Tag Archive for: judicial review

Cyrus Mehta

The Pathos of Patel v. Garland

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By Stacy Caplow∗

There are many reasons for despair over the Supreme Court’s technocratic decision in Patel v. Garland which strikingly depends on arguments advanced by an amicus rather than the Government. The decision effectively forecloses judicial review of fact-finding by immigration courts or agencies regardless of whether the fact-finding was unreasonable and produced an incorrect legal conclusion.  In 1996, Congress did insulate certain specific discretionary decisions, which already have an almost impossible standard of review in most contexts and, by their nature are highly subjective, from judicial review. But, in Patel, the effort to protect the courts’ dockets from revisiting a “matter of grace” shields incorrect, biased, ignorant, illogical, and indefensible fact-finding by low-level or quasi-judicial officials.

As Justice Gorsuch laments in his surprisingly critical and forceful dissent, life-altering consequences ensue based on the assessment of a single Immigration Judge, or worse immigration functionaries in local offices—in this case the deportation of a person whose ties to the U.S. were substantial and longstanding.  He describes this an “assertion of raw administrative power.”

Mr. Patel made a mistake—checked a wrong box which happens to be the worst wrong box possible: misrepresentation of U.S. citizenship.  His mistake related to a Georgia driver’s license not any immigration benefits.  Apparently, he may even have been entitled to a license without being a citizen.  More importantly, when his misrepresentation was discovered, Georgia declined to prosecute him, crediting his claim of mistake.  That was the end of the road for his good luck.

Anyone familiar with the bureaucracy of the immigration system must cringe at Mr. Patel’s misfortune at every stage thereafter.  The Georgia decision apparently was unpersuasive to immigration authorities who denied lawful permanent residence, and several years later, placed Mr. Patel into removal proceedings.

This is the first cringe: Why did USCIS seek his removal?  Both the agency and then the ICE lawyers in Immigration Court had could have exercised discretion by declining to prosecute.  His basis for removal was unlawful presence making him a low priority for deportation.  The equities of his situation were in his favor.

The next cringe is geographical: While none of the reported decisions specify the jurisdiction of his removal proceedings or name the judge, as a Georgia resident he likely was venued in Atlanta Immigration Court where every judge has a denial rate over 90% in asylum cases.  While his application for relief was Adjustment of Status, this astonishingly miserly grant rate reveals how immigrant-unfriendly the judge who decided that Mr. Patel was untruthful must have been.

From one of the most immigrant-hostile immigration courts, Patel’s case eventually landed in the Eleventh Circuit, whose pro immigrant rulings are below average for all circuits.

The final cringe is ideological:  Despite the Government’s basic agreement with Patel’s legal theory that the law permits judicial review in cases like his, the Court invited an amicus defense of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, enlisting a former law clerk of Justice Thomas.  Then, early in its opinion the majority states “Amicus’ interpretation is the only one that fits [the statute’s] text and context.” The outcome, however laboriously reasoned, was a foregone conclusion.

While Patel was found incredible by an Immigration Judge, the ramifications of this decision extend far beyond the 3,000 or so Adjustment of Status and the close to 3,000 Cancellation of Removal or related relief matters heard in Immigration Courts yearly, a small percentage of the overall caseload.  Every day, multiple thousands of cases decided by USCIS never reach even Immigration Court let alone the Circuits. These agency determinations rarely are explained or justified.   Bureaucrats—not judges—make life changing decisions invisibly, anonymously, and unaccountably.

This case has a sad ending for Mr. Patel personally.  Maybe one of the nameless agency decision makers will be compassionate enough to exercise their unlimited discretion now and defer deportation.  He may not gain lawful status, but he can remain in the U.S. with his family and his community.

Patel shuts the door firmly and unequivocally, preventing independent review of fact-finding by Immigration Judges, however irrational and indefensible once the Board of Immigration Appeals has affirmed. This makes the need to populate the Immigration Court bench with independent, highly qualified, experienced, non-political unbiased individuals with appropriate temperament even more urgent. Perhaps this case will provide new impetus for reform such as Real Courts, Rule of Law Act of 2022 voted by the House Judiciary Committee in May just days before the Supreme Court’s decision.

∗Guest author Professor Stacy Caplow teaches immigration law at Brooklyn Law School where she has co-directed the Safe Harbor Project since 1997. 

