come to have less faith in the U.S. asylum system than the Canadian refugee system, and due to the restriction of the U.S.-Canada STCA to entrants at land ports of entry (or instances of removal through one country by the other), an increased number of refugee claimants have entered Canada at unauthorized crossing points outside a port of entry in order to make a claim, most notoriously at Roxham Road along the New York-Quebec border. (The idea is not to evade immigration officers, but simply to avoid the application of the STCA; news articles describe an oft-repeated formal warning to the applicants that entry at that specific place will result in arrest, which does not generally dissuade people since being arrested after entry into Canada, and making a refugee claim, is precisely their goal.) There has been discussion of modifying, suspending, or terminating the agreement, and one Conservative Member of Parliament suggested that the entire U.S.-Canada border be designated as a port of entry, although in practice that would have very peculiar consequences for the immigration system as a whole (since it would mean applicants for admission in general could show up at any point along the border to be processed). There has also been a legal challenge, discussed further below, to the notion that the U.S. can currently qualify as a safe third country consistent with Canadian constitutional law and international obligations. The Canadian government also recently, as part of a budget bill, added to IRPA a provision separate from the STCA but also evidently designed to discourage claimants from the United States, section 101(1)(c.1), which bars refugee claims by those who have previously claimed in the United States or another country with which Canada has an information-sharing agreement—a provision I have criticized in a prior blog post.

The U.S., meanwhile, has been entering and seeking to enter into “Asylum Cooperation Agreements” with various Central American countries, Guatemala being the first followed by Honduras and El Salvador. An interim final rule was published last week to implement such agreements, and removal from the United States under the Guatemala agreement is said to have begun just a few days ago.

The signing and implementation of these “Asylum Cooperation Agreements” has attracted a great deal of criticism, because describing Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador as safe third countries, or safe countries in any sense, would be highly dubious, to put it mildly. A piece in Foreign Policy described the Agreement with Guatemala as “a lie”, given Guatemala’s high level of crime – the U.S. State Department’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) having written of the country as “among the most dangerous countries in the world” with “an alarming high murder rate” – and lack of resources to process asylum cases – the country having apparently received only 257 asylum claims in 2018 and adjudicated only 17. Indeed, even the U.S. asylum officers implementing the plan to remove asylum-seekers to Guatemala under the agreement have reportedly been given “materials . . . detailing the dangers faced by those in the country, including gangs, violence, and killings with “high levels of impunity.”” Honduras, where the U.S. Government is said to intend to implement a similar agreement by January, is also problematic to describe as a “safe” country, with OSAC relaying a Department of State Travel Advisory “indicating travelers should reconsider travel to the country due to crime.” Similarly El Salvador, with which the U.S. has also signed an agreement despite its having one of the highest homicide rates in the world. And given the radically underdeveloped asylum systems in Guatemala and likely the other countries as well, the requirement under INA 208(a)(2)(A) that “the alien would have access to a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary protection” if removed seems unlike to be met. The point of threatening removal to these countries seems to be more to discourage asylum claims entirely.

Moreover, the screening process to determine whether asylum-seekers can be exempted from removal to Guatemala, based on a fear of persecution there, is already being implemented in a way that has been described as “a sham process, designed to generate removals at any cost.” Under the interim final rule, those subject to potential removal under an “Asylum Cooperation Agreement” will not be allowed to consult with attorneys or others during the screening process, or present evidence. As the interim final rule puts it at new 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(7), “In conducting this threshold screening interview, the asylum officer shall apply all relevant interview procedures outlined in paragraph (d) of this section, except that paragraphs (d)(2) and (4) of this section shall not apply to aliens described in this paragraph (e)(7)”—8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(4) being the provision that gives the right in ordinary credible-fear proceedings to “consult with a person or persons of the alien’s choosing prior to the interview or any review thereof, and . . . present other evidence, if available.” This is different than the U.S.-Canada STCA, which specifically provides in its Statement of Principles that “Provided no undue delay results and it does not unduly interfere with the process, each Party will provide an opportunity for the applicant to have a person of his or her own choosing present at appropriate points during proceedings related to the Agreement.” Unless vulnerable people with no legal representation, no opportunity to consult with an attorney or anyone else, and no opportunity to present evidence can prove to an asylum officer that they are more likely than not to be persecuted on a protected ground or tortured in Guatemala, they will be given the option of being returned to their home country of feared persecution or being removed to Guatemala. One might reasonably describe this as outrageous, and a question that naturally comes to mind is whether it would survive review by a court.

The question of judicial review of the propriety and application of safe third country agreements and “Asylum Cooperation Agreements” has indeed arisen in both the United States and Canada, with different initial indications regarding the result. In the U.S., the suggestion has been made by at least one commentator that the recent U.S. decision to send certain asylum applicants to Guatemala pursuant to an agreement may not be judicially reviewable (or at least “any lawsuits challenging the new rule will face significant obstacles”.) In Canada, on the other hand, a challenge to the Canada-United States STCA, asserting that given current conditions in the U.S. the STCA violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, was argued before the Federal Court of Canada earlier in November and is awaiting decision. A previous challenge to the Safe Third Country Agreement and the regulations implementing it had some success before being rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada in part on the basis that the organizations which had brought the challenge did not have standing to do so in the abstract; the current challenge includes a family of rejected refugee applicants seeking judicial review.

