Cyrus Mehta

Positive Changes to 90-Day Misrepresentation Guidance in the Foreign Affairs Manual – Especially for Foreign Students

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In September 2017, the State Department abruptly amended the Foreign Affairs Manual to provide consular officers with broader grounds to find that foreign nationals misrepresented their intentions when they came to the United States on nonimmigrant visas.  A finding of fraud or misrepresentation under INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) can result in a permanent ground of inadmissibility. I previously blogged on this development here and here,  I am blogging yet again because I am pleased to report on further recent changes,  which are more positive this time especially for foreign students.

In order to presume fraud or misrepresentation, the applicant must have engaged in conduct inconsistent with representations made to consular officers or DHS officers within 90 days of applying for a visa, admission or other immigration benefit. If the foreign national engaged in inconsistent conduct more than 90 days after entry, no presumption of willful misrepresentation arises, although consular officers may still find facts that provide a reasonable belief that the foreign national misrepresented his or her purpose of travel at the time of applying for a visa or admission into the US. Although this provision is popularly known as the “90 Day Misrepresentation Rule”, the FAM is not codified law or regulation, but merely sub-regulatory guidance for consular officials abroad. Thus, I prefer to call it guidance rather than a rule.

The latest modification at 9 FAM 302.9-4(B)(3)(g)(2) cites the following examples of inconsistent conduct that can result in a presumption of willful misrepresentation:

(i)Engaging in unauthorized employment;

(ii) Enrolling in a course of academic study, if such study is not authorized for that nonimmigrant classification (e.g. B status);

(iii)A nonimmigrant in B or F status, or any other status prohibiting immigrant intent, marrying a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident and taking up residence in the United States; or

(iv)Undertaking any other activity for which a change of status or an adjustment of status would be required, without the benefit of such a change or adjustment.

The big change is in (iii) where the words “or F status, or any other” have been stricken. The omission of these few words provides welcome relief to students in F status who study in the US as well as other nonimmigrants in status prohibiting immigrant intent such as J status. A student who travels abroad for vacation, but has planned to get married to a US citizen shortly after the vacation, no longer needs to fear being found to have willfully misrepresented his  or her intentions at the time of admission. Although (iii) contemplates marriage to a US citizen and taking up residence in the United States thereafter, it could encompass other scenarios, such as a student filing an adjustment of status application, based on an approved  I-140 petition with a current priority date, after returning from a brief trip overseas.

This welcome change appears to acknowledge an inherent dual intent in all nonimmigrant visa categories. In Matter of Hosseinpour, 15 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1975), the Board of Immigration Appeals following earlier precedents held that “a desire to remain in this country permanently in accordance with the law, should the opportunity to do so present itself, is not necessarily inconsistent with lawful nonimmigrant status.” Thus, conflating a desire to remain in the United States is not inconsistent with any nonimmigrant visa classification at the time of applying for the visa or admission. See e.g.Garavito v. INS, 901 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1990) (the filing of an immigrant visa petition on behalf of a foreign national does not negate nonimmigrant intent).

Such inherent dual intent as established in Matter of Hosseinpour is also applicable to one who enters the United States in B status too, but the B nonimmigrant still seems vulnerable to a charge of fraud or misrepresentation based on conduct inconsistent with what was represented to the consular or DHS officer. Still, there are other positive and sensible changes in the FAM that apply to all nonimmigrants, especially in the  preceding section at 9 FAM 302.9-4(B)(3)(g)(1). For ease of reference, the entire section is reproduced below with the changes reflected in Red Italics.

(U) Activities that May Indicate A Possible Violation of Status or Conduct Inconsistent with Status

  1. (U) In General:
    1. (U) In determining whether a misrepresentation has been made, some questions may arise from cases involving aliens in the United States who have performed activities that are inconsistent with representations they made to consular officers or DHS officers when applying for admission to the United States, for a visa, or for another immigration benefit.  Such cases occur most frequently with respect to aliens who, after being admitted to the United States, engage in activities for which a change of status or an adjustment of status would be required, without the benefit of such a change or adjustment of status.
    2. (U) In determining whether a misrepresentation has been made, some questions may arise from cases involving aliens in the United States who have performed activities that are inconsistent with representations they made to consular officers or DHS officers when applying for admission to the United States, for a visa, or for another immigration benefit.  Such cases occur most frequently with respect to aliens who, after being admitted to the United States, engage in activities for which a change of status or an adjustment of status would be required, without the benefit of such a change or adjustment of status.
    3. (U) The fact that an alien’s subsequent actions are inconsistent with what was represented at the time of visa application, admission to the United States, or in a filing for another type of benefit does not automatically mean that the alien’s intentions were misrepresented at the time of either the visa application or application for admission to the United States.  To conclude there was a misrepresentation, you must make a finding that there is direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to meet the “reason to believe” standard, which requires more than mere suspicion and is akin to probable cause.  See In re Jose Manuel Isabel Diaz (BIA Dec. 30, 2013).  If the activities happened within 90 days after the visa application and/or application for admission to the United States, please see paragraph (2) below.

(U) Note: The case notes must reflect that, when applying for admission into the U.S. or for a visa, the alien stated either orally or in writing to a consular or immigration officer that the purpose of travel was consistent with the nonimmigrant visa class sought.  (For example: “The officer finds that the applicant told the officer at the port of entry that his purpose of travel was consistent with the visa class held.”)

 

The heading of 9 FAM 302.9-4(B)(3)(g)(1) now reads “Activities that May Indicate A Possible Violation of Status or Conduct Inconsistent with Status” thus suggesting more discretion and leeway before a consular officer jumps to the conclusion that the application misrepresented his or her intention.  Notwithstanding the 90 day period, so long as one initially entered the United States with the intention that was consistent with the visa status, such as to visit the US for tourism, in B-2 status, but then genuinely changed one’s mind and got married to a US citizen within 90 days, the presumption of misrepresentation can be rebutted if it can be demonstration that the intent at the time of admission was consistent with the B-2 status. The guidance goes onto further state that even if the conduct was inconsistent to what was previously represented to the consular or DHS officer,  there should not be an automatic presumption of fraud or misrepresentation. Consular officers are not permitted to go along with a hunch or mere suspicion, the FAM cautions. Rather, consular officers must adopt the reason to believe standard: “To conclude there was a misrepresentation, you must make a finding that there is direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to meet the “reason to believe” standard, which requires more than mere suspicion and is akin to probable cause.  See In re Jose Manuel Isabel Diaz (BIA Dec. 30, 2013).”  “Probable cause” is generally associated with a reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty, see e.g. Ludecke v. United States Marshall, 15 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 1994).   Thus, the implementation of “probable cause” gives more room for an applicant to rebut an accusation of misrepresentation.

Finally, the insertion of  “engage in activities for which a change of status or an adjustment of status would be required, without the benefit of such a change or adjustment of status” appears to be in harmony with prong (iv) of 9 FAM 302.9-4(B)(3)(g)(2). Prong (iv) says the same thing: “Undertaking any other activity for which a change of status or an adjustment of status would be required, without the benefit of such a change or adjustment.” As I had suggested in the prior prior blog, the applicant should only be penalized if he or she engaged in activities without applying for a change of status or adjustment of status. Assume that a person is admitted into the United States in B-2 status for purposes of tourism but who is also an exceptional violinist. Suppose this person begins to get paid for violin performances within 30 days of admission. Such an activity would likely be inconsistent with the purpose of the B-2 visa and she would probably be presumed to have misrepresented her intentions under the 90 day guidance. On the other hand, if this person’s employer first files a change of status from B-2 to O-1B (a visa for people who can show extraordinary ability in the arts or extraordinary achievement in the motion pictures or television industry) on the 30thday, and she only begins to concertize as a violinist after the O-1B petition and request for change of status from B-2 to O-1B is approved, a literal reading of the prong (iv) criterion suggests that the 90 day rule has not been implicated. This person undertook the work activity “for which a change of status would be required” and should not be presumed to have misrepresented under INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) even though the change of status application was filed within 90 days.

It should be noted that this interpretation must be viewed from the State Department’s perspective that resulted in this guidance in the FAM. The USCIS, which adjudicates visa petitions within the US, will not be bound and the DOS is not trying to ask other agencies to follow this interpretation. Thus, what the DOS is really saying is that if the USCIS approves such a change of status petition that was filed within 90 days, a consular official will not find a person inadmissible for misrepresentation, if the USCIS already approved it. Also, since the salutary change for students in the FAM guidance is for consular officers, a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer at the airport may not be guided by it, and may not even know about it. Thus, a foreign student who has resided in the United States for several years coming back from a brief weekend trip from Canada could still be suspected for misrepresenting his or her intentions as a nonimmigrant if there is a plan to marry a US citizen and adjust status in the US.

It is hoped that the change in the FAM guidance benefitting foreign nonimmigrant students will guide USCIS and CBP too. It makes little sense to penalize a bona fide foreign student who plans to marry and adjust status just because of a short vacation overseas. The inherent dual intent wisely recognized by the Board of Immigration Appeals in all nonimmigrant visa categories in Matter of Hosseinpour ought to be part of guiding policy for all the agencies administering the Immigration and Nationality Act. One who enters the United States as a nonimmigrant to pursue the objectives of the visa, but who also desires to immigrate, should not be viewed in the same way as one who commits blatant fraud. Nonimmigrants should be allowed to follow their destiny as it naturally unfolds in the United States without having to worry about being accused of engaging in inconsistent actions within 90 days of their admission.

Cyrus Mehta

AG Barr Cannot Ignore the Constitution: The AG’s Latest Attack on Asylum Seekers in Matter of M-S-

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By: Sophia Genovese*

The Attorney General cannot selectively choose when to apply the rule of law. Yet when it comes to immigrants, the government feels emboldened to ignore the constitutional protections that are afforded to immigrants.

In his most recent self-certification, Matter of M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019), the Attorney General unilaterally decided that asylum seekers who entered without inspection and who have been found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture are ineligible for release from detention on bond. Notably, in footnote 1, AG Barr proclaims “[t]his opinion does not address whether detaining transferred aliens for the duration of their removal proceedings poses a constitutional problem, a question that Attorney General Sessions did not certify and that is the subject of ongoing litigation.” 27 I&N Dec. at 509. In addition, because the ruling affects a “sizeable population” of asylum seekers, and also because it would have a significant impact on detention operations, the Attorney General ordered his ruling to take effect 90 days after his order, which falls on July 15, 2019. Id. at note 8.

