Tag Archive for: Parole in Place

Cyrus Mehta

Parole in Place – A Means to an End or An End in Itself?

/0 Comments/in /by

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

 On June 18, 2024, President Biden announced new measures aimed at ensuring that “U.S. citizens with noncitizen spouses and children can keep their families together”. One of these measures provides a discretionary grant of parole in place (“PIP”) to individuals who: are present in the United States without admission or parole; have been continuously physically present in the United States since at least June 17, 2014; have a legally valid marriage to a U.S. citizen on or before June 17, 2024; have no disqualifying criminal history and otherwise are not deemed to be a threat to public safety, national security, or border security; and submit biometrics and undergo required background checks and national security and public safety vetting. Individuals whose PIP applications are approved will be able to remain in the U.S. and apply for work authorization. Moreover, the intent of the program is to provide a path to permanent residence. A grant of parole in place “satisfies the requirement under INA section 245(a) that the requestor has been inspected and paroled by an immigration officer”. Qualifying family members of noncitizens granted PIP can file I-130 petitions on their behalf, and the noncitizens can then apply for adjustment of status.

PIP under DHS’s Implementation of the Keeping Families Together program in the Federal Register poses a philosophical question, however – is the measure a means to an end or an end in itself?  The intent of the program is for a noncitizen granted PIP to ultimately be able to be able to adjust status under INA 245(a). When PIP is granted, though, DHS does not require requestors to establish that they are not inadmissible or ineligible for adjustment of status. Although the grant of PIP is only for 3 years, unless extended, requestors can remain in the U.S. and apply for employment authorization upon being granted in PIP. This in itself is a benefit, albeit temporary, and may allow requestors who face grounds of inadmissibility or ineligibility for adjustment of status additional time to overcome these barriers before they file an I-485 adjustment of status application.

There are clearly explicit criminal grounds that would disqualify a PIP application. On the other hand, if a requestor may be potentially inadmissible that in itself would not preclude them from requesting PIP.

The Federal Register notice implementing PIP states the following regarding inadmissibility:

DHS additionally considered requiring the requestor to demonstrate that they are not inadmissible under any ground set forth in INA section 212(a), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a), to be granted parole under this process. This parole in place process is meant for those requestors who are otherwise eligible to adjust status. As noted elsewhere in this notice, serious criminal convictions, including certain convictions that would render the requestor inadmissible and therefore ineligible for adjustment of status, will be disqualifying for this process; other criminal convictions, as well as prior, unexecuted removal orders, will trigger a rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for this process. However, detailed consideration of grounds of inadmissibility—including whether applicable grounds can be waived—is a complex analysis undertaken during the Form I-485 adjustment of status adjudication. Requiring parole in place adjudicators to conduct the inadmissibility analysis that is normally conducted at the adjustment of status stage would be an inefficient, duplicative, and costly use of USCIS resources. Therefore, when assessing eligibility for parole in place, while DHS will consider the requestor’s criminal and immigration history and any other adverse factors that could bear upon admissibility, it will not import the admissibility analysis conducted at the Form I-485 stage into the parole adjudication.

Therefore, requestors who are likely inadmissible but feel that they will be able to overcome these grounds can still apply for PIP. A requestor, for example, who believes that they will not at present be able to overcome the public charge grounds of inadmissibility because the petitioner lacks sufficient income, for example, can still apply for PIP as they may hope that the petitioner’s future tax returns will reflect an income that exceeds 125% of the relevant poverty guideline. Similarly, a requestor who has committed fraud, such as filing a fraudulent asylum applicant in the past, can still apply for PIP and file an I-601 waiver with the I-485, even if the high standard for demonstrating extreme hardship to a qualifying relevant may not be met at the time of requesting PIP but may be satisfied at a later point. For example, having additional US citizen children in the near future would render it more difficult for the US citizen spouse to take care of children if the noncitizen spouse is hypothetically removed from the US. Requestors in these scenarios would still derive the benefits of PIP in good faith and be able to apply for EADs.

An individual requesting PIP could also be prima facie ineligible for adjustment of status if they are subject to an unexecuted removal order for example. The requestor would need to reopen the removal order, most likely though a joint motion with the government, which may or may not occur. Even though a certain fact pattern presented by the requestor could make it difficult to convince an ICE OPLA attorney to agree to join in a motion to reopen, the requestor can still apply for PIP. The Federal Register notice states the following with regards to prior removal orders:

DHS considered whether noncitizens with unexecuted final removal orders should be eligible for this process. DHS determined that noncitizens with unexecuted final removal orders will be presumptively ineligible for parole under this process. DHS recognizes that a noncitizen may have grounds to request that an immigration judge or the BIA reopen their immigration proceedings when they are otherwise eligible for adjustment of status, and thus determined that categorical ineligibility for this parole process would be inappropriate. As a result, DHS will evaluate, in the exercise of its discretion on a case-by-case basis, the facts and circumstances underlying the unexecuted final removal order and all other mitigating factors presented in determining whether the noncitizen may overcome the rebuttable presumption of ineligibility and be granted parole in place.