The basis for the potential lack of judicial review in the United States regarding safe third country agreements and their implementation is section 208(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3), which provides that “No court shall have jurisdiction to review a determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).” (Recall that safe third country agreements, as a bar to asylum, are authorized by section 208(a)(2)(A) of the INA, which is part of the referenced paragraph 2.) There are potential exceptions to this rule, such as the exception at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) for review of constitutional claims or questions of law on petition for review of a removal order, and the provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3) for review of written policies regarding expedited removal procedures within 60 days of their implementation, as in Grace v. Barr (formerly known as Grace v. Sessions and Grace v. Whitaker). It may well be that the deeply problematic agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, and the details of their implementation, will be subject to judicial review under one of these exceptions or otherwise. There is certainly at least some basis, however, for the existing conventional wisdom that judicial review will be quite difficult.

Under Canadian law, on the other hand, judicial review of administrative action cannot be precluded in this way. As I explained in my above-mentioned prior blog post, even aspects of the refugee determination as to which administrative decision-makers are given deference by the courts will be reviewed for reasonableness, because as explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, “The rule of law requires that the constitutional role of superior courts be preserved and, as indicated above, neither Parliament nor any legislature can completely remove the courts’ power to review the actions and decisions of administrative bodies. This power is constitutionally protected.”

Admittedly, even under Canadian law judicial review can be procedurally limited by legislation, although not eliminated. Under section 72(1) of IRPA, for example, seeking review in the Federal Court of Canada of any decision under IRPA generally requires “making an application for leave to the Court.” Moreover, under section 72(2)(d) of IRPA, the leave application is adjudicated by a single judge of the Federal Court “without delay and in a summary way and, unless a judge of the Court directs otherwise, without personal appearance”, and under section 72(2)(e), there is no appeal with regard to an application for leave. Even if leave is granted, the single level of judicial review at the Federal Court may be all there is: under section 74(d) of IRPA, an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada in an immigration matter is generally possible “only if, in rendering judgment, the judge certifies that a serious question of general importance is involved and states the question.” (Under certain very limited circumstances, an appeal can be taken to the Federal Court of Appeal even absent a certified question, but the threshold for that is quite high, as clarified recently in the citizenship context by Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Fisher-Tennant, where the Court of Appeal quashed a government appeal against what was at most an ordinary error by the Federal Court in finding Andrew James Fisher-Tennant to be a citizen of Canada.) So there is not an unlimited amount of judicial review, but there is necessarily some.

To the extent that the existing exceptions under the INA do not prove adequate to allow for full judicial review of decisions under safe third country agreements or “Asylum Cooperation Agreements”, Congress should give serious consideration to revising INA § 208(a)(3) to provide for judicial review of such decisions to exist in the United States, as it exists in Canada. It was one thing, although still deeply problematic from a rule-of-law perspective, when the statute in practice only attempted to guard from judicial review decisions to return asylum-seekers to a plausibly safe country such as Canada. If agreements are to be made with other, much more dangerous countries such as Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, however, then judicial review of these agreements and how they are applied in practice becomes significantly more urgent. Given the conditions in these countries, the question of whether people can be sent to such countries under safe-third-country agreements without any judicial review could literally be a life-or-death issue.

Filing an EB-1 as a Multinational Manager After the Approval of an EB-2 for a Backlogged Indian Beneficiary

November 18, 2019/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus Mehta

It requires skill and creativity to assist Indians caught in the employment based backlogs to find ways speed up the process or ameliorative solutions. The India employment-based second preference (EB-2) and employment-based third preference (EB-3) dates have barely moved for years, and the prospects for a beneficiary of an I-140 petition born in India for obtaining permanent residence anytime soon are bleak.

One strategy is to file an I-140 petition in the employment-based first preference (EB-1) for an individual who is stuck in the EB-2. Under the State Department November 2919 Visa Bulletin, the Final Action Date for EB-2 India is May 13, 2009. The Final Action Date for EB-1 India is January 1, 2015. Since it is possible to capture the earlier priority date of the EB-2, a successful filing under EB-1 can assist the person to escape the backlog and gain permanent residency more quickly.

Take for instance Sunil Kumar who already has an approved I-140 under EB-2 with a priority date of January 1, 2012. His employer, ACB Corp. sponsored him through the labor certification process as a Systems Analyst. ABC Corp. wishes to promote Sunil to the position of Vice President, Cloud Projects. Under the new position, Sunil will be required to manage all cloud based projects of ABC Corp’s Fortune 500 corporate clients. Sunil will oversee subordinate managers and professional employees, mainly software developers and systems analysts, in this new position of Vice President, Cloud Projects.

Before moving ahead, an important caveat: Sunil and his fact pattern is a made up for purposes of illustrating a legal strategy. Any resemblance to actual persons, entities or actual events is purely coincidental.

Prior to coming to the US, Sunil was employed with ABC Pvt. Ltd. in India, a wholly owned subsidiary of ABC Corp., in the position of Systems Analyst from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2010. He entered the US in H-1B status on January 1, 2011 to work for ABC Corp as a Systems Analyst.

In order to sponsor an employee under INA 203(b)(1)(C) as a multinational manager or executive for permanent residency (EB-1C), not only must the proposed position in the US be managerial or executive in nature, but the prior employment in the qualifying entity in India should have also been managerial or executive in nature for one year in the past three years, which as will be explained below, can be tolled in certain circumstances. While Sunil was employed as a Systems Analyst at the qualifying entity in India with no obvious managerial duties, towards the end of his employment in India, from October 1, 2009 till December 31, 2010, due to his talent and acumen, Sunil was assigned to manage important migration projects on behalf of ABC Pvt. Ltd. clients in India even though he was not formally employed as a manager. While the title of his position remained Systems Analyst, Sunil managed other professional employees with respect to various complex migration projects that he successfully completed on behalf of his employer.