Matter of M-S- overruled Matter of X-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 731 (BIA 2005), which held that an asylum seeker who is initially placed in expedited removal proceedings under INA § 235(b)(1)(A), but who then is placed in INA § 240 proceedings after a positive credible fear determination, is eligible for a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. Matter of X-K- did not apply to “arriving aliens,” i.e. those individuals who presented at a port of entry and claimed asylum; instead, it applied to the class of foreign nationals who have entered without inspection and who have been present for fewer than 14 days within 100 miles of the border. In Matter of X-K-, the Board found that Immigration Judges have custody jurisdiction over foreign nationals in INA § 240 proceedings, “with specifically designated exceptions” as outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i). 23 I&N Dec. at 731. Because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i) does not exclude asylum seekers who are placed in INA § 240 proceedings after a positive credible fear determination, the BIA concluded that Immigration Judges have jurisdiction over their bond proceedings.

The main bone of contention in Matter of M-S- is one of statutory interpretation. In Matter of X-K-, the Board explained that, “the Act provides for the mandatory detention of aliens who are being processed under section 235(b)(1) proceedings ‘pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.’” 23 I&N Dec. at 734. The BIA reasoned that because the regulations are silent on the bond eligibility of asylum seekers after there has been a final credible fear determination, authority over custody re-determinations vests with the Immigration Judge since the asylum seekers are placed INA § 240 proceedings and because they do not fit under any of the exceptions outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i).

The AG in Matter of M-S-, in contrast, looks to INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), which states that, if it is determined that an asylum seeker possesses a credible fear of persecution “the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” 27 I&N Dec. at 510. The AG reasons that the plain language of the Act provides for the mandatory detention of asylum seekers, but that they remain eligible for release on humanitarian parole under INA § 212(d)(5)(A). Id.

Although the BIA does not opine on constitutional matters, it cannot issue unconstitutional rulings. The Attorney General’s ruling in Matter of M-S- runs afoul of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. Although asylum seekers will still be eligible for release on humanitarian parole under INA § 212(d)(5)(A), the standards are far different than bond eligibility where the asylum seeker must demonstrate that their parole is for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. This is distinct from, and far more limited than, parole eligibility for arriving aliens under ICE Directive 11002.1, “Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture.” As a reminder, under Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006), the BIA interpreted INA § 236(a) to require an asylum seeker to establish that he or she does not present a danger to others, is not a threat to the national security, and is not a flight risk in order to be released on bond. As a result of Matter of M-S-, far fewer asylum seekers will be able to obtain release from detention.

Padilla v. ICE

After then-Attorney General Sessions referred Matter of M-S- to himself, but before AG Barr rendered his decision, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington issued a preliminary injunction in Padilla v. US Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. C18-928 MJP (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 2019). The Honorable Marsha J. Pechman ordered that by May 5, 2019, the EOIR must conduct bond hearings for class members (defined as all detained asylum seekers who entered the US without inspection, were initially placed in expedited removal proceedings, and who were determined to have a credible fear of persecution) within seven days, and place the burden of proof on DHS in those bond proceedings to demonstrate why they should not be released on bond, among other holdings. In so ordering injunctive relief, Judge Pechman found that Padilla and class members were likely to succeed on the merits, that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction, that a balance of equities favored the moving party, and that the injunction was in the public interest. Id. at 4.

Judge Pechman relied on Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) and Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2019) in analyzing Padilla’s likelihood of success on the merits. In particular, she noted that “it has been long recognized that immigration detainees have a constitutionally-protected interest in their freedom” and that “freedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Padilla at 6. Judge Pechman rejected the government’s arguments that the class was not entitled to due process under Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953), finding that Shaughnessy only applied to “excludable” immigrants. Id. Rather, she relied on United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1995 (9th Cir. 2014) and Zadvydas in finding that “once an individual has entered the country, [she or] he is entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause […] including their right to be free from indeterminate civil detention.” Padilla at 7.

Where Do We Go From Here?

Going forward, practitioners should first keep in mind the effective dates of both Padilla v. ICE and Matter of M-S-. The Padilla injunction takes effect on May 5, 2019, and accordingly, practitioners should fully argue their bond motions under such authority. Matter of M-S- does not take effect until July 15, 2019. However, practitioners should be prepared to remind Immigration Judges that basing their bond denials on Matter of M-S-, or ‘the spirit of Matter of M-S-,’ is inappropriate. Indeed, several practitioners have already reported that Immigration Judges have cited to Matter of M-S- as reason for bond denial, despite the fact that it would have been appropriate for the IJs to find that they do not have jurisdiction over such motions in light of the decision.

Second, even after July 15th (if there has not already been an emergency stay of the implementation of Matter of M-S- by then), practitioners should argue that Padilla supersedes Matter of M-S-. The Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) held that where there is an ambiguity in the law, courts should generally defer to the decisions of an executive agency charged with administering it. In so doing, courts must interpret the statute and the intent of Congress before engaging in deference. In Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a prior court’s construction of a statute that is in conflict with an agency’s ruling can only supersede the agency’s ruling if the statute in question is unambiguous. Additionally, under Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy 6 U.S. 64 (1804), the Supreme Court held that statutes should be construed where possible to avoid conflict with international law.

Practitioners should seek to explain that Padilla is a nationwide injunction, and accordingly has greater judicial weight than a BIA case where this situation is distinguishable from Brand X. Moreover, in Matter of X-K-, although the BIA believed that there was a regulatory gap in jurisdiction over custody redetermination, it found that there was legislative history that suggested Immigration Judges do indeed have authority over bond proceedings. 23 I&N Dec. at 734; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 209 (1996). One may also argue that INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) unambiguously does not apply to asylum seekers who are not arriving aliens, as it refers to “certain other aliens,” and once they are placed in INA § 240 proceedings, they should eligible for bond. Furthermore, under Charming Betsy, one can argue that the detention of asylum seekers in the Padilla class runs afoul of international law, and deference to Matter of M-S- should not be given. See, e.g., Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (“The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees…”); Articles 3 and 9 if Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (dealing with the fundamental rights to liberty). Practitioners should continue to ponder and challenge Chevron and even Skidmore deference to the Attorney General’s self-certified cases. In so doing, they may find the late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s reasoning in his concurring opinion for Crandon v. United States, a criminal case, to be instructive:

[W]e have never thought that the interpretation of those charged with prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference [… Prosecutors have an incentive] to err in the direction of inclusion rather than exclusion—assuming, to be on the safe side, that the statute may cover more than is entirely apparent […] Thus, to give persuasive effect to the Government’s expansive advice-giving interpretation […] would [replace] the doctrine of lenity with a doctrine of severity.

494 U.S. 152, 177-788 (1990).

Lastly, practitioners should continue to argue in their bond motions (and subsequent appeals) that Matter of M-S- violates the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, practitioners can argue that due process requires “adequate procedural protections” to ensure that the government’s justification for physical confinement “outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–91; see also, Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010). Practitioners should also raise due process concerns where immigration detention has proven to be a major barrier to access to counsel, and where medical and mental healthcare in detention are subpar, which can have a substantial impact on one’s ability to prevail in their immigration proceedings (note, though, that practitioners may also want to seek humanitarian parole if their clients do have any sort of medical hardship in addition to seeking release on bond). Practitioners should be prepared to defend against the government’s assertions that Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. __ (2018) allows for the indefinite detention of asylum seekers and that they are not eligible for release. Practitioners may wish to point out that Jennings v. Rodriguez is actually on remand for the Ninth Circuit to consider the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to indefinite detention, which the Supreme Court did not address, and may also wish to point out that the case deals with a separate class of foreign nationals.

There is no shortage of battles to fight under Trump’s regime. However, practitioners should continue to come together and zealously fight these egregious and unlawful policies. Practitioners are encouraged to check with their local immigration law chapters and litigious nonprofits to ensure that each and every one of our clients is advocated for. If we have learned anything over the past several years, it is that immigration advocates, backed by the power  of the courts, will continue to uphold the law by ensuring that we provide safety and refuge to those fleeing persecution.

 

*Guest author Sophia Genovese is a Direct Services Attorney for the Southeast Immigrant Freedom Initiative (SIFI), a project of the Southern Poverty Law Center. Sophia works exclusively with immigrants and asylum seekers detained at the Irwin County Detention Center in rural Georgia. There, she represents immigrants in their bond and parole proceedings, as well as in their merits cases. Sophia previously worked as an Associate at Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners PLLC, where she gained critical insights into immigration law.

David Isaacson

Are the Canadian and U.S. Refugee/Asylum Processes Really “Similar Enough”? How the New Refugee Bar in Bill C-97 Is Based on a Misunderstanding of U.S. Asylum Law

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In a development decried by several refugee-serving and civil rights organizations, the Canadian government’s proposed budget bill, Bill C-97, contains within it an amendment to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) that would, as described by the bill’s official summary, “introduce a new ground of ineligibility for refugee protection if a claimant has previously made a claim for refugee protection in another country.”  More specifically, according to the new paragraph c.1 that would be added to subsection 101(1) of IRPA by section 306 of Bill C-97, a refugee claimant would be ineligible to have their case referred to the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) for a full hearing if

“the claimant has, before making a claim for refugee protection in Canada, made a claim for refugee protection to a country other than Canada, and the fact of its having been made has been confirmed in accordance with an agreement or arrangement entered into by Canada and that country for the purpose of facilitating information sharing to assist in the administration and enforcement of their immigration and citizenship laws”.

Instead, such claimants would be relegated to a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA), a primarily paper-based process which is known to have a significantly lower approval rate than RPD hearings.

There are a few countries with which Canada has such an information-sharing agreement, including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.  The primary purpose of new paragraph 101(1)(c.1), however, appears to be to bar refugee claims in Canada by those who have already made claims in the United States, or so an official government spokesperson has told the media:

“Mathieu Genest, a spokesman for Immigration Minister Ahmed Hussen, said the change’s primary effect is expected to be on people whose refugee claims have been rejected in the United States and who then try again in Canada. . . . .  The provision is based on the belief that Canada’s refugee system is similar enough to that of the U.S. that anyone rejected there is likely to be rejected here as well, Genest said.”

