Tag Archive for: H-4 EAD

Cyrus Mehta

Court Upholds Regulation Issuing Employment Authorization to H-4 Spouses Even After the Demise of Chevron Deference

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On August 2, 2024, the D.C. Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Save Jobs USA v. DHS, upholding the regulation that provides employment authorization to certain H-4 spouses of H-1B nonimmigrants. Save Jobs USA, an organization aiming to “address the problems American workers face from foreign labor entering the United States job market through visa programs” had challenged this regulatory provision, 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2, 274a, arguing that it “exceeded the [DHS]’s statutory authority, and that, in adopting it, [DHS] acted arbitrarily and capriciously.”

The DC Circuit found that DHS is authorized to extend employment authorization to H-4 spouses under 8 USC 1184(a)(1), INA 214(a)(1) (stating that “The admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations prescribe…”) and 8 USC 1103(a)(3), INA 103(a)(3) (stating that the DHS Secretary “…shall establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter.”). Moreover, the court held it had already “interpreted the relevant provisions of the INA to answer a similar question in favor of DHS in Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS, 50 F.4th 164 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“Washtech”). As discussed in a prior blog, Washtech involved a challenge to the 24 month Optional Practical Training (OPT) extension for STEM graduates by the Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (Washtech), a union representing tech workers. Washtech argued that “the statutory definition of the F-1 visa class precludes the Secretary from exercising the time-and conditions authority to allow F-1 students to remain for school recommended practical training after they complete their coursework”. Washtech further asserted INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i) authorizes DHS to allow F-1 students to remain in the U.S. only until they have completed degree program, not to pursue post-graduation practical training. The DC Circuit upheld DHS’ STEM OPT rules, reasoning that the STEM OPT extension is a valid exercise of DHS’ authority under INA § 214(a)(1) to promulgate regulations that authorize an F-1 student’s stay in the U.S. beyond graduation, noting that practical training is critical to STEM students’ ability to apply skills learned during their degree programs once they return to their home countries. Judge Pillard, who authored the opinion, noted that the U.S. has long permitted foreign students to remain in the country for practical training, beginning with a 1947 rule which “allowed foreign students ‘admitted temporarily to the United States . . . for the purpose of pursuing a definite course of study’ to remain here for up to eighteen months following completion of coursework for ‘employment for practical training’ as required or recommended by their school”. Under Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978), Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts its statutes without change. Practical training was authorized even prior to the enactment of the INA in 1952.

Because Save Jobs USA did not meaningfully distinguish its case against H-4 work authorization from the precedent established in Washtech, the DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of DHS. Save Jobs USA argued that Washtech should be disregarded because it did not address the major questions doctrine established by the Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 716 (2022), which holds that courts “expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast economic and political significance.” The DC Circuit gave short shrift to this argument, though, stating that the purpose of the major questions doctrine is a tool of statutory construction “to help courts figure out what a statute means”. Because Washtech had already interpreted the relevant regulations after West Virginia v. EPA, the court found that there was no need to overturn Save Jobs USA v. DHS as Washtech remained good law. Under stare decisis a future court lacks the authority to say a previous court was wrong about how it resolved the actual legal issue before it. As Washtech was decided after the major questions doctrine was established by the Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA, it was assumed that Washtech already considered it and there was no need to upset the Court’s holding in Save Jobs USA, which relied on Washtech.

Save Jobs USA v. DHS also represents one of the first instances of a federal court upholding a regulatory provision notwithstanding the demise of Chevron deference. In its June 28, 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court abolished the long-standing Chevron doctrine, which held that courts were required to defer to the government agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. We have discussed Loper Bright at length in a previous blog. In footnote 2 in Save Jobs USA v. DHS, the DC Circuit stated that “Washtech did not depend on Chevron” because Washtech had applied Chevron as a “counter-factual, fallback argument”, but this did not alter Washtech’s holding that INA 214(a)(1) and INA 101(a)(3) were not ambiguous in the first place.

Save Jobs USA v. DHS affirms that courts can rely on direct authorization from DHS to promulgate regulation to issue employment authorization to noncitizens. Despite the evisceration of Chevron deference, courts need not rely on an agency’s interpretation of an INA provision in order to provide noncitizens with work authorization, such as the INA provisions that extend STEM OPT work authorization to F-1 students or provide work authorization to H-4 spouses, because these statutory provisions are not ambiguous in the first instance.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Cyrus Mehta

Shaping Immigration Policy Through EADs

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

In the face of Congressional inaction to fashion an immigration solution for the United States, the Administration does have broad authority to grant an employment authorization document (EAD) to noncitizens. It also has the ability to extend the validity of an EAD.