While Sunil was in H-1B status and performed his duties in an exemplary manner, ABC Corp decided to sponsor Sunil for permanent residency for the position of Systems Analyst. A PERM labor certification was filed on Sunil’s behalf on January 1, 2012, and after it got approved, an I-140 petition under EB-2 was also filed and easily got approved. The PERM labor certification that supported the I-140 under EB-2 required a Bachelor of Computer Science degree plus five years of progressively responsible experience as a systems analyst. The five years of experience described in Column K of the PERM labor certification for Sunial included managing technology migration projects for large corporate clients. The 15 months of Sunil’s employment at ABC Pvt Ltd. in India from October 1, 2009 to December 31, 2010 could have been viewed as managerial, but an I-140 under EB-1C was not contemplated in 2012 since the position of Systems Analyst in the US was not managerial. Moreover, it was not clear then whether the duties in India during the last fifteen months of his employment would be considered managerial as he was not formally employed as a manager. It was also not conceivable then that the EB-2 would languish in the backlogs until 2019 and beyond. At the present time, however, ABC Corp. is very keen on promoting Sunil to the position of Vice President, Cloud Projects, which is clearly a managerial position.

Sunil potentially qualifies under EB-1C based on the proposed position of Vice President in the US and his prior managerial experience in India from October 1, 2009 to December 31, 2010. Although the qualifying experience at the foreign entity must be for one year in the past 3 years, the “one of three year” requirement may be met even if the person is in the United States for more than three years if s/he is working for the same employer, affiliate, or subsidiary in the United States and was employed for at least one of the last three by company abroad before entering in valid nonimmigrant status. 8 C.F.R. §204.5(j)(3)(i)(B). Sunil has been in valid H-1B status from January 1, 2011 till today for ABC Corp, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of ABC Pvt. Ltd in India. Although the six year limitation under H-1B has long since gone, he has been able to obtain 3 year extensions pursuant to § 104(c) of the American Competitiveness in the 21^st Century Act by virtue of his approved I-140 under the India EB-2, which has not yet become current. Thus, the experience that Sunil obtained from October 1, 2009 to December 31, 2010 would potentially be qualifying experience for classification as a multinational executive or manager under EB-1C. Although Sunil was admittedly a first level supervisor, INA § 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) states that “[a] managerial employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals.” Since Sunil managed professional employees, a case can be made that he was engaged in qualifying managerial role.

Sunil also has a daughter, Sujata, who is going to turn 21 on January 1, 2020. Pursuant to the current I-140 under EB-2, there is no hope that Sunil’s daughter will be able to protect her age under the Child Status Protection Act, codified at INA §203(h). If ABC Corp. files a new I-140 under EB-1C, however, even if Suneeta crosses 21 on January 1, 2020, once the EB-1C is approved and captures the EB-2 priority date of January 1, 2012 (and the priority date of January 1, 2012 for EB-1 India continues to remain current), any time between the filing of the I-140 petition and the approval of the I-140 petition can be subtracted from Sujata’s age pursuant to INA §203(h)(1)(A)&(B). As long as the I-140 was filed prior to her 21^st birthday, even if it gets approved after her 21^st birthday, that time can be subtracted from her age and artificially bring the age under 21. Sunil may also file an I-485 application for adjustment of status concurrent with the I-140 petition under EB-1C, and corresponding I-485 applications can be filed by his daughter, Sujata, and his spouse, Suneeta. The USCIS allows such an I-485 filing concurrently with an I-140 udder EB-1C if it is clearly explained that the EB-2 priority date will be captured upon the approval of the EB-1C. While Suneeta has work authorization under the H-4 EAD rule, 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(9)(iv), she is nervous that she will not be able to continue to have it as the Trump administration has declared its intention to rescind the rule. Suneeta will be able to obtain an EAD based on her I-485 pursuant to 8 CFR § 274a (12)(c)(9). Unlike the renewal of an H-4 EAD, an EAD obtained based through I-485 gets automatically renewed for 180 days provided the renewal is filed prior to the expiration of the initial EAD.

If the I-140 under EB-1 gets approved, the January 1, 2012 priority date of the EB-2 will transfer to the EB-1, and Sunil, Suneeta and Sujata will get permanent residency once their I-485 applications are approved.

This strategy assumes that like Sunil, a backlogged beneficiary under EB-2, had qualifying managerial experience with a related foreign entity prior to being employed in the US, and the experience indicated in the PERM labor certification is consistent with the qualifying experience that will be indicated in support of the I-140 under EB-1C. The USCIS also strictly scrutinizes the managerial role of the beneficiary at both the qualifying foreign entity and the proposed managerial role in the US. Many similar cases have been arbitrarily denied even where a strong case was made demonstrating the managerial role at both entities. Still, those whose facts are similar to Sunil can try to file a new I-140 under EB-1. Even if the beneficiary does not have prior qualifying managerial experience at the related foreign entity, if he or she has attained recognition in cloud related projects and can qualify as a person of extraordinary ability under INA 203(b)(1)(A) (EB-1A), an I-140 petition can be attempted under EB-1A. An EB-1A I-140 filed as a person of extraordinary ability is also very difficult to obtain, and the USCIS routinely denies such petitions. Yet another more safe approach is to transfer the employee to the foreign related entity in an executive or managerial capacity for one year, and then file an EB-1C after the completion of one year of qualifying employment. However, this strategy will not help if there is a child who is imminently aging out and uprooting a family for one year from the US is less than ideal.

