Tag Archive for: State Department

Cyrus Mehta

Although DOS Resumes Visa Processing for Foreign Students,  the Enhanced Vetting Guidance Undermines American Values of Free Speech and Expression

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On June 18, 2025, the Department of State resumed visa processing for new and returning students and exchange visitors (F, M, and J nonimmigrants) but announced enhanced social media and online presence screening and vetting procedures. All applicants for F, M, and J nonimmigrant visas will be instructed to adjust the privacy settings on all of their social media profiles to “public” at their visa interviews. If the consular officer finds them otherwise eligible for the visa sought, the officer will issue the student an INA § 221(g) decision while they gather more information and documentation before issuing a final determination.

The guidance directs consular officers to review visa applicants’ online presence for “any indications of hostility towards the citizens, culture, government, institutions or founding principles of the United States.” Consular officers will review more than just social media accounts with particular attention to applicants with a history of political activism. Officers will comprehensively screen every visa applicant “for potential security and non-security related ineligibilities.” Although the online content found may not alone be sufficient to deny a student’s visa, officers will conduct additional vetting to determine if the applicant will respect U.S. laws and “engage only in activities consistent with” their status. While some travelers have taken to temporarily wiping their social media accounts, consular officers will be taking screenshots during their vetting process to preserve records of their findings. 

Lack of a public online presence or refusal to make sites accessible will raise a red flag. If no derogatory information is found, the officer may make a decision on the visa application. However, according to the guidance, “[i]f potentially derogatory information is found, post should refuse the case under the appropriate refusal code; or, if needed, post should call the applicant back for a follow-up interview.”

According to the guidance, consular posts may resume processing of expedited appointment requests and are directed to prioritize physicians applying for J visas and applicants studying at U.S. universities where international students constitute 15 percent or less of the total student body.

The guidance is very authoritarian and not befitting American values that cherish freedom of speech and expression, and is aimed at stifling all forms of critical speech that is integral to a student’s expression. For instance, a student may have randomly posted on social media about the blandness of American cuisine because of the dominance of McDonalds in a small  town he visited in comparison to New York or San Francisco. Could this post now be used as a basis to refuse the student visa because he displayed hostility towards US culture? Or what if a student of international affairs writes an essay in the college newspaper critical of President Trump’s decision to bomb Iran without Congressional authorization even though many elected representatives in Congress share this view? One can go on and one with ridiculous examples of how a student may be refused a visa under this policy. 

Unfortunately, it is difficult to challenge a consular officer’s refusal of a student visa but there may be some legal foundation. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Supreme Court held that the government has broad discretion to  refuse entry of a noncitizen seeking entry to the US. So long as there is a  “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” to refuse entry, courts will not question that decision or weigh it against the First Amendment rights of those seeking to communicate with the noncitizen.  One may be able to argue in court  that denying a student visa to one who has posted critically against “McDonald culture” does not meet the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” standard, but courts have still  historically been reluctant  to question a consular officer’s decision or gone behind it so long as the officer provided a decision. It may be more feasible to seek review in court  if the challenge intersects with a claim under the First Amendment and if US based plaintiffs are involved. In American Academy of Religion  v. Napolitano, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the lower district court had jurisdiction to consider US organizations’ First Amendment claims despite consular non- reviewability in the denial of a B visa to an Islamic scholar.  The Court  found the First Amendment rights of U.S. organizations are at stake when foreign scholars, artists, politicians and others are excluded, quoting from Kleindienst v. Mandel that the organizations have a First Amendment right to “‘hear, speak, and debate with’ a visa applicant.” The appeals court also found that the government cannot exclude an individual from the U.S. on the basis of “material support” for terrorism without affording him the “opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and reasonably should not have known, that the recipient of his contributions was a terrorist organization.”

