Cyrus Mehta

Top Ten Most Viewed Posts on the Insightful Immigration Blog in 2020

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Thank you for reading and supporting The Insightful Immigration Blog.  Listed below are the top 10 most viewed blogs that were published in 2020.  While these are the 10 most viewed blogs, each blog is a carefully crafted gem, and we invite you to read all of them. Blogs from previous years continued to be widely read in 2020.

2021 ushers in a new dawn with the end of the Trump administration’s hostile policies towards immigrants. We covered much of President Trump’s policies in our blogs, most notably the ban on immigrants and nonimmigrants, and also commented on many of the successful court challenges thwarting or delaying their implementation. Indeed, one of the bright spots was that the courts in 2020 did not allow the Trump administration to get its way, whether it was on rescinding DACA or gutting the H-1B visa program through regulations that provided no advance notice.

In addition to Trump’s cruel immigration policies, Covid-19 also struck in 2020 and disrupted the world. Trump weaponized Covid-19 as a pretext to continue putting road blocks on immigration and asylum. The pandemic also adversely impacted the status of foreign national workers who lost their jobs or had to work under modified terms as well as the ability of green card holders to maintain permanent residence in the US. Our blogs addressed novel issues arising from Covid-19 regarding protecting the status of nonimmigrant workers, ethical issues for attorneys, and how green card holders could still assert they had not abandoned permanent residence even though they were forced to remain outside the US due to Covid-19.  We also wrote on how remote work impacted visa status, as well as how many immigration attorneys were still forced to appear in court, attend interviews for clients, and process and file paper based applications in their offices notwithstanding the risks posed by Covid-19.

The incoming Biden administration ushers in a new dawn on immigration in 2021. President Biden, in sharp contrast to Trump, has loftily proposed big and generous ideas on immigration and we hope that he will live up to these promises.  Our blogs have proposed ideas on how the Biden administration can improve our immigration system through executive actions, which, in addition to rescinding Trump’s actions, can also improve the immigration system and provide relief to many.

A new dawn for immigration in 2021

A new dawn for immigration in 2021 (Photo by Cyrus Mehta)

Ultimately, true and meaningful reform can only come through Congress. If Congress remains divided when Biden becomes president it will be much harder to push through badly needed reform such as expanding the employment and family based preferences so that would-be immigrants with approved petitions need not be waiting in decades long backlogs. While advancing filing dates in the visa bulletin, like what was done in October 2020, was salutary and allowed tens of thousands of skilled workers to file adjustment of status applications, which we blogged about, that was no substitute for Congressional action that can end discriminatory country quotas and infuse more visas into the system.

Finally, we also look forward to reform in the asylum system, the immigration courts, and due process for noncitizens, which the Trump administration disgracefully curtailed to such an extent that Lady Liberty seemed out of place and at odds with the long cherished idea that America is a nation of immigrants and a beacon for the world’s oppressed.

We look forward to blogging in 2021, albeit on different themes, and wish all our readers a safe and happy New Year. Below are the Top 10 viewed blogs of 2020:

  1. Downgrading from EB-2 to EB-3 under the October 2020 Visa Bulletin
  2. FAQ for Green Card Holders During the Covid-19 Period
  3. Frequently Asked Questions on Filing a Downgrade EB-3 Petition under the October 2020 Visa Bulletin
  4. FAQ Relating to Skilled Workers in the Green Card Backlogs During COVID-19
  5. Proposal for the Biden Administration Using the Dual Date Visa Bulletin to Allow the Maximum Number of Adjustment of Status Filings
  6. FAQ on Changes in Salary and Other Working Conditions for Nonimmigrant Workers in L-1, O, TN, E and F-1 Status Due to Covid-19
  7. Proposal for the Biden Administration to Reduce Backlogs: Count the Family Together so that they may Stay Together
  8. Killing the H-1B Visa Also Kills the US Economy
  9. What if the Job Has Changed Since the Labor Certification Was Approved Many Years Ago
  10. LCA Posting Requirements at Home During Covid-19 Pandemic: Do I Post on the Refrigerator or Bathroom Mirror

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Innova Solutions v. Baran: Computer Programmer is a Specialty Occupation Under the H-1B Visa

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By Cyrus D. Mehta & Kaitlyn Box*

On December 16, 2020, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran,  which involved a technology company, Innova, that wanted to hire an Indian employee in the specialty occupation of Computer Programmer, and filed an H-1B petition on his behalf. Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran, No. 19-16849, *4.  USCIS denied the petition stating that Innova failed to show that the position of Computer Programmer is a specialty occupation. Id. at 5-6. USCIS relied heavily on the Department of Labor’s Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH), which states that “[m]ost computer programmers have a bachelor’s degree”, thereby implying that some individuals employed as computer programmers do not have bachelor’s degrees. Id.

In a prior blog, we have discussed the outcome of the Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran case at the District Court level. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California heard the case in 2018, and held that the position of Programming Analyst, categorized under the OOH’s Computer Programmer classification, did not qualify as a specialty occupation because the OOH’s description for Computer Programmer stated only that “most” Computer Programmers have a bachelor’s degree but “some employers hire workers with an associate’s degree”. Innova Sols., Inc. v. Baran, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134790, *17.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to USCIS, and remanded the case, holding the USCIS’ denial of the visa was arbitrary and capricious. The court first examined the OOH language, holding that USCIS’s denial of the petition on this basis was arbitrary and capricious. Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran, No. 19-16849, *8. The court compared the OOH statements that “[m]ost computer programmers have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related subject” and a bachelor’s degree is the “[t]ypical level of education that most workers need to enter” with the computer programmer occupation to the regulatory language at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), which requires that a bachelor’s degree “normally” the minimum education required for the occupation. Id. The court found there to be no appreciable difference between these two descriptions, stating that: “[t]here is no daylight between typically needed, per the OOH, and normally required, per the regulatory criteria”. Id. Given the agreement between the two requirements, the court found that USCIS’s denial of the visa based on the OOH criteria was arbitrary and capricious, lambasting USCIS’s reasoning as “beyond saving” and stating that “there is no “rational connection” between the only source USCIS cited, which indicated most computer programmers have a bachelor’s degree and that a bachelor’s degree is typically needed, and USCIS’s decision that a bachelor’s degree is not normally required”. Id. at *9.

The court was similarly unpersuaded by USCIS’s argument that OOH language stating that “some employers hire workers with an associate’s degree” indicates that a bachelor’s degree is not normally required for the position. Id. at 10. In fact, the court reasoned, this language is entirely consistent with the regulatory criteria, which requires only that a bachelor’s degree “normally”, and not “always”, be required for entry into an occupation. Id. The court stated that “[w]hile agencies are entitled to deference in interpreting their own ambiguous regulations, this regulation is not ambiguous and deference to such an implausible interpretation is unwarranted, relying on Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414 (2019), which limited Auer deference to “genuinely ambiguous” regulations. Id. at 10-11.

The court also held that USCIS’s denial was arbitrary and capricious because it mischaracterized the language in the OOH. Id. at *12-13. The USCIS decision claimed that the OOH stated that “the [computer programmer] occupation allows for a wide range of educational credentials, including an associate’s degree to qualify”, when in fact it states merely that “[m]ost computer programmers have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related subject; however, some employers hire workers with an associate’s degree.” Id. at 13. While it acknowledged that “a factual error is not necessarily fatal to an agency decision”, the court found USCIS’s misconstruction of the OOH language to be arbitrary and capricious in this instance because whether or not computer programmers normally possess a bachelor’s degree was central to USCIS’s decision. Id.

Finally, the court found USCIS’s decision arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider key evidence. Id. at *14. The court reasoned that OOH language stating that a bachelor’s degree is the “[t]ypical level of education that most workers need” to become a computer programmer was prominently featured on the OOH landing page and of central importance to the USCIS’s determination, but the USCIS failed event to mention this language in its decision. Id.

While the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Innova Solutions is doubtless a victory for U.S. technology companies who employ foreign workers as computer programmers, the decision has broader implications, as well. For one, the decision is a refreshing rebuttal to USCIS’s longstanding practice of challenging computer programming on specialty occupation grounds. On March 31, 2017, the USCIS issued a policy memorandum that rescinded earlier 2000 guidance that acknowledged the position of computer programmer as a specialty occupation. The 2017 policy memorandum relied on the current language in the OOH as basis for rescission of the earlier guidance. Importantly, the Ninth Circuit in Innova Solutions held that this same language from the OOH does not contradict the regulatory criteria at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), effectively undercutting the USCIS’ rationale for issuing the 2017 memorandum.

Additionally, Innova Solutions represents the first recent reported circuit court decision in which the court has ruled in favor of the H-1B petitioner. Other landmark circuit court cases have historically favored the USCIS. In Defensor v. Meissner, for example, the Fifth Circuit ruled against a medical staffing agency that had filed H-1B petitions on behalf of the nurses it employed on the grounds that the end hospital where the nurses were placed was really the supervising entity, and reasoning that no evidence suggested these hospitals required the nurses to possess bachelor’s degrees.  Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F.3d (5th Cir. 2000). In Defensor, the court held that the held that the criteria in 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) are merely necessary conditions, rather than necessary and sufficient conditions, to establish that a position is a specialty occupation, a decision the USCIS often cites in H-1B RFEs. Id. Similarly, in Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, the First Circuit ruled in favor of USCIS’s position that a position which requires a degree in a specific specialty related to the duties and responsibilities of the job should be accorded more weight than a generic degree requirement. Royal Siam Corp v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139 (First Cir. 2007). Innova Solutions is thus a unique and welcome victory for H-1B petitioners in the circuit courts.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision is in line with a number of recent decisions in lower courts in which, in contrast to most circuit court cases, H-1B petitioners have successfully challenged USCIS’s denial of H-1B petitions on the grounds that the position in question did not qualify as a specialty occupation. See, e.g., Taylor Made Software, Inc. v. Cissna, Civil Action No. 2019-0202 (D.D.C. 2020); Relx, Inc. v. Baran, 397 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D.D.C. 2019); Next Generation Technology v. Johnson, 15 cv 5663 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). In Innova Solutions, the Ninth Circuit reminds the USCIS, as the numerous lower court decisions have done, that the OOH may not be used as a Holy Grail to deny H-1B petitions that are based on well-reasoned arguments by the petitioner and corroborated by substantial evidence, including expert opinions.

