Tag Archive for: DACA

Cyrus Mehta

SEC v. Jarkesy and Loper Bright v. Raimondo: How the Supreme Court’s Dismantling of the Administrative State Impacts Immigration Law

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

The conservative majority Supreme Court recently issued two decisions that will have a major impact on the administrative state by transferring power from administrative agencies to the courts. We discuss both these cases and their impact on immigration law.

SEC v. Jarkesy

On June 27, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy. As discussed in our previous blog, Jarkesy involved an investment advisor who was charged with violations of securities law and challenged the SEC’s enforcement action on the grounds that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial, that “Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the SEC by failing to provide it with an intelligible principle by which to exercise the delegated power”, and that restrictions on the removal of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) violate Article II. It was feared that the outcome of Jarkesy could significantly impact the immigration court system, as the authority of Immigration Judges (IJs) could be challenged using the same arguments advanced by Jarkesy.

The Supreme Court ultimately held that defendants are entitled to jury trials when the SEC seeks civil penalties against them for securities fraud. However, this holding appears unlikely to impede the ability of IJs to hear cases. In its opinion, the Supreme Court addressed concerns that its holding could reach beyond SEC administrative enforcement proceedings that replicate common law fraud. Citing Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (1909), a case that involved the imposi­tion of a monetary penalty on a steamship company accused of transporting immigrants afflicted with “loathsome or dangerous contagious diseases” to the United States, the Supreme Court clarified that Congress has the power to regulate immigration and even impose monetary fines for violations without triggering the right to a jury trial under the plenary power doctrine. Justice Robert’s majority opinion cited this case as on of the category of cases concerning public rights, including immigration law, which do not include a jury trial.  This discussion seems to exclude most, if not all, immigration-related matters from the Supreme Court’s holding in Jarkesy. On the other hand, one provision resembling common law fraud is the document fraud provision at INA 274C. An individual who is subject to an INA 274C hearing before an ALJ may wish to try to invoke Jarkesy to invalidate the hearing because it is a violation of their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Similarly, if there is an discrimination hearing under INA 274B based on an employee’s complaint, an employer may seek to invoke its right to a jury trial.

Since the Supreme Court did not review an appointments clause violation involving an ALJ, Jarkesy may not have impacted the Space X and Walmart lawsuits that have thus far successfully invalidate proceedings before the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, which handles cases involving unfair employment practices, document fraud and noncompliance record keeping requirements. These will be dealt with at a later time in another case.

Although Jarkesy only struck down as unconstitutional the lack of a civil jury trial for civil penalties under securities law, Justice Sotomayor in her dissent identified at least two dozen agencies that impose civil penalties in administrative proceedings including CFPB, CFTC, EPA, FCC, FDA, FMC, FMSHRC, FRA, DOJ, DOT, FERC, HHS, HUD, MSPB, OSHA, Treasury, USDA, and USPS.

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimando

Another recent Supreme Court decision may, on the other hand, have wide reaching impacts on immigration. In its June 28, 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court abolished the long-standing Chevron doctrine.  Under this doctrine, courts were required to defer to the government agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, stated that “Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires”, but made clear that prior cases decided under the Chevron framework are not automatically overruled. It is likely that courts will revert to Skidmore deference, the lower-level framework that preceded Chevron, which asserts that the level of deference an agency’s decision merits depends on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 (1944).

In a previous blog, we discussed the possible impacts of the elimination of Chevron deference, including the idea that it may open the door for challenges to a number of unfavorable immigration policies. For example, 20 CFR 656, which requires employers to place outdated print advertisements in Sunday newspapers as part of the labor certification recruitment process could now be vulnerable to challenges. INA §212(a)(5) states only that a noncitizen is deemed “inadmissible unless the Secretary of Labor” certifies, inter alia, that “there are not sufficient [U.S.] workers who are able, willing, qualified…and available at the time of application”, and imposes no requirement on employers to conduct recruitment to establish a lack of U.S. workers. Post Chevron deference, courts may be more reluctant to defer to DOL’s interpretation of INA § 212(a)(5) as set forth in 20 CFR 656, which requires compliance with onerous recruitment steps including the placement of print ads. Moreover, the Supreme Court also issued Corner Post v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System further widening the window to challenge regulations beyond the 6-year statute of limitations until the plaintiff is injured b final agency action.

USCIS’ “final merits determination”, the second component of a two-part test for determining whether an applicant has satisfied the criteria for extraordinary ability, outstanding researcher and professor, and exceptional ability immigrant visa petitions may now be more ripe for legal challenges, as well. This requirement arose from USCIS’ interpretation of dicta referencing a “final merits determination” in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Kazarian does not actually impose a final merits determination, nor does this requirement appear anywhere in the relevant regulatory criteria. It may now be possible to attack unfavorable interpretations such as the  BIA’s restrictive definition of “particular social group” under Matter of M-E-V-G , or the BIA’s narrow interpretation of INA §203(h)(3) under Matter of Wang, which precludes many derivative beneficiaries of visa petitions who did not get protection under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) from retaining their parents’ priority dates. The Supreme Court affirmed Matter of Wang purely under Chevron deference in Scialabba v. Osorio.

On the other hand, the future of other, beneficial immigration policies is rendered uncertain without Chevron deference. F-1 OPT is an exercise of DHS’ discretion and not explicitly authorized by statute. F-1 OPT has already been challenged, and was upheld by the First Circuit in 2022 in WashTech v. U.S. under Chevron deference. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a discretionary benefit that has been the subject of numerous legal challenges, could also be vulnerable without Chevron. Even if Chevron no longer helps, there is a statutory basis for the USCIS to issue work authorization to noncitizens under INA § 274A(h)(3) and to set time and other conditions for nonimmigrants under INA § 214(a)(1).

The demise of Chevron also brings about the fall of Brand X. As discussed in our prior blog, the Supreme Court in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) held that an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute may still be afforded deference even if a circuit court has interpreted the statute in a conflicting way. Brand X has been a double edged sword – although allowed agencies to interpret statutes in a way that was detrimental to immigration, it also allowed for the possibility of creative beneficial interpretations notwithstanding contradictory circuit court precedent. Brand X could have been harnessed to allow derivative family members to be counted together with principal applicants in the employment-based (EB) and family based (FB) visa preference categories under INA § 203(d), as the plain text of §203(d) does not require separate counting of derivatives. Although Wang v. Blinken, No. 20-5076 (D.C. Cir. 2021) held that derivative family members must be counted separately in the EB-5 context, Brand X could have allowed an immigrant-friendly presidential administration to issue a policy memorandum overruling the case everywhere else.

Brand X has  also been employed to the detriment of immigrants. In his concurrence in Loper Bright v. Raimondo, Justice Gorsuch pointed to De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1165 (CA10 2015), in which the BIA had invoked Chevron to “overrule a judicial precedent on which many immigrants had relied” in the 10th Circuit. That precedent was Padilla–Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F. 3d 1294 (CA10 2005), which held that a noncitizen subject to the permanent bar could nonetheless adjust pursuant to INA § 245(i). According to Justice Gorsuch, who clearly dislikes Brand X:

“The agency then sought to apply its new interpretation retroactively to punish those immigrants—including Alfonzo De Niz Robles, who had relied on that judicial precedent as authority to remain in this country with his U. S. wife and four children…Our court ruled that this retrospective application of the BIA’s new interpretation of the law violated Mr. De Niz Robles’s due process rights…But as a lower court, we could treat only the symptom, not the disease. So Chevron permitted the agency going forward to overrule a judicial decision about the best reading of the law with its own different ‘reasonable’ one and in that way deny relief to countless future immigrants.”

Its problematic aspects aside, Brand X was a tool for reversing unfavorable circuit court decisions, but has now fallen along with Chevron. In Matter of F-P-R-, 24 I&N Dec. 681 (BIA 2008), for example, the BIA declined to follow the Second Circuit’s decision in Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172 (2d Cir 2006), and held that the one-year period in which a timely application for asylum may be made runs from the applicant’s literal “last arrival” even when that last arrival followed a relatively brief trip outside the United States pursuant to advance parole granted by immigration authorities (which the Second Circuit had held would not restart the one-year clock). Also  in Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012) (regarding travel on advance parole by one who has accrued unlawful presence) that could be read as pointing in this direction, the BIA in Arrabally made much of the fact that it was addressing an aspect of the law that the petitioner in the Third Circuit’s previous decision in Cheruku v. Att’y Gen., 662 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2011), had not challenged, see Matter of Arrabally, 25 I&N Dec. at 775 n.6. With the fall of Chevron, Arrabally might also be vulnerable although it remains to be seen whether a state or organization, which tries to challenge Arrabally  and other immigration policies may get standing to sue. In United States v.  Texas, the Supreme Court held that Texas and Louisiana had no standing to challenge the Biden administration’s enforcement priorities. Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh said: “The States have brought an extraordinarily unusual lawsuit. They want a federal court to order the Executive Branch to alter its arrest policies so as to make more arrests. Federal courts have not traditionally entertained that kind of lawsuit; indeed, the States cite no precedent for a lawsuit like this.” In the face of United States v. Texas, it could be harder for states to argue that they have standing to challenge Arrabally or other policies.