Still, when one’s back is against the wall, and there is a child who is aging out, it is worth trying every legitimate measure permissible under the law. My good colleague Brent Renison has also suggested creative solutions for surviving spouses and children who will age out. If there were no country cap, Indians would not be so badly affected and Sunil with a priority date of January 1, 2012 under EB-2 would have by now had a green card, and also likely become a US citizen, and so would his wife and daughter. Until country caps are eliminated through the passage of S386, or S2603, although S386 has a significantly better chance of passing than S2603, Indians will continue to languish in the EB backlogs. A lucky few may be able to escape the backlogs by filing EB-1 petitions, but not everybody will be eligible to do so.

(This blog is for informational purposes and is not intended to constitute legal advice).

Court Shoots Down Embarrassing Leaps by USCIS to Justify an H-1B Denial

November 12, 2019/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cora-Ann Pestaina

Ever got that frustrating feeling that the USCIS adjudicator first decided that the H-1B petition needed to be denied and only then set about finding reasons, however shaky, to support that denial? Ever wondered how it is possible for the adjudicator to completely ignore the preponderance of the evidence standard in favor of the criminal standard of beyond all reasonable doubt? The case of Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Kathy A. Baran, case number 2:18-cv-09732 in the US District Court for the Central District of California evokes these exact types of feelings and questions.

As background, except where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought. See e.g. Matter of Martinez, 21 I&N Dec. 1035, 1036 (BIA 1997) (noting that the petitioner must prove eligibility by a preponderance of evidence in visa petition proceedings) . . .

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant’s claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. Matter of E-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, Matter of E-M- also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” Id. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring).

Matter of Chawathe, A74 254 994 (Admin. Appeals Ofc. / USCIS Adopted Decision, Jan. 11, 2006).

Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, the adjudicating USCIS officer is supposed to approve the petition as long as it is “more likely than not” that the petitioner’s claim is true. Cases like Innova demonstrate that this standard is surely not being applied, at least not across the board.

Innova sought to employ the foreign national beneficiary as a Solutions Architect to work in-house at their corporate headquarters developing their proprietary software and hardware. USCIS issued what has become a typical RFE requesting additional information to establish the specialty occupation nature of the position; the beneficiary’s qualifications; and that an employer-employee relationship existed. Innova’s RFE response included a cover letter explaining the type of the work in which the beneficiary would be engaged; a description of the beneficiary’s typical day by percentage; an organizational chart; a Proof of Concept for the project the beneficiary would be involved with; Innova’s tax returns; Innova’s lease for the area where the Beneficiary would work; and an overview of Innova. Still, USCIS denied the petition on the grounds that the employer-employee relationship had not been established and Innova had failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary would be working in-house and not placed with an end-client and failed to show sufficient in-house employment for the duration of the requested H-1B period.

Innova filed suit thereby allowing us to see that no argument is too weak for USCIS to rely upon.

Despite Innova’s clear statements in its initial petition and RFE response, USCIS argued that it was rendered incapable of determining whether the beneficiary would be working on Innova’s product or whether he would be working at a third party client site all because Innova’s website indicated that Innova’s main function is to provide information technology consulting services to other companies. But the court pointed out that this same website indicated that Innova provided “services” and “solutions” to its clients. Under the “solutions” portion of the website was information about software programs and applications created by Innova. The court stated that “because USCIS visited Innova’s website and relied on the website as evidence in making its findings, USCIS may not then ignore evidence on the website contradicting its position.”

Another reason for USCIS’ denial was that Innova failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that it created its own products in-house. To justify its reasoning, USCIS pointed out that the Proof of Concept PowerPoint that Innova submitted with its RFE response merely established that the product exists and not that Innova is the company producing it or that the beneficiary would work on it. USCIS dismissed information on the project because all information about it “was submitted by petitioner or petitioner’s counsel in counsel’s cover letter”, i.e. there was no published or printed information. USCIS even went as far as to claim that despite Innova’s submission of a copy of its lease for a 450ft space, it remained unknown whether this is sufficient space to produce the information technology project or whether the space is being used to develop and produce the claimed product. USCIS also claimed that Innova’s tax returns were not sufficient to establish that the company produced a product that it sold within those tax years.

Thank goodness for the existence of rational judges. The court held that it was illogical for USCIS to dismiss Innova’s PowerPoint in its entirety just because there was an absence of printed work published about the product. The product is nonexistent and Innova consistently stated that the beneficiary was needed to produce the product. Regarding USCIS’ purported lack of knowledge as to whether the corporate headquarters would be able accommodate the work on the project, the court pointed out that it was entirely clear that the beneficiary would only require a desk and a computer! And, as for the tax returns, the court reminded USCIS that these were only submitted to prove that the company had sufficient work available for the beneficiary and not to prove it sold goods. Further, the product on which the beneficiary would work was intended to be used in-house to provide solutions to Innova’s clients and there was no stated intention to sell it.

Overall, USCIS claimed that it had to deny the case due to “numerous inaccuracies and contradictions.” Thankfully, the court did not find these to be plausible. The court shot down USCIS’ claim that there was an inaccuracy in Innova’s statement that it had 177 employees because the organizational chart it submitted showed only 7 people. The court pointed out that Innova never claimed that the chart listed every single employee. It was actually submitted to show that the beneficiary would report to the Vice President of the company. USCIS also isolated one job duty that indicated the beneficiary would “clarify the ambiguities and issues with the business stakeholders and help the team in proper execution of the project” and used this to state that it appeared he may be working with clients. The court found that there was no evidence that he would not be doing this in-house as the company stated.