Although many refugee claimants arriving from the United States at a land port of entry are already barred by the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) – which is currently the subject of a challenge in the Federal Court of Canada – the STCA has exceptions for certain persons with relatives already in Canada and others.  It also does not apply to claims made by persons already inside Canada, a substantial number of which have recently been made after irregular entries into Canada away from an official port of entry that the government may be trying to discourage through this new legislation.  Thus, even with respect to the United States, the new bar would go beyond the STCA.

The “belief” expressed by Mr. Genest regarding the degree of similarity of the U.S. and Canadian asylum and refugee systems, however, is misguided.  The systems in fact have significant differences.  If the Canadian government is relying on the notion that anyone rejected in the U.S. asylum and refugee system is likely to be rejected in the Canadian one, that is a compelling reason (in addition to other reasons beyond the scope of this blog post) to follow the above-mentioned refugee and human rights organizations and “urge, in the strongest possible terms, that the government withdraw this measure from the Budget Implementation Act.”

For one thing, under U.S. asylum law, an asylum application can be denied solely because it was not made sufficiently soon after the applicant’s arrival in the United States.  Pursuant to INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), the right to seek asylum generally does not apply “unless the alien demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.”  There are limited exceptions for changed and extraordinary circumstances under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D), but if not qualifying under those, an asylum applicant will be relegated to seeking withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), or under the Convention Against Torture.  Besides allowing removal to other countries and not providing a route to permanent status, however, withholding of removal requires a higher standard of proof than asylum: one must show a clear probability of persecution for withholding, that is, show that persecution is more likely than not, while asylum requires only a well-founded fear of persecution.  The difference was made clear more than 30 years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).  (At that time, there was no one-year time limit, but asylum and withholding of what was then deportation were still importantly distinct in that withholding was mandatory if the higher burden of proof was met, while asylum was and remains a discretionary benefit, as the Supreme Court explained.)

Under Canadian law, on the other hand, while a delay in applying for refugee status may be seen as evidence of lack of subjective fear, it does not lead to a categorical bar.  As the Federal Court reiterated less than two years in Kivalo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 728:

“Justice Zinn provided a helpful summary of the law regarding delay in claiming protection in Gurung v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1097, [2010] FCJ No 1368 (QL), noting at para 21 that delay may be a valid factor to consider, but delay does not automatically result in a finding of lack of subjective fear. The circumstances and explanations for the delay must be considered.”

Indeed, it was already “well settled law” over a decade ago, according to Juan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 809, that although “a delay in seeking refugee status may be a relevant factor when assessing a claimant’s credibility . . . .  delay in claiming protection cannot, in and of itself, justify the rejection of a claim to Refugee status or to protection.”

Thus, a claimant who can show a well-founded fear of persecution, a realistic chance, but cannot meet the more-likely-than-not burden of withholding of removal, and who has delayed in seeking protection, may be rejected under United States law when he would have been accepted under Canadian law.

Moreover, unless an error of law has been made, a denial under the one-year bar is not judicially reviewable under the United States.  Pursuant to INA § 208(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), “No court shall have jurisdiction to review a determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).”  While the exception under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) allowing judicial review of “constitutional claims or questions of law” is an important one, it does not alter the fact that with respect to factual determinations, there will be no independent review to determine whether an administrative decision may have been unreasonable.  In the Canadian system, on the other hand, even aspects of the refugee determination as to which administrative decision-makers are given deference by the courts will be reviewed for reasonableness, because as explained in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, “The rule of law requires that the constitutional role of superior courts be preserved and, as indicated above, neither Parliament nor any legislature can completely remove the courts’ power to review the actions and decisions of administrative bodies.  This power is constitutionally protected.”  This difference is yet a further dissimilarity between the U.S. and Canadian systems.

Nor is the lack of judicial review of one-year deadline issues the only important procedural difference in the treatment of refugee and asylum claims under Canadian and U.S. law.  Members of the IRB generally and the RPD in particular “are independent decision makers at an independent administrative tribunal operating at arm’s length from government.”  “The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada is an independent tribunal established by the Parliament of Canada.”  The Immigration Judges and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) who process many asylum applications in the United States, on the other hand, rather infamously do not meet that description.  Under 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(h)(1)(i), their decisions are subject to review by the Attorney General, a political appointee, to whom they are subordinate.  There has been much discussion of proposals to establish an independent “Article I Court” to address U.S. immigration cases, but at the moment the Immigration Judges and BIA are situated firmly within the Executive Branch under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, rather than being at arm’s length from the government.  Where certain types of asylum claims are deemed politically inconvenient, they may for this reason face rejection under U.S. law where they would not under Canadian law.

The subordination of the BIA and Immigration Courts to the Attorney General is not merely a theoretical issue.  Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions rendered several precedent decisions, required to be followed by the BIA and Immigration Judges and without analogy in Canadian refugee law, which sought to restrict available bases for asylum and the procedures to be followed in adjudicating asylum claims.  In Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), for example, Attorney General Sessions sought to restrict eligibility for asylum by victims of domestic violence (although as discussed in a blog post by my partner Cyrus D. Mehta, some such claims may still be possible), and in Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I&N Dec. 226 (A.G. 2018), Attorney General Sessions overturned a BIA decision that had made clear asylum-seekers generally had the right to a full evidentiary hearing.  Immigration Judges were also instructed to adhere to a case-completion quota that has been criticized as giving rise to an “assembly line” version of (in)justice.

An asylum claimant asserting persecution relating to domestic violence, or raising a complex claim the merits of which are not apparent prior to an evidentiary hearing, may thus also be denied asylum in the United States even if they would be granted refugee status in Canada.  Victims of domestic violence may still claim protection in Canada, as in Kauhonina v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1300, and Jeanty v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 453. And while the RPD may favorably resolve some less complex claims upon review of the file without a hearing, the reverse is not true: “where a member determines that a claim cannot be accepted through the file-review process, the claimant will have an opportunity to their case at a hearing.”

The Attorney General’s supervisory role in the process, and the related lack of independence of Immigration Judges and the BIA compared to the IRB, is not the only important procedural difference between the U.S. asylum process and Canadian refugee-claim process that could lead to different outcomes.  There is also an important difference in the nature of the administrative appellate review provided by the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) of the IRB as opposed to the review provided by the BIA.

When the RAD reviews a decision of the RPD, it generally, under the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, reviews the decision for correctness.  There is an exception, set out in paragraph 70 of Huruglica, for certain instances in which “the RPD enjoy[ed] a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because they require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to the oral evidence it hears.”  But in general, the RPD’s decision may be overturned if the RAD panel believes it not to be correct, even in cases involving the credibility of testimony.  The BIA, on the other hand, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(3)(i), “will not engage in de novo review of findings of fact determined by an immigration judge. Facts determined by the immigration judge, including findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to determine whether the findings of the immigration judge are clearly erroneous.”

This distinction is particularly significant because of the dramatic disparities between the rates at which different U.S. Immigration Judges grant asylum.  Records compiled by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University, for example, show that asylum grant rates over the same 5-year period can range from as high as 97% to as low as less than 3%. Another TRAC report covering a slightly different five-year period found that even within the same immigration courts, in Newark and in San Francisco, the asylum grant rates of different Immigration Judges ranged from less than 3% up to as high as 89% (in Newark) or 91% (in San Francisco).  When an unusually skeptical Immigration Judge makes an unfavorable finding of fact, even if it relates to country conditions background materials or some other area where credibility of oral testimony is not at issue, the BIA will not intervene unless clear error can be shown.

Where the decision of an overly-skeptical RPD member is subject to RAD review, on the other hand, the RAD’s review for correctness can catch factual errors that fall short of being clearly erroneous.  RAD review is not available for all refugee claims, and for example claims made at a Canada-U.S. port of entry under an exception to the STCA are not entitled to RAD review pursuant to section 110(2)(d) of IRPA, but an applicant who is outside the coverage of the STCA by virtue of having crossed into Canada away from a port of entry before making a claim would be entitled to RAD review, and indeed such applicants often have their cases reviewed by the RAD.  This is another reason why such a claimant, even if denied asylum in the United States, might obtain refugee status in Canada, were it not for the new bar to be added by Bill C-97.

For all of these reasons, it is simply not true that “Canada’s refugee system is similar enough to that of the U.S. that anyone rejected there is likely to be rejected here as well.”  The Bill C-97 amendment to IRPA based on this false premise should itself be rejected.

Cyrus Mehta

The Nuts and Bolts of Complying with the H-1B Notice Requirements

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A US employer has to meet several requirements when filing an H-1B visa petition on behalf of the foreign national employee. One important requirement is for the employer to notify affected US workers regarding its intent to hire a foreign worker in H-1B nonimmigrant status. The notification requirement is considered to be an important protection for US workers as it informs them of the terms of the employment of the nonimmigrant H-1B worker, including the wage being offered, and the right of the US worker to examine documents justifying the wage, as well as the ability of the US worker to file complaints if they believe that violations have occurred.

The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has issued useful guidance regarding H-1B notice requirements by electronic posting in a Field Assistance Bulletin dated March 15, 2019 (FAB).  The WHD has seen a rise in the use of electronic notification by employers who file H-1B petitions. Employers have the option to notify US workers either through a hard copy notice or through electronic means. In the case of large employers, especially consulting companies who place thousands of H-1B workers at third party worksites of their clients, they have been using their own public website to meet the notification obligation. The FAB clarifies that use of a public website is permissible provided “all affected workers, including those employed by a third party, have access to, and are aware of, the electronic notification.”

212(n)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides the legal basis for employers to provide notification to affected US workers of its intent to hire H-1B nonimmigrant workers. This notification obligation is triggered prior to the employer filing the Labor Condition Application (LCA). It is only after the LCA is certified that an employer may file the Form I-129 petition to classify the foreign worker for an H-1B visa or H-1B status. The DOL is required to certify the LCA within 7 days unless the information provided therein is inaccurate or incomplete. The notice must be given on or within 30 days before the date the LCA is filed with the DOL. It is important to first post and then electronically file the LCA in order to ensure perfect compliance.

20 CFR 655.734 provides further guidance on the employer’s notification obligation. Employers may comply with their notification obligation by posting either a hard copy notice or by electronic notification. Where there is a collective bargaining representative for the occupational classification in which H-1B nonimmigrants will be employed, the employer must provide the notice to the collective bargaining representative on or 30 days before the date the LCA is filed with the DOL.

Regarding who affected workers are, the FAB states:

“Affected workers are those at the same place of employment and in the same occupational classification in which H-1B workers will be or are employed. See 65 FR 80110; 80161. Affected workers need not be employed by the H-1B petitioner to qualify as such: the H-1B petitioner’s notification responsibilities extend to all affected employees, regardless of whether they are employed by the H-1B petitioner or by a third party company. Id.”

