Can the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Under the Administrative Procedure Act Save DACA?

The Supreme Court announced on June 28, 2019 that it would consider the legality of President Trump’s ending of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program.  Although federal courts in New York, California and Washington DC have blocked Trump’s efforts to block DACA, the Supreme Court decided to take up the matter striking fear in the hearts of Dreamers. The Supreme Court had previously declined to take up DACA, and so it needn’t have prematurely considered the ongoing challenges in the lower courts to Trump’s rescission of the program, which have benefitted 800,000 Dreamers.  Given the Supreme Court’s new conservative majority, there is a chance that the Court could uphold Trump’s action. It is indeed paradoxical that the nation’s highest court is viewed with fear by many vulnerable immigrants rather than as a protector of their rights.

Still, even though DACA was initiated by President Obama as an executive action, it cannot be arbitrarily and capriciously rescinded by the next president.

In one of the lower court decisions in April 2018, NAACP v. Trump, Judge Bates invoked 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act to stay President Trump’s decision to rescind DACA.  The APA provides that a court “shall … hold unlawful and set aside agency action … found to be … arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Judge Bates ruled that the Trump administration provided scant legal reasoning to support its justification that DACA was unlawful. “A conclusory assertion that a prior policy is illegal, accompanied by a hodgepodge of illogical or post hoc policy assertions, simply will not do,” Judge Bates opined in a further ruling in August 2018.

The ability for a court to set aside a decision by the administration under the Administrative Procedure Act if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law” is a powerful tool. It can be invoked by a foreign national who may no longer be able to remain in the United States based on the government’s unlawful actions. §706(2)(A) has also been successfully invoked in recent challenges to denials of H-1B requests by employers and foreign nationals.

Will the Supreme Court rely on §706(2)(A) to hold that Trump’s justification was arbitrary and capricious? One can find a clue in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Department of Commerce v. New York where it questioned the Commerce Secretary’s insertion of a citizenship question in the 2020 census form. Plaintiffs challenged the insertion of the citizenship question on the ground that it would result in a chilling effect. Census Bureau experts had warned that adding the citizenship question would result in a significant undercount of households with at least one noncitizen member. The Supreme Court, in this case, examined whether the Commerce Secretary’s action was arbitrary and capricious under 706(2)(A) of the APA. Mr. Ross’s reason for adding the citizenship question was “solely” because the Justice Department “initiated the request” for the purpose of enforcing the Voting Rights Act, which relies on  data collected by the Census Bureau.  However, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority along with the four liberal justice, indicated that “the evidence tells a story that does not match the explanation the Secretary gave for his decision.” The chief justice further opined that the voting rights rationale offered by Mr. Ross depended on an “incongruent” explanation that was not supported by proper evidence. “It is rare to review a record as extensive as the one before us when evaluating informal agency action — and it should be,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote. “But having done so for the sufficient reasons we have explained, we cannot ignore the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given.” The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the lower court so that the Commerce Department could provide a better explanation.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Commerce v. New York may provide a sliver of hope on how the Supreme Court may rule, if Justice Roberts and the four liberal justices again reach agreement that the administration’s justification in rescinding DACA was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The key issue is whether the post hoc rationalization by the Trump administration for rescinding the DACA program by DHS Secretary Nielsen  was arbitrary and capricious in light of an earlier 2014 Department of Justice memo justifying its legibility.