 

 

 

 

 

David Isaacson

“Safe” Third Country Agreements and Judicial Review in the United States and Canada

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The subject of safe third country agreements, or as the U.S. government has begun calling them “Asylum Cooperation Agreements”, has been in the news lately in both the United States and Canada.  The U.S. and Canada have had such an agreement with one another since 2002, implemented pursuant to section 208(a)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(A), and section 208.30(e)(6) of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in the U.S., and pursuant to section 101(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and sections 159.1-159.7 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR) in Canada.

The idea of a safe third country agreement (STCA) as it has traditionally existed, as between the U.S. and Canada, is that the two countries agree that many applicants for asylum or refugee status, who have first come to one of the two countries should apply in that country where they first arrived, rather than going to the other country to apply.  If both countries have “generous systems of refugee protection,” as the preamble to the U.S.-Canada STCA puts it, then there may arguably be efficiency in relegating people to apply for asylum in the first of the two countries that they reach.

The U.S.-Canada STCA covers only people who make a claim at a land border port of entry or are being removed from one of the two countries through the territory of the other.  It does not apply to citizens of either country or stateless persons last habitually residing in either country.  It also has other exceptions for applicants who have certain family members with lawful status in the country where they wish to make a claim, or whose family members already have ongoing asylum/refugee claims in that country, or who are unaccompanied minors, or who either have a valid visa for the country where they wish to apply or did not need a visa for that country but did for the other.  In addition, each country may exempt additional applicants whom it determines to process itself on the basis that it is in its public interest to do so. These exceptions are laid out at Articles 2, 4, and 6 of the agreement itself, and are also detailed at 8 C.F.R.§ 208.30(e)(6) and at IRPR sections 159.2 and 159.4-159.6.

As many refugee claimants have come to have less faith in the U.S. asylum system than the Canadian refugee system, and due to the restriction of the U.S.-Canada STCA to entrants at land ports of entry (or instances of removal through one country by the other), an increased number of refugee claimants have entered Canada at unauthorized crossing points outside a port of entry in order to make a claim, most notoriously at Roxham Road along the New York-Quebec border.  (The idea is not to evade immigration officers, but simply to avoid the application of the STCA; news articles describe an oft-repeated formal warning to the applicants that entry at that specific place will result in arrest, which does not generally dissuade people since being arrested after entry into Canada, and making a refugee claim, is precisely their goal.)  There has been discussion of modifying, suspending, or terminating the agreement, and one Conservative Member of Parliament suggested that the entire U.S.-Canada border be designated as a port of entry, although in practice that would have very peculiar consequences for the immigration system as a whole (since it would mean applicants for admission in general could show up at any point along the border to be processed).  There has also been a legal challenge, discussed further below, to the notion that the U.S. can currently qualify as a safe third country consistent with Canadian constitutional law and international obligations.  The Canadian government also recently, as part of a budget bill, added to IRPA a provision separate from the STCA but also evidently designed to discourage claimants from the United States, section 101(1)(c.1), which bars refugee claims by those who have previously claimed in the United States or another country with which Canada has an information-sharing agreement—a provision I have criticized in a prior blog post.

The U.S., meanwhile, has been entering and seeking to enter into “Asylum Cooperation Agreements” with various Central American countries, Guatemala being the first followed by Honduras and El Salvador.  An interim final rule was published last week to implement such agreements, and removal from the United States under the Guatemala agreement is said to have begun just a few days ago.

The signing and implementation of these “Asylum Cooperation Agreements” has attracted a great deal of criticism, because describing Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador as safe third countries, or safe countries in any sense, would be highly dubious, to put it mildly.  A piece in Foreign Policy described the Agreement with Guatemala as “a lie”, given Guatemala’s high level of crime – the U.S. State Department’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) having written of the country as “among the most dangerous countries in the world” with “an alarming high murder rate” – and lack of resources to process asylum cases – the country having apparently received only 257 asylum claims in 2018 and adjudicated only 17.  Indeed, even the U.S. asylum officers implementing the plan to remove asylum-seekers to Guatemala under the agreement have reportedly been given “materials . . . detailing the dangers faced by those in the country, including gangs, violence, and killings with “high levels of impunity.””  Honduras, where the U.S. Government is said to intend to implement a similar agreement by January, is also problematic to describe as a “safe” country, with OSAC relaying a Department of State Travel Advisory “indicating travelers should reconsider travel to the country due to crime.”  Similarly El Salvador, with which the U.S. has also signed an agreement despite its having one of the highest homicide rates in the world.  And given the radically underdeveloped asylum systems in Guatemala and likely the other countries as well, the requirement under INA 208(a)(2)(A) that “the alien would have access to a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary protection” if removed seems unlike to be met.  The point of threatening removal to these countries seems to be more to discourage asylum claims entirely.