While many are fearing that the undoing of Chevron will unleash an environmental, consumer, food and drug safety free for all, AILA is viewing the decision in a more positive light. AILA’s president Kelly Stump responded to Loper Bright as follows:

“The Loper Bright and Relentless cases had nothing to do with immigration law and policy, but SCOTUS overturning the longstanding Chevron doctrine will have a significant impact on many immigration adjudications. This now means that an agency’s interpretation of the INA doesn’t automatically prevail, which could level the playing field for immigrants and their families and employers. In removal cases, those seeking review of immigration judges’ or Board of Immigration Appeals decisions should now have more opportunity to do so. Employers seeking to obtain a favorable interpretation of a statute granting H-1B or L visa classification to a noncitizen worker may also benefit. We note possible negative consequences as well, as the decision has severely handicapped the executive branch’s power to modernize our immigration system through policy updates or regulations. Valuable immigration benefits created by regulations may be threatened if not clearly based on statutory language. With this ruling, SCOTUS is punting the rule making process back to Congress. We hope Congress takes the initiative to come together in a bipartisan fashion to legislate sensible solutions that make our immigration system reflective of our modern-day realities.”

Notwithstanding Stump’s upbeat view, not everybody will benefit from the fall of Chevron. The most vulnerable being DACA recipients whose cases is being heard at the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Stump too acknowledges that “valuable immigration benefits created by regulations may be threatened if not clearly based in statutory language. “ If the Fifth Circuit and then the Supreme Court find DACA unlawful, Congress will need to step in to save DACA recipients. This remains wishful thinking as Congress has never been able to pass meaningful immigration reform in recent times. Chevron provided the bulwark for an immigrant friendly administration to pass meaningful immigration reform through executive action  thus providing ameliorative relief to hundreds of thousands of nonimmigrants. Some programs involving parole have a statutory basis under INA 212(d)(5) and will continue but other programs without explicit statutory language may be susceptible to challenge.  Without Chevron and Congress stepping up, the rug has been pulled under the feet of vulnerable noncitizens.

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Cyrus Mehta

The Uncertain Path of the D-3 Waiver for DACA Recipients under Biden’s New Immigration Initiative  

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On June 18, 2024, the Biden administration announced two new immigration initiatives aimed at keeping families together. The first is a “parole in place” program which will provide a pathway for undocumented spouses of U.S. citizens to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs). In order to be eligible, the noncitizen spouse must have entered the U.S. without admission or parole and hold no immigrant or nonimmigrant status, and “must – as of June 17, 2024 – have resided in the United States for 10 or more years and be legally married to a U.S. citizen, while satisfying all applicable legal requirements.” DHS will evaluate these applications on a case-by-case basis, and will afford approved applicants a three-year period in which to apply for permanent residence.

The other process will enable Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients to more easily obtain employment-based visas. The measure will allow “DACA recipients and other Dreamers, who have earned a degree at an accredited U.S. institution of higher education in the United States, and who have received an offer of employment from a U.S. employer in a field related to their degree, to more quickly receive work visas.” Although many details about this measure are still forthcoming, it appears to involve the expedited issuance of an INA § 212(d)(3) waiver (D-3), which waives many grounds of inadmissibility, including the 3 and 10 year bars that arise from unlawful presence. In a news release corresponding with the Biden administration’s announcement, the U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs stated: “As part of this initiative, the Department will clarify existing guidance to consular officers related to when they should consider recommending that DHS grant a waiver of ineligibility, where applicable… These clarifications will describe when consular officers should consider recommending that the Department of Homeland Security waive ineligibility for these applicants on an expedited basis, in conjunction with visa applications overseas.  However, the processing steps will remain the same.” The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) will also be updated to “encourage consular officers to consider recommending expedited review of waiver requests in conjunction with certain nonimmigrant visa applications overseas, consistent with existing Department regulations and guidance…This will result in certain individuals to potentially more quickly receive work visas if DHS approves a waiver of ineligibility.”

Although DACA recipients can at present apply for a D-3 waiver in order to obtain an employment-based nonimmigrant visa, this process is rarely used in practice. When a DACA recipient who has been unlawfully present in the United States for a lengthy period of time leaves the United States to apply for an employment-based visa at a U.S. consulate abroad, they are likely to trigger the 3- or 10-year bars pursuant to INA § 212(a)(9)(B).Under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) a person who is unlawfully present for more than 180 days but less than 1 year, and who voluntarily departs the US prior to the commencement of proceeding is inadmissible if they seek admission within 3 years from the date of departure. Under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) a person who has been unlawfully present for more than one year, and who again seeks admission within 10 years from the date of the departure is inadmissible.

Minors do not accrue unlawful presence under INA§ 212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I), so a DACA recipient who applied for and received DACA before the age of 18.5 years would not trigger the 3- or 10- year bars. Since the grant of DACA stops the accrual of unlawful presence, they would have accrued less than 180 days of unlawful presence. An individual who obtained DACA after the age of 18.5 years and before 19 would trigger only the 3- year bar, having accrued more than 180 days but less than one year of unlawful presence. DACA recipients who obtained the benefit after the age of 19 would have been unlawfully present in the U.S. for a year or more, and would face the 10-year bar. Individuals could enroll in the DACA program up until they reach age 31, and participation in the program was  highest among those who were well over 18, so many DACA recipients will unfortunately face the full 10-year bar.

The question of whether or not the waiver will be granted is also a purely discretionary determination made by a consular officer, and the waiver application can take months to be adjudicated. The Foreign Affairs Manual directs consular officers to “consider the following factors, among others, when deciding whether to recommend a waiver: The recency and seriousness of the activity or condition causing the applicant’s ineligibility; The reasons for the proposed travel to the United States; and The positive or negative effect, if any, of the planned travel on U.S. public interests. Whether there is a single, isolated incident or a pattern of misconduct; and Evidence of reformation or rehabilitation.”  Thus, DACA recipients, and their prospective employers, currently have little assurance that a D-3 waiver will be granted when they leave the country for consular processing. If the waiver is not granted, the DACA recipient could be stranded outside the U.S. for up to 10 years.

Importantly, an individual can typically only spend a limited amount of time in an employment-based nonimmigrant status – for an H-1B nonimmigrant the maximum is 6 years – so DACA recipients who obtain an employment-based visa such as an H-1B will also need to find a path to remain in the U.S. on a long-term basis, including being sponsored for permanent residence by their employer. Even if the DACA recipient has received the D-3 waiver, this waiver only waives the ground of inadmissibility for the temporary nonimmigrant admission. If the DACA recipient is sponsored for permanent residence, the bars at INA § 212(a)(9)(B) will continue to trigger if the applicant applies for adjustment of status or applies for an immigrant visa overseas. Hence, they will need to wait for 3 or 10 years before they can get admitted as lawful permanent residents. Under USCIS policy, the 3 and 10 year bars can be spent in the US, which we have extensively discussed in a prior blog. The question is how can one wait for 10 years in lawful nonimmigrant status in the US before they can apply for adjustment of status?

Many DACA recipients are natives and citizens of Mexico or South American countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, or El Salvador, so they are likely to be eligible to file an employment-based adjustment of status application much more quickly than a beneficiary from a backlogged country such as India or China. In the June 2024 Visa Bulletin, for example, the Final Action Date for the employment-based third preference category (EB-3) is November 22, 2022 for India and the “rest of world”, but for India it is August 22, 2012. However, §104(c)  the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21)  allows a beneficiary’s H-1B status to be extended for three years at a time if they are the beneficiary of an employment-based I-140 immigrant visa petition, and are eligible to adjust status but for backlogs, caused by per-country limitations, in the employment-based first (EB-1), second (EB-2), or third preference (EB-3) categories. The H-1B status can be extended every three years until the backlogs caused by the per country limitation clears.  Because the priority date is likely to become current far more quickly for former DACA recipient not born in India who are the beneficiaries of I-140 petitions, they will be at a disadvantage when it comes to obtaining H-1B extensions beyond the sixth year, as they need to spend 10 years in the US before they can overcome the 212(a)(9)(B) ground of inadmissibility, which could complicate the process of remaining in a valid nonimmigrant status while they wait to apply for adjustment of status. An H-1B worker can also obtain a one year H-1B extension under AC21 §106(a) if at least 365 days have elapsed since the filing of a labor certification with the DOL or an immigrant visa petition with USCIS. See 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D). However, noncitizens are precluded from availing of this extension if they do not file for adjustment of status within one year of visa availability. 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D)(10). DACA recipients waiting to overcome 212(a)(9)(B) inadmissibility are thus unlikely to benefit from this provision.

Some DACA recipients may opt for the L-1 nonimmigrant path if they spend one year abroad for a subsidiary, parent, or branch of their US employer in a qualifying executive, managerial or specialized knowledge capacity. However, beware, that unlike one in H-1B status who may be able to keep on applying for extensions under AC 21, the shelf life of the L-1A status is 7 years, and 5 years for the L-1B status, as AC21 does not apply to L-1s. One way to get around spending 10 years in the US to overcome 212(a)(9)(B) inadmissibility is if the applicant is eligible for a waiver under INA §212(a)(b)(b)(v), which is based on a showing of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative such as a spouse or parent is a US citizen or lawful permanent resident. If an applicant has such a qualifying relative, they need not wait out the entire 10 years and can waive the ground of inadmissibility.

