Tag Archive for: Immigration Judges

To What Extent Can Walmart’s Successful  Blocking of an Administrative Law Judge in the Executive Office for Immigration Review  Extend to  Immigration Judges?

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box

On March 25, 2024 Chief Justice J. Randal Hall of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Statesboro Division granted Walmart’s motion for summary judgment in Walmart Inc. v. Jean King, which alleged that the administrative proceedings against the company for violations of immigration-related recordkeeping requirements should be halted because they were “being conducted by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who is unconstitutionally shielded from the President’s supervision. ALJs like Jean King, who was presiding over the proceedings against Walmart and is the Chief Judge within the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO), can be removed from their position only for “good cause” as determined by the Merits System Protection Board (MSPB) and by the president for “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”. Walmart alleged that this system violates the Constitution by insulating ALJs “from presidential control by two levels of removal protection”. Walmart argued that Article II of the Constitution, which commands the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”, requires him to have the power to remove executive officers. Only two types of officers have been determined to be exempt from the President’s removal power – principal officers, who report directly to the President, and inferior officers, who are appointed by the President but supervised by others. See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020); United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1980 (2021). Walmart argued that ALJs do not within either of these exceptions, “so the removal scheme that protects them is unconstitutional twice over”. Judge Hall agreed with Walmart and granted the motion for summary judgement, finding that “the multilevel protection from removal present for the OCAHO ALJs is contrary to Article II, and contrary to the executive power of the President.”

 This case is just one in a string of recent examples of constitutional challenges to the authority of ALJs. In a previous blog, we discussed Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, which, in part, concerns whether the Congress’ decision to allow ALJs to be removed only for “good cause” violates Article II. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jarkesy in November 2023, and its decision in the case could have sweeping consequences for the future of ALJs. We also reported on SpaceX’s successful challenge against the DOJ’s prosecution of discrimination allegations against it under INA 274B. SpaceX’s Appointments Clause challenge was unique as it argued that the Attorney General, despite appointing OCAHO ALJs, does not review their decisions under INA 274B as an aggrieved party under  INA § 274B(g)(1) must seek review in the court of appeals.

Jarkesy and Walmart also raise the possibility about whether Immigration Judges (IJs), too, could face constitutional challenges. Like the OCAHO, they too are housed within the Executive Office for Immigration Review under the purview of the Department of Justice.

However, in Fortunato de Jesus Amador Duenas v. Garland, the Ninth Circuit rejected an argument that the removal process for IJs violates Article II. The Court reasoned that the Attorney General (AG), who supervises IJs, enjoys the unrestricted authority to remove them at his discretion. Historically, AGs have exercised this power fairly liberally. John Ashcroft, the AG under President George W. Bush, fired a number of IJs who had reputations for being lenient toward immigration. See Jill Family, Regulated Immigrants: An Administrative Law Failure, 29 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 401, 415 (March 14, 2024). Jill Family’s article in providing a fascinating history of the APA points out that Congress exempted deportation and exclusion cases from the Administration Procedure Act. See Supplemental App. Act of 1951, Pub. L.64 Stat. 1044 (1951).  During the Trump administration, AG Jeff Sessions similarly removed IJ Steven Morley from handling the Castro-Tum case and replaced him with a different judge after Morley had previously administratively closed it.  On the other hand, IJs are also subject to the Merits System Protection Board (MSPB) like the ALJ in the Walmart case. In Roy v. MSPB,  the only reason why Susan Roy, a former  Immigration Judge,  could not make a claim in the MSPB is because she had not served two years. Otherwise, Roy v. MSPB shows that IJs who have completed two years can challenge their removal to the MSPB.  IJs are also subject to union control, which was not brought up in Fortunato de Jesus Amador Duenas v. Garland.

Even if the Supreme Court in Jarkesy ultimately rules that ALJs are unconstitutional, it is unlikely that the holding would extent to IJs notwithstanding the fact that IJs may also receive some modicum of protection from removal. IJs have historically been susceptible to removal by the AG who is appointed by the President. They can be reassigned from a case and the  AG also has the authority to certify decisions made by an IJ to himself and overrule them. There is another part of Jarkesy that brought a Seventh Amendment challenge because Mr. Jarkesy was subject to an administrative proceeding against him and was deprived of a jury trial in federal court.  If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Mr. Jarkesy on his right to a jury trial, this may invite challenges with respect to the authority of IJs. Even here, S. Michael McColloch, counsel for Jarkesy, argued that the court should hold that when the government brings a case with the “same essential function” as a traditional lawsuit for claims such as fraud, it should have to bring the case in federal court, where a jury trial right would apply. However, when pressed further he emphasized that Jarkesy should not apply to adjudicating government benefits and debts and that  the authority of IJs should not be impacted by the outcome of the case.