Finally, one cannot overstate the growing importance of Kisor v. Wilkie in limiting the USCIS’s ability to exercise broad discretion in interpreting its own regulations under Auer precedent. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). In its decision in Innova Solutions, the court acknowledges that Auer deference applies only to genuinely ambiguous regulations, which 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) is not. The court’s decision reminds the USCIS that Auer deference is not a broad license to deny meritorious H-1B petitions.

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a Law Clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Cyrus Mehta & Kaitlyn Box

Two New York Ethics Opinions Instruct When Lawyers Can Withdraw from Representing a Client in Court During COVID-19

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In an earlier blog, we discussed ethics for immigration lawyers during the COVID-19 pandemic. Another ethical dilemma, addressed by two recent ethics opinions from the New York City Bar and the New York State Bar, arises when a lawyer is required to make an in-person court appearance, but is reluctant to go to court for fear of contracting COVID-19 or out of fear of for passing onto the infection to others. These ethics opinions are directly relevant to immigration lawyers who need to make appearances in immigration court on behalf of clients as well as as appear on behalf of clients for adjustment of status and naturalization interviews at USCIS.

On December 2, 2020, the New York City Bar Professional Ethics Committee issued Formal Opinion 2020-05: A Lawyer’s Ethical Obligation When Required to Return to Court During a Public  Health Crisis. The opinion deals with a New York lawyer’s duty to appear physically appear in court during the COVID-19 pandemic. The opinion acknowledges that some lawyers may be concerned about physically returning to court during the pandemic. Lawyers who are more susceptible to COVID-19 due to health conditions, or those who care for a medically vulnerable family member worried about appearing in court in person while the pandemic remains a threat. The opinion first examines whether a lawyer’s health concerns could create a personal conflict of interest. According to New York Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”) 1.7(a)(2), a personal conflict of interest exists where a reasonable lawyer would conclude that “there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, business, property or other personal interests.” The opinion reasons that “a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf a client would be compromised by the lawyer’s personal interest in not wanting to resume in-person court appearances”. One can imagine scenarios, like those outlined in the opinion, in which a lawyer who is extremely anxious about contracting the COVID-19 virus would avoid pursuing a remedy that would involve court appearances, even though this might be the best course of action for his or her client.

However, even if a lawyer’s health concerns create a conflict of interest, that conflict may be waived if the lawyer nonetheless believes that he or she “will be able to provide competent and diligent representation”. Rule 1.7(b)(1). The opinion recommends that a lawyer who has reservations about appearing in court in person, but believes that he or she can still competently and diligently represent the client though other means like video appearances, should disclose the conflict and obtain a waiver from the client, provided that the client is comfortable with the lawyer’s proposed alternatives. If, however, the lawyer’s health concerns make it impossible to provide competent and diligent legal representation, then the conflict is not waivable.

If a lawyer believes that a conflict of interest is not waivable or is not able to obtain a waiver from the client, the lawyer must withdraw if the conflict will result in her representation of the client falling below the “competent and diligent” standard. See Rule 1.16(b)(1).  This rule requires the lawyer to withdraw if “the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the representation will result in a violation of these Rules or of law.” Although Rule 1.16 allows permissive withdrawal of representation under Rule 1.16(c), this ethics opinion insists that a lawyer must withdraw based on the non-waivable conflict of interest pursuant to Rule 1.16(b)(1).   The opinion also recognizes that when the lawyer is before a tribunal, under Rule 1.16(d) the lawyer must seek permission from the court to withdraw, and the court may still require the lawyer to continue with the representation. The opinion states that the lawyer “should obtain a clear and unequivocal order from the tribunal and consider whether to appeal or comply with the order.” If the lawyer is permitted to withdraw by the court, the lawyer must take reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client. See Rule 1.16(e).  Finally, the opinion also advises that law offices and lawyers with supervisory responsibilities must take reasonable steps  to address the ethics issues detailed in the opinion.

2.3(i)(ii) of the EOIR Practice Manual lays out the requirements for a lawyer who wishes to withdraw from representation in immigration court. The lawyer must first submit to the court a written or oral motion to withdraw. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17(b). The EOIR Practice Manual specifies what information a motion to withdraw must contain, including the reason for the withdrawal and a statement concerning the lawyer’s efforts to obtain consent from the client to withdraw. The immigration court will then consider the motion, taking special consideration of the time remaining before the client’s next hearing and the reason the attorney has put forth for wishing to withdraw. Until the immigration court has granted the attorney leave to withdraw, the attorney must continue to diligently and competently represent the client, including attending any scheduled hearings.

An earlier New York State Bar Association ethics opinion on October 8, 2020 similarly concluded that a lawyer may withdraw when health concerns create a situation where “the lawyer’s mental or physical condition renders it difficult for the attorney to carry out the representation effectively.”  See NYSBA Ethics Op. 1203 (2020). The New York City Bar Professional Ethics Committee’s opinion reaches a parallel conclusion, but emphasizes that a lawyer may withdraw if her fear of contracting COVID-19 prevents her from providing competent and diligent representation to her client. The opinion concludes by pointing out that, even if a lawyer wishes to withdraw, she may still be required to continue representation if so ordered by the court under Rule 1.16(d), or if withdrawal would harm the client.

NYSBA Ethics Opinion 1203 involved a similar inquiry from an attorney who was required to make an in-person  appearance in immigration court during the pandemic, but was concerned about contracting the virus or infecting a family member, given the lack of safety protocols that the immigration court had implemented at the time. The opinion addressed the question of whether an attorney might withdraw if continued representation would endanger the lawyer’s health or safety. The opinion concluded that the lawyer could withdraw, with permission from the court, reaching a similar conclusion to the New York City Bar Professional Ethics Committee’s opinion. The NYBSA ethics opinion first points to  Rule  1.16(b), although this appears to be a scrivener’s  error as the opinion is likely referring to Rule 1.16(c)(9), which permits withdrawal when “the lawyer’s mental or physical condition renders it difficult for the lawyer to carry out the representation effectively.”  The standard, according to the NYSBA, is that effective representation becomes ‘difficult,’ not impossible. The NYSBA provides examples of how the lawyer’s fear of COVID-19 might “subtly but powerfully” undermine the representation of a client in immigration court in a number of ways.  The lawyer may be reluctant to spend time with the client in-person to understand the client’s case and communicate the options. The lawyer might also be inclined to consent to a premature disposition of the case, even though prolonging the case through additional appearances and motions could lead to a more favorable outcome. The lawyer may also try to complete the hearing quickly without calling witnesses to testify or waiving cross examination of government witnesses.

While the New York City Bar’s opinion centers around the mandatory ground under Rule 1.16(b)(1), based on a non-waivable conflict of interest,  the NYSBA opinion invokes the permissible withdrawal ground ostensibly under Rule 1.16(c)(9) when “the lawyer’s mental or physical condition renders it difficult for the lawyer to carry out the representation effectively.” The opinion also invokes two additional permissible grounds for withdrawal:   Rule  1.16(c)(1) if the “withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client” and Rule 1.16(c)(10) if the client “knowingly and freely assents to termination of the employment.”

The opinion concludes that a lawyer caught in this situation may seek to withdraw from representation, provided the lawyer has permission from the court and withdraws in a manner that does not prejudice the client’s interests and has permission from the court. Rule 1.16(d) requires lawyers to seek permission from the court before withdrawing, and forbids them from withdrawing at all if the court declines to allow withdrawal.

An immigration judge might refuse to allow a lawyer to withdraw because of a fear of contracting COVID-19 if alternatives, such as appearances by telephone or video, would allay the lawyer’s health concerns and allowed for continued representation. EOIR has attempted to offer alternatives to in-person hearings to mitigate health concerns. All EOIR courtrooms are equipped with telephones and some with video equipment, so hearings conducted by telephone or video conference may be appropriate alternatives in many cases.  In July 2020, The AILA New Jersey Chapter filed a complaint in district court seeking an injunction to prevent the Newark Immigration Court from forcing immigration attorneys to appear for in-person court proceedings during the pandemic, but the U.S. District Court declined to grant the injunction on the grounds that EOIR’s policy of offering a videoconferencing alternative sufficiently mitigated the harm plaintiffs would suffer if forced to appear in person. A November 6, 2020 EOIR policy memo memorializes EOIR’s practice of offer telephonic and video hearings in lieu of an in-person hearing where appropriate.

Lawyers must carefully consider whether they may be able to competently and diligently represent a client through a telephonic, or video hearing if they are reluctant to attend a live hearing. Attending the hearing in person may have advantages where there are difficult and complex evidentiary issues and where the client’s credible testimony is crucial for a successful outcome, but the lawyer must make that determination when deciding to opt for remote representation. There are times when the immigration court may force a remote hearing on all the parties.  If the client chooses a live hearing when it is an option, the lawyer must abide by the client’s wishes. If a lawyer’s request to withdraw is declined by an immigration judge, a lawyer should try to find alternative approaches without compromising competent representation. If the immigration judge is not inclined to grant a continuance, one possible approach is to arrange to have another competent lawyer within the lawyer’s firm attend the hearing. A solo practitioner may arrange for a competent colleague to appear at the hearing. These arrangements should only be undertaken after obtaining the client’s informed consent and ensuring that the client will still be competently represented. It is hoped that the two New York ethics opinions would persuade an immigration judge to allow an attorney to withdraw from representation either on the ground that it would create a personal conflict of interest or when the lawyer’s mental or physical condition renders it difficult for the lawyer to carry out the representation effectively.