The State Department policy will either dissuade or deprive thousands of foreign students from studying in the US. It will also lead to processing delays as consular officers will be required to vet all student visa applicants for potential security and non-security ineligibility. This is turn will further undermine the ability of US universities to enroll foreign students who generally pay fees at full freight. It will erode America’s credibility as a destination to attract the best and the brightest, and it will also undermine the ability of universities to foster critical thinking as well as sow fear lest one’s published views lead to retaliation. The policy could also be applied arbitrarily, potentially leading to visa denials based on innocuous or irrelevant online activity. This could further support a challenge by demonstrating that the policy lacks clear standards and is inconsistent with American values of free speech and expression. Furthermore, the policy’s potential to dissuade or deprive foreign students from studying in the U.S. could undermine the ability of U.S. universities to foster critical thinking and academic exchange. This impact on U.S. institutions could strengthen the argument that the policy is detrimental to the First Amendment interests of U.S. entities.

If Trump’s State Department does not come to its senses and rescinds its unwise policy, visa applicants who have been baselessly denied visas and impacted US organizations should consider  challenging the policy in federal court under American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano.  

 

Cyrus Mehta

The Perils of Claiming the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion When Sponsoring an Immigrant on an Affidavit of Support

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

 Although most U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents must pay U.S. taxes on their worldwide income, the foreign earned inclusion exclusion (“FEIE”) allows some U.S. citizens and residents to exempt income earned outside the country from U.S. taxes. In order to avail of the FEIE, the taxpayer must be “a U.S. citizen who is a bona fide resident of a foreign country or countries for an uninterrupted period that includes an entire tax year, a U.S. resident alien who is a citizen or national of a country with which the United States has an income tax treaty in effect and who is a bona fide resident of a foreign country or countries for an uninterrupted period that includes an entire tax year, or a U.S. citizen or a U.S. resident alien who is physically present in a foreign country or countries for at least 330 full days during any period of 12 consecutive months”. Salaries, wages, and self-employment income may be excluded as foreign-earned income, but other types of income, such as pay received from the U.S. government, may not. In 2023, those to whom the FEIE applies may exclude a portion of their foreign-earned income – up to $120,000 for 2023 – from their worldwide income.

Difficulties can arise, however, when a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident who can avail of the FEIE intends to sponsor a family member for permanent residence and must submit Form I-864, Affidavit of Support, in order to demonstrate that they have the financial means to support the individual they are sponsoring. Most sponsors must demonstrate that their income meets 125% of the HHS Poverty Guidelines for the relevant year and household size. The USCIS looks to see the “total income” indicated in item # 9 on Form 1040, US Individual Tax Return.  The FEIE, however, could result in a sponsor’s total income appearing as a negative number on the tax return even if the wages reported in item # 1 of Form 1040. This may be the case even if the wage income indicated in item # 1 of the Form 1040 may be sufficient.   Moreover, a sponsor who qualifies for the FEIE at the time of filing the I-864 may not even be considered domiciled in the US for purposes of the I-864 under 8 CFR 213a.2(c)(1)(ii), which requires that their principal place of residence be in the U.S. A sponsor who finds themselves in this scenario would need to show that they have taken steps to make the U.S. his immediate principal place of abode. It would be preferable if a sponsor who has taken advantage of the FEIR in a previous year is presently residing in the U.S. at the time of filing the I-864 and no longer claiming the FEIR for the current tax year.

Based on anecdotal experience, even if it is explained that the total income was negative because of the FEIE but the wages reported in item #1 of the 1040 were sufficient to meet the income requirements, both the USICS in cases where an I-485 adjustment of status is being filed or the National Visa Center (NVC) of the State Department in cases where the  applicant is consular processing overseas for the immigrant visa, reject the sponsor’s I-864 when the total income in item # 9 is insufficient because of the FEIE. It would be unfortunate for a sponsor who is legitimately entitled to take the sizable deduction from their taxable income afforded by the FEIE to forego it in order to demonstrate that they have sufficient income to meet 125% of the poverty line to satisfy the income requirement for Form I-864.

