Tag Archive for: EB-1

Will the Immigration Provisions in the AI Executive Order Bring Meaningful Change Or Be Mere Window Dressing?

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On October 30, 2023, President Biden issued an Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI). The stated purpose of the order is to ensure that the “development and use of AI” is governed “safely and responsibly”. The executive order further lays out eight “guiding principles and priorities” for the development and use of AI: “a.) Artificial Intelligence must be safe and secure, b.) Promoting responsible innovation, competition, and collaboration will allow the United States to lead in AI and unlock the technology’s potential to solve some of society’s most difficult challenges, c.) The responsible development and use of AI require a commitment to supporting American workers, d.) Artificial Intelligence policies must be consistent with [the] Administration’s dedication to advancing equity and civil rights, e.) The interests of Americans who increasingly use, interact with, or purchase AI and AI-enabled products in their daily lives must be protected, f.) Americans’ privacy and civil liberties must be protected as AI continues advancing, g.) It is important to manage the risks from the Federal Government’s own use of AI and increase its internal capacity to regulate, govern, and support responsible use of AI to deliver better results for Americans, and h.) The Federal Government should lead the way to global societal, economic, and technological progress, as the United States has in previous eras of disruptive innovation and change”. Although the executive order sets out numerous broad guidelines aimed at ensuring that AI is developed and used responsibly, it also includes several provisions that lay the groundwork for immigration policy innovations for AI experts.

Section 5 of the Executive Order first directs the DHS Secretary to “review and initiate any policy changes the Secretary determines necessary and appropriate to clarify and modernize immigration pathways for experts in AI and other critical and emerging technologies, including O-1A and EB-1 noncitizens of extraordinary ability; EB-2 advanced-degree holders and noncitizens of exceptional ability…” Although the executive order does not further specify what measures the DHS Secretary should take to achieve these goals, it is hoped that the criteria for O-1As and EB-1 and EB-2 I-140s could be expanded to make it easier for AI experts to qualify. In an emerging field such as AI, it could be difficult for a prospective O-1A candidate to demonstrate, for example, authorship of scholarly articles in the field or receipt of nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards for excellence in the field, as such scholarly publications and awards may not exist yet. O-1 and EB-1 candidates may already submit “comparable evidence” to establish eligibility if the listed criteria are not readily applicable to their occupation. This policy could allow prospective O-1 and EB-1 candidates to establish extraordinary ability by highlighting other evidence more relevant to the field of AI, to which the traditional criteria may not readily apply.  Interestingly, the executive order further states: “for purposes of considering updates to the “Schedule A” list of occupations, 20 C.F.R. 656.5, the Secretary of Labor shall publish a request for information (RFI) to solicit public input, including from industry and worker-advocate communities, identifying AI and other STEM-related occupations, as well as additional occupations across the economy, for which there is an insufficient number of ready, willing, able, and qualified United States workers”. “Schedule A” occupations are those for which the Department of Labor has “predetermined there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available pursuant to regulation”, so employers may file an I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers for a beneficiary in these occupations without a labor certification. For years the only Schedule A occupations have been nurses and physical therapists, and immigrants of exceptional ability in the sciences or arts, including college and university teachers, and immigrants of exceptional ability in the performing arts. Although a rulemaking would be required to add occupations to the Schedule A list, this change, if it were to go into effect, would be a significant change that would allow U.S. employers to sponsor noncitizen AI professionals for permanent residence without going through the burdensome labor certification process. The list of Schedule A occupations has not changed for decades, so it is high time that the list be expanded even beyond AI occupations to include others for which there are a shortage of U.S. workers, such as other computer occupations.

The executive order also states that the DHS Secretary should “continue its rulemaking process to modernize the H-1B program and enhance its integrity and usage, including by experts in AI and other critical and emerging technologies, and consider initiating a rulemaking to enhance the process for noncitizens, including experts in AI and other critical and emerging technologies and their spouses, dependents, and children, to adjust their status to lawful permanent resident”. On October 23, 2023, DHS promulgated a proposed rule amending its H-1B regulations. Cyrus Mehta’s previous blog discusses significant features of the proposed rule in depth. One of the points of concern in new the rule is its redefinition of “specialty occupation” to require studies in a field that is “directly related” to the H-1B position. The proposed rule further states, “A position is not a specialty occupation if attainment of a general degree, such as business administration or liberal arts, without further specialization, is sufficient to qualify for the position. A position may allow a range of degrees or apply multiple bodies of highly specialized knowledge, provided that each of those qualifying degree fields or each body of highly specialized knowledge is directly related to the position.” As AI is an emerging field, there are likely few degree programs that are specifically AI-focused as yet, so the definition of specialty occupation should not be narrowed such that it thwarts the ability of an AI specialist to obtain an H-1B visa. Given that AI is beginning to be used in fields ranging from finance to graphic design, introducing flexibility into the O-1A, EB-1/EB-2, and H-1B criteria could benefit numerous noncitizens who work with AI in some capacity.

The executive order also includes provisions that may benefit noncitizen students studying AI. It instructs the Secretary of State to “consider initiating a rulemaking to expand the categories of nonimmigrants who qualify for the domestic visa renewal program covered under 22 C.F.R. 41.111(b) to include academic J-1 research scholars and F-1 students in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)” and “establish, to the extent permitted by law and available appropriations, a program to identify and attract top talent in AI and other critical and emerging technologies at universities, research institutions, and the private sector overseas, and to establish and increase connections with that talent to educate them on opportunities and resources for research and employment in the United States, including overseas educational components to inform top STEM talent of nonimmigrant and immigrant visa options and potential expedited adjudication of their visa petitions and applications”. The State Department recently announced that it will soon launch a pilot stateside visa renewal program for certain H-1B and L-1 visa holders. Stateside visa processing was available for some nonimmigrants in the past, but has been suspended since 2004. Adding J-1 research scholars and F-1 STEM students to the list of nonimmigrants who can renew their visas in the U.S. would be a significant expansion of the reintroduced program, but would require a rulemaking to actually take effect.

Not all of the executive order’s provisions concerning J-1s will be beneficial for noncitizen research scholars, however. The executive order directs the Secretary of State to “consider initiating a rulemaking to establish new criteria to designate countries and skills on the Department of State’s Exchange Visitor Skills List as it relates to the 2-year foreign residence requirement for certain J-1 nonimmigrants, including those skills that are critical to the United States”. This requirement prevents certain J-1s from changing to H or L status in the U.S., adjusting status, or receiving an immigrant visa or H, L, or K visa until they have first spent two cumulative years in their home country. Waivers of this requirement are only available to J-1 who can meet certain very narrow criteria, such as establishing that their departure from the U.S. would result in exceptional hardship to their U.S. citizen or LPR spouse or child, or that they would face persecution if they returned to their home country. Expanding the skills list could result in more J-1 scholars being required to return to their home countries for two years after completing their programs, rather than being able to remain in the U.S. to take up employment and contribute to developments in the AI field.

Many of the immigration policy changes suggested in the executive order could greatly benefit noncitizen AI experts. However, the executive order itself in many instances merely directs the relevant agencies to “consider initiating a rulemaking” to implement the changes. So, while the policies laid out in the executive order may come as largely welcome news to noncitizen students, scholars, and professionals in the AI field, some changes remain aspirational for now until put into effect through a regulation. However, USCIS directly implemented changes to its Policy Manual regarding O-1s and EB-1s in STEM fields, so it is hoped that the agency will take similar action to assist AI experts. .

While the executive order intends to bring about positive changes that would enable AI experts to work in the US, only Congress can bring about meaningful change. While the executive order can provide guidance to USCIS officers to consider O-1, EB-1 and EB-2 petitions in favor of the AI specialist, the potential changes may not be so attractive to the AI specialist who may be considering other countries like Canada and the UK if the backlogs in the employment-based categories continue to persist especially for those born in India.  Moreover, if the H-1B cap continues to remain at 85,000 subjecting applicants to a randomized lottery, the best and the brightest in the AI field will choose to go somewhere else as America is not the only game in town. Unless Congress acts fast to infuse more visas in the legal immigration system, the changes in the executive order may prove to be only window dressing.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Using U.S. Immigration Law to Undermine Putin

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, there has rightly been much discussion of how to assist the Ukraine and its citizens. The United States’ immigration laws can plainly be employed to assist Ukrainian nationals who wish to seek refuge in the United States, including extending Temporary Protected Status for them. However, immigration can serve another important function, as well. One can harness immigration avenues that are already open to Russian citizens to welcome Russia’s “best and brightest” to the United States, thereby undermining Putin’s tyrannical regime. While immigration attorneys and advocates may not be able help courageous Ukrainians in the battlefield, we can help their cause by using our immigration law expertise in creatively finding pathways for Russians opposing Putin to come to the US.