The FAB then goes onto discuss hard copy and electronic notification requirements.

Hard Copy Posting Requirements

These requirements are set forth in 20 CFR 655.734(a)(1)(ii). The petitioning employer must post notice in at least two conspicuous places at the place of employment so that affected workers can easily see and read the posted notices. The notice shall indicate that H-1B nonimmigrants are sought; the number of such nonimmigrants the employer is seeking; the occupational classification; the wages offered; the period of employment; the locations at which the H-1B nonimmigrant will be employed, and that the LCA is available for public inspection at the employer’s principal place of business or at the worksite. The notice shall also include the following statement: “Complaints alleging misrepresentation of material facts in the labor condition application and/or failure to comply with the terms of the labor condition application may be filed with any office of the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor.”

There are additional requirements for H-1B dependent employers or willful violators who are not using exempt workers, which are also set forth in the regulation.

A copy of the LCA that is posted at two conspicuous locations also fulfills the notice requirement.  Note, though, that the most recent version of ETA 9035 requires the employer to indicate the business name and address of the entity, if the H-1B worker will be assigned to a third party site. Thus, the information contained in the LCA, if it is used to fulfill the notice requirement, goes beyond what is required in the regulation. 20 CFR 655.734(a)(1)(ii) only requires notification of the “location(s) at which the H-1B nonimmigrants will be employed” and not the business name and address of the entity.

The FAB states that an employer will not be in compliance of its notice obligation if it posts the “hard copy notification, for example, in a custodial closet or little visited basement.” 20 CFR 655.734(a)(1)(ii)(A)(2) suggests that appropriate locations for posting could be in immediate proximity to wage and hour notices or occupational safety and health notices. Still, if the intention of the notice is for workers in the same occupational classification to see them, then the notices could conceivably be posted conspicuously in the place where say software engineers in a large company congregate, such as in their pantry or recreational area. It would, however,  be prudent for the employer to post the hard copy in the vicinity of other notices that the employer is obligated to post under law as that would maximize the ability of affected workers to read it.

The employer who intends to employ H-1B workers at third party worksites also has an obligation to post at the third party site even if that place is not owned by the petitioner. The FAB suggests that the hard copy posting must be placed in a location available to all affected employees. “For example, if the H-1B petitioner posts at a third-party worksite, but in a physical location accessible only to its own employees (such as a private employee lounge or office) affected workers employed by the third-party have not been notified and the employer has not complied with this provision.”

There have been instances of entities that receive H-1B workers who do not cooperate with the posting requirement. The H-1B petitioner, unfortunately, is still liable for violating the notification requirement even if the third party entity refuses to post the notice. See Administrator v. Sirsal, Inc. and Vijay Gunturu, 11-LCA-1 (ALJ July 27, 2012).  There is no legal basis for penalizing the third party that refuses to cooperate.  Some petitioners in a good faith attempt to comply, when the third party refuses to post,  have the H-1B worker post the notice on his or her cubicle, but this  attempt, even if sincere,  may still not be in compliance if the posting is not visible to all affected workers in the occupational classification at the third party worksite.

The notice shall be posted on or within 30 days before the date LCA is filed, and shall remain posted for a total of 10 days.

Electronic Notification

In cases where the third party entity refuses to cooperate, electronic notification may be a way for the employer to be in compliance, especially those who place large number of H-1B workers at many worksites throughout the country. Electronic notification is as effective as hard copy notification under 20 CFR 655.734(a)(1)(ii)(B). The employer, according to the FAB, “must make the notification readily available, as a practical matter, to all affected employees.” Thus, the affected worker must be capable of accessing the electronic notification. The employer may e mail or actively circulate electronic messages such as through an employer newsletter.

Such notification shall be given on or within 30 days before the date the LCA is filed, and shall be available to the affected employees for a total of 10 days, except that if employees are provided individual, direct notice (as by e-mail), notification only need to be given once during the required time period. The notification must contain the same language as a hard copy posting.

With respect to notification to affected workers employed at a third party worksite, when the petitioner places its employees there, electronic notification must be given to “both employees of the H-1B petitioner and employees of another person or entity which owns or operates the place of employment.” 20 CFR 655.734(a)(ii)(B). The FAB still warns that some electronic resources used by H-1B petitioners may not be accessible to affected workers at a third party. Even if employees of the third party site can visit the electronic resource, “if they do not know to visit the electronic resource, the notification is not readily accessible, to affected workers employed by the third party.” And if affected employees have access to the electronic notice, but they cannot determine which notice is applicable to their worksite, the notice is insufficient and the employer will not be in compliance.

Electronic Notification on Public Websites

H-1B petitioners may provide electronic notification on their public websites, so long as the affected workers at the third-party worksite are aware of the notice and are able to determine which notice is applicable to their worksite. A number of large employers post the LCAs on their website and indicate the work locations.

Take for example PwC. PwC’s website has a link to Careers. From the Careers page, one scrolls down to Labor Condition Applications, which in turn takes you to a link to the work location such as San Antonio, TX, which opens up the actual LCA for that location.

Similarly, with respect to Cognizant, one has to go to Careers, and then scroll quite a way down to LCA Notices, which then links to a location, which further links to the LCA notice rather than the actual LCA.

Both PwC and Cognizant are compliant relating to a website posting as the affected workers are able to determine which electronic notice applies to their worksite. However, the FAB indicates that employers may need to do more than just posting the links with the work locations on their websites, and may have to make affected workers aware that the petitioner has posted on its website. This is not to suggest that these companies are not taking additional steps to notify affected workers, but the point being made is that posting the worksite by any employer on its public website may not be enough.  The FAB suggests posting a link to the electronic notice for a particular third-party employer’s intranet site or emailing the link to all affected employees at that worksite. The FAB also suggests that the H-1B petitioner complies, after electronic notification, by posting a hard copy message in a conspicuous site or directing affected workers to the website where the notice is posted for that particular website.

According to Roman Zelichenko, CEO and Co-Founder of LaborLess, the “DOL has allowed for some flexibility.” In the penultimate paragraph, the FAB states that, “an H-1B petitioner may provide this notification using whatever method, or combination of methods, it deems most prudent for its businesses.”  Zelichenko, whose company automates LCA posting for employers and attorneys, adds: “And this makes sense – small companies who hire H-1B workers through a consulting company or staffing firm might use Slack, Microsoft Teams, etc. to communicate with their staff, making that potentially the “most prudent” means of notifying their employees of an LCA posting. For other employers, the easiest way to comply would be to post a notice where they traditionally posted hard copy LCAs, except now it would direct employees to a URL. Ultimately, the memo’s language allows companies to decide for themselves how best to comply, while outlining the basic guidelines those companies should follow if they want to remain compliant.”

Even if an H-1B employer posts electronically, the DOL may still find that the employer is non-compliant if affected workers are not notified about the existence of the electronic posting. The guidance thus suggests that “[a]n H-1B petitioner may default to posting of a hard copy if it cannot ensure that all affected employers have ready access, as a practical matter, to the electronic notice.” The lesson to be learned from this is that electronic notification may not be the ultimate solution, especially to get around a recalcitrant third party entity that refuses to cooperate, and H-1B employers may still have to resort to a paper posting to ensure that all affected workers  have been notified.  And if the third party refuses to post, the H-1B employer is caught in a classic Catch -22!

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

The Best Way for Trump to Offer “Love and Sympathy” is to Repeal the Muslim Ban

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In the aftermath of the killing of 49 people who were peacefully praying in two mosques in Christchurch by a white supremacist, it is worth reflecting on Trump’s travel ban  again.

Trump’s travel ban, also known as the Muslim ban, and all of his other immigration policies, are based on promoting white nationalism. It is thus little surprise that Trump did not firmly denounce white nationalism and did not view it as a worrying trend in the world and instead  blamed a small group of people “with very, very serious problems.” He did not show any revulsion for the suspected killer, Brenton Harrison Tarrant, even though in his manifesto Tarrant praised Trump “as a symbol of renewed white identity and common purpose.”

When Trump was a candidate he said “I think Islam hates us.” He also lied about Muslims across the river in New Jersey celebrating after the September 11 attacks. As a candidate, Trump audaciously called for a “total and complete shutdown for Muslims entering the United States.” It was this animus towards Islam that played to Trump’s electoral base that served as the backdrop for Trump’s executive orders banning people from mostly Muslim countries when he took office. The first two executive orders were struck down by courts. A modified third executive order was fashioned to survive court scrutiny, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii even though two lower courts of appeal struck it down as unconstitutional. The ban has empowered extremists and Islamophobes worldwide.

This may also be the reason why Trump did not specifically express empathy with Muslims in his tweet expressing condolence after the Christchurch massacres, which he tweeted shortly after an interview with Brietbart News where he suggested that his supporters would resort to violence:

My warmest sympathy and best wishes goes out to the people of New Zealand after the horrible massacre in the Mosques. 49 innocent people have so senselessly died, with so many more seriously injured. The U.S. stands by New Zealand for anything we can do. God bless all!

Neither does Trump condemn the killer in this tweet. He insensitively says “best wishes” as if it is a wedding and ends with “God bless all.” One can see white supremacists taking some comfort in this equivocal message. Recall his other infamous equivocal message when he defended neo Nazis in Charlottesville by stating that there are “very fine people on both sides.”  Compare Trump’s statements with those of New Zealand’s premier Jacinda Ardern’s expressing great solidarity with Muslims while wearing a dupatta. She also advised Trump to offer Muslim communities “sympathy and love” when he asked her what the United States could do to help New Zealand.

While nobody is expecting Trump to visit a mosque in Muslim dress, the best way for him to take up Ardern’s offer of “sympathy and love” is to repeal the Muslim ban. It does not matter that the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii upheld the travel ban by a narrow 5-4 majority. The ban has contributed to global Islamophobia, which in turn inspires supremacists like the New Zealand killer to massacre peaceful Muslims during Friday prayer time. There has already been much criticism of the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii. Although Trump made various utterances regarding his animus towards Muslims during his campaign and even after he became president, the majority found the third version of the executive order to be neutral on its face and that it did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of Constitution. Still, ironically, the majority overruled Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which upheld the forced internment of citizens of Japanese-American origin during World War II,  as having no place in the US Constitution. Yet in her powerful dissent, Justice Sotomayor found striking parallels between Korematsu and Trump’s ban. For example, both executive orders were based on dangerous stereotypes about particular groups’ inability to assimilate and their intent to harm the United States.  In both cases, there were scant national security justifications. In both cases, there was strong evidence that there was impermissible animus and hostility that motivated the government’s policy. The Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii is destined to be viewed in the same way as Korematsu – a shameful low point in Supreme Court history.