Sponsors who are in this predicament may want to rely on their assets in addition to the income and report those assets on Form I-864. If the sponsor is unable to meet the income requirement through income or assets, then it may need to be necessary to include an I-864 from a joint sponsor. Many joint sponsors are reluctant to file I-864 applications as they are fearful of being held liable in case the beneficiary of the petition becomes reliant on public benefits.

If the sponsor on an I-864 claiming the FEIE is a lawful permanent resident, this LPR may also be jeopardizing their ability to naturalize in addition to not being able to show sufficient income if the FFIE takes up a large proportion of the reported income in item # 1 of Form 1040. IRS Form 2555 allows taxpayers to indicate whether they are making an election under the bona fide residence test or the physical presence test. An LPR who is claiming the FEIE based on being a bona fide resident must be a citizen of a country that has a treaty with the U.S.  According to a previous blog posted on October 1,  2012,  claiming the FEIE based on being a bona fide resident for one year in the foreign country is more harmful than claiming the FEIE based on being physically present for 330 days in a foreign country for maintaining continuous residence for naturalization purposes. This blog was based on the guidance in the USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) at 74(g)(9)(B). On the other hand, the newer USCIS Policy Manual, which is replacing the AFM does not include any caveats on claiming the FEIE for maintaining continuous residence although USCIS could still consider its prior policy in determining whether an applicant has demonstrated continuous residence to qualify for naturalization.   Thus, for the permanent resident sponsor of an I-864 who has claimed the FEIE, there is a double whammy as they may not be able to sponsor an intending immigrant and may have also jeopardized their ability to naturalize.

It makes no sense for both the USCIS and State Department to take such a rigid position. If the sponsor can show that they earned an income through wages or other means that was sufficient to meet 125% of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, why should it matter if the income gets deducted based on the FEIE? This is a paper deduction as the sponsor has received the requisite income in hand already and can support the noncitizen beneficiary of an I-130 petition, and in some cases, and I-140 petition. We do hope that the USCIS and DOS will pay heed and stop rejecting I-864s if the total income in the 1040 income appears to be insufficient, when it is actually not. There is no statute or regulation authorizing the government to take such an arbitrary and irrational position, which deprives noncitizen beneficiaries of approved I-130 and I-140 petitions from being able to immigrate to the US as permanent residents.

 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

State Department’s New Guidance Broadening Transmission of Citizenship to Children Born Abroad Is Welcome and Consistent with Federal Court Decisions

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On May 18, 2021, the State Department issued guidance broadening the path for transmission of US citizenship to a child born abroad to married parents. The guidance is reproduced below:

Recognizing the advances in assisted reproductive technology the State Department is updating our interpretation and application of Section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which establishes the requirements for acquisition of U.S. citizenship at birth.

Children born abroad to parents, at least one of whom is a U.S. citizen and who are married to each other at the time of the birth, will be U.S. citizens from birth if they have a genetic or gestational tie to at least one of their parents and meet the INA’s other requirements.  Previously, the Department’s interpretation and application of the INA required that children born abroad have a genetic or gestational relationship to a U.S. citizen parent.

This updated interpretation and application of the INA takes into account the realities of modern families and advances in ART from when the Act was enacted in 1952.

This change will allow increased numbers of married couples to transmit U.S. citizenship to their children born overseas, while continuing to follow the citizenship transmission requirements established in the INA.   Requirements for children born to unmarried parents remain unchanged.

At the same time, we remain vigilant to the risks of citizenship fraud, exploitation, and abuse.  As with all citizenship and immigration benefits we examine, the Department will implement this policy in a manner that addresses these concerns.

This new interpretation allows a U.S. citizen who has a child through surrogacy, an egg donor, in vitro fertilization as well as other advances in assisted reproductive technology (ART)  to transmit U.S. citizenship to their child, even if there is no genetic or gestational relationship to the U.S. citizen parent so long as such a link exists with the other married parent. As stated in the State Department’s announcement, this change in policy “takes into account the realities of modern families.” This is welcome news for a growing number of families who rely on the advancements of reproductive technologies to build their families.