In recent weeks, Putin has cracked down on those within the country who object to the war, targeting journalists who even refer to the operations in Ukraine as a “war” or “conflict”.  Many educated Russians who impose the war have been forced to leave the country out of fear of arrest or worse. With more and more companies and institutions withdrawing from Russia, many also find themselves concerned about the future of their career and ability to earn a living. Along with journalists, bloggers, and activists, I.T. professionals and other creatives have been leaving Russia in droves since the onset of the war.

Offering Russian nationals who oppose the war a safe harbor is a worthy objective in and of itself, but attracting Russian talent to the United States can serve another goal as well – undermining the Kremlin’s power and influence. The United States would undoubtedly benefit from an influx of Russian scientists, researchers, I.T. professionals and other skilled workers, and the Russian military and economy would suffer from the loss of this talent. Offering Russian nationals a streamlined process for immigration to the United States, as well as connecting them to employers and universities in the country, would assist in attracting top talent.

In the current absence of targeted programs for fleeing Russians, however, existing immigration options can help fleeing Russian national who wish to relocate to the United States. Russian nationals of extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics may be eligible for an employment-based, first-preference visa. In order to obtain an EB-1 visa, one must provide evidence of a one-time achievement of major, internationally-recognized award on the level of an Oscar or Pulitzer Prize, or meet 3 of the following 10 criteria:

  • Evidence of receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards for excellence
  • Evidence of your membership in associations in the field which demand outstanding achievement of their members
  • Evidence of published material about you in professional or major trade publications or other major media
  • Evidence that you have been asked to judge the work of others, either individually or on a panel
  • Evidence of your original scientific, scholarly, artistic, athletic, or business-related contributions of major significance to the field
  • Evidence of your authorship of scholarly articles in professional or major trade publications or other major media
  • Evidence that your work has been displayed at artistic exhibitions or showcases
  • Evidence of your performance of a leading or critical role in distinguished organizations
  • Evidence that you command a high salary or other significantly high remuneration in relation to others in the field
  • Evidence of your commercial successes in the performing arts

A noncitizen of extraordinary ability must also be able to demonstrate that she intends to continue working in her area of expertise. Importantly, no offer of employment or labor certification is required for an EB-1 visa.

Similarly, highly talented Russian nationals could consider applying for an O-1 visa, the nonimmigrant parallel to an EB-1 visa, as the O-1 visa can be effectuated more rapidly. Individuals with an extraordinary ability in the sciences, education, business, or athletics may be eligible for an O-1A visa, while those with an extraordinary ability in the arts or extraordinary achievement in motion picture or television industry may be eligible for an O-1B visa. A U.S. employer must file an O-1 petition on behalf of a foreign national of extraordinary ability, and must demonstrate that the beneficiary meets the relevant criteria. There are other visa options under immigration law, such as the H-1B visas and permanent residency in the employment and family based categories, although we have highlighted two that would be applicable to the “best and brightest.”

 Finally, Russian nationals who have publicly expressed opposition to the war, or even reported on it,  may also be eligible for asylum in the United States. Russia has already opened cases, both administrative and criminal, against people who have protested or written about the war.   As noted, on March 4, 2022 Russia enacted two laws, adopted and brought into force on March 4, that criminalize independent war reporting and protesting the war, with penalties of up to 15 years in prison. The laws make it illegal to spread “fake news” about the Russian armed forces, to call for an end to their deployment and to support sanctions against Russian targets. On March 23, 2022, Russia’s Parliament adopted amendments effectively expanding the ban on criticizing the armed forces to banning criticism of all Russian government actions abroad. Individuals who have a well-founded fear of persecution based on past persecution or a risk of future persecution due to their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion may be eligible for asylum. They must be in the US or must be apply at a land border post or port of entry. If they come in through Mexico and apply at the Southern Border, they will be subject to Title 42 that has been used by both the Trump and Biden administrations to block asylum seekers out of fear that they will bring Covid-19 into the US. The Biden administration has exempted Ukrainians from Title 42 on a case by case basis, but Russians will be subject to Title 42.   Given the Putin regime’s recent increased sanctions on those who even discuss the war against Ukraine, Russian nationals who have openly opposed the invasion could potentially have a viable political opinion-based asylum claim.

The Biden administration has recently announced that the United States will accept up to 100,000 Ukrainian refugees, but U.S. immigration policy assist the victims of Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine in another way, also. By attracting highly skilled Russian nationals who oppose the war, the United States can both drain the Kremlin of key talent and shelter civilians who face danger in Russia through the effective deployment of US immigration policy. As the atrocities committed by Putin increase by the day, Russian nationals themselves, and the United States’ reception of these individuals, may be a key to achieving peace.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Isn’t Being Extraordinary More Than Enough?  There’s No Need for USCIS to Ask for a Prospective Benefit to the US

By Cyrus Mehta and Patrick Matutina

We have previously blogged regarding The Curse of Kazarian v. USCIS in Extraordinary Ability Adjudications Under the Employment-Based First Preference. Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010),as interpreted by the USCIS, has resulted in a two part test for Extraordinary Ability petitions (EB-1). In the first part of the test, the USCIS has to determine whether the individual has demonstrated “sustained national or international acclaim. However, even after meeting the first part of the test, the individual has to establish through a vague and undefined “final merits determination” that he or she is extraordinary.

Evidence to demonstrate “sustained national or international acclaim” – the first part of the test – could be a one-time achievement such as a major international award (for example, a Nobel Prize, Oscar or Grammy). If the applicant is not the recipient of such an award then documentation of any three of the following is sufficient:

  • Receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards.
  • Membership in an association in the field for which classification is sought, which requires outstanding achievement of its members, as judged by recognized national or international experts.
  • Published material about the person in professional or major trade publications or other major media.
  • Participation as a judge of the work of others.
  • Evidence of original scientific, scholastic, artistic, athletic or business-related contributions of major significance.
  • Authorship of scholarly articles in the field, in professional or major trade publications or other media.
  • Artistic exhibitions or showcases.
  • Performance in a leading or cultural role for organizations or establishments that have a distinguished reputation.
  • High salary or remuneration in relation to others in the field.
  • Commercial success in the performing arts.

See 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x). An applicant may also submit comparable evidence if the above standards do not readily apply.

Post-Kazarian decisions have generally affirmed the two-part test and final merits determination analysis. Albeit at times seeming to nonetheless conflate the two tests in practice. (See Rijal v. USCIS, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (W.D. Wash. 2011), aff’d Rijal v. USCIS, 683 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2012) (criticizing the USCIS’s conclusion that a prize did not meet the evidentiary criterion of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards of excellence” but nonetheless finding that the petitioner did not suffer prejudice from these errors as it made those errors with an eye toward the ultimate merits determination). Recently, however, a disturbing pattern has emerged that practitioners must vigorously push back against.

To reiterate, an individual whose achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation, may obtain permanent residence in the United States under the employment-based first preference (EB-1) by establishing extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business or athletics. See INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(i). However, in addition to satisfying the provisions of INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(i), the individual must also show that she seeks entry to continue work in the area of extraordinary ability, and that her entry will also substantially benefit prospectively the U.S. See INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(ii) & (iii).

As we have shown, voluminous case law and policy memorandum may assist us in interpreting the provisions of INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(i). Recent Requests for Evidence (“RFE”) received by this office, however, suggest that the newest brick in the current administration’s “invisible wall” may be to require petitioners to respond to INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(iii), which has heretofore been unmoored from any authoritative interpretation.