Moreover, the screening process to determine whether asylum-seekers can be exempted from removal to Guatemala, based on a fear of persecution there, is already being implemented in a way that has been described as “a sham process, designed to generate removals at any cost.”  Under the interim final rule, those subject to potential removal under an “Asylum Cooperation Agreement” will not be allowed to consult with attorneys or others during the screening process, or present evidence.  As the interim final rule puts it at new 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(7), “In conducting this threshold screening interview, the asylum officer shall apply all relevant interview procedures outlined in paragraph (d) of this section, except that paragraphs (d)(2) and (4) of this section shall not apply to aliens described in this paragraph (e)(7)”—8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(4) being the provision that gives the right in ordinary credible-fear proceedings to “consult with a person or persons of the alien’s choosing prior to the interview or any review thereof, and . . . present other evidence, if available.” This is different than the U.S.-Canada STCA, which specifically provides in its Statement of Principles that “Provided no undue delay results and it does not unduly interfere with the process, each Party will provide an opportunity for the applicant to have a person of his or her own choosing present at appropriate points during proceedings related to the Agreement.”  Unless vulnerable people with no legal representation, no opportunity to consult with an attorney or anyone else, and no opportunity to present evidence can prove to an asylum officer that they are more likely than not to be persecuted on a protected ground or tortured in Guatemala, they will be given the option of being returned to their home country of feared persecution or being removed to Guatemala.  One might reasonably describe this as outrageous, and a question that naturally comes to mind is whether it would survive review by a court.

The question of judicial review of the propriety and application of safe third country agreements and “Asylum Cooperation Agreements” has indeed arisen in both the United States and Canada, with different initial indications regarding the result.  In the U.S., the suggestion has been made by at least one commentator that the recent U.S. decision to send certain asylum applicants to Guatemala pursuant to an agreement may not be judicially reviewable (or at least “any lawsuits challenging the new rule will face significant obstacles”.)  In Canada, on the other hand, a challenge to the Canada-United States STCA, asserting that given current conditions in the U.S. the STCA violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, was argued before the Federal Court of Canada earlier in November and is awaiting decision.  A previous challenge to the Safe Third Country Agreement and the regulations implementing it had some success before being rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada in part on the basis that the organizations which had brought the challenge did not have standing to do so in the abstract; the current challenge includes a family of rejected refugee applicants seeking judicial review.

The basis for the potential lack of judicial review in the United States regarding safe third country agreements and their implementation is section 208(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3), which provides that “No court shall have jurisdiction to review a determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).”  (Recall that safe third country agreements, as a bar to asylum, are authorized by section 208(a)(2)(A) of the INA, which is part of the referenced paragraph 2.)  There are potential exceptions to this rule, such as the exception at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) for review of constitutional claims or questions of law on petition for review of a removal order, and the provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3) for review of written policies regarding expedited removal procedures within 60 days of their implementation, as in Grace v. Barr (formerly known as Grace v. Sessions and Grace v. Whitaker).  It may well be that the deeply problematic agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, and the details of their implementation, will be subject to judicial review under one of these exceptions or otherwise.  There is certainly at least some basis, however, for the existing conventional wisdom that judicial review will be quite difficult.

Under Canadian law, on the other hand, judicial review of administrative action cannot be precluded in this way.  As I explained in my above-mentioned prior blog post, even aspects of the refugee determination as to which administrative decision-makers are given deference by the courts will be reviewed for reasonableness, because as explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, “The rule of law requires that the constitutional role of superior courts be preserved and, as indicated above, neither Parliament nor any legislature can completely remove the courts’ power to review the actions and decisions of administrative bodies.  This power is constitutionally protected.”