The Muslim ban views every national of a banned country as  suspect and as someone who possesses a grave threat to the United States even if this person is a grandmother or a baby. While it is true that nationals of banned countries can seek waivers, such waivers are seldom granted and have been viewed as a farce. The ban separates a foreign national spouse of the banned country from uniting with the US citizen spouse. The ban also prevents a banned country national from studying in a US university, taking up employment as a skilled professional on an H-1B visa or attending an academic conference as a visitor. While one is hard pressed to conclude whether the ban  furthers the national security interests of this nation, it definitely inspires white supremacists, who like the Christchurch killer believe that white people will be replaced by Muslims, blacks and Jews who will eventually subordinate them. In his manifesto, the killer referred to himself as a “regular white man” and that he was carrying out this attack to “directly reduce immigration rates to European lands by intimidating and physically removing the invaders themselves.” This is so similar to Trump’s rhetoric where he refers to the “caravan” of Central American migrants as invaders to justify the Wall, which is lapped up by white nationalists. Trump also falsely claimed when speaking about the dangers of the caravan that prayer rugs were found at the border to keep his base happy but also playing to their basest instincts. How could Trump denounce white nationalism when asked about it in the aftermath of Christchurch when he has the support of white nationalists and his immigration policy promotes white nationalism? White nationalism can only be eradicated if Trump is first universally condemned for inspiring it.

Can Trump rise up to the challenge and repeal the travel ban, and reverse so many other of his harsh immigration policies that do nothing to further America’s interests? It is the millions of immigrants who came to America since its inception for a better life that have contributed to the nation’s greatness. Trump has nothing to make America great by undermining the notion of America as a nation of immigrants. Instead, his immigration policies have been deployed to please his mostly white voter base who are insecure that immigrants are invading their country. His base does not represent the majority of Americans who have a positive view of immigrants. Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again” is code for making America white again. Trump likes to cast himself as an incredible leader who has achieved more than any other president in his first two years, but that claim merely exists as fantasy in his mind. A leader can do better than catering to people’s vilest and basest fears, as Trump has done so far.  A leader must inspire Americans to embrace immigrants who, like sugar dissolving in a bowl of full of milk, have sweetened the nation with their enterprise, talents and culture.

Trump’s travel ban is a mere executive order that can be withdrawn with the stroke of a pen. If he does so, it would be a powerful symbolic gesture for expressing solidarity with Muslims after the horrific Christchurch massacres and a blow to the cause of white supremacists and Islamophobes.  If Trump cannot rise to the occasion and view white nationalism as a rising global threat, he will deservedly be viewed no better than a vile white supremacist even though he rose to become president of the United States,  and consigned to history’s garbage bin.

Cyrus Mehta

Advancing a “Social Group Plus” Claim After Matter of A-B-

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In Matter of A-B–, 27 I&N Dec. 227 (A.G. 2018), former Attorney General Jeff Sessions overruled a prior Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) precedent, Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), which held  that victims of domestic violence can qualify for asylum based on their particular social group (PSG) of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.” Although victims of domestic violence has been recognized as a particular social group in US asylum law as well as in the asylum laws of other countries like the United Kingdom,  Canada and New Zealand,  Sessions set aside Matter of A-R-C-G resulting in a setback for persons fleeing domestic violence.

There is much commentary revealing how the reasoning of Matter of A-B was dicta. The application of Matter of A-B has been successfully challenged in the context of credible fear claims in Grace v. Whitaker.  Therefore, despite Matter of A-B, an applicant must still assert membership in a particular social group when fleeing domestic violence. In Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N 227 (BIA 2014), the Board acknowledged that whether a particular social group exists is a case-by-case determination and the AG’s decision should not be read to foreclose alternative particular social group formulations for victims of domestic violence where the facts of the case support it. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N 227, 242 (BIA 2014); Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 227, 319 (AG 2018) (noting that this decision is consistent with Matter of M-E-V-G-).  It may however be prudent for an applicant fleeing domestic violence to assert other grounds of asylum in addition to membership in a particular social group.

As brief background, in order to be granted asylum, the applicant must show that they have suffered past persecution or have a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to, or avail himself or herself of the protection of, their country of origin owing to such persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) & (2).

The agile immigration law practitioner must endeavor to invoke grounds in addition to particular social group when representing an asylum claimant fleeing domestic violence such as race, religion, nationality or political opinion. This is what I refer to as a “social group plus” claim.   Often times, the additional ground can be blended and intertwined with the particular social group ground that would only strengthen this ground, and enable the client’s claim to be readily distinguished from Matter of A-B.

 Religion and Ethnicity

It may be worth exploring whether an applicant can claim asylum on account of race, religion or nationality. Many applicants may belong to ethnic backgrounds or religions whose members may face discrimination in the country. Hence, a victim of domestic violence who belongs to a religion or ethnic group that is disfavored may find it more difficult to seek the help of the authorities when seeking protection from domestic violence perpetrated by a private actor. Establishing this fact, based on the claimant being part of a disfavored group, will enable such a claim from overcoming the elevated concern of “private actor harm” in Matter of A-B. There are several decisions that have acknowledged persecution claims based on religion, ethnicity or both. In one decision, the Board held that the respondent faced anti-Semitic persecution on account of the respondent’s Jewish nationality. Even if ethnicity is not part of the grounds for asylum, an ethnic group may fall under the “nationality” ground.   It can thus be argued that ethnicity or religion can also constitute “nationality”, such as Jewish nationality in the Ukraine, Armenian in Russia or Parsi Zoroastrian in a Muslim majority country. The following decisions support such an argument:

  • Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2015) (Korean ethnicity and evangelical Christian religion).
  • Shi v. AG, 707 F.3d 1231 (11th 2013)(Christian religion in China).
  • Bracic v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1027 (8th 2010) (Muslim religion and Albanian ethnicity).
  • Matter of O-Z and I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23 (BIA 1998) (Jewish nationality).
  • Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183 (2007) (Bihari in Bangladesh was a disfavored group and respondent likely to be targeted as a result).

Moreover, as family qualifies as a social group under Matter of  L-E-A, 29 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017), an applicant can also distinguish ethnicity or religion of the family that stands out in the country or because it may be a vulnerable minority group. This can overcome the nexus barrier in L-E-A. Although former Acting Attorney General Whitaker referred L-E-A to himself, L-E-A is still good law at present. There is also a long history of family units constituting particular social groups. See, e.g., Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 128 (4th Cir. 2011); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2009); Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 629 (7th Cir. 2008). The BIA has previously “explained that ‘persecution on account of membership in a particular social group’ refers to ‘persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic…such as…kinship ties.” Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 955 (BIA 2006) (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA 1985)). “It has been said that a group of family members constitutes the ‘prototypical example’ of a particular social group.” INS, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course: Eligibility Part III: Nexus 21 (Nov. 30, 2001) (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)). “There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family.” Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993).

Imputed Political Opinion

Imputed political opinion can also be developed in a domestic violence asylum case when the abusive spouse is politically powerful and uses the state apparatus to persecute defiant or feminist spouse or spouses who defy their husband’s authority under an honor code such as Kanun in Albania.  Long before there was any precedent decision, in 1996,   I successfully represented a respondent claiming asylum who escaped domestic violence abuse perpetrated by her husband who was a powerful police officer in Bangladesh. He did not allow her to work or start her own business, and thus she was persecuted for expressing herself, which went against the mores of her family and society. She was unable to seek protection as her husband was a powerful police officer.   Around the same time, in another case where I had no involvement,  an Immigration Judge granted asylum to Bangladeshi woman who had been beaten by family on account of her role in the Jatiyo Mahila Party and because of her efforts to lead an independent life. Matter of Sonia Sharmin (A73 556 033, IJ New York, NY, Sept 30, 1996). In Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir 1993), Judge Alito writing for the majority agreed that gender was an immutable characteristic and thus satisfying the particular social group definition, and in addition, the respondent’s feminism or opposition to male dominance constituted political opinion. In a post Matter of A-B– decision, an Immigration Judge in San Francisco granted asylum to a woman from Mexico who suffered abuse from both her mother and her husband  on account of both particular social group and her feminist political opinion.

There is also a nexus between gangs and the government in the Northern Triangle countries. Gangs may control the government, and in some cases they have become the “de facto government” controlling significant areas of the country. This factor too can give rise to an alternative ground for asylum under political opinion.

Consider the following cases in advancing imputed political opinion in addition to membership in a particular social group for an asylum claimant fleeing domestic violence:

  • Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143 (9th 2001) (political opinion encompassed more than electoral politics or formal political ideology or action).
  • Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482 (9th 1997) (political opinion can be an actual opinion held by the applicant or an opinion imputed to him/her by persecutor).
  • Ahmed v. Keisler, supra (Bihari in Bangladesh who wants to be sent to Pakistan can show imputed political opinion in addition to membership in particular social group).
  • Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017 (2d Cir. 1994) (membership in union can constitute social group, but if union is also opposed to the government in economic dispute, can impute political opinion to its member).

Matter of A-B was a cowardly decision based on Session’s personal bias. He abused his authority as Attorney General to overturn an established precedent decision that has provided protection to thousands of victims of domestic violence in the United States. Although Sessions is no longer Attorney General, this is his dark legacy that must not be allowed to undermine the rights of mainly women fleeing domestic violence. Immigration practitioners must use every strategy to both overcome and take down Matter of A-B.

 

Cyrus Mehta

Trump Administration Imposes Another Unnecessary Obstacle: USCIS to Issue New Version of Form I-539 and New I-539A on March 8

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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has announced that the revised Form I-539, Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status, and new Form I-539A, will be published on March 8, 2019, not March 11 as previously reported. USCIS will accept the old form through March 21.