 Of course, each noncitizen considering requesting PIP must make these assessments themselves. Even if there is no chance that the I-485 will ever get approved, it may be beneficial to request PIP for a 3 year period along with a grant of employment authorization. On the other hand, the Federal Register notice clearly states that there is no assurance that the information provided by the noncitizen in the PIP request will not be used against them:

DHS generally will not use information contained in a request for parole in place under this process for the purpose of initiating immigration enforcement action against the requestor unless DHS determines, in its discretion, the requestor poses a threat to national security, public safety, or border security.[162] This process does not preclude DHS from, in its discretionary authority, taking enforcement actions as deemed appropriate, in accordance with the INA and consistent with governing policies and practices, against noncitizens who may be eligible or who have pending applications for parole under this process. Information provided under this process may be otherwise disclosed consistent with statutory authorities, obligations, and restrictions, as well as governing privacy and information-sharing policies.

Requestors need to decide on a case by case basis whether it is worth obtaining  PIP and work authorization for at least a 3 year period even if they do not ultimately get permanent residence through adjustment of status, and instead get removed from the US. Indeed, there are other risks that could expose the requestor to enforcement action independent of whether the I-485 may be filed and approved. On August 23, 2024, Texas and 15 other Republican states filed a lawsuit in federal court on the ground that the PIP has violated the INA,  the Administrative Procedure Act and the Take Care Clause of the US Constitution. Although in the opinion of the authors the lawsuit is not meritorious as parole is clearly authorized under INA 212(d)(5), it is likely that a judge may preliminarily enjoin the program and a higher court may find it unlawful. Under this circumstance, information provided in the PIP could potentially be used against the noncitizen in an enforcement action regardless of whether the I-485 application may get granted or not.

 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

  

Cyrus Mehta

How USCIS Can Remain True to its Mission by Exercising Compassion During the COVID-19 Period

/0 Comments/in /by

Although the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services is mandated by Congress to grant benefits, it has become an enforcement oriented agency under the Trump administration that has displayed remarkable hostility towards immigrants.    During the period when people are mandated to stay confined and practice social distancing in order to prevent the spread of the coronavirus, and many will unfortunately also fall sick, the USCIS ought to become compassionate and true to its mission of  being a benefits granting agency.

The USCIS has admittedly made some changes in a niggardly fashion. Although the public charge rule got rolled out last month, which is intended to deny immigration benefits under a more expansive interpretation of who is likely to become a public charge, it made one small exception on March 13, 2020 by encouraging noncitizens with symptoms resembling COVID-19 to seek medical treatment or preventive services. “Such treatment or preventive services will not negatively affect any alien as part of a future public charge analysis,” the agency said in a statement.  The exception goes beyond treatment and preventive services, and the USCIS goes onto state: “[I]f the alien is prevented from working or attending school, and must rely on public benefits for the duration of the COVID-19 outbreak and recovery phase, the alien can provide an explanation and relevant supporting documentation.” The USCIS has also allowed applicants to reschedule appointments if they have travelled internationally to any country within the past 14 days of their appointment, believe they have been exposed to the COVID 19 virus or are experiencing flu like symptoms. Separately, DHS has notified that foreign students  should be able to maintain status even if the program goes online so long as the school makes the notification within 10 days.

While these fixes are steps in the right direction, USCIS ought to make more bold changes to provide ameliorative relief to noncitizens that would be in the best interests of the nation. Below are some suggestions:

  1. As employers and law firms have allowed their staff to work remotely, USICS should immediately allow all filings with USCIS to be made online, and also allow scanned or electronic signatures. The electronic H-1B Registration is a good example of how this can be implemented for all USCIS filings.
  2. While an H-1B workers who works from home in the same area of intended employment or within commuting distance does not need a new LCA, eliminate the need to file a new LCA and H-1B amendment even if the home is located outside the MSA or beyond the area of commuting distance. The DOL rules governing LCAs never contemplated telecommuting, and it makes no sense for affected workers to post the LCA on their refrigerator.  The telecommuting is tied to the location where the work is actually performed and for which the LCA was originally obtained and where the posting already occurred.
  3. While the USCIS should give a blanket 90 day extension for filing extension and change of status requests (and this is beyond the 60 day grace period that is given to certain nonimmigrants upon cessation of employment); any delay beyond the 90 days can still be deemed an extraordinary circumstance, and thus excused, under 8 CFR 214.1(c)(4) or 248.1(c) if it is based on a corona virus circumstance.
  4. Coronavirus issues should be deemed technical reasons for INA 245(c)(2) purposes to allow delayed adjustment filings when necessary.
  5. Similar extensions ought to be given with respect to filing responses to RFEs and I-290B appeals or motions as well as filing an I-140 beyond 180 days of the grant of labor certification.
  6. Auto-extend EADs, Advance Paroles and I-551s to eliminate the need to file I-765, I-131 and I-90 extensions.
  7. Automatically reschedule all missed USCIS appointments (biometrics, adjustment and naturalization interviews and oath ceremonies) rather than deem that the application has been deemed abandoned. Also, if possible, develop technology for noncitizens to securely process their biometrics through their own phone devices.
  8. The filing of a meritorious and nonfrivolous I-290B should no longer trigger unlawful presence for purposes of the 3 and 10 year bars.
  9. Have a policy of granting parole in place to one otherwise eligible to adjust status if it can be demonstrated that it would be impossible or harmful for a person to return to the home country.
  10. Advance the Chart B filing dates to Current or close to Current as the notion of an “immigrant visa is immediately available” under INA 245(a)(3) has always been viewed with elasticity, especially in the case of the July 2007 visa bulletin and more recently in the implementation of Chart B filing dates. In the same vein, rescind the USCIS policy that requires the CSPA age to be triggered only if the final action date becomes current rather than the filing date becoming current.
  11. Allow for video interviews for adjustment of status and naturalization applications, as well as with respect to an oath swearing ceremony. If that is not feasible in the short run, at least minimize the interviews. For example, employment-based adjustment cases do not need interviews, which was the case before.
  12. Relax the standard for competent representation at 8 CFR 1003.102(o) and diligent representation at 8 CFR 1003.102(q), as well as the duty to communicate at 8 CFR 1003.102(r), if an attorney is affected by the coronavirus and is forced to be quarantined for several weeks and has no other attorneys who can act on his or her behalf.

These are a few suggestions for USCIS to revert to its historic role of viewing its mission as providing benefits rather than being a junior partner to Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Other agencies also need to step up to also take appropriate actions, and this blog only focuses on USCIS fixes. If God forbid the situation goes out of hand,  bolder action would need to be taken. There is statutory authority to grant mass Temporary Protected Status under INA 244(b). There is also authority to grant deferred action to large groups of noncitizens who may be at grave risk to themselves and others if they are asked to leave the US. The President has broad powers in times of a national emergency. Now is not the time for restrictionists to oppose such measures that benefit noncitizens, and it would also be perverse for them to advocate that the President use these powers to hurt noncitizens. The health and safety of everyone is paramount, and all people living in this nation, whether citizen or non-citizen, are intractably connected and the administration must take all measures to protect everyone.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

TWO ACES UP PRESIDENT OBAMA’S SLEEVE TO ACHIEVE IMMIGRATION REFORM WITHOUT CONGRESS – NOT COUNTING FAMILY MEMBERS AND PAROLE IN PLACE

/6 Comments/in /by

Nothing more poignantly describes the current humanitarian crisis at the Southwest border than a recent New York Times article describing the journey of Alejandro, 8, who came to the United States on his own with only his birth certificate looking for his parents who are somewhere in San Antonio or an aunt in Maryland. The story of an adorable, courageous and resourceful 8 year old braving a dangerous journey in search of his parents will pull at the heartstrings of any parent. 

There may be many reasons for this crisis and what may draw unaccompanied young children to the United States, but one reason for this is our broken immigration system. This system does not allow people accessible pathways to come to the United States legally or gain legal status.  Even those who are here as permanent residents or naturalized citizens have to wait years before their loved ones can join them due to the backlogs in our family and employment-based immigration preferences.  Until recently there was some hope that the House would pass its own version of immigration reform after the Senate passed S. 744 last year. Those hopes have now been dashed. 

