Tag Archive for: DOL

Cyrus Mehta

Space X’s Constitutional Challenge May Nix DOJ’s Ability to Bring Discrimination Claims Against Employers Under Section 274B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Including in the Labor Certification Context

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On November 9, 2023, the Department of Justice (DOJ) settled a dispute with Apple concerning allegations that Apple’s recruitment practices under the Department of Labor’s (DOL) foreign labor certification program –  known as  Program Electronic Review Management (PERM) – had discriminated against certain U.S. workers. Specifically, the DOJ alleged that Apple did not advertise PERM jobs on its own website, although it did this as a standard practice for other job openings. Additionally, Apple required applications for PERM job openings to send in paper applications by postal mail, despite permitting online applications for other open positions. Finally, the investigation found that “Apple did not consider certain applications for PERM positions from Apple employees if those applications were submitted electronically, as opposed to paper applications submitted through the mail”. The DOJ asserted that these practices cumulatively resulted in Apple receiving few or no applications from U.S. workers for PERM positions. Apple agreed to a settlement that requires it to “pay $6.75 million in civil penalties and establish an $18.25 million back pay fund for eligible discrimination victims”. Moreover, the settlement agreement specifies that the company must ensure that its PERM recruitment practices more closely match its standard recruitment practices in future.

In 2021, the DOJ and DOL reached similar settlement agreements with Facebook over issues with its own PERM recruitment practices. The agencies allegedly discovered through audit of Facebook’s pending PERM applications that the company “routinely reserved jobs for temporary visa holders through the PERM process” through practices designed to deter potentially qualified U.S. workers from applying in violation of INA § 274B(a)(1)(A). Specifically, Facebook allegedly required “applications to be submitted by mail only; refused to consider U.S. workers who applied to the positions; and hired only temporary visa holders”. Pursuant to its settlement agreement with the DOJ, Facebook was required to “pay a civil penalty of $4.75 million to the United States, pay up to $9.5 million to eligible victims of Facebook’s alleged discrimination, and train its employees on the anti-discrimination requirements of the INA”, as well as “conduct more expansive advertising and recruitment for its job opportunities for all PERM positions, accept electronic resumes or applications from all U.S. workers who apply, and take other steps to ensure that its recruitment for PERM positions closely matches its standard recruitment practices”. Facebook’s settlement agreement with the DOL will require it to conduct additional notice and recruitment for U.S. workers, and consent to ongoing audits of its PERM applications. We discussed the Facebook settlement in detail in a previous blog.

In our previous blog, we noted that the Facebook settlement seemingly imposed a requirement that employees go above and beyond the PERM regulations when conducting recruitment to ensure that its PERM recruitment practices mirror the way it advertises regular job openings. Because DOL regulations require employers to carry out highly specific recruitment practices, some of which may be quite outdated, such as placing print advertisements in two Sunday newspapers, it may be difficult for employers to both mirror their normal recruitment practices and adhere to the regulatory requirements when conducting PERM recruitment. We noted that these conflicting requirements could prompt some employers to stop sponsoring foreign national workers for permanent residence altogether. Although the penalties paid by Apple and Facebook may be small change to such large companies, similar fines could ruin smaller employers, potentially deterring them from attempting to file PERM applications at all.

Because Apple and Facebook both chose to settle, it is unclear what the outcome of these cases might have been if the companies had chosen to challenge the agencies’ allegations. Both Apple and Facebook complied with the DOL regulations regarding recruitment for US workers under the PERM program. They may have been able to win if they did not cop for settlements. Despite the settlement, Apple did not agree with DOJ’s allegations in its lawsuit. “Apple contests the accusation, according to the agreement, and says that it believes it was following the appropriate Department of Labor regulations,” reported CNBC. “Apple also contests that any failures were the result of inadvertent errors and not discrimination, according to the agreement.”

In September 2023, the DOJ sued SpaceX for discriminating against refugees and asylees in its hiring and recruitment practices. As stated in a DOJ press release, the agency alleged that “[i]n job postings and public statements over several years, SpaceX wrongly claimed that under federal regulations known as ‘export control laws,’ SpaceX could hire only U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, sometimes referred to as ‘green card holders’”. Specifically, the company allegedly “…discouraged asylees and refugees from applying for open positions, through public announcements, job applications and other online recruiting communications that excluded asylees and refugees, …failed to fairly consider applications submitted by asylees and refugees, …refused to hire qualified asylee and refugee applicants and repeatedly rejected asylee and refugee applicants because of their citizenship status, and …hired only U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, from September 2018 to September 2020”. The suit alleged that SpaceX disregarded the fact that refugees and asylees are treated the same as U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents for export control purposes, and are similarly permitted to access export-controlled technology after they are hired. SpaceX filed a complaint arguing that the DOJ’s complaint is unconstitutional because the Attorney General, despite appointing Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), does not review their decisions. This constitutes a violation of the Appointments Clause, which requires a department head like the Attorney General to “direct and supervise” the “inferior officers” he appoints. Judge Rolando Olvera of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas agreed with SpaceX’s contention and granted a preliminary injunction in the case. See SpaceX v. Carol Bell, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00137 (Nov. 8, 2023).   According to Judge Olvera’s order, IER will not be able to cure this defect as “[b]ased on § 1324b’s [INA § 274B] plain language, broader context and legislative history, it is clear the decisions of OCAHO ALJ’s are not subject to the Attorney’s General review.” INA § 274B(g)(1) requires an ALJ to issue “an order, which shall be final unless appealed as provided under subsection (i).” INA § 274B(i) provides that the avenue for an aggrieved party to “seek review of such order” lies exclusively “in the United States court of appeals” 60 days after the entry of such an order.” According to Judge Olvera, “[i]t does not affirmatively provide for the Attorney General to review OCAHO ALJ decisions.”

SpaceX’s countersuit may provide a pathway for other employers whose hiring and recruitment practices under the foreign labor certification program are called into questions by the DOJ,, and wish to assert a constitutional challenge if they are investigated for unlawful discriminatory practices during the labor certification process. Indeed, based on SpaceX v. Bell,  employers may be able to pose an Appointments-Clause challenge to any IER lawsuit or investigation under INA § 274B sealing IER’s ability to bring any discrimination claim.  As stated by Cyrus Mehta in a recent Forbes article, the best practice for employers in light of these cases is to “hew as closely as possible to their non-PERM recruitment practices”, while also ensuring compliance with the DOL’s PERM regulations. Thus, an employer who normally advertises for open positions that are submitted by email should not require applicants for PERM positions to send their applications only by postal mail. When an employer normally advertises open positions on its website, it may be prudent for the employer to do the same for PERM positions, rather than advertising only in print newspapers. At the same time, employers must comply with the DOL regulations’ dictate of advertising in two Sunday print newspapers, even though they do not normally advertise other open positions in newspapers.