In conclusion, obtaining the D-3 waiver only allows the DACA recipient who faces the 3 or10 year bar to be admitted into the US as a nonimmigrant. If the DACA recipient needs to obtain permanent residence, they must either wait it out for 3 or 10 years in a nonimmigrant status before they can get admitted as permanent residents, or they need to qualify for a second waiver under INA 212(a)(b)(b)(v). Most DACA recipients may be better off remaining in DACA status rather than exchanging it for H-1B nonimmigrant status. Once they are in H-1B nonimmigrant status, they will have to remain with the employer who sponsored them and will not be able to seek employment in the open market so readily. Of course, the calculus of giving up DACA in exchange for the H-1B nonimmigrant status may change if the Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court deem DACA unlawful, or if President Trump is reelected and yanks DACA. It remains to be seen whether DACA could survive rescission efforts by a future Trump administration. When upholding DACA in 2020 in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, the Supreme Court found that the “reliance interests” of DACA recipients, who have enrolled in college, embarked on careers, started businesses, purchased homes, and married and had children in reliance on the DACA program, must be taken into consideration when deciding the future of the program. This case was discussed at length in a prior blog.

 

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Who Are the Undocumented Immigrants That Would Become Targets of Trump’s Deportation Army If He Got Reelected

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By Cyrus D. Mehta

If Trump gets reelected, he has hinted that his administration will create a deportation force that would deport 15 million undocumented immigrants. Radley Balko’s  newsletter on substack,  Trump’s Deportation Army,  provides chilling details on how this deportation would be executed, which would be an unmitigated disaster for families, the US economy and the standing of the United States.

“The Trump immigration plan would be the second largest forced displacement of human beings in human history, on par with Britain’s disastrous partition of India, and second only to total forced displacement during World War II, ” Balko states.

According to New York Times’s columnist Jamelle Bouie in  Trump’s Taste for Tyranny Finds a Target immigrants would be the most easy target for Trump to play out his autocratic fantasies. Trump has already said that undocumented immigrants are “poisoning the blood of this country.” The Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii allowed Trump to enforce his Muslim ban.

Stephen Miller, the architect of Trump’s anti-immigrant policies,  has stated on Charlie Kirk’s show how this deportation force would fulfill Trump’s fantasy. The  deportation force would comprise agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Border Patrol and other federal agencies, as well as the National Guard and local law enforcement officials. They would look all over the  country for unauthorized and undocumented immigrants moving from state to state, city to city, neighborhood to neighborhood and, finally, house to house. These are people who in the view of Trump and Miller do not belong, not that because are not authorized but because they are also nonwhite and who are from what Trump once called “shithole” countries. By raiding workplaces and staging public roundups, this deportation force would create a climate of fear and intimidation.

Mistakes are bound to happen as legal immigrants and even US citizens may get caught up in the roundups. There could not be any notion of selective enforcement in these roundups, and those caught up in them would be because they appeared to be immigrants. There would be mass racial and ethnic profiling. And by the time this gets sorted out it may be too late if the person already got deported.

Moreover, one thinks of an undocumented immigrants as a person who entered the United States without inspection or who came to the US legally on a visa and overstayed. However, the term is broader to encompass persons who were previously unauthorized and who have been authorized to stay such as recipients of the Deferred Action of Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, applicants for Temporary Protected Status (TPS),  those who have pending asylum applications and applications for other relief such as under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) or crime victim U visas. There are also those who are on supervised release or who have obtained stays of removal and eligible for employment authorization year after year. All these noncitizens would be lumped together as undocumented immigrants that would be red meat for Trump’s deportation force.

Since it would be beyond the capacity to quickly deport the people caught up in these roundups, especially since countries may not even be willing to accept them easily, there would be holding facilities that would serve as staging centers on land near the Texas border. This would not be too dissimilar from internment camps, which were set up in the United States to detain Japanese Americans after the attack by the Japanese military on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

In addition to the round ups, the second Trump administration would sign an executive order to withhold passports, social security numbers and other government benefits from  children born of undocumented immigrants in the United States never mind that the Fourteenth Amendment says the exact opposite. Under Trump’s deportation plan, there would be no distinction between undocumented immigrants and children born to an undocumented immigrant in the United States. If there are going to be protests and resistance from people against agents storming homes, schools and religious places, Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act to mobilize the miliary and crush the resisters as well as his political opponents.

According to Bouie, “what we are seeing here from Trump isn’t simply a distaste for liberal values; it is a taste for genuine tyranny and bona fide despotism, one that complements his endless praise for dictators and strongmen.” Trump has already likened immigrants to invaders, and he can invoke an emergency, and thus a constitutional crisis,  to go ahead with deportations without waiting for the courts to rule, and  when they do rule, Trump’s hope is that the courts will rule in his favor, especially the Supreme Court, which have historically given deference to the executive branch on matters involving national security. This has happened time and time again with respect to court challenges to the internment of Japanese Americans, against the unlawful detention and abuses of noncitizens after the September 11 attacks and most recently in allowing Trump’s travel ban to pass, which was a major part of his election campaign in 2016 to ban Muslims from coming to the US, and in this reelection campaign for 2024, Trump promises to create a tyrannical force to deport millions of immigrants.

On this Memorial Day, as we reflect upon the sacrifices our military personnel have made to free America and the world from fascism and tyranny, think about how Trump can so easily unravel all of this through a deportation force that rips families apart, tears lives and fractures America.

 

Cyrus Mehta

As Texas Has Been Smacked Down Twice for Lack of Standing in Challenges to Federal Immigration Policies, Biden Should Get Even Bolder in Reforming Our Immigration System Through Executive Actions

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On March 8, 2024, Judge Tipton in Texas v. DHS dismissed a lawsuit brought by Texas and 20 other states challenging President Biden’s humanitarian parole program. Judge Tipton, who was appointed by Trump,  has otherwise been receptive to challenges to Biden’s immigration policies but not this time. Texas filed the lawsuit in his court thinking that Judge Tipton would again issue a favorable decision but Judge Tipton held that Texas did not have standing to bring the lawsuit.

President Biden’s humanitarian parole program is a wonderful example of how executive action can reshape immigration policy in the face of Congressional inaction.  It allows people fleeing troubled spots to come to the US in an orderly manner. The program initially implemented for Ukrainian and Venezuelan nationals all0wed 30,000 qualifying nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela (CHNV) to be admitted to the United States every month for up to two years. These individuals will be eligible for work authorization, and must have a U.S. sponsor who agrees to provide them with financial support for the duration of the parole period.

In Texas v. DHS  the challengers asserted that the program exceeded the parole authority given to the administration under INA 212(d)(5) as it can be used ‘only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit’”. They also asserted that the program failed to include a notice and comment period and the program was arbitrary and capricious. Judge Tipton’s order did not address the merits because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate they had standing to bring the lawsuit.

Judge Tipton gave short shrift to Texas’s claim that the parole of CHNV nationals  would impose additional health care costs on the state or additional incarceration costs or an increase in education costs since the CHNV program has resulted in the decrease of migrants entering the US irregularly through the southern border. Judge Tipton also found that an increase in CHNV nationals seeking driver’s licenses would not impose additional costs on Texas, in fact the increased applications would result in a profit for Texas.  Prior to the CHNV program DHS released an average of 2,356 CHNV nationals per day but after the implementation of the program there were a total of 1,326 arrivals per day, which was a 44% reduction.

As a result, Texas was unable to show an “injury-in-fact” that the CHNV program increased the   costs on Texas. In fact, to the contrary, the CHNV parole program has reduced the total number of individuals from the four countries and Texas has spent less money after the implementation of the parole program. Texas counter argued that even if there are fewer apprehended CHNV nationals, the court should consider the money Texas would spend on CHNV nationals under the parole program. Judge Tipton emphasized that the court must consider the “actual injury – not the labels put on the injury” as otherwise plaintiffs will engage in “artful pleading” to make an end run around the standing requirement under Article III of the Constitution. To determine whether actual injury exists the raw numbers need to be looked at in context rather than in a vacuum. The CHNV program reduced the overall numbers of CHNV nationals that the United States admitted prior to the implementation of the program.

The CHNV program, which will continue for now,  has been a spectacular success thus far and is built on the US historically using parole to respond to immigration crises.  The CHNV parole program has “redirected many migrants away from risky journeys through Mexico into a lawful framework. By allowing sponsors to financially support beneficiaries, the programs have facilitated safe and orderly migration, reducing the strain on government resources,” according to the Cato report in the link.

Texas and the other states may appeal Judge Tipton’s decision, but this is the second time that Texas’s challenge has been smacked down due to lack of standing. Last June 2023 in United States v.  Texas, the Supreme Court in an 8-1 majority opinion rendered a blow to Texas and Louisiana in holding that they had no standing to challenge the Biden administration on federal immigration policy on enforcement priorities. Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh said, “The States have brought an extraordinarily unusual lawsuit. They want a federal court to order the Executive Branch to alter its arrest policies so as to make more arrests. Federal courts have not traditionally entertained that kind of lawsuit; indeed, the States cite no precedent for a lawsuit like this.”

Originally laid out in the 2021 Mayorkas Memo, this list of enforcement priorities would have allowed ICE to focus its efforts on the apprehension and removal of noncitizens who pose a threat to “national security, public safety, and border security”. The attorneys general of Texas and Louisiana swiftly challenged these enforcement priorities, arguing that ICE would be allowed to overlook noncitizens for whom detention was required, which would subject the citizens of these states to crime committed by noncitizens who should be in detention, and force the state to spend resources providing education and medical care to noncitizens who should be detained.. The question turned on  whether the Biden administration’s enforcement priorities in the Mayorkas Memo contradicted two statutory provisions – 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) pertains to the detention and removal of those who have been ordered removed. § 1226(c) lays out a list of noncitizens who “shall” be taken into custody by the Attorney General, including those who have committed certain criminal offenses. Judge Tipton readily agreed by vacating the Mayorkas Memo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed but the Supreme Court reversed holding  that in order to get standing the plaintiff states must show that the alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable and that the dispute must also be redressable in federal court. As Kavanaugh explains, the plaintiff states “have not cited any precedent, history, or tradition of courts ordering the Executive Branch to change its arrest of or prosecution policies so that the Executive Branch makes more arrests of initiates more prosecutions.”