The impetus to preserve family unity is pervasive and exists across all cultures, and so is the deep love that parents have for their children and that children have for their parents. Many of the children fleeing violence in Central American countries are trying to unite with parents living in the United States. However, the broken immigration system does not allow families to unite through legal means Instead of beefing up the border with more enforcement; President Obama can bring some balance to the immigration system through bold administrative measures that will promote family unification in a legal and orderly manner. While there are several proposals on the table, one that resonates is to not count derivative family members in the employment and family preferences. The solution is simple but elegant: Count all members of a family together as one unit rather than as separate and distinct individuals. Do that and systemic visa retrogression, resulting in family members waiting endlessly, will quickly become a thing of the past. 

Not Counting Family Members 

Section 203(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is the provision that deals with family members. Let us examine what section 203(d) says: “A spouse or child defined in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E) of section 1101 (b)(1) of this title shall, if not otherwise entitled to an immigrant status and the immediate issuance of a visa under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, be entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration provided in the respective subsection, if accompanying or following to join, the spouse or parent.” There is nothing in section 203(d) that explicitly provides authority for family members to be counted under the preference quotas. While a derivative is “entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration” as the principal, nothing requires that family members also be given numbers. If Congress allocates a certain number of visas to immigrants with advanced degrees, it makes no sense if half or more are used up by family members.  

There is no regulation in 8 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) instructing what section 203(d) is supposed to be doing. Even the Department of State’s regulation at 22 C.F.R. 42.32 only parrots section 203(d) and states that children and spouses are “entitled to the derivative status corresponding to the classification and priority date of the principal.” 22 C.F.R. 42.32 does not provide further amplification on the scope and purpose of section 203(d). We acknowledge that section 203(d) derivatives are wholly within the preference system and bound by its limitations. They are not independent of numerical limits, only from direct limitations. It is the principal alien through whom they derive their claim who is counted and who has been counted. Hence, if no EB or FB numbers were available to the principal alien, the derivatives would not be able to immigrate either. If they were exempt altogether, this would not matter. There is a difference between not being counted at all, which we do not argue, and being counted as an integral family unit as opposed to individuals, which we do assert. We seek not an exemption from numerical limits but a different way of counting such limits.  

If the Executive Branch wanted to reinterpret section 203(d), there is sufficient ambiguity in the provision for it do so without the need for Congress to sanction it. A government agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)—often abbreviated as “Chevron deference”.  When a statute is ambiguous in this way, the Supreme Court has made clear in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), the agency may reconsider its interpretation even after the courts have approved of it.  Brand X can be used as a force for good. For instance, in  Sciallaba v. Osorio: Does the Dark Cloud Have A Silver Lining, Cyrus  Mehta and David Isaacson propose that notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent decision concerning  section 203(h)(3) of the INA, where the Court agreed with the  Board of Immigration Appeal’s (BIA) more restrictive interpretation of this Child Status Protection Act provision in Matter of Wang, 25 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 2009),  the BIA has the power to reverse Matter of Wang under Brand X. Matter of Wang held that not all children who are unable to protect their age under the Child Status Protection Act can claim the earlier priority date under which their parent immigration to the United States.  

As the plurality opinion in Sciallaba v. Osorio explained in its conclusion:

This is the kind of case Chevron was built for.  Whatever Congress might have meant in enacting §1153(h)(3), it failed to speak clearly.  Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually reasonable construction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies underlying immigration law.  Were we to overturn the Board in that circumstance, we would assume as our own the responsible and expert agency’s role.  We decline that path, and defer to the Board.

Kagan slip op. at 33. 

Thus, when a provision is ambiguous such as section 203(d), the government agency may reasonably interpret the provision in a reasonable manner. In our prior article relating to not counting relatives, Why We Can’t Wait:   How President Obama Can Erase Immigrant Visa Backlogs With A Stroke Of A Pen, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2012,0201-endelman.shtm, we discussed  that  there are admittedly some statutory provisions which might be read as pointing against an interpretation to not count family members. Most notably, it has also been pointed to us that  INA section 202(b) permits a spouse or child to “cross charge” to the foreign state of either of the parents or the spouse to avoid family separation, and this may suggest that derivatives must be individually counted for purposes of the per country cap. Still, this too can be interpreted differently under Chevronand Brand X, namely, that the entire family be counted as single unit to the other spouse or parent’s country. Of course, the statutory provision which militates in favor of such an interpretation is most notably the text of INA §203(d) itself. If this happened, the EB and FB preferences could instantly become “current.” The backlogs would disappear. The USCIS might even have to build a new Service Center!