It remains to be seen whether a broad ruling in Jarkesy will strike at the heart of the immigration court system. If the Supreme Court’s holding brings about the evisceration of the immigration courts, Congress could be forced to create an independent immigration court system under Article I of the Constitution as a replacement. An Article 1 court would ensure that IJs are independent from political interference as they are currently under the purview of the Attorney General within the Department of Justice.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

The Potential Impact of SEC v. Jarkesy on Immigration Law and EB-5 Lawyers

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On November 29, 2023, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, a case that involves several key questions: whether the statues allowing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to bring administrative enforcement proceedings that impose civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, whether the statute allowing the SEC to enforce securities laws through agency adjudication rather than in federal court violates the nondelegation doctrine, and whether the Congress’ decision to allow Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) to be removed only for “good cause” violates Article II of the Constitution, which commands the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Oral argument focused primarily on whether the SEC’s enforcement system deprives those charged with SEC violations of the right to a jury trial. Jarkesy argued that an SEC adjudication triggers a right to a jury trial because it is more akin to a civil fraud lawsuit imposing monetary penalties than a proceeding involving a “public right”, where agency adjudication is appropriate.

An ALJ found Jarkesy, an investment advisor, guilty of violating securities law by fraudulently overvaluing the investments he oversaw, and making misrepresentations to investors about the management of the funds. He was fined $300,000, barred from securities industry activities, and his firm was ordered to repay investors. Jarkesy challenged the SEC’s enforcement action at the 5th Circuit, arguing that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial, that “Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the SEC by failing to provide it with an intelligible principle by which to exercise the delegated power”, and that restrictions on the removal of ALJs violate Article II. The Fifth Circuit agreed, holding that the SEC’s choice of enforcing securities violation through agency adjudication violates the Seventh Amendment, and that Congress’ open-ended grant of authority to the SEC to determine whether to initiate enforcement proceedings for securities fraud is impermissible under the Constitution. Further, the court held that “for-cause” removal protections for ALJs violates the “take care” clause of the Constitution by impermissibly insulating them from removal by the President.

The outcome of Jarkesy could have significant impacts on immigration law. The same arguments that could invalidate the authority of ALJs in Jarkesy could also be applied to Immigration Judges (IJs), potentially depriving them of the ability to hear cases. Because IJs are non-ALJ adjudicators, their authority could be even more vulnerable to the challenges issued by Jarkesy. Additionally, if the Supreme Court’s holding eliminates ALJs at the SEC, lawsuits challenging the authority of ALJs at other agencies are likely to follow, meaning that the Department of Labor, for example, could be hindered from holding hearings to address an employer’s failure to comply with a Labor Condition Application (LCA). During the oral argument, which only focused on the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, Justices Kagan and Sotomayor expressed concerns that Jarkesy could result in radical changes to the immigration court system. If the Supreme Court’s holding brings about the evisceration of the immigration courts, Congress could be forced to create an independent immigration court system under Article I of the Constitution as a replacement. An Article 1 court would ensure that IJs are independent from political interference as they are currently under the purview of the Attorney General within the Department of Justice.

S. Michael McColloch, counsel for Jarkesy, argued that the court should hold that when the government brings a case with the “same essential function” as a traditional lawsuit for claims such as fraud, it should have to bring the case in federal court, where a jury trial right would apply. However, when pressed further he emphasized that Jarkesy should not apply to adjudicating government benefits and debts and that  the authority of IJs should not be impacted by the outcome of the case.

A broad Supreme Court ruling in  Jarkesy  affirming all the three aspects of the Fifth Circuit decision could have disastrous consequences for the immigration court system while also providing immigration lawyers charged with SEC violations with an interesting means of challenging the administrative proceedings. The SEC often initiates enforcement actions against immigration lawyers arising from their work with the EB-5 program, which affords noncitizen investors a path to lawful permanent residence. The SEC has initiated these actions against immigration lawyers who it claimed, for example, offered investments without registering as a broker or received commissions from their clients’ investments. As in the enforcement action at issue in Jarkesy, the SEC often imposes monetary sanctions on immigration lawyers found to have committed a securities violation. Jarkesy could provide immigration lawyers accused of securities fraud with a template for challenging the enforcement proceedings brought against them by the SEC on the grounds that they are entitled to a jury trial or asserting a Constitutional challenge to the authority of ALJs. Jarkesy also argued that the statutory provision which allows the SEC to bring agency enforcement actions rather than enforcing securities law in federal court offends the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine. This argument too could be advanced by immigration lawyers facing an SEC administrative proceeding. The SEC does not always initiate agency enforcement proceedings against immigration lawyers for securities violations, however, sometimes suing in federal court instead (see here and here). Immigration lawyers facing a jury trial in federal court will find it more difficult to make use of the arguments laid out in Jarkesy.

Our blog on Jarkesy is part of a series of blogs analyzing forthcoming Supreme Court cases that may eviscerate Chevron deference,  curb the power of federal government agencies in interpreting statutes and regulations, and broaden the statute of limitations to challenge regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act.  Although these challenges are being made by plaintiffs  before sympathetic conservative justices whose objective it is to dismantle the administrative state, we have tried to also find a silver lining in each of these cases that might benefit immigrants or their attorneys.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.