As a result of Texas losing twice on standing, the enforcement priorities under the Mayorkas Memo continue to be applied and the CHNV parole program will also allow CHNV nationals to enter the US through parole in an orderly manner and relieve the strain on the Southern border. It remains to be seen whether Texas’s challenge to DACA can also be denied based on standing. Currently, the Fifth Circuit is reviewing Judge Hanen’s ruling in September 2023 holding that DACA is illegal.  Judge Hanen also affirmed that Texas had standing to challenge DACA notwithstanding the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Texas, where Justice Kavanaugh also stated  that “a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis.” Judge Hanen seized upon this sentence from Justice Kavanaugh’s decision by holding that DACA involved  “non prosecution with benefits” and so it was distinguishable from the enforcement priorities in the Mayorkas Memo. Judge Hanen also seized upon another part in Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion stating that the “standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions.” Judge Hanen thought that DACA was such an example where the administration has abandoned its statutory responsibility to make arrests and bring prosecutions and thus violated the “Take Care Clause” of the Constitution.

Both Texas v. DHS and United States v. Texas should serve as templates for either the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court to once again deny Texas standing to challenge DACA and Texas’s other serial challenges to Biden’s immigration programs. Texas lacks standing  because DACA like the CHNV parole program has been widely successful and it can be shown that it has not injured Texas. In his order Judge Tipton contrasted Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), as revised, (Nov. 25, 2015), aff’d by equally divided Court, 597 U.S. 547 (2016), where President Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) was found to be unlawful, with the CHNV program. The Fifth Circuit held that Texas demonstrated injury in fact because “DAPA would enable at lest 500,000 illegal aliens in Texas” and the extended DACA program  would also cause “pocketbook injuries on the State in the form of healthcare, education, and social service costs.” However, if DACA is viewed independently from DAPA, it can be demonstrated that the benefits from DACA recipients since 2012 in the form of tax contributions to Texas and increased profits from the issuance of driver’s licenses, among other benefits,  have not resulted in injury-in-fact to Texas. Using the comparative analysis of Judge Tipton in Texas v. DHS, it can also be argued that the number of DACA recipients did not increase after the implementation of DACA in 2012 as they were already in the US prior to its implementation.

Moreover, in  Texas’ challenge to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, Texas has argued that it is entitled to “special solicitude.” The doctrine first enunciated in Massachusetts v. EPA allows states to skirt some of the usual standing requirements, like whether the court can redress an alleged injury. However, Justice Brett Kavanaugh addressed the doctrine in a footnote in United States v. Texas stating that the states’ reliance on Massachusetts v. EPA to support their argument for standing was misplaced. Massachusetts v. EPA held that the state could challenge the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases based on special solicitude, although that case dealt with a “statutorily authorized petition for rulemaking, not a challenge to an exercise of the executive’s enforcement discretion,” the footnote said. Another footnote in Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion said lower courts need to be mindful of constraints on lawsuits filed by states, saying that indirect effects on state spending from federal policies don’t confer standing. Although Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion in United States v. Texas left open the possibility that “a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis”. note that Justice Kavanaugh said that it “could” lead to a different standing analysis and not that it would. It is also worth mentioning that In his concurrence in United States v. Texas, Justice Gorsuch argued that the harm Texas and the states that joined it were concerned with – primarily increased spending to provide healthcare and other services to higher numbers of undocumented immigrants present in the state – was not redressable. As with the Mayorkas Memo, the DACA program also involves prosecutorial discretion and so Texas’s challenge to DACA may suffer the same redressability problem identified by Justice Gorsuch.

As the latest order to Judge Tipton in Texas v. DHS and Texas v. United States has made it harder for a state like Texas, which has reflexively sued on every immigration policy to get standing, the Biden administration should consider moving forward more boldly by reforming the immigration system through parole initiatives  and other executive actions without fear of being sued by these states. As a fitting coda, it is worth mentioning that the Judicial Conference of the United States, the policy arm of the judiciary, has  strengthened the policy governing random case assignment, limiting the ability of litigants to effectively choose judges in certain cases by where they file a lawsuit. This new policy would make it more difficult for states like Texas to file a lawsuit in courts where the judge might rule more favorably in a challenge to a Biden federal immigration policy. However, after receiving intense backlash from conservative lawmakers, judges and judicial experts, the Judicial Conference issued a revised policy making clear that the policy is a recommendation and district courts cannot be forced to follow it.  Although Texas’s choice of filing its lawsuit against the CHNV program in the United States District Court Southern District of Texas, Victoria Division, where Judge Tipton presides, backfired, even if this policy is non-binding guidance, it would still make it more difficult for Texas to try this strategy repeatedly in courts where other friendly judges preside like the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Brownsville Division,  where Judge Hanen presides.

Cyrus Mehta

How Prosecutorial Discretion Saved Our Client

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By Cyrus Mehta and Jessica Paszko*

This is the story of our client Nadia Habib who was in immigration proceedings from 18 months till 31 years until an Immigration Judge granted her adjustment of status on November 21, 2023!

Nadia Habib came to the US in 1993 from Bangladesh when she was less than 2 years old with her mother Nazmin Habib. They were paroled into the US at JFK airport.  Some years later in June 1997 they were placed in removal proceedings in New York, and ordered deported in absentia on April 26, 2000 by an Immigration Judge. They did not show up in court on the day of their hearing due to an unfortunate misunderstanding as a result of Nazmin being seriously ill the day before.  Several efforts were made to reopen the in absenstia deportation order but to no avail. However, they continued to live their lives normally as a tightly knit family. Nazmin and her husband Jawad, who had a green card, had three more children in the US who were automatically citizens. Jawad supported the entire family as a yellow taxi driver in New York. Nadia continued to be vulnerable to deportation unlike her citizen siblings, although she showed great promise by doing well in school and getting admitted into the elite Bronx High School of Science in New York.

On September 10, 2011, Nazmin and Nadia, then 19 years old, received a bag and baggage letter from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ordering that they surrender for deportation on September 29, 2011. This letter brought their lives and the lives of their family and loved ones to a shocking halt. Nadia’s friends and other immigrant students quickly sprung to action, launching campaigns on Facebook and Twitter, in the hope that Nadia and her mother would be allowed to remain in the US with her father and her three US citizen siblings. On the fateful day she had to appear for deportation on September 29, members of the Youth Leadership Council gathered thousands of petition signatures and turned out over 100 people to rally in support of Nadia and Nazmin and to try to halt the deportation scheduled for that day at 11 am.  The community’s fervent efforts to keep Nadia and Nazmin from returning to Bangladesh that was entirely foreign to Nadia paid off. ICE halted the deportation order and decided to review their case. Though September 29, 2011 was marked with victory for Nadia and her mom, their immigration woes were far from over.

At that time when Nadia was about to get deported, President Obama began to be known as the Deporter-in-Chief. Although Obama was sympathetic towards immigrants, he wanted to also show that he was strict on enforcing the law as a way to get his Republican opponents in Congress to pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill.  As the deportations under Obama spiked in 2011 and 2012, until they reached a record high by 2013, the then ICE Director John Morton issued a landmark memo in 2011 providing detailed guidelines on how ICE officers should exercise prosecutorial discretion.

On September 30, 2011, which also happened to be Nadia’s 20th birthday, ICE issued a Stay of Removal Order for Nadia and Nazmin. This was the first exercise of prosecutorial discretion that would benefit Nadia and Nazmin and a birthday present that Nadia would never forget. Nadia and Nazmin approached our firm to seek representation. The case was so sympathetic and meritorious that we decided to take on the case pro bono. The goal was to find a pathway for Nazmin and Nadia to reopen their deportation orders and adjust status while keeping them in the US in the interim in an authorized capacity as long as possible.

On February 23, 2012, ICE also issued an order of supervision to both Nadia and Nazmin which required them to report in person to ICE on specified dates, usually once or twice a year. On June 15, 2012, the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Janet Napolitano issued a memorandum entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children”, officially establishing what would later be known as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. DACA came to be the second form of prosecutorial discretion that benefitted Nadia who clearly qualified as she came to the US well before the age of 16. After graduating from the Bronx High School of Science, Nadia pursued undergraduate studies at Stony Brook University and later obtained her master’s degree in architecture from The City College of New York. On the basis of DACA, Nadia was able to apply for an Employment Authorization Document (EAD) in September 2012. Since then, our firm helped Nazmin and Nadia comply with their annual appointments with ICE and apply for DACA extensions along with the EAD. Nadia had to report each year for her appointment with ICE even though she was authorized to remain in the US under DACA. Every time Nadia wanted to travel outside New York for a trip to another state, even over a long weekend, she had to ask for and receive permission from ICE.