While many immigration courts remain closed, or close whenever there is a COVID-19 incident, USCIS has been more regularly conducting in person adjustment and naturalization interviews. A lawyer would face a similar dilemma in deciding to attend an adjustment of status or naturalization interview on behalf of a client. The current USCIS policy is to allow the lawyer to represent the client via telephone while the client appears in person for the interview. In this case too, the lawyer must ensure that representing the client via telephone will not compromise the representation. It is easier for a lawyer to withdraw from representation before the USCIS than immigration court, but whether the lawyer has withdrawn from representation of a client for an in person appearance in immigration court or an in person appointment at USCIS, it is important that the lawyer follows Rule 1.16(e), which is to “take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, including by giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, promptly repaying any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned and complying with applicable laws and rules.”

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a Law Clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

[This blog is for informational purposes and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice.]

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Justice Department’s Discrimination Complaint Against Facebook Chills Employer’s Ability to Legitimately Sponsor Skilled Foreign National Workers for a Green Card

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The Department of Justice’s complaint claiming that Facebook discriminated against US workers even when it followed DOL regulations for sponsoring foreign national workers is troubling. It renders every employer vulnerable to charges of discrimination each time it files a labor certification on behalf of a foreign national worker.

When an employer wishes to sponsor a foreign national for a green card, it is required to test the domestic labor market for qualified workers before a PERM labor certification is approved. Labor certification is the first step in the employment sponsored green card process.  It is rather odd that when Facebook followed the DOL rules regarding recruitment for a labor certification, another agency of the federal government, the Immigrant and Employee Rights (IER) Section of the Department of Justice (DOJ) accuses it of discriminatory practices under INA 274B(a)(1).  Facebook was not accused of violating the DOL rules. Under the DOL rules, if the employer finds a qualified  US worker after testing the labor market, the employer cannot go ahead with the labor certification and is not required to hire the US worker and terminate the foreign worker who already holds the job often on an H-1B visa.  The IER has accused Facebook of discrimination for not hiring US workers for advertisements that were related to a labor certification filed on behalf of a foreign national worker. The labor certification process requires the employer to test the US labor market with respect to an application filed on behalf of a foreign worker, and contrary to the allegations in the IER complaint, is not set up as a program for recruiting US workers.

The IER complaint says at paragraph 24 that “in conducting recruitment, employers must also engage in a good faith search that closely resembles the employer’s normal recruiting process.”  It cites Matter of Am. Specialty Pharmacy, 2016-PER-00016, 2019 WL 2910815 (BALCA 2019). The IER accuses Facebook of implementing a recruitment process intentionally designed to deter US workers from applying, thus discriminating against US workers because of their citizenship status in violation of INA 274B(a)(1)(A). The complaint states that Facebook uses recruitment methods for PERM labor certifications that were different than those it employs for its regular positions. For example, Facebook requires resumes to be sent by postal mail for advertisements related to labor certifications but for open market positions they will accept resumes by e mail. Facebook also does not post advertisements on their website for labor certification positions but for their other positions they do post on their website.

However, Matter of Am. Specialty Pharmacy, supra, which IER cites in its complaint,  just says that: “We have interpreted this regulation as placing a burden on the Employer to conduct a good faith recruitment effort.”  It cites East Tennessee State University, 2010-PER-00038, slip op. at 11 (Apr. 18, 2011) (en banc), which does go into some more detail, but not in the direction that IER suggests. BALCA stated in East Tennessee State University that “employers seeking permanent labor certification may have to conduct their recruitment in a manner different than they would normally in order to ensure that the position is clearly open to all qualified U.S. workers.” In a 2008 Guidance Memo, the DOL also confirmed that “given that the permanent labor certification program imposes recruitment standards on the employer that may deviate from the employer’s normal standards of evaluation, the Department understands and appreciates the legitimate role attorneys and agents play in the permanent labor certification process.”

DOL also insists on recruitment practices that have no bearing on real world recruitment such as placing print advertisements in two Sunday newspapers even when most employers and job seekers do not rely on the print classified sections any longer. Indeed, most of the advertisements in the classified Sunday edition of the NY Times have the look and feel of labor certification advertisements. Although the IER accuses Facebook of requiring applicants to respond by postal mail rather than online, when its non-labor certification advertisements allow for online responses from applicants, that in itself is not a violation of the DOL rules, and DOL has already conceded that the employer’s labor certification recruitment deviates from normal labor practices. While in hindsight, Facebook should have done more to reconcile its labor certification advertisements with its real world advertisements, the labor certification process requires the employer only to test the labor market and not to use it to hire US workers. The DOL imposes other requirements on an employer during labor certification recruitment, which are unimaginable in real world recruitment. If a US worker applicant does not respond to the employer’s invitation to an interview, the employer must go the extra mile to demonstrate that it did indeed contact the applicant who never showed up by sending up a follow up e mail or letter to the uninterested candidate, and must prove that this candidate actually received the communication!  Even when the US worker applicant was interviewed and rejected, the employer must prove that it actually made contact with the applicant.  Thus, even if an employer mirrors its real world recruitment with its labor certification recruitment,  and even goes beyond, it will still be vulnerable to a citizenship discrimination claim by the IER because labor certification recruitment inherently requires a good faith test of the labor market, and not to hire US workers,  before the labor certification can be filed and certified by the DOL.

Rather than penalize an employer for following the rules set forth in 20 CFR 656, Congress,  the administration, or both, could change the rules governing the labor certification process to make them more rational and comport with real world practices.  In a 2008 article Walking The High Wire Without A Net – The Lawyer’s Role In The Labor Certification Process, Bender’s Immigration Bulletin, February 1, 2009,  Gary Endelman and I noted how far removed the labor certification process truly is from an employer’s real world recruitment practices.  Although the labor certification process requires an employer to conduct a “good faith” test of the US labor market to determine whether US workers are qualified or available for the position held by the foreign national, the very notion of “good faith” seems oddly out of place when used with reference to a recruitment effort that achieves its desired objective by failing to locate any qualified job applicants. Only in the labor certification world do you win by losing. Unable to utilize real world recruitment standards, compelled to base evaluations upon the entirely artificial concept of “minimal qualifications” that does not exist outside the cordon sanitaire of 20 CFR §656, wedded to an inflexible job description that can never change regardless of an employer’s business needs or a worker’s evolving talents, and effectively prohibited from taking into consideration the very subjective character traits whose presence or absence is the most reliable predictor of effective job performance, the labor certification process is fundamentally at odds with the very economic system it allegedly seeks to serve.

It is reiterated that an employer is under no legal obligation to hire a qualified applicant at the end of the process. If the employer finds a U.S. worker who is qualified for the position, the labor certification dies. In other words, the employer cannot file the labor certification on behalf of the foreign national worker.  This makes sense as it would be rather cruel to fire the foreign worker on a temporary work visa like the H-1B, which can extend for many years, and replace them with the US worker.  Even if the employer hires this minimally qualified US worker, and files the labor certification on behalf of the foreign worker, the employer may be found to be in violation as a result of “diversion.” The Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA) has held that a US applicant cannot be diverted to another position, even a more senior position. See Engineering Technology, Inc.,89-INA-10 (BALCA 1990), Sam’s Exxon, 91-INA-362 (BALCA 1992). BALCA has found “diversion” even when the U.S. worker was hired for the same position as the foreign national worker where the employer was unable to establish multiple openings. Aloha Airlines, 91-INA-181 (BALCA 1992).

The statutory basis for labor certifications is provided in §212(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Under INA §212(a)(5), an alien is deemed “inadmissible unless the Secretary of Labor” certifies, inter alia, that “there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified…and available at the time of application” among the U.S. workforce. A plain reading of INA §212(a)(5) does not in any way suggest that an employer must seek to recruit U.S. workers in order for the Secretary of Labor to certify that there are a lack of U.S. workers who are qualified and willing at the time of the application. Interestingly, INA §212(a)(5) is silent about requiring the employer to advertise or to establish that it advertised the position without reference to unduly restrictive requirements. It appears that the Department of Labor has created out of whole cloth the current system it enforces against U.S. employers. Gary Endelman previously wrote for the National Foundation for American Policy: “There was no mention of individualized recruitment in the proposed labor certification regulations on November 19, 1965, or the final version of these same implementing rules that came out on December 3, 1965. There was no sense that employers had to advertise; the availability of U.S. workers, or their nonavailability, was based solely on statistics as embodied in Schedules A and B, respectively.”

In discussing the labor certification requirement in the 1965 Amendments,8 Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) stated:

It was not our intention, or that of the AFL-CIO. that all intending immigrants must undergo an employment analysis of great detail that could be time consuming and disruptive to the normal flow of immigration. We know that the Department of Labor maintains statistics on occupations, skills, and labor in short supply in this country. Naturally, then, any applicant for admission who falls within the categories should not have to wait for a detailed study by the Labor Department before his certificate is issued …(W]e would expect the Secretary of Labor to devise workable rules by which he could carry out his responsibilities under the law without unduly interrupting or delaying immigration to this country. The function of the Secretary is to increase the quality of immigration, not to diminish it below levels authorized by the law.

Thus, one of the key drafters of the bill, Senator Kennedy, never mentioned nor contemplated the need for the individualized, wasteful, and unreal recruitment that the DOL has imposed on employers. Indeed, after all this recruitment, the DOL only requires the employer to test the U.S. labor market. In other words, employers must prove a negative, namely, that there are no minimally qualified workers for the position. The employer is not required to hire minimally qualified workers. If the employers find qualified workers, they are precluded from filing the labor certification application on behalf of the foreign national worker. Through this process, the DOL forces employers to make pawns of U.S. worker applicants by advertising the position, having them apply for the position, interviewing them, and in the end, not encouraging their hire even if the employer wants them in addition to the foreign national worker.