We are seeing RFEs requesting extensive documentation to establish how the beneficiary’s entry will substantially benefit prospectively the United States pursuant to INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(iii). Here is an example from a very recent RFE received in November 2019:

Documentation to establish that the beneficiary’s entry will substantially benefit prospectively the United States

 It must be shown how the beneficiary’s entry will substantially benefit prospectively the United States. The petition does not indicate that the beneficiary’s entry will substantially benefit prospectively the United States. Please submit evidence that the beneficiary’s entry will substantially benefit prospectively the United States. Evidence that may be submitted to satisfy this requirement includes, but is not limited to:

  •  Letters from current or prospective employers, or individuals who work in the beneficiary’s field;
  • Other evidence explaining how the beneficiary’s work will be advantageous and of use to the interests of the United States on a national level

 

When faced with such a request, how should a Petitioner respond? On first brush it may seem prudent to substantively respond to such a request. But responding in such a manner could lead one down a veritable “rabbit’s hole” with no exit given the lack of authoritative guidance on the matter. One “middle path” approach may be to substantively respond to a request for evidence of prospective benefit, albeit while navigating without a GPS, while simultaneously, and forcefully, arguing that such evidence is nonetheless not required as discussed further below.

A request to show “substantial benefit” at a national level would be more appropriate if the I-140 petition was filed requesting a “national interest waiver” of the Labor Certification Application requirement of EB-2 Petitions under INA §203(b)(2)(B)(i). Briefly, under the standard articulated in Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884 (AAO 2016), after eligibility for EB-2 classification has been established, USCIS may grant a national interest waiver if a Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:

  • The foreign national’s proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance.
  • The foreign national is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor.
  • On balance, it would be beneficial to the United States to waive the requirements of a job offer and thus of a labor certification.

Such a conflation between the EB-1 criteria and the National Interest Waiver is clearly inappropriate. INA §203(b)(2)(B)(i) explicitly requires that the job offer and labor certification be waived if the foreign national will serve the national interest of the United States. INA §203(b)(1)(A) requires the foreign national to demonstrate that he or she is a person of extraordinary ability. In fact, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service determined over two decades ago that the regulations do not require the submission of any such evidence prospective benefit in relation to EB-1 Petitions. See letter from E. Skerrett, Chief, Immigrant Branch, Adjudications, INS (Mar. 8, 1995), reprinted in 72 Interpreter Releases 445–47 (Mar. 27, 1995) (“prospective advantage” may generally be assumed except in rare instances where an extraordinary foreign national’s field of work might somehow be detrimental to U.S. interests). Crucially, the regulations do not specifically define prospective advantage, and it has subsequently been interpreted very broadly. See e.g. Matter of Price, 20 I&N Dec. 953 (Assoc. Comm. 1994) (golfer of beneficiary’s caliber will substantially benefit prospectively the United States given the popularity of the sport). See Special Considerations Relating to EB-1 Cases, Adjudicator’s Field Manual Ch. 22.2, USCIS (November 27, 2019),  https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-6330/0-0-0-6423.html.  See also Buletini v. INS, 860 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Mich 1994) (“the assumption [is] that persons of extraordinary ability working in their field of expertise will benefit the United States”). Moreover the USCIS Policy Memorandum, which invented the two-part test from its interpretation of Kazarian, is silent regarding how to interpret INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(iii). Therefore, the substantial benefit criterion is ordinarily met through the other two criteria under INA §§203(b)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). There is also no independent regulation implementing INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(iii). Indeed, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(5), while acknowledging that the EB-1 does not require a job offer, requires evidence that the foreign national is coming to the United States to work in the area of expertise, this is to meet INA §203(b)(1)(A)(A)(ii), and if this is met, then the person has also implicitly been able to demonstrate that they will prospectively benefit the United States. The RFE requiring evidence of prospective benefit to the United States through letters from employers and others invents a regulation in violation of the notice and comment requirement under the Administrative Procedures Act.

It remains to be seen if this indeed a new theatre in the current administration’s war on immigrants. However, practitioners should remain vigilant in their watch and continue to push back on such attempts to apply standards such as this, which are fundamentally ultra vires. Practitioners must continue to attempt to have USICS accept that the petitioner meets 3 out of the 10 criteria, and then fight USCIS under step 2 final merits determination, and finally reiterate that the substantial benefit criterion is ordinarily met through the other two criteria under INA §§203(b)(A)(i) and (II). Under a burden shifting approach, the Petitioner should be deemed qualified, and the burden should be on the Service to reject the Petitioner pursuant to INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(iii) based on specific and substantiated reasons. To do otherwise could allow the curse of Kazarian to continue to grow unchecked and untethered from legal principle.

The Curse of Kazarian v. USCIS in Extraordinary Ability Adjudications Under the Employment-Based First Preference

When Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010), was first decided, it was received with much jubilation as it was thought that the standards for establishing extraordinary ability would be more straightforward and streamlined. Kazarian essentially holds that a petitioner claiming extraordinary ability need not submit extraordinary evidence to prove that he or she is a person of extraordinary ability. If one of the evidentiary criteria requires a showing of scholarly publications, the petitioner need not establish that the scholarly publications in themselves are also extraordinary in order to qualify as a person of extraordinary ability. This is a circular argument, which Kazarian appropriately shot down.  If Kazarian just stopped there, it would have been a wonderful outcome. Unfortunately, Kazarian has been interpreted to also require a vague and second step analysis known as the “final merits determination,” which can stump even the most extraordinary.

As background, an individual can obtain permanent residence in the US under the employment-based first preference (EB-1) by establishing extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business or athletics which has been demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation. See INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(i). Furthermore, the individual seeks entry to continue work in the area of extraordinary ability and his or her entry will substantially benefit prospectively the U.S. See INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(ii) & (iii). Unlike most other petitions, no job offer is required and one can even self-petition for permanent residency. Evidence to demonstrate “sustained national or international acclaim” could be a one-time achievement such as a major international award (for example, a Nobel Prize, Oscar or Grammy). If the applicant is not the recipient of such an award then documentation of any three of the following is sufficient:

  • Receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards.
  • Membership in an association in the field for which classification is sought, which requires outstanding achievement of its members, as judged by recognized national or international experts.
  • Published material about the person in professional or major trade publications or other major media.
  • Participation as a judge of the work of others.
  • Evidence of original scientific, scholastic, artistic, athletic or business-related contributions of major significance.
  • Authorship of scholarly articles in the field, in professional or major trade publications or other media.
  • Artistic exhibitions or showcases.
  • Performance in a leading or cultural role for organizations or establishments that have a distinguished reputation.
  • High salary or remuneration in relation to others in the field.
  • Commercial success in the performing arts.

See 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x). An applicant may also submit comparable evidence if the above standards do not readily apply.

In Kazarian, the main bone of contention was what constitutes “authorship of scholarly articles in the field, in professional or major trade publications or other media.” In the original decision, Kazarian v. USCIS, 580 F.3d 1030 (Kazarian 1), the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Appeals Administrative Office (AAO) that “publication of scholarly articles is not automatically evidence of sustained acclaim; we must consider the research community’s reaction to those articles.” The court in Kazarian 1 acknowledged that this reasoning “may be circular, because publication, on its own, indicates approval within the community.” However, the court went on to justify the AAO’s circular reasoning probably unmindful of the adverse impact that it would have for future EB-1 petitioners, “Because postdoctoral candidates are expected to publish, however, the agency’s conclusion that the articles must be considered in light of the community’s reaction is not contrary to the statutory mandate that the alien have achieved “sustained national or international acclaim.” (citation omitted).

It was precisely this reasoning that  the new Kazarian decision reversed, on the ground that it was inconsistent with the governing regulation, 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(3)(vi), which simply states, “Evidence of the alien’s authorship of scholarly articles in the field, in professional or major trade publications or other major media.” The regulation does not require consideration of the research community’s reaction to those articles, which was essentially an invention of the USCIS.

Unfortunately after the initial victory, Kazarian, as interpreted by the USCIS, has resulted in a two part test. In the first part of the test, the USCIS has to determine whether the individual has met three of the 10 criteria to establish extraordinary ability. However, that is not sufficient and does not result in an approval. Even after meeting the first part of the test, the individual has to establish through a vague and undefined “final merits determination” that he or she is extraordinary.

Whether we like it or not, the two part test, based on the USCIS’s interpretation of Kazarian is here to stay with us – at least for now – and the focus of this article is to suggest ways to confront it and still win petitions for persons of extraordinary ability or outstanding professors and researchers.