Under the foreign labor certification program, it is impossible for employers to completely mirror the recruitment with their real-world recruitment. Employers are also required to only test the labor market before filing the PERM. If there is a qualified US worker, the employer is not required to hire them and is only precluded from filing the labor certification application. The DOL invented the recruitment procedures out of whole cloth in its regulations at 69 FR 77325-77421 (Dec. 27, 2004).  INA § 212(a)(5), from which labor certification springs, only requires the DOL to determine the unavailability of qualified workers for the position and did not impose such an artificial labor market test.   On the other hand, the IER under INA § 274B has a different mandate and can potentially charge employers who conduct recruitment under the foreign labor certification program for discriminatory practices even if they follow the PERM regulations. The Appointments-Clause challenge by Space X if not overturned by the Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court could provide a pathway for other employers to fend off investigations and lawsuits by the IER when they conduct recruitment under the foreign labor certification program.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Although Section H.10-B Has Disappeared in the New ETA 9089, Will Its Ghost Continue to Haunt Us?

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

The new ETA 9089 form has gone into effect and DOL stopped using the old version of the form on the evening of May 31, 2023. The new form does not have Box H.10-B. In our previous blog, we discussed the rise in PERM labor certification denials related to question H.10-B between October 2022 and March 2023. Does that mean that the problem has gone away? Not entirely, since the new ETA 9089 links to the Form ETA 9141 – the application for a prevailing wage determination – which asks an analogous question to H.10-B regarding the occupation required if employment experience is required. If the employer did not respond appropriately to the analogous question in ETA 9141 that now links to the new ETA 9089, will the DOL still deny labor certification?

This blog is part of a series, see here and here, that  address some of the numerous questions and issues raised by these new forms.

As background, Box H.10-B of the previous version of the ETA 9089 asked employers to “identity the job title of the acceptable alternate occupation” if experience in an alternate occupation is acceptable. The DOL had promulgated little guidance on this question, so immigration lawyers completed this question in a variety of ways, including describing the experience such as “2 years of experience in engineering management emphasizing cloud-based product development” and then referring to section H.14., which lists the requirements of the offered position, rather than attempting to list specific job titles. This is because foreign national workers often had a number of job titles in their prior experience, which may not have reflected the job offered in the labor certification. For instance, with respect to the position of Engineering Manager, the foreign worker may have had similar experience in prior engineering management positions, but may have held titles that had little direct connection to the duties, such as Associate or Specialist. Hence, it was more appropriate to describe the experience gained rather than the titles in the prior positions, as this approach would define the employer’s job requirements with greater clarity.  Historically, the DOL had accepted PERM applications that responded to question H.10-B in this way. Since the spate of denials from October 2022, the Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC) communicated the following guidance to the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) in November 2022 in response denials on this issue:  “Employers may list a specific job title, a number of related job titles, or even language such as ‘any occupation in which the required experience was gained.’ The answer does not have to be an exact job title, but employers still have to answer the question. If employers reference H.14 to answer the question in H.10-B, employers must be sure to answer the H.10-B question. Just providing a list of requirements is not acceptable.” See AILA Doc. 22092601.

The denials concerning question H.10-B centered on the idea that question H.10-B is not properly completed if the employer fails to list specific job titles. The DOL therefore took the position that the entire PERM application is rendered incomplete if this question is not completed properly. The DOL cited to 20 CFR § 656.17(a), which states that incomplete applications will be denied, as the authority for the denials.

The DOL responded to reports of increasing PERM denials concerning question H.10-B, and posted a notice that read as follows as its website on April 14, 2023:

OFLC has stopped issuing denials for this issue for pending applications and will not deny for this reason for any application submitted on or before May 30, 2023, by which point OFLC expects to be accepting the updated version of Form ETA-9089 in the Foreign Labor Application Gateway system. Further, OFLC will overturn denials based solely on this issue. OFLC will identify applications that were denied for this issue and for which reconsideration has not yet been requested; employers whose applications have been denied solely for this reason and have not yet requested consideration are encouraged not to submit a request for reconsideration. Where reconsideration has been requested, OFLC will prioritize processing for any pending reconsideration requests based on denials where this is the only denial issue.

Although this notice has now been removed, it is reproduced as AILA Doc. No. 23041700. In our firm’s experience, PERMs denied solely on a question H.10-B issue were certified rather quickly after a Requestion for Reconsideration (“RFR”) was filed. Interestingly, though, while OFLC acknowledges that it has not adjudicated H.10-B issues in a consistent manner, it states that some of the denials were justified, stating:

…OFLC concluded that some employers have not consistently answered the question accurately by providing acceptable alternate job titles; rather, they include statements such as “see H.14 – Special Skills.” The information provided in H.14 does not identify what alternate occupations are acceptable to meet the experience requirements for the job that is the subject of the PERM application. Instead, the application only lists a series of the special skills requirements and/or other alternative combinations of education and experience that the employer is willing to accept. As a result of employers providing insufficient information in either H.10-B. or H.14, OFLC has recently denied applications for being incomplete.

OFLC evaluated these denials and determined that while they are appropriate, it has not been consistent about when it denies an application for this reason, which could confuse filers.

On April 24, 2023, the Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA) issued an important decision addressing H.10-B denials. In Matter of Charter Communications, Inc., 2020-PER-00171 (Apr. 24, 2023), BALCA held that an employer’s failure to list specific occupation titles in box H.10.B. alone was not sufficient grounds for denial of a PERM application, also noting that the OFLC has dealt with this issue in an inconsistent manner in its adjudication of PERM applications. The employer in this case had inserted the following in box H.10-B: “Please see [Section] H-14.” Id. The employer’s response to section H.14 read as follows: “Bachelor’s degree, or foreign equivalent, in Engineering, Computer Science, or [a] related field. Must have 7 years of experience working with DSG/DAVIC set top boxes; and managing, maintaining, and configuring Linux operating systems. Must have 5 years of experience supporting software applications for back office servers.” Id. The Certifying Officer denied certification, and affirmed its denial after the employer filed a Request for Reconsideration (“RFR”), asserting that section H.10-B requires an occupation or job title. BALCA vacated the denial and remanded the PERM application for certification, reasoning that: “…the Employer persuasively argued why, in this matter, failing to include the job title of an acceptable alternative occupation was immaterial to the CO’s review of the substance of the Form 9089. The Employer precisely detailed the skills needed to satisfy the requirement that “experience in an alternate occupation” was acceptable. […] Section H.10-B conveyed significantly more information than simply listing the job title of an acceptable alternate occupation.” Id.