On September 27, 2023, USCIS announced that it will increase the maximum employment authorization document (EAD) validity period for “certain noncitizens who are employment authorized incident to status or circumstance” to five years. This five-year EAD validity period also applies to some “initial and renewal EADs for certain noncitizens who must apply for employment authorization”. Refugees, asylees, individuals granted withholding of removal, and those with pending asylum application or applications for adjustment of status under INA 245, are among the categories of noncitizens who will be issued EADs with a five-year validity period, according to a USCIS Policy Alert. USCIS stated that this change is aimed at “significantly reduc[ing] the number of new Forms I-765, Application for Employment Authorization, we receive for renewal EADs over the next several years, contributing to our efforts to reduce associated processing times and backlogs”. This announcement is the one of the most recent in a series of DHS measures that have the effect of shaping immigration policy through EADs.

INA 274A(h)(3) provides DHS a basis for providing employment authorization to noncitizens when not specifically authorized under the INA. The provision states:

(3) Definition of unauthorized alien – As used in this section, the term “unauthorized alien” means, with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this Act or by the Attorney General.

DHS has relied on INA 274A(h)(3) as the authority for issuing EADs to H-4 spouses of H-1B workers under 8 CFR 274.12(c)(26). Save Jobs USA, an organization representing California IT workers, is currently challenging the DHS rule that grants work authorization to H-4 nonimmigrants before the Supreme Court. Although the policy was upheld at the district court level in March and no court of appeals decision has yet been rendered, Save Jobs has already sought review by the Supreme Court. Save Jobs is arguing that the issue of H-4 EADs in one of “extraordinary practical importance” because it represents “just the tip of a regulatory-work-authorization iceberg” that threatens the jobs of U.S. workers. Save Jobs further claimed that providing work authorization to noncitizens paroled into the U.S. for humanitarian purposes will “will allow aliens to hold 18 percent of the jobs created in an average year.” In a September 2023 brief, DHS contended that Save Jobs does not have standing to challenge the regulation, and urged the Court to deny certiorari, stating that: “The case would… not warrant certiorari even had the court of appeals already affirmed the district court’s ruling. That petitioner seeks to skip that critical step and obtain certiorari before judgment makes denial of the petition all the more appropriate.”

Although employment authorization is specifically provided for recipients of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) under INA 244(a)(1), INA 274A(h)(3) also affords DHS a basis for providing interim EADs to applicants who have pending TPS applications under 8 CFR 274.12(c)(19). Pursuant to a recent announcement, DHS is redesignating and extending TPS for Venezuela for 18 months. The redesignation will allow Venezuelan nationals who have been continuously residing in the United States since July 31, 2023 and meet the other eligibility criteria to apply for TPS. EADs for current Venezuelan TPS beneficiaries will be automatically extended through March 10, 2025. The redesignation of Venezuela for TPS will relieve the pressure for cities like New York that have accepted recent migrants from Venezuela, as these individuals will be able to legally work with EADs even while they have pending TPS applications rather than relying only on housing and other services provided by NYC.

Other examples where the Administration has relied on INA 274A(h)(3) include the granting of EADs to those who have been paroled into the United States under humanitarian parole under 8 CFR 274.12(c)(11), F-1 students who are in a period of practical training (8 CFR 274.12(c)(3)), applicants with pending I-485 applications (8 CFR 274.12(c)(9)), applicants with pending cancellation of removal applications (8 CFR 274.12(c)(10)), recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) (8 CFR 274.12(c)(33)), and beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions, as well as their spouses and children, based on compelling circumstances (8 CFR 204.5(p)). Under these regulations, some EADs are linked to the noncitizen’s nonimmigrant visa status such as F-1 or H-4 while other EADs are not linked to such visa status and allow the noncitizen to remain lawfully present in the US.

Some of the programs that have provided the basis for EADs have been challenged in addition to the H-4 EAD program, such as the DACA program, which the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas recently struck down once again. In a September 13, 2023 order, Judge Hanen stated that the 2022 Final Rule promulgated by the Biden administration to formalize the DACA program was not “materially different” from the 2012 policy that first created the program, and held that “the Final Rule suffers from the same legal impediments” as the 2012 policy. The 2012 policy was ruled unlawful in by the 5th Circuit in October 2022. In a 2015 opinion authored by Judge Hanen, the 5th Circuit struck down the “Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents” program (or “DAPA”) and questioned whether INA 274A(h)(3), which the court characterized as a definitional provision, even affords DHS the authority to grant employment authorization or related benefits.