For instance, prior State Department policy deprived the US citizen mother who may neither have been the gestational mother nor have a genetic relationship with the child from passing US citizenship. A US citizen mother is medically unable to bear a child and needs to use a surrogate mother overseas to carry the child to birth, and the egg is not hers and the sperm is from a non-US citizen father, US citizenship could not be passed onto the child. Thus, under the prior policy, such a mother who for medical reasons was unable to establish a biological link to her child, and also could not serve as the gestational mother herself, was unable to transmit US citizenship to her child. This was unfair for such mothers.

The nationality provisions of the INA were written long before the advent of ART. The State Department is to be heartily congratulated for bringing them into the 21st century. The willingness and ability to understand parentage in a broader sense is something for which advocates have long contended. It is precisely what a consistent line of Ninth Circuit case law and more recently a Second Circuit case, which did not deal with ART, has long exemplified. See Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159 (2000); Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F. 3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005);   Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2018).  In these cases,  so long as a child was not born out of wedlock, or if born out of wedlock was subsequently legitimated,  the child did not need to prove that he or she was the biological child of the US citizen parent to acquire citizenship.

Public policy supports recognition and maintenance of a family unit. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) was intended to keep families together. It should be construed in favor of family units and the acceptance of responsibility by family members. See, e.g., Kaliski v. Dist. Dir. of INS, 620 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir.1980) (discussing the “humane purpose” of the INA and noting that a “strict interpretation” of the Act, including an “arbitrary distinction” between legitimate and illegitimate children, would “detract from … the purpose of the Act which is to prevent continued separation of families.”); H.R.Rep. No. 85-1199, pt. 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N.2016, 2020 (observing that the “legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to provide for a liberal treatment of children and was concerned with the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united).

Solis-Espinoza, supra, at 1094.

The Second Circuit in Jaen v. Sessions did not insist on a genetic or gestational tie with the US citizen parent, and the State Department’s new policy is consistent with Jaen v. Sessions. David Isaacson’s blog, Jaen v. Sessions: The Government Reminds Us That Government Manuals Aren’t Always Right, correctly pointed out that the prior US government policy or guidance may not actually be the law, and federal courts need to step in to point this out. Fortunately, the State Department has now stepped in.  In Jaen v. Sessions, as discussed in David’s blog,  Levy Alberto Jaen was born in Panama in 1972 to a non-U.S.-citizen mother, Leticia Rogers Boreland, who was then married to a naturalized U.S. citizen named Jorge Boreland.  But Jaen’s Panamanian birth certificate indicated that his father was another man named Liberato Jaen. Jaen moved to the US at the age of 15 as a nonimmigrant in 1988 and lived with the Boreland family. In 2008, Jaen was placed in removal proceedings based on controlled substance violations and he moved to terminate proceedings on the ground that he was a US citizen. The Immigration Judge denied the motion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Second Circuit reversed and pointed out that  the historic common-law definition of the term “parent” included a common-law presumption of legitimacy that held a married man to be the father of a child to whom his wife gave birth.  As it was put in Blackstone’s Commentaries, “Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant”—the nuptials show who is the father.  Jaen, slip op. at 13 & n. 5.  This common-law definition of parent, the Second Circuit held, would be sufficient to render Jorge Boreland the parent of Levy Jaen for citizenship purposes.

Although the State Department policy is meant to cover children born through ART, it is clearly applicable to out of wedlock scenarios in Jaen, Solis-Espinoza and Scales. Levy Alberto Jaen, for example, had a genetic link to his non-US citizen mother Leticia Rogers Boreland, who was married to his US citizen legal (although not biological) father Jorge Boreland.  Consistent with the new State Department policy, Jaen had a genetic or gestational tie to at least one of [his] parents, Leticia, and she was married to another, U.S. citizen parent of his. Though born in Mexico, Solis-Espinoza claimed citizenship by virtue of the US citizenship of the woman he knew as his mother.   That woman, who was married to Solis-Espinoza’s biological father at the time of petitioner’s birth, acknowledged him from his infancy as a member of her family and raised him as his mother, though he did not in fact have a biological connection with that woman. Scales was born in the Philippines in 1977, to Stanley Scales, Sr.  an American citizen-serviceman at the time, and Aily Topaz, a Philippine citizen.   Stanley and Topaz met during the first week of September 1976, and one week later, Topaz told Stanley that she was pregnant, probably from a prior relationship.  Topaz and Stanley were married on March 13, 1977, and Petitioner was born on April 6, 1977.