Form I-539 is used for a variety of application types, including:

  • Certain nonimmigrant applications for an extension of stay
  • Certain nonimmigrant applications for a change of status
  • Reinstatement for F-1 and M-1 students

USCIS has expanded the scope of information to be gathered and will change the filing and adjudication requirements. The revised Form I-539 includes the following significant changes:

  • Every co-applicant included on the primary applicant’s Form I-539 must submit and sign a separate Form I-539A. Parents or guardians may sign on behalf of children under 14 or any co-applicant who is not mentally competent to sign.
  • Every applicant and co-applicant must pay an $85 biometric services fee, except certain A, G, and NATO nonimmigrants as noted in the new Form I-539 instructions.
  • Every applicant and co-applicant will receive a biometric services appointment notice, regardless of age, containing their individual receipt number. The biometric services appointments will be scheduled at the Application Support Center (ASC) closest to the primary applicant’s address. Co-applicants who wish to be scheduled at a different ASC location should file a separate Form I-539.

USCIS said it will reject any Form I-539 that is missing any of the required signatures or biometrics fees, including those required for Form I-539A.

The biometric requirement is bound to slow down the process especially when the dependents are accompanying the principal through a premium processing request. The USCIS has always taken the position that premium processing only applies to the principal filing the Form I-129, and processing the I-539 and I-765 is only a courtesy. The new biometric requirement will most likely deprive the dependent of any premium processing. It also seems odd to subject dependents to biometrics, but not the principal beneficiary. Even dependent infants will be subject to biometrics. Besides being cruel, it also adds another layer of uncertainty in the life of a foreign national worker who may also be subject to a denial of the renewal of his or her Form I-129 request.

The new biometric requirement poses yet another obstacle to foreign nationals who are legally in the US and wish to play by the rules. It is completely unnecessary to subject dependents to biometrics when the principal is not. Not only will it deprive dependents from taking advantage of premium processing, but it will lead to further delays with respect to spouses who are seeking to obtain or renew work authorization as H-4 or L-2 dependents.  The Trump Administration is also on the verge of promulgating a new regulation that will rescind work authorization for H-4 spouses. The biometric requirement will delay the H-4 spouses ability to obtain another renewal before the H-4 regulation takes effect. It only adds insult to injury and rubs salt in the wound of those waiting in the never ending green card backlogs.

 

 

Cyrus Mehta

Don’t Always Suck Up to Buy American Hire American

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President Trump’s Buy American Hire American Executive Order (BAHA) has little relevance in an economy where the unemployment rate is 4% and the Labor Department has reported that there is a record high of 7.3 million job openings.  BAHA has however been deployed to make life harder for legal immigrants who do their best to remain in status while pursuing lawful permanent residence. They also benefit the United States as their employers need them and follow the law in filing appropriate visa applications.   For example, H-1B visa renewals that were routinely approved previously are now being denied in the name of BAHA. The USCIS has recently released new H-1B data that reflects an increase in requests for evidence and denials in 2019, again pursuant to BAHA.

BAHA aims to create higher wages and employment rates for U.S. workers, and directs the Secretaries of State, Labor, and Homeland Security, as well as the Attorney General, to issue new rules and guidance to protect the interests of U.S. workers in the administration of the immigration system. BAHA highlights the H-1B visa program and directs the agencies to ensure that H-1B visas are awarded to the most skilled and highest-paid beneficiaries. BAHA, however, is merely an executive order. It should not take precedence over the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Still, the USCIS uses BAHA as justification to refuse otherwise approvable H-1B petitions. Some of these H-1B denials are absurd. The author recently heard that the USCIS denied a petition filed on behalf of a pathologist by an established pharmaceutical company.

Following BAHA, the State Department also swiftly made changes to the Foreign Affairs Manual regarding guiding consular officials in issuing nonimmigrant H, L, O, P and E visas. The changes relating to H and L visas are reproduced below as examples:

9 FAM 402.10-2 Overview of H Visas

On April 18, 2017, the President signed the Executive Order on Buy American Hire American (E.O. 13788), intended to “create higher wages and employment rates for workers in the United States, and to protect their economic interests.”  The goal of E.O. 13788 is to protect the interests of United States workers in the administration of our immigration system, including through the prevention of fraud or abuse, and it is with this spirit in mind that cases under INA 101(a)(15)(H) must be adjudicated.

https://fam.state.gov/FAM/09FAM/09FAM040210.html

9 FAM 402.12-2 Overview of L visas

On April 18, 2017, the President signed the Executive Order on Buy American Hire American (E.O. 13788), intended to “create higher wages and employment rates for workers in the United States, and to protect their economic interests.”  The goal of E.O. 13788 is to protect the interests of United States workers in the administration of our immigration system, including through the prevention of fraud or abuse, and it is with this spirit in mind that cases under INA 101(a)(15)(L) must be adjudicated.

https://fam.state.gov/FAM/09FAM/09FAM040212.html

Based on these FAM changes, here have been several anecdotal reports of consular officers asking visa applicants as to how their employment will further BAHA by creating jobs for American workers or not depressing their wages. Some have been questioned whether their employers first tried to hire American workers even when such recruitment is not required under the specific visa. Such questioning is entirely inappropriate and not consistent with the law under which the visa petition was approved.

For example, the remuneration of an intracompany transferee on an L-1 visa can emanate from a US or a foreign source. See Matter of Pozzoli, 14 I&N Dec. 569 (RC 1974). The L visa also does not mandate a certain wage or a test of the U.S. labor market.  An E visa treaty trader or investor does not need to be paid wages. Still, under BAHA, this may be viewed as suspect if it does not create higher wages and employment rates for US workers. BAHA was not in existence when Congress created the L, E, H-1B or O visa provisions in the INA. According to the legislative history for the 1970 Act, the L-1 visa was intended to “help eliminate problems now faced by American companies having offices abroad in transferring key personnel freely within the organization.” H.R. Rep. No. 91-851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 5815 (Leg. Hist.).  There is also no indication in the plain text of INA 101(a) (15) (L) that the purpose of the L visa was to “create higher wages and employment rates for workers in the United States, and to protect their economic interests.” If Congress desired that objective in the L visa program, it would have stated so more explicitly. Indeed, Congress did speak about protecting US workers in INA 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) requiring an H-2B worker to perform temporary services or labor only “if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found in this country.” Therefore, if Congress desired the same purpose for the L or the O visa, as it did for the H-2B visa, it would have said so. Even with H-1B visas, unless an employer is a dependent employer, there is no obligation on the part of the employer to recruit for US workers. Regarding wages too, if an employer is legitimately hiring a worker for an entry level position in an H-1B specialty occupation, the employer is under no obligation under the law to pay the highest level wage.

As a result of all visa applications being viewed through the prism of BAHA, attorneys feel the need to advise their clients to answer questions of consular officials relating to BAHA. Some attorney are also indicating in H-1B and other visa petitions (both nonimmigrant and immigrant) as to how the beneficiary will further BAHA. While it may be tempting for us as attorneys to invoke BAHA as if it is a deity with magical powers, it may also lead us down a rabbit hole. Apart from not being law and only an executive order, BAHA sets no standard for the attorney to guide the client. If the attorney indicates that the H-1B worker’s entry into the US will create more jobs, there is no metric to establish this. The only metric we have under current immigration law include specific labor market tests under the permanent labor certification program, the H-2A and H-2B programs and the H-1B program for dependent employers or willful violators. These rigid criteria have not been followed in other visa petitions such as an L-1 or an H-1B (for a non-dependent employer or an employer who is not a willful violator), and they do not need to.

If a client is asked inappropriately regarding whether the position will impact American workers or not, the client should be prepared to answer that the visa petition met all the criteria under the statutory and regulatory provisions, and was approved accordingly. There is no need for the client, or the attorney, to improvise on why the applicant’s employment in the US will result in more jobs for US workers.  Advancing the client’s cause under BAHA will lead to more questions from the adjudicating official, which could be arbitrary and cannot he held up to an objective legal standard.

This is not to say that an applicant should never make a BAHA argument in his or her favor. There may be some instances where the argument in favor of BAHA is clear cut or the official asks specific questions where an answer may be readily available.  The purpose of this blog is to caution against the talismanic invocation of BAHA, when there is no metric or standard, under which an adjudicating official can be held up to. BAHA has also been used most effectively to deny immigration benefits. If an official infuses the adjudication process with BAHA, resulting in a denial, it could be grounds for appeal. Even at the consular level, which is generally immune from administrative or judicial review, a denial of a visa application based on BAHA would potentially allow the applicant to seek an advisory opinion from the Visa Office if the denial was contrary to the statutory provision.  If the applicant already conceded that the official could ask for extraneous evidence under BAHA and provided it, it may be harder to appeal such a denial. Therefore, in the opinion of this author, it is best to not always suck up to BAHA.

 

David Isaacson

Not Sure Whether to Laugh or Cry: How the Border Patrol’s Harassment of an Oregon Comedian Shows Why It Should Not Be Checking Documents Within the United States

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In late January, Oregon comedian Mohanad Elshieky was briefly detained by the Border Patrol while traveling on a Greyhound bus in Spokane, Washington.  He recounted the incident on Twitter, and it was also reported by a number of news organizations.  In summary, the agents boarded the bus at the Spokane Intermodal Bus Station and began questioning passengers about their citizenship.  When Mr. Elshieky admitted to the Border Patrol agents that he was not a U.S. citizen but informed the agents that he had been granted asylum in the United States, the agents rejected the Employment Authorization Document (EAD) and driver’s license that he offered them, and asserted that he was “illegal”.  After questioning Mr. Elshieky for roughly 20 minutes outside the bus in freezing weather, and checking by phone with supervisors, the agents finally allowed Mr. Elshieky to reboard the bus and go on his way.

The Border Patrol, attempting to justify its action, appears to have sent the following statement to several news organizations, at least one of which reproduced it in full.  I reproduce the statement below in full as well to avoid any suggestion that I am taking language out of context:

“Agents from the U.S. Border Patrol’s Spokane Station encountered an individual on Sunday at the Spokane Intermodal Bus Station who was not in possession of the immigration documents required by law.

While performing transportation checks, agents made contact with Mohanad Elshieky. Mr. Elshieky stated he was from Libya and presented the agents with an Oregon driver’s license and an Employment Authorization Card (EAD). As with anyone who needs to have their immigration status verified, Mr. Elshieky was asked to exit the bus. After the approximately 20 minutes needed to verify his status, Mr. Elshieky was allowed to board the bus and continue his travels without delay.

According to 8 USC 1304(e), all immigrants 18 years and older are required to carry immigration documents showing they are in the United States legally. Neither an EAD nor a driver’s license is considered a valid document to satisfy this law. A valid I-94, which is given to all immigrants when legally entering the United States, or paperwork showing a person is currently in the asylum process, which is given to the asylee by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, would have worked to resolve this inquiry quickly.