And, in its biggest leap, USCIS took Innova old job advertisements, submitted to prove that Innova typically required a Bachelor’s degree for the offered position, wherein Innova had stated a requirement for travel to client sites, and used these to support its argument that the beneficiary would be traveling to client sites. The court had to point out that a showing relevant to the specialty occupation argument did not demonstrate that the beneficiary would also be required to travel.

The jumps and leaps that USCIS made to deny this case truly indicate a complete disregard for the preponderance of the evidence standard. Rather than adhering to the rule of law, USCIS is blatantly more concerned with its agenda to maintain its steady attack on the H-1B visa category. With all the evidence submitted by Innova, it was unquestionably “more likely than not” that its claims were true. While the court didn’t go as far as to state this, it appears that USCIS applied the “beyond all reasonable doubt” standard, the highest standard of proof possible. Thankfully, they were not allowed to get away with it in this instance. Hopefully, more and more employers are finding the courage to fight back and illuminate for the rest of us, how far USCIS will sometimes go and to provide us with case law that can be cited to prevent future, similar casualties, especially for employers who simply cannot finance a federal law suit. Plucky Innova deserved to win this one even though it has lost previously in other H-1B matters. RFE responses should remind USCIS that it needs to consider the record as a whole; that USCIS cannot isolate specific statements to try to justify its claims; and that there must be a rational connection between any stated reasons for denial and the actual facts of the case. And, as if H-1B petitions haven’t gotten hard enough, it may behoove us to sit with each piece of evidence and try to imagine how it could possibly be misinterpreted or reimagined to justify a denial. Although, try as we might, some things are just unimaginable.

Trump Is Not King, Cannot Rewrite Public Charge Law Through Executive Fiat

November 4, 2019/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus Mehta

Can President Trump act like a king by rewriting US immigration law through the invocation of INA 212(f)? Although America shrugged itself from the yoke of King George III in 1776, Trump issued a Proclamation on October 4, 2019 in total disregard of a Congressional statute – defining who is likely to become a public charge – that would bar intending immigrants from the United States if they do not have health insurance lined up within 30 days of their admission. A federal court in Oregon in Doe v. Trump issued a Temporary Restraining Order on November 2, 2019, one day before the Proclamation was to take effect. Although the TRO is only valid for 28 days, it is still a significant victory in the opening salvo of yet another challenge to thwart Trump’s ability to rewrite large swaths of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

While INA § 212(f) does give extraordinary power to a president, Trump has tried to use his powers beyond what could have been imagined when Congress enacted this provision. INA §212(f) states:

Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate

Trump soon after becoming president invoked INA § 212(f) through presidential proclamations to impose his travel ban against nationals of mainly Muslim countries. This was done to fulfill a campaign promise to impose a ban on Muslims, which is also why it is known as a Muslim ban. He decided without foundation that the entry of Iranian nationals (one of the countries subject to the ban) would be detrimental to the interests of the United States even though they came to marry a US citizen or visit relatives. The Supreme Court, disappointingly, upheld the third version of the ban in Trump v. Hawaii in June 2018 stating that INA § 212(f) “exudes deference to the President” and thus empowers him to deny entry of noncitizens if he determines that allowing entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” One should still give credit to prior lower federal court decisions that blocked the first and second versions of the travel ban, on the grounds that Trump exceeded INA 212(f), which were far worse than the watered down third version that was finally upheld.

Trump got more emboldened. On November 9, 2018, he issued another proclamation invoking INA § 212(f), which banned people who cross the Southern border outside a designated port of entry from applying for asylum in the United States. The Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security followed by jointly issuing a rule implementing the proclamation. The key issue is whether INA § 212(f) allowed a president like Trump with authoritarian impulses to override entire visa categories or change the US asylum system? INA § 208(a)(1) categorically allows any alien who is physically present in the United States to apply for asylum regardless of his or her manner of arrival in the United States “whether or not at a designated port of arrival.” Trump attempted to change that by virtue of the authority given to him in INA § 212(f) by not allowing people who cross outside a port of entry from applying for asylum. Never mind that the administration had virtually closed the designated ports of entry for asylum seekers, which forced them to cross the border through irregular methods. In East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742 (2018), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Trump administration had unlawfully done what the “Executive cannot do directly; amend the INA”. Indeed, even in Trump v. Hawaii, the administration successfully argued that INA § 212(f) only supplanted other provisions that allowed the administration to bar aliens from entering the United States, but did not expressly override statutory provisions. Thus, INA § 212(f) could not be used as a justification to override INA § 208. Although the Supreme Court has temporarily blocked East Bay Sanctuary Covenant from taking effect until the government’s appeal in the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court is decided, Supreme Court has not passed any judgment on the merits of the case.

On October 3, 2019, Trump yet again invoked INA §212 (f) by issuing a Proclamation to ban intending immigrants from entering the United States if they did not have health insurance within 30 days of their arrival in the United States. Under the Proclamation, an intending immigrant who has satisfied all statutory requirements set out in the INA will nevertheless be permanently barred from entering the United States if that person cannot show, to the satisfaction of a consular officer, that he or she either “will be covered by approved health insurance” within 30 days of entering the United States, or “possesses the financial resources to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical costs.” Except for certain special Immigrant Visa applicants specifically from Iraq and Afghanistan, and unaccompanied biological and adopted children, the Proclamation will be applied to all intending immigrants. The Proclamation, which was to take effect on November 3, 2019, was expected to affect nearly two-thirds of all legal immigrants, with a disproportionate impact on immigrants from Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

The Proclamation provides eight specific types of “approved health insurance” for an intending immigrant: (1) an employer-sponsored plan; (2) an “unsubsidized health plan offered in the individual market within a State;” (3) a short-term limited duration insurance (“STLDI”) plan “effective for a minimum of 364 days;” (4) a catastrophic plan; (5) a family member’s plan; (6) TRICARE and similar plans made available to the U.S. military; (7) a visitor health insurance plan “that provides adequate coverage for medical care for a minimum of 364 days;” and (8) Medicare. A prospective immigrant may also obtain a “health plan that provides adequate coverage for medical care as determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services or his designee,” but the Proclamation provides no guidance as to how “adequate coverage” is defined.

