Tag Archive for: Deportation

Challenging the Foreign Policy Ground of Removability in Defense of  Free Speech and the Rights of Green Card Holders

By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On March 8, 2025, DHS arrested Mahmoud Khalil, a Columbia University graduate and Palestinian activist, and purportedly revoked his green card. Khalil was detained under INA 237(a)(4)(C)(i) that provides for the deportation of a noncitizen if the Secretary of State has determined that their presence or activities would have adverse policy consequences. The Notice to Appear (NTA) issued to Khalil was sloppily drafted; clause 3 is particularly disjointed and includes a reference to a noncitizen who “was admitted to the United States at unknown place on or about unknown date as a unknown manner”, language wholly inapplicable to Khalil. Moreover clause 3 also states that he adjusted his status to permanent residence under INA 212(a)(3)(C), which makes no sense. There is no basis to adjust status to permanent residence under  INA 212(a)(3)(C). 

Clause 4 of the NTA invokes INA 237(a)(4)(C)(i) that provides for the deportation of a noncitizen if the Secretary of State has determined that their presence or activities would have adverse policy consequences. Facially, INA 237(a)(4)(C)(i) renders it difficult for a respondent to challenge a negative determination. Although the government must prove through clear and convincing evidence that a green card holder is deportable, the Secretary’s determination meets that heavy burden based on a 1999 BIA precedent, Matter of Ruiz-Massieu

The statute may nonetheless provide Khalil some hope for challenging his detention and removal. INA 237(a)(4)(C)(ii) contains a freedom of speech and association safe harbor incorporated by reference to the inadmissibility provisions at INA 212(a)(3)(C)(iii) prohibiting deportation “because of the alien’s past, current, or expected beliefs, statements or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations would be lawful”.  In order to invoke an exception for the safe harbor protection, the Secretary of State must “personally determine[e] that the alien’s presence would compromise a compelling US foreign policy interest.” According to an AILA Advisory, in drafting this provision, Congress replaced the phrase “seriously adverse” with “compelling”, and required the government to prove an actual compromise to U.S. foreign policy rather than merely “potential” compromise, thereby establishing a stricter standard. In a conference report issued at the law was passed, Congress explained how this standard should be applied to protected speech: 

“It is the intent of the conference committee that this authority would be used sparingly and not merely because there is a likelihood that an alien will make critical remarks about the United States or its policies. … Furthermore, the conferees intend that the “compelling foreign policy interest” standard be interpreted as a significantly higher standard than the general “potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences standard.”

Congress considered examples that might meet the “compelling” standard, such as when a noncitizen’s presence would violate a treaty or international agreement that the United States is a party to or the admission of the former Shah of Iran into the U.S. for medical treatment in 1979, which sparked the Iranian Hostage Crisis, according to the AILA Advisory. 

As yet, Khalil does not stand accused of having engaged in unlawful activities (See Arulanantham and Cox, March 12, 2025, Justsecurity.org). There is thus a chance that he could avail of the safe harbor provision. However, Secretary Rubio’s letter asserting that Khalil’s presence would compromise a compelling US foreign policy interest has not yet been made public (if at all there is such a letter) as of the date of this blog, and there is similarly no evidence that Rubio notified his determination to the chairmen of the Judiciary and Foreign Affairs Committees of the House and to the Judiciary and Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate under INA 212(a)(3)(C)(iv). If Rubio issued this letter after March 9, the date when the NTA was served, this oversight could potentially provide a basis for termination of the removal proceedings with prejudice, along with the sloppily drafted clause #3 in the NTA.  Moreover, letter of the Secretary of State in Matter of Ruiz-Massieu was quite detailed. If there is a letter from Rubio that was hastily written and flimsy, this too could be the basis of a challenge that it does not meet the “compelling” standard. 