Admittedly, even under Canadian law judicial review can be procedurally limited by legislation, although not eliminated.  Under section 72(1) of IRPA, for example, seeking review in the Federal Court of Canada of any decision under IRPA generally requires “making an application for leave to the Court.”  Moreover, under section 72(2)(d) of IRPA, the leave application is adjudicated by a single judge of the Federal Court “without delay and in a summary way and, unless a judge of the Court directs otherwise, without personal appearance”, and under section 72(2)(e), there is no appeal with regard to an application for leave.  Even if leave is granted, the single level of judicial review at the Federal Court may be all there is: under section 74(d) of IRPA, an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada in an immigration matter is generally possible “only if, in rendering judgment, the judge certifies that a serious question of general importance is involved and states the question.”  (Under certain very limited circumstances, an appeal can be taken to the Federal Court of Appeal even absent a certified question, but the threshold for that is quite high, as clarified recently in the citizenship context by Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Fisher-Tennant, where the Court of Appeal quashed a government appeal against what was at most an ordinary error by the Federal Court in finding Andrew James Fisher-Tennant to be a citizen of Canada.)  So there is not an unlimited amount of judicial review, but there is necessarily some.

To the extent that the existing exceptions under the INA do not prove adequate to allow for full judicial review of decisions under safe third country agreements or “Asylum Cooperation Agreements”, Congress should give serious consideration to revising INA § 208(a)(3) to provide for judicial review of such decisions to exist in the United States, as it exists in Canada.  It was one thing, although still deeply problematic from a rule-of-law perspective, when the statute in practice only attempted to guard from judicial review decisions to return asylum-seekers to a plausibly safe country such as Canada.  If agreements are to be made with other, much more dangerous countries such as Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, however, then judicial review of these agreements and how they are applied in practice becomes significantly more urgent.  Given the conditions in these countries, the question of whether people can be sent to such countries under safe-third-country agreements without any judicial review could literally be a life-or-death issue.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Poursina v. USCIS: Federal Courts May Not Have Last Word in Reviewing a Denial of a National Interest Waiver

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Filing lawsuits in federal court to challenge erroneous denials of visa petitions by USCIS have become more frequent. There is more of a shot at a reversal when a federal judge reviews a denial of the USICS. Under the Administration Procedures Act, a court must set aside an agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A). Seeking review in federal court under the APA is far more powerful that appealing a denial to the USCIS’s Administrative Appeals Office, which seldom reverses denials. Sometimes, however, a challenge in federal court can get nixed if the court finds that it has no jurisdiction to review a discretionary decision under §242(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In Poursina v. USCIS, the plaintiff sadly found out that a federal court had no jurisdiction to review a denial of his request for a national interest waiver under the jurisdiction stripping §242(a)(2)(B)(ii) because the granting of a national interested waiver is inherently discretionary.

INA 242(a)(2)(B) is reproduced below in its entirety:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review-

(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 212(h), 212(i), 240A, 240B, or 245, or

(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 208(a) of this title

The Ninth Circuit in Poursina v. USCIS relied on INA 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), which requires that Congress must specify n the statutory provision that the decision must be in the discretion of the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security. At issue is whether Congress specified that the issuance of a national interest waiver under INA 203(b)(2)(1)(A) is a discretionary decision.

If a national interest waiver is granted, a foreign national can waive the employer’s sponsorship through a labor certification in the employment-based second preference. Specifically, INA § 203(b)(2)(1)(A) states that the “Attorney General may, when the Attorney General deems to be in the national interest, waive the requirements….that an alien’s services in the sciences, arts, professions,  or business be sought by an employer in the United States.”  Note that under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress transferred this authority from the Attorney General to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

INA § 203(b)(2)(1)(A) does not contain magic words such as “in the discretion of the Attorney General” to place it within the purview of the jurisdiction stripping provision. Still, the Ninth Circuit in Poursina v. USCIS opined that words like “may” and “deems it so” suggested some measure of judgment, and thus discretion on the part of the Attorney General (now the DHS Secretary) in granting a national interest waiver.  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit was also enamored by the fact that the invocation of “national interest” inherently exudes deference to the Executive Branch, See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988),  and further invokes broader economic and national security considerations that are firmly committed to the discretion of the Executive Branch, See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).

But assuming the Ninth Circuit’s logic was correct, even within a discretionary decision that may be immune from judicial review under INA 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), there may be purely legal questions that are non-discretionary. Indeed, the precedent decision of the Appeals Administrative Office in Matter of Dhanasar imposed such objective criteria that required the DHS Secretary to measure the national interest claim under those criteria rather than through the exercise of unbridled discretion. A person seeking a national interest waiver mush show:

(1)that the foreign national’s proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance; (2) that the foreign national is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor; and (3) that, on balance, it would be beneficial to the United States to waive the requirements of a job offer and thus of a labor certification. If these three elements are satisfied, USCIS may approve the national interest waiver as a matter of discretion.