The Trump administration’s animus against immigrants is no secret, and all its actions, whether it was the imposition of the travel ban against nationals of mainly Muslim countries or the repeal of DACA are driven by this animus. It is thus heartening that the Supreme Court did not make the same mistake as it made in Trump v. Hawaii by taking at face value Commerce Secretary’s “contrived” explanation for adding the citizenship question. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will continue on the same trajectory when it rules on  President Trump’s rescission of DACA, and emphasize that although President Trump has broad powers relating to immigration, his actions must be held against the arbitrary and capricious standard under §706(2)(A) of the APA. Since most of the Trump administration’s actions have been executive rather than legislative, challenging them under the APA appears to be the most viable and effective path. Justice Robert’s invocation of Justice Friendly in the census decision is especially relevant as the Supreme Court continues to review Trump’s executive actions relating to immigrants:

Our review is deferential, but we are “not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.” United States v. Stanchich, 550 F. 2d 1294, 1300 (CA2 1977) (Friendly, J.). The reasoned explanation requirement of administrative law, after all, is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public. Accepting contrived reasons would defeat the purpose of the enterprise. If judicial review is to be more than an empty ritual, it must demand something better than the explanation offered for the action taken in this case.

Illogical Situation for Family-Sponsored Second Preference Spouses and Children under the July 2019 Visa Bulletin

The Department of State Visa Bulletin is eagerly anticipated each month. It tells aspiring immigrants their place in the green card queue, and whether one has moved ahead, remained static or gone backwards. There are many people stuck in the green card backlogs, some stretching to several decades, hoping each month to move ahead in the queue. The person who sets the dates each month is Mr. Charles (“Charlie”) Oppenheim, Chief of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) Visa Control and Reporting Division based on projected demand and the fixed supply of visas within each category.

The July 2019 Visa Bulletin to the pleasant surprise of many indicates that the Family-Sponsored Second Preference,  F2A,   will become current for all countries of the world on July 1, 2019. This category applies to spouses and minor children of lawful permanent residents. The wait in this category has been nearly three years till now. In the current June 2019 Visa Bulletin, the Final Action Date for the F2A preference is July 15, 2017. This means that those whose I-130 petitions were filed on or before June 15, 2017 by the spouse or parent are today eligible for an immigrant visa or to file an I-485 application for adjustment of status.  On July 1, 2019, the Final Action Date under F2A becomes current, which means that a visa number is immediately available regardless of when the I-130 petition was filed, subject obviously to processing times for the adjudication of the I-130. Spouses and children who are in the US can potentially apply for an I-485 adjustment of status concurrently with an I-130 petition. Those who are overseas will be scheduled for an immigrant visa interview, provided that they have become documentarily qualified, and be eligible for an immigrant visa.

The Visa Bulletin has two charts – Chart A, the Final Action Date, and Chart B, the Filing Date. Although the Final Action Date for the F2A is current in the July 2019 Visa Bulletin, the Filing Date is March 8, 2019. Surprisingly, with respect to family sponsored filings, the USCIS has indicated in the Adjustment of Status Filing Charts from the Visa Bulletin that applicants in the US can only use the Filing Date and not the Final Action Date to file an I-485 application. This makes no sense as the Filing Date should always be ahead of the Final Action Date. In the case of the F2A for July 2019, it is the other way around. The Final Action Date is ahead, by virtue of being current, while the Filing Date is behind at March 8, 2019.

The DOS introduced the two charts in the monthly visa bulletin for the very first time on October 1, 2015.  The Filing Date in the Visa Bulletin potentially allows for the early filing of I-485 adjustment of status applications if eligible applicants are in the United States and the filing of visa applications if they are outside the country. The Final Action Date is the date when permanent residency (the green card) can be granted.  The Filing Date, if the USCIS so determines, allows for the early submission of an I-485 application prior to the date when the green card actually become available. Similarly, for those who are outside the United States and processing for an immigrant visa overseas, the Filing Date allows applicants to submit the DS-260 immigrant visa application and become documentarily qualified prior to the issuance of the immigrant visa when the Final Date becomes available. The DOS had historically issued a qualifying date prior to the visa becoming available so that applicants could begin processing their visas. This informal qualifying date system morphed into a more formal Filing Date in the Visa Bulletin from October 1, 2015 onwards. As a result, the USCIS also got involved in the administering of the Visa Bulletin with respect to the filing of I-485 adjustment applications. Even if the Filing Date becomes available, it is the USCIS that determines whether applicants can file an I-485 application or not each month.