The administration’s humanitarian parole program, which allows 30,000 qualifying nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela to be admitted to the United States every month for up to two years and apply for work authorization, is currently facing a challenge by Texas and nineteen other states. The plaintiff states allege that the program “amounts to the creation of a new visa program that allows hundreds of thousands of aliens to enter the United States who otherwise have no basis for doing so”. In an October 2022 Court of Appeals case, the Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (Washtech) similary argued that the F-1 STEM Optional Practical Training (OPT) rule should be struck down on the ground that INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i) authorizes DHS to allow F-1 students to remain in the U.S. only until they have completed their course of study and does not specifically authorize post-graduation practical training. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, upheld STEM OPT as a valid exercise of DHS’ authority under in INA § 214(a)(1) to promulgate regulations that authorize an F-1 student’s stay in the U.S. beyond graduation. The Supreme Court recently denied  certiorari allowing STEM OPT and the EAD emanating under 8 CFR 274.12(c)(3) to continue.

Notwithstanding these legal challenges on specific executive actions, the Administration continues to  have the authority to issue and extend EADs to a broad swath of noncitizens. Some of the beneficiaries of EADs are those who are in the queue for permanent residence but are unable to obtain it due to backlogs in the employment categories while others are in the US based on humanitarian reasons. The authority and flexibility that INA 274A(h)(3) provides to the Administration to fashion immigration policy through the grant EADs and transform the lives of hundreds of thousands of noncitizens fills an important gap that complements the immigration benefits provided in the INA.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate

Cyrus Mehta

Coping with Delays Facing H-4 and L-2 Spouses When They Have a Pending Adjustment Application – Part 2

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By Cyrus Mehta and Isabel Rajabzadeh*

Although H-4 and L-2 extensions continue to be delayed since our  last blog  “Coping with Delays Facing H-4 and L-2 Spouses”,  we highlight another issue,  which adds further hardship for H-4 and L-2 spouses faced with unjust processing delays. In October 2020, the EB-3 Dates for Filing in the Visa Bulletin advanced significantly, which allowed many born in India to file Form I-485, Adjustment of Status (AOS) applications. The surge in AOS cases, coupled with the H-4/L-2 processing delays, have left many with the inability to travel abroad as they await both their H-4/L-2 extension and Advance Parole (AP) processing. This blog tackles the threat to abandonment of AOS when traveling internationally while AP and H-4/L-2 are processing. We also discuss the complex interplay with employment authorization for H-4/L-2 spouses who have pending AOS applications.

Preserving H-4 and L-2 Status When an AOS is Pending

Since the H-1B and L visas allow for dual intent, it is possible to maintain H or L nonimmigrant status while an AOS application for permanent residence has been filed.

Due to the delays in the processing of H-4/L-2 extensions and requests for EAD, travelling abroad poses a conundrum. In order to preserve the AOS that is still processing, one needs to have either AP or valid H-4/L-2 status before leaving. Accordingly, 8 CFR 245.2(a)(4)(ii)(B)-(C) outlines two distinct pathways. Under (B), it allows those with approved AP to leave the country and then subsequently return in AP without abandoning their AOS, absent any specific situations outlined in the regulation. Under (C), the same is true for those who leave in H-4/L-2 status and return in H-4/L-2.

In 2000, the Cronin Memo was published and clarified that although an H-1B or L is considered  to be paroled after entering the United States via AP, he/she is still able to apply for an extension of H-1B or L if there was a valid and approved petition. Upon the granting of the H-1B or L extension, the grant of parole would be terminated, and the H-1B applicant would then be admitted into the relevant H-1B status. Although the Cronin Memo contemplates one who is already in H-1B and L status before traveling abroad and being paroled via AP, it could also apply to one who has a pending extension of  H-1B or L-1 status application and who traveled abroad under AP and was paroled into the US. Likewise, upon the approval of the H-1B or L-1 request, the parole would be terminated, and the beneficiary would be admitted in H-1B or L status. This allows the H-1B beneficiary to travel abroad while simultaneously preserving the AOS when both the H-1B and AOS are pending.

There is an inherent vagueness as to whether the Cronin memo applies to derivatives since H-4s and L-2s are not mentioned in the memo in respect to this issue. One may however argue, through anecdotal experience, that the Cronin Memo should apply to H-4s and L-2s and therefore, the H-4/L-2 should be able to enter the United States in AP and be able to switch to H-4/L-2 status once the H-4/L-2 extension is approved.