Notwithstanding these criteria that are similar to other undisputable objective regulatory criteria in determining who is extraordinary under INA § 203(b)(1)(A) and 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x), the Ninth Circuit in Poursina v. USCIS strangely held they fell short of a legal standard, and the Dhanasar standards expressly reserved the issuance of the waiver “as a matter of discretion.” But is there not always some discretion in all agency adjudications?  Even under the extraordinary ability standard pursuant to §203(b)(1)(A) there is discretion in determining whether fulfillment of the evidentiary criteria under 8 CFR § 204.5(h)(3)(i)-(x) can survive a final merits determination. See  Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010).  Yet, courts have always assumed jurisdiction over appeals challenging denials under extraordinary ability standard.

One should therefore be able to argue that a federal court is not forever precluded from reviewing a denial of a national interest waiver. If  for example the USCIS does not apply the Dhanasar standard whatsoever in a future case, would that then pose a purely legal question or will a court, following  Poursina v. USCIS, throw out the case under INA 242(a)(2)(B)(ii)?  In fact, with respect to a denial of Poursina’s second national interest waiver, Poursina claimed that he never received a request for evidence. The Ninth Circuit ultimately shot down that claim on the grounds that Poursina did not update his address with USCIS in time, but agreed that a constitutional claim, such as this, is not subject to INA §242(a)(2)(b)(ii)’s jurisdictional bar.

One Third Circuit case, Pinho v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005) is especially noteworthy and discussed in David Isaacson’s blog.  Pinho’s adjustment of status application was denied because he was found to be ineligible as a result of a disqualifying conviction. However, that conviction was vacated and the charges were dismissed, but the adjustment application was still erroneously denied on the ground that his vacated guilty plea still met the definition of “conviction” under the INA.  Pinho was not placed in removal proceedings and he sought review of the denial of his adjustment of status application in federal court under the APA despite the bar on review of discretionary decisions, including adjustment of status under INA §242(a)(2)(B)(i), which is the companion jurisdiction stripping provision to INA §242(a)(2)(B)(ii). The Third Circuit Court held that this denial was based on the legal question of whether Pinho was statutorily eligible for adjustment of status, and thus fell outside the purview of the jurisdiction stripping clause.  The Third Circuit stated, “To treat all denials of adjustment as discretionary, even when based on eligibility determinations that are plainly matters of law, is to fundamentally misunderstand the relationship between the executive and the judiciary.”

Hence, under Pinho, there may still be scope to review a denial of a discretionary national interest waiver denial in federal court if there was a legal error or a constitutional claim. It must be acknowledged that the facts in Pinho were different as that case clearly concerned statutory eligibility without any element of discretion.    It remains to be seen whether a plaintiff can show legal error if the standards set forth in Matter of Dhanasar are not properly evaluated by the USCIS even though the application of those standards require discretion. This argument was not successful in Poursina v. USCIS, as the Ninth Circuit was of the opinion that the Dhanasar standards still smacked of discretion.  Moreover, in Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010), the Supreme Court held that only decisions actually declared discretionary by statute can be immunized from judicial review and not decisions made discretionary by regulation. This would also apply in the reverse. A discretionary statute cannot be made non-discretionary by regulation, or by standards set forth by the AAO in precedent decision such as Dhanasar.

While Poursina v. USCIS may have immunized national interest waiver denials from judicial review, the holding should be limited to national interest waivers only and should not impact the ability to challenge denials of other visa petitions in federal court, such as H-1B, L, or EB-1 cases.  The language of INA 214(c)(1) about how a nonimmigrant petition “shall be determined by the Attorney General” is even further away from explicit discretion than the national interest waiver language , and INA §203(b)(1)(A) regarding EB-1 cases doesn’t even have that level of Attorney General authority specified. Thus, in an APA action challenging a religious worker denial under INA §203(b)(4), the Third Circuit in Soltane v. US Dep’t of Justice, 381 F.3d 143 (3rd Cir. 2004) held that the provision did not specify that the Attorney General had discretion.  In Residential Finance Corporation v. USCIS, a federal district court in Ohio reversed a denial of an H-1B case and the court also overrode the objections of the government that it did not have jurisdiction under INA §242(a)(2)(B)(ii). None of the provisions governing approval of an H-1B petition specified that granting a petition is in the discretion of the Attorney General. The court in Residential Finance distinguished the facts from those in CDI Information Services Inc. v. Reno, 278 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2002) which refused to review the denial of an H-1B application for extension of stay as the grant of such an extension was within the discretion of the attorney general under INA §214(a)(1).