For July 2019, the USCIS has absurdly indicated that the Filing Date of March 2019 must be used for filing I-485 adjustment applications under the F2A category rather than the Final Action Date, which is current. It is unclear whether this is intentional or a mistake. If it is a mistake, it is hoped that the USCIS will correct itself and allow the filing of an I-485 under the F2A on July 1, 2019 under the Final Action Date rather than the Filing Date.

If this is intentional, then the USCIS is plain wrong. It must allow applicants to file I-485 applications under the Final Action Date and not the Filing Date.  Alternatively, Mr. Oppenheim should move the Filing Date to Current like the Final Action Date. The Filing Date must always be equal to the Final Action Date or ahead of it. If the DOS corrects the Filing Date, it can prevent the USCIS from authorizing the filing of I-485 adjustment of status applications under the Filing Date rather than the Final Action Date.

The USCIS also contradicts itself with respect to the position it has taken on the date that freezes the age of a minor child under the Child Status Protection Act. On August 24, 2018,  the USCIS Policy Manual  definitively confirmed that the Final Action Date protects the age of the child rather than the Filing Date. Under INA 203(h)(1)(A), which codified Section 3 of the CSPA,  the age of the child under 21 is locked on the “date on which an immigrant visa number becomes available…but only if the [child] has sought to acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residency within one year of such availability.” If the child’s age is over 21 years, it can be subtracted by the amount of time the applicable petition was pending. See INA 203(h)(1)(B). While the USCIS considers a child’s age to be frozen on the first day of the month when the Final Action Date becomes current rather than the Filing Date, under the July 2019 Visa Bulletin, the USCIS is preventing a child from seeking to acquire permanent residency within one year of visa availability provided the I-130 petition was filed after March 8, 2019. Under the Final Action Date, the visa number becomes available on July 1, 2019, but the USCIS is saying that only those who are beneficiaries of I-130 petitions filed on or before March 8, 2019 can file I-485 adjustment of status application. Thus, one who has filed an I-130 petition after March 8, 2019 cannot file an I-485 application, and is prevented from seeking to acquire permanent residency by filing an I-485 application.

In the event that the F2A retrogresses in the coming months, and the USCIS sticks to its position that only the Fling Date can be used to file an I-485 application, then children who will age out,  but protected under the CSPA, would be deprived of the benefit of seeking to apply for permanent residency within one year of visa availability on July 1, 2019. Although under the CSPA the child’s age is frozen only when both the visa becomes available and the I-130 petition is approved, an I-130 and I-485 filed concurrently (or an I-485 filed while an I-130 is pending), may serve to protect the age of the child even if the I-130 gets approved after the date retrogresses.  This happened during the July 2017 Visa Bulletin, which suddenly became current, for EB-2 and EB-3 beneficiaries. A concurrently filed I-140 and I-485 served to protect the age of the child even upon the retrogression of cut-off dates after August 17, 2007 so long as the I-140 petition got approved.  Thus, if there is retrogression in the F2A after July 2019, the USCIS would have deprived the ability of children who will age out from the F2A if they could not file the I-485 application concurrently with the I-130 petition.

There may be ways to still seek CSPA protection notwithstanding USCIS’s illogical position. For those who already have independently filed I-130 petitions after March 8. 2019, an attempt should be make to file an I-485 application,  and even if it gets rejected, it  would demonstrate that the applicant sought to acquire permanent residency within one year of visa availability. Those who already have approved I-130 petitions may file Form I-824, and even though the filing of this form triggers consular action, it demonstrates that the child sought to acquire permanent residency within one year of July 1, 2019. On the other hand, a child who will age out on August 1, 2019 and is not yet the beneficiary of an I-130 petition, will not be able to file a concurrent I-130 and I-148 in July 2019 and will never be able to seek the protection of the CSPA.  Such a child may wish to seek review of the USCIS’s action in federal court.