Although one arguable difference is that he had a legally relevant third parent to a greater extent than generally exists in ART cases (where the egg or sperm donor is usually acknowledged not to have legal parentage rights),  it isn’t unheard of for a child to have more than two parents for immigration purposes especially in the stepparent context. The State Department’s new policy is not only consistent with the common law meaning of “parent” in the INA, especially INA 301(g), but it is also in keeping with public policy that supports the recognition and maintenance of a family unit.

 

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

TRANSMISSION OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP THROUGH ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY – AN UPDATE

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By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

“The journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step” Lao –Tzu, Chinese philosopher (604 BC-531 BC)

Ed. note – This article updates information from a previous piece, “Answer Man: Assisted Reproductive Technology and U.S. Immigration Law.”

The Department of State has announced a major and most welcome policy shift to facilitate the transmission of American citizenship to children born outside the United States using Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART). It will no longer be necessary in all such cases for the “mother “to have a genetic link to the child. The Department has happily now recognized that American mothers can pass on citizenship to children to whom they give birth regardless of whose egg was used for conception. The “mother” must be the legal mother at the time and place of the child’s birth and the gestational mother. Under the new State Department policy, the biological mother can either be the genetic or the gestational mother; the biological father can obviously only be the genetic father.  The State Department policy goes onto clarify: 

If the child is biologically related to a US citizen father, but not to the father’s spouse, the case would be treated as a birth out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father, pursuant to INA 309(a), and the father would have to meet the additional requirements of that section.  If the child is biologically related to a U.S. citizen mother, but not her spouse, the case would be treated as a birth out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen mother, and would have to meet the requirements of INA 309(c).  If the child is the biological child of both parents, and the biological parents are married to one another, INA 301 requirements would apply, including a requirement that at least one of the US citizen parents had resided in the United States prior to the child’s birth.

In addition, the State Department now views the child of a legally married lesbian couple as being “born in wedlock” if the baby is conceived from the egg of one mother and carried by the other.

Under the new policy, a US citizen mother who gives birth to a biological child abroad, including through a foreign surrogate (via her egg), can apply for a US passport and Consular Report of Birth Abroad. While the USC parent with the biological nexus should be listed on the CRBA, a second parent can be listed as well if they can document a legal relationship under local law.

It should be noted that this new policy is retroactive. In those instances where an immigration benefit was denied to the foreign-born child of a gestational and legal American mother, the parent should now submit a new application corroborated by probative evidence that they satisfy the substantive requirements of the new policy.

The nationality provisions of the INA were written long before the advent of ART. The State Department is to be heartily congratulated for bringing them into the 21st century. While a genetic footprint will still be necessary for children born out of wedlock to American fathers under INA 309, it will no longer be required for citizenship claims in all other cases arising under INA 301 which is silent on the need for genetic parentage. The willingness and ability to understand parentage in the legal and gestational sense, as well as in the genetic sense, is something for which advocates have long contended. It is precisely what a consistent line of Ninth Circuit case law, which did not deal with ART, has long exemplified. See Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159 (2000); Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F. 3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) and, most recently, Gonzalez-Marquez v. Holder, http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2014/01/03/12-71861.pdf. In these cases, so long as a child was not born out of wedlock, or if born out of wedlock was subsequently legitimated,  the child did not need to prove that he or she was the biological child of his USC mother in order to acquire citizenship.  The Department of State, by allowing the transmission of citizenship through a gestational mother, has advanced the concept of family unity which is the organizing principle at the heart of our immigration system:
Public policy supports recognition and maintenance of a family unit. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) was intended to keep families together. It should be construed in favor of family units and the acceptance of responsibility by family members. See, e.g., Kaliski v. Dist. Dir. of INS, 620 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir.1980) (discussing the “humane purpose” of the INA and noting that a “strict interpretation” of the Act, including an “arbitrary distinction” between legitimate and illegitimate children, would “detract from … the purpose of the Act which is to prevent continued separation of families.”); H.R.Rep. No. 85-1199, pt. 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N.2016, 2020 (observing that the “legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to provide for a liberal treatment of children and was concerned with the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united).
Solis-Espinoza, supra, at 1094.