While box H.10-B has disappeared from the new ETA 9089, box F.b.4.b. of the new 9141 with respect to minimum job requirements still asks employers to “indicate the occupation required” if employment experience is required for the position. See AILA Doc No. 23050101. On the previous version of the ETA 9141, which included the same version of this question as the new 9141, employers often responded  by indicating “see addendum” and listing the full requirements of the position rather than just the occupation, such as “2 years of experience in engineering management emphasizing cloud based product development”, in the addendum. Because the new ETA 9141 will link to the ETA 9089 and certain fields will be populated automatically, uncertainty for practitioners remains, even though box H.10-B itself has disappeared, as the response to box F.b.4.b may not have been in compliance to the recent guidance provided by OFLC with respect to H.10-B. These ETA 9141s were prepared and submitted in 2022, even before the H.10-B denials, and do not contain the preferred language recommended by OFLC in November 2022. They will now link to the new ETA 9089. The employer will not have an opportunity in the new ETA 9089 to include any rehabilitative language as it did in response to H.10-B closely analogous to DOL’s suggested  “any occupation in which the required experience was gained” language.  Will the DOL deny the ETA 9089 because the preferred language was not included in the previously approved ETA 9141?

Although only time will tell whether section H.10-B will haunt us despite its disappearance in the new form, employers who have not listed specific job titles  in box F.b.4.b. of the 9141 should be able to take reassurance from BALCA’s decision in Matter of Charter Communications, which although it pertained to an H.10-B denial, seems to support the more general idea that an employer’s failure to list specific job titles is not sufficient justification for denial of a PERM application.  Employers should also be able to argue that 20 CFR § 656.17(a), the provision used to justify PERM denials based on box H.10-B, pertains only to an  incomplete Form ETA 9089. If the DOL issues a denial based on an incomplete ETA 9141, there should be a strong legal basis to challenge the denial under 20 CFR § 656.17(a) in addition to the reasoning provided in Matter of Charter Communications. Another point in favor of challenging any denial is that the ETA 9141 with respect to alternative job requirements at box F.c.4.a asks for the number of months of alternate experience. It does not ask for the job title in the alternate occupation even if box F.b.4.b asks for the occupation required. It is hoped that DOL will not use the logic from its H.10-B denials to deny ETA 9089s in the new system because the occupation was not mentioned in response to box F.b.4.b. of the 9141. If it does, there will be ample basis to challenge the denial and forever exorcize H.10-B’s ghost.

The DOL sees the new 9089 as the solution to all the ambiguities in the old ETA 9089.  However, we all know that the new ETA 9089 is not the panacea to all the problems in the old form and continues to create additional ambiguities. We will need to remain vigilant and point these issues out as they play out including challenging potential denials to BALCA and even in federal court.

[This blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as a substitute for legal advice]

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

The Facebook Settlement Resolving Claims of Discrimination Against U.S. Workers Only Adds to the Contradictions in the Labor Certification Program

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On October 19, 2021, the U.S. DOJ and DOL announced that they had reached separate settlement agreements with Facebook regarding the company’s purportedly discriminatory PERM labor certification practices. These settlement agreements stem from a December 2020 DOJ complaint, in which the government alleged that Facebook had discriminated against qualified and available U.S. workers by “refus[ing] to recruit, consider, or hire” them for over 2,600 positions, which were tied to labor certifications filed on behalf of foreign national workers. Interestingly, Facebook was not accused of violating DOL rules, which require merely that employers test the labor market and discontinue the labor certification process if a qualified U.S. worker is found, but do not mandate that the company actually hire the U.S. worker or terminate the foreign national who currently holds the position pursuant to H-1B status. Instead, Facebook was charged with discriminatory practices under INA § 274B(a)(1), despite adhering to the DOL’s rules for recruitment.

In particular, the complaint alleged that “in conducting recruitment, employers must also engage in a good faith search that closely resembles the employer’s normal recruiting process”, citing Matter of Am. Specialty Pharmacy, 2016-PER-00016, 2019 WL 2910815 (BALCA 2019). The complaint accused Facebook of designing recruitment practices specifically intended to deter US workers from applying for the relevant positions, a policy which discriminated against U.S. workers in violation of INA § 274B(a)(1)(A). At issue in particular were Facebook’s use of different recruitment methods for PERM labor certifications than those employed for regular positions, such as requiring resumes to be sent by postal mail for advertisements related to labor certifications while accepting resumes by email for other open positions. In a previous blog, we discuss in greater depth the context of the complaint and its contradictions with actual DOL recruitment rules.

Although Facebook will pay a civil penalty of $4.75 million to the United States and up to $9.5 million to workers impacted by its practices, a sum that is likely small change to one of the largest companies in the world, the settlement carries more worrying implications for smaller companies that lack Facebook’s resources. The complaint against Facebook emphasizes that employers must make “good faith” recruitment efforts, but paradoxically implies that it may not be sufficient for companies to follow the DOL regulations, particularly where an employer’s PERM recruitment differs from the way it advertises regular job openings. DOL regulations are largely outdated and require employers to carry out recruitment practices, such as placing print advertisements in two Sunday newspapers, that are out of touch with modern employment practices. In addition to conforming their recruitment practices to the specific and anachronistic methods prescribed by the regulations, the Facebook complaint implies that employers must conduct PERM recruitment that mirrors their regular recruitment, requirements which may be near impossible to reconcile. Among the grievances leveled against Facebook were its failure to hire qualified U.S. workers who applied for PERM-related positions and its rejection of free online advertisements when it had purchased print versions, neither of which are prohibited by the regulations.

Even if an employer mirrors its real world recruitment with its labor certification recruitment,   it will still be vulnerable to a citizenship discrimination claim by the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division’s Immigrant and Employee Rights Section (IER) because labor certification recruitment inherently requires a good faith test of the labor market, and not to hire US workers and replace the foreign national worker,  before the labor certification can be filed and certified by the DOL. If the employer hires the US worker, the labor certification may be denied. Even if the employer hires this minimally qualified US worker, and files the labor certification on behalf of the foreign worker, the employer may be found to be in violation as a result of “diversion.” The Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA) has held that a US applicant cannot be diverted to another position, even a more senior position. See Engineering Technology, Inc.,89-INA-10 (BALCA 1990), Sam’s Exxon, 91-INA-362 (BALCA 1992). BALCA has found “diversion” even when the U.S. worker was hired for the same position as the foreign national worker where the employer was unable to establish multiple openings. Aloha Airlines, 91-INA-181 (BALCA 1992).

As part of the settlement,  Facebook is required to consider applicants who apply for PERM positions on Facebook’s Career website. Furthermore, the settlement requires the entry into “Facebook’s recruiting system (“FBR”) all applicants to all PERM related positions who apply via Facebook’s Careers website, enabling such applicants to be searchable and remain searchable in the same manner as applicants to non-PERM related positions at Facebook, and allowing Facebook’s recruiting team to identify, consider, and/or hire such applicants for Facebook job opportunities, including but not limited to ones in the same job profile group as the PERM-related position to which they previously applied. “It is hoped that if applicants for PERM positions are hired for other positions, the DOL does not deny the labor certification under its antiquated “diversion” doctrine.

These conflicting requirements may well prompt some employers to stop sponsoring foreign national workers for permanent residence. The penalty paid by Facebook would be ruinous to smaller employers and may deter them from even wading into the PERM domain. Further adding to the deterrent effect, Facebook faced not only a monetary penalty, but will also be forced to conduct supervised recruitment in future and will be subject to increased scrutiny even of its H-1B program. The latter penalty may be particularly off putting to companies who employ a large H-1B workforce.