In the meantime, Nadia’s US citizen brother filed Form I-130 on behalf of his mother Nazmin which was approved in early 2016. Jawad had not yet naturalized as his application had been erroneously denied and our appeal challenging the denial was pending. This I-130 served as the basis of our request to DHS to join our motion to reopen Nazmin’s removal so that Nazmin could apply for adjustment of status based on the approved I-130 petition filed by her US citizen child. A removal order can be reopened at any time if the government joins in a motion to reopen even though prior efforts to reopen the removal were unsuccessful. The ability of the government joining in a motion to reopen depends on the policies of the administration at any given time. We requested the government to join in the motion in September 2016, during the final year of the Obama administration based on Morton’s prosecutorial discretion policy. Donald Trump became president in 2017 and our request was pending, but the ICE attorney who got our request to join in the motion fortunately agreed to join in the motion to reopen Nazmin’s removal proceedings to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) even though by then prosecutorial discretion became non-existent under Trump’s new enforcement oriented immigration focus. In July 2017, the BIA granted our motion based on the government’s consent and remanded for further proceedings. After a nearly five year wait (since the I-485 application could not be tracked in the USICS bureaucracy until there was Congressional intervention), Nazmin was scheduled for an adjustment interview in March 2022 at a USCIS field office in Long Island where her adjustment of status application was finally granted.

Nadia was still not eligible to adjust status, so we could not request the government to join in the motion to reopen. Although Nadia’s father eventually naturalized, she was unable to adjust status through him as she was over 21 years old. Despite this, Nadia continued to be able to remain in the US thanks to DACA. When Nadia married her US citizen husband in 2020, he filed Form
I-130 on her behalf which was approved the following year. Following a similar path as her mother case, in January 2022, our firm submitted a request to DHS to join our motion to reopen Nadia’s removal order so that Nadia could apply for adjustment of status based on the approved I-130 petition filed by her husband. By then Joe Biden was President and he once again instructed ICE to exercise prosecutorial discretion. In November 2022, DHS consented to joining in the motion to reopen for the sole purpose of dismissal of removal proceedings. The following month, in December 2022, we submitted our joint motion to reopen Nadia’s removal proceedings to the BIA. In February 2023, the BIA granted our motion and reopened and remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings. In September 2023, we learned that Nadia had been scheduled for a merits hearing on November 1, 2023 by happenstance as neither Nadia nor our firm received the notice – imagine if the Immigration Judge would have again deported Nadia in absentia at the hearing. Our request to adjust Nadia’s status on the basis of her I-130 was unopposed by DHS, though the Immigration Judge could not grant the adjustment as the sealed medical report that we had delivered to the Immigration Court in advance of the November 1st hearing had not made its way to him. The Immigration Judge continued the hearing to November 17, 2023 where finally, after many trials and tribulations, Nadia was adjusted to lawful permanent resident status. Nadia’s order of supervision dissolved on that day too relieving her from reporting to ICE each year.

Nadia was 32 years old on the day she was granted adjustment of status, and before then she had been in some form of immigration proceeding since she was 17 months old. Today Nadia is a successful architect and her siblings are also equally successful. Through this period, Nadia benefited from prosecutorial discretion, but the path was never smooth. DACA was declared unlawful by a federal judge and its fate hangs in the balance till this day. Even after Biden became president, courts enjoined his prosecutorial discretion policies that were set forth in the memo of DHS Secretary Mayorkas, but we advocated, when requesting the government to join in the motion to reopen, that the government could still exercise discretion outside the priorities set forth in the Mayorkas memo. Despite the court block of the Mayorkas memo, the DHS retained the ability to exercise discretion and join in a motion to reopen. Imagine if Nadia did not receive the stay of removal in 2011 and was deported to Bangladesh after she had spent her whole life in the US. But for the prosecutorial discretion policies in place, Nadia would have been deported because of an in absentia deportation order that she received, over which she had no control and for no fault of her own. Nadia and Nazmin were also fortunate that ICE attorneys agreed to join in the motions to reopen despite the zigzagging prosecutorial discretion policies over three presidential administrations.

We are proud to have represented Nadia and Nazmin tenaciously and doggedly for well over 10 years in a pro bono capacity!

*Jessica Paszko is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

DHS’s Family Reunification Parole Initiative Can Serve as Template for Other Bold Executive Actions to Reform the Immigration System Without Fear of Being Sued by a State

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On July 7, 2023, DHS announced a new family reunification parole initiative for beneficiaries of approved I-130 petitions who are nationals of Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, & Honduras. Nationals of these countries can be considered for parole on a case-by-case basis for a period of up to three years while they wait to apply to become lawful permanent residents. This is an example of the administration using its executive authority to shape immigration policy in the absence of meaningful Congressional action to reform the system. Indeed, this initiative can serve as a template to allow beneficiaries of approved I-130, I-140, and I-526 petitions to be paroled into the US while they wait for a visa number to become available, which under the backlogs in the employment and family preference categories, can take several years to decades.

Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, in his discretion, to parole noncitizens into the United States temporarily on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. The parole authority has long been used to establish family reunification parole (FRP) processes administered by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, including the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, which was established in 2007, and the Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program, which was established in 2014.

The processes begin, according to the DHS announcement, with the Department of State issuing an invitation to the petitioning U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident family member whose Form I-130 on behalf of a Colombian, Salvadoran, Guatemalan, or Honduran beneficiary has been approved. Beneficiaries awaiting an immigrant visa could include certain children and siblings of U.S. citizens and certain spouses and children of permanent residents. The invited petitioner can then initiate the process by filing a request on behalf of the beneficiary and eligible family members to be considered for advance travel authorization and parole.

The new processes allow for parole only on a discretionary, case-by-case, and temporary basis upon a demonstration of urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, as well as a demonstration that the beneficiary warrants a favorable exercise of discretion. Individuals paroled into the United States under these processes will generally be considered for parole for up to three years and will be eligible to request employment authorization while they wait for their immigrant visa to become available. When their immigrant visa becomes available, they may apply to become a lawful permanent resident.

The Federal Register Notices for Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras provide more information on the FRP process and eligibility criteria.

According to the federal register notices, the justification for the new FRP initiative is part of a broader, multi-pronged, and regional strategy to address the challenges posed by irregular migration through the Southwest border. Consideration of noncitizens for parole on a case-by-case basis will meaningfully contribute to the broader strategy of the United States government (USG) to expand access to lawful pathways for individuals who may otherwise undertake an irregular migration journey to the United States. The case-by-case parole of noncitizens with approved family-based immigrant visa petitions under this process will, in general, provide a significant public benefit by furthering the USG’s holistic migration management strategy, specifically by: (1) promoting family unity; (2) furthering important foreign policy objectives; (3) providing a lawful and timely alternative to irregular migration; (4) reducing strain on limited U.S. resources; and (5) addressing root causes of migration through economic stability and development supported by increased remittances.

It remains to be seen whether states like Texas will attack this program in federal court. A similar humanitarian parole program has been the subject of a lawsuit by Texas and nineteen other states, and  allows 30,000 qualifying nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela to be admitted to the United States every month for up to two years. The new FRP initiative is more narrowly tailored as it applies only to spouse, children and sibling beneficiaries of  approved I-130 petitions. Also, in United States v.  Texas, the Supreme Court in an 8-1 majority opinion rendered a blow to Texas and Louisiana in holding that they had no standing to challenge the Biden administration on federal immigration policy on enforcement priorities. Although that case dealt with whether a state could challenge the federal government’s ability to exercise prosecutorial discretion, it can also potentially deter a state’s ability to demonstrate standing when it challenges other federal immigration policies.

In Texas’ challenge to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, Texas has argued that it is entitled to “special solicitude.” The doctrine first enunciated in Massachusetts v. EPA allows states to skirt some of the usual standing requirements, like whether the court can redress an alleged injury. However, Justice Brett Kavanaugh addressed the doctrine in a footnote in United States v. Texas stating that the states’ reliance on Massachusetts v. EPA to support their argument for standing was misplaced. Massachusetts v. EPA held that the state could challenge the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases based on special solicitude, although that case dealt with a “statutorily authorized petition for rulemaking, not a challenge to an exercise of the executive’s enforcement discretion,” the footnote said. Another footnote in Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion said lower courts need to be mindful of constraints on lawsuits filed by states, saying that indirect effects on state spending from federal policies don’t confer standing. Still, Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion in United States v. Texas left open the possibility that “a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis”. Note that Justice Kavanaugh said that it “could” lead to a different standing analysis and not that it would.

Florida has already challenged the Biden administration’s “Parole Plus Alternatives to Detention” (Parole+ATD) and “Parole with Conditions in Limited Circumstances Prior to the Issuance of a Charging Document” (PWC) policies in Florida v. Mayorkas  that is currently pending before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In a brief filed on July 5, 2023, the government argued that the “special solicitude” doctrine proffered by states in United States v. Texas. should not apply in the humanitarian parole context. Florida asserted that it was entitled to special solicitude for the same reasons articulated by Texas in United States v. Texas – “a challenge to its sovereignty and indirect fiscal costs flowing from the presence of more noncitizens in its state.” Because the Supreme Court rejected an almost identical argument for the application of special solicitude in United States v. Texas, the government argued that Florida is similarly not entitled to avail of the doctrine.

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Texas could have interesting implications for challenges to DACA, as well, and DACA recipients as intervenors have filed additional briefing to the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas in US v. Texas, Case No. 1:18-CV-68. In his concurrence in United States v. Texas, Justice Gorsuch argued that the harm Texas and the states that joined it were concerned with – primarily increased spending to provide healthcare and other services to higher numbers of undocumented immigrants present in the state – was not redressable. Although an injunction would prevent the implementation of the Biden administration’s enforcement guidelines, Justice Gorsuch argued that this remedy was unavailable to the states because of 8 U. S. C. § 1252(f )(1), which provides that “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain immigration laws, including the provisions that the states want to see enforced. The district court attempted to avoid offending this provision by “vacating” the Biden administrations guidelines instead of issuing an injunction, but Judge Gorsuch argued in part that a vacatur order nullifying the guidelines does nothing to redress the states’ supposed injuries because the “federal officials possess the same underlying prosecutorial discretion”, even in the absence of the guidelines. DACA recipients argued that this program also represents an exercise of inherent prosecutorial discretion, and states’ challenge of the program therefore suffers from the same redressability problem identified by Judge Gorsuch. Similarly, the states challenging the DACA program have alleged indistinct injuries similar to those articulated by Texas in United States v. Texas. Because the Supreme Court found that Texas lacked standing to challenge the Biden administration’s guidelines, DACA recipients have argued that states do not have stating to challenge the DACA program based on similar theories.