Rather than agonizing about how illogical all this is, it is hoped that the USCIS will allow the filing of I-485 applications based on the Final Action Date by July 1, 2018, or that Mr. Oppenheim moves the Filing Date to current like the Final Action Date.

Update June 27, 2019: USCIS has fixed the issue. The Adjustment of Status Filing Charts from the Visa Bulletin now says:

For Family-Sponsored Filings:
In the F2A category, there is a cutoff date on the Dates for Filing chart.  However, the category is “current” on the Final Action Dates chart.  This means that applicants in the F2A category may file using the Final Action Dates chart for July 2019.

For all the other family-based preference categories, you must use the Dates for Filing chart in the Department of State Visa Bulletin for July 2019.

Hopefully, my blog raised awareness about the inconsistency.  I thank USCIS for realizing its error and fixing its chart prior to July 1, 2019.

 

 

 

Fallout from Trump’s Muslim Ban: Requiring Use of Social Media on Visa Application Forms

On May 31, 2019, the State Department added new questions to visa application forms, DS-160/DS-156 Nonimmigrant Visa Application and Form DS-260, Immigrant Visa Application. Visa applicants now have to disclose the social media platforms that they have used within the previous five years and provide their user names or handle for each platform. This information needs to be provided through a drop down list of common social media platforms, although some of the platforms listed are defunct. Applicants are instructed to not provide the passwords for these accounts.  Additional questions requesting the applicant’s current e mail and phone number, as well as a list of additional e mail addresses and phone numbers used in the past five years also now appear on the forms. If applicants are unable to provide the precise details, they can insert “unknown”, but this could result in additional screening or delays during the visa process.

The new policy has caused worldwide concern as it is expected to affect 710,000 immigrant visa applicants and 14 million nonimmigrant visa applicants.

This policy has its genesis in President Trump’s travel ban of January 27, 2017 executive order 13769, which banned nationals from seven Muslim countries  from entering the US- Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia and Yemen. After this executive order was blocked by courts, the Trump administration issued a repackaged March 6, 2017 executive order 13780, which banned nationals from six of the seven countries subject to the original executive order. Iraq was taken off the list.   After even the March 6, 2017 executive order was found unconstitutional by the fourth and ninth circuit courts of appeals, the March 2017 executive order was subsequently revised through a third proclamation 9645 dated  September 24, 2017, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii.  Chief Justice John Roberts, in writing the 5-4 majority opinion, found that Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality (INA) “exudes deference to the President” and thus empowers him to deny entry of noncitizens if he determines that allowing entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” There has already been much criticism of this decision. Although Trump made various utterances regarding his animus towards Muslims during his campaign and even after he became president, the majority found the third version of Trump’s ban on its face and that it did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of Constitution.

Section 5 of the March 6, 2017 executive order provided the basis for the new social media screening policy:

Implementing Uniform Screening and Vetting Standards for All Immigration Programs. (a) The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence shall implement a program, as part of the process for adjudications, to identify individuals who seek to enter the United States on a fraudulent basis, who support terrorism, violent extremism, acts of violence toward any group or class of people within the United States, or who present a risk of causing harm subsequent to their entry. This program shall include the development of a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures, such as in-person interviews; a database of identity documents proffered by applicants to ensure that duplicate documents are not used by multiple applicants; amended application forms that include questions aimed at identifying fraudulent answers and malicious intent; a mechanism to ensure that applicants are who they claim to be; a mechanism to assess whether applicants may commit, aid, or support any kind of violent, criminal, or terrorist acts after entering the United States; and any other appropriate means for ensuring the proper collection of all information necessary for a rigorous evaluation of all grounds of inadmissibility or grounds for the denial of other immigration benefits.