Skilled foreign national workers already face several limitations in the US immigration system. There is a paucity of H-1B visas every year. The annual cap is set at a paltry 65,000 plus an additional 20,000 for those who have graduated with advanced degrees from US institutions of higher education. Skilled foreign national workers born in countries such as India and China also face disproportionate backlogs when they are sponsored for permanent residence due to the per country limits. The latest action against Facebook would now provide a disincentive for employers to file labor certifications. This would impact those caught in the backlogs who wish to change employers and obtain new labor certifications but retain their place in the queue by capturing the original priority date

The safest course for employers to pursue in light of the Facebook settlement may be to hew as closely as possible to their non-PERM recruitment practices when conducting PERM recruitment, within the dictates of the DOL regulations. If the employer normally accepts resumes by email, they should not require that applicants for PERM related positions send their resumes only by postal mail. When regular positions are advertised online, it may be prudent for the employer to do the same for PERM positions, rather than advertising only in print newspapers. At the same time, the employer must comply with the DOL regulation of advertising in two Sunday print newspapers even though they do not normally advertise in print for their normal recruitment.

Although the labor certification process requires an employer to conduct a “good faith” test of the US labor market to determine whether US workers are qualified or available for the position held by the foreign national, the very notion of “good faith” seems oddly out of place when used with reference to a recruitment effort that achieves its desired objective by failing to locate any qualified job applicants. Only in the labor certification world do you win by losing.  The real solution, though, would be for Congress or the Biden administration to amend the regulations to comport with real, modern recruitment practices, ensuring that employers will not be tripped up by the contradiction between the “good faith” recruitment suggested by the Facebook complaint and the antiquated practices laid out in the DOL rules.

(This blog is for informational purposes, and should not be relied as a substitute for legal advice).

* Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Trump’s Final Attacks on H-1B Visas and Legal Immigration: Reintroduction of the Wage Rule and Rule Requiring Client Companies to File H-1B Petitions 

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By Cyrus D. Mehta & Kaitlyn Box* 

Although President Trump is on his way out, his administration has promulgated two new rules that will have a devastating impact on the H-1B visa program and legal immigration.

Reissuance of DOL Wage Rule

 On January 12, 2021 the Department of Labor (DOL) published an advance copy of a final rule which changes the way in which prevailing wage levels will be computed for purposes of permanent labor certifications and Labor Condition Applications (LCAs). The final rule is expected to be published on January 14, 2021. The new rule will raise all four salary tiers, with the Level I wage, currently set at around the 17th percentile, eventually increasing to approximately the 35th percentile. However, the new rule acknowledges that an abrupt transition to the new wage levels could be disruptive to the economy and detrimental to U.S. employers, so the DOL will gradually introduce the new wages over a period of a year and a half, with the first increase set to take place on July 1, 2021. For H-1B workers who were the beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions as of October 8, 2021, the phase-in period for the increased wages is extended over a three- and- a -half year period. See Stuart Anderson, DOL H-1B Visa Wage Rule: Donald Trump’s Bad Parting Gift To Immigrants, Forbes (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2021/01/13/dol-h-1b-visa-wage-rule-donald-trumps-bad-parting-gift-to-immigrants/ for a detailed summary of the phase-in.  

This rule was initially published with an effective date of October 8, 2020, but was struck down in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia last month on the ground that the COVID-19 pandemic did not give the DOL sufficient cause to publish the rule without a notice and comment period. Purdue University, et al., v. Scalia, et al., Civ. Actin No. 20-3006 (2020).  

Though the new wages themselves will be gradually phased in, the new rule will go into effect 60 days after publication, absent intervention from the Biden administration. Despite the phase in, the new wage levels will have no bearing to wages paid to US workers. They will not reflect prevailing or market wages and will be set at artificially high levels, thus rendering it difficult for an employer to either sponsor a new H-1B worker or retain an existing  H-1B worker at the time of renewal.  The American Immigration Lawyers’ Association (AILA) has reported that President-Elect Biden’s transition team will issue a memorandum on January 20, 2020 that will delay for 60 days the implementation of this and other last-minute regulations promulgated in the last days of the Trump presidency. 

Requirement to File H-1B Petitions by Employer and Third Party Client

On Friday, January 15, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) quietly issued a new rule aimed at demolishing the H-1B visa program. The Department of Labor (DOL) also issued accompanying new guidance entitled “H-1B Program Bulletin Clarifying Filing Requirements for Labor Condition Applications by Secondary Employers at 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.715 and 655.730(a)”. The DHS rule is a limited version of a proposed rule published in October, the implementation of which was enjoined, and will take effect 180 days after publication in the Federal Register.  

The DHS rule changes and broadens the definition of the employer-employee relationship by incorporating common law elements into the definition of an employer. Historically, USCIS has been concerned with whether a petitioner who file an H-1B petition and then sends the beneficiary to a third-party worksite is the true employer of that beneficiary. The DHS rule, after taking into account comments made in response to the prior H-1B proposed rule, has now broadened the definition of the employer-employee relationship. 

However, the USCIS, by broadening the employer-employee definition, is now requiring the entities who use the services of the H-1B worker to also file H-1B petitions if they meet the broader definition of employer. The DOL’s corresponding guidance announced that it is reinterpreting its regulation to also require such “secondary employers” to file the LCA and H-1B petition. This departure completely contradicts USCIS’ concerns about whether the petitioner of an H-1B worker is a genuine employer or not by now rendering even the user of the H-1B worker’s services an employer.  

This outcome was never contemplated in the initial proposed H-1B rule which was blocked in court, and stake holders were not given an opportunity to comment on this aspect of the rule, which will create a radical paradigm shift. “Secondary employers” will have difficulty even complying with the rule since they do not pay the H-1B worker’s wages. The concept of secondary employment has existed in DOL regulations with respect to dependent employers and willful violators who needed to ascertain whether the assigning of an H-1B worker with a secondary employer would displace US workers. In 2000, the Fifth Circuit in Defensor v. Meissner also viewed a hospital that used the nurses of a staffing company as a secondary employer, but the Court developed this analytical framework of two employers to determine whether the hospital, as a secondary employer, required the nurses to have a bachelor’s degree or whether it was only the staffing company’s requirement. Defensor v. Meissner, 201 F. 3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000). However, those applications of “secondary employer” were limited to the dependent employer’s obligation to ensure there was no displacement of US workers when an H-1B worker was placed with a secondary employer, or in the case of Defensor v. Meissner, used to determine whether the position qualified for H-1B classification. The DOL uses this term in an unprecedented way, and this new interpretation will adversely impact the H-1B visa program – if not kill it completely.  

While this Friday night Trump rule in the waning days of a failed presidency has been designed to kill the India heritage IT industry, it will also hurt corporate America, which relies on this IT industry to keep humming away, creating jobs, and thus remaining competitive in the global economy. The change will also do significant harm to other sectors as well that involve third-party placements, including nursing, consulting, audit, engineering services among many others. 