And now the complaint against Facebook brought by a sister federal agency further highlights the contradictions in the labor certification program.  The IER complaint is aimed at discouraging employers from sponsoring skilled foreign national workers for permanent residence lest they be accused of  citizenship discrimination after following the labor certification process. Whatever may be the motivation behind this action – and it is not unreasonable to speculate that it may be linked to President Trump’s dislike for Facebook and Twitter – the end result is that skilled foreign national workers deserving of green card sponsorship by a US employer bear the brunt,  and America loses the most if they are forced to leave.

Cyrus Mehta

The Inappropriateness of Finding Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Residency During Naturalization

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On November 18, 2020, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) updated policy guidance to clarify the circumstances when the agency would find applicants ineligible for naturalization because they were not lawfully admitted for permanent residence. “Applicants are ineligible for naturalization if they obtained lawful permanent residence (LPR) status in error, by fraud or otherwise not in compliance with the law,” USCIS said.

The update also clarifies that USCIS reviews whether an applicant has abandoned LPR status when it adjudicates a naturalization application. If an applicant does not meet the burden of establishing maintenance of LPR status, USCIS said it generally denies the naturalization application and places the applicant in removal proceedings by issuing a Notice to Appear (NTA). The update also provides that USCIS generally denies a naturalization application “filed on or after the effective date if the applicant is in removal proceedings pursuant to a warrant of arrest.”

The updated policy guidance does not break new ground.  USCIS has always rendered applicants ineligible for naturalization after it finds that they were not lawfully admitted for permanent residence. One example is if the applicant made a misrepresentation while applying for a tourist visa many years ago and failed to disclose this fact when filing the I-485 application for adjustment of status along with the submission of a waiver to overcome this ground of inadmissibility under INA 212(a)(6)(C)(1).

What is more troubling about this new guidance is that it incentivizes USCIS to find that lawful permanent residents may have abandoned that status previously even though Customs and Border Protection (CBP) may have admitted them into the United States. A naturalization applicant may have  at some point in the past been outside the US for more than 180 days, and then admitted by CBP into the US. Even if the LPR remained outside the US for over a year, as a result of inability to return to the US due to Covid-19, the LPR may still be admitted into the US.  The new guidance now encourages naturalization officers to investigate whether the applicant may have abandoned LPR status regardless of the length of prior trips abroad, even if the trips abroad were for less than 180 days. Indeed, the guidance encourages naturalization examiners to overrule a determination that CBP made at the time of the LPRs admission into the US. At that point in time, the government had a very heavy burden to establish that the LPR had abandoned permanent residence.

Under INA 101(a)(13)(C), LPRs shall not be regarded as seeking admission into the United States unless, inter alia, they have abandoned or relinquished that status or have been absent from the US for a continuous period in excess of 180 days.

It has historically been the case that when an applicant for admission has a colorable claim to lawful permanent resident status, the burden is on the government to show that they are not entitled to that status by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence. This standard was established by the Supreme Court in Woodby v. INS, which held that the burden was on the government to prove by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that the LPR should be deported from the United States. Subsequent to Woodby, in Landon v. Plasencia, the Supreme Court held that a returning resident be accorded due process in exclusion proceedings and that the Woodby standard be applied equally to a permanent resident in exclusion proceedings.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) introduced the notion of “admission” in INA §101(a)(13)(C).  “Admission” replaced the pre-IIRIRA “entry” doctrine as enunciated in Rosenberg v. Fleuti,  which held that a permanent resident was not considered making an entry into the US if his or her departure was “brief, innocent or casual.” Under §101(a)(13)(C), an LPR shall not be regarded as seeking admission “unless” he or she meets six specific criteria, which include the permanent abandoning or relinquishing of that status or having been absent for a continuous period in excess of 180 days. Fleuti has been partially restored in Vartelas v. Holder with respect to grounds of inadmissibility that got triggered prior to the enactment of IIRIRA.  Moreover, the returning permanent resident who returns from a trip abroad that was more than 180 days would be treated as an applicant for admission under INA 101(a)(13)(C)(ii), and thus vulnerable to being considered inadmissible. INA 240(c)(2), also enacted by IIRIRA, requires an applicant for admission to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that he or she is “lawfully present in the US pursuant to a prior admission.”   INA 240(c)(2) places the burden on an applicant for admission to prove “clearly and beyond doubt” that he or she is not inadmissible.  On the other hand, with respect to non-citizens being placed in removal proceedings, INA 240(c)(3), also enacted by IIRIRA, keeps the burden on the government to establish deportability by “clear and convincing” evidence.

Notwithstanding the introduction of INA 101(a)(13)(C), as well as INA 240(c)(2) and INA 240(c)(3),  the Woodby standard still prevails and nothing in 101(a)(13)(C) overrules it, and the burden of proof is still on the government through clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence that LPR has lost that status. See Matadin v. Mukasey.  This was further established in 2011 by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Rivens, which held:

Given this historical practice and the absence of any evidence that Congress intended a different allocation of standard of proof to apply in removal cases arising under current section 101(a)(13)(C) of the Act, we hold that the respondent – whose lawful permanent resident status is uncontested – cannot be found removable under the section 212(a) grounds of inadmissibility unless the DHS first proves by clear and convincing evidence [footnote omitted] that he is to be regarded as an applicant for admission in this case by having “committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2).

Although in Matter of Rivens, the BIA acknowledged that the language in INA 240(c)(3) indicated “clear and convincing” evidence rather than “clear, convincing and unequivocal” evidence as in Woodby, the BIA has not had occasion to determine that the deletion of one word “unequivocal” has  effected a substantial change to the standard.

Additionally, in cases involving the abandonment of permanent residence, it is not the length of the absence that is determinative but whether it was a “temporary visit abroad” pursuant to INA 101(a)(27)(A). The term “temporary visit abroad” has been subject to interpretation by the Circuit Courts that requires a searching inquiry of the purpose of the trip, thus making it harder for the government to find that the LPR abandoned that status even if the trip abroad was for an extended period of time in addition to the high burden of proof that the government is required to meet under Woodby. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “temporary visit abroad”  in Singh v. Reno is generally followed:

A trip is a “temporary visit abroad” if (a) it is for a relatively short period, fixed by some early event; or (b) the trip will terminate upon the occurrence of an event that has a reasonable possibility of occurring within a relatively short period of time. If as in (b) the length of the visit is contingent upon the occurrence of an event and is not fixed in time and if the event does not occur within a relatively short period of time, the visit will be considered a “temporary visit abroad” only if the alien has a continuous, uninterrupted intention to return to the United States during the visit.

The Second Circuit in Ahmed v.Ashcroft, with respect to the second prong, has further clarified that when the visit “relies upon an event with a reasonable possibility of occurring within a short period to time…the intention of the visitor must still be to return within a period relatively short, fixed by some early event.” The Sixth Circuit in Hana v. Gonzales held that LPR status was not abandoned where LPR was compelled to return to Iraq to resume her job and be with her family while they were waiting for immigrant visas to materialize.

Although the USCIS guidance to naturalization examiners cites these and other cases regarding abandonment of LPR status, this determination was already made by the CBP at the time of the applicant’s admission when the burden was on the government to establish through clear and convincing evidence that the LPR had abandoned that status. Since presumably the government did not meet this burden then, the LPR was admitted into the US.  It is inappropriate to empower the USCIS through new policy guidance to once again meet this burden after the fact in a naturalization interview. It is one thing to investigate whether an applicant was ineligible for LPR status at the time of receiving it based on a ground of inadmissibility (e.g. fraud or misrepresentation) that was not overcome, but it is quite another to waste government resources to require USCIS to meet its heavy burden again regarding abandonment of LPR status during naturalization.  If the USCIS wants to retain guidance regarding finding abandonment in a naturalization interview, it can be narrowed, which the Biden administration may wish to consider, in circumstances where naturalization may be denied when it is readily obvious that the applicant is no longer a permanent resident. This may apply to one who was once an LPR as  the unsuccessful plaintiff in Biglar v. Attorney General, departed the US over a period of several years and then was subsequently admitted in B-2 visitor status, after which the applicant applies for naturalization. The Eleventh Circuit held that Biglar had abandoned his LPR status even though he sought to renew his green card after he was admitted into the US in B-2 status. Except for these unusual facts, the USCIS should not be investigating abandonment based on any and every absence especially when the CBP admitted the applicant as an LPR after being aware of the length of that absence from the US.

While the government will argue that the burden is on the applicant for naturalization to establish his or her eligibility, see Berenyi v. INS, the guidance also instructs the USCIS to initiate removal proceedings against LPRs who have been deemed to abandon their status. While in removal proceedings, applicants must insist that the government continue to meet its heavy burden through clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate that they abandoned LPR status, and this burden becomes doubly difficult when USICS is required to second guess a CBP officer’s determination regarding an LPRs admission several years later in a naturalization interview.

The new guidance has been introduced by the Trump administration to create a chilling effect on potential applicants on naturalization based on past travel abroad.  The Biden administration should immediately revise the guidance on January 20 or shortly thereafter.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Proposal for the Biden Administration to Reduce Backlogs: Count the Family Together So That They May Stay Together

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Ever since I co-wrote The Tyranny of Priority Dates in 2010, followed by How President Obama Can Erase Immigrant Visa Backlogs With A Stroke Of A Pen in 2012,  I have steadfastly maintained that the current and prior administrations  have got it wrong when counting visa numbers under the family and employment preferences. I do hope that the Biden administration will seriously consider this proposal, which I reiterate below.

There is no explicit authorization for derivative family members to be counted separately under either the employment-based or family based preference visas in the Immigration and Nationality Act.  While they must still be counted, they should be counted as “one” with the principal family member. Each family unit takes up one visa rather than separate visas. The treatment of family members is covered by INA 203(d), enacted by the Immigration Act of 1990, which states:

A spouse or child defined in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E) of section 1101(b) of this title shall, if not otherwise entitled to an immigrant status and the immediate issuance of a visa under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, be entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration provided in the respective subsection, if accompanying or following to join, the spouse or parent.