The Proclamation excludes from the scope of “approved health insurance” any “subsidized” healthcare offered in the individual market within a State under the Affordable Care Act, as well as Medicaid for individuals over 18 years of age, even though some states have chosen to make Medicaid available to certain adults over 18 years of age, including certain new and recently arrived immigrants. The Proclamation relies on a single dispositive factor—the health care insurance status of an individual—to determine whether the individual will “financially burden” the United States. It is designed to exclude a large number of otherwise qualified immigrants because in reality only an STDI plan and a visitor health insurance plan would be available to one who has yet to enter the United States. Even if such plans were available, they would exclude people with preexisting conditions and would not have the essential health benefits as required under the ACA to which a new immigrant could access, but which would not qualify under the Proclamation.

Based on the likelihood of success on the merits standard that applicable for the grant of a TRO, Judge Michael Simon in Doe v. Trump found that the Proclamation’s reliance on the health care insurance status of an individual as the sole factor for determining inadmissibility as a public charge conflicted with INA § 212(a)(4) in at least five ways.

First, Congress in INA §212(a)(4)(A) has spoken directly to the circumstances in which an individual may be deemed to become a “financial burden” to the United States and has rejected the Proclamation’s core premise of lack of health insurance being the sole factor. This provision states that “[a]ny alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible.” When determining whether an individual may become a public charge, the statute enumerates the factors that are to be considered “at a minimum” to include the applicant’s age; health; family status; assets, resources, and financial status; and education and skills. The statute outlines the permissible factors in the public charge determination and nowhere mentions an individual’s health care insurance status as one of the permissible factors, according to Judge Simon. Given the statute’s enumeration of age and health, the statute’s omission of “health care insurance status” is important.

Second the statute precludes any single factor from being a dispositive factor, which requires a totality of the circumstances test to be applied. The totality of the circumstances test has long been a feature of the public charge ground even before Congress statutorily mandated it in 1996. The court in Doe v. Trump cited Matter of Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137 (BIA 1974) in support of the long use of the totality of circumstances test. The Proclamation, on the other hand, conflicts with the statutory text by deeming an individual to be a financial burden based solely on her health care insurance status and eschewing all the other statutory factors including, perhaps most incongruously, the health of the individual herself.

Third, the Proclamation’s dispositive reliance on health care insurance status contravenes decades of agency interpretation.

Fourth, the Proclamation’s reliance on an individual’s accessing short-term health care benefits as a reason to find the person a “financial burden” has been expressly rejected. Citing City & Cty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2019) (the public charge statute has had a “longstanding allowance for short-term aid”).

Fifth, the Proclamation revives a test for financial burden—the receipt of non-cash benefits—that Congress has rejected. In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 531, 110 Stat. 3009, 3674-75 (1996), which amended the INA by codifying five factors relevant to a public charge determination. The Senate rejected the effort to include previously unconsidered, non-cash public benefits in the public charge test and to create a bright-line framework of considering whether the immigrant has received public benefits for an aggregate of twelve months as “too quick to label people as public charges for utilizing the same public assistance that many Americans need to get on their feet.” S. Rep. No. 104-249, at *63-64 (1996) (Senator Leahy’s remarks). Accordingly, in its final bill, Congress did not include the receipt of Medicaid, Security Income, and other means-tested public benefits as determinative of a public charge.

Based on these five reasons, the court in Doe v. Trump issued the TRO on the ground that plaintiffs were able to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The court specifically relied on East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, supra, which specifically held that a president cannot rely on INA 212(f) to amend the INA. The court also held that notwithstanding this being a presidential proclamation, it was “not in accordance with the law” under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Further, the court also noted that the Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of showing Defendants’ implementation of the Proclamation likely constitutes final agency action, thus akin to a final substantive rule, that is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” While the government has yet to submit arguments, and another hearing is scheduled shortly, it is remarkable that once again a court has struck down Trump’s use of INA §212(f) to rewrite the immigration law. In the instant case, Trump has undermined provisions that Congress has specifically enacted to determine who is likely to become a public charge. If courts do not check the president’s use of INA §212(f) to issue policies that reflect his racist views, there will be no limit with what Trump can do with our immigration laws without having to go through Congress to change them, or even issuing regulations under the Administrative Procedures Act.

There are other arguments that can be advanced to show how utterly incompatible the Proclamation is to specific provisions of the INA. The Proclamation would also bar immigrants based on approved self-petitions under the Violence Against Women Act. Congress specifically indicated that VAWA self-petitioners will be excepted from the public charge requirements in INA 212(a)(4)(A)-(C). How can the Proclamation override these provisions in the INA that created an exception for VAWA petitioners and require them to have health insurance?