However, the Biden administration may forestall the implementation of this rule after January 20th. The rule is likely to be politically unpalatable, even to Democrats who disfavor the H-1B visa program, given how overbroad and radical it is, as well as the deleterious impact it would have on the American economy and U.S. companies who use H-1B workers.  

The DHS circumvented the notice and comment process in promulgating this rule, alleging that the change in the employer definition would be inconsequential. Nothing could be further from the truth as the new rule requires the end client to also file an H-1B petition. To IT consulting companies, H-1B workers, and third parties who use the services of the workers, however, this rule would be catastrophic. By implementing an expanded definition of “employer”, the DHS and DOL will force third parties who do not pay an H-1B worker’s wage to file LCAs and H-1B petitions, interfering in contractual obligations and perhaps even forcing end clients to disclose confidential wage information. These secondary employers, according to a DOL Field Assistance Bulletin  that was issued upon the promulgation of the DHS rule, will need to comply with all the required wage and other obligations under the Labor Condition Application, along with maintaining their own pubic access file.  

This disconnect between the DHS statement and the rule’s true breadth could render  it even more vulnerable to the legal challenges that are sure to come.  For instance,  the Supreme Court in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400 (2019) recently held that  government agencies no longer get unbridled deference to interpret their  own regulations as they did under a previous holding, Auer v. Robbins, 519 US 452 (1997). While the need for a secondary employer to file an H-1B petition has been suggested in the preamble to the rule, it is not stated in the actual rule, which defines the employer in a broader sense but does not include any definition of “secondary employer”  or the need to file an H-1B petition. The DHS and DOL cannot now reinterpret the new definition of employer to require multiple H-1B petitions on behalf of the same H-1B worker when the new rule does not contain this requirement, and which has never been the authoritative position of the agency and has taken stakeholders by unfair surprise. There is a good argument to make to a court that this interpretation of the new rule ought to be held unreasonable under Kisor v. Wilkie. 

Even though Trump will exit on January 20, his attacks on legal immigration through last minute regulations such as the ones above will take time to challenge, unravel and rescind.

 *Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and works as a Law Clerk at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC. 

 

Cora-Ann Pestaina

Recent BALCA Cases Highlight the Importance of Choosing the Right Sunday Newspaper

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In June 2019, the Board of Alien Labor Certifications Appeals (BALCA) issued at least ten decisions that addressed the employers’ choice of Sunday newspaper in the PERM labor certification recruitment process. So maybe they wanted to make a point? Let’s discuss.

As background, an employer must conduct a good faith recruitment of the labor market in order to obtain labor certification for a foreign national employee. The PERM recruitment process, whether for a professional or a nonprofessional position, requires employers to place two Sunday advertisements in a newspaper of general circulation. As PERM practitioners, having read the regulations, how confident are we on advising employers regarding which newspaper to use for Sunday ads? Some New York practitioners say that they always advise employers to use the New York Times. Others say they’ve successfully used the Daily News but have felt scared each time. What about the New York Post?  Over the years the question just keeps coming up. The Department of Labor (DOL) has not provided any specific guidance. One FAQ contains the following question and answer:

Question:         What is considered an acceptable newspaper and/or acceptable journal and is there a published list?

Answer:            There is no published list of acceptable publications.

Most employers, based on their normal recruiting efforts, will be able to readily identify those newspapers…that are most likely to bring responses from able, willing, qualified and available U.S. workers.

I am not sure if the newspapers are as readily identifiable as the DOL expects.

For nonprofessional positions, 20 C.F.R. 656.17(e)(2)(ii) requires that the employer place “an advertisement on two different Sundays in the newspaper of general circulation in the area of intended employment most appropriate to the occupation and the workers likely to apply for the job opportunity.” For professional occupations, there is the added requirement that the newspaper be “most likely to bring responses from able, willing, qualified, and available U.S. workers.” See 20 C.F.R. 656.17(e)(1)(i)(B)(I). A nonprofessional occupation is defined as any occupation for which the attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree is not a usual requirement for the occupation. A professional occupation is an occupation for which the attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree is a usual education requirement. See 20 C.F.R. 656.3.

The ten recent BALCA decisions each involved the posting of Sunday ads in the Washington Examiner which was a free newspaper of general circulation in Maryland, D.C. and Virginia (it no longer publishes a Sunday newspaper). Eight of the decisions involved nonprofessional positions and two involved professional positions. In Matter of Fernando Lawn Services, LLC, 212-PER-01989 (Jun 6, 2019) the employer recruited for the position of Assistant Manager which required 2 years of experience as an assistant manager and a high school diploma. The CO denied the application on the sole ground that the Washington Examiner was “not a newspaper of general circulation most likely to bring responses from available U.S. workers.”  As authority, the CO cited 20 C.F.R. 656.17(e)(1)(i)(B)(l) which relates to professional occupations. The employer requested reconsideration or review and argued that the job was nonprofessional; the Washington Examiner was a newspaper of general circulation in the intended area of employment and was most likely to bring responses from able, willing, qualified, and available U.S. workers. However, the CO denied the motion for reconsideration on the same sole ground even though he cited the regulations relating to both professional and nonprofessional occupations thereby conflating the standards applicable to professional advertising with those applicable to nonprofessional positions.   The case was then forwarded to BALCA.

BALCA reexamined existing, inconsistent case law that involved the Washington Examiner. Capital Building Services, Inc., 2012-PER-01971 (Feb. 12, 2013) involved the position of Cleaning Supervisor. The job requirements were two years of experience and therefore the position was nonprofessional. The CO denied certification because the employer used the Washington Examiner as its newspaper of general circulation. The majority BALCA panel disagreed with the CO and ordered certification.  They distinguished the case from Intercontinental Enterprises, Inc., 2011-PER-02756 (July 30, 2012). In Intercontinental Enterprises, the CO denied certification, finding that the Washington Examiner was not the newspaper of general circulation most appropriate to the occupation and the workers likely to apply for the job opportunity because it involved the professional position of Senior Food Technologist. The BALCA panel noted that the regulatory history of the regulations recognized a distinction between professional and nonprofessional occupations. Specifically, when the regulations were being promulgated, the Employment and Training Administration explained in the proposed rule:

Under the current system [i.e., the pre-PERM regulations], the employer may advertise, when a newspaper of general circulation is designated as the appropriate advertising medium, in any newspaper of general circulation. However, our experience has shown that some employers routinely place newspaper advertisements in those newspapers with the lowest circulation and that these publications are often the least likely to be read by qualified U.S. workers. Therefore, in order for the employer’s job opening to receive appropriate exposure, the proposed regulation requires that the mandatory advertisements appear in the newspaper of general circulation most appropriate to the occupation and the workers most likely to apply for the job opportunity in the area of intended employment. For example, in a relatively large metropolitan area such as Philadelphia, Pennsylvania or Washington, DC, it would not be appropriate to place an advertisement for a computer professional in a suburban newspaper of general circulation since workers interested in professional jobs consult the metropolitan newspapers in the area of intended employment with the largest circulation rather than the suburban newspapers of general circulation. On the other hand, it would be appropriate to advertise in a suburban newspaper of general circulation for nonprofessional occupations, such as jewelers, houseworkers or drivers.