For decades, the U.S. Border Patrol has been performing enforcement actions away from the immediate border in direct support of border enforcement efforts and as a means of preventing trafficking, smuggling and other criminal organizations from exploiting our public and private transportation infrastructure to travel to the interior of the United States. These operations serve as a vital component of the U.S. Border Patrol’s national security efforts.

Although most Border Patrol work is conducted in the immediate border area, agents have broad law enforcement authorities and are not limited to a specific geography within the United States. They have the authority to question individuals, make arrests, and take and consider evidence. The Immigration and Nationality Act 287(a)(3) and 8 USC 1357 state that Immigration Officers, without a warrant, may “within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States…board and search for aliens in any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States and any railcar, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle.” A reasonable distance is defined by 8 CFR 287 (a)(1) as 100 air miles from the border.”

The notion that there is a comprehensive registration scheme currently in operation, which registers all aliens and requires them to carry certain documents, has been contested in an article by Professor Nancy Morawetz and Natasha Fernandez-Silber that is very much worth reading, but for present purposes we can take it as given.  The more important point here is that the Border Patrol, even in its statements to the media, appears to be unaware of what that registration scheme actually says.

The provision of law cited by the Border Patrol for the proposition that “all immigrants 18 years and older are required to carry immigration documents showing they are in the United States legally”, 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e), states that “Every alien, eighteen years of age and over, shall at all times carry with him and have in his personal possession any certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card issued to him pursuant to subsection (d).”  The referenced subsection (d), in turn, states that

Every alien in the United States who has been registered and fingerprinted under the provisions of the Alien Registration Act, 1940, or under the provisions of this chapter shall be issued a certificate of alien registration or an alien registration receipt card in such form and manner and at such time as shall be prescribed under regulations issued by the Attorney General.

8 U.S.C. § 1304(d).  The statute makes clear that its structure will be fleshed out by regulations.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 264.1 then sets out in detail what documents qualify as evidence of alien registration for purposes of the statute.  It states:

The following forms constitute evidence of registration:

Form No. and Class

I-94, Arrival-Departure Record—Aliens admitted as nonimmigrants; aliens paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; aliens whose claimed entry prior to July 1, 1924, cannot be verified, they having satisfactorily established residence in the United States since prior to July 1, 1924; and aliens granted permission to depart without the institution of deportation proceedings.

I-95, Crewmen’s Landing Permit—Crewmen arriving by vessel or aircraft.

I-184, Alien Crewman Landing Permit and Identification Card—Crewmen arriving by vessel.

I-185, Nonresident Alien Canadian Border Crossing Card—Citizens of Canada or British subjects residing in Canada.

I-186, Nonresident Alien Mexican Border Crossing Card—Citizens of Mexico residing in Mexico.

I-221, Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing—Aliens against whom deportation proceedings are being instituted.

I-221S, Order to Show Cause, Notice of Hearing, and Warrant for Arrest of Alien—Aliens against whom deportation proceedings are being instituted.

I-551, Permanent Resident Card—Lawful permanent resident of the United States.

I-766, Employment Authorization Document.

Form I-862, Notice to Appear—Aliens against whom removal proceedings are being instituted.

Form I-863, Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge—Aliens against whom removal proceedings are being instituted.

Note to paragraph (b):

In addition to the forms noted in this paragraph (b), a valid, unexpired nonimmigrant DHS admission or parole stamp in a foreign passport constitutes evidence of registration.

8 C.F.R. § 264.1(b).  (Emphasis added.)

The regulation clearly lists an “I-766, Employment Authorization Document” as a form of “evidence of alien registration.”  This is in stark contrast to the Border Patrol spokesperson’s assertion that “Neither an EAD nor a driver’s license is considered a valid document to satisfy this law.”  In fact, an EAD is indeed considered a valid document to satisfy the law—although apparently not to satisfy the Border Patrol.

The Border Patrol spokesperson’s assertion that “A valid I-94, which is given to all immigrants when legally entering the United States, or paperwork showing a person is currently in the asylum process, which is given to the asylee by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, would have worked to resolve this inquiry quickly” fares little better on close examination.  Many nonimmigrants can indeed print a Form I-94 from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) website, although paper Forms I-94 are no longer routinely issued upon entry into the United States, and one assumes that the Border Patrol did not expect Mr. Elshieky to have a printer with him.  But Mr. Elshieky’s I-94 issued upon entry to the United States, if he had had it with him, would have revealed only that he had once been a J-1 (exchange visitor) nonimmigrant, a status he no longer held—which would be of little use to the Border Patrol in their efforts to determine whether he was here legally now.  And some asylees, who initially entered without inspection but were subsequently granted asylum, would not have such an I-94 from their time of entry anyway.

What the Border Patrol spokesman presumably meant was that Mr. Elshieky should have been carrying a Form I-94 indicating his current asylum status, as opposed to his former J-1 status.  But while some asylees will indeed possess such a document, the regulations quoted above specify a Form I-94 as evidence of alien registration only for limited classes of people, and asylees are not among them:

I-94, Arrival-Departure Record—Aliens admitted as nonimmigrants; aliens paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; aliens whose claimed entry prior to July 1, 1924, cannot be verified, they having satisfactorily established residence in the United States since prior to July 1, 1924; and aliens granted permission to depart without the institution of deportation proceedings.

8 C.F.R. § 264.1(b).  Moreover, not all asylees will have a Form I-94.  It is supposed to be issued following a grant of asylum by an immigration court or by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), but this is not done contemporaneously with the grant.  The Form I-94 is issued by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) within the Department of Homeland Security, while the immigration courts and BIA are part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) located within the Department of Justice, and the government lawyers who will have the asylee’s file at the moment of the grant are part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  The issuance of an I-94 by USCIS following a grant of asylum by an immigration judge or the BIA has, from this author’s personal experience, sometimes taken months, depending on how long it takes for the relevant file to be transferred.

As for the Border Patrol spokeman’s suggestion that Mr. Elshieky ought to have presented “paperwork showing a person is currently in the asylum process, which is given to the asylee by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,” this misses the mark on two levels.  First, such paperwork is not listed in 8 C.F.R. § 264.1(b) as evidence of alien registration.  And second, Mr. Elshieky was not, and never claimed to be, “currently in the asylum process”; he correctly informed the Border Patrol that he had already been granted asylum.

The bottom line, therefore, is that the Border Patrol got the law wrong.  I would respectfully suggest that this misunderstanding by the Border Patrol, including not only the agents on the ground but the agency’s own official spokesperson, is illustrative of a broader problem.

The Border Patrol, according to its spokesperson’s statement, believes that “[a]lthough most Border Patrol work is conducted in the immediate border area, agents have broad law enforcement authorities and are not limited to a specific geography within the United States. They have the authority to question individuals, make arrests, and take and consider evidence.”  Whether or not this is correct as a description of the Border Patrol’s statutory and regulatory authority, it does not appear to be correct as a description of what they are qualified to do and should be doing.

Enforcement of U.S. immigration laws is, and historically has been, divided among multiple agency components.  Enforcement of the laws within the interior of the United States is performed by what is now ICE and used to be a component of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) within the Department of Justice.  There has been recent debate about whether to abolish ICE and return that enforcement function to within the Department of Justice, an issue beyond the scope of this blog post, but the important point here is that there has always been a component of the government performing this function which was not the Border Patrol.  Even within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), of which the Border Patrol is a component, it is the Office of Field Operations (OFO), the officers in black uniforms whom one encounters at airports and other ports of entry, who have the primary responsibility for determining whether people arriving at the borders of the United States are admissible under our complex immigration laws—not the green-uniformed Border Patrol.  And when applicants seek immigration benefits from within the United States, or the government seeks to remove them from the United States, the relevant legal determinations are generally made either by USCIS, a descendant of the former INS, within the Department of Homeland Security, or by the immigration courts and BIA in EOIR within the Department of Justice.  All of these agency components have specialized training in the nuances of immigration law, and must have it in order to perform their functions.  The Border Patrol is not in the same position.

This author would respectfully suggest that the Border Patrol’s place in the overall immigration-enforcement scheme should be limited to determining whether people who are trying to cross the border, or have very recently done so and are still very near the border, have passed (or will pass) through a port of entry for inspection, or have crossed elsewhere to avoid inspection.  In the former case, when someone passes through a port of entry, CBP OFO can analyze the details of their situation.  In the latter case, the Border Patrol can hand over recent entrants without inspection to ICE (or perhaps in the future a revamped INS) and the immigration courts, and in certain cases to USCIS asylum officers for an analysis of a claimed fear of persecution.  But when someone is not a recent border-crosser in close proximity to the border, the Border Patrol is not the agency component qualified to determine whether they are properly maintaining some status in the United States or potentially ought to be processed for removal proceedings.

This is so whether or not someone in the interior of the United States is encountered less than 100 miles from the border, as was apparently the case here.  (The Spokane bus station is evidently 90-something miles from the U.S.-Canada border in a straight line, although Google Maps suggests that actually driving from there to the border would take roughly 108 miles.)  As the American Civil Liberties Union has pointed out, roughly two-thirds of the U.S. population lives within 100 miles of some U.S. border, if one includes the water boundaries of the United States.  Operating within that 100-mile zone does not equate to only patrolling the actual border and only seeking out people who appear to have recently crossed it.  Spokane, Washington, is not on the border with Canada, and I very much doubt that the Border Patrol agents who questioned Mohanad Elshieky really thought that he had just entered from Canada without inspection.

Checking documents within the United States to enforce the immigration laws in the interior of the United States is not the Border Patrol’s job, or at least should not be.  As the case of Mohanad Elshieky illustrates, forcing the square peg of the Border Patrol into the round hole of interior enforcement can produce deeply problematic results.  The Border Patrol should stick to patrolling the border, and leave interior enforcement and legal interpretation to better-qualified agency components.

Sophia Genovese

The Trump Administration’s Lawlessness at the Border: Stories from Tijuana

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Following the law should not be a radical idea. Yet the governments of the United States and Mexico somehow find advocacy for the codified rights of asylum seekers reprehensible.