In its December 22, 2010 Policy Memorandum, (“Policy Memorandum”), USCIS implemented a “two-part adjudicative approach” for extraordinary ability, outstanding researcher and professor, and exceptional ability immigrant visa petitions. The Service cites Kazarian as the basis for modifying the Adjudicator’s Field Manual to include a second step in the adjudication process, the “final merits determination.” Although Kazarian did not actually create a “final merits determination,” and objected essentially to the AAO’s imposition of extra requirements under the evidentiary criteria in 8 CFR §§ 204.5(h)(3)(iv) and (vi), the Service seized on the following dicta in Kazarian as a basis for justifying a “final merits determination” analysis:

(1) While other authors’ citations (or lack thereof) might be relevant to the final merits determination of whether a petitioner is at the very top of his or her field of endeavor, they are not relevant to the antecedent procedural question of whether the petitioner has provided at least three types of evidence (emphasis added); and

(2) …[W]hile the AAO’s analysis might be relevant to a final merits determination, the AAO may not unilaterally impose a novel evidentiary requirement (emphasis added).

Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d at 1121.

Under this two part test, the USCIS must essentially accept the evidence of extraordinary ability under the 10 criteria set forth in 8 CFR §204.5(h) (3)(i)-(x). The USCIS cannot object to the submission of the alien’s “scholarly articles in the field, in professional or major trade publications or other major media” under §204.5(h)(vi) unless there is consideration of the research community’s reaction to those articles, as it did erroneously in Kazarian. Still, the USICS may take this extra evidentiary factor into consideration, namely, the lack of reaction in the research community, during the “final merits determination” analysis. It is readily apparent that the analysis under the second step defeats the very essence of the holding in Kazarian that the USCIS cannot impose extra requirements under the evidentiary criteria. What it cannot do under the first step, the USCIS can still do under the “final merits determination.”

Post Kazarian decisions have generally affirmed the two-part test and final merits determination analysis notwithstanding the holding in a prior decision, Buletini v. INS, 860 F.Supp. 1222 (E.D. Mich 1994), which held, “[o]nce it is established that the alien’s evidence is sufficient to meet three of the criteria listed in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3), the alien must be deemed to have extraordinary ability unless the INS sets forth specific and substantiated reasons for its finding that the alien does not meet extraordinary ability.” Id. at 1234.  Under the burden shifting approach in Buletini, the petitioner should be deemed qualified, and the burden then shifts  onto  the  Service to reject the evidence that meet the criteria, if suppose, it finds that the evidence was  fraudulent or too dated and stale. Moreover, even while courts have adopted the final merits analysis, they seem to also be upholding the USCIS’s conflation of the step one analysis with the step two analysis.

Rijal v. USCIS, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (W.D. Wash. 2011), aff’d Rijal v. USCIS, 683 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2012) is a decision that explicitly follows the Policy Memorandum, ignored the burden shifting approach as set forth in Buletini and conflated the two steps.  Although the petitioner in Rijal, a Nepali documentary film maker, submitted a UNICEF prize, the USCIS concluded that it did not meet the evidentiary criterion of “lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards of excellence”   as it was awarded more than 4 years ago and did not provide evidence of the alien’s sustained acclaim. While the court criticized the USICS for failing to consider this evidence under 8 CFR §204.5(h)(3)(i) and for similar errors under other evidentiary criteria, it nevertheless held that the petitioner did not suffer prejudice from these errors as “it made those errors with an eye toward the ultimate merits determination.” Rijal at 1347.  Based on a holistic determination of the petitioner’s evidence, the court held that the USCIS appropriately found that the petitioner did not demonstrate sustained national or international acclaim. It is clear that the court in Rijal affirmed the two step test set forth in the Policy Memorandum even though the suggestion of a “final merits determination” was mere dicta in Kazarian. However, instead of remanding the case because of the USCIS’s faulty step one analysis in rejecting the evidence, the Rijal court held these errors to be harmless under the step two final merits determination.

Noroozi and Assadi v. Napolitano is another decision, albeit unpublished, from the Southern District of New York that has agreed with the Kazarian two-step analysis, but also seemed to agree with the USCIS’s conflation of the two. Petitioner Noroozi represented Iran in table tennis at the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. Although neither Noroozi nor the Iranian table tennis team won any medal at the Olympics, the USICS initially approved the EB-1 petition, but then subsequently revoked it. A second EB-1 petition was filed, which was denied on the ground that Noroorzi only met two of the criteria, but not three. The court agreed with the USCIS that there was no evidence to substantiate that he played a “leading or critical role” for his team and nor did the “published material” about him pass muster since it focused more on the team and only briefly mentioned Noroozi. Although the failure to meet the evidentiary criteria could have ended the analysis, the court also discussed how Noroozi did not merit a favorable judgment under the second part “final merits determination.”  Since Noroozi ranked 284th in the world in table tennis, and finished 65th place in table tennis in the 2008 Olympics, the court noted that this would oblige the USCIS to hypothetically grant EB-1 petitions to the 283 higher ranked table tennis players, and also to the 283 higher ranked players in other sports, assuming they were non-US citizens, as well as to the 64 table tennis players who outperformed Noroozi in the 2008 Olympics. The court’s “final merits determination” in Noroozi is troubling as the EB-1 was never intended only for the number one player in a sporting field, and this decision should be contrasted with a pre-Kazarian decision involving an ice hockey player in the National Hockey League whose team won the Stanley Cup, but was not an all-stars or one of the highest paid players, but was still found to be qualified under EB-1. See Muni v. INS, 891 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill 1995).  The “final merits determination” permits USCIS to set subjective baselines with respect to rankings of   players in sports even if they would potentially qualify under the ten evidentiary criteria as Muni did after he sought reversal of the denial of his EB-1 petition in federal court. Interestingly, in Noroozi, the attorney also became a plaintiff along with the petitioner on the ground that the USCIS denied the EB-1 petition based on the petitioner’s association with the attorney who had been unfairly singled out in a DOS cable. That strategy too failed since the court rejected that there was any bad faith on the part of the USCIS in denying Noroozi’s EB-1 petition.

Various unpublished AAO decisions [See e.g. AILA InfoNet Document Nos. 12062752 and 12062753]   suggest that the government’s final merits determination will consider evidence whether or not the petitioner has demonstrated : 1) a “level of expertise indicating that the individual is one of the small percentage who have risen to the very top of the[ir] field of endeavor,” 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(2); and 2) “that the alien has sustained national or international acclaim and that his or her achievements have been recognized in the field of expertise.” § INA 203(b)(1)(A); 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(3). See also Kazarian, 596 F.3d at 1119-20.   While it makes sense to preserve the argument in the record that the final merits determination is inapplicable and to propose the burden shifting approach under Buletini instead, it also behooves a petitioner to argue that his or her client merits a favorable adjudication under the “final merits determination” analysis given that it has been blessed in post-Kazarian decisions.  The amorphous nature of this standard allows the petitioner’s attorney flexibility to make a broad argument just as it gives the USCIS examiner the same flexibility to approve or not approve a case even after the petitioner has submitted evidence under the evidentiary criteria. For instance, if a petitioner has met 3 out of 10 evidentiary criteria, the agile practitioner may be able to argue that the petitioner has demonstrated to be among the small percentage who has risen to the top of the field, sustained national or international acclaim, and recognition of achievements, by highlighting only the strongest evidence rather than evidence submitted under all three criteria. If the scholarly articles are very impressive, but the awards are not and the petitioner may have judged the work of only one PhD student, then the focus could be on the impressive scholarly articles when qualifying him or her under the final merits determination. Moreover, under the final merits determination, a petitioner may be able to point to other evidence that may not categorically fall under the 10 evidentiary criteria, such as testimonials from eminent authorities in the field, as well as petitioner’s stellar academic background. Of course, if the evidence submitted under the evidentiary criteria is all qualitatively superior and extensive, then the practitioner must not rest on these laurels and take pains to highlight this for the final merits determination. Finally, the practitioner must always remind the USICS that the final merits determination is governed by the preponderance of evidence standard, as suggested in the Policy Memorandum too, which requires only 51% certainty.