ETA, Proposed Rule, Implementation of New System, Labor Certification Process for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States [“PERM”], 20 C.F.R. Part 656, 67 Fed. Reg. 30466, 30471 (May 6, 2002).

The Intercontinental Enterprises panel acknowledged that The Washington Examiner was not a mere suburban newspaper, but found that the employer failed to establish that it was the newspaper in the Washington, D.C. area most appropriate to the occupation in question and the workers likely to apply for the job opportunity and most likely to bring responses from able, willing, qualified, and available U.S. workers. Essentially, The Washington Examiner was not appropriate to recruit for professional positions.

The panel in Capital Building Services found that the case was distinguishable from Intercontinental Enterprises because it presented an application involving a nonprofessional position and thus, the persons likely to apply are different types of job seekers. However, in his dissent, then Associate Chief Administrative Law Judge Johnson agreed with the majority that The Washington Examiner is a newspaper of general circulation and that the regulatory history indicates that a suburban newspaper of general circulation would be appropriate for certain nonprofessional occupations. But he disagreed with majority panel’s implication, by way of their grant of certification, that an employer may base its newspaper selection on less than the best newspaper choice for the occupation and the area of intended employment.

Further, in Millenniumsoft, 2012-PER-00636 (Nov. 23, 2015), regarding the position of Programmer Analyst, BALCA found that the use of the Washington Examiner was not appropriate for professional positions under either Intercontinental or Capital Building. The panel questioned the majority’s statement in Capital Building that the publication was a good choice for nonprofessional positions, noting that the statement did not seem consistent with the employer’s obligation under the regulation to use the newspaper “most likely” to attract domestic applicants. The “most likely” provision applies only to professional positions but the language “most appropriate to the occupation and the workers likely to apply for the job opportunity” appears in the criteria for both professional and nonprofessional positions. Several other BALCA panels go back and forth on finding the Washington Examiner to be either appropriate or inappropriate for recruitment for nonprofessional positions.

The panel in Fernando Lawn Services, after reviewing all the case law, agreed with the majority in Capital Building Services and held that the Washington Examiner is a newspaper of general circulation that may be a good choice for advertising certain types of jobs in the Washington, DC area; and the regulatory history indicates that a suburban newspaper of general circulation would be an appropriate choice for certain nonprofessional positions. BALCA held that an employer does not need to establish that its chosen newspaper is the best publication or has the greatest circulation where a nonprofessional occupation is involved. Rather, it must be established that it was “most appropriate to the occupation and the workers likely to apply for the job opportunity.” Since the employer asserted that the Washington Examiner was most appropriate and the CO offered nothing to refute this and did not identify the newspaper in which the Sunday ads should have been placed and explain why that paper would have been a better choice, the CO erred in denying the application.

Of the remaining nine recent cases, BALCA found the Washington Examiner to be the appropriate for nonprofessional positions such as Pipelayer, Server, Maintenance Repairer, Mason, Mechanic, and Cook and called out the CO for applying the standard applicable to professional positions to labor certification applications for these positions. See Eastern Pool Co. Inc., 2012-PER-01849; Fil Parong, 2012-PER-01167; Mount Vernon country Club, Inc., 2012-PER-02764; Daco Construction Corporation, 2012-PER-03333 and 2012-PER-03539; City Concrete Corp., 212-PER-02516 and Nova Europa Restaurant, 212-PER-03442, all issued on June 6, 2019.

In Georgetown Hill Early School, 2012-PER-03334, the offered position was that of a Teaching Assistant and required a Bachelor’s degree. The CO denied the application upon concluding that the Washington Examiner was not appropriate for recruitment for a professional position. In the end, BALCA did not accept the employer argument that the publication was targeted at young urban professionals and commuters and was widely read by white collar professionals and stated that this is not the standard but rather, it must be the newspaper “most likely to bring responses from able, willing, qualified and available U.S. workers” under the criteria for professional occupations appearing in 20 C.F.R. 656.17(e)(1)(i)(B)(1). See also, Software Catalysts, LLC, 2012-PER-01899 (Jun, 6, 2019).

BALCA cases can often serve as a warning of what is to come. Could the DOL soon start to focus more of its attention on the Sunday paper? While these recent cases focus on one paper in one geographic area, they are very important to highlight the importance of careful consideration when deciding on a Sunday newspaper of general circulation especially in relatively large metropolitan areas such as New York where there may be several newspapers that qualify as a “newspaper of general circulation.” It may not suffice to use the New York Times for a nonprofessional position such as a Nanny if the New York Times is not the paper “most appropriate to the occupation and the workers likely to apply for the job opportunity.” An argument that the New York Times has the highest circulation may not be successful if it cannot be proven that an out of work Nanny would likely search for a job in the New York Times as opposed to other newspapers of general circulation such as the New York Post or Daily News. In several of the ten cases discussed above, the CO actually checked the classified sections on the newspaper tear sheets provided by the employer and observed that the Washington Examiner’s classified sections included “no more than 30 total job listings over two pages, while they included nine pages of legal notices.” As practitioners, we ought to pay close attention to the types of advertisements that appear in different newspapers so that we are prepared to demonstrate that the employer has chosen the correct newspaper and to be able refute potential assertions made by a Certifying Officer in denying an application. There is no perfect method for making these determinations but in the end, the application ought to be certified as long as the employer has abided by the regulations and has demonstrated good faith recruitment. Hopefully.

Cyrus Mehta

Employer Not Always Obligated To Pay Return Transportation Cost Of Terminated H-1B Worker

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In Vinayagam v. Cronous Solutions, Inc., ARB Case No. 15-045, ALJ Case No. 2013-LCA-029 (ARB Feb. 14, 2017) the Administrative Review Board held that an employer’s failure to pay return transportation costs home of a terminated H-1B employee was not fatal when the worker did not return to her home country on her own volition.

When filing a Labor Condition Application (LCA) – a necessary first step in the filing of an H-1B visa petition – the employer attests that it will pay the required wage to the H-1B nonimmigrant worker. See INA 212(n)(1)(A); 20 CFR 655.731(a). The required wage must be paid until there is a bona fide termination of the employment relationship. In order to demonstrate such a bona fide termination of the employment relationship, the ARB held in Amtel Group of Fla., Inc. v. Yongmahapakorn, ARB No. 04-087, ALJ No. 2004-LCA-0006 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006). that an employer must meet three requirements to effectuate a bona termination of the relationship under 20 CFR 655.731(c)(7)(ii). First, the employer must expressly terminate the employment relationship with the H-1B worker. Second, the employer must notify USCIS of the termination so that the USCIS can revoke its prior approval of the employer’s H-1B petition under 8 CFR 214.2(h)(11). Third, the employer must provide the H-1B worker with payment of return transportation home under INA 214(c)(5)(A) and 8 CFR 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(E). If the employer otherwise explicitly terminates the employment relationship, but fails to follow the second and third steps, the employer may still be obligated to pay the required wage for failure to effectuate a bona fide termination. Although in the real world the employer must only undertake step one, in the case of an H-1B worker, the employer must also take steps two and three that have been mandated by the Department of Labor (DOL).