Section 5 of the September 24, 2017 proclamation further provided:

Reports on Screening and Vetting Procedures. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and other appropriate heads of agencies shall submit periodic reports to the President, through appropriate Assistants to the President, that:

(i) describe the steps the United States Government has taken to improve vetting for nationals of all foreign countries, including through improved collection of biometric and biographic data;

(ii) describe the scope and magnitude of fraud, errors, false information, and unverifiable claims, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security on the basis of a validation study, made in applications for immigration benefits under the immigration laws; and

(iii) evaluate the procedures related to screening and vetting established by the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs in order to enhance the safety and security of the United States and to ensure sufficient review of applications for immigration benefits.

Subsequently, in March 2018,  the State Department provided  60 day notices in the federal register regarding its intent to include social media information in  the DS 160 and DS 260 visa applications. Although AILA provided  comprehensive comments in response to the notices expressing concern about  how these questions would discourage individuals from applying for a visa, rendering it impossible to respond accurately to questions relating to temporary telephone numbers as well as concerns about how it will be used, the State Department nevertheless went ahead and introduced these additional questions on  May 31, 2019.

The new questions on social media thus stem from the same executive order that caused worldwide consternation against the US when it banned millions of people from mainly Muslim countries in keeping with Trump’s earlier campaign pledge to ban Muslims. Although the September 24, 2017 executive order was upheld by the Supreme Court, the US has suffered worldwide reputational damage due to the indiscriminate banning of persons solely because because of their nationality. Countries like Iran and Yemen have been particularly affected as many thousands of their nationals have legitimate ties with the US.  Thousands of families remain separated as a result of what is widely come to be known as Trump’s Muslim ban.

Justifying the new questions on social media, a State Department official stated, “As we’ve seen around the world in recent years, social media can be a major forum for terrorist sentiment and activity. This will be a vital tool to screen out terrorists, public safety threats, and other dangerous individuals from gaining immigration benefits and setting foot on U.S. soil.”  But social media has never been a reliable indicator in determining whether someone is a threat to US or not. A post that was written many years ago could also be taken out of context and be easily misunderstood or misinterpreted, resulting in a denial of the visa. This would also create a chilling effect on people and some may feel that participating in a political online discussion could hinder their visa approval hopes.

There is also no ground of inadmissibility in the INA that should apply if one legitimately opposes the United States, its polices or even President Trump. Even if one wishes to come to the US as a visitor for pleasure to participate in a peaceful protest that in itself should not be the sole basis for denying a visa. Under 22 CFR 41.31(b)(2) pleasure is defined as “[l]egitimate activities of a recreational character, including tourism, amusement, visits with friends or relatives, rest, medical treatment and activities of a fraternal, social or service nature.” Clearly, being part of a peaceful protest with like-minded people could constitute activities of a “fraternal” or “social” nature. 9 FAM 402.2-4(A)(3) also contemplates as visitors for pleasure “[p]articipants in conventions of social organizations.”  Still INA 214(b) provides unbridled discretion to a consular officer to refuse most nonimmigrant visas as such an applicant “shall be presumed to be an immigrant” until it is established that he or she is entitled to the nonimmigrant status under INA 101(a)(15).  The consular officer need not provide a reason for the refusal. Even if the visa applicant can demonstrate his or her ties with the home country, the visa can still be refused if all the activities in the US are not consistent with the visa. See 9 FAM 302.1-2 (B)(6). Furthermore, if the social media profile is not consistent with an applicant’s employment history that is required for the eligibility of a visa, such as an L-1 intracompany visa that requires one year of prior employment with a qualifying entity abroad, it could be used as a basis for denial, and even a recommendation to the USCIS to revoke the underlying visa petition.