Because Khalil is a green card holder, he also has a strong basis to distinguish his case from Matter of Ruiz-Massieu. Ruiz-Massieu, a Mexican official, entered the US as a temporary visitor and was apprehended a day after he arrived based on accusations of corruption. Khalil, meanwhile, is a lawful permanent resident who engaged in constitutionally protected speech. Perhaps, a courageous Immigration Judge (IJ) will be persuaded by this argument distinguishing Khalil’s case from Ruiz-Massieu and terminate the removal proceedings. Even if the IJ denies, Khalil can appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, where he will probably also lose, and then to the Court of Appeals. If his hearing is in Louisiana, the 5th Circuit will not be as friendly as the Second Circuit, assuming he can successfully transfer to New York if his habeas petition in the Southern District of New York prevails.

Khalil has a very good chance of constitutionally attacking INA 237(a)(4)(C) in a court of appeals on grounds that it violates his First Amendment rights as an LPR as established by the Supreme Court in Bridges v. Wixon, and is also void for vagueness. A federal district court has also found the statute unconstitutional (the judge Maryanne Trump Barry who made the ruling was none other than Trump’s late sister) in 1996 in Ruiz Massieu v. Reno. The court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it impermissibly vague, deprives noncitizens of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and represents an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the executive, stating that the provision: “represents a breathtaking departure both from well established legislative precedent which commands deportation based on adjudications of defined impermissible conduct by the alien in the United States, and from well established precedent with respect to extradition which commands extradition based on adjudications of probable cause to believe that the alien has engaged in defined impermissible conduct elsewhere.” The court’s holding was later reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on other grounds.  If the Trump administration prevails, who is to stop them from using it, for example, against a noncitizen who promotes green technology because if undermines the policy objective of promoting fossil fuels of this administration? 

While Khalil has an uphill climb, he does have opportunities for challenging his deportation in Immigration Court first, the Court of Appeals, and even in the Supreme Court. The robust dissent of BIA members Rosenberg and Schmidt will also provide ammunition to attack the statute in the Court of Appeals. The dissent disagreed with the majority’s position that the Secretary of State’s letter alone “was conclusive and dispositive on the issue of deportability, and that the Immigration Judge erred in requiring the Service to provide something more than the Secretary’s letter to satisfy its burden of proving, according to the language of the statute, that ‘the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe [that the respondent’s presence] would have potentially serious adverse policy consequences.’” Board Members Rosenberg and Schmidt instead argue in the dissent that the decision of the IJ should be adopted, which held that “the plain language of section 241(a)(4)(C)(i) [predecessor to INA 237(a)(4)(C)] requires that the Service prove (1) the Secretary’s belief; (2) the Secretary’s concern regarding the respondent’s presence in this country; and (3) the ‘reasonable ground to believe’ that the respondent’s presence would have serious adverse foreign policy consequences.”

It is important that Khalil  successfully challenges the deportation ground against him in order to uphold the right to free speech and the rights of green card holders to express them without fear. Even if one does not agree with the speech, and finds it repugnant, so long as the speech is lawful,  the government should not have the power to retaliate by detaining and deporting a noncitizen. If the government has the power to retaliate against noncitizizen green card holders, even US citizens will no longer be immune from similar retaliation. 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Partner at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

A version of this post was published on LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lets-fight-uphold-our-rights-free-speech-green-card-holders-mehta-ngede/?trackingId=RzyvcsXtR6C56C5VSuOWMw%3D%3D

 

Obama’s Paradoxical Deportation Policies

President Obama has been called the Deporter in Chief as he has presided over nearly 2 million deportations during his presidency – higher than that of any other President. On the other hand, President Obama has also rolled out some of the most innovative prosecutorial discretion policies, which include granting deferred action to hundreds of thousand immigrants who came to the United States when they were young.

A revealing article in the Los Angeles Times shows that the high number of deportations is largely misleading. The likelihood of an undocumented individual already in the United States who has developed ties being deported has lessened considerably under President Obama. Even people with removal orders can seek a stay of removal if they establish that they are deserving of prosecutorial discretion under the Morton June 17, 2011 Memo.  Young immigrants who arrived in the United States prior to the age of 16 and who meet other conditions can apply for deferred action, along with work authorization, under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.