In more recent cases, the USCIS has continued to conflate the step one with the step two analysis by rejecting that the petitioner met the evidentiary criteria and thus  bypassing the step two final merits determination altogether. A petitioner may seek review under the Administrative Procedure Act asking a federal court to find that the USCIS decision was arbitrary and capricious by conflating the two steps. Therefore, if we in any event have to deal with Kazarian, one strategy is to force USCIS to adopt the two steps if it only denied the case under step one.   Thus, in Eguchi v. Kelly, another unpublished decision, the USCIS denied an EB-1 petition of a Brazilian bullfighter. Eguchi submitted evidence that he won Brazil’s PBR Rookie of the Year in 2008. USCIS rejected the award on the ground that “such an award by its very nature is limited to neophytes, excluding more experienced bull riders. And therefore, such an honor does not measure your standing or selection from among those who are well established in the field or show your extraordinary ability under this criterion.”  The court disagreed since USCIS was conflating the step two final merits determination when the regulation only required Eguchi to submit evidence of receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards for excellence in the field of endeavor, which he did. Eguchi also submitted articles from various publications, including Yahoo! Sports, ESPN, and PBR’s website. The articles acknowledge Eguchi’s high rankings, victories, and earnings in PBR events. USCIS concluded that Eguchi submitted no evidence that PBR’s website is a major trade publication. The court held that it was self-evident that the website of the world’s premier professional bull riding association is a major publication for professional bull riding. The court also cited Muni v. INS., supra, at 444 which concluded that the petitioner did not need to show that National Hockey League’s (“NHL’s”) own magazine was major trade publication. Eguchi submitted evidence that he had earned over $700,000 in PBR events and ranked 44th on the association’s all-time money list—a ranking of the top earners in PBR history. He also submitted a history of PBR, which states that “[m]ore than 1,200 bull riders from the U.S., Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico hold PBR memberships. But USCIS disputed this evidence on the ground that Eguchi’s earnings did not compare with the top 3 earners, whose earning have grossed between 3.9 and 5.15 million dollars, thus failing to establish that he is one of that small percentage who have risen to the very top of their endeavor. The court again smacked down USCIS that it impermissibly conflated step 1 with step 2.  At step one, according to the court, Eguchi was not obligated to prove that his salary illustrates that he is one of a small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor and enjoy sustained national or international acclaim. Rather, Eguchi need only provide documentation showing that he has commanded a high salary or other significantly high remuneration for services, in relation to others in the field. According to the court, USCIS only focused on the top 2 or 3 earners in the sport but ignored the earnings of 1,200 PBR members.

Although the court in Eguchi v. Kelly found the USCIS’s denial to be arbitrary and capricious, and remanded, this author is unaware of the outcome of this case after it got remanded. It remains to be seen whether USCIS in similar cases will find a way to deny the petition again under the step two final merits determination analysis after a court has remanded based on the faulty analysis under step one. However, it still at least behooves the practitioner have a court hold the USCIS to the two step analysis rather than let USCIS conveniently deny the petition under step one. This is precisely what happened in Visinscaia v. Beers, 4 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D.D.C. December 16, 2013) involving an EB-1 petition for a ballroom dancer from Moldova. The court agreed with the USCIS that the petitioner failed to provide evidence that she influenced the field with her dance techniques, although it seemed that the USCIS conflated step two with step one. The court also agreed with USCIS that the petitioner had not played a leading role in a dance club in Moldova, which petitioner claimed had a distinguished reputation in Moldova, but USCIS countered that the club’s reputation did not extend beyond the borders of Moldova. Here too, the USCIS conflated step two with step one, which the Court endorsed. Finally, the USCIS interpreted the artistic exhibitions criterion as only including “visual arts”, where “tangible pieces of art … were on display” and not dance performances. This was a strained interpretation of the regulation, but the court still gave deference to the agency’s interpretation. Finally, the court also agreed with the rejection of the USCIS’s strained interpretation that “lesser national and international awards” must involve winning more than one such award, and the petitioner in that case only won one world championship in the World Dance Sport Federation Junior II Ten category.

Petitioners must at least try to get USICS to accept that the petitioner meets 3 out of the 10 criteria, and then fight USCIS under step 2 final merits determination. If the USCIS can knock out the petitioner under step 1, the game is over. The author highly recommends the reader to Recent Trends in EB 1 Extraordinary Ability and Outstanding Professor/Researcher Green Card Petitions by Dan Berger, Emma Binder, Philip Katz, David Wilks, and Stephen Yale‑Loehr. This insightful article surveys recent decisions of the AAO in the EB-1 extraordinary ability and Outstanding Professor/Researcher arena. It provides useful guidance regarding what kinds of evidence will be accepted under the 10 evidentiary criteria. Under the outstanding contributions of major significance evidentiary criterion, the authors point to AAO decisions that suggest that the contribution must have “measurably” expanded the scholarship such as in the case of an insect researcher whose discovery of ninety‑six new species of jumping spiders represented “10% of the overall documented information regarding certain spider families.” With respect to the authorship of scholarly articles prong, the authors have analyzed decisions where the “AAO is critical of inconsistent and declining publication records. According to the AAO, a publication rate that has declined in the past five years or so may indicate a lack of sustained acclaim, even if the individual published prolifically in prior years.”

Still, this begs the question that Kazarian sought to clarify, which is that the evidence submitted by the petitioner need not inherently be extraordinary under step one. That has to be determined in the step two final merits determination analysis. But, unfortunately, the Kazarian two step analysis is fundamentally flawed for it will continue to confuse and confound USCIS adjudicators and courts where the merits determination is often made under step one, and if it is not, the evidence is rejected under step two. If only one can convince a federal court to adopt the clearer standard in Buletini v. INS, the two step analysis under Kazarian will continue to roil EB-1 extraordinary ability adjudications.

A prior version of this blog, How Extraordinary Must One Be to Qualify as a Person of Extraordinary Ability, was published on The Insightful Immigration Blog on July 5, 2013, https://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2013/07/how-much-more-extraordinary-does-one.html

 

Reviving The National Interest Waiver For International Entrepreneurs

A proposed rule would allow the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to use its existing discretionary statutory parole authority for entrepreneurs of startup entities whose stay in the United States would provide a “significant public benefit through the substantial and demonstrated potential for rapid business growth and job creation.” Under this proposed rule, DHS may parole, on a case-by-case basis, eligible entrepreneurs of startup enterprises:

  • Who have a significant ownership interest in the startup (at least 15 percent) and have an active and central role to its operations;
  • Whose startup was formed in the United States within the past three years; and
  • Whose startup has substantial and demonstrated potential for rapid business growth and job creation, as evidenced by:

– Receiving significant investment of capital (at least $345,000) from certain qualified U.S. investors with established records of successful investments;

– Receiving significant awards or grants (at least $100,000) from certain federal, state, or local government entities; or

– Partially satisfying one or both of the above criteria in addition to other reliable and compelling evidence of the startup entity’s substantial potential for rapid growth and job creation.

Under the rule, entrepreneurs may be granted an initial stay of up to two years to oversee and grow their startup entities in the United States. A subsequent request for re-parole (for up to three additional years) would be considered only if the entrepreneur and the startup entity continue to provide a significant public benefit as evidenced by substantial increases in capital investment, revenue, or job creation. What is truly lacking is the lack of a pathway to permanent residence for the entrepreneur.

Several organizations and individuals submitted comments to the rule by the deadline on October 17, 2016. The Alliance of Business Immigration Lawyers, www.abil.com, of which I am a shareholder and member, also submitted comments in order to improve the rule and point out its limitations. The thrust of the comments was to make parole more accessible to entrepreneurs by lowering the investment amounts and expanding the types of persons who could qualify as investors. I was pleased to be part of the ABIL comment team of distinguished immigration attorneys, and my focus was to comment that the rule also provides a pathway to permanent residence. If the rule does not provide a pathway to permanent residency, it will not be viable at all. It is thus imperative that the rule also provide a pathway for permanent residence through the National Interest Waiver. In fact, this is not the first time that the DHS has thought about providing a pathway for permanent residence to entrepreneurs.

When USCIS announced its policy to encourage foreign entrepreneurs to take advantage of the existing immigration system on August 2, 2011, it provided Question and Answers on the Employment-based Second Preference (EB-2 Q&A) suggesting that an entrepreneur can be sponsored through a “national interest waiver”. The EB-2 (Q&A) acknowledges  Matter of New York State Department of Transportation, 22 I&N Dec. 215 (Comm. 1998) (NYSDOT), which set forth a three-prong test, and how it could apply to entrepreneurs seeking the NIW.