In addition, the Proclamation is also a gross violation of the APA as the Proclamation is ultra vires of the INA. This argument can be further bolstered if the court considers Justice Robert’s invocation of Justice Friendly in the census case, Department of Commerce v. New York, favoring judicial review of executive actions:

Our review is deferential, but we are “not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.” United States v. Stanchich, 550 F. 2d 1294, 1300 (CA2 1977) (Friendly, J.). The reasoned explanation requirement of administrative law, after all, is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public. Accepting contrived reasons would defeat the purpose of the enterprise. If judicial review is to be more than an empty ritual, it must demand something better than the explanation offered for the action taken in this case.

Furthermore, a presidential executive order cannot supersede a law previously passed by Congress. A case in point is Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (1996) which held that a 1995 executive order of President Clinton violated a provision of the National Labor Relations Act. President Clinton’s EO No. 12, 954 declared federal agencies shall not contract with employers that permanently replace lawfully striking employees. The lower district court held that the president’s interpretation of a statute was entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The DC Court of Appeals, however, overruled the district court, without explicitly stating whether the president’s interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference or not.

It is also no secret that the Proclamation is designed to exclude immigrants from poorer countries from Latin America, Asia and Africa, which Trump has derided as “shithole countries.” The President’s derisive language towards Muslims was successfully used against him in the Fourth Circuit decision in IRAP v. Trump, to demonstrate that the Muslim ban violated the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution. It has also been used against him in litigation opposing the termination of Temporary Protected Status. Although the Supreme Court did not consider violation of the Establishment Clause argument, it does not mean that plaintiffs cannot pursue constitutional arguments in Doe v. Trump. Here, the Proclamation has violated the Equal Protection Clause as it discriminates against immigrants from poorer countries who will not be able to afford the health insurance or will be forced to buy substandard insurance plans. The healthcare exchanges under the Affordable Care Act clearly allows a new immigrant to buy into a subsidized healthcare plan, which they cannot decline under a particular income level. This is inconsistent with the statutory and regulatory structure that directs a lawful permanent resident to do so under the ACA.

The American Immigration Lawyers Association along with a coalition of civil rights groups under Latino Network inspired the lawsuit, which makes me feel proud to be a member of AILA and especially AILA’s Administrative Litigation Task Force. We have a long road ahead as the government will respond with arguments in favor of presidential power, but now is the time to make the most compelling arguments to stop a president like Trump from invoking INA § 212(f) to rewrite immigration law in a way that is both inconsistent with the INA and with the foundational principle of America being a nation of immigrants.

Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Constitutionality of Smuggling Statute That Could Impact Immigration Lawyers

October 21, 2019/0 Comments/in Blog/by Cyrus Mehta

The Supreme Court has agreed to review the constitutionality of a smuggling statute under the Immigration and Nationality Act. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, No. 19-67. The statutory provision in question, INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv), permits a felony prosecution of anyone who “encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States” if the encourager knew or recklessly disregarded “the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of the law.”

INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv), which involves encourage a non-citizen to reside in the United States in violation of law, is a companion to other related smuggling provisions such as “brings to” or “smuggling” (INA §274(a)(1)(A)(i)), “transportation” (INA §274(a)(1)(A)(ii)), and “harboring” (§274(a)(1)(A)(iii)). While these three provisions relating to smuggling, transportation and harboring are discrete, the “encouraging” provision is far broader and can potentially apply to a person who encourages an undocumented person who is already residing in the United States to do so in violation of the law. This provision could thus also potentially reach ethical lawyers who advise and represent undocumented clients.

The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Evelyn Sineneng-Smith ruled last year that INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) was so broad and vague that it could criminalize speech protected under the First Amendment. The following examples were provided in the Ninth Circuit’s decision that could potentially constitute criminal conduct under this provision:

A loving grandmother who urges her grandson to overstay his visa by telling him “I encourage you to stay”
A speech addressed to a gathered crowd or directed to undocumented individuals on social media in which the speaker says something such as “I encourage all you folks out there without legal status to stay in the US! We are in the process of trying to change the immigration laws, and the more we can show the potential hardship on people who have been in the country a long time, the better we can convince American citizens to fight for us and grant us a path to legalization”
An attorney tells her client that she should remain in the country while contesting removal – because, for example, non-citizens within the United States have greater due process rights than those outside the United States, and because as a practical matter, the government may not physically remove her until removal proceedings have been completed.

The government, on the other hand, argued that INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) should be read narrowly to target unscrupulous lawyers and unauthorized practitioners who dupe migrants into staying in the United States in violation of the law. Despite the broadness of INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv), the government asserted that it was not its intention to prosecute people in the above examples who were exercising free speech. Indeed, United States v. Evelyn Sineneng-Smith involved an unauthorized practitioner who operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. Sineneng-Smith represented mostly natives of the Philippines who were unlawfully employed in the home health care industry and who sought to adjust their status to permanent residence through the filing of a labor certification by an employer. These clients were not eligible to apply for adjustment of status in the United States under INA § 245(i) which expired on April 30, 2001 and they also did not appear to be grandfathered under this provision. Although Sineneng-Smith knew that her clients were not eligible under 245(i), she continued to sign retainer agreements with them and tell them that they could apply for green cards in the United States. At least two of the clients testified that they would have left the country if they were advised that they were not eligible to apply for permanent residence.

Sinseneng-Smith was convicted by a jury on two counts of encouraging and inducing an alien to remain in the United States for the purposes of financial gain, in violation of INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) and INA §274(a)(1)(B)(i). She also got convicted on two counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341. The Ninth Circuit reversed her convictions under INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) and INA §274(a)(1)(B)(i) on the ground that “encourage” and “induce” under their plain meaning restrict vast swaths of protected expression in violation of the First Amendment despite the government countering that the statute only prohibits conduct and a narrow band of unprotected free speech. Because the provision was so overbroad, the Ninth Circuit refused to construe it narrowly as the Third Circuit in DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties had done by holding that encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in the United States did not mean just general advice but some more substantial assurance that would make someone lacking lawful status more likely to enter or remain in the United States.

The Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari. According to the Crimigration blog, the “Supreme Court’s decision to hear this case is … fascinating” as there was not really a circuit split. Typically, the Court agrees to hear a case when there is a sharp conflict in the lower courts regarding the proper interpretation of a statute. Here there is hardly a split between the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sinseneng-Smith and the Third Circuit in DelRio-Mocci as the latter does not involve First Amendment. Instead, the Third Circuit’s holding was based on a private lawsuit claiming that an apartment property management company violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act by encouraging undocumented people to reside in the United States unlawfully in their property as tenants. Sinseneng-Smith claimed in opposition to the government’s certiorari petition that the government asserting that the circuits are in conflict is nothing more than an “attempt to conjure a limited circuit split.” It will also be interesting to see how Justice Gorsuch rules in this case as he is averse to laws that are void for void for vagueness as he did in demolishing “crimes of violence” in Sessions v. Dimaya. Although the Ninth Circuit did not have to deal with the void for vagueness challenge as it found the statutory provision unconstitutional under First Amendment overbreadth analysis, both sorts of challenges might be of interest to Justice Gorsuch that might potentially align him with the four liberal justices.

Whatever may have been the motivations of the Supreme Court to take up the case, how the Supreme Court will rule carries important implications especially for immigration lawyers. If the Supreme Court reverses the Ninth Circuit and upholds the constitutionality of the provision, would an immigration attorney advising unauthorized individuals to remain in the United States to seek adjustment of status at a later point in time, whenever they become eligible, be within the scope of the prohibition against encouragement or inducement under INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv)? Granted that the facts in Sineneng-Smith are bad as she advised clients as an unauthorized practitioner, but even if Sineneng-Smith was a lawyer, she would have still been convicted under the provision. Even if this lawyer had provided more appropriate advice when filing the labor certification such that the clients would have to return to their home country for consular processing, assuming an I-601A would be approved based on extreme hardship to a qualifying relative, the lawyer could have still been potentially implicated by advising the unauthorized person to remain in the US during the processing of the labor certification, I-140 petition and the I-601A waiver.

It is indeed salutary that the government strenuously argued in United States v. Sineneng-Smith that it would not prosecute cases cited in the above three examples or with respect to lawyers giving legitimate advice to clients. But there is no guarantee that if the statute remains intact an overzealous prosecutor cannot try to prosecute attorneys providing legitimate advice to their clients in other examples, as I have discussed with Alan Goldfarb in AILA’s practice advisory, Executive Disorder: Ethical Challenges for Immigration Lawyers Under the Trump Administration. A lawyer may advise a client whose citizen child is turning 21 in two years to remain so that she can adjust status in the United States. Even if the client may not have a citizen child who is turning 21, there is a possibility that the client may marry a US citizen some day and likewise be eligible for adjustment of status. Alternatively, if this client entered without inspection and is not eligible for adjustment of status, he may be eligible to file an advance I-601A waiver application of the 3 or 10 year bar based on a qualifying relationship with the prospective citizen spouse, and return to the home country for consular processing upon the approval of the I-601A application. A lawyer who may competently advise the client to remain in the United States during the pendency of the I-601A application could get snared for encouraging the unauthorized client to remain in the United States in violation of the law. In yet another example, lawyers represent clients who have outstanding orders of removal and have not departed the United States. Failure to depart within 90 days after a removal order pursuant to INA §237(a) under INA §243 renders such conduct a criminal felony. However, even here, INA §243(a)(2) provides for an exception: “It is not in violation of paragraph (1) to take any proper steps for the purpose of securing cancellation of or exemption from such order of removal or for the purpose of securing the alien’s release from incarceration or custody.” The competent lawyer will advise the client with the removal order to remain in the United States while every effort is made to reopen the removal order. A person with a final order of removal may attempt to reopen a removal order after several years if the government consents to reopening and there is available relief against deportation. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(iii); 8 C.F.R. §1003.23(b)(4)(iv). Yet, under INA §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) an ethical lawyer, who exercises great competence and diligence in representing a vulnerable client with a removal order, could get snared for encouraging the client to remain in the United States in violation of the law even if there is a game plan down the road to render the client’s stay lawful.

The most prudent approach is for a lawyer to refrain from expressly advising or encouraging a client to remain in the U.S. in violation of the law; and instead, present both the adverse consequences and potential benefits to clients if they to remain in the United States in violation of the law. Such an approach would also be prudent if the Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) even if the government has asserted in its pleadings that it will enforce the law in a limited manner. Regardless of whether §274(a)(1)(A)(iv) is upheld or not, a lawyer’s conduct should be guided by rules of professional responsibility. Significantly, ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) states that “[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.” Please note that this is only a Model Rule, and readers should check the analog to Rule 1.2(d) within the rules of professional responsibility within their own state.

In the immigration law context, a disciplinary authority would be hard pressed to conclude that a lawyer who advises an unauthorized client to remain in the United States due to the likelihood of benefiting at some point in the future would be engaging in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. Still, there is still a possibility of criminal prosecution under the broad ambit of §274(a)(1)(A)(iv), and a lawyer who practices within the confines of Model Rule 1.2(d) – such as presenting the legal consequences of remaining in the United States or not rather than explicitly advising the client to remain – should be more insulated than a lawyer who does not.