Nothing in INA 203(d) provides authority for family members to be counted under the preference quotas. While a derivative is “entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration” as the principal, nothing requires that family members also be allocated visa numbers. If Congress allocates a certain number of visas to immigrants with advanced degrees or to investors, it makes no sense if half or more are used up by family members. I have also written blogs over the years, here, here and here, to further advance this argument.

The EB and FB numbers ought not to be held hostage to the number of family members each principal beneficiary brings with them. Nor should family members be held hostage to the quotas. We have often seen the principal beneficiary being granted permanent residency, but the derivative family members being left out, when there were not sufficient visa numbers under the preference category during that given year. If all family members are counted as one unit, such needless separation of family members will never happen again.  Should only the principal become a permanent resident while everyone else waits till next year? What if visa retrogression sets in and the family has to wait, maybe for years? This does not make sense. Is there not sufficient ambiguity in INA §203(d) to argue that family members should not be counted against the cap? It is not contended that they should be completely exempted from being counted. As stated in INA §203(d), family members should be given the “same status and the same order of consideration” as the principal. Hence, if there is no visa number for the principal, the rest of the family does not get in. If, on the other hand, there is a single remaining visa number for the principal, the family members, however many there are, ought to be “entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration as the principal.” Viewed in this way, INA §203(d) operates in harmony with all other limits on permanent migration found in INA both on an overall and a per country basis.

There is no regulation in 8 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) that truly interprets INA § 203(d). Even the State Department’s regulation at 22 CFR §42.32 fails to illuminate the scope or purpose of INA 203(d). It does nothing more than parrot INA § 203(d). In Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243, 257 (2006) the Supreme Court held that a parroting regulation does not deserve deference:

Simply put, the existence of a parroting regulation does not change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the statute. An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.

It is certainly true that family members are not exempted from being counted under INA § 201(b) as are immediate relatives of US citizens, special immigrants, or those fortunate enough to merit cancellation of their removal. Yet, it is noted that the title in INA §201(b) refers to “Aliens Not Subject to Direct Numerical Limitations.” What does this curious phrase mean? Each of the listed exemptions in INA §201(b) are outside the normal preference categories. That is why they are not subject to direct counting. By contrast, the INA § 203(d) derivatives are wholly within the preference system, bound fast by its stubborn limitations. They are not independent of all numerical constraints, only from direct ones. It is the principal alien through whom they derive their claim who is and has been counted. When viewed from this perspective, there is nothing inconsistent between saying in INA §203(d) that derivatives should not be independently assessed against the EB or FB cap despite their omission from INA §201(b) that lists only non-preference category exemptions.

It is reiterated that derivative beneficiaries are not exempt from numerical limits. As noted above, they are indeed subject in the sense that the principal alien is subject by virtue of being subsumed within the numerical limit that applies to this principal alien. Hence, if no EB or FB numbers were available to the principal alien, the derivatives would not be able to immigrate either. If they were exempt altogether, this would not matter. There is, then, a profound difference between not being counted at all and being counted as an integral family unit rather than as individuals. For this reason, INA §201(b) simply does not apply. The Biden administration through the simple mechanism of an Executive Order can direct a different way of counting derivatives.

INA §§201(a)(1) and 201(a)(2) mandate that “family sponsored” and “employment based immigrants” are subject to worldwide limits. Does this not cover spouses and children? True enough but all is not lost. While the term “immigrant” under INA §101(a)(15) includes spouse and children, they were included because, in concert with their principal alien family member, they intended to stay permanently in this their adopted home. No one ever contended they were or are non-immigrants. However, this does not mean that such family derivatives are either “employment based” or “family sponsored” immigrants. No petitioner has filed either an I-140 or I-130 on their behalf. Their claim to immigrant status is wholly a creature of statute, deriving entirely from INA §203(d) which does not make them independently subject to any quota.

INA §203(d) must be understood to operate in harmony with other provisions of the INA. Surely, if Congress had meant to deduct derivative beneficiaries, it would have plainly said so somewhere in the INA. The Immigration Act of 1990 when modifying INA §§201(a)(1) and 201(a)(2) specifically only referred to family sponsored and employment-based immigrants in §203(a) and §203(b) respectively in the worldwide cap. This was a marked change from prior law when all immigrants save for immediate relatives and special immigrants, but including derivative family members, had been counted. In this sense, the interpretation of INA §203(d) for which we contend should be informed by the same broad, remedial spirit that characterizes IMMACT 90’s basic approach to numerical limitation of immigration to the United States As already noted, these immigrants ought to only be the principal beneficiaries of I-130 and I-140 petitions. Derivative family, of course, are not the beneficiaries of such sponsorship. At no point did Congress do so. Under the theory of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that Congress had not authorized such deduction. Surely, if this was not the case, Congress would have made its intent part of the INA.  If the Executive Branch under President Biden wanted to reinterpret §203(d), there is sufficient ambiguity in the provision for it do so without the need for Congress to sanction it. A government agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)—often abbreviated as “Chevron deference”.  When a statute is ambiguous in this way, the Supreme Court has made clear in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), the agency may reconsider its interpretation even after the courts have approved of it.  Brand X can be used as a force for good.  Thus, when a provision is ambiguous such as INA Section 203(d), the government agencies charged with its enforcement may reasonably interpret it in the manner that we suggest.

Skeptics who contend that the INA as written mandates individual counting of all family members point to two provisions of the INA, §§202(a)(2) and 202(b). Neither is the problem that supporters of the status quo imagine.  Let’s consider §202(a)(2) first. In relevant part, it teaches that not more than 7% of the total number of family and employment-based immigrant visas arising under INA §203(b) may be allocated to the natives of any single foreign state. Eagle eyed readers will readily notice that this does not apply to derivative family members whose entitlement comes from INA §203(d) with no mention of §203(b). Also, but no less importantly, INA §202(a)(2) is concerned solely with overall per country limits. There is no reason why the number of immigrant visas cannot stay within the 7% cap while all members of a family are counted as one unit. There is no reason why monitoring of the per country family or employment cap should require individual counting of family members. The per country cap is, by its own terms, limited to the named beneficiaries of I-130 and I-140 petitions and there is no express or implied authority for any executive interpretation that imposes a restriction that Congress has not seen fit to impose.

What about cross-chargeability under INA §202(b)? Even if §202(b) has language regarding preventing the separation of the family, it does not mean that the derivatives have to be counted separately. If an Indian-born beneficiary of an EB-2 I-140 is married to a Canadian born spouse, the Indian born beneficiary can cross charge to the EB-2 worldwide rather than EB-2 India. When the Indian cross charges, the entire family is counted as one unit under the EB-2 worldwide by virtue of being cross charged to Canada. Such an interpretation can be supported under Chevron and Brand X, especially the gloss given to Chevron by the Supreme Court in the Supreme Court decision in Scialabba v. de Osorio involving an interpretation of the provision of the Child Status Protection Act.  Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion, though seeking to clarify the Child Status Protection Act, applies with no less force to our subject: “This is the kind of case that Chevron was built for. Whatever Congress might have meant… it failed to speak clearly.” Kagan slip op. at 33. Once again, as with the per country EB cap, the concept of cross-chargeability is a remedial mechanism that seeks to promote and preserve family unity, precisely the same policy goal for which we contend.

In a recent not so positive development, a federal district court in Wang v. Pompeo  turned down a claim from EB-5 investors that derivatives should not be counted under the employment-based fifth preference (EB-5). Even though the claim focused on the EB-5 preference, it can be applied to all preference categories.   Although plaintiffs argued that the annual limits do not apply to derivatives pursuant to  INA §203(d) as enacted by the Immigration Act of 1990, Judge Tanya Chutkan disagreed on the ground  that §203(d) is identical to the prior §203(a)(9) as it existed after the 1965 Act. If derivatives were counted under 203(a)(9), under the doctrine in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 US 575, 580 (1978), “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that same interpretation when it re-enacts the statute without change.” Moreover, in footnote 1 in Wang v. Pompeo, the court agreed with the government that “Congress spoke unambiguously spoke to the question at issue” and so the court need not address whether the government was entitled to Chevron deference.

Since this is a district court decision, the Biden administration can disregard Wang v. Pompeo and still choose to interpret §203(d) to allow for the unitary counting of principal and derivatives. Plaintiffs have appealed this decision to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals. If the DC Court of Appeals affirms Judge Chutkan’s decision, especially footnote 1, which indicates that INA 203(d) is unambiguous, it would be impossible for the Biden administration to change the interpretation of §203(d) under Chevron and Brand X within the jurisdiction of the DC Circuit Court of Appeals.  This in turn will result in an untenable situation where those within the jurisdiction of the DC Court of Appeals would not be able to derive the beneficial impact of a reinterpretation of §203(d). It would thus be prudent for plaintiffs to delay taking up the appeal until the Biden administration decides whether they will change the interpretation under §203(d) or not. On the other hand, one would not complain if the DC Court of Appeals rules in plaintiff’s favor and overrules the district court decision.

Obviously, if Congress can affirmatively modify §203(d) to explicitly state that derivates will not be counted, that would be the best outcome. However, if Congress remains divided and there is no legislative fix forthcoming, and unless we are willing to watch the slow and tortured death of the priority date system in silence, President Biden must act on his own. Doing so will double or triple the number of available green cards without the creation of a single new visa. The waiting lines will vanish or be drastically reduced.

Cyrus Mehta

Proposal for the Biden Administration: Using the Dual Date Visa Bulletin to Allow the Maximum Number of Adjustment of Status Filings

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As a result of the existence of the per country limits, those born in India and China have been drastically affected by backlogs in the employment-based green card categories. Each country is only entitled to 7 percent of the total allocation of visas under each preference. Thus, a country like Iceland with only about 330,000 people has the same allocation as India or China with populations of more than a billion people. For instance, in the employment-based second preference (EB-2), those born in India have to wait for decades, and one study estimates the wait time to be 150 years!