DOJ attorneys and intervenor defendants filed a joint motion on July 7, 2023, asking Judge Tipton of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas to delay a bench trial in the earlier lawsuit filed by Texas to challenge the Biden administration’s parole program for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans. Although the motion argued that the outcome of United States v.  Texas would determine whether Texas had standing in the federal suit, Judge Tipton predictably declined to push back the trial date. Texas had previously argued that the parole program is distinguishable from the Biden administration’s enforcement guidelines because “[w]hatever discretion [the administration] might have in choosing which aliens to arrest or otherwise take into custody, [it has] no discretion to parole into the country aliens who do not meet the statutory criteria for parole.” At this point, states like Texas are arguing that their legal challenges to Biden’s earlier humanitarian parole or DACA program can be distinguished from United States v. Texas, which involved enforcement priorities, while the Biden administration and intervenors such as DACA recipients are arguing that Texas should not have standing to challenge even other immigration programs.

Returning to the idea of how this initiative can be broadened, parole can potentially be expanded to all beneficiaries of approved I-130, I-140, and I-526 petitions who are waiting overseas in the green card backlogs. Even if parole is expanded, the administration can still remain faithful to INA § 212(d)(5) by approving parole on a discretionary and case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or a significant public benefit. For instance, it may be possible to justify the parole of certain beneficiaries of I-526 petitions who have made a minimum investment of  $500,000 in a US business prior to May 15, 2022 or $800,000 after this date,  and created 10 jobs as that could be considered a significant public benefit. The same justification can be made for certain beneficiaries of approved I-140 petitions in the EB-1, EB-2, and EB-3 preference categories whose presence in the US can benefit US employers who have sponsored them through the labor certification process or who have demonstrated that they are either persons of extraordinary ability or are well situated to advance the national interest of the United States. Beneficiaries of approved I-130 petitions who are caught in backlogs can make a justification for parole for urgent humanitarian reasons to unite with family members in the US.

Out of the four proposals Cyrus Mehta made to the Biden administration in May 2021 for reforming the legal immigration system without waiting for Congress to act, we are happy to see that two have come to fruition- parole for beneficiaries of I-130 petitions and using the Dates for Filing (DFF) for protecting the age of the child under the Child Status Protection Act. Cyrus Mehta has also proposed that the administration has the authority to advance the DFF in the State Department Visa Bulletin to current to maximize the number of people who can file for adjustment of status in the US. Cyrus Mehta has also proposed that there is nothing in INA § 203(d) that requires the counting of derivatives in  the family and employment green card preferences, although since the submission of this proposal, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals in Wang v. Blinken ruled that INA § 203(d) requires the counting of derivative. Hence, any hope of administrative reform with regards to the unitary counting of family members has been shelved for the time being unless Congress is able to provide clarification on §203(d). Even if the administration issues a new interpretation to INA § 203(d) and abandons the position it took in Wang v. Blinken, the DC Circuit Court of Appeal’s interpretation will still prevail within the jurisdiction.

As Texas v. United States has made it harder for a state like Texas, which has reflexively sued on every immigration policy to get standing, the Biden administration should consider moving forward more boldly by reforming the immigration system through executive actions without fear of being sued by these states. It may be no coincidence that the latest family reunification parole initiative was unveiled within two weeks of the favorable ruling for the Biden administration in Texas v. United States!

[This blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as a substitute for legal advice]

*Kaitlyn Box is a Senior Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

Cyrus Mehta

While Supreme Court Holds That States Have No Standing to Challenge Federal Immigration Enforcement Priorities in United States v. Texas, How Does This Bode for  DACA and Other Immigration Policies?

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By Cyrus D. Mehta

In United States v.  Texas, the Supreme Court in an 8-1 majority opinion rendered a blow to Texas and Louisiana in holding that they had no standing to challenge the Biden administration on federal immigration policy on enforcement priorities. Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh said, “The States have brought an extraordinarily unusual lawsuit. They want a federal court to order the Executive Branch to alter its arrest policies so as to make more arrests. Federal courts have not traditionally entertained that kind of lawsuit; indeed, the States cite no precedent for a lawsuit like this.”

Originally laid out in the 2021 Mayorkas Memo, this list of enforcement priorities would have allowed ICE to focus its efforts on the apprehension and removal of noncitizens who pose a threat to “national security, public safety, and border security”. The attorneys general of Texas and Louisiana swiftly challenged these enforcement priorities, arguing that ICE would be allowed to overlook noncitizens for whom detention was required, which would subject the citizens of these states to crime committed by noncitizens who should be in detention, and force the state to spend resources providing education and medical care to noncitizens who should be detained.. The question turned on  whether the Biden administration’s enforcement priorities in the Mayorkas Memo contradicted two statutory provisions – 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) pertains to the detention and removal of those who have been ordered removed. § 1226(c) lays out a list of noncitizens who “shall” be taken into custody by the Attorney General, including those who have committed certain criminal offenses. Trump appointed Judge Tipton readily agreed by vacating the Mayorkas Memo.

Justice Kavanaugh held that in order to get standing the plaintiff states must show that the alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable and that the dispute must also be redressable in federal court. As Kavanaugh explains, the plaintiff states “have not cited any precedent, history, or tradition of courts ordering the Executive Branch to change its arrest of or prosecution policies so that the Executive Branch makes more arrests of initiates more prosecutions.” In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), cited in the majority opinion, “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Similarly, a state government like the private citizen in this case cannot bring such a lawsuit. In another case Heckler v. Chaney, 470 US 821 (1983), the Court recognized that the government has to balance several factors such as resource constraints and changing public safety and public welfare needs, and that such a complicated balancing process leaves the courts without meaningful standards for assessing those policies.

The Court recognized that the Executive Branch exercises absolute discretion to prosecute a case, and this discretion extends to the immigration context. The Court previously in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) declared that the Executive Branch retains discretion over whether to remove a noncitizen from the United States. Indeed, prosecutorial discretion is so inevitable in immigration enforcement that even after the Mayorkas Memo was set aside, ICE has continued to exercise discretion by moving to dismiss thousands of removal cases in immigration courts  but without referring to the priorities in the Mayorkas Memo.

This decision bodes well for the other cases where Texas and other states have challenged federal immigration policy, although with respect to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, Kavanaugh’s opinion states that “a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis.” One wonders whether this would give Judge Hanen some leeway in distinguishing this case from United States v. Texas. Still, DACA is also part of enforcement priorities as the administration has decided to defer the removal of youths who fell out of status for no fault of their own. The final rule’s definition of “lawful presence” is also a significant provision. The final rule points to 8 CFR § 1.3(a)(4)(vi), which defines “an alien who is lawfully present in the United States” as “an alien who belongs to one of the following classes of aliens permitted to remain in the United States because DHS has decided for humanitarian or other public policy reasons not to initiate removal proceedings or enforce departure” including “aliens currently in deferred action status”. As this provision makes clear, all recipients of deferred action, not DACA recipients alone, are considered lawfully present for certain purposes. Lawful presence does not confer any immigration status in the United States, a distinction that has long been misunderstood. In a 2017 decision that upheld a challenge to DAPA by the state of Texas, the Fifth Circuit viewed a grant of deferred action as something akin to an immigration status. Judge Hanen in 2021, too, seemed to conflate lawful presence with a legal immigration status. Rather, lawful presence renders individuals who have been granted deferred action eligible for certain federal benefits and ensures that they do not accrue unlawful presence for inadmissibility purposes, which could render them subject to the 3- and 10- year bars. Moreover, since they are considered lawfully present, DACA recipients will be eligible for Social Security benefits, including a Social Security number itself when they apply for employment authorization, which assists individuals in filing taxes, obtaining identification cards, and obtaining employment. Most important, a clarification of lawful presence not being legal status should put DACA in the same category of cases where the DHS has exercised  prosecutorial discretion, and should in turn preclude Texas and other states from getting standing to challenge the program.

There is also this fear whether this ruling would preclude an immigrant friendly state like New York, Hawaii, Washington or California to challenge an anti-immigrant policy of a future president. Would Hawaii be able to challenge a future travel ban based on discriminatory grounds like it did in Trump v. Hawaii? Or would a state like New York be able get standing to sue a future administration if it again restricted the public charge parameters?  Assuming that United States v. Texas precludes standing for these states in the future, there will also be plaintiffs who have been actually injured such as noncitizens whose travel has been blocked to the US or who have been denied permanent residence as they could not meet the new restrictive public charge grounds. United States v. Texas serves as a shield against plaintiffs who wants to play offense but does not come in the way of an injured plaintiff who needs to play defense. It also remains to be seen whether the standing analysis in the ruling is limited to challenging the government regarding non-prosecutions or exercising prosecutorial discretion or whether it would apply to other matters.