For all of its manifest merits, however, this new policy does not go as far it we would like it to go. If there is no biological link, but the US citizen is still considered as the legal mother under local or foreign law, will the claim to citizenship be accepted?  It does not seem so, unless the mother was the genetic or gestational mother. It is certainly true that, if the mother is neither the genetic nor the gestational mother, but the sperm is that of the US citizen father, US citizenship can still be acquired under the out of wedlock provisions pursuant to INA 309. Yet, what if the father is a lawful permanent resident or perhaps a non-immigrant, while the mother is a US citizen who lacks a genetic or gestational relationship with the baby but nonetheless is the mother under the law of the country of birth? Under these slightly altered facts, there is no automatic transmission of citizenship. This should change.  The State Department is to be praised for recognizing that there need be no biological link but should a child be deprived of the priceless gift of citizenship simply because his or her US citizen mother is unable to bring them to birth due to a medical infirmity? Practically speaking, if the US citizen mother is able to carry the baby, but needs another female’s egg, there would be no reason to leave the USA and the child thus born in the US would be a birthright citizen. It is only when the US citizen mother cannot use her own egg or carry the baby to term that she needs to enter into an arrangement with a surrogate mother overseas. In such an instance, the citizenship of the child should not depend on the sperm donor father being an American citizen. As long as the law of the state or jurisdiction recognizes the US citizen mother as the child’s legal mother who is married to the father, that should be all that matters. Such a policy would be in accord with Scales and Solis-Espinoza.

None of this detracts from the wonderful step that the State Department has made. Let us recognize and rejoice in this advance while we hope for further progress down the road. This is a long journey but the ART update is a milestone along the march. Thanks to the Department of State, the law on citizenship transmission is now far more aligned with modern science and contemporary social mores. No longer is it required that both spouses in a marital union be genetically related to their child as a condition of bring a citizenship claim under INA 301. Legal children born in wedlock now will have the same ability to acquire citizenship at birth as anyone else notwithstanding the continued relevance of genetics. Parents legally bound to each other and to their child under local or foreign law can now apply for a US Passport secure in the knowledge that their baby will not be left stateless. Same sex marriages will now enjoy the presumption of legitimacy for the conferral of citizenship that they have never known.

Not bad.

Authors’ Note: This comment is dedicated to the shining memory of Carmen DiPlacido, author of the Child Citizenship Act. To those who knew the pleasure of his company, the warmth of his friendship, the depth of his wisdom and the strength of his intellect, this is precisely the kind of change that Carmen would have championed, one that reflects equity and inclusiveness. He lived these values and this policy embodies them.

(Guest writer Gary Endelman is the Senior Counsel of FosterQuan. A prior version of this article was published on blog.fosterquan.com on February 10, 2014).

Cyrus Mehta

DEPORTING A US CITIZEN CHILD? TAKE A LEAF OUT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S BOOK ON BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP

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By Cyrus D. Mehta

This week, while we have all been stunned at the way Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) sent a four year old US citizen child packing out of the country to Guatemala, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/03/23/navarrette.child.deported/?hpt=Sbin, even though her parents lived in the US, we can take some comfort that the State Department scrupulously adheres to birthright citizenship enshrined in the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution.