With respect to the first two criteria under NYSDOT, the petitioner must show that he or she will be employed “in an area of substantial intrinsic merit” and that the “proposed benefit will be national in scope.” It was always difficult for an entrepreneur to show that localized employment through his or her enterprise would be national in scope. This concern was addressed in the EB-2 Q&A:

For example, the entrepreneur might be able to demonstrate that the jobs his or her business enterprise will create in a discrete locality will also create (or “spin off”) related jobs in other parts of the nation. Or, as another example, the entrepreneur might be able to establish that the jobs created locally will have a positive national impact.

The third criterion in NYSDOT is extremely opaque and difficult to overcome. The petitioner must demonstrate that “the national interest would be adversely affected if a labor certification were required for the alien. The petitioner must demonstrate that it would be contrary to the national interest to potentially deprive the prospective employer of the services of the alien by making available to U.S. workers the position sought by the alien.” The AAO went on to further illuminate this criterion as follows: “Stated another way, the petitioner, whether the U.S. employer or the alien, must establish that the alien will serve the national interest to a substantially greater degree than would an available U.S. worker having the same minimum qualifications.”

Still, the EB-2 Q&A provides helpful guidance to the entrepreneur to overcome the third prong:

The entrepreneur who demonstrates that his or her business enterprise will create jobs for U.S. workers or otherwise enhance the welfare of the United States may qualify for the NIW. For example, the entrepreneur may be creating new job opportunities for U.S. workers. The creation of jobs domestically for U.S. workers may serve the national interest to a substantially greater degree than the work of others in the same field.

Nevertheless, if the parole rule provides guidance on how to seek a NIW, it should do away with the NYSDOT test, especially the subjective third criterion. Indeed, when President Obama’s executive actions on immigration were announced on November 20, 2014, a memo specifically aimed to improve the system for skilled immigrants also sought to:

Clarify the standard by which a national interest waiver may be granted to foreign inventors, researchers and founders of start-up enterprises to benefit the U.S economy

ABIL therefore suggests that the final rule should contain a rebuttable presumption stating that an international entrepreneur who has maintained parole status for five years is presumed to qualify for the national-interest waiver. The five years should be extended for entrepreneurs who have already started the permanent residency process, however long it takes, given the processing delays and backlogs. Alternatively, because of prolonged visa quota backlogs, those which adversely affect persons in the EB-2 and EB-3 preferences such as beneficiaries born in India and China, ABIL suggests that entrepreneurial parolees be able to use the NYSDOT national-interest waiver standards to qualify as a person of extraordinary ability under INA § 203(b)(1)(A). Even if an entrepreneur cannot readily meet the three out of ten criteria under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3), the petitioner can also qualify as a person of extraordinary ability by submitting comparable evidence under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(4). Hence, the final rule should expressly provide that comparable evidence includes (but is not limited to) proof that an entrepreneur meets the NYSDOT national-interest waiver criteria, and thus may qualify as a person of extraordinary ability.

Given the lack of certainty in a national-interest waiver adjudication due to NYSDOT, ABIL further suggests that the seven factors set forth in the non-precedent decision of Matter of Mississippi Phosphate, EAC 92 091 50126 (AAU July 21, 1992) be reconsidered. The seven factors include 1) improving the U.S. economy; 2) improving wages and working conditions of U.S. workers; 3) improving education and training programs for U.S. children and underqualified workers; 4) improving health care; 5) providing more affordable housing for young and/or older, poorer U.S. residents; 6) improving the environment of the U.S. and making more productive use of natural resources; or 7) involving a request from an interested U.S. government agency. This decision provided good guidance for the national interest waiver petitioner as well as the adjudicating officer and seemed to signal an understanding of congressional intent.

The EB-2 Q&A appears to suggest that the entrepreneur can also be sponsored for a green card under the EB-2 through a labor certification. In fact, an entrepreneur who cannot qualify under EB-2, can also theoretically obtain labor certification for purposes of obtaining permanent residency under EB-3. The DOL, on the other hand, has always frowned upon an owner of an entity being sponsored for a labor certification. In order to obtain labor certification, the employer must establish that it has conducted a good faith test of the labor market and that there were no qualified US workers who were available for the position. The DOL has denied labor certification to both 100% and minority owners of companies who filed a labor certification on their behalf. See ATI Consultores, 07-INA-64 (BALCA Feb. 11, 2008); M. Safra & Co. Inc., 08-INA-74 (BALCA Oct. 27, 2008). The test for determining whether an employee closely tied to the sponsoring entity could qualify for labor certification was set forth in Modular Container Systems, Inc. 89-INA-228 (BALCA July 16, 1991) (en banc), where BALCA applied a “totality of circumstances” test to determine whether there was a bona fide job offer to US workers. Modular Container Systems considers whether the foreign national:

a) Is in a position to control or influence hiring decisions regarding the job for which LC is ought;
b) Is related to the corporate directors, officers or employees;
c) Was an incorporator or founder of the company;
d) Has an ownership interest in the company;
e) Is involved in the management of the company;
f) Is on the board of directors;
g) Is one of a small number of employees;
h) Has qualifications for the job that are identical to specialized or unusual job duties and requirements stated in the application; or
i) Is so inseparable from the sponsoring employer because of his or her pervasive presence and personal attributes that the employer would be unlikely to continue without the foreign national.

An entrepreneur who may successfully obtain parole will most likely fail under the Modular Container Systems “totality of circumstances” test. ABIL suggests that USCIS consult with the DOL before issuing this guidance so that DOL be receptive to the USCIS’s new policy of encouraging entrepreneurs and liberally interpret Modular Container Systems, which are incorporated in 20 CFR §656.17(l). For example, if an entrepreneur who qualifies for parole and owns a minority state in the enterprise should still be able to obtain labor certification if he or she did not influence the recruitment, even if the entrepreneur may have been a founder or is on its board of directors.

In conclusion, quite independent of the parole rule, the proposed broadening of the National Interest Waiver should also similarly be applicable to entrepreneurs who have used existing nonimmigrant visa categories. This is explained in the Entrepreneur Pathways portal. Indeed, the parole rule and the Entrepreneur Pathways should exist alongside each other. Neither is perfect, especially in the absence of a Congressionally mandated startup visa, but if an entrepreneur cannot qualify under the parole policy, every encouragement must be given for the entrepreneur to qualify for a visa through his or her startup under the existing visa system, such as through an H-1B visa. In order to provide viability to both the parole rule and existing policy supporting entrepreneurs, the National Interest Waiver ought to be broadened. Most importantly, entrepreneurs born in India and China should also be allowed to take advantage of the person of extraordinary ability category under EB-1. The EB-1 is current for these countries. It would be unviable for the beneficiary of an EB-2 National Interest Waiver born in India or China to wait for several years to obtain the green card. It is hoped that this administration and the next does everything in their power to attract foreign entrepreneurs.

Given the centrality of immigrant entrepreneurs to the American economy, it may come as a shock to many when they realize that, on an increasing number, immigrant entrepreneurs are going home. With the economic renaissance in India, China, Korea, Chile, Mexico and other traditional sources of immigration, while entrepreneurs continue to come to America, we are, it seems, no longer the only game in town. Faced with uncertain green card prospects and what appears as an unfriendly and intractable immigration system that questions their value rather than welcoming their talent or appreciating their contributions, immigrant entrepreneurs are having second thoughts. It is impossible to understand or appreciate the current entrepreneurial initiative without this foundation. It is therefore hoped that this administration and the next does everything in their power to attract foreign entrepreneurs to the United States.

 

HOW EXTRAORDINARY DOES ONE NEED TO BE TO QUALIFY AS A PERSON OF EXTRAORDINARY ABILITY?

When Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010), was first decided, it was received with much jubilation as it was thought that the standards for establishing extraordinary ability would be more straightforward and streamlined. Kazarian essentially holds that a petitioner claiming extraordinary ability need not submit extraordinary evidence to prove that he or she is a person of extraordinary ability. If one of the evidentiary criteria requires a showing of scholarly publications, the petitioner need not establish that the scholarly publications in themselves are also extraordinary in order to qualify as a person of extraordinary ability. This is a circular argument, which Kazarian appropriately shot down.  If Kazarian just stopped there, it would have been a wonderful outcome. Unfortunately, Kazarian has been interpreted to also require a vague and second step analysis known as the “final merits determination,” which can stump even the most extraordinary. Read on….