If the standing analysis applies to other matters, then the Biden administration should consider boldly providing relief to backlogged skilled immigrants by radically advancing the dates for filing in the State Department Visa Bulletin so that thousands of beneficiaries of approved I-140 employment petitions may file for adjustment of status in the US and obtain benefits such as interim work authorization, travel permission and the ability to exercise job portability. The administration can also consider  providing parole to beneficiaries of approved I-130 family,  I-140 employment  and I-526 investor petitions who are waiting overseas to immigrated until their priority dates becomes current. These are just a few examples where the Biden administration can tread more boldly without fear of being sued by Texas, Louisiana or Missouri.

In the immediate aftermath of the decision where Justice Alito was the only dissenter, DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said that the DHS would reinstate the guidelines, which were paused last summer by the Supreme Court. He said this would “enable DHS to most effectively accomplish its law enforcement mission with the authorities and resources provided by Congress.” Texas Gov. Greg Abbott said that Texas would “continue to deploy the National Guard to repel [and] turn back illegal immigrants trying to enter Texas illegally.”

 

Cyrus Mehta

A Tale of Two Cases – Washtech v. DHS and Texas v. USA: To What Extent can the Executive Branch Allow Noncitizens to Remain and Work in the US

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

To what extent can the Executive Branch allow noncitizens to remain and work in the US when there is no explicit provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) covering these categories of noncitizens? Two courts of appeals have ruled differently in recent decisions. One court found authority while the other court did not. The D.C. Circuit addressed the question of F-1 students and whether they could remain in the U.S. after graduation for practical training. Citing DHS’ authority under INA § 214(a)(1) and the long history of post-graduation practical training, the court upheld OPT. The Fifth Circuit confronted a different issue – that of young people who came to the U.S. and whether they could remain in the country through deferred action. Finding that DACA exceeds DHS’ inherent authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, the court struck down the program, though deferred action is a well-established practice like OPT.

On October 4, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion in Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“Washtech v. DHS”). The case involved a challenge to the STEM Optional Practical Training (OPT) rules by the Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (Washtech), a union representing tech workers. DHS allows eligible students in STEM fields an additional 24 month OPT extension beyond the usual 12 month OPT period. Washtech argued that “the statutory definition of the F-1 visa class precludes the Secretary from exercising the time-and conditions authority to allow F-1 students to remain for school recommended practical training after they complete their coursework”. Washtech read INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i) as authorizing DHS to allow F-1 students to remain in the U.S. only until they have completed their course of study, as the provision does not specifically mention post-graduation practical training. The court affirmed a district court judgment that upheld DHS’ current OPT rules. The court reasoned that the STEM OPT extension is a valid exercise of DHS’ authority under in INA § 214(a)(1) to promulgate regulations that authorize an F-1 student’s stay in the U.S. beyond graduation. The court further noted that “practical training not only enhances the educational worth of a degree program, but often is essential to students’ ability to correctly use what they have learned when they return to their home countries. That is especially so in STEM fields, where hands-on work is critical for understanding fast-moving technological and scientific developments.” Judge Pillard, who authored the opinion, noted that the concept of post-coursework practical training for foreign students predates the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, pointing to a 1947 rule which “allowed foreign students ‘admitted temporarily to the United States . . . for the purpose of pursuing a definite course of study’ to remain here for up to eighteen months following completion of coursework for ‘employment for practical training’ as required or recommended by their school”. Under Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978), Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts its statutes without change. Practical training has been authorized even prior to the enactment of the INA in 1952.  In previous blogs, we have discussed Congressional authority for OPT at length, see here, here, here, and here.

In Texas v. U.S., decided on October 5, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program is unlawful, upholding an earlier decision by Judge Andrew Hanen of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Although the practice of deferred action, of which the DACA program is a form, has also existed for decades, the Fifth Circuit’s decision was much less favorable than that of the D.C. Circuit. The court reasoned that the DACA program exceeds DHS’ inherent authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, as “declining to prosecute does not transform presence deemed unlawful by Congress into lawful presence and confer eligibility for otherwise unavailable benefits based on that change”. Further, the court found that there is no “clear congressional authorization” for DACA. In light of a recent regulation promulgated by the Biden administration to “preserve and fortify” DACA, the case was remanded to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Although DACA lives for now, it remains on the respirator as both the district court and the Fifth Circuit have consistently held that DACA is not authorized by the INA, and notwithstanding the new regulation, may still be held to be unlawful.

Though the courts in these cases arrived at few different outcomes, the two decisions share at least one commonality – both made reference to the “major question” doctrine recently introduced in West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). There the Supreme Court held that “in certain extraordinary cases” where it is unclear whether an agency action was authorized by Congress, “given both separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent, the agency must point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ for the authority it claims”.  Such extraordinary cases where the “major questions” doctrine is invoked have vast economic and political significance.  Interestingly, the dissent in Washtech indicated that the issue of whether DHS’ 2016 OPT Rule exceeds its statutory authority is a “major question”. Finding that the major questions doctrine applied, the dissent in Washtech directed the district court upon remand to examine whether DHS had the authority to issue OPT regulations under this principle.

In footnote 206, the court in Texas v. USA cited West Virginia v. EPA in holding that DHS had no Congressional authority to implement DACA. The court also held that DACA did not pass the first step of the Chevron test, which asks “whether Congress has ‘directly addressed the precise question at issue.’” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The court in Washtech analyzed the OPT rule under the lens of Chevron also, but gave DHS’ interpretation of INA § 214(a)(1) deference.

If the major questions doctrine is implemented in this way, it could result in fewer agency actions receiving Chevron deference. Chevron gives the Biden administration the ability to interpret the INA by implementing OPT and DACA programs, so it is hoped that the major questions doctrine does not impede the application of this longstanding precedent. Moreover, immigration decisions unlike environmental cases ought not to be cases involving vast economic and political significance.  The majority decision in Washtech involved challenges to the INA provisions that provide the authority for noncitizens to remain in the U.S. The court gave due deference under Chevron to the executive’s interpretation of INA § 214(a)(1) and upheld OPT. The majority did not reference the “major questions” doctrine in Virginia v. EPA.  The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, held that  DHS cannot rely on INA § 103(a)(3) as a basis for implementing DACA, and cited Virginia v. EPA. This provision states that the DHS Secretary “shall establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of the Act.” This provision is comparable to INA § 214(a)(1), which the First Circuit held provided the basis for F-1 OPT. INA § 214(a)(1) provides that “[t]he admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations prescribe…….”

Although the Washtech case dealt with students, the D.C. Circuit’s decision can serve as a template for the Supreme Court to uphold the authority for other categories of noncitizens to remain in the U.S., including DACA recipients. The same deference that the D.C. Circuit afforded to the executive’s authorization of OPT ought to also be given to the government’s interpretation of INA § 103(a)(3) and 6 USC § 202(5) so that the DACA program is upheld.

Another interesting issue discussed in both cases is whether the Executive Branch can issue work authorization to noncitizens. The court in Washtech upheld the authority of the executive to grant employment authorization documents (EADs) under INA § 274(a)(h)(3), which has long provided authority for the Executive Branch to provide employment authorization to broad categories of noncitizens. The executive’s authority to grant EADs under this provision had been soundly rejected by the Fifth Circuit in the earlier DAPA decision and Judge Hanen’s lower court decision in Texas v. U.S. In footnote 37, Hanen’s decision makes reference to INA §274a(h)(3) as a definitional miscellaneous provision, which cannot provide the basis for DACA and the grant of EADs, while the First Circuit relied on the same provision as a statutory basis for OPT EAD.

Charles Dickens opened his A Tale of Two Cities with the following famous line: “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.” Like London and Paris in Dickens’ novel, Washtech and Texas are comparable in some respects and very different in others. Though Texas may represent the worst of times and the age of foolishness, Washtech ushers in an age of wisdom and the best of times for foreign students hoping to gain practical training in the U.S.

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

Cyrus Mehta

The Legal Basis for DACA as Expressed in the Final Rule

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By Cyrus D. Mehta and Kaitlyn Box*

On August 24, 2022, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a final rule aimed at “preserving and fortifying” the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. The DACA program was initiated by a 2012 memo from then-DHS secretary Janet Napolitano (“Napolitano Memo”) and has been subjected to numerous legal challenges since. Many of our previous blogs discuss the DACA program. The Napolitano Memo stated that DHS would consider deferred action for individuals who met the following criteria pursuant to the DACA program: 1) came to the United States under the age of 16; 2) continuously resided in the United States for at least 5 years preceding June 15, 2012, and were present in the United States on that date; 3) are in school, have graduated from high school, have obtained a General Education Development (GED) certificate, or are an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; 4) have not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, or multiple misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise do not pose a threat to national security or public safety; and 5) were not above the age of 30 on June 15, 2012.

The new final rule takes effect on October 31, 2022, is expected to be published in the Federal Register on August 30, 2022. It retains the same criteria for DACA eligibility that were laid out in the Napolitano Memo and preserves the existing process for DACA recipients to request work authorization. The final rule also affirms USCIS’ longstanding policy that DACA recipient are considered “lawfully present”.

It is plain that the new final rule is aimed at insulating the DACA program from being invalidated by future litigation. In a July 16, 2021 decision, Judge Hanen of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the DHS violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as it was not established through notice and comment rulemaking.. Judge Hanen further reasoned that DHS did not have the inherent authority to enact the program, and held that DACA conflicts with sections of the INA that describe which individuals are removable and lay out a statutory scheme for work authorization. Because Congress had already clearly articulated rules surrounding removal, lawful presence, and work authorization, Judge Hanen held that DACA failed the first step of the Chevron test and violates the APA.  Prosecutorial discretion, of which DACA is a variant, is an established doctrine that does not need to be codified. Promulgating a regulation may protect DACA from some legal challenges, but not all. If litigation asserts that the program is not authorized under the INA, the fact that it was established through notice and comment rulemaking will not provide a defense.