Unfortunately, there exist grounds of inadmissibility that may trigger upon a review of one’s social media. One  ground is under INA 212(a)(3)(A)(i), which allows a consular  to find inadmissible one, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she seeks to enter the US to engage principally or incidentally in “any other unlawful activity.” Still, one’s legitimate expression of free speech on social media should not lead to the inference that this person will engage in unlawful activity in the US. Then, there is also the extremely broad ground of inadmissibility for terrorist activity under INA 212(a)(3)(B)(II) that allows a consular officer to render the applicant inadmissible if there is a reasonable ground to believe that he or she is engaged or is likely to engage in terrorist activity. Even with respect to this ground, one’s expression of free speech that is generally protected under the First Amendment, however objectionable it may be to the consular officer, ought not to lead to an inference that the applicant will engage in terrorist activity.

Then, there is the possibility that if the information on social media use is not submitted accurately on the visa application due to a misunderstanding, the issuance of the visa can be held up, or worse, the applicant can be rendered inadmissible for fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact pursuant to INA 212(a)(6)(C)(i). Someone who inadvertently forgets to reveal a social media handle from over 4 years ago can argue that the misrepresentation was neither willful nor material. According to 9 FAM 302.9-4(B)(4), the “term ‘willfully’ as used in INA 212(a)(6)(C)(i) is interpreted to mean knowingly and intentionally, as distinguished from accidentally, inadvertently, or in an honest belief that the facts are otherwise.” Even if an applicant willfully misrepresents, it must be a material misrepresentation. A misrepresentation is material if “[t]he misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the alien’s eligibility and which might well have resulted in a proper determination that he or she be inadmissible.” See 9 FAM 302.9-4 (citing Matter of S- and B-C, 9 I. & N. Dec. 436, at 447).   Unfortunately, even when one can overcome a finding of inadmissibility, it is a very difficult and protracted process to convince a consular officer to reverse an unfavorable determination. Moreover, deleting social media handles prior to completing a visa form will serve no benefit whatsoever, as the question asks for use of social media in the past 5 years without regard to whether one is using them presently or not. It will also lead to further suspicion and thus delays and denials.

The additional questions on visa forms relating to social media are a logical extension of Trump’s Muslim ban – rather it is more like going down the proverbial slippery slope. The countries affected by the ban were few but the added instruction on the forms to profile and suspect people based on their social media use will impact millions more. It remains to be seen whether other countries will also impose similar questions on their visa forms. Such copycat actions can be used to retaliate against American visa applicants or by other countries who want to screen out nationals of countries they find undesirable.  The questions will dissuade applicants from visiting the US temporarily for legitimate purposes.  These questions will also unfortunately result in unfounded and arbitrary denials of visa applications of those who are coming to the US both temporarily and permanently, thus depriving US educational institutions of foreign students and US businesses from increased business through tourism. Those legitimately sponsored for permanent residency by family members, employers or through investment will also be adversely impacted. The policy is also going to create a chilling effect on people as  some may feel participating in a political online discussion could hinder their visa approval hopes. It would hope that people are not denied a visa based on a tweet that’s deemed to be against American policies that is consistent with free speech protected under the First Amendment. Otherwise, the only loser will be America, whose standing has already been diminished after the implementation of the Muslim ban.

 

Making the Case for Expanding a Foreign National’s Interest in an I-140 Petition

By Cyrus D. Mehta & Patrick Matutina

Current regulations generally preclude beneficiaries from participating in employment-based immigrant visa proceedings, including post-adjudication motions and appeals. The employment-based immigrant visa petition is Form I-140 that is filed by an employer on behalf of a foreign national beneficiary who is being sponsored for permanent residency under the employment-based first, second and third preferences.

An interesting case arises, however, when a beneficiary exercises her right to job portability pursuant to §204(j) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and 8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B). If a Request for Evidence (RFE) is subsequently issued on the underlying I-140, what rights does a Beneficiary have in regards to her ability to respond?