The people who are being deported, and are part of the increased statistics, are those who recently crossed the border without inspection and are apprehended within 100 miles from the border. Under previous administrations, such people were informally bused back outside the United States in what was known as “voluntary returns.” Under the Obama administration, these people are fingerprinted and issued formal deportation orders. INA section 235(b)(1), which was enacted by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, granted authority to expeditiously remove persons at the border who are deemed inadmissible under INA sections 212(a)(6)(C) for making a material misrepresentation or 212(a)(7) for not possessing valid visa documents. On August 11, 2004, DHS promulgated a rule to expand expedited removal to persons who are present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled and who are apprehended within 100 miles from the southern border and who also cannot prove that they were physically present in the country continuously for the preceding 14 days. This rule was expanded to all borders on January 30, 2006.

This is not to suggest that the increased use of expedited removal to recent border crossers does not have devastating effects and should not be remedied through immigration reform measures, since many of these crossers are entering the United States to join family members. Still, it is the expanded use of expedited removal that has resulted in an increase of deportations, when under prior administrations, such persons were informally returned from the United States without terming them as deportations. Once a recent border crosser is expeditiously removed, a reentry into the United States also carries severe criminal penalties unlike a ‘voluntary return.” On the other hand, a person who has been in the United States for a longer period is less likely be placed in the removal proceedings, and even if this person is issued a Notice to Appear before an Immigration Judge, he or she can have a shot at requesting prosecutorial discretion under President Obama’s administration than before, which will result in either administrative closure or termination of the case. Unfortunately, the majority of people who came to the attention of the immigration enforcement authorities within the interior, resulting in deportation proceedings,  are those who got arrested for minor offenses.

As an aside and consistent with the topic of this article, there are instances when it can be more beneficial for a person to be placed in removal proceedings than not. Pursuant to INA section 240A(b), an individual who meets 10 years of physical presence, good moral character for this entire period and can demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to qualifying relatives who are either citizens or permanent residents can obtain cancellation of removal, leading to lawful permanent resident status. The hardship standard is extremely high and needs to be substantially beyond the hardship that would ordinarily be expected to result from the alien’s deportation, as demonstrated in cases such as Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 53 (BIA 2001); Matter of Andazola, 23 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2002) where cancellation was denied; and Matter of Recinas, 23 I&N  Dec. 467 (BIA 2002) where it was granted. Another advantage of being in removal proceedings is to escape the 3 year bar based on unlawful presence of more than 180 days but less than 1 year pursuant to INA section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). Departing the United States under a grant of voluntary departure, which is issued prior to the alien accruing 1 year of unlawful presence, and after the commencement of proceedings, may allow this alien to reenter the United States without being subject to the 3-year bar. Finally, another tactical advantage to being placed in removal proceedings is when an application for adjustment of status is denied, and the best way to get a second chance is to have an Immigration Judge review the adjustment application de novo in proceedings. The irony is that ICE is often  reluctant to put a person under these circumstances in removal proceedings because it is does not have the resources, and is also of the view that as an enforcement agency,  it is contrary to the agency’s mission to place someone in removal so that he or she can ultimately secure an immigration benefit.  One note of caution is that those who came into the United States on a visa waiver should not consider requesting a removal proceeding as they have waived their right to a removal hearing under INA section 217(b).

President Obama used the increased deportation statistics to show that he was enforcing the law, but this has backfired among his critics. Those who favor stricter enforcement are not satisfied with the record increase in deportations by pointing to the Administration’s expanded prosecutorial discretion policies that has resulted in the deferring of thousands of deportations. Enforcement advocates in Congress use the President’s expanded prosecutorial discretion policies, while conveniently ignoring the spike in deportations, as an excuse to delay immigration reform and cooperating with the President.  At the same time, immigration advocates and allies have criticized President Obama for increasing deportations without truly bringing about genuine immigration reform. After the passage of the S. 744, the Senate’s immigration reform bill last year, there is now a stalemate where the prospects of immigration reform in the House have almost evaporated despite unanimous agreement that the immigration system is broken.