As background, an individual can obtain permanent residence in the US by establishing extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business or athletics which has been demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation. See INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(i). Furthermore, the individual seeks entry to continue work in the area of extraordinary ability and his or her entry will substantially benefit prospectively the U.S. See INA § 203(b)(1)(A)(ii) & (iii). Unlike most other petitions, no job offer is required and one can even self-petition for permanent residency. Evidence to demonstrate “sustained national or international acclaim” could be a one-time achievement such as a major international award (for example, a Nobel Prize, Oscar or Grammy). If the applicant is not the recipient of such an award then documentation of any three of the following is sufficient:

 

  1. Receipt of lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards.
  2. Membership in an association in the field for which classification is sought, which requires outstanding achievement of its members, as judged by recognized national or international experts.
  3. Published material about the person in professional or major trade publications or other major media.
  4. Participation as a judge of the work of others.
  5. Evidence of original scientific, scholastic, artistic, athletic or business-related contributions of major significance.
  6. Authorship of scholarly articles in the field, in professional or major trade publications or other media.
  7. Artistic exhibitions or showcases.
  8. Performance in a leading or cultural role for organizations or establishments that have a distinguished reputation.
  9. High salary or remuneration in relation to others in the field.
  10. Commercial success in the performing arts.

See 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x). An applicant may also submit comparable evidence if the above standards do not readily apply.

In Kazarian, the main bone of contention was what constitutes “authorship of scholarly articles in the field, in professional or major trade publications or other media.” In the original decision, Kazarian v. USCIS, 580 F.3d 1030 (Kazarian 1), the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Appeals Administrative Office (AAO) that “publication of scholarly articles is not automatically evidence of sustained acclaim; we must consider the research community’s reaction to those articles.” The Court in Kazarian 1 acknowledged that this reasoning “may be circular, because publication, on its own, indicates approval within the community.” However, the Court went on to justify the AAO’s circular reasoning probably unmindful of the adverse impact that it would have for future EB-1 petitioners, “Because postdoctoral candidates are expected to publish, however, the agency’s conclusion that the articles must be considered in light of the community’s reaction is not contrary to the statutory mandate that the alien have achieved “sustained national or international acclaim.” (citation omitted).

It was precisely this reasoning that  the new Kazarian decision reversed, on the ground that it was inconsistent with the governing regulation, 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(3)(vi), which simply states, “Evidence of the alien’s authorship of scholarly articles in the field, in professional or major trade publications or other major media.” The regulation does not require consideration of the research community’s reaction to those articles, which was essentially an invention of the USCIS.

Unfortunately after the initial victory, Kazarian, as interpreted by the USCIS,  has resulted in a two part test. In the first part of the test, the USCIS has to determine whether the individual has met three of the 10 criteria to establish extraordinary ability. However, that is not sufficient and does not result in an approval. Even after meeting the first part of the test, the individual has to establish through a vague and undefined “final merits determination” that he or she is extraordinary.

Whether we like it or not, the two part test, based on the USCIS’s interpretation of Kazarian is here to stay with us – at least for now – and the focus of this article is to suggest ways to confront it and still win petitions for persons of extraordinary ability or outstanding professors and researchers.

In its December 22, 2010 Policy Memorandum, (“Policy Memorandum“), USCIS implemented a “two-part adjudicative approach” for extraordinary ability, outstanding researcher and professor, and exceptional ability immigrant visa petitions. The Service cites Kazarian as the basis for modifying the Adjudicator’s Field Manual to include a second step in the adjudication process, the “final merits determination.” Although Kazarian did not actually create a “final merits determination,” and objected essentially to the AAO’s imposition of extra requirements under the evidentiary criteria in 8 CFR §§ 204.5(h)(3)(iv) and (vi), the Service seized on the following excerpts in Kazarian as a basis for justifying a “final merits determination” analysis:

(1) While other authors’ citations (or lack thereof) might be relevant to the final merits determination of whether a petitioner is at the very top of his or her field of endeavor, they are not relevant to the antecedent procedural question of whether the petitioner has provided at least three types of evidence (emphasis added); and
(2) …[W]hile the AAO’s analysis might be relevant to a final merits determination, the AAO may not unilaterally impose a novel evidentiary requirement (emphasis added).

Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d  at 1121.

Under this two part test, the USCIS must essentially accept the evidence of extraordinary ability under the 10 criteria set forth in 8 CFR §204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x). The USCIS cannot object to the submission of the alien’s “scholarly articles in the field, in professional or major trade publications or other major media” under §204.5(h)(vi) unless there is consideration of the research community’s reaction to those articles, as it did erroneously in Kazarian. Still, the USICS may take this  extra evidentiary factor into consideration, namely, the lack of reaction in the research community,  during the “final merits determination” analysis. It is readily apparent that the analysis under the second step defeats the very essence of the holding in Kazarian that the USCIS  cannot impose extra requirements under the evidentiary criteria. What it cannot do under the first step, the USCIS  can still do under the “final merits determination.”

Unfortunately, post Kazarian decisions seem to be affirming the two-part test and final merits determination analysis notwithstanding the holding in a prior decision, Buletini v. INS, 860 F.Supp. 1222 (E.D. Mich 1994), which held, “[o]nce it is established that the alien’s evidence is sufficient to meet three of the criteria listed in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3), the alien must be deemed to have extraordinary ability unless the INS sets forth specific and substantiated reasons for its finding that the alien does not meet extraordinary ability.” Id. at 1234.  Under the burden shifting approach in Buletini, the petitioner should be deemed qualified, and the burden then shifts  onto  the  Service to reject the evidence that meet the criteria, if suppose, it finds that the evidence was  fraudulent or too dated and stale. In fact, such a burden shifting approach is not unknown in other aspects of immigration law. As my colleague David Isaacson has pointed out, in the asylum context, an applicant who demonstrates that he or she has suffered past persecution on account of a protected ground is rebuttably presumed to have a reasonable fear of future persecution on that same ground.  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(1).  In such cases, by regulation, “the Service shall bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence” that a change in circumstances, or the reasonable possibility of relocating within the country of persecution, should lead to a denial of asylum.  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(ii), 1208.13(b)(1).

Rijal v. USCIS, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (W.D. Wash. 2011), aff’d Rijal v. USCIS, 683 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2012) is a decision that explicitly follows the Policy Memorandum, and ignores the burden shifting approach as set forth in Buletini.  Although the petitioner in Rijal, a Nepali documentary film maker, submitted a UNICEF prize, the USCIS concluded that it did not meet the evidentiary criterion of  “lesser nationally or internationally recognized prizes or awards of excellence”   as it was awarded more than 4 years ago and did not provide evidence of the alien’s sustained acclaim. While the court criticized the USICS for failing to consider this evidence under 8 CFR §204.5(h)(3)(i) and for similar errors under other evidentiary criteria, it nevertheless held that the petitioner did not suffer prejudice from these errors as “it made those errors with an eye toward the ultimate merits determination.” Rijal at 1347.  Based on a holistic determination of the petitioner’s evidence, the court held that the USCIS appropriately found that the petitioner did not demonstrate sustained national or international acclaim. It is clear that the Ninth Circuit in Rijal affirmed the two step test set forth in the  Policy Memorandum even though the suggestion of a “final merits determination” was mere dicta in Kazarian.

Noroozi and Assadi v. Napolitano,  ___ F. Supp. ___ (SDNY Nov. 14, 2012), available on AILA InfoNet at Doc. No. 12111644 (posted 11/16/12), is another recent decision from the Southern District of New York that has agreed with the Kazarian two-step analysis. Petitioner Noroozi represented Iran in table tennis at the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. Although neither Noroozi nor the Iranian table tennis team won any medal at the Olympics, the USICS initially approved the EB-1 petition, but then subsequently revoked it. A second EB-1 petition was filed, which was denied on the ground that Noorzi only met two of the criteria, but not three. The court agreed with the USCIS that there was no evidence to substantiate that he played a “leading or critical role” for his team and nor did the “published material” about him pass muster since it focused more on the team and only briefly mentioned Noroozi. Even though the failure to meet the evidentiary criteria could have ended the analysis, the court also discussed how Noroozi did not merit a favorable judgment under the second part “final merits determination.”  Since Noroozi ranked 284th in the world in table tennis, and finished 65th place in table tennis in the 2008 Olympics, the court noted that this would oblige the USCIS to hypothetically grant EB-1 petitions to the 283 higher ranked table tennis players, and also to the 283 higher ranked players in other sports, assuming they were non-US citizens, as well as to the 64 table tennis players who outperformed Noroozi in the 2008 Olympics. The court’s  “final merits determination” in Noroozi  is troubling as the EB-1 was never intended only for the number one player in a sporting field, and this decision should be contrasted with a pre-Kazarian decision involving an ice hockey player in the National Hockey League whose team won the Stanley Cup, but was not an all-stars or one of the highest paid players, but was still found to be qualified  under EB-1. See Muni v. INS, 891 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill 1995).  The “final merits determination” permits USCIS to set subjective baselines with respect to rankings of   players in sports even if they would potentially qualify under the ten evidentiary criteria as Muni did after he sought reversal of the denial of his EB-1 petition in federal court. Interestingly, in Noroozi, the attorney also became a plaintiff along with the petitioner on the ground that the USCIS denied the EB-1 petition based on the petitioner’s association with the attorney who had been unfairly singled out in a DOS cable. That strategy too failed since the court rejected that there was any bad faith on the part of the USCIS in denying Noroozi’s EB-1 petition.