Expansion of Parole in Place

The very idea of “parole” in section 212(d)(5) of the INA is linked to  allowing deserving aliens to come to the United States for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” In most cases, we think this only applies to people who are not yet here. Not so. Digging a bit deeper into the INA, we find in section 235(a)(1) this golden nugget: an applicant for admission is “an alien present in the United states who has not been admitted…” Putting all of this together, there is nothing in law or logic that prevents the full embrace and unfettered application of parole to those already in the United States outside the color of law. The invocation of ‘parole in place” is another example of using new interpretive techniques to mine the existing law for greater benefits. It is the antidote to the inability of Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform. There should be no concern over a possible infringement of separation of powers for the authority of Congress over the legislative process is being fully respected.  Part of the responsibility of the President to enforce the laws is to adopt an understanding of them that best promotes what Congress had in mind when it passed the law in the first place. Parole in place does precisely that. This is not amnesty. The requirements for obtaining legal status on a permanent basis apply in full. It is merely an attempt to think of the law we have not purely or primarily as an instrument of enforcement but as a platform for remediation of the human condition. Indeed, is this not how law in the American tradition is meant to function?

The creation of new solutions by federal agencies has become the norm rather than the exception in our system of governance if for no other reason that the sheer multiplicity of issues, as well as their dense complexity, defies traditional compromise or achievable consensus which are the hallmarks of Congressional deliberation. They require timely and directed executive action as a formula for keeping present problems from getting worse. This is exactly why Congress authorized the Attorney General to grant employment authorization without terms or limitations pursuant to INA 274A (h) (3)(B), a provision that should be linked with the robust exercise of the Executive’s parole power. The INA leaves the granting of parole completely up to the discretion of the Attorney General, now shifted to the DHS. It is hard to imagine a more open invitation to Executive rule- making to provide when parole can be extended, as there is absolutely nothing in the INA that would contradict a DHS regulation allowing parole in place. Not only is it appropriate for the DHS to formulate immigration policy on highly minute technical issues of surpassing moment such as parole in place, but the Constitution expects that to happen. Indeed, without this, who would do it? Far from crossing the line and infringing the authority of Congress, what we ask the DHS to do augments Congressional prerogative by providing a practical way for them to function.

In addition to not counting derivatives, the Obama Administration can extend parole in place (PIP) that has been granted to military families to all immediate relatives of US citizens, which would allow them to adjust in the US rather than travel abroad and risk the 3 and 10 year bars of inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) and (II) of the INA. Such administrative relief would be far less controversial than granting deferred action since immediate relatives of US citizens are anyway eligible for permanent residence. The only difference is that they could apply for their green cards in the US without needing to travel overseas and apply for waivers of the 3 and 10 year bars.

The concept of PIP can be extended to other categories, such as beneficiaries of preference petitions, which the authors have explained in The Tyranny of Priority Dates. However, they need to have demonstrated lawful status as a condition for being able to adjust status under INA section 245(c)(2) and the current memogranting PIP to military families states that “[p]arole does not erase any periods of unlawful status.” There is no reason why this policy cannot be reversed. The grant of PIP, especially to someone who arrived in the past without admission or parole, can retroactively give that person lawful status too, thus rendering him or her eligible to adjust status through the I-130 petition as a preference beneficiary. The only place in INA section 245 where the applicant is required to have maintained lawful nonimmigrant status is under INA section 245(c)(7), which is limited to employment-based immigrants. Family-based immigrants are not so subject. For purposes of section  245(c) of the INA, current regulations already define “lawful immigration status” to include “parole status which has not expired, been revoked, or terminated.” 8 C.F.R. section 245.1(d)(v). Indeed, even if one has already been admitted previously in a nonimmigrant visa status and is now out of status, the authors contend  that this person should be able to apply for a rescission of that admission and instead be granted retroactive PIP. Thus, beneficiaries of I-130 petitions, if granted retroactive PIP, ought to be able adjust their status in the US.