Contrary to the common notion -that parents come to the US to give birth to children so that they may become US citizens – some non-US citizen parents do not desire that their minor children remain US citizens, notwithstanding their birth in the US. Their main motivation is that if they choose not to live in the US permanently, they would rather that the child enjoys the citizenship of their nationality so that he or she does not suffer any potential impediments later on in that country, such as the inability to vote, attend educational institutions or stand for elected office. Often times, the country of the parent’s nationality and the United States lay claims on the child’s citizenship, and this may often create conflicts between the citizenship laws of the two countries, particularly if the child will return to its parents’ country and live there.

For instance, a child born to Indian citizen parents in the US can still claim to be an Indian citizen by descent, even though India does not otherwise permit dual nationality, provided that the parents declare that the child does not hold the passport of another country, http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/ic_act55.pdf. This may not be possible if the child is born in the US, and thus a US citizen and potentially an Indian citizen, since the State Department’s regulation provides that “[i[t is unlawful for a citizen of the United States, unless excepted under 22 CFR 53.2, to enter or depart, or attempt to enter or depart, the United States, without a valid passport.” See 22 CFR §53.1. Therefore, if the child obtains an Indian passport while in the US, it will still need to depart the US with a US passport, and this may conflict with the Indian requirement of submitting a declaration that the child does not hold the passport of another country.

Moreover, even after the child has left the US, unless the child can effectively renounce US citizenship at a US Consulate (and that too could be problematic as a child cannot make a knowing renunciation), the child will most likely have to return to the US on the US passport. Regarding the renunciation of US citizenship by a minor, the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual at 7 FAM 1292 clearly states that parents or guardians cannot renounce or relinquish the citizenship of a child who acquired US citizenship at birth. The relevant extract from 7 FAM 1292 is worth noting:

  1. occasionally, CA/OCS or a post abroad will receive an inquiry from the parent of a child born in the United States who acquired US citizenship at birth protesting the “involuntary” acquisition of US citizenship.

  1. Jus soli (the law of the soil) is the rule of common law under which the place of a person’s birth determines citizenship. In addition to common law, this principle is embodied in the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the various U.S. citizenship and nationality statutes. The 14th Amendment states, in part, that: All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.

  1. In U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), the U.S. Supreme Court examined at length the theories and legal precedents on which U.S. citizenship laws are based and, in particular, the types of persons who are subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

  1. Children born in the United States to diplomats accredited to the United States are not subject to U.S. jurisdiction and do not acquire U.S. citizenship under the 14th Amendment or the laws derived from it [citation omitted].

  1. Parents or guardians cannot renounce or relinquish the U.S. citizenship of a child who acquired U.S. citizenship at birth.

While the FAM leaves open the possibility for a minor to renounce citizenship, there must be a determination by the consul whether the minor had the requisite maturity and knowing intent, free from parental influence. According to 7 FAM 1292(i)(3), “Minors who seek to renounce citizenship often do so at the behest of or under pressure from one or more parent. If such pressure is so overwhelming as to negate the free will of the minor, it cannot be said that the statutory act of expatriation was committed voluntarily. The younger the minor is at the time of renunciation, the more influence the parent is assumed to have.” 7 FAM 1292(i)(2) further states, “Children under 16 are presumed not to have the requisite maturity and knowing intent.” It should be noted, though, that even if a child successfully renounces US citizenship, upon reaching 18 years, the child has a six-month opportunity to reclaim US nationality. See INA § 351(b).

The deportation of the 4 year old child is one recent example. CBP’s sister agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), has also been notorious for detaining and deporting US citizens in recent times, http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/2010/07/us-citizens-detained-and-deported-2010.html despite an ICE memo admonishing its officers to treat claims by US citizens with care and sensitivity, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/usc_guidance_nov_2009.pdf. In a time when a very vocal minority is advocating for the repeal of birthright citizenship, government agencies in charge of enforcing immigration laws ought not to be swayed by the passions of the day, and must scrupulously ensure that a child born in the US, regardless of the parents’ status, is treated as a US citizen under the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution, like the State Department does.