It would be ideal for Congress to eliminate the per country limits and even add more visas to each preference category. Until Congress is able to act, it would be easy for the Biden administration to provide even greater relief through executive action. One easy fix is to advance the dates in the State Department’s Visa Bulletin so that many more backlogged beneficiaries of approved petitions can apply for adjustment of status and get  ameliorative relief. Other fixes could include allowing beneficiaries of petitions overseas to enter the US on parole, and protecting more derivative children from  aging out under the Child Status Protection Act.

The State Department’s October 2020 Visa Bulletin was thus refreshing. It advanced the Dates for Filing (DFF) for the India employment-based third preference (EB-3) from February 1, 2010 to January 1, 2015. This rapid movement allowed tens of thousands of beneficiaries of I-140 petitions who were languishing in the backlogs and born in India to file I-485 adjustment of status applications. Although an I-485 application filed pursuant to a current DFF does not confer permanent residence, only the Final Action Dates  (FAD) can,  the DFF provides a number of significant benefits, such as allowing the applicant to “port” to a different job or employer in the same or similar occupational classification after 180 days pursuant to INA 204(j), obtain an Employment Authorization Document (EAD) that enables them to work in the United States, and request advance parole or travel permission. Even derivative family members can also get EADs and travel permission upon filing an I-485 application.

The January 1, 2015 DFF in the November 2020 Visa Bulletin continue to remain at January 1, 2015 date for the India EB-3, thus enabling many more in the backlogs to file I-485 applications and take advantage of job portability. While the advance to January 1, 2015 was a positive development, there is a legal basis to advance the DFF even further, perhaps to as close as current. The Biden administration should seriously consider this proposal.

INA 245(a)(3) allows for the filing of an adjustment of status application when the visa is “immediately available” to the applicant. 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) links visa availability to the State Department’s monthly Visa Bulletin. Pursuant to this regulation, an I-485 application can only be submitted “if the preference category applicant has a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in the Bulletin (or the Bulletin shows that numbers for visa applicants in his or her category are current).” The term “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3) has never been defined, except as in 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) by “a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in Bulletin” or if the date in the Bulletin is current for that category.

The State Department has historically never advanced priority dates based on certitude that a visa would actually become available. There have been many instances when applicants have filed an I-485 application in a particular month, only to later find that the dates have retrogressed. A good example is the April 2012 Visa Bulletin, when the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China were May 1, 2010. In the very next May 2012 Visa Bulletin a month later, the EB-2 cut-off dates for India and China retrogressed to August 15, 2007. If the State Department was absolutely certain that applicants born in India and China who filed in April 2012 would receive their green cards, it would not have needed to retrogress dates back to August 15, 2007.  Indeed, those EB-2 applicants who filed their I-485 applications in April 2012 are still waiting and have yet to receive their green cards even as of today! Fortunately, under the current November 2020 Visa Bulletin, the beneficiary of an I-140 petition under EB-2 may “downgrade” by filing an I-140 under EB-3 and a concurrent I-485 application.  Another example is when the State Department announced that the July 2007 Visa Bulletin for EB-2 and EB-3 would become current. Hundreds of thousands filed during that period (which actually was the extended period from July 17, 2007 to August 17, 2007). It was obvious that these applicants would not receive their green cards during that time frame. The State Department then retrogressed the EB dates substantially the following month, and those who filed under the India EB-3 in July-August 2007 waited for over a decade before they became eligible for green cards.

These two examples, among many, go to show that “immediately available” in INA 245(a)(3), according to the State Department, have never meant that visas were actually available to be issued to applicants as soon as they filed. Rather, it has always been based on a notion of visa availability at some point of time in the future.

Under the dual filing dates system first introduced by the State Department in October 2015, USCIS acknowledges that availability of visas is based on an estimate of available visas for the fiscal year rather than immediate availability:

When we determine there are more immigrant visas available for the fiscal year than there are known applicants, you may use the Dates for Filing Applications chart to determine when to file an adjustment of status application with USCIS. Otherwise, you must use the Application Final Action Dates chart to determine when to file an adjustment of status application with USCIS.

See https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/visa-availability-and-priority-dates

 

Taking this to its logical extreme, visa availability for establishing the DFF may be based on just one visa being saved in the backlogged preference category in the year, such as the India EB-3, like the proverbial Thanksgiving turkey. Just like one turkey every Thanksgiving Day is pardoned by the President and not consumed, similarly one visa can also be left intact rather than used by the foreign national beneficiary.   So long as there is one visa kept available, it would provide the legal basis for an I-485 filing under a DFF, and this would be consistent with INA 245(a)(3) as well as 8 CFR 245.1(g)(1). DFF could potentially advance and become current, thus allowing hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries of I-140 petitions to file I-485 applications.

This same logic can be extended to beneficiaries of family-based I-130 petitions.

8 CFR 245.1(g)(1) could be amended (shown in bold) to expand the definition of visa availability:

An alien is ineligible for the benefits of section 245 of the Act unless an immigrant visa is immediately available to him or her at the time the application is filed. If the applicant is a preference alien, the current Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Bulletin will be consulted to determine whether an immigrant visa is immediately available. An immigrant visa is considered available for accepting and processing the application Form I-485 [if] the preference category applicant has a priority date on the waiting list which is earlier than the date shown in the Bulletin (or the Bulletin shows that numbers for visa applicants in his or her category are current) (“Final Action Date”). An immigrant visa is also considered available for submission of the I-485 application based on a provisional priority date (“‘Dates for Filing”) without reference to the Final Action Date. No provisional submission can be undertaken absent prior approval of the visa petition and only if all visas in the preference category have not been exhausted in the fiscal year. Final adjudication only occurs when there is a current Final Action Date. An immigrant visa is also considered immediately available if the applicant establishes eligibility for the benefits of Public Law 101-238. Information concerning the immediate availability of an immigrant visa may be obtained at any Service office.

 

Parole of Beneficiaries of Approved I-130 and I-140 petitions

With respect to beneficiaries of approved I-130 and I-140 petitions who are outside the US, they too can be paroled into the US upon their DFF becoming current. This would provide fairness to beneficiaries of approved petition who are within or outside the US.

However, due to a quirk in the law, beneficiaries of I-130 petitions should be able to file I-485 applications upon being paroled in the US since parole is considered a lawful status for purpose of filing an I-485 application. See 8 CFR 245.1(d)(1)(v). On the other hand, beneficiaries of I-140 petitions will not be eligible to file an I-485 application, even if paroled, since INA 245(c)(7) requires one who is adjusting based on an employment-based petition to be in a lawful nonimmigrant status. Parole, unfortunately, is not considered a nonimmigrant status.  Such employment-based beneficiaries may still be able to depart the US for consular processing of their immigrant visa once their FAD become current.

This proposal can be modelled on the Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program that allows certain beneficiaries of I-130 petitions from Haiti to be paroled into the US pursuant to INA 212(d)(5). See https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/the-haitian-family-reunification-parole-hfrp-program. (The Filipino World War II Veterans Program also has a liberal parole policy for direct and derivative beneficiaries of I-130 petitions, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/filipino-world-war-ii-veterans-parole-program).  Once the beneficiaries of I-130 petitions are paroled into the US, they can also apply for an EAD, and adjust status once their priority date becomes current. The HFRPP concept can be extended to beneficiaries of all I-130 and I-140 petitions, and parole eligibility can trigger when the filing date is current for each petition. Beneficiaries of I-130 petitions may file adjustment of status applications, as under the HFRPP, once they are paroled into the US. On the other hand, Beneficiaries of I-140 petitions, due to the limitation in INA 245(c)(7) would have to proceed overseas for consular processing once the FAD become current.

 

Protecting the Age of Child Under the Filing Date

The USCIS Policy Manual, https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-7-part-a-chapter-7,  states that only the FAD protects the age of the child under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA). Using the DFF to protect the age of the child who is nearing the age of 21 is clearly more advantageous – the date becomes available sooner than the FAD. Thus, if an I-485 application is filed pursuant to a DFF and the child ages out before the final date becomes available, the child will no longer be protected despite being permitted to file an I-485 application. The I-485 application will get denied, and if the child no longer has an underlying nonimmigrant status, can be put in great jeopardy through the commencement of removal proceedings, and even if removal proceedings are not commenced, can start accruing unlawful presence, which can trigger the 3 and 10 year bars to reentry. If the child filed the I-485 as a derivative with the parent, the parent can get approved for permanent residence when the final date becomes available while the child’s application gets denied.

There is a clear legal basis to use the filing date to protect the age of a child under the CSPA:

INA 245(a)(3) only allows for the filing of an I-485 adjustment of status application when “an immigrant visa is immediately available.” Yet, I-485 applications can be filed under the DFF rather than the FAD. As explained, the term “immigrant visa is immediately available” has been interpreted more broadly to encompass dates ahead of when a green card becomes available. Under INA 203(h)(1)(A), which codified Section 3 of the CSPA,  the age of the child under 21 is locked on the “date on which an immigrant visa number becomes available…but only if the [child] has sought to acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residency within one year of such availability.” If the child’s age is over 21 years, it can be subtracted by the amount of time the applicable petition was pending. See INA 203(h)(1)(B).

Under INA 245(a)(3), an I-485 application can only be filed when an “immigrant visa is immediately available.”

Therefore, there is no meaningful difference in the verbiage relating to visas availability – “immigrant visa becomes available” and “immigrant visa is immediately available” under INA 203(h)(1)(A) and INA 245(a)(3) respectively. If an adjustment application can be filed based on a Filing Date pursuant to 245(a)(3), then the interpretation regarding visa availability under 203(h)(1)(A) should be consistent, and so the Filing Date ought to freeze the age of the child, and the child may seek to acquire permanent residency within 1 year of visa availability, which can be either the Filing Date or the Final Action Date.