I travelled to Tijuana in mid-January to provide pro bono assistance to asylum seekers trying to present themselves at the San Ysidro Port of Entry and lawfully claim asylum. I was hosted by the Border Rights Project of Al Otro Lado, an amazing non-profit organization that provides critical legal orientations and know-your-rights trainings to asylum seekers in Tijuana, as well as documents human rights abuses against asylum-seekers by the Mexican and US authorities. Given their zealous advocacy and pursuit of justice, Al Otro Lado has become public enemy #1 in the eyes of US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Mexican Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM). But what Al Otro Lado and volunteers are fighting for, in part, is for the US and Mexican governments to follow the law – in particular, the right to seek asylum. They are met with shockingly hostile resistance.

Section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides,

Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 235(b).

INA § 208 does not limit the number of asylum seekers allowed to present at a port of entry and claim asylum on any given day. It does not allow for a waitlist for entry, which forces asylum seekers to wait in Mexico until their numbers are called. Critically, INA § 208 does not limit asylum protections to only those who present at ports of entry. Somehow, the plain meaning of INA § 208 is lost on this administration; or, it simply does not care. Regardless of intent, this administration is flagrantly violating the law by preventing asylum seekers from lawfully claiming asylum and sentencing them to death in the process.

I have previously blogged about the various ways in which the Trump administration has eroded the rights of asylum seekers and has made it increasingly difficult for these folks to access justice once already in the US. The Trump administration has now taken aim at asylum seekers even before they reach the US in an attempt to prevent them from asserting their rights through its illegal metering tactics and the recent rollout of the Migrant Protection Protocol.

Illegal Turn Back Policy and the Metering of Asylum Seekers

Since at least the summer of 2016, CBP has consistently violated INA § 208 by turning back asylum seekers who lawfully present themselves at ports of entry and claim asylum. CBP officers regularly tell asylum seekers that “Donald Trump just signed new laws saying there is no asylum for anyone” or that they will be separated from their children if they claim asylum, and even coerce asylum-seekers into signing documents stating that they do not have a fear of returning to their home country. CBP has attempted to justify such unlawful conduct by claiming that there is not enough room to process all of the asylum seekers who present at a port of entry on any given day.

As a result of the illegal turn back policy, asylum-seekers are forced to remain in Mexico while they await the opportunity to access basic asylum procedures. In Tijuana and several other ports of entry, this has resulted in an unlawful metering list (referred to as la lista), where asylum seekers and their families take a number and wait to be called before they may access the port of entry. Although asylum-seekers themselves are the ones responsible for giving out numbers to newly arrived asylum-seekers, la lista is actually managed by Grupos Beta (the so-called ‘humanitarian division’ of the Mexican INM) at the direction of US CBP. Each morning, CBP officials convey to Mexican INM how many asylum seekers they will accept that day. Mexican INM then relays this information to the asylum seeker tasked with running la lista, who then relays the numbers to asylum seekers anxiously awaiting their opportunity to claim asylum. Asylum seekers whose numbers are called line up at El Chaparral border crossing, but are then transported via van to a different port of entry several miles away.

It is important to note that unaccompanied minors are not allowed on la lista, thus leaving them to languish in Tijuana where they are at severe risk of exploitation and violence. Although not officially confirmed, one can infer that CBP does not wish to accept UACs because they are entitled to additional protections under the law. One can also infer that CBP conveys this desire to the Mexican INM who then conveys this to the list-keepers to not allow UACs on la lista. As a result, UACs are systemically blocked from accessing US asylum procedures, and are forced to age out while in Mexico before they are allowed to present at the port of entry. Once in the US, they will be treated as adults and entitled to fewer protections, despite their heightened vulnerability.

Illegal Metering in Practice: A Typical Morning at El Chaparral

Each morning at 7:00am, Al Otro Lado staff and volunteers arrive at El Chaparral to welcome newly arrived asylum seekers and to let them know that we are here to help them navigate the confusing US asylum process. We let them know about the organization’s daily Know Your Rights trainings and legal clinics, medical assistance, and free food and water.

The second half of the morning, Al Otro Lado volunteers turn their attention to asylum seekers whose numbers are called off of la lista and who will be allowed to present at the port of entry and claim asylum. During my stay in Tijuana, CBP allowed in anywhere from 15 to 60 people on any given morning – a shockingly low number given that San Ysidro port of entry is one of the largest and busiest land border crossings in the world which processes over 70,000 vehicles and 20,000 pedestrians per day. For about an hour before the asylum seekers are transported to the port of entry, volunteers scramble to provide last minute Credible Fear Interview (CFI) preparation for those asylum seekers whose numbers are called. We also told folks to dress in their warmest layer on the bottom because they are only permitted one layer of clothing once they are processed by CBP. All other clothing will be confiscated. This is despite the fact that asylum seekers are held for weeks on end in freezing hieleras. We also told the asylum seekers to write the phone numbers of friends or family in the US on their bodies because all of their documents will be taken from them. We told mothers with their children that we could not guarantee that they wouldn’t be separated. One mother had a teenage daughter with autism. She wanted to know what would happen to her if they were separated. We couldn’t provide her with any guarantee that the US government would comply with the law and provide her daughter with the heightened care she was entitled to. Around 9:30am, the first vans took off to the port of entry. Volunteers were hopeful that each asylum seeker would be okay, but we will never know for sure what happens to them once they are processed by CBP.

The US government’s metering practices and endorsement of la lista are unlawful. Under both US and international law, when someone expresses a fear of returning to their country of origin, the US is obligated to provide that person with an opportunity to seek protection. The US is in flagrant violation of their international and domestic obligations by refusing admission to asylum seekers who lawfully present at ports of entry, whether they turn back those asylum seekers who make it to the port of entry, through their endorsement of la lista, or the wholesale ban on admission of UACs.

Given their on-the-ground knowledge of what the US and Mexican governments are perpetrating, Al Otro Lado, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the American Immigration Council filed suit to challenge the US government’s unlawful metering practice in Al Otro Lado, Inc., et al. v. Kirstjen Nielsen, et al. The complaint explains that CBP has utilized various tactics to deny asylum seekers access to protection through “misrepresentations, threats and intimidation, verbal abuse and physical force, and coercion.” Id. at 1. It argues that such tactics have deprived asylum seekers of their “statutory and regulatory rights to apply for asylum, violated their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment […], and violated the United States’ obligations under international law to uphold the principle of non-refoulement.” Id. at 2. In particular, CBP has violated its statutory duty to inspect all noncitizens who arrive at ports of entry under INA § 235(a)(3), which provides “all aliens (including alien crewmen) who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States shall be inspected by immigration officers.” INA § 235(a)(3) is not discretionary; thus, when CBP refuses to refer an asylum seeker to a CFI or to place them in proceedings, they are in violation of INA § 235(a)(3), as well as in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for failure to comply with mandatory asylum procedures. On August 20, 2018, the court denied in part and granted in part the government’s motion to dismiss, allowing the majority of Al Otro Lado’s claims to go forward.

What Happens Next?

Against this backdrop, the Trump Administration has also recently carried out its inaccurately named Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), which will force asylum seekers to remain in Mexico while they adjudicate their claims in immigration court. Under the plan, asylum seekers will be given a Notice to Appear (NTA) for an immigration hearing and returned to Mexico while awaiting their hearing. However, the NTA may or may not actually list an actual court date, forcing asylum seekers to constantly check the EOIR hotline to know when their hearing will actually be. When the court date arrives, the onus is on asylum seekers to arrive at the port of entry in order to be escorted to their immigration hearing. UACs (if they can actually access the port of entry), Mexican nationals, and other undefined vulnerable individuals will not be subject to the MPP.

Under the Policy Memorandum, in order to not be returned to Mexico, one must show that he or she “would more likely than not be persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion […] or would more likely than not be tortured.” As a reminder, in order to demonstrate a credible fear of persecution, one must only show a significant possibility of eligibility for asylum. 8 CFR § 208.30(e)(2). To be eligible for asylum, one must only show that there is a one-in-ten probability of being persecuted in order to demonstrate that such fear is “well-founded.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 431 (1987) (“That the fear must be ‘well-founded’ does not alter the obvious focus on the individual’s subjective beliefs, nor does it transform the standard into a “more likely than not” one. One can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place”). When individuals are ineligible for asylum, they can alternatively show eligibility for withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), by initially demonstrating a reasonable fear of being tortured. 8 CFR § 208.31(c).  Withholding of removal and protection under CAT require the applicant demonstrate that “it is more likely than not” that he or she will suffer harm upon return. 8 CFR § 208.17 (Deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture); see also 8 CFR § 208.16(b)(2) (Withholding of removal). Thus, under the MPP, an applicant is subject to a higher standard of proof than they would be subject to in regular credible or reasonable fear interviews, a higher standard of proof than they would be subject to in asylum proceedings, and the same standard of proof if they were in withholding proceedings. Critically, in its Policy Memorandum, USCIS explicitly states that it is “unable to provide access to counsel during the assessments” because of supposed capacity issues and the need for “efficient processing.” Such a high burden and denial of access to counsel makes it entirely certain that asylum-seekers will be forced to remain in Mexico pending their hearings.

When the US was previously considering a safe third country agreement with Mexico (where an asylum seeker would be denied the ability to seek refuge in the US if they first travelled through Mexico), I explained the numerous reasons why Mexico is not a safe third country and how such an agreement would violate the United States’ obligations of non-refoulement. These same arguments are applicable to the MPP because the plan will continue to put asylum seekers in grave danger while awaiting refuge in the US. In particular, as reported by Human Rights First and Amnesty International, asylum seekers are in extreme danger of kidnapping, murder, rape, trafficking, and other crimes by INM officers and civilians. If they are women, children, indigenous, LGBT, or a member of any other minority group, they are especially vulnerable. Forcing asylum seekers to remain in Mexico while they await their court date is also arguably a violation of non-refoulement, which requires that no State, including the US, “shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened.” Given the numerous reports of violence against asylum seekers in Mexico, it is clear that their life and freedom would be threatened.

The numerous assaults on asylum seekers by the Trump administration must be met with sharp rebuke by immigration advocates. Driven by xenophobia, Trump’s anti-asylum policies are not only morally objectionable, but expressly unlawful under US and international law. Although it will continue to be an uphill battle over the next few years, advocates must continue to support the incredible work of organizations like Al Otro Lado, who continue to be on the frontlines of the battle at the border. If we have learned anything over the past several years, it is that immigration advocates, backed by the power of the courts, will continue to uphold the law by ensuring that we provide safety and refuge to those fleeing persecution.