Preserving Adjustment of Status When Advanced Parole and H-4 are Pending 

What happens when an H-4 has a pending AOS and has not received AP or H-4 approval but wants to travel based on an emergency? This issue is two-fold and is specifically applicable to those whose prior H-4/L-2 statuses have expired and have timely filed their extensions but still await processing. As mentioned before in our prior blog, although the H-4 can get a visa stamp at a US consulate, the AOS may be deemed abandoned if the H-4 left the US without H-4 status or AP.

In this scenario, the only recourse for the H-4 is to apply for an emergency AP by calling the USCIS 800 number to schedule an appointment with the local USCIS office, however, it is not definite that one will be able to connect to a live-person, let alone convince the USCIS that the emergency qualifies for expeditious AP processing.

Does an L-2 Spouse Need an EAD?  

Out of the many downfalls of the H-4/L-2 processing delays, one of the most significant is the Employment Authorization Document (EAD) processing gaps afflicting families around the nation. At large, this issue has subjected many spouses and their families to financial struggle, and it remains a leading issue that the USCIS and the Biden administration must immediately resolve. The hardship is compounded by the fact that there are delays in the processing of the EAD under both the AOS and the H-4/L-2.  Nonetheless, there may be an arguable legal basis for an L-2 spouse to engage in employment without obtaining an EAD.

In the Matter of Do Kyung Lee, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that employment authorization is incident to E-2 status. INA 214(e)(6) explicitly states that an E-2 spouse shall be authorized to engage in employment.  In this unpublished  decision, the BIA reasoned that the regulation at 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(2) only specified that the dependent spouse and child of an E-1 visa holder must apply for work authorization, but the same regulation did not specifically state that the spouse of an E-2 must do the same. The Court held that since INA 214(e)(6) specifically authorized the E-2 spouse to engage in employment, the E-2 spouse’s failure to apply for an EAD did not result in a violation of status. Based on the reasoning of this BIA decision, the same logic can be applied to L-2 spouses since INA 214(c)(2)(E) explicitly authorizes L-2 spouses to engage in employment. The regulations at 8 CFR 274a.12 do not have a specific category for L-2 spouses, and USCIS requires L-2 spouses to use the catchall reserved provision under 8 CFR 274a.12(a)(18).

Nevertheless, this is still a gray area and E-2 and L-2 spouses are therefore still recommended to apply for an EAD. Even if the reasoning of this unpublished BIA decision is accepted by the USCIS, a lack of EAD could potentially trigger I-9 noncompliance issues with respect to the employer as ICE may not recognize the holding of an unpublished BIA decision.

The reasoning of this BIA decision is not appliable to H-4 spouses as there is no explicit INA provision that specifically authorizes H-4 spouses to engage in employment. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Obama administration specifically created a regulation which authorizes EAD for an H-4 under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(26), based on implied authority in the INA to issue work authorization to any class of noncitizens. The Trump administration tried to unsuccessfully rescind the rule as it was hostile towards H-4 EADs, but could not get it past the Office of Management and Budget. The Trump administration then imposed the biometric requirement for every I-539 extension, which in turn delayed the grant of the H-4 EAD. The pandemic that followed in March 2020 caused further delays and backlogs.

Conclusion

We reiterate our request that the Biden administration remove the biometric requirement imposed by the prior Trump administration when an I-539 application is filed. The justification by the Trump administration, as revealed in a recent WSJ article, that the biometric requirement was necessary so that dependents did not misrepresent themselves is spurious. Until 2019, there was never a biometric requirement when dependents filed I-539s, and there were no widespread incidents of such misrepresentations. Many of these dependents were already vetted when they obtained H-4 and L-2 visa stamps at US consulates. Moreover, subjecting infants and toddlers seeking H-4 and L-2 extensions to this is downright cruel. Eliminating this unnecessary biometric requirement will go a long way in eliminating the delays facing H-2 and L-2 spouses as they can then be processed under the premium processing request filed through the principal spouse’s H-1B or L-1 petition. The DHS should also initiate premium processing for EAD requests since Congress authorized additional premium processing last year. Finally, since INA 214(c)(2)(E) explicitly authorizes an L-2 spouse to engage in employment, what is the need to require the L-2 spouse to go through the lengthy process of applying for an EAD? Under the logic of the BIA decision in Do Kyung Lee, an E-2 or L-2 spouse who engages in employment without an EAD will not be viewed as engaging in unauthorized employment. Therefore, even if the Biden administration cannot speed up EAD processing quickly, it can officially pronounce that L-2 and E-2 spouses need not obtain an EAD.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

* Isabel Rajabzadeh is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC and is admitted to practice law in New York.