Unfortunately, USCIS disagrees. It justifies its position through the following convoluted explanation that makes no sense: “If an applicant files based on the filing date chart prior to the date of visa availability according to the final date chart, USCIS considers the applicant to have met the sought to acquire requirement. However, the applicant’s CSPA age calculation is dependent on visa availability according to the final date chart. Applicants who file based on the filing date chart may not ultimately be eligible for CSPA if their calculated CSPA age based on the final dates chart is 21 or older.” The USCIS recognizes that the sought to acquire requirement is met when an I-485 is filed under the DFF, but only the FAD can freeze the age! This reasoning is inconsistent. If an applicant is allowed to meet the sought to acquire requirement from the DFF, the age should also similarly freeze on the DFF and not the FAD. Based on USCIS’s inconsistent logic, the I-485s of many children will get denied if they aged out before the FAD becomes available.

USCIS must reverse this policy by allowing CSPA protection based on the DFF.

References

https://www.scribd.com/document/45650253/The-Tyranny-of-Priority-Dates-by-Gary-Endelman-and-Cyrus-D-Mehta-3-25-10

https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2010/03/286.html

https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2015/10/when-is-visa-immediately-available-for.html

https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2018/09/recipe-for-confusion-uscis-says-only-the-final-action-date-in-visa-bulletin-protects-a-childs-age-under-the-child-status-protection-act.html

https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2020/09/downgrading-from-eb-2-to-eb-3-under-the-october-2020-visa-bulletin.html

 

Cyrus Mehta

What If the Job Has Changed Since the Labor Certification Application Was Approved Many Years Ago?

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Foreign national workers who have been waiting in the employment-based second and third preference green card backlogs for many years have fortuitously become eligible to file I-485 adjustment of status applications due to the advancement of filing dates in the October 2020 Visa Bulletin.

Many of the labor certifications were filed between 2009 and 2014. A labor certification filed on behalf of a software engineer years ago may have been required to use very different technologies from today. Even the SOC Code 15-1031 for Software Engineer is now defunct and cross walks to SOC Code 15-1132 for Software Developer, Applications. In addition, the wage being paid is probably higher than what was indicated on the labor certification and the title may have changed to Vice President of Software Engineering or Director of Software Projects. While it is good news for the foreign national and the US employer when a skilled foreign national worker advances up the ladder, the employment-based immigration system requires that the duties still comply with what was indicated in the fossilized labor certification many years ago.

It is truly unfortunate that there has never been an expansion in the visa numbers in the employment based green card categories since the Immigration Act of 1990. Due to the per country limits within each employment preference, beneficiaries of approved labor certifications and I-140 petitions born in India are destined to wait in backlogs that can stretch over decades. The wait for the green card stalls careers and precludes job mobility.  It is thus fortunate that the India EB-3 Dates of Filing in the October 2020 Visa Bulletin advanced to January 1, 2015 allowing tens of thousands of beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions to become eligible to file I-485 adjustment of status applications.

Many are now finding that their job descriptions have changed since the approval of the labor certification and they have also been promoted a few times over. While section 204(j) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows the worker to exercise job portability to a same or similar occupation if the I-485 application has been pending for 180 days or more, such job mobility is not available at the time of filing the I-485. Whether the I-485 is being filed with either a concurrent I-140 petition, which may be a downgrade EB-3 petition, or by itself based on an old approved I-140 petition that is now current, it must be supported by a job offer from the employer that is substantially similar to the job described in the labor certification.

If the job has drastically changed, then the employer may need to file a new labor certification describing the new position, and if approved, a new I-140 petition that recaptures the old priority date. Alternatively, the employer may still offer the position in accordance with the terms of the approved labor certification. But the old job may have become obsolete due to a rapid advance in technology and it would also be unfair to expect the foreign worker to regress to the old job after a natural career progression. Yesterday’s programmer may have today become a machine learning engineer. Or the automotive engineer involved with the internal combustion engine is now a high voltage battery test engineer.   There is little USCIS guidance on dealing with career progression after a labor certification has been approved although it has been established USCIS  policy  that any material changes in the terms and conditions of employment requires an amended petition.  Unfortunately, a future visa bulletin may no longer have current filing dates by the time a new labor certification is granted, and there is a risk that in the current economic downturn, the new labor certification may not even get approved.

On the other hand, if the job role remains the same and requires the same skills set, but only the technologies have changed, it is still possible to rely on the previously approved labor certification. In the case of the software engineer, if the duties still include involvement in all phases of the life cycle development process, but the technology has changed and the position has more responsibility than before, it may be possible to describe the new position as being similar to the old position, but that the beneficiary is using updated technologies of those listed in the labor certification. An increase in the salary would not be of concern if it is generally for the same job described in the labor certification. Even a change in the job title should not be considered material so long as the position remains in the same SOC occupational code.

A recent AILA practice advisory suggests that when a promotion results in a substantial change “e.g., when a Software Engineer is promoted to Director of Engineering or a Biostatistician becomes a Manager, Machine Learning,” then a new labor certification and consequently a new I-140 petition is required. An incremental promotion, on the other hand, which does not alter the basic position duties or qualifications in any significant way, may not require a new labor certification. The AILA practice advisory provides the example of a “Biostatistician I who becomes a Biostatistician III with a salary increase but no substantial changes to duties or responsibilities. In this scenario, an employer may file a new I-140 based on the original Labor Certification to either upgrade or downgrade the beneficiary’s classification depending on which visa category is current.”

It is indeed a sad state of affairs that the tyrannical priority dates in the employment green card system have not just held up lives and careers of skilled immigrants for so many years, but the long waits also have the potential to render the prized labor certification approved years ago obsolete. It is hoped that the USCIS adopts a more flexible approach and makes allowances for job promotions and changes, even if the change is substantial, and even if the change has been from analyst to manager,  so long as the foreign national worker’s job description uses the same baseline skills and education, and is within the same or related SOC occupational code. Those who have waited patiently for so many years and played by the rules ought to be rewarded with a green card based on an old labor certification even if the job has naturally and incrementally progressed over time.

 

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Killing the H-1B Visa Also Kills the US Economy

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By Cyrus D. Mehta & Kaitlyn Box

Last week the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) each issued new rules aimed at further attacking the H-1B visa program. The DOL rule, which was issued without affording the public an opportunity for notice and comment, significantly raises the minimum required wage that employers must pay to H-1B employees. The new rule could increase prevailing wages for some positions by as much as 40% or more.  The rule goes into effect immediately. The rule’s stated purpose is to ensure that U.S. workers are not forced out of their jobs by cheap foreign labor, but it advances no support for the outdated notion that H-1B workers are systematically underpaid. It was promulgated without any notice and comment as required under the Administrative Procedures Act. The DOL’s spurious justification for this unfair surprise was to prevent employers from rushing to filing Labor Condition Applications under the old wage rates that would have been valid for three years.

The rule, which was likely aimed at making H-1B employees too costly for U.S. employers to hire, poses several legal quandaries.  As pointed out by Stuart Anderson in a Forbes article, U.S. employers, for example, could be forced to pay H-1B employees significantly higher wages than their American counterparts, causing them to run afoul of equal pay laws that require employees who are in a protected class, including nationality, to be paid wages that are equivalent to those earned by employees who are not members of the protected class. Take, for example, New York’s New York State’s Pay Equity Law, which prohibits employers from paying an employee who is a member of one of the protected classes less than a worker without protected status for equal or substantially similar work. N.Y. Labor Law art. 6, § 194 (1) (2019). “Protected Class” is defined to include gender, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or domestic violence victim.

By promulgating this latest rule, the DOL could also be forcing employers to violate its own rules regarding the payment of wages to H-1B workers. Under 20 CFR § 656.731(a), employers must pay H-1B workers the higher of the prevailing or the actual wage. The actual wage is the wage paid to all other individuals with similar experience and qualifications for the specific employment in question. An employer could be forced to pay new hires significantly higher wages than those paid to existing H-1B workers holding the same position, resulting in the existing employees being paid less than the actual wage in violation of 20 CFR § 656.731(a). Employers could raise wages across the board to avoid this situation, but increasing wages substantially and with little warning is unlikely to be feasible for most, and could ultimately result in layoffs and damage to the U.S. economy.

The DHS rule, which goes into effect on December 7, 2020, makes it more difficult yet for U.S. employers to win H-1B approvals by imposing language requiring a direct relationship between the specialized degree and the occupation. Under the new rule, a position does not qualify as a “specialty occupation” unless:

“(1) A U.S. baccalaureate or higher degree in a directly related specific specialty, or its equivalent, is the minimum requirement for entry into the particular occupation in which the beneficiary will be employed;

(2) A U.S. baccalaureate or higher degree in a directly related specific specialty, or its equivalent, is the minimum requirement for entry into parallel positions at similar organizations in the employer’s United States industry;

(3) The employer has an established practice of requiring a U.S. baccalaureate or higher degree in a directly related specific specialty, or its equivalent, for the position. The petitioner must also establish that the proffered position requires such a directly related specialty degree, or its equivalent, to perform its duties; or

(4) The specific duties of the proffered position are so specialized, complex, or unique that they can only be performed by an individual with a U.S. baccalaureate or higher degree in a directly related specific specialty, or its equivalent.”

(emphasis added)

Among the DHS rule’s most significant changes is the reduction of the H-1B visa validity period from the current three years to just one year when the H-1B worker will work at a third-party worksite. Additionally, the rule inserts the requirement that only positions requiring education or experience in a “directly related specific specialty” will qualify as specialty occupations, greatly limiting the number of individuals who can successfully qualify for an H-1B visa. Employees in IT-related fields, who often hold general degrees in engineering or computer science, are likely to have particular difficulty meeting this new requirement.

The rule also imposes burdens on employers who send H-1B workers to third-party worksites, apparently reviving some of the onerous requirements struck down in IT Serve Alliance v. Cissna. In assessing whether an employer-employee relationship exists, the new rule encourages closer scrutiny as to whether the requisite level of employee supervision exists when the employee is stationed at a third-party worksite. Additionally, employers who employ H-1B workers at third-party worksites must submit additional evidence such as “contracts, work orders, or other similar corroborating evidence showing that the beneficiary will perform services in a specialty occupation at the third-party worksite(s), and that the petitioner will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary”.