While one may disagree with the holding in Poursina v. USCIS, seeking review of a denial of a national waiver request in federal court is more likely to fail than the review of denial of other petitions. Even the DC Court of Appeals in Zhu v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir. 2005) has agreed. The Ninth Circuit even refused to extend its holding in ANA International v. Way, 393 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2004), which held that the visa revocation statute, INA §205, was not subject to the jurisdiction stripping provision although it was linguistically similar to the national interest waiver statute as it did not contain any language suggesting discretion. Thus, unless another circuit court disagrees with Poursina v. USICS and Zhu v. Gonzales, an APA challenge seeking review of a national interest denial, without more, may not succeed. In a future case, an argument can be made that when the statute, which in this case INA § 203(b)(2)(1)(A) does not specify that the grant of a waiver is in the discretion of the Attorney General, the court should not be able to divine discretion from other words in the statute as the Ninth Circuit did in Poursina v. USCIS. This is especially so, when unlike the companion jurisdictional stripping provision under INA §242(a)(2)(B)(i), there is no specific mention of discretionary applications that immunize them from a court’s jurisdiction such as an adjustment of status application or cancellation of removal. Until there is such success, prospective litigants should be made aware that the USCIS’s Appeals Administrative Office rather than a federal court will likely have the final word when USCIS denies a national interest waiver request.

 

 

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta & Sophia Genovese

Administrative Review Versus Judicial Review When an Employment-Based Petition Is Denied

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Under the Trump administration, there have been an increasing number of denials of employment-based petitions, especially of H-1B visas. To reverse what Trump sees as American carnage, his administration has unleashed carnage on the H-1B visa program, and indeed, all legal immigration. It does not matter that employment-based visas help facilitate American competitiveness globally by attracting worldwide talent, or that foreign workers complement the US workforce rather than replace them, resulting in greater overall efficiency, productivity and jobs. Rather, the administration continues to attack all pathways to legal immigration under its misguided America First philosophy.

The stakes for an approval have become even higher, as USCIS recently announced that it will “issue an NTA [Notice to Appear] where, upon issuance of an unfavorable decision on an application, petition, or benefit request, the alien is not lawfully present in the United States.” In yet another recent policy, USCIS instructs adjudicating officials to deny applications based on the lack of “sufficient initial evidence” without the issuance of an RFE or notice of intent to deny. This could be subjectively viewed as resulting in more denials followed by NTAs.

Upon the USCIS Service Center denying an employment-based petition, the petitioner may file Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion in order to appeal to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) within 30 days (plus 3 days if received in the mail) of the decision. Alternatively, the petitioner may request a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider or both with 33 days of the decision. The petitioner may also opt to seek judicial review in federal court without going to the AAO. In addition, a petitioner may also wish to re-file the petition, which may at times be the best strategy. However, the re-filing option may not always be available, such as when the H-1B cap for the fiscal year has already been reached or the beneficiary’s nonimmigrant status has ended and consular processing would be problematic for whatever reason.

This blog will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of administrative review over judicial review.

Advantages of Seeking Administrative Review

Filing Form I-290B is more administratively convenient, efficient and less costly for the client. If the USCIS has made an obvious error, requesting that the USCIS either reopen or reconsider or do both may be an effective and simple strategy. For example, if an H-1B is erroneously denied without an RFE or NOID, and it was clearly an error, the filing a motion to reopen may make more sense over judicial review.

In the event that the petition has been denied on substantive grounds, filing an appeal to the AAO allows one to supplement the record by providing additional evidence such as a more detailed expert evaluation. The process is less formal than going to federal court. Writing the brief in support of the appeal or motion is an extension of what was already said in the response to the Request for Evidence prior to denial, although the new brief must make new and creative arguments to overcome the denial.

Even when the intention is to file an appeal on Form I-1290B, the official who made the initial decision, according to agency regulation, will first review the appeal and determine whether to take favorable action and grant the benefit request. This process is called “initial field review.” Thus, every appeal is first treated as a motion to reopen or reconsider. There are many occasions where a case based on an egregious denial can be reopened and reversed without going through the AAO.