Various unpublished AAO decisions [See e.g. AILA InfoNet Document Nos. 12062752 and 12062753]   suggest that the government’s final merits determination will consider evidence whether or not the petitioner has demonstrated : 1) a “level of expertise indicating that the individual is one of the small percentage who have risen to the very top of the[ir] field of endeavor,” 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(2); and 2) “that the alien has sustained national or international acclaim and that his or her achievements have been recognized in the field of expertise.” § INA 203(b)(1)(A); 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(3). See also Kazarian, 596 F.3d at 1119-20.   While it makes sense to preserve the argument in the record that the final merits determination is inapplicable and to propose the burden shifting approach under Buletini instead, it also behooves a petitioner to argue that his or her client merits a favorable adjudication under the “final merits determination” analysis given that it has been blessed in post-Kazarian decisions.  The amorphous nature of this standard allows the petitioner’s attorney flexibility to make a broad argument just as it gives the USCIS examiner the same flexibility to approve or not approve a case even after the petitioner has submitted evidence under the evidentiary criteria. For instance, if a petitioner has met 3 out of 10 evidentiary criteria, the agile practitioner may be able to argue that the petitioner has demonstrated to be among the small percentage who has risen to the top of the field, sustained national or international acclaim, and recognition of achievements, by highlighting only the strongest evidence rather than evidence submitted under all three criteria. If the scholarly articles are very impressive, but the awards are not and the petitioner may have judged the work of only one PhD student, then the focus could be on the impressive scholarly articles when qualifying him or her under the final merits determination. Moreover, under the final merits determination, a petitioner may be able to point to other evidence that may not categorically fall under the 10 evidentiary criteria, such as testimonials from eminent authorities in the field, as well as petitioner’s stellar academic background. Of course, if the evidence submitted under the evidentiary criteria is all qualitatively superior and extensive, then the practitioner must not rest on these laurels and take pains to highlight this for the “final merits determination.”Finally, the practitioner must always remind the USICS that the “final merits determination” is governed by the preponderance of evidence standard, as suggested in the Policy Memorandum too, which requires only 51% certainty.

It need not be this way as Congress probably did not intend for the USCIS to create a subjective final merits determination, when it enacted the priority worker categories under the Employment-based first preference in the Immigration Act of 1990. The starting point for examining the legislative history of the Immigration Act of 1990 is the House Report. See H.R. Rep. No. 723, Pt. 1, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Sept. 19, 1990).  With respect to aliens of extraordinary ability, the House Report states:

 

In order to qualify for admission in this category an alien must (1) demonstrate sustained national or international acclaim in the sciences, arts, education, business or athletics (as shown through extensive documentation); (2) be coming to the United States to continue work in that area of expertise; and (3) by virtue of such work benefit the United States. Documentation may include publications in respected journals, media accounts of the alien’s contributions to his profession, and statements of recognition of exceptional expertise by qualified organizations. Recognition can be through a one-time achievement such as receipt of the Nobel Prize. An alien can also qualify on the basis of a career of acclaimed work in the field. In the case of the arts, the distinguished nature of the alien’s career may be shown by critical reviews, prizes or awards received, box office standing or record sales. In short, admission under this category is to be reserved for that small percentage of individuals who have risen to the very top of their field of endeavor.
H.R. Rep. No. 723 at 69.

There is nothing in this passage that suggests that the USCIS needed to conduct a two-step analysis to determine extraordinary ability. On the contrary, the House Report broadly suggests a number of possibilities under which an alien can establish extraordinary ability, such as through publications in respected journals, media accounts or statements of recognition of exceptional expertise by qualified organizations. Moreover, the House Report also indicates that “[a}n alien can also qualify on the basis of a career of acclaimed work in the field.”

The implementing regulations appropriately relied on the House Report in defining “extraordinary ability” to mean “a level of expertise indicating that the individual is one of the small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor.” See commentary on implementing regulations at 56 Fed. Reg. 60897 (Nov. 29, 1991). The proposed regulations would have used one of the “few (emphasis added) who has risen to the very top of the field,”  but after listening to the objection of commentators, the Service substituted the word “few” with “small percentage” in deference to the same, albeit broader, verbiage that was used in the House Report. By developing the ten evidentiary criteria at 8 C.F.R. §204.5(h)(3)(1)-(x), and recognizing that if an alien met three out of the 10 criteria, the Service appropriately followed Congressional intent by allowing this alien to demonstrate  extraordinary ability, which is “a level of expertise indicating that the individual is one of the small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor.” There is nothing more that is required within the regulatory criteria to demonstrate whether an alien was within that “small percentage,” and this appears to be consistent with the House Report too. Given the broad examples in the House Report for demonstrating extraordinary ability, the Service also promulgated an additional regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(4),  that permits submission of comparable evidence when the given criteria do not apply to the candidate’s occupation or achievements. The DHS Ombudsman’s recommendations to improve the quality of extraordinary ability adjudications also discusses that the administrative practice prior to Kazarian was to base an applicant’s extraordinary ability on complying with 3 out of the 10 evidentiary criteria.

The extraordinary ability provision, as crafted by Congress in 1990, should be viewed in the context of other introductory passages in the House Report preceding the section on extraordinary ability. Congress was clearly concerned about the US labor market facing two problems, which immigration policy could help correct. Id. at 52. “The first is the need of American business for highly skilled, specially trained personnel to fill increasingly sophisticated jobs for which domestic personnel cannot be found and the need for other workers to meet specific labor shortages.” Id. The following passage from the House Report is worth extracting, and while written in 1990, is relevant even in 2013:

The competitive influences of the Asian Pacific Rim, Caribbean Basin, and the European Community are forcing re-evaluation of the U.S. role in the world. Immigration law is not now in synchronization with these global developments. Its current structure inhibits timely admittance of needed highly skilled immigrants. The highest preference in the employment category, relating to people of exceptional ability, currently involves an 18-month wait for a visa. The other employment category, for skilled and unskilled workers, is subject to a 2 ½ year wait. This lack of responsiveness may impede the ability of businesses to plan and operate efficiently and effectively in the global economy.
Id. at 53.

Indeed, it is very clear that IMMACT90, as reflected by the intent of Congress in the House Report, has failed to address the problem of timely admittance of highly skilled immigrants. The waits under the employment-based second preferences (EB-2) for India and China and in the employment-based third preferences (EB-3) for all countries, and worse for India, are far greater in 2013. In the case of the India EB-3, the wait could be several decades long. If immigration law was not in synchronization with global developments in 1990, it is much less so in 2013 especially since the world has become far more globalized and interdependent. Indeed, one way to correct the imbalance is for the USCIS to faithfully interpret the pivotal extraordinary ability provision in light of Congressional concern in 1990, which continues to be even more of concern today, and that is to expeditiously allow an alien of extraordinary ability who meets 3 out of the 10 evidentiary criteria to be able to obtain permanent residence  in the employment-based first preference (EB-1), which unlike the EB-2 for India and China, and the EB-3, remains current and has always remained current. A second-step subjective merits analysis, as proposed by the USCIS, would continue to thwart Congressional intent as it would lead to arbitrary denials of aliens who otherwise can demonstrate extraordinary ability, and who would clearly be able to benefit the U.S.

(This article is partly based on Demystifying the Final Merits Analysis of Extraordinary Ability by Cyrus Mehta, Roberto Caballero and Rita Sostrin, Immigration Practice Pointers, AILA 2013-14 Ed. The article contains general information and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice.)