It is the third prong that has been the subject of much interpretation.  Must an employer still offer to pay the return transportation costs even if the worker chooses to remain in the US on his or her own volition? In Vinayagam v. Cronous Solutions, the terminated H-1B worker did not leave the United States on her own volition and unsuccessfully applied for H-1B status through another employer. Prior to this unsuccessful attempt, the worker sought to apply for B-2 visa status, which was also denied. The employer under this scenario was not required to pay the return transportation costs home, and thus was not liable to continue to pay the required wage after the employer fulfilled steps one and two. This decision follows a line of other ARB decisions where the employer was not obligated to pay the return transportation costs where the H-1B worker had married a US citizen and adjusted her status to permanent residence or where the worker found an employer to file another H-1B petition and thus extend H-1B status through that employer or where the H-1B worker outright rejected the reimbursement. If the H-1B worker voluntarily terminates employment prior to the expiration of the authorized H-1B stay or is dismissed when the authorized stay has ended, the employer is not liable for return transportation costs. See Toia v. Gardner Family Care Corp., 2007-LCA-6 (April 25, 2008).

It is intriguing that the Department of Labor has latched on to USCIS rules for requiring a bona fide termination of employment. The employer’s obligation to pay the wage is an obligation under DOL rules, but in determining the employer’s ending of that obligation, the DOL has relied on the rules of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which includes notification to the USCIS that results in the revocation of the H-1B petition (8 CFR 214.2(h)(11) and payment of the return transportation home obligation (8 CFR 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(E). Naomi Schorr has astutely observed that when one agency engages in interpreting and enforcing the rules of another agency, courts will not defer to that agency’s interpretation. See Schorr, It Makes You Want To Scream: Overstepping Bounds: The Department of Labor and the Bona Fide Termination of H-1B Employees, Bender’s Immigration Bulletin, Oct. 15, 2014. Indeed, in a 1999 exchange of correspondence between a private attorney and the INS, the response was that the “Service views the return transportation provision as a private contractual issue between the petitioner and the beneficiary. As a result, the Service has not developed any policies with respect to the questions that you have raised.” See Letter from Thomas W. Simmons, Chief, INS Business and Trade Services Branch to Robert A. Klipstein (May 20, 1999), reprinted in 70 Interpreter Releases 1140 (July 26, 1999).

While the USCIS does not give this rule any teeth, the DOL has chosen to enforce it against an employer if the employer cannot demonstrate that the H-1B worker chose to stay in the US on his or her own volition. In fact, notwithstanding Vinayagam v. Cronous Solutions, unless it is clearly indicated that the worker chooses to remain in the US, it would be prudent for the employer to give the benefit of doubt to the H-1B worker and offer the return transportation costs home. These cases have shown that the employer must always go through protracted litigation to establish that the H-1B worker voluntarily stayed on in the US in order to escape back wage liability. Moreover, the burden is on the employer to demonstrate whether it had a duty to provide the return transportation costs and whether it had satisfied that requirement. See Gupta v. Jain Software Consulting, Inc., ARB No. 05-008, ALJ No. 2004-LCA-039 (ARB Mar. 30, 2007).

The High Skilled Worker Rule that took effect on January 18, 2017 provides for a 60 day grace period to H-1B as well as other nonimmigrant workers holding E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B1, L-1 or TN status. See 8 CFR 214.1(2). The 60 day grace period is indeed a salutary feature. Up until the rule took effect, whenever a worker in nonimmigrant status got terminated, they were immediately rendered to be in violation of status. Derivative family members, whose fortunes were attached to the principal’s, would also be rendered out of status upon the principal falling out status. Thus, the 60 day grace period not only gives the worker more time to leave the United States, but it also provides a window of opportunity to find another employer who can file an extension or change of status within the 60 day period. Similarly, the worker could also potentially change to some other status on his or her own, such as to F-1, after enrolling in a school.

The new 60 day grace period may incentivize the H-1B worker to remain in the US, and thus enable an employer to escape paying the return transportation costs. On other hand, it should not be viewed as a green light to never offer the return transportation costs home. While the 60 day grace period does allow a terminated worker some cushion in finding another employer in the US, it also provides a cushion for the worker to leave the United States less abruptly if terminated prior . In the latter situation, the employer’s failure to offer return transportation costs home could still render the employer liable for back wages as a result of not effectuating a bona fide termination.

Cyrus Mehta

The Decline of Deference: BALCA Does Not Speak for the DOL

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By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

In the ongoing litigation over the authority of the Department of Labor (DOL) to promulgate H-2B prevailing wage methodology in the Third Circuit, Louisiana Forestry Ass’n v. Secretary of Labor, No. 12-4030, the DOL wrote a letter  stating that the Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals’ decision in Island Holdings LLC, 2013-PWD-00002 (BALCA 3, 2012) did not represent the legal position of the Secretary of Labor. The DOL had issued increased prevailing wage determinations to an employer after it changed its wage methodology through an Interim Final rule that took effect on April 24, 2013. The order to increase wages was issued after the DOL had already certified the labor certification for the H-2B workers at a lower wage.  BALCA in Island Holdings invalidated the wage increases on the ground that there was no specific statutory or regulatory authority that would authorize DOL to increase the wage rate at an unknown future date.

The DOL’s letter to the Third Circuit disregarding the BALCA ruling in Island Holdings would have enormous implications on labor certification practice and administrative law. We credit Wendel Hall of C.J. Lake, counsel in the Island Holdings case, for alerting us to the significance of this issue and also bringing it to the attention of DOL itself.  If BALCA does not speak for DOL, is it necessary to exhaust administrative remedies before challenging a PERM denial in federal court? If BALCA does not speak for DOL, should the courts pay Chevron style deference to BALCA decisions? Can DOL ignore other BALCA decisions on PERM since BALCA does not speak for Secretary of Labor?

The Supreme Court established a two-step analysis in Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) for evaluating whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to administer is lawful. Under Step One, the court must determine whether Congress has clearly spoken to the precise question at issue in the plain terms of the statute. If that is the case, there is no need for the reviewing court to delve any further.  Under Step Two, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the reviewing court must determine whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute.  A permissible interpretation of the statute need not be the best interpretation or even the interpretation that the reviewing court would adopt. Step Two is commonly known as Chevron deference where the reviewing court grants deference to the agency’s permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute.