There is also no reason why PIP cannot extend to beneficiaries of employment I-140 petitions. If this is done, would such persons be able to adjust status to lawful permanent resident without leaving the USA? In order to do that, they not only need to demonstrate lawful status, but also  to have maintained continuous lawful nonimmigrant status under INA section 245(c)(7), as noted above.  Is there a way around this problem? At first glance, we consider the possibility of using the exception under INA section 245(k) which allows for those who have not continuously maintained lawful nonimmigrant status to still take advantage of section 245 adjustment if they can demonstrate that they have been in unlawful status for not more than 180 days since their last admission. We would do well to remember, however, that 245(k) only works if the alien is “present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission.”  Is parole an admission? Not according to INA section 101(a)(13)(B). So, while retroactive PIP would help satisfy the 180 day requirement imposed by INA section 245(k)(2), it cannot substitute for the lawful admission demanded by section 245(k)(1). Even if an out of status or unlawfully present I-140 beneficiary who had previously been admitted now received nunc pro tunc parole, the parole would replace the prior lawful admission. Such a person would still not be eligible for INA section 245(k) benefits and, having failed to continuously maintain valid nonimmigrant status,  would remain unable to adjust due to the preclusive effect of section 245(c)(7). Similarly, an I-140 beneficiary who had entered EWI and subsequently received retroactive parole would likewise not be able to utilize 245(k) for precisely the same reason, the lack of a lawful admission. Still, the grant of retroactive PIP should wipe out unlawful presence and the 3 and 10 year bars enabling this I-140 beneficiary to still receive an immigrant visa at an overseas consular post without triggering the bars upon departure from the US. Thus, while the beneficiary of an employment-based petition may not be able to apply for adjustment of status, retroactive PIP would nevertheless be hugely beneficial because, assuming PIP is considered a lawful status, it will wipe out unlawful presence and will thus no longer trigger the bars upon the alien’s departure from the US.

Our proposal to grant PIP retroactively so that it erases unlawful presence can also assist people who face the permanent bar under section 212(a)(9)(C) of the INA. If PIP can retroactively erase unlawful presence, then those who entered the country without inspection after accruing unlawful presence of more than 1 year will not trigger the bar under this provision if the unlawful presence has been erased.

One of the biggest contributors to the buildup of the undocumented population in the US has been the 3 year, 10 year and permanent bars.  Even though people are beneficiaries of immigrant visa petitions, they do not wish to risk travelling abroad and facing the bars.  Extending PIP to people who are in any event in the pipeline for a green card would allow them adjust status in the US or process immigrant visas at consular posts, and become lawful permanent residents. These people are already eligible for permanent residence through approved I-130 and I-140 petitions, and PIP would only facilitate their ability to apply for permanent residence in the US, or in the case of I-140 beneficiaries by travelling overseas for consular processing without incurring the 3 and 10 year bars. PIP would thus reduce the undocumented population in the US without creating new categories of relief, which Congress can and should do through reform immigration legislation. 

Achieving Something Close to Comprehensive Immigration Reform Without Congress

Not counting family members and expanding parole in place can be a potent combination for nearing comprehensive immigration reform administratively in the face of Congressional inaction. The waits in the EB and FB preferences will disappear, and family members waiting abroad can unite with their loved ones more quickly and need not be forced to take the perilous path across the Southwest border in desperation. The expansion of PIP to beneficiaries of approved I-130 and I-140 petitions would allow them to obtain lawful permanent residence, rather than being stuck in permanent limbo due to the 3 and 10 year bars. After removing the obstacle of the bars, the grant of lawful permanent residence would be more rapid as there would be no backlogs in the FB and EB preferences, and loved ones from abroad can unite with newly minted immigrants in the United States through an orderly and legal process. 

Our proposals fall squarely within the mainstream of the American political tradition, animated by the spirit of audacious incrementalism that has consistently characterized successful reform initiatives. We acknowledge that immigration reform passed by Congress would solve more problems in a fundamental way. We seek less dramatic but no less meaningful advances through the disciplined invocation of executive initiative only because these are the ones that can be achieved sooner and with greater predictability. Our justifiable zeal for immigration reform must not blind us to the benefit of more moderate proposals. We are confident that future progress will follow in a way that minimizes disruption and maximizes acceptance. We hold fast to the distinction between prudence and absolutism, between incremental reform and revolutionary upheaval. In the long run, the American experience has been characterized more by the former than the latter and it has led to a fruitful stability that has been the envy of the world.

(Guest writer Gary Endelman is the Senior Counsel of FosterQuan)

Cyrus Mehta

PAROLE IN PLACE: THE SECRET SAUCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM

/1 Comment/in /by

By Gary Endelman and Cyrus D. Mehta

On November 15, 2013, the USCIS issued a Policy Memorandum formalizing the granting of parole to persons who are present in the United States without admission or parole and who are spouses, children and parents of US citizens serving in the US military or who previously served in the US military. While parole traditionally applies to those who seek to come to the United States, the expansion of this concept to those already here is known as “parole in place”.

According to this memo, military preparedness can be potentially adversely affected if active members of the military worry about the immigration status of their spouses, parents and children. The memo makes a similar commitment to veterans who have served and sacrificed for the nation, and who can face stress and anxiety because of the immigration status of their family members. Such persons can now formally apply for parole in place (PIP) through a formal procedure pursuant to the ability of the government to grant parole under INA section 212(d)(5)(A). PIP would allow them to adjust status in the US rather than travel abroad for consular processing of their immigrant visas and thus potentially triggering the 3 or 10 year bars.