By way of background, INA §204(j) allows foreign workers who are being petitioned for a “green card” by their employer to change jobs once their I-485 adjustment of status application has been pending for 180 days or more. Furthermore, 8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B) allows a beneficiary to port to a new employer based on an unadjudicated I-140, filed concurrently with an I-485 application, so long as it is approvable at the time of filing.  8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B) provides in relevant part:

(2) Under section 204(j) of the Act, the applicant has a new offer of employment from the petitioning employer or a different U.S. employer, or a new offer based on self-employment, in the same or a similar occupational classification as the employment offered under the qualifying petition, provided that:

  1. The alien’s application to adjust status based on a qualifying petition has been pending for     180 days or more; and
  2. The qualifying immigrant visa petition:
    1. Has already been approved; or
    2. Is pending when the beneficiary notifies USCIS of a new job offer 180 days or more after the date the alien’s adjustment of status application was filed, and the petition is subsequently approved:
      1. Adjudication of the pending petition shall be without regard to the requirement in 8 CFR 204.5(g)(2) to continuously establish the ability to pay the proffered wage after filing and until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence; and
      2. The pending petition will be approved if it was eligible for approval at the time of filing and until the alien’s adjustment of status application has been pending for 180 days, unless approval of the qualifying immigrant visa petition at the time of adjudication is inconsistent with a requirement of the Act or another applicable statute; and
  3. The approval of the qualifying petition has not been revoked.

In a best case scenario, the lack of intention to employ a beneficiary after the filing of an I-140 and I-485 does not preclude a petitioner from responding to an RFE issued on the underlying I-140 for a beneficiary who has already ported or who may port in the near future. This is because this intention – which is to no longer employ the beneficiary – was formed after the filing of the I-140 and I-485. Therefore, a petitioner may still seek to establish that the I-140 was approvable when filed pursuant to 8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B), and indicate that it has no intention to permanently employ the beneficiary,  so that a beneficiary may exercise job portability based on her pending I-485. Our firm recently had success in such a situation wherein a beneficiary of a previously filed I-140 and I-485 was able to work with a petitioner to respond to an RFE even though the beneficiary would not be employed permanently and had expressed an intention to port to a new job in the same occupational classification.  After the I-140 had been erroneously denied on grounds not related to the lack of permanent employment, our firm assisted the beneficiary to successfully reopen the I-140 with the cooperation of the petitioner, and ultimately win approval of the I-140 and approval of the I-485 for the beneficiary.

The question remains, however, what recourse does a beneficiary have if the petitioner refuses to respond to an RFE, or otherwise cooperate with the beneficiary? May a beneficiary, for example, file an I-290B notice of appeal or motion to reopen a subsequent denial of the I-140?

The answer may be found under existing USCIS policy. Under the Policy Memo promulgated on November 11, 2017, a Beneficiary becomes an “affected party” upon USCIS’ favorable determination that the beneficiary is eligible to port. See USCIS, Guidance on Notice to, and Standing for, AC21 Beneficiaries about I-140 Approvals Being Revoked After Matter of V-S-G- Inc., PM-602-0152, Nov. 11, 2017 at page 5.  Thus, under the policy adopted by USCIS in Matter of V-S-G- Inc., Beneficiaries, who are affected parties as defined in the Matter of V-S-G- Inc. decision, are entitled to a copy of any decision made by USCIS and may file an appeal or motion on Form I-290B with respect to a revoked Form I-140, even though existing form instructions generally preclude beneficiary filings.

As we had previously blogged, in Matter of V-S-G- Inc. the beneficiary had changed employers and taken a new position after the adjustment of status application had been pending for more than 180 days.  Meanwhile, the president of their original petitioning organization was convicted of mail fraud in connection with another USCIS petition.  USCIS sent a notice of intent to revoke (“NOIR”).  When the petitioner failed to respond to the NOIR, USCIS revoked the petitioner’s approval due to the petitioner’s failure to respond. Although Matter of V-S-G-, Inc. dealt with the issue of an NOIR of an approved I-140 petition, one could argue that the AAO should extend the holding in Matter of V-S-G- to a Beneficiary who successfully ports to a new employer while the underlying I-140 remains unadjudicated.  This is because upon the filing of an I-485 Supplement J – required when the beneficiary ports or intends to port to a job in a same or similar occupational classification – the beneficiary becomes an “affected party,” and should be given a copy of any RFE, as well as a copy of any subsequent denial of her I-140. Our argument for extending Matter of V-S-G is further supported by the promulgation of  8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B), which enables the I-140 to be approved even if a job offer no longer exists so long as the I-140 was eligible for approval at the time of filing. See 8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B)(2). 