If President Obama desires to cement his legacy with respect to immigration reform, he may not be able to achieve it through this Congress. In the past, President Obama has indicated that he does not have the authority to further expand prosecutorial discretion, but this may have to change. The only way for the President to fulfill the promise he has made to so many who voted for him is to go about it on his own through administrative policy changes. The Executive branch can expand deferred action to a broader group of people, which could include family members of DACA recipients and those who have US citizen children. The prosecutorial discretion guidelines under the Morton Memo ought to be further strengthened to ensure that they are not ignored by ICE officials, as many are wont to do. The parole in place policy for relatives of military personnel can be expanded to benefit those who are on the pathway to permanent residency if they are beneficiaries of employment and family immigrant visa petitions. In an eloquent New York Times editorial entitled Yes He Can, On Immigration, the following is worth extracting:

Mr. Obama may argue that he can’t be too aggressive in halting deportations because that will make the Republicans go crazy, and there’s always hope for a legislative solution. He has often seemed like a bystander to the immigration stalemate, watching the wheels spin, giving speeches and hoping for the best.

It’s hard to know when he will finally stir himself to do something big and consequential.

The President must no longer fear doing something big and consequential on the immigration front. Some may justifiably fear that if the President ameliorates the plight of undocumented people through administrative reform measures, another President can quickly undo them; and therefore it is best for Congress to enact immigration reform. Administrative remedies are clearly no substitute for comprehensive immigration reform passed through Congress, but it would be hard for a future President to undo wise administrative reform measures that provide a fix to a broken immigration system. For example, DACA benefits have already been granted to hundreds of thousands of young immigrants who have been able to graduate from college and find jobs. It would be politically imprudent for a future President to undo DACA. Indeed, S. 744, the bipartisan reform bill that was passed by the Senate, incorporates DACA and places DACA recipients on a faster track to permanent residency. If President Obama implements bold administrative measures, it would be difficult for a future administration to undo them, and it is likely that a future Congress will have no choice but to readily adopt them into law.

Can Piers Morgan Be Deported for His Comments on Gun Control?

At the time of writing this blog, more than 48,000 people have signed a petition on the White House website asking that CNN talk show host be deported for his comments on gun control in the wake of the mass shootings at Sandy Hook school.

According to one of the two petitions, “We demand that Mr. Morgan be deported immediately for his effort to undermine the Bill of Rights and for exploiting his position as a national network television host to stage attacks against the rights of American citizens.”

The White House is obligated to respond if the petition gathers 25,000 signatures within 30 days. Mr. Morgan, a British citizen, is not a citizen of the United States. Non-citizens can be deported from the US for a number of immigration offenses, but can Mr. Morgan’s strident comments favoring gun control truly lead to his deportation?

Not really, based on a quick analysis of some of the relevant provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Mr. Morgan certainly doesn’t seem to be seeking “the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the Government of the United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means,” and so he is clearly not deportable under INA 237(a)(4)(A)(iii).  Nor is he one who “endorses or espouses terrorist activity”, under INA 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII), and so he’s not inadmissible under that broad provision.  And there’s no reason to think that opposition to the Second Amendment would have serious adverse foreign policy consequences. Indeed, it is more likely the reverse given the international outrage against proponents of gun ownership, especially the ownership of automatic assault weapon, that led to the killings of 20 defenseless children and 6 others. So INA 212(a)(3)(C) does not apply.

Mr. Morgan has nothing to fear, if he indeed fears being deported from the United States, and the petitioners are truly wasting their time and losing more and more credibility  in the wake of an increasing number of gun related deaths. While the United States is clearly not the envy of the world with regard to its obsession for gun ownership that results in more homicides than most other nations, it can at least boast of freedom of speech enshrined in the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights. Anyone, citizen or non-citizen, whether within or outside the US, has the right to peacefully advocate for a change to the US Constitution, including a re-evaluation of the Second Amendment that forms the basis for people to easily own guns, including assault weapons that lead to the tragic and senseless slaughter of innocents.