As a quick background, an individual who is in the US without admission or parole cannot adjust status through an immediate relative such as a US citizen spouse, parent or son or daughter. This person is inherently inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i), which provides:

An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) renders an alien inadmissible under two related grounds: 1) an alien present in the US without being admitted or paroled or 2) an alien who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.

The grant of PIP to a person who is present in the US without being admitted or paroled can wipe out the first ground of inadmissibility in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). PIP would then also allow this person to adjust status in the US under section 245(a) – as the person needs to have been “inspected and admitted or paroled” – without needing to leave the US.  The ability to adjust status through PIP would obviate the need  to travel overseas and apply for the visa, and thus trigger the 3 or 10 year bar pursuant to INA section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and (ii). Since there will be no departure triggering the 3 and 10 year bars, this person would no longer need to file a waiver or an advance provisional waiver by demonstrating extreme hardship to a qualifying US citizen relative to overcome the 3 and 10 year bars before leaving the US.

So far so good, but how does one overcome the second ground of inadmissibility in section 212(a)(6)A)(i), which relates to “an alien who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General?” The memo skillfully interprets this clause as relating to an alien who is in the process of arriving in the US without inspection. Thus, the second ground only applies to an alien who is presently arriving in the US while the first ground applies to an alien who already arrived in the US without admission or parole. If the second ground is interpreted as applying to an alien who arrived in the past, then it would make the first ground superfluous, according to the memo. It would also then make the 3 year bar under INA section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) superfluous as a person who at any point arrived, if used in the past tense,  at a place or time other than designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security would be  permanently inadmissible rather than inadmissible for only 3 years. Thus, if the second ground of inadmissibility is no longer applicable with respect to an alien who has already arrived in the US, then the grant of PIP would allow such a person to adjust in the US by overcoming the first ground under INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i).

The extension of PIP to the families of current or former military service men and women is a proper recognition of their contribution to the nation and an attempt to benefit those who have given so much to the rest of us.  While such logic is compelling, why not expand its application to other instances where aliens have served and strengthened the national interest or performed work in the national interest? How about granting PIP to families of, outstanding researchers striving to unlock the mysteries of science and technology, those with exceptional or extraordinary ability, and key employees of US companies doing important jobs for which qualified Americans cannot be found? And there is also a compelling interest in ensuring family unification so that US citizens or permanent residents may feel less stressed and can go on to have productive lives that will in turn help the nation.  All such people do us proud by making our cause their own and the need of their loved ones to come in from the shadows is real and present. Indeed, the non-military use of PIP was advocated by top USCIS officials several years ago in a memo to USCIS Director Mayorkas, a memo leaked by its critics who wished successfully to kill it.

In the face of inaction on the part of the GOP controlled House to enact immigration reform, granting PIP to all immediate relatives of US citizens would allow them to adjust in the US rather than travel abroad and risk the 3 and 10 year bars of inadmissibility. Such administrative relief would be far less controversial than granting deferred action since immediate relatives of US citizens are anyway eligible for permanent residence. The only difference is that they could apply for their green cards in the US without needing to travel overseas and apply for waivers of the 3 and 10 year bars.

The concept of PIP can be extended to other categories, such as beneficiaries of preference petitions, which the authors have explained in The Tyranny of Priority Dates. However, they need to have demonstrated lawful status as a condition for being able to adjust status under INA section 245(c)(2) and the memo currently states that “[p]arole does not erase any periods of unlawful status.” There is no reason why this policy cannot be reversed. The grant of PIP, especially to someone who arrived in the past without admission or parole, can retroactively give that person lawful status too, thus rendering him or her eligible to adjust status through the I-130 petition as a preference beneficiary. The only place in INA section 245 where the applicant is required to have maintained lawful nonimmigrant status is under INA section 245(c)(7), which is limited to employment-based immigrants. Family-based immigrants are not so subject. What about INA section 245(c)(2)’s insistence on “lawful immigration status” at the snapshot moment of I-485 submission?  Even this would not be a problem. For purposes of section  245(c) of the Act, current regulations already define “lawful immigration status” to include “parole status which has not expired, been revoked, or terminated.” 8 C.F.R. section 245.1(d)(v). Indeed, even if one has already been admitted previously in a nonimmigrant visa status and is now out of status, the authors contend  that this person should be able to apply for a rescission of that admission and instead be granted retroactive PIP. Thus, beneficiaries of I-130 petitions, if granted retroactive PIP, ought to be able adjust their status in the US.