The final rule’s definition of “lawful presence” is also a significant provision. The final rule points to 8 CFR § 1.3(a)(4)(vi), which defines “an alien who is lawfully present in the United States” as “an alien who belongs to one of the following classes of aliens permitted to remain in the United States because DHS has decided for humanitarian or other public policy reasons not to initiate removal proceedings or enforce departure” including “aliens currently in deferred action status”. As this provision makes clear, all recipients of deferred action, not DACA recipients alone, are considered lawfully present for certain purposes. Lawful presence does not confer any immigration status in the United States, a distinction that has long been misunderstood. In a 2017 decision that upheld a challenge to DAPA by the state of Texas, the Fifth Circuit viewed a grant of deferred action as something akin to an immigration status. Judge Hanen in 2021, too, seemed to conflate lawful presence with a legal immigration status. Rather, lawful presence renders individuals who have been granted deferred action eligible for certain federal benefits and ensures that they do not accrue unlawful presence for inadmissibility purposes, which could render them subject to the 3- and 10- year bars. Moreover, since they are considered lawfully present, DACA recipients will be eligible for Social Security benefits, including a Social Security number itself when they apply for EADs, which assists individuals in filing taxes, obtaining identification cards, and obtaining employment. Most important, a clarification of lawful presence not being legal status could potentially nudge a court to uphold DACA rather than find it unlawful.

It remains to be seen how DACA fares in the ongoing litigation, particularly in light of the current composition of the Supreme Court. While the U.S. Supreme Court allowed DACA to survive in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California in 2020, the majority’s opinion was based on the improper procedure used by the Trump administration in its attempt to rescind DACA in 2017 in violation of the APA.  The Court in Regents did not reach the question of whether DACA itself was legal. The Supreme Court in Regents also faulted the then Trump administration for not factoring in reliance interests under Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. ___ (2016) when rescinding DACA. Justice Roberts writing for the majority observed that DACA recipients have enrolled in degree programs, embarked on careers, started businesses, purchased homes, and even married and had children, all in reliance on the DACA program. The consequences of the rescission would “radiate outward” to DACA recipients’ families, including their 200,000 US citizen children, to the schools where DACA recipients study and teach, and to the employers who have invested time and money in training them. Justice Roberts also cited a Brief for 143 Businesses as Amici Curiae, which estimated that hiring and training replacements would cost employers $6.3 billion.  In addition, excluding DACA recipients from the lawful labor force may result in the loss of $215 billion in economic activity and an associated $60 billion in federal tax revenue over the next ten years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the benefits of the DACA program to the US, the reliance interest doctrine may not be relevant if the Court rules that DACA was not authorized under the INA.

In any case, the new final rule is a good step forward and will give the program firmer legal footing. Unless the Supreme Court rules that DACA is not authorized under the INA, the final rule would render it very difficult, if not impossible, for a future administration not friendly towards immigrants to rescind DACA. It is hoped that the judges in the Fifth Circuit, and if not the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court removes any ideological lens and is able to see DACA as being lawful and authorized under the INA. If prior rulings have indicated that the government can exercise prosecutorial discretion  on a case by case basis, there is not much difference if the government exercises prosecutorial discretion in an orderly way through the DACA rule. The truth is that deferred action is neither recent nor revolutionary. Widows of US citizens have been granted this benefit. Battered immigrants have sought and obtained refuge there.  Never has the size of a vulnerable population been a valid reason to say no. A prior 2012 blog by Gary Endelman and Cyrus Mehta, Yes He Can: A Reply to Professors Delahunty and Yoo,  provided an impassioned defense of  DACA. The arguments we made then are still relevant notwithstanding Judge Hanen’s decision that found DACA to be unlawful.  The court reviewing Judge Hanen’s decision need look no further than the newly promulgated provision at 8 CFR §236.21(c)(1) which sums up why DACA is lawful:

Deferred action is an exercise of the Secretary’s broad authority to establish national immigration and enforcement priorities under 6 U.S.C. 205(5) and section 103 of the Act. It is a form of enforcement discretion not to pursue the removal of certain aliens for a limited period in the interest of ordering enforcement priorities in light of limitations on available resources, taking into account humanitarian considerations and administrative convenience. It furthers the administrability of the complex immigration system by permitting the Secretary to focus enforcement on high priority targets. This temporary forbearance from removal does not confer any right or entitlement to remain in or reenter the United States. A grant of deferred action under this section does not preclude DHS from commencing removal proceedings at any time or prohibit DHS or any other Federal agency from initiating any criminal or other enforcement action at any time.

While it is hoped that the court will uphold DACA, DACA recipients deserve better than the uncertainty of renewing  DACA  along with work authorizations every two years, and urgently need Congress to regularize their status and place them on a  pathway to citizenship.

 

(This blog is for informational purposes and should not be viewed as a substitute for legal advice).

*Kaitlyn Box graduated with a JD from Penn State Law in 2020, and is an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC.

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Can the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Under the Administrative Procedure Act Save DACA?

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The Supreme Court announced on June 28, 2019 that it would consider the legality of President Trump’s ending of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program.  Although federal courts in New York, California and Washington DC have blocked Trump’s efforts to block DACA, the Supreme Court decided to take up the matter striking fear in the hearts of Dreamers. The Supreme Court had previously declined to take up DACA, and so it needn’t have prematurely considered the ongoing challenges in the lower courts to Trump’s rescission of the program, which have benefitted 800,000 Dreamers.  Given the Supreme Court’s new conservative majority, there is a chance that the Court could uphold Trump’s action. It is indeed paradoxical that the nation’s highest court is viewed with fear by many vulnerable immigrants rather than as a protector of their rights.

Still, even though DACA was initiated by President Obama as an executive action, it cannot be arbitrarily and capriciously rescinded by the next president.

In one of the lower court decisions in April 2018, NAACP v. Trump, Judge Bates invoked 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act to stay President Trump’s decision to rescind DACA.  The APA provides that a court “shall … hold unlawful and set aside agency action … found to be … arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Judge Bates ruled that the Trump administration provided scant legal reasoning to support its justification that DACA was unlawful. “A conclusory assertion that a prior policy is illegal, accompanied by a hodgepodge of illogical or post hoc policy assertions, simply will not do,” Judge Bates opined in a further ruling in August 2018.

The ability for a court to set aside a decision by the administration under the Administrative Procedure Act if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law” is a powerful tool. It can be invoked by a foreign national who may no longer be able to remain in the United States based on the government’s unlawful actions. §706(2)(A) has also been successfully invoked in recent challenges to denials of H-1B requests by employers and foreign nationals.

Will the Supreme Court rely on §706(2)(A) to hold that Trump’s justification was arbitrary and capricious? One can find a clue in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Department of Commerce v. New York where it questioned the Commerce Secretary’s insertion of a citizenship question in the 2020 census form. Plaintiffs challenged the insertion of the citizenship question on the ground that it would result in a chilling effect. Census Bureau experts had warned that adding the citizenship question would result in a significant undercount of households with at least one noncitizen member. The Supreme Court, in this case, examined whether the Commerce Secretary’s action was arbitrary and capricious under 706(2)(A) of the APA. Mr. Ross’s reason for adding the citizenship question was “solely” because the Justice Department “initiated the request” for the purpose of enforcing the Voting Rights Act, which relies on  data collected by the Census Bureau.  However, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority along with the four liberal justice, indicated that “the evidence tells a story that does not match the explanation the Secretary gave for his decision.” The chief justice further opined that the voting rights rationale offered by Mr. Ross depended on an “incongruent” explanation that was not supported by proper evidence. “It is rare to review a record as extensive as the one before us when evaluating informal agency action — and it should be,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote. “But having done so for the sufficient reasons we have explained, we cannot ignore the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given.” The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the lower court so that the Commerce Department could provide a better explanation.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Commerce v. New York may provide a sliver of hope on how the Supreme Court may rule, if Justice Roberts and the four liberal justices again reach agreement that the administration’s justification in rescinding DACA was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The key issue is whether the post hoc rationalization by the Trump administration for rescinding the DACA program by DHS Secretary Nielsen  was arbitrary and capricious in light of an earlier 2014 Department of Justice memo justifying its legibility.

The Trump administration’s animus against immigrants is no secret, and all its actions, whether it was the imposition of the travel ban against nationals of mainly Muslim countries or the repeal of DACA are driven by this animus. It is thus heartening that the Supreme Court did not make the same mistake as it made in Trump v. Hawaii by taking at face value Commerce Secretary’s “contrived” explanation for adding the citizenship question. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will continue on the same trajectory when it rules on  President Trump’s rescission of DACA, and emphasize that although President Trump has broad powers relating to immigration, his actions must be held against the arbitrary and capricious standard under §706(2)(A) of the APA. Since most of the Trump administration’s actions have been executive rather than legislative, challenging them under the APA appears to be the most viable and effective path. Justice Robert’s invocation of Justice Friendly in the census decision is especially relevant as the Supreme Court continues to review Trump’s executive actions relating to immigrants:

Our review is deferential, but we are “not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.” United States v. Stanchich, 550 F. 2d 1294, 1300 (CA2 1977) (Friendly, J.). The reasoned explanation requirement of administrative law, after all, is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public. Accepting contrived reasons would defeat the purpose of the enterprise. If judicial review is to be more than an empty ritual, it must demand something better than the explanation offered for the action taken in this case.