These new rules pose the potential for serious harm to both H-1B workers and the U.S. companies who employ them. Employers must file an extension for an H-1B worker whose status is expiring, but if they are not able to pay the employee the new, artificially inflated wages imposed by the DOL rule, the request for an extension may not be filed. Limitations in OES data have resulted in wages for some positions being entirely unavailable. For example, no wage data has been listed for a Software Developer, Systems in San Francisco since the new rule was promulgated on October 8, 2020. The default wage for Software Developer, Systems is $208,000. Similarly, little wage data is listed for physicians so they too must be paid the $208,000 default wage. Employers are forced to either pay the default wage, an exorbitant salary for many positions, or wait until wage data is available, potentially risking an untimely filing of the employee’s H-1B extension. If an extension is not filed, the H-1B employee would then be forced to rapidly depart the United States in the midst of a pandemic. Employers, particularly those in IT-related fields who employ numerous H-1B workers, who are unable to pay the new, substantially higher wages could be forced to lay off workers, or move their operations overseas. Foreign students graduating from US schools will not be hired by US employers if the entry level wage is ridiculously high. This will result in foreign students paying tuition fees to universities in other countries if their career prospects in the US will be diminished by these rules.  Nonprofits and startups will also find it impossible to pay these artificially inflated wages, which have no bearing whatsoever on the prevailing market wage.

Although litigation may soon challenge the new rules, putting U.S. employers in this difficult position for the time being does not bode well for the American economy’s chances of recovering from the effects of COVID-19. Forcing U.S. companies to reduce their workforce or move overseas to keep costs down also threatens the employment prospects of American workers who look to these same companies for jobs – ironic, as this is the very group whose interests the new rules are aimed at protecting.  Aspiring immigrants desire to come to America to succeed, and this in turn also benefits the US economy as they innovate and start or lead great companies. This is America’s secret sauce.  Nobody is denying that some aspects of the H-1B visa program should not be reformed, such as providing more job mobility to H-1B workers and providing them with a faster path to the green card, but these two new rules poison the secret sauce that keeps America so successful.

 

Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a Law Clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Frequently Asked Questions on Filing a “Downgrade” EB-3 petition under the October 2020 Visa Bulletin

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The October 2020 Visa Bulletin significantly advanced the  Filing Date of the employment-based third preference (EB-3) for India to January 1, 2015. This would make many beneficiaries with approved I-140 petitions caught in the EB-3 backlog eligible to file I-485 adjustment of status applications. Even those with approved I-140 petitions under the employment-based second preference (EB-2) could potentially file a downgrade I-140 petition under EB-3 and concurrently file I-485 applications.   Following the posting of our blog last week, Downgrading from EB-2 to EB-3 Under the October 2020 Visa Bulletin, we have received many questions, which I address below:

 

1. I have an approved I-140 petition under EB-2 with a priority date of May 15, 2013. Am I able to file a downgrade I-140 under EB-3 along with a concurrent I-485 application for myself, spouse and minor child?

Since the Filing Date for EB-2 India is May 15, 2011 in the October 2020 Visa Bulletin, and the priority date on your I-140 petition is May 15, 2013, you cannot file an I-485 with your I-140 petition under EB-2. However, your employ will be able to file a new downgrade I-140 petition under EB-3 (as a petition approved under EB-2 should meet the lower threshold requirement of EB-3 and the EB-3 date is January 1, 2015), based upon which you will be able to file a concurrent I-485, and your spouse and child will also be able to file I-485  applications as derivatives with your I-485  application.

 

2. How will filing an I-485 application benefit me?

Filing an I-485 application under a Filing Date will not result in permanent residency or the green card. The Final Action Date in the Visa Bulletin needs to become current for you to be eligible to receive the green card. The Filing Date is a prediction of where the Final Action Date will be at the end of the fiscal year. As this is just an estimate, there is a possibility that if the advance in dates results in many I-485 filings, the Filing Date can also retrogress rather than move forward. While your I-485 is pending, you and your derivative family members will be eligible to apply for an employment authorization document and advance parole or travel permission. If the I-485 application is pending for 180 days, you will also be able to exercise job portability under INA 204(j) in a same or similar occupation either with the same or another employer.

 

3. Must I be in a nonimmigrant status in order to be eligible to file the I-485?    What if I am in violation of my H-1B status since my last entry because my employer terminated me during the Covid-19 economic downturn 120 days ago, but now wishes to hire me back?

Yes. You need to be in a lawful nonimmigrant status as a condition to filing an I-485 application, but with an exception. If your employer terminated you 120 days back, you have been out of status for 60 days (as you were entitled to a 60 day grace period upon termination). Fortunately, under INA 245(k), you may still be eligible to file an I-485 as 245(k) renders one ineligible to apply for adjustment of status who has failed to maintain status for more than 180 days from your last admission. Since you failed to maintain status for 60 days from your last admission, you will still be able to file an I-485 application if your employer files the downgrade I-140. 245(k) will also apply to your spouse and child if they too fell out of status for less than 180 days.

Upon filing the I-485, you can also apply for an Employment Authorization Document. Upon receiving the EAD, your employer will be able to employ you.

 

4. Assuming that I was in H-1B status at the time of filing the I-485 application, do I still need to remain in H-1B status after I file the I-485 application?

While it is always prudent to remain in H-1B status (as one who is maintaining status cannot be placed in removal proceedings), it is not required as being an I-485 applicant authorizes you to remain in the US. However, an I-485 applicant without the underlying H-1B status can theoretically be placed in removal proceedings, although as a practical matter this rarely happens.  For instance, if you wish to port to a new employer, and the new employer is not willing to file an H-1B extension, you can rely on the employment authorization document that was issued to you as a pending I-485 applicant. Likewise, you may also rely on the advance parole for purposes of travel, and this would even obviate the need for you to seek a new H-1B visa from the US Consulate during the Covid-19 period, which may only issue emergency visa appointments.

 

5. What if the Final Action Date on my prior EB-2 I-140 becomes current before the Final Action Date on my EB-3 becomes current?

The USCIS does have the ability to use the most appropriate I-140 – whether under EB-2 or EB-3 – when the visa becomes available for the appropriate preference category. If the USCIS does not do this on its own volition, you can write to the USCIS to request that the I-485 application be transferred from one basis to another, see https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-7-part-a-chapter-8 .  Alternatively, you can also try calling the USCIS Contact Center at i-800-375-5283 and request a transfer of the I-485 from one basis to another. There is no need to file a new I-485 based on the EB-2 I-140 if the EB-2 Final Action Date becomes current.

 

6. My son is 18, will his age be protected under the Child Status Protection Act if he turns 21 and our I-485 applications are still pending?

Under current USCIS policy, the Filing Date does not freeze the age of the child based on the Filing Date (see Recipe for Confusion: USCIS Says Only the Final Action Date in the Visa Bulletin Protects a Child’s Age under the Child Status Protection Act). So, if the Final Action Date does not become current before your child turns 21, your child will not be able to adjust to permanent residence with you.  Note, however, that under the CSPA, you can subtract the number of days the I-140 petition remained pending from the age of your child if he is over 21 at the time the Final Action Date becomes current.

The lack of CSPA protection based on a Filing Date is erroneous policy. My colleague Brent Renison has filed a lawsuit to force USCIS to accept the Filing Date for CSPA protection, and you can visit his website, http://www.entrylaw.com/backlogcspalawsuit, to join the lawsuit in case your child will be impacted by this policy.

 

7. Should I request premium processing on the downgrade I-140 petition?

The USCIS has specifically indicated that premium processing for an I-140 will be precluded if the original labor certification was filed with the previous I-140 under EB-2, although some have requested premium and USCIS accepted request. If a child is involved who may need CSPA protection, then requesting premium on the I-140 is not advisable as you will be able to subtract more time (as the I-140 petition will take longer to get approved) from the child’s age in case the child turns 21.

 

8. I have an approved EB-3 I-140 filed by a prior employer with a priority date of January 1, 2014. My new employer has just filed my labor certification and is hoping to capture the priority date of the prior I-140 after the labor certification gets approved. Can I use the prior I-140 to file an I-485 application?

The prior employer would have to offer the job to you on an I-485 Supplement J. It has to be a bona fide offer of employment based on the terms of the underlying labor certification of that I-140. If is not a bona fide offer of employment, it would certainly not be advisable to go ahead and file the I-485 application based on the previously approved I-140. Rather, it would be prudent to wait for the labor certification to get approved and recapture the old priority date when the current employer is able to file the I-140 petition. However, there is no way of knowing whether the Filing Date will continue to be current by the time the new labor certification is approved. Still, this would be the only approach if the prior employer’s offer of employment is not bonafide.

 

9. Can the EB-3 I-140 downgrade be denied?

There is nothing in the law or regulations precluding the existence of two I-140 petitions, one under EB-2, and the other under EB-3. 8 CFR 204.5(e)(1), which was last amended in 2017,  contemplates the existence of multiple approved petitions on behalf of a single beneficiary even if filed by the same employer, and the beneficiary is entitled to capture the earliest priority date when a subsequently filed petition is approved. However, one cannot foreclose the possibility of a USCIS examiner inventing erroneous reasons to deny an EB-3 I-140 based on the same labor certification that supported an I-140 under EB-2.

Still, an I-140 downgrade can be denied on legitimate legal grounds such as if the employer cannot demonstrate ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary if the tax returns show losses, or if the USCIS revisits an issue that it did not pay attention to while adjudicating the prior I-140 petition such as whether the foreign degree was a single source degree.

 

10. If the EB-3 I-140 gets denied, will my previously I-140 EB-2 be safe?

If the grounds for denying the EB-3 were based on issues that were relevant to the approval of the EB-2, such as whether the beneficiary possesses a single source degree or whether the employer had the ability to pay the proffered wage at the time the labor certification was filed, then there is a risk that the I-140 under EB-2 can also get revoked.