There is nothing to lose and a chance of a favorable result – the AAO could either outright reverse a denial or remand back to the USCIS Service Center, which in turn, could issue another RFE. If the AAO dismisses the appeal, one can still seek review in federal court.

Disadvantages of Seeking Administrative Review

The success rate at the AAO is very low. In FY2017, with respect to H-1B petitions, the AAO dismissed 598 appeals, sustained only 22 and remanded 44. With respect to L-1 petitions, the AAO dismissed 181 appeals, sustained only 15 and remanded 6.

The process is also not expeditious. If the beneficiary is already in the US and does not have another underlying nonimmigrant status, he/she will start accruing unlawful presence for purposes of triggering the 3/10 year bar upon the denial of the request for change or extension of status. If the individual’s appeal is not successful after 180 days of unlawful presence have accrued, the beneficiary will be subject to the bars upon departing the US.  (If the individual’s appeal is successful, any related application for change of status or extension of stay is likely to be reopened on Service motion following the granting of the petition, but one cannot know for sure in advance whether this will happen.)

The AAO may not just affirm the USCIS denial, but may also improve upon it by providing better reasoning or even affirming for different or additional reasons. This would render it more difficult to seek judicial review.

Advantages of Seeking Judicial Review

The case is reviewed by a judge who is not part of the USCIS and is not influenced by its prevailing policy as an adjudicator within the AAO is.

There may also be an opportunity to have the case resolved with an Assistant US Attorney who may advise his/her client, the USCIS, to reverse the decision rather than fight it out in court.

If the plaintiff prevails, the attorney may seek fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

One can ask for extraordinary remedies through a preliminary injunction (or temporary restraining order followed by a preliminary injunction) to maintain the nonimmigrant status of the beneficiary during the pendency of the matter, or at least prevent the beneficiary from accruing unlawful presence during the pendency of the matter.

Moreover, if an NTA is issued upon the denial of petition, then one potential advantage in federal court litigation is to ask the court in the preliminary injunction to restore the status of the beneficiary, which could then be grounds for termination of the removal proceedings. It should be noted that business immigration attorneys will also need to either hone in or develop their litigation skills for beneficiaries who are placed in removal proceedings, which was discussed in our previous blog, “Heightened Ethical and Strategic Considerations for Business Immigration Attorneys Under USCIS’s New Removal Policy.” Attorneys will need to simultaneously navigate the removal process while challenging the denial of the underlying petition.

In a few cases, the beneficiary has been able to establish standing as a plaintiff in litigation involving nonimmigrant visas. See e.g., Tenrec, Inc. v. USCIS, No. 3:16‐cv‐995‐SI, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129638 **21‐22 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 2016). In the administrative review context, the USICS has recognized that the beneficiary of an I-140 may administratively challenge the revocation of an I-140 petition who has exercised job portability pursuant to INA 204(j). See Matter of V-S-G- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-06 (AAO Nov. 11, 2017).

Disadvantages of Seeking Judicial Review

Seeking judicial review can be far more expensive and time consuming. In addition, a federal court may exercise a more deferential standard, where under the Administrative Appeal Act (APA) a denial may be set aside only if  it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 77 (2002). Factual findings may be set aside by a federal court only if “unsupported by substantial evidence”—which is not quite the same thing as review for “clear error” as in appellate review of a lower court’s fact-finding, but is still far from de novo review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).  The AAO, on the other hand, can undertake a de novo review of all issues of fact, law, policy, and discretion, and can also address new issues that were not addressed in the prior decision. See AAO Practice Manual, Chapter 3 Appeals.

New evidence cannot be introduced into the record.

Some employers also fear government retaliation, although this may be anecdotal and not necessarily official policy. Employers also are shy about unwanted publicity when they become plaintiffs.

The stakes have never been higher for employment-based immigration. With the very real threat of deportation looming, practitioners and employers alike must weigh the benefits and risks with any of these options when seeking review of a denial. For some, a motion to reopen and reconsider may be sufficient for a more obvious error. Others may wish to resolve a recurring, systemic issue by seeking judicial review in a district court. Regardless, it is clear that the role of the immigration practitioner, especially those practicing business immigration, must be prepared to increasingly litigate these petitions in order to prevent further carnage of the existing immigration system.