A review of the preamble to 8 CFR 245.25 published in the Federal Register, while not dispositive, also supports our position. The preamble notes that several commentators had expressed concern that individual Beneficiaries of Form I-140 are not provided notice when USCIS seeks to revoke the approval of those petitions. In response, DHS noted that it was considering administrative action to address these concerns. See Federal Register /Vol. 81, No. 223 /Friday, November 18, 2016 /Rules and Regulations at page 82418 (hereinafter the “preamble”). Similar concerns were also raised in the preamble in the section entitled “Portability Under INA 204(j)” wherein the DHS states:

As a practical matter, petitioners have diminished incentives to address inquiries regarding qualifying Form I-140 petitions once beneficiaries have a new job offer that may qualify for INA 104(j) portability […] Accordingly, denying a qualifying Form I-140 petition for either ability to pay issues that occur after the time of filing, or for other petition eligibility issues that transpire after the associated application for adjustment of status has been pending for 180 days or more, would be contrary to the primary goal of AC21. Such a policy would in significant part defeat the aim to allow individuals the ability to change jobs and benefit from INA 204(j) so long as their associated application for adjustment of status has been pending for 180 days or more.

 

In a perfect world, a beneficiary ought to be able to work with a petitioner for the purpose of responding to any RFE or NOIR issued on a previously filed I-140 and I-485 despite the petitioner’s lack of intention to continue to employ the beneficiary. However, as a practical matter, a petitioning employer is likely to refuse to cooperate with a beneficiary who has already been terminated. Nonetheless, there exists a compelling argument that the beneficiary be allowed to respond due to the growing legal recognition of a beneficiary’s interest in an I-140 approval where there is also a pending I-485.  Although Matter of V-S-G-, Inc. dealt with the issue of an NOIR of an approved I-140 petition, it would be consistent with the holding to argue that if a beneficiary is able to successfully port to a new employer prior to the issuance of an RFE, that Beneficiary is also an “affected party” due to her interest in demonstrating that the I-140 was approvable as filed.  USCIS ought to extend the holding in Matter of V-S-G- to any beneficiary who successfully ports while the underlying I-140 remains unadjudicated and was filed concurrently with an I-485 application. Such an extension would go a long way towards fulfilling one of the primary goals of AC21 by allowing individuals the ability to change jobs and benefit from INA 204(j). Even if the employer does not participate, a beneficiary should be allowed to respond to the RFE in order to establish that the I-140 was approvable when it was filed concurrently with an I-485 application.  Such an extension of the holding of Matter of V-S-G- would also be in line with the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, which held that a plaintiff has the ability to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act when his or her claim is within the zone of interests a statute or regulation protects. Other courts have agreed that the original employer should not be the exclusive party receiving notice relating to an I-140 petition when the foreign national employee has ported to a new employer. Beneficiaries who have ported to new employers fall within INA 204(j)’s zone of interests and have standing to participate in visa revocation proceedings. See Mantena v. Johnson and Kurupati v. USCIS. This logic should now extend to the ability of a foreign national beneficiary of an I-140 petition to be able to respond to an RFE even before it gets denied, especially since 8 CFR § 245.25(a)(2)(ii)(B)(2) permits the beneficiary to port based on a concurrently filed unadjudicated I-140 petition and I-485 application. This regulation, which was promulgated consistent with Lexmark, will carry little force if the beneficiary is not considered an affected party in order to challenge both an RFE and a denial.