There is also no reason why PIP cannot extend to beneficiaries of employment I-140 petitions. If this is done, would such persons be able to adjust status to lawful permanent resident without leaving the USA? In order to do that, they not only need to demonstrate lawful status, but also  to have maintained continuous lawful nonimmigrant status under INA section 245(c)(7), as noted above.  Is there a way around this problem? At first glance, we consider the possibility of using the exception under INA section 245(k) which allows for those who have not continuously maintained lawful nonimmigrant status to still take advantage of section 245 adjustment if they can demonstrate that they have been in unlawful status for not more than 180 days since their last admission. We would do well to remember, however, that 245(k) only works if the alien is “present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission.”  Is parole an admission? Not according to INA section 101(a)(13)(B). So, while retroactive PIP would help satisfy the 180 day requirement imposed by INA section 245(k)(2), it cannot substitute for the lawful admission demanded by section 245(k)(1). Even if an out of status or unlawfully present I-140 beneficiary who had previously been admitted now received nunc pro tunc parole, the parole would replace the prior lawful admission. Such a person would still not be eligible for INA section 245(k) benefits and, having failed to continuously maintain valid nonimmigrant status,  would remain unable to adjust due to the preclusive effect of section 245(c)(7). Similarly, an I-140 beneficiary who had entered EWI and subsequently received retroactive parole would likewise not be able to utilize 245(k) for precisely the same reason, the lack of a lawful admission. Still, the grant of retroactive PIP should wipe out unlawful presence and the 3 and 10 year bars enabling this I-140 beneficiary to still receive an immigrant visa at an overseas consular post without triggering the bars upon departure from the US. Thus, while the beneficiary of an employment-based petition may not be able to apply for adjustment of status, retroactive PIP would nevertheless be hugely beneficial because, assuming PIP is considered a lawful status, it will wipe out unlawful presence and will thus no longer trigger the bars upon the alien’s departure from the US.

There are two ways to achieve progress. Congress can change the law, which it persists in refusing to do, or the President can interpret the existing law in new ways, which he has done.  The holistic approach to parole for which we argue is a prime example of this second approach. The term “status” is not defined anywhere in the INA.  By ordinary English usage, “parolee status” is a perfectly natural way of describing someone who has been paroled. Parole is a lawful status in the sense that, by virtue of the parole, it is lawful for the parolee to remain in the United States, at least for the authorized period of time under prescribed terms and conditions. We credit David Isaacson for suggesting that there are other instances in the INA where lawful status does not automatically equate to nonimmigrant status: for examples, asylum status under INA Section 208 and refugee status under INA section 207 are lawful statuses, even though strictly speaking, neither an asylee nor a refugee is a nonimmigrant according to the INA Section 101(a)(15) definition of that term. The Executive can easily revise the memo for military families to declare parole under INA  section 212(d)(5) a status  because it has already declared parole a lawful status for NA 245(c)(2) purposes under 8 C.F.R. 245(d)(v), asylum a lawful status under INA section 208, and refugee a lawful status under INA section 207.  See 8 C.F.R. 245.1(d)(iii)-(iv). In all three cases, people are allowed into the United States in a capacity that is nether legal permanent residence nor, strictly speaking, nonimmigrant.  True, INA section 101(a)(13)(B) does say that parolees are not “admitted”, but is one who enters without admission and is granted asylum under INA 208 ever been “admitted” per the statutory definition of that term? Yet, such a person has a lawful status.

One of the biggest contributors to the buildup of the undocumented population in the US has been the 3 and 10 year bars.  Even though people are beneficiaries of immigrant visa petitions, they do not wish to risk travelling abroad and facing the 3 or 10 year bars, as well as trying to overcome the bars by demonstrating extreme hardship to qualifying relatives, which is a very high standard. Extending PIP to people who are in any event in the pipeline for a green card would allow them adjust status in the US or process immigrant visas at consular posts, and become lawful permanent residents. These people are already eligible for permanent residence through approved I-130 and I-140 petitions, and PIP would only facilitate their ability to apply for permanent residence in the US, or in the case of I-140 beneficiaries by travelling overseas for consular processing without incurring the 3 and 10 year bars. PIP would thus reduce the undocumented population in the US without creating new categories of relief, which Congress can and should do through reform immigration legislation.

There is no doubt that the memo for military families is a meaningful example of immigration remediation through executive initiative. Yet, it is one step in what can and should be a much longer journey. In the face on intractable congressional resistance, we urge the President to take this next step.

(Guest writer Gary Endelman is Senior Counsel at FosterQuan)