Still, Chevron deference cannot be accorded unless there is an agency construction of a statute to which the federal court must defer. DOL has now told the 3rd Circuit that BALCA does not speak for the Secretary of Labor since the administrative law judges on BALCA are only subordinate DOL employees. Therefore, an interpretation by BALCA does not represent the official view or understanding of the DOL. For this reason, one may never reach the question of deference since there is no agency finding or interpretation capable of commanding it. In United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (9th Cir. 2001), the Supreme Court held that not all agency interpretations qualify for Chevron deference, and deference is only accorded “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”    Using the Mead language or rationale, one can conclude that, since DOL has now decided that BALCA does not speak for the DOL, Congress has not delegated any interpretive authority to BALCA. Hence, no deference can or should be paid to any BALCA ruling.  Such a ruling would appear not to be entitled to deference

Even under the lower  standard in Skidmore v. Swift & Co, 323 U.S. 134 (1944) the weight accorded to an administrative interpretation or judgment “depends upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those facts which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”  If DOL does not think that BALCA speaks for the Secretary of Labor, using theSkidmore criteria, how can BALCA ever have the power to persuade? Not having that, any BALCA decision would not be invested with any deference under Skidmore.

Finally, in Auer v. Robins, 519 US 452 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the same Chevron type of deference applies to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. However, even under the Auer concept of deference, which gives federal agencies the right to interpret their own regulations, there would be no deference to a BALCA decision since the DOL has now told the Third Circuit that an opinion by BALCA is not an interpretation by the DOL but only an expression of what individual subordinate DOL employees think.

Since DOL does not think BALCA speaks for the Secretary of Labor, is there a need to exhaust administrative remedies before challenging a PERM labor certification denial in federal court? Moreover, if no deference to a BALCA decision is justified or required, can there be a failure to exhaust? We doubt it. If DOL does not think that BALCA speaks for the agency, how can an appeal to BALCA be mandatory despite 20 CFR 656.24(d)(e)(3) that advises an employer a failure to appeal to BALCA within 30 days constitutes a failure to exhaust. How can going to BALCA be a mandatory administrative remedy when BALCA speaks only for itself and not the DOL?  There is a conflict between this regulation and the DOL view in the 3rd Circuit Louisiana Forestry case. This regulation is key since, for Administrative Procedure Act purposes, only if exhaustion is required by an agency regulation can recourse to the federal courts be barred. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 US 137, 144-54 (1993). 

The four criteria set forth in Darby v. Cisneros in order to bypass an administrative appeal, are as follows:

  • Federal review has been brought pursuant to the APA;
  • There is no statute that mandates an administrative appeal;
  • Either: a) there is no regulation that mandates an administrative appeal; or b) if there is a regulation that mandates an administrative appeal, it also does not stay the agency decision pending administrative appeal; and
  • The adverse agency decision to be challenged is final for purposes of the APA.

BALCA cannot provide an administrative remedy to the parties concerned since its decisions do not represent the official view of the DOL. Rather than constituting “superior agency authority” to use the language of Section 10 (c ) of the APA, 5 USC 704, BALCA consists of a collection of subordinate DOL employees  in the view of the DOL itself. Since that is the case, BALCA “lacks the ability or competence to resolve the issue or grant the relief requested…” Iddir v. INS, 301 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2002).  

None of the various reasons most regularly advanced for the exhaustion doctrine apply here given the DOL repudiation of BALCA as the final expression of the DOL. The need to first appeal to BALCA does not promote administrative efficiency since it can be ignored by the DOL as the individual perspectives of subordinate employees. For the same reason, it will not avoid needless litigation or promote the conservation of judicial resources. When DOL agrees with BALCA, it accepts what BALCA says. When DOL disagrees, it can tell the court, as here, that BALCA does not speak for the DOL.  This is how and why the lack of deference is linked to the absence of any need to exhaust remedies.

Aggrieved employers and aliens may wish to directly seek review in federal court than seek review at BALCA after the DOL’s letter to the Third Circuit. Strategically, going directly into federal court may be advantageous if the plaintiff wished to challenge a regulation on constitutional grounds rather than waste time with BALCA, which may not have jurisdiction over such a challenge. Moreover, if the employer desires to file a new PERM application, and still seek review of the old denial, going to BALCA would preclude the filing of a new application until there was a final adverse decision. 20 CFR § 565.24(e)(6). The same prohibition does not apply if the aggrieved employer directly goes into federal court.

Finally, 20 CFR 656.26 does not require an alien to go to BALCA; indeed, the alien has no such right. In the labor certification context, the alien is not even informed of a right to appeal in contrast to the  notification of such right provided to an alien investor,  8 CFR 204.6(k), or fiancé(e) , 8 CFR 123.2 (k)(4). Then, under Darby, an alien ought to be able to get APA standing even if the employer does not seek review of the denial with BALCA, which in any event has been downgraded by the DOL.  The Sixth Circuit in Patel v. USCIS very recently held that an alien had standing to seek review of the denial of an I-140 petition as the alien’s interests are within the zone of interests protected by INA section 203(b)(3). See also Stenographer Machines v. Regional Administrator for Employment and Training, 577 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1978); Cf Ramirez v. Reich, 156 F.3d 1273 (DC Cir. 1998) (although alien has standing to sue on a denied labor certification, government’s motion to dismiss granted due to absence of employer’s participation in the litigation).  Given that the DOL has rendered BALCA irrelevant in its letter to the Third Circuit, aliens ought to be able to bolster their argument about seeking review of a denied PERM labor certification in federal court.

The DOL repudiation of BALCA as an authoritative voice calls into question the relevancy of BALCA itself. If BALCA does not speak for the DOL to a federal judge, how can it do so in any other context? Can BALCA represent the DOL in an administrative law sense only?  Is it possible for BALCA to be invested with a sense of finality only with respect to decisions on labor certification, both temporary and permanent, but to lose such imprimatur should the DOL go into court? To answer these questions, we would do well to cast our minds back to the reason that DOL created BALCA in the first place. At that time, the DOL’s administrative decisions were neither consistent nor uniform. So the DOL revised the regulations to create a Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA) in 1987 to replace the system of appeals to single administrative law judges within the DOL. The rule creating the BALCA said, “[T]he Board will enhance uniformity and consistency of decisions.” 52 Fed. Reg. 11218 (Apr. 8, 1987). A subsequent BALCA decision explained: “The purpose of the Board is to provide stare decisis for the immigration bar.” Matter of Artdesign Inc., 89–INA–99 (Dec. 5, 1989). Subsequently, however, these goals were not achieved, and the BALCA invented a device (the en banc decision) to resolve inconsistencies in BALCA decisions. The BALCA suffers from a strange defect: unlike the DHS and the BIA where regulations exist that make BIA decisions binding on all officers and employees of the Service and Immigration Judges, BALCA decisions cannot command unquestioning obedience from the federal agency it claims to represent. Yet, until today, both the regulators and the regulated assumed that BALCA spoke not merely or even primarily for the administrative law judges themselves but for the Department of Labor. Now, we are not so sure.

(Guest writer Gary Endelman is the Senior Counsel at FosterQuan)